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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by alfahrisrg on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by alfahrisrg on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by alfahrisrg on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@alfahrisrg?source=rss-c52827b3920f------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[From AI Governance to AI Capabilities: Analysing Indonesian Students’ Readiness for AI-integrated…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@alfahrisrg/from-ai-governance-to-ai-capabilities-analysing-indonesian-students-readiness-for-ai-integrated-380501d56a04?source=rss-c52827b3920f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/380501d56a04</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[indonesia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[artificial-intelligence]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ai-in-education]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ai-policy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[public-policy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[alfahrisrg]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 21 Nov 2026 05:58:50 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-21T05:58:50.782Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><strong>From AI Governance to AI Capabilities: Analysing Indonesian Students’ Readiness for AI-integrated Curriculum</strong></h3><p><strong>Author: Alfahrisrg</strong></p><p><strong>Introduction</strong></p><p>In 2025, Indonesia introduced a new national curriculum that integrated Artificial Intelligence and coding as a new subject for students, from grade five of elementary school through middle school. According to the guidebook published by the Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education of the Republic of Indonesia, the objective of this policy is to develop students’ competencies in line with their grades. Furthermore, by introducing Indonesian students to AI and coding, the government aims to accelerate Indonesia’s broader human capital development, which is stated under the National Long-Term Development Plan (RPJPN) for 2025–2045 of social and economic transformation.</p><p>However, far less attention is given to one fundamental question: How prepared are Indonesian students to benefit from this policy? To address this question, this essay uses Amartya Sen’s capabilities approach and lessons from Singapore’s Public-Private Partnership (PPP) model to examine how Indonesia can ensure that students have the necessary resources and capabilities to benefit from AI in education.</p><p><strong>The Significance</strong></p><p>To assess whether Indonesian students can benefit from this policy, it is important to use Amartya Sen’s capabilities approach to distinguish between the resources available to them and their ability to utilise those resources. In the context of AI integration into the national curriculum, the availability of resources in Indonesia’s education system, such as internet connectivity and school infrastructure, remains constrained. For instance, 65% of students who reside in Indonesia’s underdeveloped regions lack internet connectivity, and 35% of them lack sufficient electricity.</p><p>Beyond infrastructure and connectivity readiness, teachers’ readiness should not be overlooked in the resource discussion. From the perspective of Sen’s Capability Approach, teachers play an important role in enabling students to convert available AI resources into effective learning opportunities. Nevertheless, according to the data from 2012 to 2015, 1.3 million out of 1.6 million teachers in Indonesia did not pass the Teacher Competency Test. Moreover, the quality of Indonesian teachers becomes more concerning when we look at data between rural and urban teachers, where 70% of primary school teachers in disadvantaged areas have never received AI and coding training from the government.</p><p>The other component of Sen’s Capabilities Approach is capabilities, which in this context are students’ capabilities to convert resources into outputs and the skills to do so. However, what is missing in Indonesian students is a lack of foundational skills, such as comprehension, critical thinking, and foundational literacy. These skills are the building blocks in ensuring that students can benefit from AI in education. However, the PISA 2022 report suggests that only 25% of Indonesian students reach a minimum level of reading proficiency.</p><p><strong>Policy Analysis</strong></p><p>Currently, the government has established two main regulatory frameworks for the AI curriculum. First, Permendikdasmen №13/2025 provides the foundation for introducing Coding and Artificial Intelligence into Indonesia’s education system as an elective subject. Through this regulation, the Indonesian government aims to introduce students to computational thinking and AI at an early stage as part of a broader objective to prepare Indonesian students for the digital transformation.</p><p>On the other hand, the Joint Ministerial Decree of 12 March 2026 further regulates the interaction and use cases for students to use AI in the learning process. According to the Joint Ministerial Decree, the implementation of AI and coding curriculum should comply with available schools’ resources, while emphasising the importance of maintaining students’ critical thinking by prohibiting the use of instant AI interaction. In essence, both regulations actually share a similar objective: introducing AI into the education system while ensuring that students understand how to use the technology appropriately.</p><p>However, whilst the Joint Ministerial Decree acknowledges that the implementation should consider the available resources, such as human resources, infrastructure, and institutional readiness, it does not provide any information or action for schools that may not be ready to implement the AI curriculum. Without specific action or recommendation for unprepared schools, the policy risks widening the rural and urban gaps.</p><p>Another potential gap occurs on the implementation side between Permendikdasmen №13/2025 and the Joint Ministerial Decree of 12 March 2026. Permendikdasmen №13/2025 describes the policy as an integral part of Indonesia’s digital transformation, and therefore it mandates that AI curriculum should enter schools from an early age. In contrast, the Joint Ministerial Decree of 12 March 2026 mandates that schools should limit any direct interaction between AI and students. This contradiction is not merely a matter of inconsistency between two policy documents. It also creates uncertainty for schools and teachers about how they should translate these regulations into classroom practices.</p><p><strong>Policy Recommendation</strong></p><p>From the perspective of Sen’s Capability Approach, the Indonesian government has recognised the limits of implementation and the need for students to benefit from AI integration in education. Nevertheless, the challenge remains in ensuring that the necessary conditions are actually available across different schools.</p><p>To address the resource constraints between rural and urban schools, the government can build on the existing policy of the school revitalisation programme. In 2025 alone, the policy has made remarkable achievements in revitalising 16,167 schools across different levels of education. However, the objective of this policy should also include AI in education policy objectives as well. It means that there should be a realignment of what is considered a success of the policy. For instance, instead of measuring the success of the policy by how many schools have been revitalised, the government can focus on whether revitalised schools have the necessary infrastructure, internet connectivity, and technological resources to support AI-based learning. This would shift the measurement of success from the number of schools revitalised towards their actual readiness to implement AI in education, while also ensuring alignment across government policies.</p><p>The issue of students’ capabilities should also be addressed through improving teachers’ quality. Considering the government’s limitations in providing sufficient teacher upskilling programmes, it is recommended to explore Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) to support AI training for Indonesian teachers. Taking inspiration from Singapore’s partnership with Google, the Indonesian government can establish similar collaborations with technology companies to equip teachers with the necessary technical and pedagogical skills to deliver AI subjects in the classroom. However, these programmes should also ensure that teachers can integrate AI while improving students’ critical thinking and independent learning capabilities.</p><p>Furthermore, the government should establish an educational AI regulatory framework, designed specifically for rural regions. The point of this recommendation is to provide a controlled environment for rural schools to test different approaches to implementing AI in education. For instance, schools could prioritise foundational AI literacy before introducing students to direct AI tools. Through this approach, the government can better understand what implementation models work in rural regions, while rural schools can integrate AI according to their capacity and readiness.</p><p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p><p>Indonesia has taken an important step by introducing AI into its national curriculum. However, providing regulation alone is insufficient. What matters more is whether students possess the necessary resources and capabilities to benefit from AI. Through Amartya Sen’s capabilities approach, the findings suggest that Indonesia should address both the resources and capabilities aspects by realigning existing government policies that support AI in education, expanding collaboration with the private sector to enhance teachers’ quality and readiness, and establishing a regulatory framework to accommodate rural schools in implementing an AI subject in the classroom.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=380501d56a04" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Beyond Constitutional Obligation: Rethinking the Effectiveness of Indonesia’s Education Spending]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@alfahrisrg/beyond-constitutional-obligation-rethinking-the-effectiveness-of-indonesias-education-spending-edfe4af6e631?source=rss-c52827b3920f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/edfe4af6e631</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[oecd-economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[public-policy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[education-policy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[public-investment]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[government-and-politics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[alfahrisrg]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 11 Oct 2026 03:47:13 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-11T03:47:13.455Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Muhammad Ikhsan Alfahri</p><p><strong>Introduction</strong></p><p>Public investment in education has long been integral to Indonesia’s development. The significance of education in Indonesia is demonstrated in Indonesia’s constitutional mandate, Article 31, Paragraph 4, stating that the government shall prioritise the budget for education to a minimum of 20% of the State Budget (APBN) and the Regional Budgets (APBD). Complying with the constitutional mandate, the Indonesian government has always claimed to fulfil the 20% allocation, and the budget has also increased national expenditure on education over the past few years, from Rp550.0 trillion in 2021 up to approximately Rp722.6 trillion in 2025.</p><p>However, despite the enormous resource allocation for education, indicators such as the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) suggest that Indonesia’s education quality remains behind. The PISA 2025 report illustrates that Indonesian students’ performance in math, science, and reading was below the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries’ average. Indonesia’s PISA results show that policymakers must rethink the country’s broader education spending strategy, particularly regarding educational outcomes. However, the PISA results do not mean that education spending in Indonesia is ineffective; rather, it demonstrates that there is a persistent learning challenge despite Indonesia’s substantial investment in education.</p><p><strong>The Significance</strong></p><p>These two contrasting figures between Indonesia’s 20% budget allocation for education and the PISA 2025 results raise an important question about the effectiveness of Indonesia’s education spending. Although the Indonesian government has fulfilled its constitutional obligation to the education sector, it continues to face considerable challenges in improving student learning outcomes.</p><p>This essay argues that Indonesia has correctly identified its national priority by complying with the constitutional allocation mandate. <strong>Nevertheless, the government should strengthen the link between education spending and learning outcomes by improving programme evaluation, supporting evidence-based programmes, and directing resources towards students and schools with the greatest learning needs.</strong></p><p><strong>The Policy Problems</strong></p><p>In early 2025, President Prabowo Subianto emphasised that the 2025 education spending is the highest in history, with Rp724.3 trillion of Rp2,701.4 trillion allocated for the education sector. However, by the end of 2025, the budget realisation, which refers to the actual amount of money being spent, for the education sector fell below the 20% threshold. The then Indonesian Minister of Finance, Purbaya Yudhi Sadewa, argued that the unprecedented shocks, such as natural disasters, increased government expenses and, in turn, reduced education budget realisation. This example illustrates how competing fiscal demands can constrain the government’s efforts to translate its education spending commitments into sustained improvements in learning outcomes.</p><p>Beyond competing fiscal demands, Indonesia’s education priorities predominantly focus on inputs, but lack in translating them into outcomes. For instance, in the 2025 budget allocation, teacher welfare allowances increased quite significantly, while the broader education programmes, such as school operational assistance, the Smart Indonesia Program (PIP), and school infrastructure revitalisation, also took a large portion of the total educational budget. While continued investment in teachers and educational infrastructure remains necessary, these inputs should also be accompanied by stronger mechanisms to assess whether they translate into improvements in learning outcomes.</p><p><strong>The Policy Framework</strong></p><p>It is not to say that Indonesia’s existing education programmes should be abandoned; rather, the government should incorporate performance evidence to improve the implementation and effectiveness of existing programmes. The challenge, however, is finding the right framework to ensure public expenditure aligns with the intended results. The OECD’s principles of performance-informed budgeting provide a practical approach by integrating performance information into budget decisions, allowing the government to evaluate existing programmes, identify implementation gaps, and make informed adjustments.</p><p>In Indonesia’s context, educational programmes, such as teacher welfare and school revitalisation, should be systematically and periodically evaluated to determine whether their implementation translates into measurable improvements and to inform policy adjustments. Nonetheless, the OECD framework does not imply improved PISA scores in Indonesia or proof that Indonesia’s education policies are ineffective. Instead, it provides a structured approach to examining how education budget allocations align with their intended outcomes.</p><p><strong>The Policy Recommendations</strong></p><p>To translate the framework into an actionable plan to improve learning outcomes, the government should<strong> </strong>first establish indicators to measure whether programmes achieve their intended objectives to complement the existing financial report. In practice, every programme becomes part of the budget cycle, making it easier for the government to assess the effectiveness of programme implementation.</p><p>Additionally, the government can identify the gaps and where additional support is needed. This approach is consistent with a 2020 World Bank report, which found that education expenditure is often measured by quantities of inputs rather than the actual outcomes. For instance, the government only highlights the number of revitalised schools in Indonesia, rather than the actual school performance after being revitalised. Through this approach, the assessment data provides information on how the funding is being used and, ultimately, how educational actors are responding to the improvement of the input and the remaining challenges.</p><p>More importantly, these findings can inform the Ministry of Finance’s review of programme effectiveness and budget allocations. So, rather than treating programme evaluation as a reporting cycle, the government can use the assessment results to identify which programmes require additional support and where spending needs to be adjusted. By following these steps, the government can improve the effectiveness of education spending while ensuring that the constitutional mandate of allocating at least 20% continues to be fulfilled.</p><p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p><p>In conclusion, Indonesia has correctly identified the significance of education by complying with the constitutional budget allocation. However, this commitment to education should be accompanied by stronger mechanisms to evaluate programme outcomes and incorporate the findings into budget decisions. By following the OECD’s principles of performance-informed budgeting, the government can improve the implementation of existing education programmes while identifying where further support is needed. This would provide a more evidence-based approach and ensure that public investment in education contributes to better learning outcomes across Indonesia.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=edfe4af6e631" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Is STEM the Answer? Evaluating Indonesia’s STEM Push and Its Structural Challenges]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@alfahrisrg/is-stem-the-answer-evaluating-indonesias-stem-push-and-its-structural-challenges-e92037114c5f?source=rss-c52827b3920f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e92037114c5f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[public-policy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ai]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[indonesia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[education]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[stem]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[alfahrisrg]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 10 Sep 2026 11:22:18 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-10T11:22:18.599Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Author: Muhammad Ikhsan Alfahri</em></p><p><strong>Introduction</strong></p><p>As the most populous country in Southeast Asia, Indonesia faces high youth unemployment (aged 15–24) at around 17% (Agsita et al., 2025). One reason for youth unemployment in Indonesia is the mismatch between graduates’ skills and industry needs. According to the Minister of Manpower, Yassierli, Indonesia’s new graduates face a skill mismatch of 30–40% (ANTARA News, 2026). To address this issue, the government is introducing several initiatives, such as opening new vocational training programs, establishing the national internship programme, and accelerating the number of Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM) graduates from universities.</p><p>The number of STEM graduates in Indonesia is relatively low compared to other Southeast Asian counterparts, with only 18.47% STEM graduates, according to Bappenas (2023). This number is far lower than Singapore’s 34.3% and Malaysia’s 37.19% (Kanopi FEB UI, 2025). By looking at the numbers, it may seem imperative for the government to encourage more graduates from STEM majors to attain what Malaysia and Singapore have done. The logic is straightforward: Singapore is the only developed country in the region, whereas Malaysia has been able to transform its economy and attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in technology and manufacturing, such as the Australian firm Lynas’ investment in Malaysia to build a refinery to process heavy rare earths (HRE) (International Trade Administration, 2025). Therefore, if Indonesia attempts to follow its neighbours’ path, then putting more emphasis on STEM sounds reasonable.</p><p>Using Indonesian government statements, labour statistics, and existing literature, this essay evaluates whether increasing STEM graduates is the answer to Indonesia’s youth unemployment crisis. Does the issue stem from an education system that produces more social and humanities graduates and fewer STEM graduates, or is there a structural impediment that makes it improbable for graduates to secure formal employment? Furthermore, taking the case of Malaysia’s 60:40 policy, it may offer a comparative understanding of whether increasing the supply of STEM graduates in Indonesia alone is sufficient to address the youth unemployment crisis.</p><p><strong>What is Driving Indonesia’s STEM Initiatives</strong></p><p>Indonesia’s decision to increase its STEM graduates stems from three major factors: global demands, national priorities, and national challenges. Globally, there is a growing appetite for nations to seize the opportunities presented by the rise of Artificial Intelligence (AI). According to a report from New York University (2025), the global AI race is shaping how nations perceive power and dominance in the global order, with China and the US leading the race (Zaffaroni &amp; Haar, 2025). This is particularly important for Global South countries like Indonesia to seize the economic and political opportunities of AI development, especially under Prabowo’s high-profile diplomacy, in which he aims to increase Indonesia’s profile and role in a multipolar world order (Muhamad, 2026). As a result, increasing STEM graduates may help Indonesia’s ambitions in the global AI development race.<br> Moreover, Indonesia’s eight-point national priorities highlight the importance of downstream processing (Prabowo &amp; Gibran, 2024). Downstream processing aims to reduce Indonesia’s dependence on exporting raw materials and instead process the commodities to increase their value-added and competitiveness in the global market (Putri, 2024). Nevertheless, realising the downstreaming policy requires more than investment in building the industry ecosystem; it also requires developing Indonesia’s human capital and skilled workers. This is where the gap prevails between the intended goals and the human capital, as Indonesia produces less than 20% of STEM graduates. Therefore, Indonesia’s intention to increase the supply of STEM graduates derives from its national priorities for the downstreaming process.</p><p>Furthermore, Indonesia’s high youth unemployment has become a lingering issue at the national level. This is particularly concerning because Indonesia pledges to achieve 8% economic growth, and with the rise of youth unemployment, it can be challenging for the Indonesian government to realise its national ambition (Cabinet Secretariat of the Republic of Indonesia, 2025). Adding to that issue, approximately 7.02 million people fall into the educated unemployment category, according to the Bureau of Statistics of the Republic of Indonesia (2025), despite less than 10% of the population having a bachelor’s degree (Yashinta, 2023). Hence, the Indonesian Ministry of Higher Education, Science, and Technology plans to close majors deemed irrelevant, such as education and social sciences majors, and focus more on ‘future and relevant’ majors, which refers to STEM (Tempo English, 2026).</p><p><strong>The Unresolved Structural Issues</strong></p><p>However, increasing STEM alone may not be sufficient for Indonesia to address the skill mismatch between graduates and industry, resulting in high youth unemployment. Indonesia’s youth unemployment crisis is not solely caused by the failure of higher education to produce relevant graduates, or in this case, STEM graduates for the job market; rather, it is a multidimensional issue that the Indonesian government has overlooked. These structural issues encompass three domains: first, the weakening of formal jobs in Indonesia; second, the slowdown of Foreign Direct Investment; and third, Indonesia’s education policy focus.</p><p>First, recent data from the Bureau of Statistics of the Republic of Indonesia suggests that informal occupations reached 57.80% as of August 2025 (Ibrahim, 2025). Meanwhile, the share of people working full-time jobs steadily declined from 68.07% in August 2024 to 66.19% in February 2025, while part-time work rose from 23.94% to 25.81% (Sandi, 2025). And with 1.8 million new graduates every year, the pace of formal job openings and the number of graduates are fundamentally mismatched (Tempo, 2023). Therefore, Indonesia’s youth unemployment crisis is driven by a deficit of high-quality formal jobs rather than a mere shortage of STEM graduates.</p><p>Secondly, frequent regulatory changes, coupled with President Prabowo’s protectionist stance, may discourage foreign investment in Indonesia. According to a report from Jakarta Globe (2026), since Prabowo took office in 2024, the FDI-to-GDP ratio has fallen to just 1.61%, with the annual FDI growth in 2025 rising by only 0.1% compared to 21% growth in 2024 (Reuters, 2026). These figures are relatively low compared to other regional competitors, such as Vietnam at 4.31% and Cambodia at 9.34%, respectively (Jakarta Globe, 2026). As a developing country, FDI is not crucial for the government to achieve its ambitious 8% economic growth, but it still has the potential to create new jobs, especially in the manufacturing and technology industries. Without an adequate supply of FDI, driven by persistent regulatory changes, Indonesia’s STEM policy may not yield the expected employment outcomes, instead creating a structural surplus of STEM graduates trapped in underemployment.</p><p>Lastly, Indonesia’s education policy paradigm predominantly prioritises enrollment numbers over educational outcomes. Historically, this prioritisation of numbers and statistics was apparent in the 80s and 90s, when the government introduced 6- and 9-year compulsory education, aiming to address Indonesia’s illiteracy issues and improve labour market outcomes. Through this initiative, Indonesia’s Gross Enrollment Ratio (GER) reaches roughly 104.9% nationally, while the Net Enrollment Rate (NER) for primary and secondary education stands at 99% and 68%, respectively (Statistics Indonesia, 2026). However, Indonesia should focus beyond the mere numbers or statistics paradigm. The recent push for STEM graduates mirrors past policies focused on enrollment, potentially neglecting improvements in graduates’ quality and institutional capabilities.</p><p><strong>The Lesson from Malaysia’s 60:40 STEM Policy</strong></p><p>The structural issues in Indonesia are not unique and share conditions with Malaysia. Malaysia introduced a policy aiming to increase STEM enrollment in 1967, known as the 60:40 policy. This policy targets a minimum of 60 per cent of students in the STEM field, while the remaining 40 per cent is allocated to non-STEM fields. To achieve this STEM enrollment target in Malaysia, the government supports ministry- and state-led STEM activities (Malaysia Ministry of Education, 2012; 2016). Similar to Indonesia’s objective to move up the value chain through downstreaming and moving from a raw materials exporter, Malaysia in the past relied heavily on traditional agriculture and produced raw materials, such as tin and rubber (Ibrahim, 2022, p. 125). However, Malaysia’s emphasis on STEM began during the then Prime Minister Tun Mahathir’s tenure in the 1980s, when he aimed to develop the industrial sector of Malaysia, including trades, the oil and gas industry, and petroleum.</p><p>Macroeconomically, the 60:40 policy contributed to Malaysia’s development in manufacturing, electronics, and refineries, making it the only country outside of China to process heavy rare earth elements like dysprosium and terbium (Reuters, 2025). Moreover, through the implementation of 60 per cent STEM enrollment, Malaysia was able to foster socioeconomic mobility. The effectiveness of the policy for socioeconomic mobility showed a significant result, with the unemployment rate declining from 37.3% in 1976 to 20.7% in 1984 (Ibrahim, 2022, p. 132).</p><p>However, despite being in place for over 50 years, the 60:40 policy has failed to reach its 60 per cent ambitious target. In 2024, STEM enrollment reached only 50.83 per cent, despite huge incentives and initiatives from the government (BERNAMA, 2026). Furthermore, Malaysia continues to struggle with underemployment and a shortage of STEM jobs, forcing many STEM graduates to pivot to non-STEM industries (<em>STEM Enrolment Climbs</em>, 2025). As a result, the higher proportion of STEM graduates does not directly translate into national development, creating a structural mismatch where STEM graduates are underutilised due to inadequate industry ecosystems.</p><p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p><p>The Indonesian government’s decision to increase enrollment in STEM is a reasonable response to the country’s ambition to develop its downstream industries, driven by the global AI race, and the skill mismatch among new graduates. However, increasing the number of STEM graduates alone will not address Indonesia’s youth unemployment crisis. The lesson from Malaysia illustrates how focusing on the numbers without creating sufficient high-quality jobs in the STEM fields can create another issue. And even after decades of prioritising STEM, Malaysia has not reached its 60 per cent target and continues to face underemployment among STEM graduates.</p><p>Therefore, if Indonesia continues to focus primarily on the number of STEM graduates, it risks producing STEM graduates whose skills are not fully utilised, while the economy continues to generate informal and low-quality employment. The problem is that it will weaken the return on investment in higher education, limit the benefits of downstreaming, and make Indonesia’s ambition of achieving higher economic growth more difficult. In other words, I believe the problem is not that Indonesia produces too few STEM graduates, but that Indonesia has not yet built an ecosystem capable of fully utilising the graduates it produces.</p><p>Alternatively, Indonesia should shift from merely a number or statistic towards a broader human capital and employment strategy. Increasing STEM capacity should continue, but building strong industry linkages is necessary.</p><blockquote><strong>If Indonesia wants STEM to become a driver of economic transformation, it must first ensure that there is a long-term and holistic strategy capable of absorbing and utilising its STEM talent.</strong></blockquote><p>Otherwise, Indonesia may succeed in producing more STEM graduates, but fail to produce the jobs and economic transformation that the policy was intended to achieve.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e92037114c5f" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[If We’re Not at the Table, We’re on the Menu: Indonesia’s Strategic Autonomy amid Hegemonic…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@alfahrisrg/if-were-not-at-the-table-we-re-on-the-menu-indonesia-s-strategic-autonomy-amid-hegemonic-bc6e4a2c0002?source=rss-c52827b3920f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/bc6e4a2c0002</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[diplomacy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[indonesia-foreign-policy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[middle-power]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[prabowo]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[international-affairs]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[alfahrisrg]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 01 Mar 2026 13:49:38 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-03-01T13:49:38.003Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><strong>If We’re Not at the Table, We’re on the Menu: Indonesia’s Strategic Autonomy amid Hegemonic Competition and Multilateral Decline</strong></h3><p>by: Alfahrisrg</p><p><strong>The Emergence of New Hegemons and the Erosion of Multilateralism</strong></p><p>In recent years, the world community has witnessed a new geopolitical reality, characterized by the emergence of hegemons and the erosion of international law and norms. From the ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine, the displacement palestinean in Gaza, the lack of funding to the UN bodies, and the arrival of the Trump administration in the White House have all undermined the old world order, underpinned by shared consensus and norms and the existence of multilateral organisations. These perilous geopolitical circumstances will affect countries across the globe, especially small and middle power countries, in which their survival lies within international cooperation, a stable geopolitical environment, and adherence to international law.</p><p>In the world of realism, power is the currency of international politics, and therefore, hegemons, like the United States (US), Russia, and China, will see this environment as an opportunity to exercise their maximum power and may well project their dominance and influence on the world stage. Whether to maintain its relative power on the international stage or to prevent stronger actors from emerging or challenging its influence, a hegemon always acts on its national interests rather than international consensus. In a recent interview with The New York Times, President Trump made it clear that international law will not stop him from exercising his interests on the global stage, and instead, his morality is the only thing that could limit his power. Similarly, Russian President Vladimir Putin, in many of his remarks, made a blatant statement regarding the sovereignty of Ukraine, while President Xi Jinping from China is consistent with his objective to “reunify” Taiwan under the rule of the Communist Party of China (CCP).</p><p>Given that major powers are becoming increasingly unrestrained, the survival of middle powers is becoming more contentious. Historically, middle power countries, such as the European Union, India, Brazil, South Africa, and Indonesia, were an indispensable part of international architecture. They could use their voice to advocate for more robust implementation of rules-based order and equal participation for all nations at the world forums. However, as the world shifts from a rules-based order to the law of the jungle, a new approach is needed for middle powers, not only to ensure that they are not on the menu, but at the table with the superpowers.</p><p><strong>Indonesia’s High-Profile Diplomacy in a Fragmented World</strong></p><p>As a rising middle power, Indonesia has long been regarded as a reliable partner for both spectrums between the US and China. This reliability stems from Indonesia’s foreign policy principle of non-alliance, in which Indonesia will not pick a side amidst global rivalry, and instead, pursue its national interests and promote peace and stability. As a result of this principle, Indonesia was able to seize the benefits from both sides. Historically, Indonesia has relied on China when it comes to investment and development projects, such as the Belt and Road Initiatives (BRI). On the other hand, militarily, Indonesia prefers to align with the Western partners, whether through joint exercises in the Natuna Sea or military cooperation with Australia.</p><p>Although the long-standing principle is integral for Indonesia to project its national interest globally, there is a gradual shift of priority between the previous and the current administration. Previously, under President Joko Widodo, Indonesia emphasized the importance of regionalism and close cooperation with its closest neighbours. This is manifested through numerous occasions and efforts that the previous government has made, including becoming the chair of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 2023. Additionally, former foreign minister of Indonesia, Retno Marsudi, made an enormous effort to alleviate the tension that occurred in ASEAN, including her effort to mediate the Myanmar conflict. That does not mean that Indonesia was not involved in global issues, as Indonesia was one of the few countries that visited both Russia and Ukraine to mediate the conflict, despite little to no breakthrough coming from that visit. Instead, the priority from the previous administration was regional cooperation, especially in the context of ASEAN.</p><p>In contrast, President Prabowo, a former military general and a son-in-law of Indonesia’s dictator, Soeharto, is eager to put Indonesia under the international spotlight. In his first year as president, Prabowo has made numerous trips and actively engaged in myriad international forums, from attending the Shanghai Cooperation Summit, speaking at the United Nations General Assembly, and joining BRICS as a permanent member. Recently, however, Indonesia also joined the Trump board of peace, aiming to oversee the reconstruction of Gaza as part of the fragile ceasefire between Hamas and the Israeli government. The decision to join the board of peace is debatable, as some would argue that the group attempts to undermine the role of the United Nations to address global issues and allow President Trump to hold unrestricted veto power within the organization. Regionally, Indonesia seems to be less inclined to participate in ASEAN matters. The military outbreak on the border between Thailand and Cambodia shows that Indonesia may not put its priority in the region, despite advocating for peaceful solutions for both sides.</p><p>Overall, President Prabowo’s objective to elevate Indonesia’s role on the world stage reflects a clear ambition to avoid marginalization. Nevertheless, in a system defined by hegemonic competition, such high-profile diplomacy risks either pulling Indonesia into the gravitational pull of superpowers between the US and China or weakening its strategic autonomy amid global turbulence.</p><p><strong>Maintaining Strategic Autonomy: Strategic Realism in Indonesia’s Foreign Policy Outlook</strong></p><p>As a middle power, Indonesia does not have the military, economic, or technological capacity to shape the international system on its own. In a system dominated by great powers, Indonesia must<strong> </strong>adapt rather than dictate. Whilst Indonesia’s commitments enhance legitimacy through joining and aligning its interests with both superpowers, Indonesia should see the world not as what it wishes to be, but as it is, or strategic realism.</p><p>Strategic realism emphasizes the importance of practicing pragmatic realism, where autonomy is not neutrality, it is a freedom of action. In practice, Indonesia can maintain its ties with both China and the US, while still minimising dependence on both. Minimizing dependency can be manifested through selective multilateralism within ASEAN, where it is used to amplify diplomatic cooperation rather than as substitutes for national power and contested spheres of influence.</p><p>In conclusion, the urgent need for Indonesia to maintain this strategic autonomy in an increasingly unpredictable geopolitical environment. Considering the hegemonic competition and the weakening of multilateral institutions, this strategic autonomy serves not as an expression of neutrality but as a mechanism to preserve flexibility, safeguard national interests, and prevent external actors from exerting influence over Indonesia’s national interests.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=bc6e4a2c0002" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[From Geopolitical Chessboard to Central Player: What It Takes for ASEAN to Stay Relevant in a…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@alfahrisrg/from-geopolitical-chessboard-to-central-player-what-it-takes-for-asean-to-stay-relevant-in-a-0b83d58256b9?source=rss-c52827b3920f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/0b83d58256b9</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[geopolitics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[international-relations]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[diplomacy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[southeast-asia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[asean]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[alfahrisrg]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 13 Dec 2025 06:37:29 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-12-13T06:37:29.775Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><strong>From Geopolitical Chessboard to Central Player: What It Takes for ASEAN to Stay Relevant in a Polarizing World</strong></h3><p>by: alfahrisrg</p><p><strong>Geopolitical Outlook and the Great Power Rivalry</strong></p><p>The previous world order, born after the Cold War in the early 1990s, characterized by the hegemonic power of the United States and its Western allies, which shaped the world order under liberal democracy through the creation of numerous multilateral organizations and shared international values, has gradually come to an end. The global community is now entering a new world order, where power is distributed more proportionately, diplomatic relation is built upon national interest, and multilateral organisations are diluted. Moreover, the emergence of great power rivalry between China and the United States has added nuance to the already unpredictable environment of geopolitics. In contrast to the previous world order, this new environment poses significant threats to regional peace and stability, especially for the region that is trying to hold its position in the geopolitical landscape, from merely being a chessboard to a regional actor.</p><p>Some analysts believe that regionalism, which is manifested through regional institutions, will still play a crucial role in shaping the new world order, maintaining peace and stability, and ensuring the existence of international laws. These regional organisations, such as the European Union (EU), the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), are some of the most prominent regional architectures in their respective region. However, these multilateral bodies are currently under heavy strain with the ongoing war in Europe between Russia and Ukraine, the ambiguous position among the Gulf States countries to end the genocide in Gaza, and the fragile ceasefire between Thailand and Cambodia in Southeast Asia. As a result, there has been a huge question mark regarding the relevance of regional organisations in dealing with the new world order.</p><p>Unlike the European Union (EU), which is a supranational organization that has a legal authority over its member states and has a binding law that can be enforced in its member states, the Association of Southeast Asia (ASEAN) works differently. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations, which was first introduced in 1967 by five founding members of Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand, aims primarily to preserve the regional peace and stability through informal dialogue, mutual respect, and noninterference. These principles allow ASEAN member states to voluntarily attain their shared goals without the legal binding that may interfere with their domestic affairs. Although the ASEAN diplomatic mechanism is fairly unique compared to the EU, it successfully preserves the primary goal of achieving regional peace and stability, at least from an external point of view.</p><p><strong>Internal Conflicts Expose ASEAN Vulnerability</strong></p><p>However, the regional peace and stability that ASEAN has achieved comes from negligence by ASEAN to properly managing interstate and intrastate conflicts, such as the unresolved border dispute between Thailand and Cambodia, the ongoing issue in the South China Sea, and the prolonged civil war in Myanmar. ASEAN’s inability to address its regional conflicts stems from the nature of ASEAN, which is not a supranational organization like the EU, but merely a regional milieu.</p><p>Aside from the legal authority aspect, ASEAN’s principles of noninterference and consensus-building have impeded any initiatives from both ASEAN as a regional body and its member states to act swiftly whenever intrastate issues occur. For instance, when the coup in Myanmar happened in 2021, it took three months for ASEAN member states to make a joint statement, partly because some member states believed that the coup was Myanmar’s domestic affairs, whilst others were keen to mediate the situation.</p><p>Although ASEAN already has several mechanisms to address interstate and intrastate conflicts, such as the ASEAN Way and the formation of the ASEAN High Council, these two mechanisms are not adequate to overcome the preexistence conflicts. The ASEAN Way emphasizes the importance of ASEAN’s quiet diplomacy has not been fully adhered to in reality. In multiple instances, ASEAN member states often bypass the mechanism of the ASEAN Way and instead bring the issue to external parties. One example is the Philippines in 2013, which brought the issue of the South China Sea dispute to the international body, bypassing any consultation with ASEAN. On the other hand, a similar condition applies to the ASEAN High Council, where it acts as a recommendator over disagreements or conflicts, making it less reliable for the member states to utilize it as an effective conflict mechanism.</p><p>The recent ASEAN Summit 2025 in Malaysia exposed ASEAN’s vulnerability in managing its regional affairs. Despite the triumph of being able to pressure Thailand and Cambodia to sign a ceasefire deal, it only came after the United States and China put pressure on both sides. This situation demonstrates an unpleasant reality for ASEAN to manage its own backyard, while at the same time, it signals that the region is prone to global superpowers’ influence.</p><p><strong>Becoming a Central Player Requires Unity Among ASEAN Member States</strong></p><p>Considering the obstacles that ASEAN faces as a regional organisation, it is imperative for all member states to acknowledge the limitations of their own regional organisation to handle its regional affairs. ASEAN’s core principles of noninterference, consensus-building, and non-law enforcement were highly successful in helping the region to accelerate its development and shared prosperity in the past. However, as the world keeps changing at the speed of light, so does ASEAN. Therefore, in order for ASEAN to stay relevant, not only for its member states but also for the global community, it requires significant reform within ASEAN.</p><p>Moving forward, as the torch of ASEAN’s chair will be passed from Malaysia to the Philippines, it is essential for the upcoming chair to strengthen its unity among all ASEAN member states.</p><blockquote>As the world becomes much more unpredictable and perilous, the survival and success of ASEAN lie within its strong unity among its member states. This is a prerequisite for ASEAN to move from simply a geopolitical chessboard to becoming a central player in the world order.</blockquote><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=0b83d58256b9" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The First Island Chain Flashpoint: What Triggered the Latest Diplomatic Clash Between China and…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@alfahrisrg/the-first-island-chain-flashpoint-what-triggered-the-latest-diplomatic-clash-between-china-and-1abe7577648b?source=rss-c52827b3920f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/1abe7577648b</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[geopolitics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[taiwan]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[international-relations]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[xi-jinping]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sanae-takaichi]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[alfahrisrg]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 30 Nov 2025 09:08:32 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-11-30T09:08:32.019Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><strong>The First Island Chain Flashpoint: What Triggered the Latest Diplomatic Clash Between China and Japan?</strong></h3><p>by: alfahrisrg</p><p><strong>East Asia Diplomatic Fragility</strong></p><p>The region of East Asia, consisting of four major powers: the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Japan, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), and the Republic of Korea (ROK), is known for its fragile diplomatic architecture among its nations. Despite its relatively homogeneous society, East Asian countries are highly divided when it comes to ideological standpoint, security and military alliances, and economic dependency.</p><p>These divisions are rooted in historical events that shape the East Asian community both internally and externally. Internally, East Asia countries were facing a bloody massacre in the 18th and 19th centuries under Japan’s fascist ideology that attempted to conquer Korea and China, resulting in a Sino-Japanese War that happened multiple times in a decade and Japan’s occupation of Korea. Whilst externally, the East Asian region was once a place for a proxy war between the world’s major powers after World War II, resulting in unresolved issues such as border disputes, nationalist sentiment, and mass destruction weapons. All of these issues, combined with recent geopolitical tension in many parts of the world, have made East Asia vulnerable to any future war or conflict in the future.</p><p><strong>What Sparked the Latest Diplomatic Clash?</strong></p><p>Recently, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi made a blunt statement regarding the possibility of using the self-defence law, which allows Japan to deploy its military forces near Taiwan if China invades Taiwan, a hypothetical statement that infuriated Beijing. Takaichi’s answer represents a shift from Japan’s ambiguous foreign policy when it comes to Taiwan issues, avoiding confrontation with Beijing and maintaining the status quo of the self-ruling island.</p><p>This foreign policy approach has made Beijing hesitant to capture Taiwan as part of its goal to reunify China because of the unknown consequences of taking such action, and therefore, neither Japan’s previous prime ministers nor the Communist Party of China (CCP) took any real action towards Taiwan. Despite China’s effort to reunify through dialogue and peaceful coexistence, there has been no sign from the ruling party in Taiwan to welcome the reunification. Therefore, there is a worry in Taiwan and Japan that China will use its military forces to attain its ultimate goal of unifying Taiwan.</p><p>From Japan’s point of view, Takaichi’s statement towards Taiwan has embarked on a new foreign policy departure from passivism to a more vocal foreign policy, whereas from China’s standpoint, her remarks signaled Beijing to prepare for the potential of Japan’s military intervention regarding the reunification of Taiwan. Beijing’s initial response was demanding that Takaichi retract her statement on Taiwan issues, as it had crossed the red line that no country has ever crossed before, including the United States.</p><p>However, Tokyo has refused to retract Takaichi’s statement on Taiwan, while acknowledging that future comment on Taiwan needs to be crafted carefully. To ease the tension between Beijing and Tokyo, Takaichi’s government decides to approach Beijing’s anger with cool-headedness by advocating for dialogue and peaceful settlement. Nevertheless, there is no sign from Beijing to alleviate the tension, and instead, several Chinese diplomats use the Wolf Warrior diplomacy on social media to put pressure on Japan by using harsh, inappropriate, and fiery diplomatic tones.</p><p>Beyond diplomatic words, Beijing’s reaction has so far imposed economic sanctions on Japanese seafood and issued a travel warning for Chinese citizens not traveling to Japan. These measures towards Japan have sparked anxiety in Japan, considering that China is the biggest exporter of Japanese seafood and almost a quarter of Japan’s tourism comes from China. But the real question is why Japan insists that the Taiwan issue is also part of Japan’s interest in the region, and what the future will look like for Sino-Japanese relations in the foreseeable future?</p><p><strong>Takaichi’s Close Ties with Taiwan</strong></p><p>The emergence of Sanae Takaichi, a hawkish and hard-line conservative, as Japan’s first female prime minister from the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), resembles Japan’s latest right-wing conservative prime minister, Shinzo Abe. During her tenure as a lawmaker, Takaichi was known for her frequent visits to Yasukuni Shrine, a sacred yet controversial place to commemorate Japan’s war, including those who were convicted of war crimes during the Pacific War.</p><p>This frequent visit from Takaichi to the war shrine signals her foreign policy towards China, in which she rejected Beijing’s claim of the total number of Chinese people who were murdered by the Japanese atrocities. Moreover, before she became a prime minister, Takaichi had a relatively closed relationship with Taiwan. Although it is unclear what the main purpose of her past visit to Taiwan was, especially in her capacity as a lawmaker, politically speaking, her trip to Taiwan signals her support for the self-ruling island.</p><p><strong>The First Island Chain as a Containment Strategy</strong></p><p>Aside from Takaichi’s personal connection with Taiwan, Japan’s three strategic documents in 2022 were characterized by Japan’s anxious tone towards the regional peace and stability in East Asia. The documents elucidate Japan’s long-term military and security goals, from enhancing defence capabilities (Japan’s self-defence force) to strengthening the US-Japan alliance in the Pacific, which is known to be the first island chain.</p><p>The concept of the first island chain was first introduced in the 50s as a geostrategic barrier to contain the influence of China and the Soviet Union by drawing a superficial line from Japan’s Ryukyu Islands to Taiwan, and between those islands, there are military bases that act as a defense mechanism for both Japan and Taiwan. For the United States, this concept of the first island chain has become a strategic balance towards Beijing’s military rise in the region, while for Japan, the concept not only offers military reassurance from its biggest ally, but also holds its interests in preserving the free and open Indo-Pacific. However, in recent years, there has been a persistent threat from Beijing to project its naval capabilities beyond the first island chain, especially around the Taiwan Strait.</p><blockquote>Taiwan’s geographic position is not only crucial for Japan’s security, but also holds an important sea line for trade from the Indian Ocean to Japan, with approximately 25% of Japan’s exports and 30% of Japan’s imports crossing the Taiwan straits from the Indian Ocean. Hence, any disruption in the sea line, including China’s military presence in the Taiwan Strait or even a military invasion, is considered a threat to Japan’s national interest.</blockquote><p>This is why, when faced with a question in the parliament regarding the potential of China’s military invasion of Taiwan, Prime Minister Takaichi mentioned the possibility of invoking Article 9 in Japan’s constitution, in which the use of military forces is allowed merely for defending Japan’s national security.</p><p><strong>What the Future Will Look Like for Japan-China Relations?</strong></p><p>Currently, the diplomatic spat between Beijing and Tokyo has entered a new round beyond economic and diplomatic pressures. Both sides are adamant to ease the tension, and instead, both China and Tokyo have elevated their security and military operations in the region, a reckless decision that may lead both countries to an unimaginable military clash. The recent incident of China’s drone and patrol entering Japan’s Yonaguni Island has sparked anger in Tokyo. Some analysts believe that this action from Beijing represents a reciprocal provocative measure towards Tokyo’s hesitation to retract its statement on Taiwan.</p><p>Amid all of these tumultuous situations in East Asian, some efforts have been made by Washington to alleviate the tension between Japan and China, with President Trump making a phone call to Japan’s Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi and China’s President Xi Jinping. However, Trump’s effort offers little breakthrough, and the diplomatic spat between the two neighbours will likely be prolonged. For Takaichi, this issue has increased national support for her government, as recent national polls suggest that Takaichi’s acceptance rate sits around 80%. On the other hand, the Chinese Communist Party will likely leverage this issue to spread the ultra-nationalist sentiments in China towards Japan.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1abe7577648b" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[A Friend to All, but a Leader to None: Rethinking Indonesia’s Friend to All Diplomacy]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@alfahrisrg/a-friend-to-all-but-a-leader-to-none-rethinking-indonesias-friend-to-all-diplomacy-3182b9844308?source=rss-c52827b3920f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/3182b9844308</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[prabowo-subianto]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[indonesia-foreign-policy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[asean]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[international-relations]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[foreign-policy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[alfahrisrg]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 23 Nov 2025 04:39:05 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-11-23T04:39:05.387Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>by: alfahrisrg</p><p><strong>Indonesia’s Long-standing Foreign Policy</strong></p><p>Since its independence in 1945, Indonesia has consistently maintained its foreign policy philosophy of a free and active foreign policy, which was later translated into the introduction of the Non-Alignment Movement in 1961. A Free and Active foreign policy stems from the belief that Indonesia positions itself as a constructive player amidst geopolitical rivalry by not entangling itself with either side of the spectrum, while still pursuing its national interests with all partners through bilateral and multilateral engagement. As a result of this principle of dealing with other nations, historically, Indonesia has been able to navigate numerous geopolitical uncertainties, from the Cold War between the United States of America (US) and the Soviet Union that ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s to a new emerging dispute between China and the US.</p><p>Through all of these periods, Indonesia’s long-standing foreign policy has been considered effective in maintaining global political order and, at the very least, helping Indonesia to achieve its foreign policy goals. However, despite the triumph of the success of Indonesia’s foreign policy, some analysts believe that Indonesia lacks bold movement to exercise its power on the global stage. This article aims to unravel the shortcomings of Indonesia’s foreign policy decisions and how Indonesia, as a rising middle power, increases its presence in shaping the global order.</p><p><strong>Prabowo’s a Thousand Friends too Few, One Enemy too Many</strong></p><p>The current government under President Prabowo Subianto has underscored its government’s foreign policy agenda, which is rooted in the principle of non-alignment, to the extent that Prabowo made myriad trips to visit both the Western Hemisphere and the Global South countries, including attending the 80th anniversary of China’s post-World War 2, where he sat in the same line with China’s President Xi Jinping along with Russia’s President Vladimir Putin and North Korea’s supreme leader Kim Jong Un.</p><p>A photo from the internet depicts Prabowo standing with all three most powerful global leaders in Tiananmen Square has made the West uncomfortable and worried about the potential of Indonesia’s neutral position is gradually pivoting towards China and its allies. This concern from the West also occurs nationally, considering that the visit was unprecedented after the deadly protest that happened a week before the visit, and the unresolved tariff agreement with the US. Nevertheless, Indonesia’s foreign ministry spokesperson shrugged off the allegation regarding Indonesia’s shift to China by underscoring the importance of Prabowo’s Friend to All diplomacy and convincing the consistent implementation of Indonesia’s active and free foreign policy.</p><p>To restore trust from the Western allies that Indonesia remains a neutral partner for them, in recent weeks, President Prabowo and his government officials embarked on a long trip to some of the Western countries, such as Australia, the European Union (EU), Japan, and even sealed a deal with the Trump’s adminstration regarding the tariff deal between Jakarta and Washington. With the European Union, Indonesia has reached to end the trade dispute between the EU and Indonesia, creating a new market opportunity for Indonesia to intensify its domestic exports to Europe.</p><p>Additionally, Indonesia also made a stunning move to elevate the defense treaty with its southern neighbour, which allows both countries to exchange and consult in the area of regional security. From the Australian point of view, the defense treaty represents an effort from Canberra to ensure that Indonesia remains a neutral partner and avoid any foreign military influence in the Pacific. Whilst for Indonesia, the defense treaty helps Indonesia to balance its reliance on China in the economic sphere and military support from the West.</p><p>On a separate occasion, Jakarta has elevated its maritime cooperation with Tokyo, in which both countries agreed to deepen ties in defense and security areas, including joint exercises, exchanging military information, and collaborating to address the regional threat, such as China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea. This is a testament to Prabowo’s delicate balance on the international stage to ensure that Indonesia’s national interest remains at the heart of foreign policy while solidifying Indonesia’s position as a constructive and reliable player in the region.</p><p><strong>Indonesia’s Leadership Void Amid ASEAN’s Crises</strong></p><p>All of the efforts from Prabowo’s administration to engage with all partners in the region are something Prabowo himself believes Indonesia should be a friendly neighbourhood to all partners, and having an enemy should be avoided at all costs. However, Indonesia, as one of the biggest countries in the world, can do more than just become a friendly partner to all. It is natural in the geopolitical landscape that the biggest country tends to have more influence through leadership initiatives to shape the regional architecture, including resolving the impotence of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to overcome some of the most pressing issues that are lingering in Southeast Asia, such as the Thailand-Cambodia border dispute.</p><p>Historically speaking, Indonesia was a key player in resolving any conflict that emerged in Southeast Asia; for instance, Indonesia initiated a peace talk between Cambodia and Vietnam in the 1980s, which resulted in a Peace Agreement in Paris in 1990. Another bold movement that Indonesia had done in the past was establishing the ASEAN Peacekeeping Centres Network (APCN) in 2000 to manage the disputed border between Thailand and Cambodia. These two initiatives were driven by Indonesia’s huge influence in Southeast Asia, and many believed that Indonesia could one day become a leading actor in ASEAN.</p><p>However, the hope of many for Indonesia to become a leader in Southeast Asia has not been fully optimized yet, and the void becomes larger and more prone to conflict and external influence. When facing with regional conflict such as the recent Thailand-Cambodia border dispute, Indonesia seemed to refrain from playing a constructive role in dealing with the conflict, and instead gave the responsibility to Malaysia as the Chair of ASEAN in 2025 to put real pressure on both Thailand and Cambodia, with the help of the US and China.</p><p>It is quite ambiguous to really understand what drives the largest country in ASEAN not to leverage its power to ensure the regional peace and stability, but the assumption would be that Indonesia’s decision stems from the ASEAN value of non-interference. Under the non-interference value, countries in ASEAN should not interfere with internal affairs, and perhaps, Indonesia interprets the Thailand and Cambodia conflict as their internal matters. Still, Indonesia’s lack of a leadership role in the Southeast Asia region creates a loop that no country in the region can fill in.</p><p><strong>Moving Forward</strong></p><p>As much as Indonesia, under President Prabowo, is eager to become a friendly neighborhood to all partners, Indonesia must embrace its instinct as a middle power in Southeast Asia. The decision to become only a player is not necessarily wrong, as it is a representation of Indonesia’s long-standing free and active foreign policy. However, if Indonesia is serious about elevating its profile as a middle power, the country needs to take more responsibility in a leadership role, especially in Southeast Asia.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3182b9844308" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Pragmatist Foreign Policy in East Asian: How Has Japan’s New Prime Minister and South Korea’s New…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@alfahrisrg/pragmatist-foreign-policy-in-east-asian-how-has-japans-new-prime-minister-and-south-korea-s-new-f6190f244d5c?source=rss-c52827b3920f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f6190f244d5c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[sanae-takaichi]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[international-relations]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[china-foreign-policy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[foreign-policy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[lee-jae-myung]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[alfahrisrg]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 01 Nov 2025 06:13:46 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-11-01T06:13:46.632Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><strong>Pragmatist Foreign Policy in East Asian: How Has Japan’s New Prime Minister and South Korea’s New President Navigate the Tumultuous Geopolitical Landscape?</strong></h3><p>by: alfahrisrg</p><p><strong>Navigating East Asian’s complex foreign relations</strong></p><p>The East Asian region, which comprises four distinct regional powers — China, Japan, South Korea, and North Korea — has long been known for its difficulty in finding common ground across myriad aspects of regional architecture. The nuances of foreign relations in this region have been contaminated by the historical rivalry between Sino-Korea-Japanese relations, which can be traced back to when Japan occupied Korea and China during World War II, and also, the fragmented region constructed by the United States of America and the Soviet Union during the Cold War period has profoundly affected how East Asian countries perceive each other. What is interesting is that despite having unharmonious relations, some countries in East Asian have managed to uplift their nation, from a severely post-war era to one of the biggest economies in the World.</p><p>The remarkable achievement that East Asian countries attained in the last few decades, mainly Japan, China, and South Korea, has attracted the West countries, led by the United States, to establish diplomatic ties with some of these countries beyond traditional alliances. Japan and South Korea have been a cornerstone for the West to contain the unprecedented growth of the Communist Party of China by creating a non-traditional alliance, such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), with Beijing and Pyongyang showing dissatisfaction with this Western-led alliance. In response to that, China in recent years has been focusing on nurturing its traditional partners like Russia, Iran, and North Korea, while at the same time, deepening ties with the Global South countries by forming multilateral organizations like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the BRICS alliance. These multilateral alliances in East Asian have made some analysts concerned about the future of East Asian, considering that this region was once a battlefield of proxy war between the major powers.</p><p>With all the nuances that are happening in East Asian, topped up with Donald Trump’s unpredictable foreign policy, one question arises: How can Japan and South Korea, who have just elected their new leaders, navigate the complexity in geopolitics?.</p><p><strong>From Instagram’s live feature to the Korean Presidential Seat, Lee Jae Myung</strong></p><p>On 3 December 2024, South Korea’s former president, Yoon Suk Yeol, made a surprising move to lift the Martial Law or military emergency after the opposition parties won the majority election at the National Assembly. His reckless decision then turned into chaos when the military personnel sealed the House of Representatives building. Amidst political chaos, one representative stood out by filming himself attempting to enter the building while activating Instagram’s live feature. His decision to use a social media platform during one of the most turbulent political situations in South Korea’s history was able to gather viewers and sympathy from Koreans. Later on, he is sworn in as the new President of South Korea, replacing Yoon Suk Yeol after the court toppled him over. His name is Lee Jae Myung.</p><p>Lee Jae Myung himself was previously known for his skeptical stance towards South Korea’s longstanding partner, the United States. During his tenure as a representative, he made several statements opposing the presence of the United States’ troops in South Korea and vowed that South Korea to not heavily depend on the United States. His past statements have raised eyebrows from many people, whether his presidency will push South Korea further into its alliance, or a change will be made when he takes office.</p><p>However, it seems like his past statements will not translate into South Korea’s foreign policy agenda, as Lee pledges to strengthen South Korea’s relations with its traditional partners, including the United States, and also aims to resume diplomatic deadlock with China and its neighbor, North Korea. Unlike his predecessor, who vowed a hardline towards Beijing and Pyongyang, Lee somehow portrays himself as a globalist leader, a stark difference from what he is known for previously as a more populist of spectrum.</p><p><strong>A Hardline Conservative and Japan’s first Iron Lady, Sanea Takaichi</strong></p><p>For many years, Japan has been known for its political passivism, where Japanese people are not necessarily associated with one or two political parties. Ideologically speaking, there is almost no ideological political division, unlike what commonly happens in the United States, where bipartisan differences between parties are apparent. This political passivism, combined with less striking ideological differences among political parties, has made Japan’s political atmosphere less turbulent. However, the recent Liberal Democrats Party election in July 2025 suggests that passivism in Japanese politics has shifted to a more ideologically oriented stance as the biggest party in Japan nominated a first female Prime Minister, named Sanea Takaichi. Many believe that she will change the course of Japan’s political spectrum in the future, including the aspect of foreign policy.</p><p>Sanae Takaichi is well-known for her conservative hardline and is former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s closest ally. Her frequent visits to Yasukuni war shrine, a sacred place to honor Japan’s soldiers during the Indo-Pacific war, have attracted anger from South Korea and China because of the unhealed wound that Japanese soldiers inflicted on Korea and China. In addition to that, she was previously questioned about the historical numbers of deaths during the Sino-Japanese War, a statement that provoked Beijing and strained the relations between Beijing and Tokyo.</p><p>Although it is too fast to conclude a make an impartial judgment regarding Takaichi’s foreign policy agenda, recent meetings with the Two Giants on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Summit 2025 at Gyeongju International Convention in South Korea show a glimpse of what her foreign policy may look like. During the summit, Takaichi and Chinese leader Xi Jinping made a joint statement to elevate and commit to improving bilateral cooperation. This diplomatic tone alters Takaichi’s past gesture from a hardline towards China to something more cooperative and pragmatic. Moreover, during Trump’s visit to Japan, Takaichi successfully positioned herself as one of Trump’s favorite world leaders, a positive sign that may help Japan navigate its relations with the United States.</p><p><strong>Being pragmatic is a must and not a choice.</strong></p><p>A delicate balance from new leaders of Japan and South Korea shows that pragmatist foreign policy is not just a choice to survive in a more fragmented world, but it is also necessary to balance the dynamism of geopolitics and seize every opportunity that exists along the way. With Lee Jae Myung and Takaichi’s willingness to engage with their neighbors and position themselves as a reliable partner for major powers, especially toward China, it is very likely that the East Asian unrest situation, which is fuelled by historical wounds, distrust, and conflict, can be alleviated. Pragmatist foreign policy allows Japan and South Korea to move forward to harness cooperation, maintain the existence rules-based order, and create a conducive atmosphere both regionally and internationally.</p><p>However, it is worth mentioning that despite all the promises that pragmatist foreign policy offers, the nature of the world is changing at the speed of light and moving into unknown destinations. Therefore, staying vigilant and flexible are key to success for East Asia to achieve their shared goals and for Japan and South Korea to stay relevant in all the situations that may occur in the future.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f6190f244d5c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[A Binary Choice Between a Multipolar World and a Multilateral World: Which World Suits Indonesia’s…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@alfahrisrg/a-binary-choice-between-a-multipolar-world-and-a-multilateral-world-which-world-suits-indonesias-d247f3402bd9?source=rss-c52827b3920f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d247f3402bd9</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[international-relations]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[indonesia-foreign-policy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[foreign-policy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[multipolar-world]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[multilateralism]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[alfahrisrg]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 04 Oct 2025 10:28:44 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-10-04T10:28:44.342Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><strong>A Binary Choice Between a Multipolar World and a Multilateral World: Which World Suits Indonesia’s Interests?</strong></h3><p>author: alfahrisrg</p><p><strong>The Dilemma Between Multipolarity and Multilateralism</strong></p><p>The terms “multipolar” and “multilateral” have been used interchangeably for many decades, and they have become increasingly popular among world leaders in foreign affairs settings. Despite having similar connotations and aims, to describe a world where all countries, regardless of their size and strength, will be perceived as equal on the global stage, these two terms offer different practicality on how the world ought to work and how global actors should behave. These differences create a binary choice between pushing the world to become multipolar or preserving the concept of multilateral, especially for a rising middle power like Indonesia, whose survival lies within the global cooperation, while at the same time aiming to fill the void that some Western countries have left. This brief article will explore how the world will work under these two concepts, and more importantly, which one of these concepts suits Indonesia’s interests the best.</p><p>When talking about a multipolar world, it is non-negligible to mention China as the world’s most prominent power, and its growing influence has been immense, especially towards the Global South countries in Asia and Africa. Beijing is at the forefront of advocating the realism of the world stage right now, where the concept of multipolarity is used to replace the Western-led global order, and more specifically, replacing the U.S as the sole global superpower. China continues to appeal to other countries through myriad lucrative initiatives, from finance and investment, green energy transition, and military capability, while the United States, under President Donald Trump, pulls back from numerous multilateral organizations and instead treats foreign policy as a transactional relation. As a result, it is very likely that the world is moving from a unipolar world to either a multipolar world or a multilateral world.</p><p>Indonesia, on the other hand, seems to lean more on the concept of a multipolar world order in which Jakarta is eager to play a much bigger role in global affairs. Prabowo Subianto, a former military general who won the election in 2024, has shown his desire to revive Indonesia’s high-profile diplomacy, which translates to his appearance in several global events, including at the United Nations General Assembly in New York, the BRICS summit in Brazil, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in Tianjin.</p><p>During his speech at the UNGA in September, Prabowo emphasized the importance of self-determination and the right of all nations to decide their own future trajectory without fear and pressure from external parties, referring to the concept of multipolar. At the same time, Jakarta’s firm stance to preserve the UN as the beacon of hope to maintain peace and stability offers a signal that multilateral should be upheld at any cost. However, given the mixed signals that Jakarta gives during the UN Summit, it is essential for Jakarta not to get confused by the terms multipolar and multilateral, as one word in foreign relations sometimes becomes a determining factor in achieving a nation’s foreign policy goals.</p><p><strong>The Downfall of Multilateralism</strong></p><p>The concept of multilateralism can be traced back after World War II, when the United States and its Western countries were insisting the liberal democratic ideas to the newly born countries around the world in Latin America, Asia, Africa, and Eastern Europe. The goal is to liberalise the economy, promote peace and cooperation under international law, and uphold human rights by creating multilateral organisations, including the United Nations, International Monetary Fund, and more. This does not mean that the Soviet Union and China did not play any role in spreading multilateralism, but their role were limited due to the post-war recovery and their respective ideology.</p><p>Eighty years after the concept of multilateralism was first established, the nuances of multilateral organisations are facing tremendous challenges, even from those who were once helping these organisations to be born. The ineffectiveness of the United Nations in addressing some of the most pressing issues in the world, the stalemate inside the United Nations Security Council to agree on certain issues, and, recently, the cut-off funding from the United States have exacerbated the existence of multilateralism that was once promised to become the guardian of the world’s peace and stability.</p><p>A recent incident in the United Nations General Assembly in September has sparked debates among leaders, politicians, and the world community regarding the effectiveness of multilateral organisations. Should the world community believe in a multilateral world, where international law is respected, where all countries can sit together to discuss global issues, and when consensus is reached through dialogue and shared respect? Or instead, there is no room for multilateralism among nations, where consensus is built around country-to-country agreement, neglecting the implications that may occur from the agreement.</p><p><strong>The Rise and The Risk of a Multipolar World</strong></p><p>The repercussion of this issue creates a vacuum in world politics where some countries, led by China, India, Russia, and other countries from the global south, including Indonesia, propose a new world order called a multipolar world. A multipolar world order is not a groundbreaking concept; instead, it has been around coincidentally with the establishment of a multilateral world post World War II. It stems from the belief that power should be distributed equally, and therefore, every nation can play its unique role in shaping the world order. At least, that is what the ideal multipolar world may sound like. However, world politics is not as sweet as it sounds, just like the promise that the multilateral world once made to the world.</p><p>Relying solely on the definition is not going to provide any clue regarding the new world of multiple players; instead, it is important to see the world as it should be. Using realism theory, all nations act according to their own self-interest, and not by the ideal concept of multipolarity. As a result, a multipolar world will allow countries to exercise their own powers to attain their national interests, even if they use their own power for the sake of the world community; the concept of power itself will allow one nation that has more advantages than the other to impose its own agenda, creating a vicious cycle of one country bullying the others.</p><p>If power is what matters in a multipolar world, then how can a small country with such limited bargaining power survive in a multipolar world, and how do some countries that have power restrict themselves not to using their strength accordingly? One obvious example is China’s desire to foster a multipolar world, while simultaneously demonstrating assertiveness in the South China Sea, which reveals that the idea of a multipolar world must be carefully evaluated by all nations, including Indonesia.</p><p><strong>Moving Forward: Reclaiming Indonesia’s Multilateral Vision</strong></p><p>Moving forward, as a rising middle power, naturally, Indonesia depends on the predictability in international affairs, where international law exists and collective decision-making is at the heart of every foreign affairs, and not merely on powers and size. A rules-based order, where power is not a determining factor, ensures that all countries, whether they consider themselves as a great power, middle power, or small nation, can benefit through fair and just engagement that multilateralism offers. Moreover, Jakarta’s longstanding principle in foreign policy has been known for its non-alignment movement mandates the country to remain neutral amidst global contestation. This principle should be the guideline for Indonesia to navigate the unpredictable world ahead, and instead of participating in geopolitical powers, Jakarta should stay true to its position as a mediator in promoting peace, stability, and cooperation under international law.</p><p>In spite of the fact that a multipolar world may offer Indonesia more room to maneuver diplomatically, its inherent instability and competition powers may undermine the very principles of non-alignment or <em>Bebas Aktif</em>. Therefore, it is more reliable for Indonesia to strengthen the existing multilateral world or even elevate it through collective actions with other countries, aiming to ensure that the sovereignty of all nations is guaranteed and global peace, stability, and cooperation can be achieved in a just and fair manner.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d247f3402bd9" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[​​When Policy Meets Innovation: Rethinking Education Through Government–EdTech Collaboration]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@alfahrisrg/when-innovation-meets-policy-how-edtech-partnerships-can-close-indonesias-education-divide-6beca5c0b4e4?source=rss-c52827b3920f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/6beca5c0b4e4</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[education-policy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[education]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[edtech]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[rural-communities]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[indonesia]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[alfahrisrg]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 28 Jun 2025 07:20:17 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-06-28T07:54:02.002Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>by: alfahrisrg</strong></p><p><strong>Intoduction</strong></p><p>Indonesia has been experiencing a massive demographic explosion, which is dominated by young and productive people from the age of 15 to 64. This trend will reach its peak in 2030 to 2035, marking around 50% of Indonesia’s total population. Although many analyst believes that this trend will become an engine of growth in the next couple of decades, there is still some scepticism regarding the rise of the population.</p><p>The scepticism comes from the harsh reality that has not been solved or addressed properly by the Indonesian government, such as high unemployment rates, inequality in access to education, and rising cost of goods and services. These social issues, coupled with a lack of political will and evidence-based policy, will exacerbate the current and future situation. Therefore, there is an urgency from Indonesia to address some, if not all, issues to realise its demographic explosion as a “bonus”, and not as a “threat”.</p><p>Perhaps, one of the most essential aspects of building a new generation of Indonesia is education. Despite numerous efforts from the government to increase educational systems through increasing educational spending up to 20% of its National Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the twelve years of compulsory education, and improving school access across the archipelago, the preexistence issues remain, mainly access to fair and equal education for those who live in rural community outside Java Island.</p><p>According to the latest data from the Jakarta Post in 2023, only about 22.14% of rural students completed their senior high school education, compared to 35.95% for those residing in big cities. Moreover, another dataset from English First (EF) also mirrors the reality of Indonesia’s educational gap in English literacy, in which students in big cities outperformed those who live outside Java Island. Considering the government’s limited resources and ideas to address this issue, it is imperative for them to find a trusted partner that can provide innovation, ideas, and technological advancements. The private sector in education and technology, or EdTech, is well-positioned to fulfill this role.</p><p>This article will offer policy recommendations that can align the government’s objectives and the private sector’s interests, so that the issue surrounding educational inequality can be alleviated. However, it is notable to be mentioned here that the policy recommendation is impeccable and far from ideal, as many things need to be put in place first. Hence, further research and discussion are unequivocally needed for further development of this policy.</p><p><strong>Rapid Adoption of the Internet as a Catalyst</strong></p><p>Indonesia is one of the fastest adopters of the internet, with a penetration rate reaching 75% in 2024, according to APJII. This rapid penetration has helped Indonesia to reap the benefits of investment in technology and the establishment of tech companies, including EdTech. With the rise of the young Indonesian population who are proficient in utilizing technology and the internet, it will support the growth and increased prominence of EdTech companies that depend heavily on internet connectivity to market their product.</p><p>Despite having a debate about the relevance of EdTech in contributing to the rural community in Indonesia, due to the nature of private sector, which favours income and revenue more than social impact, the private sector offers three things in educational landscape in which the government has not been able to fulfill and these are:<strong> high-quality educational content and resources</strong>, <strong>standardized materials are accessible regardless of geographic location</strong>, and flexible and personalized learning experiences. From here, it will address three aspects of educational issues that mostly occur in rural communities, which are: <strong>disparities in teacher quality</strong>,<strong> resource availability</strong>, and <strong>student learning progress</strong>. Therefore, EdTech has opportunities for reducing the education gap between urban and rural communities.</p><p>With all those strengths that EdTech can bring to the table, the biggest question is <strong>“How can we ensure that EdTech has the willingness to do this ‘social impact’, so that all the benefits that we have mentioned earlier can be implemented?”</strong> The straightforward answer is policy, because policy encompasses all the aspects that are needed for both the government and the private sector to execute and align their ideas and missions.</p><p><strong>Public-Private Education Acceleration Policy Framework (PPEAF)</strong></p><p>Public-Private Education Acceleration Framework (PPEAF) can be described as a policy that aligns Indonesia’s government and EdTech sectors to undertake some of the government’s work in the public sector mainly education policy, through different mechanisms such as designing, financing, constructing, and operating works or tasks that are traditionally held by the government. PPEAF, as a policy concept, is actually not a new thing, as it is the extension of the concept called Public-Private Partnership (PPPs).</p><p>Through the mechanism of PPEAF, the private sector can promote innovation, cutting-edge technology, and presumably disruptive ways of thinking that are capable of refining the educational paradigm, while still getting the financial resources and law protection from the government. As a result, the collaboration between the government and the private sector can be elevated to the next level of cooperation and collaboration, allowing shared perspectives, ideas, and financial resources between the two entities.</p><p>Although the PPEAF implementation in<strong> </strong>Southeast Asia is still underdeveloped, other countries around the world have shown their implementation of the PPEAF, including India, Singapore, South Korea, and Chile. They both shared different mechanisms of PPEAF, but the underlying message is similar: <strong>“The government cannot carry the work of public fields alone; they need the private sector to ease their job”</strong>. One example of the implementation of the PPEAF in tackling disparities in rural communities can be seen in the case of Chile, which partnered with the tech private sector to deliver digital infrastructure, educational resources, and teacher training using public funds.</p><p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p><p>Given the growing nature of many EdTech sectors in Indonesia and the amount of budget that the government allocates each year to education, it is very likely that the implementation of PPEAF can bring benefits for Indonesia’s educational sectors and alleviate some of the core issues that persist, especially the educational gap in rural areas. Using the framework of PPEAF, Indonesia’s EdTech private sector brings digital infrastructure and expertise to generalize the resources across the islands, while the government, through the Ministry of Education, sets the standard, funding, and circulation mechanism. Hence, the issue surrounding educational inequality that lingers in rural students can be solved, which means<strong> no students receive unequal educational resources</strong>, <strong>no geographical barrier can define what students in rural areas can and cannot achieve</strong>, and more importantly,<strong> no Indonesian kids are left behind</strong>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=6beca5c0b4e4" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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