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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Alexis Duque on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Alexis Duque on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Alexis Duque on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Summing-up the ACM MSWIM Conference]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@alexisduque/summing-up-the-acm-mswim-conference-c3be883ff5e0?source=rss-e5b52382352f------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[conference]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[performance-evaluation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[acm]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[research]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[wireless]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Alexis Duque]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 06 Dec 2019 07:55:08 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-12-11T12:06:53.903Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*FCSKnFqaDGeQU62B.png" /></figure><p>From November 25th to 29th, I attended the <a href="http://mswimconf.com/2019/">ACM MSWiM conference</a>, that took place in Miami Beach, Florida, USA, to present our full paper on <em>“Performance Evaluation of LED-to-Camera Communication</em>”, co-authored with Razvan Stanica, Hervé Rivano, and Adrien Desportes.</p><p>During the conference, I introduced our work on the modeling and simulation of LED-to-Camera communications by presenting <a href="https://github.com/vlc-citi-lab/camcomsim">CamComSim</a>, the first simulator in this area. This work has been included in the conference proceedings and the presentation slides are available on my <a href="https://speakerdeck.com/alexisduque/performance-evaluation-of-led-to-camera-communications">speakerdeck</a>.</p><p>This also allowed me to attend interesting paper presentations, during the main conference, as well as the collocated workshops, <a href="http://www-entel.upc.edu/monica.aguilar/PEWASUN2019">PE-WASUN</a> &amp; <a href="http://symposium.nsercdiva.com/2019/">DIVANET</a>, and symposia: <a href="http://q2swinet.com/2019/">Q2SWinet</a> &amp; <a href="http://mobiwac-symposium.org/2019/">MobiWac</a>.</p><p>Among them, the<strong> 6 following presentations</strong> particularly interest me. Note that this selection is unfair and highly influenced by my fields of interest😀</p><p><a href="https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=3355931"><strong>HiPR: High-Precision UWB Ranging for Sensor Networks</strong></a><strong>.</strong> <em>Daniel Neuhold (Alpen Adria Universität, Austria); Christian Bettstetter (University of Klagenfurt, Austria); Andreas Molisch (University of Southern California, USA)</em></p><p>The author presented his work on improving the state of the art precision of UWB localization using the Decawave module. His approach leverage time-of-arrival measurements with the double-sided two-way ranging (DS-TWR). His technique is about 30 times faster than Decawave’s out-of-the-box solution and improves the precision by one order of magnitude.</p><p><a href="https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=3355908"><strong>ns-3 meets OpenAI Gym: The Playground for Machine Learning in Networking Research</strong></a><strong>. </strong><em>Piotr Gawłowicz and Anatolij Zubow (Technische Universität Berlin, Germany)</em></p><p>The speaker introduced <a href="https://github.com/tkn-tub/ns3-gym">ns3-gym</a>: an ns-3 module that relies on <a href="https://gym.openai.com/">OpenAI Gym</a> to add Reinforcement Learning capabilities to the widely used network simulator ns-3.</p><p><a href="https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=3356736"><strong>Fingerprinting using Fine Timing Measurement</strong></a>. <em>Nicolas Montavont (Institut Mines Telecom / IMT Atlantique, France); Jerome Henry (Cisco, USA)</em></p><p>J.Henry started its presentation by introducing the time-of-flight based ranging mechanism defined in 802.11–2016, called FTM. He then showed that simple FTM frame observations by a passive sniffer can easily allow for individual chipset identification. He leverages machine learning with LSTM to recognize individual machines performing FTM exchanges, even when these machines implement the same chipset or the same hardware platform. He concluded by proposing several ways to mitigate individual device patterning based on FTM exchange observation.</p><p><a href="https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=3355921"><strong>Simulation and Performance Evaluation of the Intel Rate Adaption Algorithm</strong></a><strong>.</strong> <em>Rémy Grünblatt (Université de Lyon, France); Isabelle Guérin Lassous (Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 — LIP, France); Olivier Simonin (INSA Lyon, France)</em></p><p>Remy described the Wifi rate adaptation algorithm implemented in the Intel IwlWifi Linux Driver, called Iwl-Mvm-Rs. He has reverse-engineered it relying on the Iwl-Mvm-Rs open-source implementation. He then summed-up the different mechanisms used to obtain the best throughput according to the network conditions and integrated the Iwl-Mvm-Rs algorithm in the ns-3 simulator. Thanks to this implementation, he presented the performance of Iwl-Mvm-Rs and compare them with the ones of Minstrel-HT and IdealWifi, also implemented in the ns-3 simulator.</p><p><a href="https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=3355934"><strong>Evaluation of LoRaWAN Transmission Range for Wireless Sensor Networks in Riparian Forests</strong></a><strong>.</strong> <em>Fabian Astudillo-Salinas, Andres Vazquez-Rodas, Pablo E Avila and Alcides Araujo (University of Cuenca, Ecuador)</em></p><p>The author proposed an empirical study of LoRa with LoRaWAN transmission range in riparian forests, based on path-loss modeling, using both received signal strength indicator (RSSI) and signal-to-noise-ratio (SNR). The measurement conducted in the riparian forest of three local rivers at urban, semi-urban, and rural environments gives the following insight: there is a significant distribution difference among measurement places, a high correlation between two banks of the same river, a higher standard deviation in urban measurements and a larger coverage in rural areas.</p><p><a href="https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=3355907"><strong>Benchmarking the Physical Layer of Wireless Cards using Software-Defined Radios</strong></a><strong><em>.</em></strong><em> Liangxiao Xin, Johannes K Becker, Stefan Gvozdenovic and David Starobinski (Boston University, USA)</em></p><p>Johannes introduced a new testbed architecture for software-defined radio (SDR) wireless device performance benchmarking. The testbed is capable of accessing and measuring physical layer protocol features of real wireless and IoT devices. The testbed allows tight control of timing events, at a microsecond time granularity. Using the testbed, he showed marked differences in the performance of Wifi devices, including a variation of the receiver sensitivity.</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://rtone.fr/en/acm-mswim-conference-performance-evaluation-of-led-to-camera-communication/"><em>https://rtone.fr</em></a><em> on December 6, 2019.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c3be883ff5e0" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Retour sur la conférence Linux Foundation Open Source Summit & Embedded Linux Conference Europe…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@alexisduque/retour-sur-la-conf%C3%A9rence-linux-foundation-open-source-summit-embedded-linux-conference-europe-7897389dcdd6?source=rss-e5b52382352f------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[embedded-systems]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[open-source]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[linux-foundation]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Alexis Duque]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 13 Nov 2019 15:11:54 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-12-01T09:06:34.053Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Retour sur la conférence Linux Foundation Open Source Summit &amp; Embedded Linux Conference Europe 2019</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*ypUSSy9nOkMAtkgo.jpg" /></figure><p>Du 28 au 31 octobre, avait lieu l’édition 2019 de l’ <a href="https://events19.linuxfoundation.org/events/open-source-summit-europe-2019/">Open Source Summit et l’Embedded Linux Conference Europe</a> qui se tenait cette année à la Cité Internationale de Lyon. J’y participais également en tant que speaker le mardi, pour présenter un <a href="https://speakerdeck.com/alexisduque/lilliput-ae-a-new-lightweight-authenticated-encryption-block-cipher-for-iot">algorithme de cryptographie légère, LILLIPUT-AE</a>, qui est le le résultat de travaux de recherche en <strong>cybersécurité</strong> pour l’IoT dans le cadre du projet <a href="https://paclido.fr/">PACLIDO</a> : Protocoles et Algorithmes de Chiffrement Légers pour L’Internet Des Objets.</p><p>Cet événement bi-annuel, avec une édition nord-américaine et européenne, rassemble les communautés du monde Open-Source et Linux embarqué pour partager des présentations techniques et échanger lors de nombreuses sessions de networking. Je vous propose donc une petite sélection des conférences qui m’ont le plus intéressées avant de terminer par mon ressenti global sur cet événement. Dans tous les cas, une majorité des présentations ont été filmées. Vous pouvez retrouver ces vidéos ici : <a href="https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLbzoR-pLrL6rF8E5yyknJzrVQaHeYszTR">Linux Security Summit 2019, Lyon</a> &amp; <a href="https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLbzoR-pLrL6pamOj4UifcMJf560Ph6mJp">Open Source Summit &amp; Embedded Linux Conference EU 2019, Lyon</a>. Les slides des présentations sont également en ligne.</p><p>Comme de nombreuses conférences, les journées ont commencé par 2h30 de keynotes non techniques avec des speakers de renom comme <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H8Gd9t7FQqI&amp;list=PLbzoR-pLrL6pamOj4UifcMJf560Ph6mJp&amp;index=9&amp;t=0s">Linus Torvald, créateur de Linux et Git</a>, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZzLrU1NAShM&amp;list=PLbzoR-pLrL6pamOj4UifcMJf560Ph6mJp&amp;index=16">Ricardo de Sa Earp, Vice Président de STMicroelectronics</a>, ou encore Erica Brescia, COO de Github. Même si l’intérêt technique est limité, j’apprécie toujours l’aisance des speakers à réaliser ce type de show dans un amphithéâtre de 5000 places. Je retiendrai néanmoins l’annonce de KernelCI, projet que je ne connaissais pas, qui rejoint la Linux Fondation ainsi que la <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LOii0t2fdlI&amp;list=PLbzoR-pLrL6pamOj4UifcMJf560Ph6mJp&amp;index=13">conférence sur DevSecOps d’Yvonne Wassenaar</a>.</p><p>Au niveau des talks techniques, difficile de choisir étant donné la variété et le nombre de sessions en parallèle. J’ai donc assisté principalement à l’OpenIoT Summit. Voici celles qui m’ont le plus intéressées :</p><ul><li><a href="https://osseu19.sched.com/event/TLBO/bluetooth-mesh-and-zephyr-martin-woolley-bluetooth-sig">Bluetooth Mesh and Zephyr — Martin Woolley</a></li><li><a href="https://osseu19.sched.com/event/TLBO/bluetooth-mesh-and-zephyr-martin-woolley-bluetooth-sig">Bluetooth SIG </a><a href="https://osseu19.sched.com/event/TLBX/location-services-and-direction-finding-with-bluetooth-martin-woolley-bluetooth-sig">Location Services and Direction Finding with Bluetooth — Martin Woolley, Bluetooth SIG</a></li><li><a href="https://osseu19.sched.com/event/TLCJ/distributed-ml-on-unikernels-for-iot-hiroshi-doyu-ericsson">Distributed ML on Unikernels for IoT — Hiroshi Doyu, Ericsson</a></li><li><a href="https://osseu19.sched.com/event/TLJc/ubers-journey-to-scalable-container-builds-antoine-pourchet-uber-technologies">Uber’s Journey to Scalable Container Builds — Antoine Pourchet, Uber Technologies</a></li><li><a href="https://osseu19.sched.com/event/TLG8/introduction-to-the-u-boot-bootloader-marek-vasut-software-engineer-limited-seating-first-come-first-served-basis">Introduction to the U-Boot Bootloader — Marek Vasut, Software Enginee</a>r</li><li><a href="https://osseu19.sched.com/event/TLIz">Using Kubeflow Pipelines for Building Machine Learning Pipelines — Yufeng Guo, Google </a><a href="https://osseu19.sched.com/event/TLKd/security-101-for-cloud-native-applications-cindy-blake-gitlab">Security</a></li><li><a href="https://osseu19.sched.com/event/TLKd/security-101-for-cloud-native-applications-cindy-blake-gitlab">101 for Cloud-native Applications — Cindy Blake, GitLab</a></li><li><a href="https://osseu19.sched.com/event/TLKv/natural-language-processing-with-deep-learning-and-tensorflow-barbara-fusinska-google">Natural Language Processing with Deep Learning and TensorFlow — Barbara Fusinska, Google</a></li><li><a href="https://osseu19.sched.com/event/TLJo/just-deploy-it-how-to-ship-your-ml-model-to-production-marianna-diachuk-women-who-code-kyiv">Just Deploy It! How to Ship Your ML Model to Production — Marianna Diachuk, Women Who Code Kyiv</a></li><li><a href="https://osseu19.sched.com/event/TLF4/writing-your-own-gadget-with-zephyr-os-andrei-emeltchenko-intel">Writing Your Own Gadget with Zephyr OS — Andrei Emeltchenko, Intel</a></li><li><a href="https://osseu19.sched.com/event/TLKa/building-a-debug-probe-with-the-zephyr-rtos-johann-fischer-phytec-messtechnik-gmbh-germany">Building a Debug Probe with the Zephyr RTOS — Johann Fischer, PHYTEC Messtechnik GmbH, Germany</a></li></ul><p>La semaine s’est terminée par les <em>co-located events </em>les jeudi et vendredi, notamment sur Yocto, Zephyr ou le Linux Security Summit auquel j’ai participé. Et je n’ai vraiment pas été déçu des présentations ! Le contenu, très pointu était particulièrement intéressant, avec des speakers experts comme Jann Horn, de l’équipe Project Zero de Google, dont j’ai particulièrement apprécié la présentation sur <a href="https://lsseu2019.sched.com/event/TynD/exploiting-race-conditions-using-the-scheduler-jann-horn-google?iframe=no&amp;w=100%&amp;sidebar=yes&amp;bg=no">l’exploitation de <em>races conditions</em> dans le noyau Linux</a>. Il en est de même pour le talk de KP Singh sur le <a href="https://lsseu2019.sched.com/event/Tyn7/kernel-runtime-security-instrumentation-kp-singh-google?iframe=no&amp;w=100%&amp;sidebar=yes&amp;bg=no#">Kernel Runtime Security Instrumentation (KRSI) et ses alternatives (comme kprobe associé à eBPF)</a>. Autre conférence très intéressante : <a href="https://lsseu2019.sched.com/event/Tyn1/the-linux-crypto-api-ard-biesheuvel-arm-ltd">The Linux Crypto API, par Ard Biesheuvel de ARM Ltd. </a>Les sessions ont été filmées.</p><p>Mon ressenti de <em>first-time attendee </em>sur ces 4 jours est l’état l’esprit Open Source, Open Minded, qui est omniprésent et qui parfois manque dans certaines conférences et dans la tech en général. Il était par exemple possible d’indiquer sur son badge si l’on est ouvert aux rencontres, ou si l’on souhaite être photographié ou non. Une attention particulière est accordée à toutes les diversités, un dîner pour les membres de communautés sous-représentées était organisé, de nombreuses sessions de mentoring par des membres de la Linux Foundation, ainsi qu’un petit-déjeuner en début de semaine pour les personnes assistant pour la première fois à l’événement.</p><p>En résumé, une conférence très intéressante pour toutes les personnes proches de l’open source, idéale pour découvrir de nouveaux sujets mais dont le format des présentations relativement court m’a parfois laissé un peu sur ma faim. Mon coup de cœur personnel revient au Linux Security Summit dont les présentations m’ont particulièrement intéressées.</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://rtone.fr/conference-linux-opensource-lyon/"><em>https://rtone.fr</em></a><em> on November 13, 2019.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=7897389dcdd6" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Retour sur la journée INSHack 2019 sur la sécurité IoT]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/rtone-iot-security/retour-sur-la-journ%C3%A9e-inshack-2019-sur-la-s%C3%A9curit%C3%A9-iot-2e283eb5c536?source=rss-e5b52382352f------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[conference]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Alexis Duque]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 23 May 2019 13:07:32 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-06-08T15:15:22.017Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*6XTT51kb11ikxk_ZgI85bw.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://inshack.insecurity-insa.fr/">https://inshack.insecurity-insa.fr/</a></figcaption></figure><h3>Conférence n°1 : Etat de l’art et méthodologie de l’analyse de la sécurité IoT</h3><p><em>présentée par AlgoSecure</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/300/0*V5wE8N-bzHZ8JGfX.png" /></figure><p>L’Internet des Objets (IoT) est un domaine en pleine explosion et on estime à plusieurs milliards le nombre d’objets connectés à internet dans les prochaines années. Malheureusement dans cette course pour le marché de l’IoT, la plupart des entreprises et constructeurs en oublient (sciemment ou non) d’inclure la partie sécurité.</p><p>Évidemment cela pose un problème, car beaucoup de ces objets connectés fonctionnent en collectant les données de l’utilisateur, et en l’absence de sécurité, ces données peuvent être récupérées par un attaquant. Mais le problème peut être encore plus grave lorsque ces objets ont un impact physique comme par exemple dans le cas d’un pacemaker.</p><p>Le domaine de l’IoT manque encore cruellement de maturité et reproduit les mêmes erreurs que lors du développement de l’internet “classique”.</p><p>D’un point de vue sécurité et plus globalement, on distingue 3 acteurs appartenant à l’écosystème de l’IoT :</p><ul><li>Les fabricants qui, par nature, ont toutes les informations sur leur produit en main et qui peuvent donc introduire la sécurité pendant la phase de développement.</li><li>Les autorités publiques, qui n’ont pas accès à toutes les informations sur les produits, mais qui peuvent mettre en place des standards à suivre qui incluent la sécurité.</li><li>Et les utilisateurs finaux, qui n’ont accès à aucune information sur le produit.</li></ul><p>Afin de tester la sécurité d’un produit IoT, on vient se mettre à la place de l’utilisateur final (sans informations) et on va analyser le fonctionnement du produit et essayer de trouver des vulnérabilités afin de pouvoir dresser un bilan du niveau de sécurité.</p><p>C’est ce que l’on appelle le pentest en anglais (test d’intrusion).</p><p>Cette phase de pentest est rendue difficile car plusieurs contraintes sont inhérentes à ce domaine : l’hétérogénéité des objets, leur mobilité, la distributivité et la scalabilité.</p><p>La principale difficulté vient de l’hétérogénéité des objets. Dans un même réseau IoT plusieurs objets différents peuvent communiquer entre eux en utilisant différents supports et protocoles de communication. Cela demande donc l’utilisation de différents outils d’analyse pour chaque protocole utilisé et cela rend difficile la visualisation des échanges et interactions entre les différents objets.</p><p>Leur approche est la suivante : récolter toutes les informations des communications via des sondes et transformer ces informations dans un format générique.</p><p>Une fois cette étape effectuée, il faut maintenant pouvoir modéliser et visualiser ces interactions. Cela se déroule sous forme de graphes en 4 étapes.</p><p>Le premier graphe représente les communications directes entre des équipements (liaison point à point).</p><p>Le deuxième graphe modélise les interactions de bout en bout (end-to-end). Par exemple il permet de visualiser l’interaction entre un capteur et un actionneur en faisant abstraction des différents intermédiaires.</p><p>Le troisième graphe utilise les graphes de la phase 2 et permet de les regrouper par “application” tout en déterminant le type d’objet (capteur, actionneur, …)</p><p>Le dernier graphe utilise des “motifs” qui permettent de déterminer les interactions précises et flux logiques entre les différents objets.</p><p>Cette approche générique permet l’abstraction des protocoles de communication utilisés tout en offrant la possibilité de visualiser les interactions entre objets. Elle est particulièrement efficace dans le cas d’un système IoT complexe faisant interagir différents objets.</p><p>Cet outil facilite grandement l’analyse de la sécurité d’un réseau IoT en offrant une visualisation claire des interactions et en regroupant les différents outils d’analyse spécifiques à tel ou tel protocole de communication.</p><p><em>AlgoSecure</em> prévoit de rendre public et open-source cet outil en fin d’année 2019.</p><h3>Conférence n°2 : Analyse d’une attaque du malware industriel Triton</h3><p><em>présenté par Sentryo</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*zUXZM9P0opQB9FmKBfkgdQ.png" /></figure><p>Un réseau industriel est un réseau informatique qui permet la communication entre différents équipements industriels au sein d’une usine. Ce type de réseau diffère d’un réseau classique de par ses contraintes liées à son environnement, à son utilisation et aux impacts en cas de défaillance.</p><p>Le système global est appelé <em>système de contrôle industriel </em>(ICS) et est composé de plusieurs parties :</p><ul><li>d’automates programmables (PLC) qui lisent des informations depuis des capteurs et effectuent des actions en conséquence,</li><li>de systèmes de contrôle et d’acquisition de données (SCADA) permettant le regroupement et la visualisation des différentes informations pour l’opérateur de contrôle,</li><li>d’une station d’ingénierie permettant la programmation et reprogrammation d’un PLC,</li><li>de systèmes instrumentés de sécurité (SIS), systèmes autonomes qui surveillent le processus physique afin d’assurer la sécurité et la sûreté de fonctionnement.</li></ul><p>Ces différents équipements industriels communiquent entre eux grâce à des protocoles de communication qui peuvent être ouverts à tous (ex : modbus) ou alors propriétaire (ex : S7 de Siemens). De plus, la plupart du temps, le réseau sur lequel communiquent ces équipements est relié via une passerelle au réseau classique de l’entreprise.</p><p>Maintenant que nous savons un peu mieux ce qu’est un système industriel, nous pouvons passer à l’analyse du malware Triton.</p><p>Le malware Triton est un malware qui vise un modèle particulier de SIS, le Triconex MP30008 commercialisé par Schneider Electric. L’usine ciblée est une usine de pétrochimie localisée en Arabie Saoudite.</p><p>L’attaque s’est déroulée en 3 étapes. La première est une intrusion dans le réseau classique de l’usine pour, dans un deuxième temps, compromettre la station d’ingénierie permettant la reprogrammation des automates. La dernière étape est la reprogrammation du SIS ciblé afin d’y injecter une backdoor, ce qui permettra aux attaquants de lancer des commandes à distance.</p><p>La partie intéressante de cette attaque se trouve entre la station d’ingénierie et le SIS. En effet, afin de communiquer entre eux ils utilisent un protocole appelé <em>Tristation</em>.</p><p>La malware exécuté sur la station d’ingénierie, qui a pour but de reprogrammer le SIS, s’appelle <em>trilog.exe</em>. Ce nom a été choisi afin d’échapper au filtrage des processus sur leur nom. Une fois exécuté, il scanne le réseau dans le but de trouver un SIS vulnérable, s’y connecte, vérifie qu’il peut lire et écrire dans la mémoire, récupère la table des programmes présents dans l’automate. Puis, il injecte le programme malveillant permettant l’exécution de commandes à distance.</p><p>Le protocole utilisé pour la communication entre la station d’ingénierie et le SIS s’appelle <em>Tristation</em> et, est un protocole propriétaire, ce qui en rend l’utilisation très difficile pour toute personne n’ayant pas accès aux spécifications.</p><p><strong>Comment les attaquants ont-ils pu utiliser le protocole <em>Tristation</em> ?</strong></p><ul><li>Soit ils se sont basés sur des papiers existants qui ont déjà analysé ce protocole.</li><li>Soit ils ont eu accès à du matériel de développement et ont pu analyser les librairies utilisées pour effectuer la rétro ingénierie du protocole.</li></ul><p>Via ce protocole, les attaquants ont ainsi pu injecter une backdoor.</p><p>Cette backdoor utilise une vulnérabilité encore inconnue à cette époque (“zero day”) afin de pouvoir s’exécuter en mode superviseur et ainsi être résistante à toute reprogrammation du SIS.</p><p>Pour communiquer avec la backdoor, les attaquants se sont servis d’une commande réseau très rarement utilisée qui répondait à leurs ordres seulement lorsqu’un paramètre précis était passé à cette commande.</p><p>Les attaquants ont effectué une première tentative d’attaque via cette backdoor, mais ont dû effectuer une erreur dans la commande passée, ce qui a fait buguer le SIS. Le problème a été attribué à une défaillance du SIS et l’attaque n’a donc pas été détectée.</p><p>Ils ont par la suite effectué une deuxième tentative mais là encore, l’attaque ne s’est pas déroulée comme prévu et cette fois elle a pu être détectée par les ingénieurs dépêchés sur place.</p><p>Plus de peur que de mal donc dans cette attaque qui n’a pas eu de réelles conséquences, mais cela pose un sérieux problème au vu de la criticité des impacts et conséquences potentielles dans le cadre industriel.</p><p>Il paraît important de se poser la question de l’efficacité de la sécurité par l’obscurité (protocole propriétaire) au vu de ce genre d’attaque.</p><h3>Conférence n°3 : Sécurité d’un réseau IoT</h3><p><em>présenté par Sogeti</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/312/1*obkZYnRaocTMD8FOcT9vUA.png" /></figure><p>Nous l’avons déjà évoqué dans la conférence n°1, la course au marché de l’IoT engendre des produit développés dans la précipitation et sans ajout de couche de sécurité. C’est encore plus vrai pour les produits grand public d’origine chinoise. Ceux-ci sont connus pour être très peu sécurisés et être vulnérables à des attaques des plus basiques.</p><p>Les exemples les plus connus sont les caméras IP, qui ont servi à plusieurs reprises dans des attaques par dénis de service.</p><p>C’est sur une de ces caméras, la VstarCam, que nous allons nous attarder.</p><p>Après une rapide recherche sur internet via des outils comme <em>Shodan</em>, on s’aperçoit qu’il existe à peu près 1500 caméras de cette marque directement connectées à internet (beaucoup plus, de manière indirecte).</p><p>La caméra est utilisable via une application mobile, on peut alors piloter la caméra, prendre des photos, récupérer des fichiers vidéo, etc. Il paraît alors logique que la sécurité est primordiale dans ce cas d’utilisation. Et pourtant nous allons voir que ce n’est pas cas.</p><p>La première partie de l’analyse se concentre sur l’application mobile. On va tout d’abord récupérer cette application et l’analyser via différents outils. Il en ressort un niveau de sécurité faible et cela nous permet de récupérer des informations sur les serveurs avec lesquelles communique l’application. Il apparaît également que ces serveurs sont uniquement un relai entre l’application et la caméra, ce qui signifie que l’authentification via mot de passe est réalisée directement par la caméra.</p><p>On va maintenant se placer sur le réseau entre l’application et la caméra afin de récupérer les paquets qui sont échangés. On remarque tout d’abord que le protocole utilisé est simplement un protocole propriétaire qui encapsule des requêtes HTTP classiques. De plus, ces requêtes HTTP ne sont pas chiffrées, donc lorsqu’on se connecte à la caméra, l’identifiant et le mot de passe utilisés sont transmis en clair.</p><p>Cela est déjà largement suffisant pour effectuer une attaque sur cette caméra, mais le manque de sécurité ne s’arrête pas là.</p><p>En effet, les caméras sont identifiées par un numéro de série unique, et ce numéro est également transmis en clair dans la requête. De ces caméras ont des vulnérabilités connues qui permettent, en connaissance de son numéro ID, de pouvoir récupérer directement les identifiants stockés sur la caméra, de pouvoir récupérer les fichiers vidéos via une injection de commande sur le serveur FTP, ou encore de se connecter sur son serveur telnet avec des identifiants par défaut.</p><p>Toutes ces vulnérabilités offrent beaucoup de possibilités à un attaquant. Il peut récupérer les identifiants et se connecter à la caméra. Il peut également se faire passer pour la caméra et envoyer de fausses informations à l’utilisateur. On imagine facilement un scénario où l’attaquant se fait passer pour la caméra et envoie une ancienne vidéo à l’utilisateur qui pense alors que tout est normal.</p><p>Ce genre de vulnérabilités n’est pas spécifique aux caméras VstarCam et se généralise à beaucoup de caméra IP chinoises, mais pas seulement.</p><p>Il convient donc, pour quiconque souhaitant faire l’acquisition de ce genre de produit, d’apporter un soin tout particulier quant au choix du produit.</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://rtone.fr/securite-iot-retour-sur-la-journee-inshack-2019/"><em>https://rtone.fr</em></a><em> on May 23, 2019.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2e283eb5c536" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/rtone-iot-security/retour-sur-la-journ%C3%A9e-inshack-2019-sur-la-s%C3%A9curit%C3%A9-iot-2e283eb5c536">Retour sur la journée INSHack 2019 sur la sécurité IoT</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/rtone-iot-security">Rtone IoT Security</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Mobile World Congress 2019 from an IoT Maker Perspective]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@alexisduque/mobile-world-congress-2019-from-an-iot-maker-perspective-87479c6c469c?source=rss-e5b52382352f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/87479c6c469c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[mobile-world-congress]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[internet-of-things]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[smart-cities]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mwc-2019]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mwc]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Alexis Duque]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 24 Mar 2019 12:59:40 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-03-24T17:17:30.335Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*VJe_mGttS_PVYye6" /></figure><p>One month ago, I came back to Barcelona to attend <strong>MWC Barcelona 2019, </strong>formerly called <strong>Mobile World Congress</strong>, to bring to our team of<strong> IoT Makers at </strong><a href="https://rtone.eu/"><strong>Rtone</strong></a> (<em>Lyon, France) </em>the latest insights on IoT and mobile technologies<strong>.</strong></p><p>Since 2006, the <strong>Mobile World Congress</strong> is an event organized by the GSMA that gathers during four days the industry to share innovation, explore trends and hear from today leaders and influencers in the field of « Mobile » communications.</p><p>Along with the vast exhibition, speakers coming from global player companies in the domain, like Cisco, IBM or Huawei, discuss the future of mobile communications during keynotes and conferences.</p><p>This 2019 edition has received more than 109,000 visitors from 198 countries, more than 2,400 companies across about 120,000 square meters of exhibition and networking space.</p><p>After five intense days walking along the corridors, attending captivating GSMA seminars, or meeting potential partners, I spend a couple of time to report the facts that get my attention this year.</p><h3>The 8th Mobile IoT Summit</h3><p>As usual, the Sunday before the event, smartphone manufacturers unveiled their flagship smartphones in private keynotes session that took place in front of Montjuic Magic Fountain: after Samsung a week before, Huawei released its folding smartphone: the Huawei Mate X. <br>At the same moment, I was attending the 8th Mobile IoT Summit, a much more confidential day of seminars and demos, gathering industry IoT experts from companies like AT&amp;T, Huawei, Nokia, Orange, and Telefonica.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*8A-BGMPPk2M9vw_H" /></figure><p>Last year, the talks were essentially about LTE-M and NB-IoT protocols characteristics and upcoming hardware platforms. Note that last year, GSMA and 3GPP have agreed that NB-IoT and LTE-M technologies will coexist and continue evolving as part of the 5G specifications. This fact means that the long-term status of these technologies is confirmed.</p><p>This year, the event focused on global deployments, the role of Mobile IoT in 5G, the new business opportunities LTE-M and NB-IoT provide, and examples of real customer deployments. One of them was presented by Orange and SNCF that exhibited a smart metering and assets tracking applications they developed in partnership.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*JY5npVtgzaUoMSP9" /><figcaption>SNCF use cases at the GSMA Mobile IoT Summit</figcaption></figure><h3><strong>Intelligent Connectivity: 5G and Artificial Intelligence</strong></h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*oMArdmkYhEIE6TKS" /></figure><p>The <strong>MWC</strong> motto this year was <strong><em>“Intelligent Connectivity”</em></strong><em>, </em>highlighting the crossing<strong> </strong>of “hyper-connectivity”, enabled by 5G and the Internet of Things, and “intelligence”, performed by artificial intelligence (AI) and big data.</p><p>In the exhibition side, 5G was omnipresent: many booths as those of Intel, HP, Telefonica or Vodafone featured 5G smart city demonstrations with smart street lights, Vehicle-to-X (V2X) communications, 5G core network, assets tracking, etc.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/proxy/0*Clo5FZeEmI_ZEgQ8" /></figure><p>Qualcomm showed its first 5G smartphone as well as a new Wireless Fast-Charging technology. Also, the company has announced the <em>Qualcomm QCA6390</em> Connectivity SoC. It is aimed at providing superior Wi-Fi and Bluetooth performance for mobile and computing devices. It is also the world’s first 14nm integrated SoC to support the full feature suites of both <em>Wi-Fi 6</em> and <em>Bluetooth 5.1</em>.</p><h3>5G Demonstrations</h3><p>The ubiquitous wireless connectivity, the network capacity and the low latency given by 5G, alongside with the computing power continually growing, allow new use cases that were demonstrated all along the exhibition. I now sum-up some of them that caught my attention.</p><h4>Remote Surgeon</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*jOw-QkD1ayw8Fy51.jpg" /><figcaption>Remote surgeon live demo</figcaption></figure><p>The first remote surgery over a 5G connection was performed between the MWC and Hospital Clinic de Barcelona. A medical expert was advising an in-theatre surgeon on a live operation in near real time.</p><p>He drew recommended incision points and pointed out potential problem areas on a screen at the venue.</p><p>The procedure used a Vodafone-provided 5G connection and was done in partnership with the Hospital Clinic de Barcelona, 5G Barcelona and Mobile World Capital. Obviously, it was done with the full consent of the patient.</p><h4>5G Ambulance</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*VduUH70TnmQfK1km" /><figcaption>The Catalonia 5G Ambulance</figcaption></figure><p>The government of Catalonia was showing off its 5G ambulance. The vehicle was using a 5G network with dedicated communication using many of 5G new features: speeds of up to <em>5 Gbps</em>,<em> lower latency</em> for communications and sending data, <em>network slicing</em> for urgent needs and <em>Massive Internet of Things. </em>The connectivity was used to receive real-time HD video, to communicate with multiple sensors, actuators, and smart devices in the region and in the ambulance as well as for <em>vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V)</em> and <em>vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2i) </em>in order to ensure they have access to clearer roads on the way to the hospital.</p><p>The Catalonian government worked with partners as Vodafone Business, Juniper Networks, Hispasat, or <a href="https://i2cat.net/">i2cat</a>.</p><h4><strong>mmWave</strong></h4><p>Sony exhibited a 28GHz mmWave demo. This technology is part of 5G and allows Gbits internet to a compatible smartphone. However, the range is in the order of a few meters and it is highly directive due to beamforming.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*Gnnko_YnLLy5WN5x" /><figcaption>Sony 28 GHz mmWave demo</figcaption></figure><h3>IoT and Smart Cities</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*w6S_HZTXPZO_ahLY" /><figcaption>Nordic Semiconductor booth</figcaption></figure><p>Obviously, the Internet of Things has not been missed during the event with a whole pavilion dedicated to IoT and LPWAN, 1-day of GSMA seminars, the MWC IoT Tour, and networking sessions.</p><h4>RF</h4><p>As each year, Nordic Semiconductor, one of the influential 802.15.4 radio module maker, highlighted their Bluetooth, and now Cellular IoT, products in a set of demos. However, nothing really new this year, except the release of the nRF52811 SoC that will support Bluetooth 5.1 features and direction finding based on multi-antenna and Angle-of-Arrival positioning.</p><h4>Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning</h4><p>I also noticed the advance in AI-enabled IoT devices by means of micro-controllers and low-end platforms able to compute Machine Learning algorithms. ARM, for instance, presented an ST Microelectronics Cortex-M4 development board able to identify objects in pictures in less than 200 ms with the <a href="http://arm-software.github.io/CMSIS_5/NN/html/index.html">ARM CMIS-NN library</a>.</p><h4>Security</h4><p>On Tuesday, I attended the GSMA IoT Security seminar. From my point of view, the most important fact was the introduction of the new ETSI standard for cybersecurity in IoT (<a href="https://portal.etsi.org/webapp/workProgram/Report_WorkItem.asp?wki_id=54761">ETSI TS 103 645</a>) by Jasper Pandza (government of UK). The talk by Ian Smith (GSMA) was also interesting. He introduced recent efforts in the normalization of cybersecurity for IoT: the <a href="https://www.gsma.com/iot/gsma-iot-security-guidelines-complete-document-set/">GSMA IoT Security Guidelines</a>, the <a href="https://medium.com/rtone-iot-security/the-uk-code-of-practice-for-consumer-iot-security-783e3473f726">UK Code of Practice for Consumer IoT Security</a>, the <a href="https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/baseline-security-recommendations-for-iot">ENISA Baseline Security Recommendations for IoT</a> and the <a href="https://www.nist.gov/programs-projects/nist-cybersecurity-iot-program">NIST Considerations for Managing IoT Cybersecurity and Privacy Risks</a>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*2Dx2LAjF8UhnnvHf" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*B1gOaqsvVHJYIgr3" /><figcaption>GSMA Internet of Things Security Seminar</figcaption></figure><h3>Visible Light Communications</h3><p>Because it is my primary research field, I especially paid attention to the VLC technology. However, I was a bit disappointed since there was not so many novelties and fewer exhibitors or demo than during the past editions.</p><p>Oledcomm was missing and only <a href="https://purelifi.com/">PureLiFi</a> was there. PureLifi brought to Barcelona an HP laptop embedding a dedicated LiFi chip that is compliant with the <a href="http://www.ieee802.org/11/Reports/tgbb_update.htm"><strong>IEEE</strong> <strong>802.11bb protocol</strong></a>. The LiFi module is small enough to be integrated into smartphones.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*fgBiIi6iWCWp5HvX" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*fJR1benkdnP7rg8T" /><figcaption>HP laptop with 802.11bb LiFi SoC by PureLifi</figcaption></figure><h3>Google Android Garden</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*FU-BtONBsyF6_258" /></figure><p>Like each year, the whole outdoor corridor between Hall 3 and Hall 4 welcomed the excellent <strong>Google Android Garden</strong>. A paradise for Android lovers where you can relax enjoying Barcelona sun, grab a coffee at the Android Coffee Shop, play in a duet the piano with Google AI or visit an art gallery improved with Virtual Reality thanks to ARCore.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*L1Ppd-1hzRmtBpVI" /></figure><p>In Barcelona, Google came with the <strong>Pixel 3 </strong>and let attendees trying its new features in activities spread out the garden. They promoted Google advances in artificial intelligence and machine learning: smarter Google Assistant allowing a deeper degree of interaction, object and drawing recognition and augmented reality.</p><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>Once again, <strong>MWC</strong> <strong>Barcelona</strong> proved that it is an event not to be missed. Beyond the consumers&#39; oriented smartphone presentations and shows, MWC featured this year <strong>5G, Artifical Intelligence, Cellular IoT</strong>, <strong>Security, Edge Computing, and Smart Cities</strong>.</p><p>As MWC is definitely a huge place, I probably missed some interesting stuff, so feel free to complete by posting a comment!</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/700/0*38ryac7Sar78L3t7.png" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=87479c6c469c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The UK Code of Practice for Consumer IoT Security]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/rtone-iot-security/the-uk-code-of-practice-for-consumer-iot-security-783e3473f726?source=rss-e5b52382352f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/783e3473f726</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[iot-security-industry]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[internet-of-things]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iot]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iot-security]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Alexis Duque]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 30 Nov 2018 11:48:16 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-11-30T16:26:04.484Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Uq1PLTrKWkecYXhU0VLXgQ.png" /></figure><p>The <strong>Internet of Things</strong> (IoT) has a poor reputation when it comes to security. Manufacturers and IoT service providers often do not implement appropriate security measures. Businesses and consumers are not aware of security concerns and typically do not change the default passwords nor update the pre-installed software. To improve the situation, the UK Government has released in mid-October a code of conduct to bring security to consumers IoT products.</p><blockquote>IoT security is too easy to ignore. What could happen with these IoT devices if they are not properly secured?</blockquote><h3>U.K. Code of Practice</h3><p>The UK Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) and the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) have published new recommendations in a 24-pages document to fight the insecurity of IoT products for consumers. The report, <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/747413/Code_of_Practice_for_Consumer_IoT_Security_October_2018.pdf"><strong><em>Code of Practice for Consumer IoT Security</em></strong></a>, is also relevant for industrial and business IoT security. The document focus is to deliver IoT products that embed security by design, rather than a “<em>patch” </em>afterthought.</p><p>IoT products deliver a range of technologies that have become increasingly common in businesses, manufacturers, and homes, making the industry more efficient and safer, and people lives easier. We entrust ever more data to online devices and services. The cybersecurity of these products is equally as important as their physical security. The guidelines provided by the DCMS can help all parties to ensure that their products are secure by design and stay secure all along the product life.</p><h3>Who is Impacted?</h3><p>Those who provide products and services supporting IoT are the stakeholders who should commit to following the code of practice. The stakeholders include:</p><ul><li><strong>IoT device manufacturers</strong> — These are organizations that produce the assembled Internet-connected products (hardware and software) which may contain the products of other manufacturers.</li><li><strong>IoT service providers</strong> — These are businesses that provide services that include networks, cloud storage, and data transfer. These may be packaged as part of IoT solutions as well as Internet-connected devices offered as part of the service.</li><li><strong>Mobile application developers</strong> — These are businesses that develop and provide applications which operate on mobile devices. These may be offered as a means of interacting with IoT devices.</li><li><strong>Retailers</strong> — These are the marketers and sellers of Internet-connected products and services.</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*rWWU-MpqfWcr-5f-4Lxk9Q.png" /><figcaption>The Code of Practice. Credit to DCMS.</figcaption></figure><h3>The 13 Code of Practice Guidelines to Follow</h3><p>The following guidelines should be verified by the customer when IoT devices are purchased and/or IoT services are subscribed to.</p><ol><li><strong>Default passwords</strong> — Many IoT devices are being sold with universal default usernames and passwords. The customer is expected to change the password before use. All IoT device passwords shall be unique and not resettable to any universal factory default value.</li><li><strong>Vulnerability disclosure policy</strong> — Anyone who offers Internet-connected devices and services shall provide a public point of contact as part of a vulnerability disclosure policy. This allows security researchers and others to be able to report issues in a timely manner.</li><li><strong>Software updates</strong> — Software resident in Internet-connected devices should be securely updateable. Updates should not impact the functioning of the device and be delivered in a timely manner.</li><li><strong>Store credentials and sensitive data securely</strong> — Any credentials should be securely stored within IoT services and devices. Hard-coded credentials are not acceptable in device software.</li><li><strong>Secure communications</strong> — Using open, peer-reviewed Internet security standards is highly recommended.</li><li><strong>Limit exposed attack surfaces</strong> — Security-sensitive data should be encrypted when communicating, including any remote management and control. All keys should be securely managed.</li><li><strong>Software integrity</strong> — IoT device software should be verified using secure boot mechanisms. When an unauthorized change is detected, the device should alert operators to the issue. The issue notification should not connect to wider networks than necessary to deliver the alert.</li><li><strong>Data protection</strong> — IoT device manufacturers and service providers shall provide clear and transparent information about how the organization’s data will be used, by whom, and for what purposes, for all devices and services. This applies to any third parties as well.</li><li><strong>Deliver resilient operation</strong> — IoT services should continue operating even when there is a loss of network connectivity, and they should recover cleanly when power is restored. IoT devices should return to a network operation in a sensible state and in an orderly fashion.</li><li><strong>Telemetry data</strong> — Usage and measurement data should be monitored for security anomalies.</li><li><strong>Data ownership and deletion</strong> — Who owns the collected data? IoT devices may change ownership and may be recycled or disposed of. Mechanisms should be provided that allow the consumers (if they’re covered by GDPR or CCPA regulations) and businesses to remain in control and remove data from services, devices and applications.</li><li><strong>Easy device installation and maintenance</strong> — IoT device installation and maintenance should require few steps and follow security best practices.</li><li><strong>Data input validation</strong> — Data input through user interfaces and transferred by APIs or between networks in services will be validated.</li></ol><h3>Conclusion</h3><blockquote>When you select an IoT manufacturer or IoT services, provide a copy of these guidelines to your vendors and providers. Ask them how they respond to the guidelines and if they do not adopt any of the guidelines. Those who do not adopt the guidelines should be considered as not appropriate vendors or providers.</blockquote><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=783e3473f726" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/rtone-iot-security/the-uk-code-of-practice-for-consumer-iot-security-783e3473f726">The UK Code of Practice for Consumer IoT Security</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/rtone-iot-security">Rtone IoT Security</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Wrap-up of the 2nd ENISA IoT Security Conference]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/rtone-iot-security/wrap-up-of-the-2nd-enisa-iot-security-conference-de04acf395be?source=rss-e5b52382352f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/de04acf395be</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[iot-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iot]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[internet-of-things]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Alexis Duque]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 15 Nov 2018 16:08:41 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-11-16T11:37:31.514Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Wrap up of the 2nd ENISA IoT Security Conference</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/1*w2xTvr6CpXXLfEp0T9Xc2w.png" /></figure><h3>Introduction</h3><p>Last month, I attended the<strong> </strong><a href="https://www.enisa.europa.eu/events/2nd-europol-enisa-iot-security-conference"><strong>2nd ENISA IoT Security Conference</strong></a>, that took place in the <strong>Europol Headquarter</strong> in<strong> La Haye</strong> (NL) on October 25th and 26th.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*c5tcZuh9DOrq0LUtqfxqHw.jpeg" /><figcaption>The Europol main building in La Haye.</figcaption></figure><p>This 2-day event gathers in the same place governmental organization representatives, security consultants, leading industries and researchers, to discuss the topic of security challenges raised by IoT applications in <strong>industry 4.0</strong>, <strong>connected cars</strong>, <strong>aerospace</strong>,<strong> smart home,</strong> or emerging IoT trends as <strong>artificial intelligence</strong> (AI) and <strong>digital forensics</strong>.</p><h3>Day 1</h3><p>The first morning was dedicated to <em>introduction</em> talks by ENISA, Europol and European Commission representatives.</p><p>All the speaker agreed<strong> ensuring security</strong> and <strong>privacy</strong> on the IoT end-to-end chain value is a <strong>big challenge</strong> especially when you have to take into account the <strong>IoT product lifecycle</strong>.</p><p>Miguel Gonzalez-Sancho-Bodero, Head of Unit Cybersecurity Technology and Capacity Building at the European Commission (EC) announced that under the Digital Europe program, <strong>the EC <em>“will invest €2 billion into boosting cybersecurity industry, financing state-of-the-art cybersecurity equipment and infrastructure”</em>.</strong> This confirms that there is a lot of cybersecurity initiatives and of course IoT is at the top of the main concerns.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*UoNoqxWpL4MOLJ17hQ3pnQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Photo credit to @EC3_Europol.</figcaption></figure><p>Steve Purser, Head of Core Operations Department at ENISA indicated that we must find<strong> <em>“a pragmatical and economically viable solution for IoT security”</em></strong>. These solutions for IoT security have to<em> “put more emphasis on processes and people, and not only on technology.”</em> After publishing <a href="https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/baseline-security-recommendations-for-iot/at_download/fullReport"><em>baseline security recommendations for IoT</em></a> last year, <strong>ENISA will develop now <em>“vertical” </em>guides, starting with the industrial field</strong>. They will provide a <strong>web tool</strong> to navigate into all these guides.</p><p>The <em>ENISA Baselines Recommendations for IoT interactive tool </em>is publicly accessible <a href="https://www.enisa.europa.eu/topics/iot-and-smart-infrastructures/iot/baseline-security-recommendations-for-iot-interactive-tool">here</a>.</p><p>After te lunch break, the afternoon session welcomed speakers talking about:</p><ul><li>Practical steps towards better IoT security and privacy.</li><li>Security in digital manufacturing</li><li>Securing IoT and Industrial IoT</li><li>The network vector attack in the Industrial IoT</li><li>Smart City security</li><li>DDoS attacks</li></ul><p>Jay Thoden van Velzen, from SAP, start the session giving his point of view about potential ways to secure <strong>Industrial IoT</strong> (IIoT).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/915/1*a8rSuCHf4foKcpe8epGP6A.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/956/1*hBal6H90tv3joIjjcvwT5g.png" /></figure><p>David Puron, from Barbara IoT, talked about the network vector attacks in IIoT, demonstrating how simple it is to attack an industrial control system (ICS) or a programmable logic controller (PLC). He reminded us how in 2018 it is still easy to access directly (unprotected) PLC from the Internet: <strong>many vulnerable IIoT devices can easily be found on </strong><a href="https://shodan.io/"><strong>Shodan</strong></a>, the popular internet vulnerability scanner. Shodan also provides an<a href="https://ics-radar.shodan.io/"> ICS Radar</a>.<br>This is seriously alarming and needs to be understood when considering IoT architecture and also policy.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*2phuIapyPSbYCVf0-W1cpg.png" /></figure><p>The next talk focused on <strong>smart cities security</strong>. According to the speaker, Andreas Kuehn, from the <a href="https://www.eastwest.ngo/profile/andreas-kuehn">EastWest Institute</a>, <em>“the extensive use of ICT and increased adoption of IoT smart cities have caused </em><strong><em>warning bells to go off</em></strong><em>.”</em></p><p>Finally, the last speaker of the day, Rien Jansen, advisor at <a href="https://politie.nl/">Netherlands High Tech CrimeTeam</a>, launched the <strong>NoMoreDDoS</strong> initiative to fight against <strong>cybercrime and DDoS attack</strong>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*0VG-dWeXyLSLOxaE2EE3Vg.png" /></figure><p>The <strong>NoMoreDDos</strong> project is based on 5 pillars: public-private partnerships, improve digital investigation, information and knowledge, outreach, and implement alternative interventions. It relies on a dedicated platform, reporting tool, and dedicated means to improve forensics.<br>Jansen wants the National Police forces to go further and deeper to <strong>fight cybercrime and make <em>“attribution”</em> a reality</strong>.</p><p>To close this first day, all attendees were invited to a networking cocktail that took place in the Europol Winter Garden.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*hA7crQs-0O-jpjbofDJJJQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Photo credit to @EC3_Europol.</figcaption></figure><h3>Day 2</h3><p>The second day started with David Rogers, who introduced the DCMS new <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/secure-by-design/code-of-practice-for-consumer-iot-security">Code of Practice to improve consumer IoT security</a>. A code of practices for consumers is in progress. This work is a result of a collaboration between universities and industries. Rogers said: “<em>the current situation is not acceptable and we are considering regulatory options”</em>.</p><p>The Code of Practice brings <strong>13 outcomes</strong> which <strong>3 are prioritized</strong>. Each one is mapped against existing standards (100+ from 50+ organizations). The mapping for each guideline is available there: <a href="https://iotsecuritymapping.uk/">IoT Security Mapping</a>. <strong>HP</strong> and <strong>HIVE</strong> already have made a <strong>public commitment </strong>to implement the Code of Practice. Also, <strong>an ETSI draft</strong> is based on this Code of Practice and know as <a href="https://portal.etsi.org/webapp/WorkProgram/Report_WorkItem.asp?wki_id=54761">DTS/CYBER-0039</a>.</p><p>The next 2 talks discussed security considerations in smart factories. Adrien Bécue spoke about the smart manufacturing security at Airbus, while Alain Filipowicz presented Continental ongoing projects in the field of smart and connected cars.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*NUja5eWAxwbTRgUdZcZ0zA.jpeg" /><figcaption>CyberFactory projects at Airbus</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ytL9y9dgVkTHii_jRjW_ig.jpeg" /><figcaption>The security assessment tools being deployed at Continental</figcaption></figure><p>During his talk, Tony Geen, from <a href="https://www.pentestpartners.com/">Pentest Partners</a>, demonstrated how a smart home can be compromised, by giving some examples of vulnerable devices:</p><ul><li>A smart kettle that leaks the WiFi password: by disassembling the kettle, getting the WiFi Module, leveraging UART pins and sending AT commands to the module, hackers are able to retrieve the WiFi AP SSID and the password.</li><li>Hardcoded credentials in August door lock APK.</li><li>A Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) padlock that uses MAC address as a password.</li><li>Another BLE padlock, this time with « strong encryption » but that can be open with a screwdriver</li></ul><p>Finally, he gave is point of view regarding IoT regulation : “<em>[..] regulation must be mandatory</em>”.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/959/1*Uk8YWj_GUkzKlBU9VrPujg.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*XYPi9a4GTGSt6-tI8J_DfA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Hardcoded credentials in an Android application (APK) and regulation wishlist according to Tony Geen.</figcaption></figure><p>Then, Ian Smith, IoT Security Director at GSMA introduce the GSMA IoT Security group and their contributions to address IoT security challenges. They have made a list of security guidelines and a self-assessment sheet for manufacturers. This work is accessible through the <a href="https://www.gsma.com/iot/iot-security/iot-security-guidelines/">GSMA IoT Security website</a>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*1ILVsFek3gSExEdfwL4o0A.jpeg" /></figure><p>Finally, the day ended with conferences about <strong>artificial intelligence</strong>, Digital <strong>forensics</strong>, and <strong>blockchains</strong> for the IoT.</p><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>For the second year in a row, ENISA and Europol joined forces to gather the world leading experts from the private sector, law enforcement and cybersecurity community to discuss the IoT security challenges. The conferences addressed topics and IoT application domains with concrete case studies in the smart factory, automotive, aerospace, and smart home industry. Emerging IoT trends like artificial intelligence and digital forensics were also discussed. These challenges — legal, policy or regulatory — <strong>need to be addressed across different sectors and stakeholders</strong>.</p><p>According to Europol, the main conclusion of the conference are following:</p><ul><li><strong>Security</strong> <strong>should not be an afterthought</strong> when designing systems and IoT systems are no exception.</li><li>Implementing <strong>security does not need to be complicated</strong>. As ENISA report shows, baseline security recommendations for IoT were made accessible via an interactive online table. This allows for easy access to specific good practices.</li><li><strong>Law enforcement</strong> needs to be in a position to go beyond defense and incident response by being able to investigate and prosecute the criminals abusing connected devices.</li><li>There is a need to discuss digital forensics in regard to IoT and the <strong>importance of data and privacy protection</strong>, considering the amount and different categories of data collected by the IoT.</li><li><strong>Multi-disciplinary dialogues</strong> are needed. ENISA and Europol are working closely together to inform key stakeholders of the need to be aware of the cybersecurity and criminal aspects associated with deploying and using these devices.</li><li>In 2019 and beyond, <strong>practical and economically viable security solutions are needed</strong>.</li><li><strong>ENISA</strong> will be working on an automotive IoT case study and <strong>stronger collaborations with industry are planned</strong>.</li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=de04acf395be" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/rtone-iot-security/wrap-up-of-the-2nd-enisa-iot-security-conference-de04acf395be">Wrap-up of the 2nd ENISA IoT Security Conference</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/rtone-iot-security">Rtone IoT Security</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[SSTIC 2018 Part 2]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/rtone-iot-security/sstic-part-2-b86a73c28a8e?source=rss-e5b52382352f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b86a73c28a8e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sstic]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Alexis Duque]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 16 Jun 2018 11:02:57 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-06-16T13:24:10.743Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*lZ3jw4Iz0-r8L2td17UH2A.jpeg" /></figure><blockquote>This post is the second part of my notes I took during the SSTIC this year. The first part is available here: <a href="https://medium.com/@alexisduque/sstic-part-1-22bdf9363058"><strong>SSTIC Part 1</strong></a></blockquote><h3>RUMP : Nordic made easy</h3><p><strong><em>Salma El Mohib</em></strong></p><p>Speaker from Digital Security presents 3 python scripts for nRF firmware analysis. Problem: How to reverse a nRF firmware with IDA? How to map it in IDA?</p><p>In fact, the nRF soft device use SVCALLS.</p><ul><li>nrfparse.py: build the knowledge database from all the Nordic SDK and softdevice</li><li>nrfident.py: nRF device identification + SDK and Soft Device version to get the memory mapping</li><li>nrfreverse.py: used after IDA configuration and firmware disassembly. It parses the assembly code to find SVC opcodes. It selects the appropriate functions prototypes and outputs them in the python output window of IDA pro.</li></ul><p>The tool is available on Github: <a href="https://github.com/DigitalSecurity/nrf5x-tools">nrf5x-tools</a></p><h3>RUMP: ARM_Now</h3><p><strong><em>Sanson Chaignon</em></strong></p><p>ARM_Now is a qemu powered tool that allows instant setup of virtual machines on arm CPU, mips, powerpc, nios2, x86 and more, for reverse, exploit, fuzzing and programming purpose.</p><p>ARM_Now is available on Github: <a href="https://github.com/nongiach/arm_now">arm_now</a></p><h3>Audit de sécurité d’un environnement Docker</h3><p><strong><em>Julien Raeis, Matthieu Buffet (ANSSI)</em></strong></p><p>Docker is a lightweight virtualization tool for packaging applications and automating the dev/deployment cycle. Each application block is a container. Each container has all the files it depends on. Docker works under windows &amp; Linux. For a developer, docker images are black boxes in which the application runs. They often do not master the security of their software execution environment. On the security side, this presentation will focus on the part that makes the Docker images turn and how to harden the host environment.</p><p>Windows Docker containers are based on JOBS kernel objects that provide a CGROUP equivalent on Linux. We can look at the container tree using winobj. Each container is in a silo, and in these silos, we discover the isolation mechanism for the symbolic links to be executed in a separate context. On the filesystem side, the NTFS driver has been patched to handle the isolation. If it is available, Docker uses Hyper-V to isolate the container and benefits from the Hyper-V isolation mechanism.</p><p>For the audit of a Docker environment, we can control the network interfaces, the permissions on the docker group, mutual authentication by certificates, etc … If we do not do it, we expose ourselves to an escalation of privileges via Docker. To avoid denials of service, we often limit the consumption of resources via ulimit.</p><p>Namespaces should be reviewed, especially those that allow to make IPC, to do ptrace, etc.</p><p>To facilitate the auditing of namespaces, speakers have developed a tool to generate a graph according to which namespace can access which process.</p><p>Process capabilities can be reduced using the tool pscap. Then we can use the docker commands to reduce these capabilities. When the container has access to real-world resources on the Host, it must be ensured that these resources do not allow elevation of privilege to the Host.</p><p><em>Windows Server Containers</em> are not secure and do not isolate the executed code of the Host. We must therefore favor <em>Hyper-V Containers</em>, rather than <em>Windows Server Container</em>.</p><p>Under Linux, a seccomp filter is compiled, so if we must decompile it if we want to audit it.</p><p>Speakers worked on a formal Prolog verifier that takes a seccomp filter as input and evaluates whether or not specific actions can be performed with this filter.</p><p>To improve the containers isolation, it is possible to use <em>Orchestrators</em> based on virtualization, <em>KAtacontainers</em> that offer an equivalent of <em>Hyper-V Containers</em> under windows, <em>gVisor</em> which is a userland kernel made by Google.</p><p><a href="https://www.sstic.org/2018/presentation/audit_de_securite_docker/">Link to the presentaiton</a></p><h3>Hardening a Java Card Virtual Machine Implementation with the MPU</h3><p><strong><em>Guillaume Bouffard, Léo Gaspard</em></strong></p><p>The speaker will introduce how to make a JavaCard JVM hardened using the features of a CPU. To obtain a trusted root, you need a secure and robust component in which you can store a cryptographic secret that will cryptographically sign and verify the integrity of some parts (or all) of the trusted system.</p><p>JavaCard technology is based on the JVM that runs on a smart card. There is no open-source implementation, but the majority of JavaCard platforms are evaluated.</p><p>The JVM is often independent of the secure component on which it operates, and the confinement is done at the application level, which at a cost in performance. As a result, the speakers decided to work on this JVM to use the hardware mechanisms of the smart card. The Memory Protection Unit is configured in privileged mode and allows setting the read/write/execution restrictions. But these configurations are limited to 8 memory regions, roughly 8 pages of MMU on a conventional CPU. One region can be included in another to refine the insulation.</p><p><a href="https://www.sstic.org/2018/presentation/hardening_a_java_card_virtual_machine_implementation_with_the_mpu/">Link</a></p><h3>Dans les coulisses de l’équipe sécurité Debian</h3><p><strong><em>Yves-Alexis Perez</em></strong></p><p>The speaker is a volunteer with the Debian security team. He will introduce his role in the team and how Debian manages the vulnerabilities.</p><p>Only 10 peoples, 5 active, all are volunteers. Some other guys help: package maintainers, researchers, project maintainers.</p><p>The team job is to manage the distribution security on stable version (Stretch and Jessy). They prepare packages security updates and write security-announce. They coordinate with the other teams: developers, etc.</p><p>The Debian security team also contributes to hardening the Debian ecosystem. However, they do not work on the platform security (Debian account and keys management, CI, Debian LTS, etc)</p><p>They admin the security tracker website that reports the current distribution security state and publish CVE list.</p><p>The security-tracker is a public git repo. They have private repositories, for instance for threats under embargo.</p><p>They also monitor external mailing lists, and their mail address about vulnerability reports. To help them in this task, they have the External-check tool that is a script that grabs the CVE and adds them to a list. The list is curated by the team;</p><ol><li>the vulnerability is identified</li><li>the CVE is assigned</li><li>a fix is identified</li><li>the patch is applied</li><li>the package is built locally</li><li>the package is uploaded to security-master</li><li>the package is built by the build bots</li><li>the package is released to the security mirror</li><li>security-announce mail is sent</li></ol><p>Different kind of vulnerabilities: public, private and complexes</p><p>In practice, embargo delay the patch and not developed by many people</p><p>Finally, the speaker introduces some example of vulnerabilities.</p><p><strong>KRACK</strong> In August, the CERT contact Debian and share all the details, the draft of the paper, and proofs of concept. In October, wpa_supplicant maintainers contact Debian with their current work and patch proposals. To conclude, during the embargo, Debian can learn about the vulnerabilities and check that wpa_supplicant patches are working. At the end of the embargo in November, Debian published the update.</p><p><strong>Meltdown</strong>: very painful for Debian because it was aware of the vulnerability during the embargo period. Debian got the info about Meltdown the same day as the public. So they can’t get prepared.</p><p><a href="https://www.sstic.org/2018/presentation/debian-security-team/">Link to the presentation</a></p><h3>A Practical Guide to Differential Power Analysis of USIM Cards</h3><p><strong><em>Adrian Thillard, Christophe Devine, Manuel San Pedro (ANSSI)</em></strong></p><p>The speaker begins introducing Milenage, an algorithm used to derivate the credentials in SIM cards. Thanks to Milenage, the phone can authenticate itself on the operator network. If an attacker can get secrets from the SIM card, the impact on privacy is huge for the user. To do this, we can perform a power consumption variations analysis using an oscilloscope, also known as DPA. This allows an attacker to identify the execution steps of the algorithm. from traces of references that are not always very clean because the clock of the card is not super precise. We must then re-align the peaks in order to have a proper basis of comparison. On the assumption that the data affects consumption. It requires about 4000 of traces to validate the hypothesis using a 400€ oscilloscope and python scripts. The number of traces required can be reduced using better equipment (e.g a 15000€ oscilloscope).</p><p><a href="https://www.sstic.org/2018/presentation/a_practical_guide_to_differential_power_analysis_of_usim_cards/">Link to the presentation</a></p><h3>HACL* une bibliothèque de cryptographie formellement vérifiée dans Firefox</h3><p><strong><em>Benjamin Beurdouche, Jean Karim Zinzindohoue</em></strong></p><p>The speaker was a member of the INRIA PROCECO team. He will introduce HACL*, a formally verified crypto library. Writing crypto is not really easy. As example, we can have a look at the OpenSSL CVE list: side channel attack, buffer overflow… It is also true for NaCl (salt) which is a modern primitive cryptographic library.</p><p>How to improve the situation. How can the community help? Using formal methods. Which approach to choose. 3 axes already exit:</p><ul><li>using assembly: best performances, no compiler (no bug, no fault introduced), best control on a side channel, ut — specific to the platform</li><li>using C: portable, good performance, but introduce a compiler</li><li>using a high-level programming language: easy, but slow,</li></ul><p>Thus they propose HACL (hacl-star) : a library with a small size, but complete, autonomous, written in F*, C code generated from F* code, C code is published</p><p>F* is a verification oriented language close to OCaml for proof automation. How to produce C code from F*? F* -&gt; Low* with F* compiler. Then KreMLin: Low* -&gt; C (correction proof)</p><p>What is proved: memory safety, execution independency Safety memory thanks to F*. IF it compiles, the code is safe from the memory point of view.</p><p>How to prove the code is correct?</p><p>HACL* is faster than C implementation.</p><p><a href="https://www.sstic.org/2018/presentation/hacl_cryptographie_formellement_verifiee_dans_firefox/">Link</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b86a73c28a8e" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/rtone-iot-security/sstic-part-2-b86a73c28a8e">SSTIC 2018 Part 2</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/rtone-iot-security">Rtone IoT Security</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[SSTIC 2018 Part 1]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/rtone-iot-security/sstic-part-1-22bdf9363058?source=rss-e5b52382352f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/22bdf9363058</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[sstic]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Alexis Duque]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 16 Jun 2018 11:02:11 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-06-16T13:42:10.959Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*QfD08LjNJq6OpV7G0GwSLg.jpeg" /></figure><blockquote>From the 13 to 15 June, I was happy to attend for the first time the 0X10 edition of the <strong>SSTIC</strong>, that traditionally takes place in Rennes every year in June. This year, the event gathered 800 participants, mostly security experts, pentesters or researcher, in the luxurious and brand new<strong> Couvent des Jacobins.</strong></blockquote><blockquote>I will share some of the notes I took during these 3 days of conferences. Unfortunately, I only report the presentations relevant to my field, or that caught my attention: <strong>#iot #embedded #hardware #sidechannel</strong></blockquote><blockquote>Note that the conference proceedings and video recording are already available on the<strong> </strong><a href="https://gist.github.com/sstic"><strong>SSTIC web site</strong></a>. Awesome!</blockquote><h3>Opening Keynote: Closed, heterogenous platforms and the (defensive) reverse engineers dilemma</h3><p><strong><em>Halvar Flake</em></strong></p><p>“Halvar Flake” gave us a retrospective on the reverse-engineering from his experiences. In fact, tools have changed a lot since it started 20 years ago.</p><p>IDA has not changed a lot in 20 years and remains his favorite tool for binary reverse engineering. After 13 years of RE, Halvar made a break of 6–7 years during which he managed dev and security teams. And he came back to RE:</p><p>Many things have evolved: the solvers have become usable to generate entries for programs, a lot of tools for RCE has been developed: r2, frida, angr, … But when you try them on real cases, it does not work. Example with MPENGINE.DLL for which is difficult to obtain coverage traces. The live debug on mobile systems are difficult to get, etc.</p><p>Why does not it work very well? Some reasons are external to the reverse community, others are related to this community. Platform providers like iOS or Android sacrifice “debuggability” to stop the reverse for “security” purposes. However, that is in favor of “big” players (hackers groups or state hackers) who have the means. POn the other side, defenders who do not have the means are left behind.</p><p>Example with iOS, for which you must set up ridiculous and expensive hacks to debug an application correctly. Manufacturers are often advised to remove the JTAG, even when physical attacks are not part of the threat model. Consequently, we lose observability, breaking the analysis and investigation capabilities of these devices.</p><p>Reducing the access to debugging means on a device decreased the population able to work on its security. In fact, fewer hackers make the curing of a platform slower, which benefits real attackers.</p><p>Time-to-market has forced developers to reduce the dev, deployment &amp; testing time. So they often work on WIP devices, not very debuggable. That complicates the diagnosis of bugs and threats in these applications, reducing their safety.</p><p>The market for RE products is very small and as a result support only between 12 to 60 engineers in the world.</p><p>The “technical” cost of designing RE tools is not covered by benefits because of the small market</p><p>Also, RE scripts, are often written in a hurry and become later tools used in the long run because anything else exists. The problem is that the RE community does not take the time to think about the future and invest in it. For instance, they do not pay attention to the memory footprint of scripts, or the ability to distribute the computation on multiple nodes.</p><p>In addition, a large number of RE frameworks have similar features but do not cover all your needs. Some of them are far from stable, or CPU/memory efficient. Ha said that <em>“It looks like the JavaScript community”</em>, and a lot of stuff is done twice or three times, on X frameworks. And they are sometimes developed in a hurry, just before CFP deadlines.</p><p>Also, in the literature, many problems have been “solved”, but in reality, for everyday work, these tools are far from keeping their promises. In fact, published results are rarely reproducible, data are not available, and sources are rarely published. Consequently, when we read a paper, we can no longer distinguish if the author exaggerates, or if the problem has been really solved.</p><p>The RE tools often focus on the source code and the recovery of the latter, but rarely on the understanding of the software package we reverse.</p><p>Finally, Halvar introduce some proposals:</p><ul><li>it is necessary that the developers of software or hardware platforms make them debuggable to facilitate the analysis.</li><li>it would be necessary to find a way to exchange the RE data, using a standard step to move from the binary to the assembler, to the assembler to CFG, etc</li><li>intermediate representation adapted to the different data used and generated by the reverse tools should be standardized. Thus, we could switch from one tool to another without having to re-develop all existing scripts &amp; tools for this new framework</li><li>a Linux distribution for the reverse as there is for the pentest, on which we could have all the necessary tools</li><li>to improve the reliability of RE tools, we need data to test and validate them.</li></ul><p>With the cloud, any software can run on machines all over the world. But debugging in the cloud is painful because there is no “cloud debugger” to manage such system. Dealing with CPU/GPU/μC/FPGA infrastructures is a big challenge for RE tools. These components are not well documented. Thus, a vulnerability on this type of components will be very difficult to manage for defenders (e.g. Spectre / Meltdown …)</p><p><a href="https://www.sstic.org/2018/presentation/2018_ouverture/">Link</a></p><h3>Backdooring your server, but its BMC: the HPE iLO4 case</h3><p><strong><em>Alexandre Gazet, Fabien Perigaud, Joffrey Czarny (Airbus)</em></strong></p><p>This talk presents the pentest of the iLO4 HP system and some critical vulnerabilities the author found. iLO systems are widely used by many server manufacturers as a stand-alone and independent ARM-based chipset with its own RAM and network interface. This system starts as soon as the server is powered. These iLOs are exposed on production VLANs, and often exposed even on the internet. A first exploit allows them to retrieve information in memory on the system managed by the iLO and write code arbitrarily to obtain a shell via netcat on the main server.</p><p>The iLOs web service have been the subject of two CVEs in 2017. The webservice makes a massive use of scanf to parse HTTP headers. Unfortunately, there are some buffer overflows, with one in the Connection header that allows an attacker to overwrite a variable, ann thus bypass the authentication and access the REST API of the iLO with admin rights.</p><p>Relying on this RCE, the speakers have worked on the ILO firmware to patch the bootloader, to later patch the kernel and insert a backdoor in the userland, in the iLO flash memory. The authors choose the web server as the target to install the backdoor since it has all the communication primitives, along with a DMA access to the memory of the main machine.</p><p>To install the backdoor in the Linux system, an attacker must create a thread in the kernel, allocate memory for the communication channel between the iLO and the Linux, and set up the execution primitives of the commands received on the memory buffer</p><p><a href="https://www.sstic.org/2018/presentation/subverting_your_server_through_its_bmc_the_hpe_ilo4_case/"><strong>Link</strong></a></p><h3>T-Brop — Taint-based Return Oriented Programming</h3><p><strong><em>Colas Le Guernic, Francois KHOURBIGA (ANSSI)</em></strong></p><p>The speaker began introducing the exploitation of a buffer overflow vulnerability by re-using the existing code in the binary. They reminded the protection that must be circumvented.</p><p>Code reuse attacks reuse bits of code, called <em>gadget</em>. These gadgets often en with a ret instruction. The DEP is not enough, it must also use the CFI, etc ...</p><p>To find these gadgets in a binary, 2 approaches exist:</p><ul><li>the syntactical approach, where the tool makes a grep in the program (e.g. rp++)</li><li>the symbolic approach, where the tool does it in symbolic. It is more efficient but is very costly in time (e.g. angrop).</li></ul><p>With RP ++, it is fast but we are fig to build the ROP chain using grep <em>à la mano</em> the gadgets we want. With angrop, it is very and can take between 15 in <em>fast mode</em> and hours.</p><p>In order to take the best of these 2 approaches, the speakers propose, <em>T-Brop</em>, a hybrid approach that is faster than symbolic analysis, and more expressive than syntactical approaches. So we have a tool less efficient than syntactic but faster than the symbolic.</p><p>T-Brop is a little faster (7min) and offers some interesting gadgets based on rsp &amp; esp, or data above the stack. In a nutshell, Angrop is good for <em>highway</em> cases, RP++ is for regexp lovers, and T-Brop sometimes offers some tricky stuff.</p><p>T-Brop is based on hue to manage which register depends on which other in the chain of gadgets. This influence is represented as dependency matrices for each gadget. To determine the impact of the sequence of gadgets on the registers, it is enough to make a product of matrix. By generalizing that, it is possible to identify whether or not it is possible to influence a target register by linking together a set of gadgets, and which registers to target in order to use the ropchain we built. T-Brop implementation is based on python3 and is available on <a href="https://github.com/DGA-MI-SSI/T-Brop">Github</a></p><p><a href="https://www.sstic.org/2018/presentation/T-Brop/"><strong>Link</strong></a></p><h3>Risques associés aux signaux parasites compromettants : le cas des câbles DVI et HDMI</h3><p><strong><em>Emmanuel DUPONCHELLE, Pierre-Michel Ricordel</em></strong></p><p>There are radio signals transmitted willingly (radio, WiFi, Bluetooth, etc), and radio signals emitted unbeknownst of the system. For example, the cathodic screens of the past that generated radiations that could be received and decoded by means of an antenna. Now with the Software Defined Radio (SDR), capturing these signals only requires a small dongle with a tiny antenna. Although cathodic screens have disappeared, many components emit on our behalf, especially video cables between computer and screen. The speakers present a demo using a small USRP and the <strong>tempestsdr</strong>, SDR tool to recover this kind of signal. The speakers can intercept the signal of their own laptop they were using during the presentation.</p><p>The talk follows with some insights on VGA, HDMI and DVI signals. Faster is the potential variation, stronger the radiation. In VGA, it does not go fast, so the fronts are soft, and the radiation is weak. With DVI, the frequency is fast, and the changes of fronts are strong, and so the radiation level is high.</p><p>To avoid radiation, the armor must be complete and if there is a hole, it will leak … and so your screen with.</p><p><a href="https://www.sstic.org/2018/presentation/risques_spc_dvi_et_hdmi/"><strong>Link</strong></a></p><h3>Three vulns, one plug</h3><p><strong><em>Gwenn Feunteun, Olivier Dubasque, Yves Duchesne (Acceis)</em></strong></p><p>The 2 speakers introduce the reverse engineering of a WiFi smart plug and the threat they found in the WiFi PSK exchange mechanism between the plug and the smartphone.</p><p>The “smart” plug use WiFi with a “smart” pairing technology avoiding to manually enter on the plug the PSK of the WiFi AP. That is not based on WPS but the configuration is achieved using an android application. In the application, the user must type the WiFi password, and choose the plug that has been detected by the application.</p><p>The authors begin by sniffing the network and look at the WiFi packets exchanged to send the security information. They found broadcast messages that consist of a series of fixed-size messages and then variable-sized packets. If fact, the plug manufacturer built a side channel using the size of the encrypted broadcast packets to encode the PSK. Then, reading the doc of the WiFi module, we can see that the wireless module is listening on a UDP port and accepts AT commands that can everything in the WiFi module configuration. Also, on the PCB, a UART can be leveraged to recover the key of the WiFI network, or to change the module configuration. The speakers have developed a <em>patch</em> to enable WPS sending the right AT command with an Arduino.</p><p><a href="https://www.sstic.org/2018/presentation/three_vulns_one_plug/"><strong>Link</strong></a></p><h3>Escape room pour la sensibilisation à la sécurité informatique</h3><p><strong><em>Eric Alata, Erwan Beguin, Vincent Nicomette (INSA Toulouse)</em></strong></p><p>The speaker presented an escape room his team developed in a student project at the INSA Toulouse. The escape room aims to teach the good habits of computer security and how to protect themselves from current social engineering attacks. Two scenarios are proposed. The first one aims to secure a working environment. In the second one, 3 participants must steal documents from a company.</p><h3>Du PCB à l’exploit: étude de cas d’une serrure connectée Bluetooth Low Energy</h3><p><strong><em>Damien Cauquil (Digital Security)</em></strong></p><p>During this talk, Damien Cauquil (<a href="https://twitter.com/virtualabs">@virtualabs</a>) introduce a methodology to conduct the pentest of an IoT device, considering hardware and software attacks. Unfortunately, the speaker laptop rapidly went wrong and the presentation was a bit hashed. In any case, I highly recommend to read the paper in the conference proceedings.</p><p>Hacking hardware is not always as easy as taking a logical parser, wiring a uart, and so getting a shell. In practice, a methodology is needed:</p><ol><li>Functional analysis of the device to be tested</li><li>Hardware vulnerabilities research</li><li>PCB reverse engineering</li><li>Firmware, mobile application collecting and disassembly.</li><li>Software vulnerabilities research</li></ol><p>Damien then applies his methodology, giving a smart lock use case. Studying the lock usage is essential, and a careful observation gives the following insights:</p><ul><li>18 hours of autonomy implies the use of a low energy technology</li><li>there are no electrical protections against the over tension on the USB port</li><li>there is no component to detect the position of the rotor of the lock, which means that the software does not know in which position is the lock</li><li>on the lock PCB, there is a nRF52 BLE module and an engine driver for the motor.</li></ul><p>Then, the interconnections between the components can be determined by using a multimeter or studying their datasheet. Once the JTAG / UART / SWD are identified, the attacker can try to recover the firmware from the MCU, and begin its analysis. The firmware can also be recovered at the network level or on the smartphone during the firmware update.</p><p>The firmware, as the Android application, can be disassembled using IDA PRO and JADX respectively.</p><p>After a quick look on the code, Damien discovered that the authentication part of the lock is broken. In fact, the <em>pseudo-random</em> nonce used for encryption is … always set to 1. Also, the BLE connection between the smartphone does not require pairing meaning that a man in the middle can easily be performed.</p><p>Finally, the speaker presents this BLE MITM attack using the <a href="https://github.com/DigitalSecurity/btlejuice">BtleJuice</a> tool it developed. The attack allows him to capture the authentication token, and to replay it.</p><p><a href="https://www.sstic.org/2018/presentation/du_pcb__lexploit_cas_dune_serrure_connecte_ble/"><strong>Link</strong></a></p><h3>Wookey: USB devices strike back</h3><p><strong><em>Arnauld Michelizza, Jérémy Lefaure, Mathieu Renard, Philippe Thierry, Philippe Trebuchet, Ryad Benadjila</em></strong></p><p>The authors present a device that is robust against BadUSB attack. Their device should not be too expensive and be shareable in open-hardware / open-source.</p><p>As part of the USB standard, it is the device that declares its functionality to the OS. Thus if the device is lying on its features, the OS keeps trusting the key: that is the BadUSB attack scenario. Along with this attack, the speakers also want to protect themselves against the theft of crypto data, so it needs a SoC solid enough to allow their implementation in a safe way. The use of a secure-element to store encryption keys, a keyboard/touchscreen independent of the host for entering the pin code, a μSD slot to host the storage, and two USB ports.</p><p>The firmware of the keys contains a bootloader firmware and a backup firmware in case of a glitch. One part is reserved for crypto signature, and a release mechanism triggerable by pressing a physical button.</p><p>Each software module managing each function of the keys must be isolated from the others. The speakers implement their own micro-kernel, called Ewok, and manages application modules of crypto, USB, pin code, secure-element. The MPU is used to define rights and attributes on memory regions to ensure isolation without an MMU.</p><p>To secure the syscall, which is the only attack surface between the app code and the kernel, the speakers used Ada and SPARK. Thus, depending on the criticality of a functionality, the speakers chose the appropriate programming language, from the least restrictive (the C), to the most constrained (SPARK).</p><p><a href="https://www.sstic.org/2018/presentation/wookey_usb_devices_strike_back/">Link</a></p><h3>Dump de flash sur circuit imprimé</h3><p><strong><em>Emma Benoit, Guillaume Heilles, Philippe Teuwen</em></strong></p><p>The speakers give their feedback on developing their own chip adapter to dump the memory of a flash chip. When we want to recover the content of a flash, we often try to connect to the pins of the chip and dump. But sometimes we come across a chip whose pins are under the chip, so we must unseat the flash, and then use the right adapter or make our own. The speaker decided to make his own. The authors designed a PCB using KiCAD and present few methods to build it:</p><ul><li>a chemical method</li><li>using a CNC to cut the tracks directly into the copper, then adding a green insulating paste</li></ul><p>To solder a BGA component by hand, it is necessary to use a microscope, and it looks very painful.</p><p>As soon as the homemade chip adapter is built hardware attack, we can micro solder the “adapted”</p><p>The global investment cost is about 1200 € for both techniques, the per PCB cost is negligible. If the BGA component pitch is very tiny (~um), a CNC laser must be used to gain precision.</p><p><a href="https://www.sstic.org/2018/presentation/attacking_serial_flash_chip_case_study_of_a_black_box_device/"><strong>Link</strong></a></p><blockquote>That’s all for the first part! But you can go to the<strong> </strong><a href="https://medium.com/@alexisduque/sstic-part-2-b86a73c28a8e"><strong>2nd part of my notes</strong></a></blockquote><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=22bdf9363058" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/rtone-iot-security/sstic-part-1-22bdf9363058">SSTIC 2018 Part 1</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/rtone-iot-security">Rtone IoT Security</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Back from the Mobile World Congress 2018]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@alexisduque/back-from-the-mobile-world-congress-2018-3360d73816a2?source=rss-e5b52382352f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/3360d73816a2</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[internet-of-things]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[5g]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[lpwan]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[vlc]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mobile-world-congress]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Alexis Duque]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 18 Mar 2018 11:54:45 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-03-18T14:01:30.935Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*lB3hk_wUfWSTBhc3FwHBxA.jpeg" /></figure><p>For the fourth time in a row, I come back to Barcelone to attend the Mobile World Congress. Since 2006, this event organized by the GSMA gathers during four days exhibitors and a hundred of thousands of attendees interested in the field of « Mobile » communications.</p><p>Along with the vast exhibitions, speakers coming from global player companies in the domain discuss the future during keynotes and conferences. If only attendees registered with the precious Golden pass, all the conferences were live streamed in the eight exhibition halls.</p><p>Even the political tensions happening in the last six months between Spain and Catalonia, this year 107 000 visitors came from all over the world.<br>After five intense days walking along the corridors, attending fascinating GSMA seminars, or meeting potential partners, I take a few minutes to report the facts that get my attention this year.</p><h3>GSMA Mobile IoT Summit and Samsung</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/1*I1C5n9eSRgXsJ8YfGv9lUg.jpeg" /><figcaption>The 6th Mobile IoT Summit</figcaption></figure><p>Traditionally, the Sunday before the event, smartphone manufacturers unveiled their flashing smartphone.<br>This year, Samsung release its Galaxy S9 which embeds a dual aperture camera able to capture 720p video at 960 fps.<br>At the same moment, I was attending the GSMA Mobile IoT Summit, a much more confidential afternoon of seminars and demos, gathering people and companies interested in LPWANs and 5G IoT protocols.<br>Panels and presentations brought up the topic on a business side discussing monetization, market and use case. The demo session was much more interesting in my perspective: module makers present their latest platforms, like the Sequans Monarch or the U-Blox LTE Cat M1/NB-IoT modules.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/1*2C8Bmaaa8AAKeI5VfsJ8_g.jpeg" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/1*vL6DhyMV6l-gGAyq2sNzTA.jpeg" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/1*-mU9vCBsS76NaoQvTGI17g.jpeg" /><figcaption>The 6th Mobile IoT Summit</figcaption></figure><h3>A 5G Flavoured MWC</h3><p>MWC 2018 was unquestionably the 5G edition with a question in everyone’s tongue: What will be the 5G’s killer app?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*rj5bOTLKu8Hz33kI-2z2uA.jpeg" /></figure><p>This question was primarily discussed during the keynotes or in the ZTE 5G Summit. As well, significant real use cases were demonstrated in the GSMA Innovation City: AI and virtual reality, drones, IoT powered services.<br>Another hot topic was the 5G business model and how to monetize these new services. In fact, most carriers agreed that the SIM business model is going to be out dated.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*sd_E2NjalqsPBmMnti3fSw.jpeg" /></figure><p>In the exhibition side also, 5G was everywhere: all the Intel booth was a 5G smart city demo with smart street lights, Vehicle-to-X (V2X) communication, a 5G core network, etc., and Qualcomm show its “cabin luggage” sized 5G smartphone. Also, Qualcomm announced a new Snapdragon SoC called Snapdragon 700 to offer a balance between their mid-range Snapdragon 600 and the high-end Snapdragon 800 series. Qualcomm says that Snapdragon 700 series provides up to 2x faster on-device AI processing with the help of their multi-core AI engine. The enhanced feature set includes support for better camera features, up to 30% power efficiency, better performance and battery life.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/657/1*86YGdln1OZGtOV7pti2ZPg.jpeg" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/592/1*yBp9tP_veYmoBO6Jp42N5g.jpeg" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Y9T3KnwJQ0J7cjI5PKBVoA.jpeg" /><figcaption>The Qualcomm 5G smartphone prototype (left) and the Intel booth featuring 5G</figcaption></figure><p>The ubiquitous wireless connectivity and the rise of network capacity offered by 5G, alongside with the computing power continually growing let us imagine revolutionary use cases for these technologies like <em>autonomous robots or vehicles</em>, <em>drones</em>, and many others.<br>An exciting but also scaring example was the <em>facial recognition access control system</em> that could have been tested by volunteers. Curious about its reliability, so I volunteered at the accreditation desk set up at the airport. And it worked like a charm! I was able to cross the access control smoothly skipping the queue ;) What we don’t know is the false positive rate and that could be interesting the GSMA provide few statics and results about that.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/1*B4AUr_6JYIBCeMWfM4L1wg.jpeg" /></figure><p>The <strong>Catalonia pavilion</strong> also introduced Barcelona as a<em> 5G Smart City.</em> In fact, the city hosts tens of research or pilot projects related to 5G. Among the various booths,<strong> the i2CAT foundation </strong>one was particularly relevant. <a href="http://www.i2cat.net/">The i2CAT foundation</a> is a non-profit R&amp;D and innovation center headed by Josep Paradells which promotes research activities on advanced Internet architecture, VLC, indoor positioning, augmented reality, E-Health, Software Defined Network (SDN) or Wireless Sensor Network (WSN). The center collaborates with companies, public administration, universities, and end-users.I2CAT plays a key role in 5G research and participates in <em>8 projects funded by the European Commission</em>.</p><p>During the fair, they showed in videos and brochures the possibilities of 3D positioning indoors, immersive virtual content and the services offered by 5G they are developing. <br>Also, Daniels Camps, R&amp;D coordinator at the foundation presented the<strong> H2020 5G XHaul</strong> project the center leads.<a href="http://www.5g-xhaul-project.eu/"> 5G-XHaul </a>proposes to develop a converged optical and wireless network solution able to connect Small Cells to the core network.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/1*Zke0nl7XqJw-b9S5Zg5Pug.jpeg" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/1*7ueMwyeWCHbPejMFYELPVA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Daniel Camps (i2CAT) presenting the 5G-XHaul project</figcaption></figure><h3>Internet of Things</h3><p>Obviously, the Internet of Things has not been missed during the event with a whole pavilion dedicated to IoT, 1-day of GSMA seminars and the MWC IoT Tour, a guided tour of the exhibition to discover during an afternoon the “best IoT booths”. <br>I particularly enjoyed the NB-IoT workshop organized by the GSMA and Telefonica. During an afternoon, I can get a deep dive into NB-IoT network stack, node duty-cyle settings, wake-up modes, node power consumption, alongside with live demos using the<a href="http://www.quectel.com/product/bg96.htm"> Quectel BG96</a> development kit and the Telefonica NB-IoT OpenLab infra.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*nD5zyWEryGKzaOnu5KMl7g.jpeg" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*rbPPQl_WTI63S02K0irDfA.jpeg" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*JESEN4eYU1KmDjGYd1he1Q.jpeg" /><figcaption>The LoRa booth in the IoT zone (left), the Thread mesh network demo (center) and the nRF91 SiP preview DK (right) at the Nordic Semiconductor booth.</figcaption></figure><p>As each year, Nordic Semiconductor, one of the influential 802.15.4 radio module maker, highlighted their upcoming Bluetooth products features in a set of demos. <br>Two of them were showing mesh networks in action leveraging the nRF52840 chip and the<a href="https://www.bluetooth.com/specifications/mesh-specifications"><strong> Bluetooth Mesh</strong></a> protocol for the one, or their<a href="https://www.nordicsemi.com/eng/Products/nRF5-SDK-for-Thread"> nRF5-Thread SDK </a>based on the <a href="https://openthread.io/"><strong>OpenThread</strong></a> for the second. <br>Even if both technologies were quite similar in term of network topology, power consumption, range and security features, they distinguished by their radio and the fact that Thread is IPv6-based but Bluetooth Mesh not. Also, Thread would be preferred for dense networks since Bluetooth Mesh always use flooding while Thread uses flooding only for multicast messages and automatically configures routes dynamically when nodes are added, removed or moved.<br>Besides, comparing BLE and Thread for P2P or star networks, BLE has a considerable advantage regarding power consumption, and it would be recommended over Thread.<br>The third demo unveiled the new <strong>nRF91</strong> global multimode LTE-M / NB-IoT system-in-package (SiP) that is currently only available for carefully chosen key customers. The preview development kit release is planned for mid-2018 and the production-ready version for the end of the year. <br>The SiP features <em>Arm Cortex-M33 ARMv8-M processor</em>, a Qorvo custom RF front-end, GPS, and TrustZone application security into a tiny footprint of 16 X 10 X 1.2mm only. The<em> TrustZone CryptoCell-310</em> security subsystem enables RoT (Root of Trust), cryptographic capabilities, and helps secure app data, firmware, and peripherals.</p><h3>Visible Light Communications</h3><p>Because it is my primary research field, I especially paid attention to the VLC technology. However, I was a bit disappointed since there was not so much news and fewer exhibitors or demo than during the previous edition.</p><p>Traditionally Oledcomm and PureLiFi were there. While Oledcomm has already unveiled at the CES in January its MyLifi® desk lamp PureLifi brought to Barcelona a DELL laptop prototype embedding a fully integrated LiFi-XC receiver. In the similar approach, they develop a smartphone case that hides the LiFi-XC dongle, making its use convenient even on smartphones. If they are only “one-shot” prototype, this is definitely the first step to reach VLC broad adoption.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/558/1*-o-mkxuDNJc5UshqZ-V9QA.jpeg" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/1*mfMhKd5AOS-i5HYekhd67w.jpeg" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/457/1*OxQPHKneBqZc3oZ05ezaWg.jpeg" /><figcaption>The LightBee smart door lock (left) and the PureLiFi LiFi-XC laptop</figcaption></figure><p>LightBee is a Canarian startup that develops as smart wireless lock relying on VLC and a smartphone. This year, they exhibit their product at 4YFN, a side event dedicated to startups. By blinking its screen fastly, the smartphone sends a short code, a kind of token, that the door look receives through a photodiode, before granting access or not after demodulation and connecting to a remote server used for access right management. Thanks to the SME Instrument funding, they were able to fill several patents, get the necessary certification and start manufacturing a small series of prototypes. They target the house-sharing and hotel business.</p><h3>Google Android</h3><p>Like each year, the whole outdoor corridor between Hall 3 and Hall 4 welcomed the awesome <strong>Google Android Garden</strong>. This heaven for Android lovers is a place to relax, grab Android goodies or collector pins, eat an Oreo flavored ice-cream, and let Google show you just how cool Android is.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/592/1*fV1trluNP2LOWALXt06Yig.jpeg" /></figure><p>In Barcelona, Google came with the first <strong>Android Go smartphones</strong>, from Nokia and Alcatel. <strong>Android Go</strong> is a lightweight version Oreo Android operating system. It promises<em> even more frequent updates for devices, extending them from 18 months to two years</em>. Security patches will be distributed on a regular basis for at least three years.<br>Also, to further advance in the field of virtual and augmented reality, Google introduced <strong>ARCore</strong>, which is not only in Pixel smartphones but also the Samsung Galaxy since the S7 Edge. The beta stage for the first version has ended and <a href="https://developers.google.com/ar/">ARCore 1.0</a> is available as well as<a href="https://developers.google.com/ar/discover/"> SDK for developers</a>. AR demos are also provided in collaboration with Porsche and FC Barcelona and it is rumored that<strong> </strong><em>Google could be planning to implement this into a new version of Google Glass.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/1*CiIzMUc6nqozTsBNdxb-6g.jpeg" /></figure><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>Once again, <strong>MWC</strong> proved that <strong>it is an event not to be missed</strong>. This year MWC featured <strong>5G</strong>, <strong>LPWAN</strong>, <strong>IoT</strong>, <strong>Drones</strong>, <strong>AI</strong>,<strong> Smart City</strong>, and <strong>Security. </strong>I noticed the<strong> absence </strong>of <strong>Sigfox</strong>, who didn’t travel to Catalonia. Besides, my feeling is that put alongside the previous editions,<strong> MWC’18 increased its difference with CES</strong>, with fewer announces, products, or exhibitors targeting consumers straightly.</p><p>As MWC is definitely a huge place, I probably missed some interesting stuff, so feel free to complete by posting a comment! In a few days, you will also find this article on the <a href="https://rtone.fr/category/blog/"><strong>Rtone blog</strong></a>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*NJrXP6XgdtpHf-l9Yt5gNg.jpeg" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/592/1*PtBGEJN60IP6o5VZfqFXvg.jpeg" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3360d73816a2" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Deep Dive into Bluetooth LE Security]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/rtone-iot-security/deep-dive-into-bluetooth-le-security-d2301d640bfc?source=rss-e5b52382352f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d2301d640bfc</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[iot]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[nordic-semiconductor]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bluetooth-low-energy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bluetooth]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Alexis Duque]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 03 Mar 2018 08:59:25 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-03-03T08:59:25.821Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*wYZPp9joQC2Ikc9pNRUVDw.png" /></figure><p>Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) is becoming one of the most common wireless standards used today in IoT devices. Likewise, it is also becoming more commonly used in applications where sensitive information is being transferred. As a consequence, IoT devices makers looking to integrate BLE into their products should be aware of the security features and limitations of this technology. In this post, I will try to provide a basic overview of BLE security features. If you are not already familiar with BLE, I suggest you to watch this nice webinar <a href="https://devzone.nordicsemi.com/tutorials/b/getting-started/posts/introduction-to-bluetooth-low-energy-and-ble-devel">by Nordic Semiconductor</a> before.</p><h3>Overview</h3><p>A BLE connection is said to operate at a specific security mode for which there are several security levels. The required security mode/level of a connection may change from time to time, leading to procedures to increase that level. Note that each connection starts its lifetime in Security Mode 1, Level 1.</p><p>When two devices, which initially do not have security, wish to do something that requires security, the devices must first pair. This process is triggered by a <em>Central device</em> (e.g. a smartphone) that is attempting to access a data value (a “characteristic”) on a <em>Peripheral device</em> that requires authenticated access. Pairing involves authenticating the identity of two devices, encrypting the link using a short-term key (STK) and then distributing long-term keys (LTK) used for encryption. The LTK is saved for faster reconnection in the future, that is termed <em>Bonding</em>.</p><p>This process is shown the following figure:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/878/0*ZkFNWk-z_MOe51SV.png" /><figcaption>Bluetooth paring process</figcaption></figure><p>The new security level of the connection is based on the method of pairing performed and its selection is based on the I/O capabilities of each device. The security level of any subsequent reconnections is based on the level achieved during the initial pairing.</p><p>The role each device plays is defined in the Security Manager (SM) portion of the BLE stack. They are the <em>Initiator</em> (the central), and the <em>Responder</em> (the peripheral).</p><h3>Encryption and Authentication</h3><p>The encryption in Bluetooth LE is based on 128-bit Advanced Encryption Standard — Counter with CBC-MAC (AES-CCM). LTK is used with this algorithm to create the 128-bit “shared secret” key.</p><p>Authentication is provided in Bluetooth (LE) by digitally signing the data using the connection Signature Resolving Key (CSRK). The sending device places a signature after the Data PDU. The receiver verifies the signature using the CSRK.</p><h3>Security Modes and Levels of a Connection</h3><p>For a BLE connection,the Generic Access Protocol (GAP) defines two security modes, along with several security levels per mode.</p><h4>Security Mode 1</h4><p>Security Mode 1 enforces security by means of encryption and contains four levels:</p><ul><li><strong>Security Level 1</strong>: No Security (No authentication and no encryption)</li><li><strong>Security Level 2</strong>: Unauthenticated pairing with encryption</li><li><strong>Security Level 3</strong>: Authenticated pairing with AES-CCM encryption</li><li><strong>Security Level 4</strong>: Authenticated LE Secure Connections pairing with encryption. Level 4 uses Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman P-256 (ECDH) and AES-CCM encryption.</li></ul><h4>Security Mode 2</h4><p>Security Mode 2 enforces security by means of data signing and contains two levels:</p><ul><li><strong>Security Level 1</strong>: Unauthenticated pairing with data signing</li><li><strong>Security Level 2</strong>: Authenticated pairing with data signing</li></ul><h4>Mixed Security Mode</h4><p>Mixed Security Mode is when a device is required to support both Security Mode 1 and 2, i.e., it needs to support signed and unsigned data. Secure Connection Only Mode is Secure Mode 1 with Security Level 4, meaning that all incoming and outgoing traffic in a Bluetooth device involve authenticated connections and encryption only.</p><p>Each connection starts its lifetime in Security Mode 1, level 1 and can later be upgraded to any security level by means of an authentication procedure discussed below. When pairing, the method/algorithm chosen determines if the pairing performed a strong authentication or not. Unauthenticated pairings occur in situations where the device could not authenticate itself (for example, if it has no input/output capabilities).</p><p>Further details are provided in Vol. 3, Part C, Section 10 of the BLE v4.2 Core Specification.</p><h3>Pairing Modes</h3><p>Pairing involves authenticating the identity of the 2 devices to be paired, usually through a process of sharing a secret. Once authenticated, the link is encrypted and keys are distributed to allow security to be restarted on a reconnection much more quickly. If these keys are saved for a future time, the devices are said to be Bonded. The pairing happens in 3 phases.</p><h4>Phase 1</h4><p>In phase one, the two devices let each other know what they are capable of doing. The values they are reading are Attribution Protocol (ATT) values and live at layer 4 with L2CAP. They are not encrypted. These values determine which pairing method is going to be used in phase two and what the devices can do and what they expect. For instance, the peer’s input and output capabilities which are selected from one of the following possibilities determine the connection security level. These capabilities are communicated between the devices by using the Security Manager (SM) Pairing Request message. They are: No Input No Output, Display Only, Display Yes/No, Keyboard Only and Keyboard Display.</p><h4>Phase 2</h4><p>In phase 2, the purpose is to generate a Short Term Key (STK). This is possible with the devices agreeing on a Temporary Key (TK) mixed with some random numbers which gives them the STK. The STK itself is never transmitted between devices. The use of STK is commonly known as LE legacy pairing. However, if the Secure Connection Only Mode is being used, a Long Term Key (LTK) is generated at this phase (instead of an STK) and this is known as LE Secure Connections.</p><h4>Phase 3</h4><p>In phase 3, the key from phase two is used to distribute the rest of the keys needed for communications. Whereas an LTK wasn’t generated in phase two, one is generated in phase three. In this phase, data like the Connection Signature Resolving Key (CSRK) for data signing or the Identity Resolving Key (IRK) for private MAC address generation and lookup are generated.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/769/0*MmSxTQl9hlgRPRGM.png" /><figcaption><em>The pairing flowchart which applies to both legacy pairing and secure connections.</em></figcaption></figure><h3>Pairing Procedures</h3><p>A pairing procedure involves an exchange of Security Manager Protocol packets to generate a temporary encryption key called the Short Term Key (STK) as depicted in the diagram above. During the packet exchange, the two peers negotiate one of the following STK generation methods:</p><p><strong>Just Works</strong>: The STK is generated on both sides, based on the packets exchanged in plain text. This method provides no security against man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks.</p><p><strong>Passkey Display</strong>: One of the peers displays a randomly generated 6-digit passkey and the other side has asked to enter it. In some cases, both sides enter the key if no display is available. This method provides protection against MITM attacks.</p><p><strong>Out of Band (OOB)</strong>: In this method, the additional data can be transferred by other means than the BLE radio (such as another wireless technology like NFC). This method also provides protection against MITM attacks.</p><p><strong>Numeric Comparison (LE Secure Connections Pairing) and only with BLE 4.2</strong>: This method uses an algorithm called Elliptic curve Diffie–Hellman (ECDH) for key generation and a new pairing procedure for the key exchange. The link is encrypted using LTK from Phase 2</p><p>The table below is a reference to determine/for determining the pairing method based on the two devices I/O capabilities and the role each device plays in the process.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/813/0*E4bS7DL8WL6yDisV.png" /><figcaption><em>Pairing procedure and I/O capabilities</em></figcaption></figure><h3>Bonding Modes and Procedure</h3><p>There are two modes:</p><ul><li><strong>Non-Bondable Mode</strong>: this is the default bondable mode for devices. This means the device will not accept bonding. No keys will be exchanged or stored by the device.</li><li><strong>Bondable Mode</strong>: to accept a bonding request, the Peripheral must set the bonding bit in the authentication requirements of the Pairing Request message during pairing. The device exchanges security keys and stores them.</li></ul><p>If a Central wants to bond with a Peripheral device it believes is bondable, it uses the bondable procedure. It initiates pairing with the same bonding bit set in the authentication requirements of the Pairing Request message. If the Peripheral device is bondable, it will respond with the bonding bit set. If all this happens, the keys will be distributed after the link is encrypted and then the keys are stored. Once the keys have been distributed and stored, the pair of devices are said to be Bonded.</p><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>BLE offers several features for securing communication between devices, each with its own advantages and limitations.</p><p>As IoT devices makers, we take care of implementing BLE features into their designs. We are aware of the specific security threats facing BLE and make our best effort to leverage BLE’s security features to mitigate them.</p><h3>Annexe 1: Summary of 4.0 and 4.2 differences</h3><p>Bluetooth 4.2 introduced a new security model, LE Secure connections. LE Secure Connections use an algorithm called Elliptic curve Diffie–Hellman (ECDH) for key generation and a new pairing procedure for the key exchange.</p><p>Using LE Secure Connections with the ECDH algorithms to generate public/private key pairs, the Security Manager protects the communication from passive eavesdropping regardless of the I/O capabilities and pairing methods (Numeric Comparison, Just Works, Passkey Entry, and Out Of Band). It will provide protection from Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) attacks if the application uses Numeric Comparison, Passkey Entry, and Out Of Band as the pairing method.</p><h3>References</h3><p><em>Bluetooth Core Specification</em>, ver. 4.1, Bluetooth SIG, December 2013</p><p><em>Bluetooth Core Specification</em>, ver. 4.2, Bluetooth SIG, December 2014</p><p>Bluetooth Pairing <a href="https://blog.bluetooth.com/bluetooth-pairing-passkey-entry">https://blog.bluetooth.com/bluetooth-pairing-passkey-entry</a> August 2016</p><p>Rosa, T. (2013, May 23). <em>Bypassing Passkey Authentication in Bluetooth Low Energy</em>. Retrieved August 01, 2016, from <a href="https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/309.pdf">https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/309.pdf</a></p><p>Ryan, M. (2013). <em>Bluetooth: With Low Energy Comes Low Security</em>. Retrieved August 01, 2016, from <a href="https://www.usenix.org/conference/woot13/workshop-program/presentation/ryan">https://www.usenix.org/conference/woot13/workshop-program/presentation/ryan</a></p><p><em>This post has been posted on </em><a href="https://rtone.fr/deep-dive-into-bluetooth-le-security/"><em>Rtone blog</em></a><em>. I would like to thanks </em><a href="https://medium.com/u/9c496ed58a55"><em>Jenny Baur</em></a><em> for the review.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d2301d640bfc" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/rtone-iot-security/deep-dive-into-bluetooth-le-security-d2301d640bfc">Deep Dive into Bluetooth LE Security</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/rtone-iot-security">Rtone IoT Security</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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