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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Alice Su on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Alice Su on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@aliceysu?source=rss-728f6d52edc3------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Alice Su on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@aliceysu?source=rss-728f6d52edc3------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[Motel Kurdistan]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@aliceysu/motel-kurdistan-dfe61bbb30e8?source=rss-728f6d52edc3------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[displacement]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[refugees]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iraq]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[isis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[kurdistan]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Alice Su]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 22 Aug 2017 16:54:41 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-08-22T16:54:41.679Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Watching the War on ISIS with Iraq’s Displaced People</h4><p>DOHUK, Iraq — Meryem has renamed the 3rd floor of Motel Kurdistan. “Welcome to Bayt al-Sinjar!” the 8-year-old shouts, flinging her arms open as the elevator door opens. I follow her down a dim hallway to number 308, the 110-sq-ft room where her family of six has lived since fleeing ISIS’ advance on their village in August.</p><p>“You can come here, but not <em>Daesh</em>,” Meryem says, using the Arabic name for ISIS as she opens the door. “No <em>Daesh</em> allowed.”</p><p>I’m visiting Meryem’s family, one of 90,564 displaced families – 543,384 individuals – seeking refuge in Dohuk, a small city 170 km from Sinjar and 77 km from Mosul in northern Iraqi Kurdistan. They are part of some <a href="http://www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/pdfpreview/bad18721e60615e6c8e9fe4008f00f39.jpg">1.8 million Iraqis</a> displaced since January, half of whom are seeking refuge in the Kurdistan region. Most are Christians and Yezidis from the Sinjar area and Ninewah plains, where ISIS has massacred minorities in an <a href="http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/gruesome-evidence-ethnic-cleansing-northern-iraq-islamic-state-moves-wipe-out-minorities-2014-0">ethnic cleansing</a> campaign throughout the summer. <em>Convert to our interpretation of Islam or die</em>, the extremist group says, and then goes through villages killing men, kidnapping <a href="http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/10/11/iraq-forced-marriage-conversion-yezidis">women and children</a>, selling them into slavery and proclaiming an Islamic State.</p><p>Those who can flee have come to places like Dohuk, where displaced people live under trees and bridges, sleeping in churchyards, unfinished buildings, parks and schools. Telltale cardboard boxes and plastic tarps with WFP and UNHCR insignia hang over balcony railings, squashed for space alongside strings of laundry and children crowding every window. 17,346 families are occupying the elementary schools, which means 224,191 local students haven’t yet begun the semester. Another 47,831 displaced kids are living in the classrooms. They don’t even have enough <a href="http://www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/pdfpreview/2810fa9b1127f01fc69578ad57e77272.jpg">food, toilets or blankets</a>, let alone opportunity to learn.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*L90h7ye2rXtSwmqn8KNOsw.jpeg" /><figcaption>A displaced Yezidi girl and her brother stand in front of the school in Dohuk, Kurdistan, where they’ve lived since fleeing ISIS in August.</figcaption></figure><p>Motel Kurdistan is among the best of situations, a temporary home for Meryem’s family and twenty others, displaced Iraqis with enough savings to afford a motel room for $700 a month. Displaced families occupy the entire 3rd and 4th floors, some living 2–3 families in one room. The motel had only been open for 3 months when the ISIS crises began, says Jihad, the Kurdish owner’s son.</p><p>“It was like a new car that had only run 1 km. Then we got flooded by <em>naziheen </em>[displaced people].” He pulls out a registration book in the hotel lobby, flipping through pages of names and figures. “We’re going crazy. Our whole hotel is <em>naziheen.</em> They come with money for 1 month, then run out and beg to stay.” The displaced people have no money, Jihad says, but neither do the local Kurds. “Have you seen Dohuk? Look, God willing we will destroy <em>Daesh</em>. God willing everyone will go home.”</p><p>Upstairs, Meryem’s mother is stirring a pot of bulgur on an electric cooking heater. Her neighbor Fatima comes over, an unmarried Sunni Arab woman taking care of two nephews whose parents — her brother and his wife — are trapped in Mosul. Half her family is living under ISIS, too afraid to leave, Fatima says. “The women hide inside all day,” she tells me. “My sister is sick but they forbid male doctors to see women. You think this is Islam? <em>Daesh</em> are garbage. Dogs. God damn their souls.”</p><p>Meryem’s mother is quiet. Earlier she’d told me, “<em>Daesh </em>is Islam. We cannot live with it. Muslims always kill Yezidis.” This genocide is just the latest in centuries of Yezidi targeting, she’d said, as Muslims forever persecute the minority, accusing them of worshipping the devil.</p><p>But Fatima is her neighbor and guest, so she nods as the Sunni woman curses <em>Daesh.</em> Meryem and her brothers are jumping on the bed with Fatima’s nephews, laughing and throwing pieces of bulgur at one another. “Who says Yezidis and Muslims cannot live together? What is wrong with these lunatics?” Fatima goes on. “Damn them and damn their father’s souls.”</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*GlXfxIAcGwQ73X46Rx3eyA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Displaced Yezidi women take their children in the elevator to visit other families seeking refuge in a Dohuk motel.</figcaption></figure><p>The motel women don’t go outside during the day, but they visit each other in the hallways. We walk to the 4th floor to see another Yezidi family: Basima, Ali and their five children, all from Sinjar, living in a motel room with Ali’s cousin and his family — 11 people in all. They walked through the mountains for 8 days without food or water, Ali tells me, eating leaves and watching the weakest starve. “I saw mothers crying and feeding the tears to their children,” Ali says, “So they wouldn’t die of thirst.”</p><p>Ali had Arab neighbors living 50m from his home, he tells me. “We grew up like brothers, playing, eating, even sleeping together. Then <em>Daesh</em> came and they looted our homes.” What about Fatima? I ask, and the neighbors from Mosul all around them? “They can’t do anything to us here. We believe in the Kurds and they believe in two things,” Ali says, pointing upward. “First, God — and second, America.”</p><p>But no one in the motel believes in America’s airstrikes. “If they were serious, we would have Sinjar back in a day,” Jihad says. “The international community doesn’t care — look at Kobane!”</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*cxN243tVzOWVKfcD7JLh2g.jpeg" /><figcaption>The motel lobby features four clocks w times for Istanbul, Erbil, New York and London, along with a portrait of the Barzanis, Kurdistan’s political leaders, and a TV playing American films.</figcaption></figure><p>Back in Meryem’s room, we watch a TV broadcast about Shi’a militias killing Sunni Turkmen and Arab civilians. “This is a Sunni channel. We can watch a Shi’a channel and it’ll say the opposite,” Meryem’s father tells me. We switch to another channel. A woman academic and male parliamentarian are engaged in heated debate. “Security Strategy,” the title reads at the bottom of the screen. Both have their voices raised, slipping in and out of formal Arabic, almost in tears.</p><p>“I don’t want anyone coming into our country,” the woman says. “What do Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, America, all of them want? It’s politics, manipulation, we’ve seen this before — [she slips into heavy Iraqi <em>ammiyah</em>] — the whole world is coming for their own benefit. Who will protect Iraqi people? They are ripping us apart.”</p><p>Kurdistan’s <em>naziheen</em> ask me too many questions. “Why are all these foreigners joining <em>Daesh</em>?” Fatima asks.</p><p>“I saw a Facebook post saying the U.S. was dropping weapons to ISIS,” Meryem’s father says. “Is that where they get their arms from?”</p><p>“Do you know the NGOs here? Can you find me a job?” Ali asks.</p><p>“We’ll be out of money next month and the camps aren’t finished yet,” Basima says. “Where should we go?”</p><p>“Will you write down the names of my kidnapped relatives?”</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*1dghe5quDPokKWFrRUVlcQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Layla, a displaced Yezidi woman, sits in an unfinished building in Shariya, northern Iraq.</figcaption></figure><p>The last question comes from Layla, a Yezidi woman living in a half-finished building in Shariya, a town 20 minutes from Dohuk that I visit the next day. I take out my pen, thinking I can at least fulfill this request. Layla starts listing names, ages and family relations, spelling each one, 22 in all. I write: Musou, 45, brother. Ammu, 43, brother. Falah, 25, nephew. Fahd, 20, nephew. Hafsa, 45, sister-in-law. Nisreen, 30, sister-in-law. Shereen, 30, sister-in-law. Fadia, 18, niece (sold). Vinal, 18, niece. Mouna, 18, niece. Ayman, 12, nephew. Anwar, 8, nephew. Elias and Hudr, 10, nephews (twins). Yazid, 4, nephew. Mirna, 3, niece. Rami, 4, nephew. Rania, 2, niece. Feryal, 25, niece. Asma, 3, niece’s daughter. Ashem, 1, niece’s son. Rena, infant, niece’s daughter.</p><p>Halfway through the list, my translator starts to cry.</p><p>“Fadia called me two weeks ago. <em>Daesh </em>sold her in Tal Afar,” Layla says. “She’s a slave but said the women and children are OK.” Layla hasn’t heard from the four men, she says, but they are also alive.</p><p>How do you know? I ask.</p><p>“They’re alive.”</p><p>But how do you know?</p><p>“They’re alive.”</p><p>But how do you —</p><p>“They’re alive.”</p><p>I stop.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*19f3OkTLsiD0VdtVZmXAoA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Two Kurdish youth walk across a field of tomatoes near Shariya, a town 20 minutes outside of Dohuk. The white tents in the distance are Shariya camp, 1/20 planned camps for internally displaced people in Duhok governorate. They are supposed to be finished by November 15. The camp is almost fully completed but still stands empty. Many others are not yet built.</figcaption></figure><p>My translator rants as we drive away: “I swear this land is cursed.” It’s 5 p.m. and sunlight is spilling, soft and gold, across rolling open fields. The Kurds have seen it all before, he says — chemical weapons, forced displacement, massacres, ethnic cleansing — Kurdish history is soaked in blood. None of this is new. “I was born in a refugee camp,” he adds. “My parents also walked 10 days in the mountains, fleeing to Turkey from the Ba’athists.”</p><p>We go to Khanke, a sprawling camp that’s taken more than 70,000 displaced Yezidis since August. People are placing cement blocks around the perimeters of their tents, trying to build a blockade before winter rains flood the dirt floors. There’s a distribution going on, and a mob of fathers and brothers is crowding, pushing, yelling at the volunteers and trying to grab boxes for their children. A policeman swats them back with a stick, and I catch the eye of a small boy squeezed amid the shouting men. His mouth is moving. I nudge my translator and he bends down to listen.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*kX3sPA10tMfN80uS77hZMQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>A displaced Yezidi child stands in Khanke Camp, an area in Kurdistan that hosts 70,000 displaced Yezidis.</figcaption></figure><p>“He’s saying, ‘Please take me with you.’”</p><p>How is Kurdistan surviving the displacement crisis? Haval Mohammed Amedy, head of the Dohuk Governorate’s Emergency Operations Committee, answers: it isn’t. The central government in Baghdad hasn’t sent funds to the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) for months. Government employees, including himself and the Peshmerga, are working without income. Meanwhile, the KRG splits what funds it does have between the ISIS frontline, held mostly by Kurdish forces, and the <em>naziheen.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*UI6uYFxSafnzmQPkFc8Stg.jpeg" /><figcaption>The city of Dohuk spreads across a valley, surrounded by mountains, with a dam on on side and former river running through the middle.</figcaption></figure><p>“We had more than half a million people flee here in 15 days,” Amedy says. “Our people are donating electricity, manpower, services, our own resources — Baghdad is not helping us.” The UN and NGOs are here, Amedy says, but money is not reaching those in need fast enough. After 3 months of emergency response, displaced people still don’t even have one blanket each, and winter is approaching.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fplayer.vimeo.com%2Fvideo%2F109338608&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fvimeo.com%2F109338608&amp;image=http%3A%2F%2Fi.vimeocdn.com%2Fvideo%2F493276169_640.jpg&amp;key=d04bfffea46d4aeda930ec88cc64b87c&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=vimeo" width="720" height="1280" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/3fb208ef8e1ed4d6c90c2c7836c2cbad/href">https://medium.com/media/3fb208ef8e1ed4d6c90c2c7836c2cbad/href</a></iframe><p>“Tell the UN to push Baghdad seriously, not partially so they can prolong their stay,” Amedy says. “Tell them people will die if they don’t get enough kerosene heaters by the end of the month. Just send us blankets! Don’t send money to the UN and have them slowly purchase things over 2 months. Send half a million blankets to the airport today.”</p><p>Back in the motel, I go to the roof with the women and children. Clotheslines are strung from satellites to water tanks, crisscrossing the area with all the displaced families’ laundry. It starts raining. The women rush to collect their clothes while their children shriek and spin in circles under the night shower.</p><p>Meryem tiptoes to the edge of a wall, peering at Dohuk in the night, its neon lights a rainy blur. The city stretches across a valley, dark mountains standing guard all around. From above, you can’t see the people crammed into classrooms and onto church floors, having nightmares of dying children, suffocating with thought of their wives and daughters under other men’s fancy and force. “The children understand. They know what’s happening,” Meryem’s mother says to me.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*gfv6kPtKpdy6jNk3QTnctw.jpeg" /><figcaption>8-year-old Meryem looks out at Dohuk in the night from the roof of a motel where her family has lived since fleeing ISIS in August.</figcaption></figure><p>But Meryem points at a ferris wheel glowing across the street, at a string of lights leading up the mountain highway, at the moon, the stars, at Mazi Mall and Dream City, the shopping center and amusement park downtown.</p><p>“Can you write about this?” she asks. “Write about the whole world! But not about Shingal,” she says, using the Kurdish name for Sinjar. “Just wait. You can write when we see Shingal. Maybe we’ll go there in the morning.”</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/10/daily-life-refugees-isis-kurdistan-iraq/381700/"><em>The Atlantic.com</em></a><em> on October 21, 2014.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=dfe61bbb30e8" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
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            <title><![CDATA[Harmony and Martyrdom Among China’s Hui Muslims]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@aliceysu/harmony-and-martyrdom-among-chinas-hui-muslims-7fbdbc4ccccf?source=rss-728f6d52edc3------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/7fbdbc4ccccf</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[muslim]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[islam]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[religion]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hui]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[china]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Alice Su]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 06 Jun 2016 17:25:57 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-08-22T16:51:26.817Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*_IwVzdbT4Wpk4kSt4PSLzQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>The Martyr’s Memorial in Shadian, China, is a gray pillar topped with a crescent moon, set on a stone block engraved with names. It commemorates the so-called Shadian incident, a massacre that took place in July of 1975, when the People’s Liberation Army came to this small southwestern town to quell what the central authorities were calling an Islamist revolt. Then, as now, Shadian was inhabited almost entirely by Hui, members of one of the country’s two main Muslim minority groups. In the years leading up to the incident, the Red Guards had attacked the Hui, destroying their mosques and forcing them to wear pigs’ heads around their necks. When the P.L.A. soldiers arrived, they razed more than four thousand houses and killed some sixteen hundred villagers in one week. The Chinese government later apologized for the raid, blaming it on the Gang of Four — the ousted architects of the <a href="http://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/the-cost-of-the-cultural-revolution-fifty-years-later">Cultural Revolution</a> — and helping fund Shadian’s reconstruction. But locals do not pay homage to the state at the memorial. The pillar is emblazoned with the Fatiha, the first chapter of the Koran, in green Arabic calligraphy, and, above it, in Chinese characters, the word <em>she-xi-de</em>. “That’s the Arabic word <em>shahid</em>, instead of <em>lieshi</em>, the Chinese word for ‘martyr,’ “ a man named Huang told me. (As with the other Chinese Muslims I spoke with, I will protect his identity by referring to him only by his surname.) “You know why?<em> Lieshi</em> would include the P.L.A. soldiers, wouldn’t it?”</p><p>Huang and I were standing on a hill overlooking Shadian, whose twelve thousand residents are about ninety-per-cent Hui. (Huang, a Muslim convert, is a member of China’s Han ethnic majority.) Most Chinese know little about the town. When I told people in Kunming, the capital of Yunnan province, that I was going there, they asked whether I was visiting for the famous halal barbecue. Shadian is otherwise best known for its Grand Mosque, a nineteen-million-dollar edifice built almost entirely with private donations, its gilding and green domes patterned after those of the Nabawi mosque in Medina, complete with imported date palms lining the entrance. It had stormed earlier that afternoon, the sound of thunder and rain mixing with a lilting call to prayer, followed by fifteen minutes of Koranic teaching blared over the mosque’s loudspeakers in Mandarin. Now Shadian’s minarets pointed quietly into a clear sky. The smell of grass filled the air as Huang and I walked around the monument, tracing the names carved into the base.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*DL1ASWbSaVMCmSMBZ9cWBQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>The history of the Hui in Yunnan is one of seasons of prosperity punctuated by violence. The province wasn’t part of China until the thirteenth century, when Sayyid Ajjal Shams al-Din Omar al-Bukhari, a Central Asian Muslim who served the imperial court, brought it into the fold. According to Ahmed, an imam at one of Kunming’s mosques, many Hui still revere Sayyid Ajjal, because he demonstrated that Islam could coexist with Chinese philosophy. “Chinese tradition teaches the <em>dao </em>of man, and Islam teaches the <em>dao </em>of heaven — the two are complementary,” Ahmed said. Sayyid Ajjal built <a href="http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/01/13/confucius-comes-home">Confucian academies</a> alongside mosques and Buddhist temples, infusing foreign religion and culture with domestic ideals of harmony and hierarchy. “This is why Hui can mix with Han, but Uighurs can’t,” Ahmed continued, referring to China’s <a href="http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2002/10/14/the-middleman">other significant Muslim minority</a>. “We have Islam with Chinese characteristics.” Nevertheless, relations between the Hui and the Han have not always been peaceful. In the nineteenth century, during the Qing dynasty, tensions between the two groups erupted over how Yunnan’s mineral resources were being apportioned. Qing officials ordered a <em>xi Hui</em> — a washing away of the Hui — slaughtering at least four thousand people in the course of three days in 1856. That massacre sparked a sixteen-year rebellion, which ended with another massacre, this time of at least ten thousand Hui.</p><p>After the Shadian incident, as China’s economy opened up, the Hui flourished again. They operated private copper, lead, and zinc mines, some of which outcompeted state-owned enterprises. Wealth brought them relative religious freedom, and with a steady flow of <em>zakat</em>, the Muslim equivalent of a tithe, Shadian’s citizens built mosques and madrassas, giving scholarships to religious students and sending hundreds of Hui on the hajj each year. Seeing potential for Shadian to attract religious tourists from Southeast Asia, provincial authorities began marketing the town as the “little Mecca of the East.” They allowed street signs in Arabic and even a green dome on the local administration building’s roof.</p><p>Things changed in 2014. On March 1st of that year, a group of knife-wielding attackers began stabbing passengers at random in the <a href="http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/confronting-violence-in-china">Kunming train station</a>, killing more than thirty and injuring more than a hundred and forty. Police shot four of the attackers at the scene, and three others were later executed; one woman was sentenced to life in prison. They were Uighurs from the far-western province of Xinjiang, known for its restive separatism and ethnic strife. When news emerged that the Kunming attackers had spent time in Shadian, droves of Chinese netizens began criticizing the town’s religious appearance, calling it “China’s Islamic State.” The little Hui town became vilified as an enclave for religious extremism, where too many Muslims were allowed too much freedom. Popular online forums such as Tianya Club and Baidu became filled with Islamophobic vitriol. “Can these yellow-skinned Arabs stop disgusting us Chinese people?” <a href="http://bbs.tianya.cn/m/post-worldlook-1111687-1.shtml">one commenter wrote</a>. “We know that <em>huaxia</em>” — the Han ethnicity’s ancestral tribe and culture — “is a pile of shit in your hearts. Why are you still here?” As Han chauvinism swept the Chinese Internet, authorities instituted a series of “counter-extremism” policies, tightening at least the image of control over Yunnan’s Muslims by planting flags in front of every mosque, painting green roofs white, and requiring all religious students and teachers from outside provinces to go home. Hundreds of Uighurs were deported to Xinjiang.</p><p>As all of this was happening, Huang moved to Shadian with his wife and daughter. “We came for her education,” Huang told me, nodding through wire-rimmed glasses at his nine-year-old. Huang is a native of Yangzhou prefecture, with a background in geological engineering. Twenty years ago, he converted to Islam and started an unlicensed magazine devoted to philosophy, culture, and politics. After five years of private publishing and distribution via mosques, halal stores, and cultural centers, the magazine became well-known in Muslim circles, including in Xinjiang, which got it banned. “So I changed the name and stopped distributing there,” Huang said with a shrug. His new publication has been circulating for fifteen years.</p><p>Huang and his wife came to Islam from atheist Han Chinese families. They both had Hui friends who roused their curiosity, prompting them to learn about the religion for themselves. For Huang, spiritual hunger was directly linked to intellectual control, and filling one meant breaking out of the other. The purpose of his magazine, he said, was to awaken his compatriots in spirit and mind. “There is an emptiness in Chinese society,” Huang told me over a dinner of spicy fish hotpot. Authoritarianism made people tools of the system, he said, without god or purpose in life. “Chinese people have been taught slavishness for thousands of years: follow tradition and don’t question authority,” he said. “Then the Cultural Revolution destroyed tradition. What we have now is authority but no questions, because people don’t remember how to ask them.” Just as asking questions had led him to faith, he wanted faith to make people start asking questions. “Han are an ethnicity with no real belief system, just superstitions and worshipping with no idea what or why,” he said. “But most Hui have no idea what Islam means, either.”</p><p>The same day that Huang and I visited the Martyr’s Memorial, he proudly took me on a tour of Yufeng Academy, an elementary school founded in the early twentieth century and once run by the Hui scholar Bai Liangcheng, who is known for having reformed Hui curricula to include Confucian classics alongside lessons in Arabic and the Koran. “Shadian is a cradle of Chinese Islamic civilization,” Huang said, as we strolled through exhibits honoring the town’s prominent Hui: Ma Jian, who studied at Cairo’s Al-Azhar University in the nineteen-thirties, translated the Koran into Mandarin, and founded the Arabic department at Peking University; Lin Xingzhi, who performed the hajj thirty-eight times and became a diplomatic representative of the Republic of China in Saudi Arabia; and Lin Song, who was once photographed presenting a Chinese Koran to Yasir Arafat.</p><p>Yet Shadian’s scars were visible nearby, too. A few streets away from the academy, I met a man named Hajji Wang, who was thirty-one when the Shadian incident happened. He and his six-year-old son had hidden outside of the village, he said, listening to the explosions and screams for seven days straight. “Every house had piles of dead people, some with babies still on their backs,” Wang told me. Now he and his family live in an airy villa with a bubbling fountain in its front garden, the archway over its entrance inscribed with the Arabic phrase <em>Bismillah ar-Rahman ar-Rahim</em> — “In the name of God, the most gracious, the most merciful.” The family’s wealth comes from a metals factory that they own, and over the years they’ve given more than fifteen million dollars to Shadian’s mosques and madrassas. “The old days were dark as hell,” Wang said. “You couldn’t think about faith. Class enemies were everywhere. Everyone was lying. Everything was fake. It’s different now.”</p><p>My last night in Shadian was spent with Huang and his neighbor Fu, drinking cup after cup of fermented <em>pu’er </em>tea as the Grand Mosque glowed outside Huang’s living-room window. When I asked what “Islam with Chinese characteristics” meant, Huang pointed to the plaza facing the mosque. “There’s a set of plaques there that says <em>ai guo ai jiao</em> — ‘love your country, love your religion,’ “ he said. All the Hui will dutifully repeat this slogan, he added, but the question is what <em>ai guo</em> means. Does loving one’s country mean loving its government? Holding it accountable? Asking for justice? If authorities destroyed the Grand Mosque today, would <em>ai guo</em> mean resistance?</p><p>Fu snorted from across the table. “Old Huang, you delusional intellectual,” he said. “If the state wanted to destroy that mosque, they would. You couldn’t do anything about it.” Fu’s father was one of ten Hui representatives who petitioned Beijing for help before the 1975 massacre. He now holds a high position in a local mining company, but has vowed never to go into politics. The Hui of Shadian want exactly what average people all over China want, Fu said — life without interference. That is why Yunnan’s Hui didn’t resist when the Uighurs were deported. It didn’t affect them, nor did the state’s security measures before or after the Kunming station attack. “Politicians made up the idea that Shadian is a terrorist place so they could then say, ‘We’re so good at counterterrorism,’ “ Fu said. “Our lives here are exactly the same. The only change is that every politician has given himself a promotion.” The single most Chinese characteristic of the Hui is probably that they are realistic, Fu added. “Let’s be clear and objective about who we are. We’re less than one per cent of the population. We’re weaklings. There’s a political game going on, and we are not part of it.”</p><p>“If you want to put it that way, everyone in China is a weakling,” Huang said. Wasn’t the difference between Muslims and atheists that they had a standard of righteousness? Wouldn’t Shadian’s people stand up if their holy places were torn down? “Sure, blood would be shed, but so what?” Fu said. “We’re a minority. We’re drops. We’re not going to dye the ocean.”</p><p><em>Reporting for this piece was facilitated by a grant from the Pulitzer Center on Crisis Reporting.</em></p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/harmony-and-martyrdom-among-chinas-hui-muslims"><em>www.newyorker.com</em></a><em> on June 6, 2016.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=7fbdbc4ccccf" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[A Muslim Minority Keeps Clashing With the ‘China Dream’ in the Country’s Increasingly Wild West]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@aliceysu/a-muslim-minority-keeps-clashing-with-the-china-dream-in-the-country-s-increasingly-wild-west-5e8ccdc98952?source=rss-728f6d52edc3------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/5e8ccdc98952</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[china]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[islam]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[xinjiang]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Alice Su]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 09 Dec 2015 03:01:52 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-12-09T03:02:38.339Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*2YjPhtK-wsvEuEU0INW5Kw.jpeg" /><figcaption>A Han Chinese tourist photographs a Uighur family in Kashgar, Xinjiang (Alice Su, Oct 2015).</figcaption></figure><p>Zhou* didn’t expect Kashgar to give him a cough. Before moving to the ancient city in China’s Xinjiang province a month ago, the 29-year-old Han migrant had steeled himself for ethnic tensions, violence, and culture shock in the country’s far west. But he had not prepared for the fact that Kashgar, located at the crossroads between East and West, would have the same thick yellow air as southern China’s special economic zones.</p><p>“This is just like Shenzhen in the nineties,” Zhou said as we drove along the Shenzhen-Kashgar Great Road, a new eight-lane highway on the expanding outskirts of Kashgar. The road and surrounding area are named and modeled after the special economic zone where China pioneered its market liberalization reforms more than two decades ago, and appropriately, dust hung in the air due to construction — half-complete office buildings, sports centers, schools, and malls, many named after China’s interior provinces.</p><p>Investors and businesses from those provinces are expected to develop Xinjiang, Zhou explained, just as inlanders began flocking to Shenzhen in the early 1990s. They’re to bring Kashgar rapid urbanization and GDP growth, in line with president Xi Jinping’s “One Belt One Road” initiative, a plan to spend billions of dollars on economic infrastructure along the ancient Silk Road and connect Chinese trade to Central Asia and the Middle East.</p><p>“The state wants us to come out here,” Zhou said. “There’s cheap housing, tax incentives, and it’s not that hard to adjust.” He’s found freelance work installing appliances and décor for the growing stream of Han migrants from inland provinces like Hebei and Sichuan. “I don’t eat lamb or speak Uighur, but it doesn’t matter,” Zhou said of the local dialect and popular cuisine; he rarely if ever engages with locals. “This place is becoming more ‘China’ every day.”</p><p>In October, China’s Communist Party marked the 60th anniversary of the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, a province the size of Alaska that is home both to the Uighurs — a Muslim minority ethnic group with Turkic roots and a history of discord with Chinese authorities — and the country’s biggest reserves of oil, coal, and natural gas. Party officials held celebrations in Urumqi and released a <a href="http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2015-09/24/c_134655252.htm">white paper</a> on “Ethnic Equality, Unity and Development in Xinjiang,” lauding the region’s economic growth, social harmony, and rising standards of living.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1000/0*0vWhBpCYSH9qWUIh.jpg" /><figcaption>A Uighur man walks through the Old Town in Kashgar, Xinjiang (Alice Su, Oct 2015).</figcaption></figure><p>Yet a week before the anniversary, at least 50 people were killed in a local attack on a coal mine in Aksu; most of the dead were Han migrant workers. In late November, China <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-security-xinjiang-idUSKCN0T909920151120#UDXUx1ZLiRPcGeAp.97">announced</a> that government forces had killed 28 “terrorists” who had carried out the attack under the direction of “foreign extremists.” Rights groups charge that there is no way to know who the government is really killing, and that there is little evidence of coordinated terrorism in the region.</p><p>There is no doubt, however, that hundreds have died in escalating Han-Uighur violence over the last two years, including stabbings and car bomb attacks at train stations, markets, and mosques. The party’s response has been to initiate a security crackdown and information control, with cameras and police at every intersection. The streets are plastered with propaganda, bright red signs heralding the “China Dream” of national rejuvenation via all kinds of <em>hua</em> [change], <em>xian dai hua</em> [modernization], <em>cheng shi hua </em>[urbanization], and <em>renmin tong yi hua</em> [people’s unification]. However, one kind of hua is going unspoken, Zhou said: <em>Han hua</em> — Han-ification.</p><p>“Han hua comes with development, which can’t be stopped,” Zhou said. “If you try to resist, hold on to your farm or whatever, they will get rid of you. This is how things work in China.” He said his former boss had been present at the Tiananmen Massacre and that his grandmother lived through the Cultural Revolution.</p><p>“The Party has its priorities. You shouldn’t get in the way.”</p><p>Billboards in front of mosques and parks stipulate that minors should not grow beards or wear religious clothing, from headscarves to T-shirts with crescent moons. “The penetration and spread of religious extremist thought is the greatest threat to social harmony,” read signs in Urumqi. “All China’s ethnicities should embrace one another like the seeds of a pomegranate.”</p><p>China’s authorities attribute the unrest in Xinjiang to the “three evils” of terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism. But Han and Uighur residents of Xinjiang told VICE News the tensions result from rapid state-driven modernization and urbanization without cultural integration, and not as a result of foreign instigation or religious ideology.</p><p>Every evening at 8pm, Han women gather in the Rich Hopes, Peaceful City compound of Shule District, 15 minutes’ drive from central Kashgar. They blast square dance music from a stereo and perform a blend of aerobics and Chinese dance, a tradition from their small towns in Hebei and Sichuan. One woman told me she’d come to Xinjiang 15 years ago, but still didn’t speak any Uighur.</p><p>“I’ve never interacted with a Uighur at all,” she said. “Why would you need to?”</p><p>Several feet away, a Uighur woman stopped to watch while walking her 3-year-old son across the square, but laughed at the idea of joining in. “Oh, no, we don’t do this kind of dance.” She said this in Mandarin, not Uighur.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1000/0*KqRB77UxpA41qhZ8.jpg" /><figcaption>A Han Chinese tourist takes pictures with Tajik minority women in Tashkorgan, close to the Pakistani border in Xinjiang (Alice Su, Oct 2015).</figcaption></figure><p>“Han hua is the reason Uighurs are unhappy,” a Han mother told me inside the compound. She’d moved to Xinjiang a year ago and enrolled her daughter in a local kindergarten comprised of 32 Uighurs and 19 Han children.</p><p>“They don’t play together. It’s a bilingual school, but that just means Uighur children learning Mandarin, not the other way around,” the mother said.</p><p>“When I take the bus, the police always check the Uighurs, but not the Han,” she said. “[Although], once an all-Uighur police group called all the Han off the bus. They took ages checking our papers and copying every ID. I guess they want us to know how it feels.”</p><p>Discriminatory security practices and lack of communal integration on the ground are worsening the Uighur-Han divide. Many Uighurs in official positions are seen not as emblems of state inclusion, but as sellouts to their own people, the mother said. “Uighurs were against Juhe Tahir because he was like a propaganda machine,” she said, referring to the imam of Id Kah Mosque in the center of Kashgar, who was stabbed to death in July 2014. “He was always reciting the nationalist slogans. That’s why the extremists called him a traitor.”</p><p>At the Qinghai Mosque of Urumqi, Hui imam Xian Wenjun told VICE News there is no inherent clash between the Chinese state and Islam, but that extremist ideology is bringing unfortunate restriction on Muslims, both Uighur and Hui, the second biggest minority in Xinjiang and largest Muslim minority in China. Hui people speak Mandarin, have no separatist history, and enjoy much less police scrutiny than Uighurs — except in sensitive areas like Xinjiang.</p><blockquote><em>‘The gaps between minorities are getting wider, and these policies are making the problem worse.’</em></blockquote><p>“If the government feels secure toward religion, they will open up as much as possible,” Xian said. That’s why the Hui Muslims in Yunnan and Qinghai can practice so openly, he said. “In Islam, our biggest enemy now is internal. The prejudiced, extremist Muslims are smearing blackness on our faith. This hurts peaceful Muslims the most.”</p><p>Ma Rong, a Peking University sociology professor who researches China’s ethnic minorities, said that China’s policies often exacerbate the identification with ethnicity rather than nationality. Citizens’ ethnicities are noted on their government IDs, and minorities get a range of different policy treatments, from extra points on the national high school exam to a history of more relaxed birthing policies.</p><p>“The gaps between minorities are getting wider, and these policies are making the problem worse,” Ma said. China should seek to be more like America in this sense, he added, a “melting pot” where ethnic identities are overshadowed by common citizenship.</p><p>Li Jin, a 30-year-old Hui native of Urumqi who works in a family wool business, compared Chinese Uighurs to African-Americans. “There is social discrimination, but they’re still citizens in the same system,” he said. “I don’t understand why Westerners are so fixated on human rights for Uighurs — I mean, do you think human rights is a priority in China?”</p><p>In 2009, violent riots erupted in Urumqi in response to two Uighur deaths at a Chinese factory in Guangdong. Li was a student then at Xinjiang University, where Han, Uighur, Hui, and other students locked themselves in school for several days to protect themselves while more than 200 people were killed on the streets. “There were taxi drivers who were pulled out of their cars and thrown over bridges,” he said. “You can’t imagine the chaos. No one wants that to happen again.”</p><p>The Karakoram Highway that leads from Kashgar to Pakistan embodies China’s dream of a Silk Road revival. It cuts through the intersection of the Hindukush, Himalaya, and Karakoram mountains, lined with Chinese projects as dramatic as their natural settings: glistening dams, hydropower plants, highways soaring through the sky in defiance of deathly mudslides below, and at the top, the Khunjerab Pass. There, about 15,000 feet above sea level on the China-Pakistan border, glaciered alps frame a gateway labeled in glinting gold: “PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.”</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1000/0*rPDZ9YZYHhCi6-Zt.jpg" /><figcaption>“People’s Republic of China,” reads a gate constructed at the Khunjerab Pass, border crossing between China and Pakistan on the Karakoram Highway (Alice Su, Oct 2015).</figcaption></figure><p>The scene is a testament to the grandiosity of China’s Silk Road plan, not only in budget but also in engineering ambition. The CCP’s economic planning will defy nature itself, it seems, and nothing can stand in its way, whether glaciers, mountains, rivers, or deserts. Nothing, that is, except the Uighurs.</p><p>I drove along the road with Abdullatif, a Uighur driver who pointed out the Kyrgyz and Tajik autonomous counties on the way, sub-territories of Xinjiang reserved for smaller, non-Uighur minorities.</p><p>“Some of these ethnic groups laugh at Uighurs, saying we don’t have our own country,” he said. “You’ve probably heard the talk about ‘East Turkestan [the Uighur separatist name for Xinjiang]. But look, those –stan countries are dirt poor. China built all the roads in this region. Chinese people excavated all the materials too.”</p><p>Local Uighurs wouldn’t be able to develop Xinjiang at China’s scale, Abdullatif said. “In any case, Xinjiang is a treasure trove,” he added. “China will never let this place go.”</p><p>As we drove back to Kashgar, a Han tourist asked Abdullatif why Uighurs and Han were clashing. “Most of the Uighurs here are simple farmers with nothing against Han people,” Abdullatif said. “Tell them <em>As-Salamu Alaykum</em> [peace be with you], they’ll be moved to tears! But if you ride in on a motorcycle to scam them with fake goods, that’s different.”</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1000/0*C7DIrkSR2FkEm0S3.jpg" /><figcaption>A Uighur woman sits in her field in Shufu District, just outside of Kashgar, Xinjiang (Alice Su, Oct 2015).</figcaption></figure><p>Last time he took a train, Abdullatif says, he heard a Han migrant talking on the phone: “’Here’s Xinjiang in six words: big money, dumb people, come quick!’” The security situation only exacerbates mistrust and exploitation, Abdullatif said. In the villages, for example, security forces often recruit unemployed Uighur youth as assistant police, who then harass local farmers.</p><p>“Uighur police are even worse than Han police. Give these kids a uniform and they think they can do whatever they want. If you have any Islamic thing on your phone, they’ll take it and report you,” Abdullatif said, adding that local police sometimes framed farmers by saying there were Quran apps on their mobile phones and then confiscating their electronics. At least Uighurs in northern Xinjiang can speak Mandarin, Abdullatif said, so they’re less easily tricked.</p><p>Back in Urumqi, I met two Uighur women in front of the Erdaoqiao Grand Theater.</p><p>We watched as a Uighur wedding party filed into a fleet of Hummer limousines.</p><p>“Clearly not all Uighurs are poor,” said 21-year-old Almira, a university student fluent in English and Mandarin. She’d entered college as the only woman in the natural resources engineering department, hoping to get a job in the oil and gas industry. But she switched out after one semester upon finding that all the high-level jobs were reserved for Han males. “Those jobs pay especially well, but they won’t even let women go near those mines and plants, let alone a Uighur,” Almira said.</p><p>The other woman, 32-year-old Aygul, is raising two sons as a divorced single mother. Their Mandarin is already stronger than their Uighur, she said, and she struggles to teach them Uighur at home. “I would never let them lose our language,” she said. But she’ll keep them in the Mandarin school because education there is better. Once the boys are older, she wants to bring them to Japan, where her sister lives. “We can learn without forgetting who we are.”</p><p>Discrimination exists, Almira said, and she knows people who resent that Han businessmen, not Uighurs, are reaping most of the economic profits from Xinjiang’s resource riches. But she doesn’t know anyone who would agitate for actual independence.</p><p>“We all remember 2009,” Almira said of the Urumqi riots. “Now there’s finally stability, so people can live their lives. Who wants to lose that?”</p><p><em>*Some names have been changed in this story.</em></p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://news.vice.com/article/a-muslim-minority-keeps-clashing-with-the-china-dream-in-the-countrys-increasingly-wild-west"><em>news.vice.com</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=5e8ccdc98952" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[心痛]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@aliceysu/%E5%BF%83%E7%97%9B-7fba98ec242c?source=rss-728f6d52edc3------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/7fba98ec242c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[asylum-seekers]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[refugees]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[chinese]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Alice Su]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 01 Dec 2015 12:43:58 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-12-01T12:43:58.403Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/640/1*JndUp1Q2gqNS2GM5XFru8w.jpeg" /><figcaption>(Khalil Gibran)</figcaption></figure><p>此周我身在西安，但从周六早上看到巴黎事件时我的心就一直挂念着中东。我为法国的人民伤心，同时更焦虑想着接下来的西方政府与军方将怎样进行对于中东难民以及仍然被困在叙利亚和伊拉克的难民的政策。完全没想象到美国竟然会走到这个地步，会有想当总统的人把叙利亚难民比喻成狗，要求要登记他们的宗教，让基督徒进来，穆斯林不准进入！我不能理解我们所谓建立在自由、民主、平等、人权、各种美德上的国家怎么会从最高层说出这种黑暗恶劣的话，而且还在 house of representatives 通过抵抗难民的法案…<br>我心中首先只感觉一片悲伤，阿拉伯文说是 عيب, shame, 丢脸。</p><p>第二，我想让西方东方世界各地享受着平安稳定生活的幸福人民说，你知道吗，我们只不过是幸运而已，只不过因为上帝给了我们一份我们无意中收到的恩典：让我们幸好在此时此代出生在美国、欧洲、中国、出生在没有战争的地方。而这份福是 arbitrary 的，不是因为我们比他人好，不是因为你前生作出了什么好事，不是因为我们更有文化，更热爱生命，更值得生存下去。我们完全只是幸运的，要不然你我他都很容易出生在另一个地方，受到战争的危害，被迫要逃离自己的国家，被迫变成难民，被迫去寻找安全的地方。</p><p>而我们这些幸运的人凭什么去歧视、鄙视、拒绝、甚至攻击无路可走的难民呢？</p><p>亲爱的朋友们啊。第三个最难表达的感觉就是我看这些政治话时感到的心痛。心好痛。他们不知道中东人正受着多么深渊的苦，而在这苦中竟然能够多么奇妙地、美丽地、忍耐坚强地继续活下去。而且不只是活下去，乃是充满热情地活着一种滋滋有味、天天庆祝、爱神爱人、无比美丽的生活。两年前我从普林斯顿大学毕业，恰是那种美国精英学校培养出来的自以为是的理想性年轻人，跑到中东，以为自己可以去拯救世界。没想到我所遇见的是完全超乎我一切力量的黑暗、悲伤与痛苦。在那边我一方面深深地学会了谦卑，另一方面认识了我一生中永远最欣赏、佩服、尊重、热爱的人：也就是现在西方国家想要排斥的难民。在中东的两年中，我身为处在远方的外国人，独在异乡为异客，当时就是那边的叙利亚、伊拉克、巴勒斯坦、苏丹难民一个接一个成为了我的家人，把我当作他们的女儿、姐妹、亲友、他们从来不因为我的皮肤颜色、国籍或文化背景而排斥我，刚开始我阿文很差的时候他们也体谅我。更重要的是他们教了我一种在最黑暗的世界中活出如深夜中的萤火虫那样仍然坚强、抓住信仰于希望、绝不让自己的心变硬、即使没有饭吃没有被子盖也还是去互相帮助，造福他人的发光式生活。他们真的是发光的。而且真的是在饥饿、贫穷、受到全世界的排斥、看到自己最爱的家人朋友邻居被残杀时，仍然坚强地往前。更令我佩服的是，他们永远不是只顾着自己往前，而是牵着他人，互相关照地奋斗挣扎，为了 LIFE 之美而活下去。</p><p>现在我心中想念的是阿拉伯世界之美。我想念早晨的 fajr 声，想念路上随便遇到人的亲切吻脸与无数的祝福语，想念在那无数的晚上中喝着无数杯薄荷茶时的香氛与心语，想念 Darfur 的舞会与 Damascus 的鼓乐，想念我走过约旦、黎巴嫩、伊拉克、加沙、巴勒斯坦西岸、突尼斯中那些雨中严冷的难民营、半轰炸的大城市、受到恐怖袭击的清澈美丽地中海海滩、战地背后的遗址时所感受的心火。那是一种内心全时在燃烧的烈火，让我时时想哭，经常在私人祷告时直接跪趴在地上求神救救我们的世界，为了周围的黑暗带着说不出来的心痛的火，但同时也是让我能够与以前无比地更加热爱生活，热爱人类，热爱周围的每一个人的燃烧视角。而且当我在这火中看他人时，我看不见他们是否所谓的 “social burden.” 我看不出任何可讨厌的、能抛弃的、无值的人，发现 “不重要”的人是不存在的，不论他们是什么教育文化背景，什么宗教，什么国籍，什么 asylum seeker or refugee status. 我只看到一个接一个绮丽灿烂的灵魂，在每个人的心、眼、脸中燃烧着，让我深信每一个人的生活是神圣的，不可轻看，不可虐待的；让我深信每个人都是一种点燃的奇迹，而当任何人去 dehumanize 任何另一个人时，他不仅侵害了他人的神圣人权，并且也渐渐地会把自己心中的灵火消灭掉，直到他也化成一个以石头代替人心的非人。</p><p>我话很多因为我的心很痛。今天我用中文写出来，是因为可能这里看得懂的人会比较少，所以我可以更直接地把这些话都表示出来。真希望我至少可以让周围的人多看多想中东的情况与难民（我更多会称他们为英雄）的困境，让我们愿意了解、在乎、关心那些与我们不一样，但能够教我们很多的人。</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=7fba98ec242c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Is There a Link Between Refugees and Extremists?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@aliceysu/is-there-a-link-between-refugees-and-extremists-4bbd25d2b19c?source=rss-728f6d52edc3------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/4bbd25d2b19c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[syria]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[refugees]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[terrorism]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Alice Su]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 30 Nov 2015 16:47:23 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-12-01T12:50:58.645Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*YSq6TvtGX24GUnv8CEkeFg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Graffiti for those who understand in Amman, Jordan.</figcaption></figure><p>Terror seems to spin in circles these days: Beirut, Baghdad, Paris, Mali, and now, again, Tunisia. As details come out about the November 24 bus bombing in Tunis, I am thinking of the last attack in Tunisia, this summer on the beach in Sousse. I’d been reporting on youth extremism there, wondering why so many young people from the only democracy born of the 2011 uprisings were going to fight in Syria and Iraq. The day after a 23-year-old gunman <a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/06/tunisia-sousse-isis-democracy/397169/">massacred</a> 38 sunbathing tourists, a Tunisian mother whispered to me how she’d hid in her room, afraid to go out, crying all afternoon in the dark. “This is not Tunisia,” the mother insisted. Tunisians are quiet, moderate, calm, she said — not terrorist. “Thank God I left the house eventually,” she said. “I went to the market with my neighbors. We needed to hold each other’s hands.”</p><p>Later that week, a younger Tunisian girl wept as she read Facebook posts to me out loud, sentiments much the same as those we see now: a father declared (in French) that nothing would stop him from taking his son to play at the beach. Sousse would stand in happiness, not fear. But there were other posts too — Tunisians from Sidi Bouzid, Kasserine and other impoverished inland regions, mocking the wealthy coastal cities for having their blue skies punctured. “Now you know how it feels,” the anonymous commentators gloated. My Tunisian friend swore under her breath. “This is not Tunisia,” she said.</p><p>I watched this summer as Tunisia careened between fear of terror and rejection of autocracy, trying to balance security versus freedom, a barely-born democracy whorled into a vortex of confused identity. I watched this week as Paris spurred responses with a similar dichotomy: those affirming strength of human spirit, resilience and love, and those angrier voices murmuring, “You are surprised by pain because you are usually oblivious. You don’t see the world like we do.”</p><p>Is there a link between refugees and extremism? I spent the last year completing two projects with the Pulitzer Center on Crisis Reporting: one on <a href="http://pulitzercenter.org/projects/middle-east-syria-jordan-lebanon-interim-lives-refugee-civil-society">protracted refugee crises</a> in Jordan and Lebanon, the other on<a href="http://pulitzercenter.org/projects/middle-east-jordan-tunisia-youth-syria-conflict"> youth extremism</a> in Jordan and Tunisia. Living in Amman, I was curious why these in- and outflows were happening at once: desperate people fleeing from nearby crises, willing to subsist on the margins rather than go back, living non-lives without a way to work or move forward, while young men with citizenship streamed toward Syria and Jordan for voluntary battle.</p><p>My confusion came from a gap in understanding, similar to the gap between responses to Sousse in July and Paris now. I was looking at these subjects from an outside perspective, one disconnected from the region’s historical traumas and ongoing suffering. I saw closed borders, displacement camps, wars and killing, but only after reporting did I see the link between refugees and extremists: that deep injustice creates both.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*bWV_3U_a3bFvkYKTKuWNHg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Jordanians mourn the death of Muath al-Kassasbeh, the pilot burned to death in a cage by Daesh (Amman, Jordan — February 2015).</figcaption></figure><p>In February this year, I watched the Jordanian pilot Muath al-Kassasbeh burn in a cage online with my Jordanian-Palestinian roommate. Soon after, King Abdullah declared wrath and revenge on television. Jordan intensified its participation in the anti-ISIS coalition. My roommate and other Jordanian friends huddled in the cafés of Amman. “This is just like the 2005 bombings, or when Saddam invaded Kuwait,” they whispered, recalling where they’d been and what they’d been doing on the day of Jordan’s last terrorist bombings, or when chemicals weapons were used in Syria, or when the Gulf War began, remembering the same fear of violent spillover and same question asked with every crisis, “Will we get out of the region?”</p><p>My childhood held no awareness of the Middle East until 9/11, which I remember as a nationwide shock of surprise, grief, and genuine questioning, “Why do they hate us?” Whereas my friends grew up in constant unease, I remember American flags and an occasional sense of broken oblivion. I never had to think, “How can I get out of this country?” They have always been on the edge of their seats, swinging from crisis to crisis, hoping for a flash moment in 2011 that things would change, but now plunged back into disillusionment.</p><p>Earlier this year, I <a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/06/jihad-jordan-syria-isis/396041/">profiled</a> a young Jordanian named Jihad who lost faith in activism and crossed into Syria to fight against Bashar al-Assad, only to be radicalized by Jabhat al-Nusra and die on the battlefield in 2014. Two scenes from his story stick in my mind: first, a line of graffiti in his neighborhood, a poor section of East Amman housing mostly Palestinians and now also Syrian refugees, where Jihad wrote during the 2011 protests: “Why does the king live in a castle while the people are dying of poverty?” The words are half-covered with red scribbles, but still visible and relevant. Second, how his mother described the days before Jihad left home: “He would sit in our living room watching Al-Jazeera, seeing the women and children die and he would cry, cry, cry.”</p><p>Another night in Tunis, I drank coffee along Habib Bourguiba Avenue with a former Salafist who told me about his days in prison under Ben Ali. “Tunisians are psychologically mutilated,” the former Salafist said. Tunisians have long been moderate and peaceful, but under tyrannical enforcement, he said, with torture for the dissenters. Those surprised at the extremism had forgotten about dictatorship, he added. “Ask any of these people if they want shari’a law, and they will say yes,” the man said, motioning at the Ramadan crowds passing by. “But ask what shari’a means specifically, and no one knows. They just want shari’a as an alternative to the world as it is. That’s why 2011 happened. People were hungry for justice — things made right — and we are still hungry now.”</p><p>Injustice is the link between refugees and extremists, especially in the Middle East. There, apocalyptic literature is superfluous; the world feels like it is already ending. Anyone can watch the news and mourn, but we in secure countries can eventually wipe it from our minds and go about our careers and lives. Those who are marginalized, poor, oppressed or under fire cannot escape so easily. Direct injustice forces people to become refugees, while protracted injustice becomes fodder and breeding ground for extremism. The more we shut our eyes to the former, the more the latter will grow.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Topauba-XxC8oYTrsca-Mg.jpeg" /><figcaption>A Sudanese refugee mother and child look over a balcony on the outskirts of Amman, Jordan (October 2014).</figcaption></figure><p>A second link between refugees and extremism is that one can help us to combat the other. Fighting extremism means we must also find real ways to give hope to those on the crushed side of our world — and no one knows how to do that better than refugees. The first time I wrote about <a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/11/how-do-you-rank-refugees/281771/">refugees </a>for<em> The Atlantic,</em> readers and friends <a href="https://www.youcaring.com/help-a-neighbor/help-keep-sudanese-somalis-in-jordan-warm-this-winter/112379">raised money</a> from abroad to fund gas heaters for the Sudanese refugees in Amman. Mohamedain Suliman, the Sudanese community’s informal leader who’d been stuck in Jordan for 11 years, waiting for resettlement, took me through <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v-ZtnEAJ_SU">the alleys and back roads</a> where those from Darfur, Kordofan and Jebel Nuba were living. It was snowing, and many of the Sudanese wore rubber sandals. Mohamedain carried two cell phones that were always ringing, now a Sudanese needing urgent hospital fees, now a group protesting in front of UNHCR, now a single mother needing blankets for a new baby — Mohamedain didn’t have extra money, but he’d pull the community together to pool funds, work extra, borrow, survive.</p><p>In May, Mohamedain got resettled to Virginia, where his son is now a<a href="http://www.richmond.com/sports/high-school/article_908f8f0f-32fc-5687-88dd-53660dcc14d4.html#.VkP27xPNQJc.facebook"> cross-country star</a>. When I visited them in March, Mohamedain was working at a laundromat, an upgrade from his first job lifting loads of dairy and frozen meat on the night shift at a factory. He wants to drive cross-country trucks eventually, but needs time to fulfill the license requirement. His oldest son is still stuck in Jordan, his file separated from the family’s because he came from Darfur later.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*hLd1Z0k9vTDk2UAWxbYxNg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Sudanese refugees dance at an engagement celebration in Amman, Jordan (February 2015).</figcaption></figure><p>Last summer in Lebanon, I profiled 25-year-old Mohammad, who volunteered with a team using Facebook to raise funds for Syrians in dire need across the Bekaa Valley. This year, Mohammad made it to Germany. As soon as he got his Schengen ID, he started flying back and forth to Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon — not to liaise with extremists, as fear-mongering politicians might say, but to raise money, coordinate and deliver medicine, food and clothing for Syrian children across the region. Their need is dire, growing, and has been for years on a scale with which Europe cannot compare: One out of every four people in Lebanon is a Syrian refugee. In Jordan, it’s one in ten. As faraway Americans squabble about how to keep safe, refugees risk their lives daily, seeing and feeling the human cost of attacks in places like Ghouta, Douma and Deir Ezzor, and giving their money, time and safety as salve for the wounds of others.</p><p>We need these survivors of Syria, Iraq, Palestine, Sudan, and so many more places to become our neighbors and friends. We need their resilience, their capacity for love, and their understanding that peace is precious and freedom is rare. In a time of terror, these brothers and sisters are our best bet against fear. They have lost more to terrorism than we have and hate it more than we do. They know how to see through the darkness, to survive evil without becoming part of it, to lose everything and yet breathe courage and burn with hope. They have wisdom to share, if we can only learn to listen.</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="http://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/there-link-between-refugees-and-extremism"><em>pulitzercenter.org</em></a><em> on November 30, 2015.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4bbd25d2b19c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Untold Stories (Jordan):]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/alice-y-su/untold-stories-jordan-98778e178b01?source=rss-728f6d52edc3------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/98778e178b01</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[syria]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[isis]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Alice Su]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 18 Aug 2015 12:59:03 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-08-18T12:59:03.604Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>The Mothers</h3><p>AMMAN, Jordan — “How are you sure that your son is <em>shaheed</em>, a martyr?” I ask Umm Jihad. We sip orange soda, fanning ourselves in the surprise heat of this day. Cartoon Network plays in Arabic in the background. Her teenage daughter and 18-year-old friend are smirking and slouching throughout the evening, tapping away at their smartphones and leaning in, then out, of our conversation.</p><p>“I am convinced that, <em>inshallah</em>, he is a martyr,” she says.</p><p>Umm Jihad is 44 years old. Her hair is dark and smooth, brushed back in a clean echo of the kohl under her eyes. I kiss and call her aunty, then sister, then dear.</p><p>I’ve come to hear about her son, 21-year-old Jihad: activist and school leader, protester and bleeding heart, the type who’d trek to Dakhiliyya Circle and sleep all night in the cold, defiant in exhaustion, waving signs about civilians’ rights, boycotting parliamentary elections, then coming home to sit before their television and watch news about Syria until he cried.</p><p>“Jihad is Jihad and has always been Jihad,” his mother says. “There’s one thing about him that’s never changed whether he was a kid or a <em>tawjihi</em> [high school] student, then in university, then in Syria: Jihad couldn’t bear injustice. He could never just stand by when anyone was being oppressed.”</p><p>Once, Jihad and his mother passed a man beating a donkey on the street. Jihad ran to the man and berated him: Why hit the donkey? Why treat your animal this way? “<em>Sho dakhelt fi yamma?</em> Why is this your business?” Umm Jihad scolded her son. Jihad turned to her, a wave of conviction. “Mama, this is my business. Mama, <em>mustaheel</em> — impossible for me not to care.”</p><p>“He treated donkeys this way,” Umm Jihad said. “What about Syria?”</p><p>The interview starts out fine. I am skeptical, cynical, questioning, listening, taking notes and sifting as I transcribe, telling myself what to second-guess, ask again, press here, push there, but then, <em>oof</em> — “Listen, <em>habibti, habibti</em>,” Umm Jihad says. “How can I try to say this to you?”</p><p>Try, I tell her. Try. Try. I’m listening. Tell me. Help me to hear.</p><p>Suddenly Umm Jihad leans forward and I’m seeing her as a mother.</p><p>“I told him every time he called, ‘Come home,’” she says.</p><p>“Then I realized I couldn’t. I couldn’t do anything.”</p><p>Do you think he did the right thing? I ask. I am pressing for an answer. I want her view on Jihad. I want her condemnation or condoning of the extremist groups. I want to know if and why she endorses Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS and their supporters in Jordan. I want to ask, ask, ask, ask, I’m asking.</p><p>Her face twists.</p><p>“I tried to make him come home but <em>khalas, khalas</em>, I couldn’t,” she says.</p><p>“I cried every night and day,” she says.</p><p>“This is his <em>naseeb</em>, his portion. It was God’s will for him to die on October 24, 2014,” she says.</p><p>“The most important thing is that he didn’t kill anyone.”</p><p>“I swear I know, he didn’t kill anyone.”</p><p>“I had to pull the words out of his mouth. He wouldn’t tell me things. He just said, ‘Pray that I can be a martyr.’”</p><p>“No, Jihad couldn’t be controlled. I could only tell him, ‘Don’t kill Muslims. Don’t kill a Muslim. Don’t kill one, because if you do you will go to hell.’ And he told me, ‘I don’t want to kill any Muslims, mama. All this fire is for Bashar al-Assad. Look at how our brothers and sisters are suffering. Look at the children splattered into pieces by the barrel bombs. Look at the chemical weapons. It’s all for him, against him. We must take him down.”</p><p>“I am sure. I am sure he never killed anyone.”</p><p>“This is the only thing that makes me a little more comfortable. He died before all this chaos began, when good and bad were still clear. Nusra was always moderate, good to the civilians, good. He was on the right side. His heart was right. He didn’t go for girls or money. He went to help people, like he’s always wanted. That’s the only consistent thing about my son. He couldn’t bear injustice.”</p><p>“I am convinced that, <em>inshallah</em>, he is <em>shaheed</em>.”</p><p>Darling woman, dearest, dear, how do you know?</p><p>I watch Umm Jihad turning circles in her words, convincing herself that surely Joojoo, her little son, the one of softest heart, the one who loved himself into fire, surely he is safe and well. Surely he chose the right way, blessed way, found freedom and paradise.</p><p>She shows me pictures of him as a baby, then in high school, <em>tawjihi</em>, asleep on the floor with books all around from too much studying. She shows me pictures of him with guns and beard, waving the Nusra flag, blood-splattered, dead on the ground in Syria.</p><p>She used Magic Photo — photoshop for amateurs — to cobble a collage together. Jihad spread chest down, passed out over his <em>tawjihi</em> books. Next to Jihad spread chest down, bullet hole dripping in his back, shot by a Syrian regime sniper in Idlib, dead.</p><p>She made sparkly graphics, purple, cerulean and pink, of Jihad in the sky. Jihad in the snow. Jihad in the cheesiest nature backgrounds with reassuring Arabic imposed over the sky:<em> Thanks be to God for the martyr who has found paradise. Glory be to God and may He come and thanks be to Him for the martyrs.</em> The martyr Jihad, her son. His smile is pixelated, blurred.</p><p>“I am convinced, <em>inshallah</em>, that he is a martyr.”</p><p>“You know what this word means? <em>Shaheed</em> and <em>jinna</em>? It means he died for God. He died in a good way. So he is in <em>jinna</em> now with all the sweetest things, the best things, nothing bad around him, free. Free. Jihad didn’t want anything left in this world. He wanted to die. God wanted him to die. I am convinced and I can only believe this now, that he is in paradise and accepted by God, <em>inshallah</em>.”</p><p>Umm Jihad likes me so much. By the end of the night she is kissing and blessing me, laughing through teary eyes. I’ve been telling her about my work, Iraq and Gaza and refugees and wars. “<em>Shatera</em>,” she calls me, “So clever, so sweet.” She clasps my hands and cheeks. “<em>Zay al-aasal</em>,” she says. Like honey, like honey.</p><p>“You would understand Jihad. He was like you,” Umm Jihad says, and I say yes, I thought that! I too watched the news about Syria and cried. I too do that every week still. But I cannot and will not pick up a weapon, cross the border and fight. My weapons are different.</p><p>“Yes, you are more logical. You are clever and smart — maybe you make more impact with your stories than he did,” she says. “Oh, and you are a girl. You couldn’t fight.”</p><p>I smile. Sure, <em>ana bint</em>, and my ways are different.</p><p>But in my mind I think, dear mother! Dear sister, dear one, dear, I am so sorry for your son.</p><p>I am so sorry for your tears.</p><p>I do not know where your son has gone.</p><p>I do not dare to presume.</p><p>Yet if God is merciful, gracious, good, surely He does not call us to fight in this way.</p><p>I need answers for my sisters. I need answers: what could Umm Jihad do when her son was in Syria? What could she do when Jihad’s heart was fit to beat right out of his chest? Who would listen to him? Who would care?</p><p>I see Umm Jihad’s face twisting, heart sore. “Our religion tells us what is right,” she says. “We must fight injustice. Syria is Jihad. Yes, this was right. Yes, they should go and fight. Yes, this is our duty in religion. Fight without weapons? How? We must defend our Muslim brothers. We must defend our sisters and children. We must fight for those without voices, those oppressed, those put in cages and set on fire. We must fight, and it is right for us to support our children’s fighting, and those with little faith might say, ‘No, stay with me.’ But she with great faith will support her child to go.”</p><p>“I am speaking for Islam,” Umm Jiahd says, “Not as a mother.”</p><p>“As a mother, this is difficult. This is right, but it is difficult.”</p><p>“I should let him go and want him to fight — no, yes, no, yes — this is clear. Our religion is very clear.”</p><p>“But it is difficult.”</p><p>I want to melt her sorrow, loosen her clenched fist of faith, clean out the fear. These things must be untrue. I cannot believe that God would demand our sons to topple into pointless death — to war, to chaos, to meaningless sacrifice, to fire, to burn, to die. How could that be good?</p><p>I don’t believe it, but I am so afraid to tell my sister: maybe your son isn’t <em>shaheed</em>. How can Umm Jihad reject militant jihad without cursing her own Beloved? How can I speak against the violence without twisting a knife into her fears? Surely that’s no good either — to condemn, to curse, to tug on a mother’s terror, to suggest her son is not in rest and bliss.</p><p>There are some questions I don’t ask.</p><p>I hold my tongue. I take notes. I listen.</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="http://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/mothers-jordan-jihad"><em>pulitzercenter.org</em></a><em> on August 17, 2015.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=98778e178b01" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/alice-y-su/untold-stories-jordan-98778e178b01">Untold Stories (Jordan):</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/alice-y-su">alice y. su</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[‘The revolution was a mistake’:]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@aliceysu/the-revolution-was-a-mistake-29d4756ad4db?source=rss-728f6d52edc3------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/29d4756ad4db</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Alice Su]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 26 Jul 2015 18:10:23 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-07-26T18:10:23.734Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Tunisians struggle with Arab Spring impact</h4><p><em>This is the second in a two-part series looking at how Tunisia’s fledgling democracy is challenged by a history of dictatorship, economic turmoil and youth radicalization. </em><a href="http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/7/22/tunisia-democracy-legacy-religious-oppression.html"><em>Read part one here</em></a><em>.</em></p><p>SBEITLA, Tunisia — At gate to the mosque in Hayy Sourour in Sbeitla, deep in Tunisia’s arid interior region of Kasserine, the main door is missing. Two of the three green doors stand remain under a simple sign identifying the place of worship. Mosque Ibn Taymiyya is named after the 13th century sheikh known for setting the precedent of takfir, or declaring other Muslims infidels and requiring warfare against them.</p><p>The name is new, locals said. Salafi painted it on the wall when they took over two years ago, renaming the mosque, removing the government-appointed imam and preaching about responsibility to send fighters to Syria. When police closed down the mosque July 4, they upset the entire neighborhood.</p><p>“People are angry because the elderly have nowhere else to pray. They’re cursing whoever caused this, whether Salafi or the state,” said Atef K., 40, a shopkeeper down the street who did not want to give his full name because of the tensions regarding the situation.</p><p>Salafi didn’t do anything bad in Hayy Sourour, he said, except encourage youths to go to Syria. “Of course, no one wants their kids in Syria. They go to jihad to die,” he said.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*nAVOsCBVdm4hODDekD3MEw.jpeg" /><figcaption>After the government padlocked the gate to Ibn Taymiyya, a Salafist mosque, locals removed the main door. Alice Su</figcaption></figure><p>The mosque was closed and reopened by force twice in one weekend, locals said. when Tunisian President Beji Caid Essebsi announced a national state of emergency against terrorism, security forces placed a padlock on the gate. Salafi youths ripped it off several hours later. Police raided Hayy Sourour at night, arresting the youths and relocking the gate. More youths — not religiously driven, just kids zealous to protect their neighborhood, Atef said — removed the main door. Authorities then cut off power and water to the mosque. At sunset prayer time, armed personnel carriers patrolled the road between Sbeitla and the town of Kasserine. Hayy Sourour was quiet. “Without electricity, there’s no call to prayer,” he said.</p><p>The fight over this one mosque symbolizes a swath of broader societal tensions and fault lines now running through Tunisia, the birthplace and <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2015/03/18/why-tunisia-the-arab-springs-sole-success-story-suffers-from-islamist-violence/">ostensibly the only success story of the 2011 Arab Spring</a>. Four years later, the country has a new constitution and unprecedented civil liberties and has had two free and fair elections. But it has also become the world’s <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2015/01/27/map-how-the-flow-of-foreign-fighters-to-iraq-and-syria-has-surged-since-october/">top contributor of fighters to the intractable conflicts in Syria</a>, Libya and Iraq.</p><p>Not only are Tunisians joining radical groups abroad, but they’ve also radicalized at home, carrying out <a href="http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/3/18/tourists-killed-in-tunisia-museum-assault.html">massacres of tourists at the Bardo Museum</a> in March and on the <a href="http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/6/26/tourist-hotel-in-tunisia-reportedly-attacked.html">beach in Sousse</a> in June. Meanwhile, the Al-Qaeda-affiliated <a href="http://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/katibat-uqbah-ibn-nafi">Okba Ibn Nafaa Brigade is training</a> on Kasserine’s Mount Chaambi and attacking security forces nearby. While the state attempts a security crackdown, residents of interior regions like Kasserine, Gafsa and Sidi Bouzid say they are more marginalized than before the revolution. Political exclusion and socioeconomic desperation, they say, are combining with strict police tactics to drive young people toward violence.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*3EYqdRDdBMnARL5ywhDqcg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Graffiti in English and Arabic on the wall outside the mosque in Hayy Sourour.Alice Su</figcaption></figure><p>Behind the Hayy Sourour mosque, graffiti on one wall read, “Fuck the police” in English, with “the government” added in Arabic. It has been there since ousted President Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali’s days, Atef said, but the revolution neither improved life in Sbeitla nor changed people’s view of the authorities.</p><p>Neighborhoods like Hayy Sourour and Hayy al-Khader are “hard,” said Habib Dalhouni, 50, an Arabic professor and community organizer in Sbeitla. “People here despise the government,” he said, pointing at the dusty unpaved streets, empty under a blazing Ramadan sun. At night these streets are full, he said, and police rarely enter, despite rampant drug abuse and petty crime.</p><p>Now that <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/07/tunisia-declares-state-emergency-beach-massacre-150704142712795.html">Tunisia is in a state of emergency</a>, arrests are increasing. Citizens feel trapped between Salafi agitation and state-imposed violence, he said. They don’t want their sons recruited to fight in Chaambi or Syria, but they also resent the heavy police presence and seemingly arbitrary raids. “The state needs to persuade citizens to join their fight against terrorism,” he said. “But people think the state is going to war against Islam.”</p><p>Unrest in the interior regions is nothing new, said 62-year-old Noureddine Ichaoui, a retired school inspector who volunteers with Amal, an organization promoting active citizenship. “Kasserine has been like this for centuries. People are always hungry and poor,” he said, listing examples of bread riots, farmers’ uprisings and other economically driven protests from the early 20th century. “The state was using machine guns and Kalashnikovs in 2011, but our youths confronted them barechested. They inherited oppression from grandparents and parents. People here were already dead two generations ago. They had nothing to lose.”</p><p>In Sidi Bouzid — where the vegetable vendor <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/01/201111684242518839.html">Mohammed Bouazizi famously set himself on fire</a> in 2011, <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/01/2011126121815985483.html">sparking Tunisia’s uprising</a> and subsequent revolts across the Arab world — people laughed off the idea of revolutionary success.</p><p>“It started as a revolution and became a catastrophe,” said Rachid Fetini, 52, a textile merchant and the head of a business center in Sidi Bouzid. Postrevolution governments brought no development to internal regions, he said, adding that authorities were busy writing the constitution and navigating between religious and political identities. But the anger and neglect that pushed people into revolution in the first place has grown. “There’s no encouragement for investors — local or international. Now we’ve been branded as a terrorism hub,” he said. “Who will ever start a business here?”</p><p>In central Sidi Bouzid, several yards from the site of Bouazizi’s self-immolation, 28-year-old Bilal sat in front of a fruit stand. He didn’t vote in the last two elections, nor has he ever held a stable, full-time job. “No one deserved my vote,” he said. Politicians don’t see people in Sidi Bouzid, he said, before or after the revolution. “We wanted to prove ourselves, to show that we exist in Tunisia. We wanted people to stop passing by us,” he said, explaining why he participated in protests in 2011. “Now we regret it. The revolution was a mistake.”</p><p>The fruit stand’s owner, Hussein Alaoui, 35, studied accounting administration. He graduated from a trade school in 1998, but for the last four years has been able only to sell fruit. “Young people go to Syria because of poverty and unemployment,” he said, waving flies from the peaches and figs. “They’re recruited with ideology plus money. Give anyone 20,000 dinars [$10,000] and tell them to take weapons and go somewhere, and they will do it.”</p><p>An International Crisis Group report warned in late 2013 that <a href="http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/north-africa/tunisia/148-tunisia-s-borders-jihadism-and-contraband.aspx">criminality and religious fervor were blending into “so-called Islamo-gangsterism”</a> in peripheral areas, combining radical ideology and organized crime through cartels and contraband networks. A U.N. report from July confirms that <a href="http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=16223&amp;LangID=E">recruiting networks make as much as $10,000 per youth</a> enlisted by their operatives. Moez Ali, the president of UTIL, a civil engagement nongovernmental organization, verified that cash flow accompanies every recruit; the kids go to Syria as volunteers, but whoever convinces them profits in the process. “They are formatting the brains of our youths and selling them. I don’t consider this a holy fight,” he said. “I consider it human trafficking.”</p><blockquote>‘They are formatting the brains of our youth and selling them. I don’t consider this a holy fight. I consider it human trafficking.’</blockquote><p>In Gafsa, an interior region rich in phosphate mines but suffering constant strikes as locals complain about insufficient jobs and wages, the streets overflow with sidewalk cafes. Their plastic tables spill into the roads, the patrons overwhelmingly young and male, drinking cheap tea and coffee for hours every day and night. Helmi Nasri, 35, is an officer of UTIL’s Gafsa branch. He said the youths there were unlikely to favor fundamentalist thinking. “Our grandfathers were all miners, so people in Gafsa are leftists. They aren’t drawn to anything conservative,” he said. At the same time, 70 percent of Gafsa’s 350,000 residents are under 35. Half of college graduates are unemployed. Youth turnout in the last elections was especially low in such regions.</p><p>“Look, these guys are just drinking coffee every day because they have nothing to do,” said Ali Maamria, 41, a high school headmaster, gesturing toward the cafés. “There isn’t much Salafi activity, but this is fertile recruitment ground. The youths are so easily influenced. They go for either drugs or extremism.”</p><p>Protests are rife in interior regions because it’s easy to blame the state for everything, said Taher Khadraoui, the director of Amal in Kasserine. But people also have an antipathy toward government that exacerbates the disconnect. “The idea of a modern state and democracy is built on citizenship. But our culture is built on violence and force, not dialogue,” he said. Tunisians have yet to learn what participatory democracy means, he said, especially in marginalized areas.</p><p>In Sbeitla, Dalhouni agreed. “The state is opaque, and the people are ignorant,” he said. “There’s no way for them to meet halfway.”</p><p>Behind the curtains of a small shop in Hayy Sourour, Nisreen Barhouni, 24, said that her neighborhood is <em>shaabi</em> (working-class) and that there are drug addicts, religious fundamentalists and people just living. She recently married and studies midwifery in the coastal city of Sfax. She returns to Sbeitla for the summer but doesn’t want to stay. Hayy Sourour is caught in a war between the Salafi and security forces, she said, with the two sides calling each other <em>irhab</em> (terrorists) and <em>taghout</em> (rebels against God).</p><p>Her neighbors are afraid for their kids, she added — afraid that they will be arrested for no reason but more afraid that they’ll go to Syria. “Everyone is against closing the mosque. How will that stop the youths from their jihad?” she said. “If they go to Syria, they die.”</p><p><em>Reporting for this article was supported by a grant from the </em><a href="http://pulitzercenter.org/"><em>Pulitzer Center on Crisis Reporting</em></a><em>.</em></p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/7/24/tunisians-grapple-with-arab-spring-aftermath.html"><em>america.aljazeera.com</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=29d4756ad4db" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Tunisia faces legacy of religious oppression in fight against radicalism]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@aliceysu/tunisia-faces-legacy-of-religious-oppression-in-fight-against-radicalism-205fda644b0f?source=rss-728f6d52edc3------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/205fda644b0f</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Alice Su]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 22 Jul 2015 12:07:45 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-07-22T12:07:45.285Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>This is the first in a two-part series looking at how Tunisia’s fledgling democracy is challenged by a history of dictatorship, economic turmoil and youth radicalization.</em></p><p>KASSERINE, Tunisia — On Valentine’s Day in 2014, Safouan Aichaoui updated his <a href="https://www.facebook.com/morabett/posts/281742698647857?pnref=story">Facebook status</a> with a smiley face and the words “feeling alive.” The Tunisian 24-year-old had arrived in Idlib, Syria, one year earlier to fight with Jabhat al-Nusra.</p><p>On the social media platform, he added a longer post in Arabic: “Many people think that jihad is the closest way to death. They don’t realize that it actually prolongs life. I swear to God, you feel the pleasure of your existence. It’s not a pointless existence. And every day you are born again.”</p><p>Three months and twelve days later, Aichaoui was dead. Back in his hometown of Kasserine, 29-year-old Abdelhamid Mhadhbi found out from Facebook that his childhood friend and neighbor had been killed in a fight against Syrian government forces. Mhadhbi had been corresponding with Aichaoui since he left Tunisia for Syria in 2013. Besides posting <a href="https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=224640034358124&amp;set=a.103227223166073.5679.100004363865025&amp;type=3&amp;theater">pro-ISIL images on Facebook</a>, Aichaoui had sent photos of himself with new comrades in Syria, dressed in black and pointing index fingers to the sky, his green eyes smiling straight at the camera. “I am never coming back home. I want to complete my life in jihad,” he told Mhadhbi in one chat exchange, mixing in French shorthand. “g trouve mon bomheur ici.” I’ve found my happiness here.</p><p>Aichaoui was one of an <a href="http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=16219&amp;LangID=E">estimated 4,000 Tunisians</a> who have become foreign fighters in Syria, along with 1,000–1,500 in Libya, 200 in Iraq, 60 in Mali and 60 in Yemen, making Tunisia the world’s top exporter of fighters to radical groups abroad. Most are 18–35.</p><p>The state’s response is a security crackdown: closing mosques, arresting aspiring fighters and building a wall on the Libyan border. But civil society groups, family members and the young Tunisians themselves say that’s not enough. The country’s young people were raised under a dictatorship that suppressed critical thinking, rendering many of them at once hungry for religious identity and vulnerable to fundamentalist preaching. As Tunisia struggles with its democratic transition, they have fallen prey to violent networks offering not only economic opportunity and social inclusion, but also a confident worldview.</p><p>Aichaoui was one of these youth. No one in his family knew Aichaoui was going to Syria until he called his mother from the Turkish border. “He’d reached a point of no return then,” Mhadhbi said, literally and ideologically. “He was convinced.” Aichaoui had left the underdeveloped interior region of Kasserine six years ago to study in Tunis, but seemed unchanged when he returned for holidays each year. Aichaoui had been quiet and religious, Mhadhbi said, praying daily and refraining from drinking. But he’d never shown violent or desperate tendencies; on the contrary, Aichaoui was an A-student, pursuing a master’s in information technology management. Jabhat al-Nusra gave Aichaoui a job, house and wife, but he could have found all those in Tunisia. What Syria offered him was the chance to be a hero, Mhadhbi said.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*aPdsEQnneJbAINX5fOhJ8A.jpeg" /><figcaption>Residents of Sousse protest against intimidation by radical groups that have become a daily threat across Tunisia. Alice Su</figcaption></figure><p>“Safouan was looking for martyrdom. He saw himself dying for God’s sake,” Mhadhbi said. “Even if Assad’s regime fell, he would never come back. He’d go to Chechnya or Afghanistan.” Aichaoui found a new surety in Syria, Mhadhbi said, writing condescendingly on social media about the glory of jihadi life and urging his friends to join. In March 2014, Aichaoui posted a <a href="https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=294721130683347&amp;set=a.124284457727016.25442.100004363865025&amp;type=1&amp;permPage=1">photo of a dead jihadist’s face</a>, circling a patch of light on his forehead. “Look at the light descending on him… look at his smile,” he wrote in the caption. “I swear to God, brothers, I am kissing him and keep rubbing my nose in his face till I am satiated with the smell of musk wafting from him … That’s God’s grace that he bestows upon whoever he wishes.”</p><p>When commenters questioned the musk, light or violence, Aichaoui retorted that they were victims of the media, clueless about true martyrdom and jihad. “What do you know about legitimate fighting?” he wrote. “I never respected you before and now it’s even worse … If you had chivalrous zeal you’d have come to defend your religion. Instead you’re defending the democracy of infidels.”</p><p>While some youth go to Syria seeking death, others go to escape it. In Douar Hicher, a poor neighborhood in the outer suburbs of Tunis, 60-year-old Umm Taher said she’d stopped her 18-year-old son from going to Syria. “Our kids go to jihad from hunger and poverty. Look how we mothers are working to keep them alive,” said Umm Taher, who sells cheap dresses on the street for a profit of a few dollars a day. Her husband requires regular kidney dialysis and can’t work, while her seven children are all unable to find jobs, despite two of them having advanced degrees in physics and chemistry. “Only a handful of people are really living in Tunisia,” she said, adding that life had gotten more difficult since the revolution. “Our kids are walking to death. But when they see darkness in front of them, they say, ‘I’m dead anyway. There’s nothing to lose if I go.’”</p><p>Umm Taher and her son had been fighting at home one day about his usual problems, she said: smoking marijuana, drinking, stealing, when he yelled that he would leave her for Syria. “Fine, go,” Umm Taher yelled back. “But then I got scared.”</p><p>So she reported her son to the police, who came to Umm Taher’s home and arrested him — not for ideological reasons but because he’d tested positive for drug use. He’s been in detention for a month now, she said, and will likely stay longer on multiple charges of theft and crime.</p><p>Most youth in Douar Hicher went to Syria under similar circumstances, Umm Taher said. “They were smokers, drinkers, addicts — then they read something on the Internet, pray for two days, and become ‘Salafis’,” she said. Now Taher is talking about getting on a boat for Italy once he’s free, she added. “The state doesn’t care. They let our kids go, and then they die.”</p><blockquote>‘Our kids go to jihad from hunger and poverty. … When they see darkness in front of them, they say, “I’m dead anyway. There’s nothing to lose if I go.”’</blockquote><p>Many Tunisians blame state negligence for what they term a youth-radicalization problem, especially accusing Ennahda, the Islamist party elected to lead Tunisia’s first post-revolution government, of letting ultra-conversative ideologies fester. Tunisia’s last four years began with a security and authority vacuum immediately after Zine El Abidine Ben Ali’s overthrow in 2011. The transitional government allowed amnesty for thousands of political prisoners, including hardliners like Abu ‘Iyadh, leader of Ansar al-Sharia, a radical group initially allowed to function freely. Its members streamed into Tunisian society, often providing charity and social services to marginalized areas, then taking over mosques, replacing the imams and sheikhs who had been appointed by the Ministry of Religious Affairs. The groups openly encouraged Tunisians to finance, support and join groups in Syria.</p><p>Moez Ali, president of UTIL, an organization promoting political participation, said that Tunisia’s government largely ignored the groups. “The government tried to minimize what was happening. They’d say ‘don’t exaggerate,’ while our kids were being brainwashed and sold in a human trafficking network of ‘takfiri’ mafia,” Ali said.</p><p>Meanwhile, violence linked to these groups grew within Tunisia, peaking with a series of political assassinations in 2013. The government outlawed Ansar al-Sharia, but related networks had already taken root across Tunisia, most notably in Chaambi mountain overlooking Kasserine on the Algerian border. There, the Al-Qaeda-affiliated Uqba ibn Nafi brigade is regularly clashing with and killing state security forces.</p><p>Authorities turned a blind eye to the danger, Ali said, because no politician wanted to be seen as anti-Islamic after the revolution. Flexibility toward Salafis could bolster one’s voter base, especially as some Tunisians were voting based on a vague perception of candidates’ religious values rather than for theories of change or socioeconomic programs. It could also please donor states in the Gulf, whose support remains critical to cash-strapped post-revolution Tunisia.</p><p>Said Ferjani, an Ennahda political relations officer, called these accusations unfair. “It’s nonsense to say we encouraged these people. They voted against us in the elections,” Ferjani said. There’s also a difference between the establishment, a holdover from Ben Ali’s time, and political parties, Ferjani added. “We can affect policies, but we cannot change the institutions. It’s not like we brought our own secret service and police.” The Ministry of Interior, not Ennahda, decided when to outlaw Ansar al-Sharia, Ferjani pointed out. They also implement Tunisia’s current security strategies.</p><p>Adam, a 32-year-old former Salafi who asked that only his first name be used, said that combating ideology with violence is what drove many Tunisians toward such a movement. “I was almost a ‘perfect Salafi’ at one point,” Adam said, explaining that he’d adhered to strict religious practices, rejected Tunisia’s democratic state, and supported “jihad” in Syria as a duty to defend Muslims. But as groups like ISIL demonstrated increasing brutality, especially toward other Muslims, Adam pulled back. “I believe our religion is not so bloody,“ he said. ”This is not the way to change things.”</p><p>A street vendor in the old city of Tunis, Adam was drawn to Salafism under Ben Ali’s regime. Salafis have been oppressed throughout history for being “true to their beliefs,” Adam said. He liked Salafism because it was clear — “one plus one equals two” — and bold, unlike the state-sponsored narrative of quietist, submissive Islam.</p><p>The appeal of Salafism became clearest to Adam in 2008, he said, when he was imprisoned several weeks for having a beard and wearing religious dress. Under Ben Ali, Salafis, moderate Islamists and secular dissidents alike were violently treated. The brutality of groups like ISIL — also known as the Islamic State — is unnatural, Adam said, but scrape off the propaganda of decapitations and beach shootings, and you find people “psychologically disfigured” from generations of oppression, starving for justice and convinced that it is only available through stringent application of Islamic law.</p><p>“People think the Islamic State is about decapitation, but it’s also a system of retirement benefits, fair banking, pregnancy leave and welfare. People want to feel like human beings, not this global inequality where only the rich are happy,” Adam said. More and more Tunisians are seeing that “the lie of democracy and pluralism” doesn’t bring justice and dignity, Adam said.</p><p>Many Salafis eschew violence, but youth are hard-pressed to resist the narrative of a global war against Islam, said Sergio Altuna, an analyst with the Global Security Institute. “It’s so easy to say, look at Israel and Palestine! Look at Saudi in Yemen! Look what America is doing!” he said. “You can point at many ‘tyrants.’” Many Salafis eschew violence, but youth are hard-pressed to resist the narrative of a global war against Islam, Altuna said.</p><p>The answer to extremist ideology must be free choice of alternative ideas, Adam said. He rejects ISIL because they are enslaving people by force, not conviction.</p><p>“It’s not sustainable to hold a gun to someone and say, ‘live like me or die.’ Islam does not need slaves,” Adam said. “It needs liberated people who know what they believe. It’s about people’s free will to decide.”</p><p><em>Reporting for this article was supported by a grant from the </em><a href="http://pulitzercenter.org/"><em>Pulitzer Center on Crisis Reporting</em></a><em>.</em></p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/7/22/tunisia-democracy-legacy-religious-oppression.html"><em>america.aljazeera.com</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=205fda644b0f" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Sousse Attack:]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/alice-y-su/the-sousse-attack-5a446fb96f68?source=rss-728f6d52edc3------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/5a446fb96f68</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Alice Su]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 16 Jul 2015 06:53:22 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-07-16T06:53:22.086Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Islam, Terrorism and the Paradox of Democracy in Tunisia</h4><p>SOUSSE, Tunisia — Terrorism is not Tunisian, the refrain of the moment goes. Except it was on Friday. Just before noon, Seifeddine Rezgui, a 23-year-old Tunisian, pulled a Kalashnikov out of an umbrella and <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/how-a-gunman-brought-terror-to-a-tunisian-resort-1435473936">murdered</a> 38 tourists on the beach here, maiming dozens of others with his rifle and grenades before being gunned down by Tunisian security forces. ISIS soon claimed responsibility for the attack, releasing photos of Rezgui wielding weapons and calling him Abu Yahya al-Qayrawani.</p><p>Four years ago, a popular revolution in Tunisia, the first of the Arab Spring’s uprisings, removed the authoritarian government of Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali, which had controlled the country for decades. Since then, the North African nation has been heralded as the Arab Spring’s <a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/03/tunisia-is-still-a-success-terrorist-attack/388436/">sole success</a>, a newborn democracy enjoying civil liberties, and political moderation and inclusion, that exist only as <a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/12/coming-of-age-in-the-syrian-conflict/282467/">trampled dreams</a> in Egypt, Libya, and Syria. But extremism is filling out the edges of this picture. Friday’s attack came just months after two gunmen killed 22 people at the Bardo Museum in Tunis. Analysts <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/foreign-fighters-flow-to-syria/2014/10/11/3d2549fa-5195-11e4-8c24-487e92bc997b_graphic.html">estimate</a> that at least 3,000 Tunisians have joined militant groups in Syria, with most fighting for ISIS. How has the region’s relative sanctuary of stability also become the <a href="http://www.rferl.org/contentinfographics/foreign-fighters-syria-iraq-is-isis-isil-infographic/26584940.html">world’s top supplier</a> of foreign fighters to the conflicts in Syria and Iraq? Is Tunisia’s hard-earned stability only now being tested, or has that stability been precarious and illusory all along?</p><p>“God knows how this happened,” said Hajer Kechiche Dandana, a 40-year-old accountant, as she held her sister Iman’s hand at Sousse’s Sahloul Hospital. Iman, 34, was working in the Imperial Marhaba Hotel’s administrative office when Rezgui began his killing spree at the beachfront establishment. She was injured in her left hip, arms, and knees by a grenade, but spared when Rezgui pointed his gun in her face and she begged him in Arabic not to shoot. The attacker was clearly targeting foreign tourists, not Tunisians, she said. Lying in the hospital bed, she closed her eyes when asked about the killer’s face, squeezing her sister’s hand.</p><p>“Iman doesn’t want to remember it,” Dandana quickly said. “We don’t know how these guys got their minds messed up. <em>Inshallah </em>the attacks will stop, but we’re afraid. We feel like it will happen again.”</p><p>On Saturday night, less than 48 hours after the attack, thousands of people marched across Sousse, waving flags, singing, and chanting slogans like, “Tunisia in freedom, terrorism get out” and, “With soul, with blood, we will protect the flag.”</p><p>“Look, this is Tunisia,” said Mohamad Habib Snoussi, a 67-year-old schoolteacher, as he swept an arm toward overflowing cafes at 11:30 p.m., after the day’s Ramadan fast had concluded. “Terrorism will not grow because Tunisians love life. … We hate this terror that is coming from outside, and we will fight it together.”</p><p>But unity is a challenge in Tunisia, where democratic transition has brought unprecedented pluralism in political and social spheres alike. Under Ben Ali’s regime, free expression and Islamist movements were violently suppressed. Post-revolution, Tunisia’s newfound liberty has birthed two free and fair elections, but also four years of obstreperous debate on everything from the wording of the new constitution to the role of Islam in a democracy. “We are moving from one party to a hundred,” Snoussi said. “It’s hard to agree.”</p><p>The first post-revolution government was led by Ennahda, a moderate Islamist party that promised religious fidelity alongside pragmatic governance. Its leaders were also loosely tolerant of Salafi groups like Ansar al-Sharia, which advocates for a strict interpretation of Islam that includes caliphate rule and sharia law, not a democratic, constitutional state. The Ennahda government outlawed Ansar al-Sharia after the group <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/26/world/middleeast/second-opposition-leader-killed-in-tunisia.html">assassinated</a> two leftist politicians in 2013, but critics blame Ennahda for allowing Salafism to spread in the country to begin with.</p><p>Last October, Nidaa Tounes, a secular party whose leaders have ties to the Ben Ali regime, replaced Ennahda in power, but the Islamist party remains a critical part of Tunisia’s governing coalition.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*YezlsUp97YzMpfoMO1mIcQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>Several politicians joined Saturday’s march in Sousse, including Mohsen Marzouk, a founding member of Nidaa Tounes and the campaign manager for Tunisia’s current president. “We are trying to organize people in the war against terror,” Marzouk said, adding that the government wants to mobilize the population to inform intelligence officials about terrorist activity. “This war is not between terrorists and the state, but between terrorists and the people.”</p><p>But the people could use more help from the state. Tunisian leaders promised tightened security and a crackdown on illegal mosques (those inciting terrorism) after the Bardo attack in March. Yet those pledges didn’t prevent or mitigate Friday’s terrorist attack, the deadliest in the country’s recent history. When the prime minister <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-33297245">announced</a> a series of security measures in response to the massacre in Sousse, Tunisian social-media users <a href="https://twitter.com/zizoo/status/614693205146271744%20https://twitter.com/Sarah_bh/status/614728490697551872">reacted</a> <a href="https://twitter.com/riadheh/status/614410008688726017">with</a> <a href="https://twitter.com/Papiillon/status/614737204032733184">biting</a> <a href="https://twitter.com/Souihli/status/614592926346256384">skepticism</a>. “2 attacks in 4 months on 2 places supposed to be under surveillance. Nearly 60 dead. 0 resignations. No challenge to the govt,” one <a href="https://twitter.com/Papiillon/status/614736547905191936">observed</a>.</p><p>As busloads of foreigners evacuated from Sousse’s tourist resorts on Friday and Saturday, Salim Qamuma, a 50-year-old taxi driver, waited outside the hotels for hours without a customer.</p><p>“We had some tourists stay after [the] Bardo [attack], but now it’s over,” Qamuma said. Extremist groups were deliberately striking the tourism sector, he added, so that Tunisia’s <a href="http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/265968b0-1d81-11e5-ab0f-6bb9974f25d0.html#axzz3ePqQptAo">already faltering economy</a> would collapse. “They want chaos. They want us [to be] like Libya. They want to make people poor and hungry so they can take over.” How, he wondered, will the government control Tunisia’s nearly 290-mile border with Libya, where the Bardo attackers reportedly trained? How can it silence Salafi preachers when free speech is now protected in the constitution?</p><p>“We had no religious consciousness under [former President Habib] Bourguiba and Ben Ali,” said Anouar Jamaoui, a Tunisian academic based in Sousse. The previous authoritarian regime had maintained absolute control over all aspects of Tunisian life, including the religious sphere. “People were frustrated, lost, unable to know more about their own religion. They wanted to be Muslims but didn’t understand what that meant,” he explained. The opening of public space for religious discussion has come faster than the public’s ability to decipher and interpret Islamic teachings for themselves, Jamaoui added. After decades of paltry religious education — “We had two hours a week of Islamic education in secondary schools under Ben Ali” — Tunisian religious identity can suddenly be freely defined.</p><blockquote>“Terrorists want to make an end to Tunisia because it is the only true democratic model in the Arab and Muslim world.”</blockquote><p>“The voice of moderate Islam is the Tunisian people,” Jamaoui said, adding that Tunisian Islam has always been <em>wasatiyya</em>, or moderate. This is the time for Tunisians to make it democratic as well — to meld Islam and democracy in a model that in many ways is the antithesis of ISIS’s caliphate — but they’re doing so amid a cacophonous debate about the nature of Islam and its role in society, charged with the emotion and suffering of regional conflicts. Meanwhile, Tunisia’s post-revolution politicians have been wary of silencing Islamist voices, even dangerously radical ones, because Ben Ali’s regime so severely oppressed them as dissidents alongside leftists and liberals.</p><p>Now the debate has turned violent. For many Tunisians, exhaustion and fear of radicalism have replaced the initial exhilaration of self-determination.</p><p>“Ben Ali wouldn’t have stood for this. He wouldn’t have let [the Salafis] speak a sentence,” said Qamuma, the taxi driver. “You couldn’t even grow a beard under the old regime, but nothing like this happened. Look what freedom has brought us: terrorism on the beach. This isn’t freedom, it’s death.”</p><p>At the demonstration against terrorism, one elderly history professor paused on the sidewalk as a group of teenagers marched by, howling a local soccer team’s song as they waved Tunisian flags in the air. “We are 11 million Tunisians with 11 million Islams, and everyone says theirs is the right one,” the professor, who gave his name only as Waled, murmured. Young people especially don’t know what they believe, he added, but who does? Tunisia is against terrorism, he observed, and yet: “<em>Le ver est dans le fruit</em>.” The worm is inside the fruit.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*RDMG9O0ilJPqvHWZc9JAuQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>The government recently proposed a <a href="http://www.leaders.com.tn/uploads/FCK_files/Projet%20de%20loi%20relative%20%C3%A0%20la%20lutte%20contre%20le%20terrorisme%20et%20l&#39;interdiction%20du%20blanchiment%20d&#39;argent_FR__1(2).pdf">new</a> <a href="http://nawaat.org/portail/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/anti-terr.pdf">law</a> that would support victims of terrorism and task a commission with developing a counterterrorism strategy. But the law would also allow extended detention, chip away at legal due process for terrorism suspects, and permit the death penalty for anyone convicted of a deadly act of terrorism, though a moratorium on executions has been in place in Tunisia since 1991. After Friday’s attack, the prime minister <a href="http://www.mosaiquefm.net/fr/index/a/ActuDetail/Element/54047-arp-adoption-de-la-loi-de-lutte-contre-le-terrorisme-avant-le-25-juillet">announced</a> that the law would be adopted by late July. International <a href="https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/memo.2015.04.08.Tunisia%20Counterterrorism%20Law.eng_.pdf">human-rights organizations</a> and Tunisian <a href="http://nawaat.org/portail/2015/04/12/counterterrorism-law-looking-beyond-laxity-vs-despotism-security-vs-human-rights/">civil-society leaders</a> have protested that the law threatens fundamental human rights. Qamuma’s comments aside: Many Tunisians want security, but not at the cost of freedom.</p><p>“Terrorists want to make an end to Tunisia because it is the only true democratic model in the Arab and Muslim world,” said Jamaoui. “They are targeting the democratic experiment in Tunisia.” The attackers’ strategy is smart, Jamaoui noted, because it is sowing tension between Tunisia’s state, police, and people.</p><p>Tunisia’s struggles to counter terrorism and nurture democracy are intertwined and, at times, mutually destructive. Terrorism spurs the state to prioritize security, but that threatens liberty and popular trust in the government. The damage extremists inflict on the vital tourism sector weakens people’s faith in the state even more, especially as unemployment and corruption go unaddressed. (A recent <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=DF0WBwAAQBAJ&amp;pg=PA42&amp;lpg=PA42&amp;dq=%E2%80%9Ca+true+social+tragedy+that+urgently+needs+to+be+addressed%22&amp;source=bl&amp;ots=mSuaGx3II3&amp;sig=7Vabpyq1nShcM1Z6Llr4Onr_C0c&amp;hl=en&amp;sa=X&amp;ei=EL-QVbKgA4ip-QHXjqzgBQ&amp;ved=0CCQQ6AEwAQ#v=onepage&amp;q=%E2%80%9Ca%20true%20social%20tragedy%22&amp;f=false">OECD report</a> described the country’s youth unemployment rate, which hovers around 40 percent, as a “true social tragedy,” while a <a href="http://blogs.worldbank.org/arabvoices/did-arab-spring-democratize-corruption-tunisia">World Bank paper</a> suggested that the revolution has “democratize[d] corruption in Tunisia.”) Tunisia’s leaders must fix the economy, but first they must build a voter base and coalition. All this takes time. In the meantime, people — especially young people — lose heart.</p><blockquote>“We are 11 million Tunisians with 11 million Islams, and everyone says theirs is the right one.”</blockquote><p>At the march against terrorism, Lassaad Ben Hassen, a 28-year-old painter and handyman, said he doesn’t vote and <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/11/tunisia-presidential-elections-low-youth-turnout.html">most of</a> <a href="http://blogs.worldbank.org/arabvoices/why-aren-t-young-people-voting-tunisian-elections">his peers</a> don’t either. “The parties don’t do anything for me, so I do nothing for them,” Ben Hassen said. Instead of improving people’s daily lives, he added, the revolution only exacerbated the <a href="http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2014/02/promoting-growth-arab-countries/arab-econpaper5boughzala-v3.pdf">wealth gap</a> between <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/04/11/tunisians-next-big-step-arab-spring/">rich and poor</a>. “Maybe it’s a mistake for me not to vote. But when you see the politicians’ empty talk, you don’t believe or want to vote for anyone.”</p><p>Zied Touzani, the president and founder of Tun’Act, an organization that promotes youth political engagement, pointed out that young people make up <a href="http://www.youthpolicy.org/factsheets/country/tunisia/">more than half of Tunisia’s population</a>, but they’ve grown increasingly disillusioned with post-revolution politics. When <a href="http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2044723,00.html">Mohamed Bouazizi</a>, a 26-year-old Tunisian street vendor, set himself on fire in 2010, precipitating the Arab Spring, it was in protest of police harassment that not only obstructed his meager livelihood of selling vegetables, but also stole his dignity. Four and a half years later, democracy has answered Tunisians’ cry for freedom, but little <a href="http://www.afdb.org/en/countries/north-africa/tunisia/tunisia-economic-outlook/">has changed</a> <a href="http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/tunisia/overview#1">economically</a>.</p><p>“It’s nice to have freedom of speech, but what we’re looking for is jobs,” Touzani said. As Tunisia’s economic problems persist, frustrated youth either change their vote from party to party, or disengage altogether. “Young people drove the revolution, that’s true. But where are they now?” Touzani asked.</p><p>In the capital, Tunis, young Tunisians flock every night to a popular villa remodeled into a hostel and bar. They drink mojitos (virgin during Ramadan), play popular music, and sport sundresses, tattoos, and dreadlocks. “Most of the people here are, like, artists, or they work for NGOs,” one girl told me over the crowd’s noise. She laughed at the idea that Tunisia is the Arab Spring’s success story. “What a joke. We’re great compared to Libya and Syria, but what are you comparing us to?”</p><p>Many young people are drawn to civil society, Touzani said. Civil-society organizations are “seen as legitimate because NGOs and human-rights groups aren’t running for their own power. They’re protecting civil rights and principles.” But others turn elsewhere: to boats of migrants crossing the Mediterranean, or to informal mosques offering an altogether different worldview — and then perhaps to Islamic extremist groups in Iraq and Syria<strong>.</strong></p><p>“We have to make youth loyal to political parties instead of extremist organizations,” said Jamaoui. Yet political engagement is a tough sell when people don’t have jobs, bread, water, or hope. Tunisians are engaged in a national conversation about balancing security and liberty, democracy and Islam, politics and civil society. It’s a critical dialogue, but Tunisians need their basic needs met so they can keep participating.</p><p>“We have potential to be a success story,” said Touzani. “But not yet.”</p><p><em>Reporting for this article was supported by the Pulitzer Center on Crisis Reporting.</em></p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/06/tunisia-sousse-isis-democracy/397169/"><em>www.theatlantic.com</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=5a446fb96f68" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/alice-y-su/the-sousse-attack-5a446fb96f68">The Sousse Attack:</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/alice-y-su">alice y. su</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Boy Named Jihad:]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@aliceysu/the-boy-named-jihad-93f149878d6?source=rss-728f6d52edc3------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/93f149878d6</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Alice Su]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 28 Jun 2015 10:40:14 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-06-28T10:40:14.416Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>From the Ashes of the Arab Spring to the Battlefields of Syria</h3><h4>When pro-democracy protests failed, one Jordanian teen made a fateful decision: to fight for al-Qaeda.</h4><p>AMMAN, Jordan — Umm Jihad’s desktop background is a photo of her son Jihad smiling over his shoulder in a forest, superimposed on a sparkly pastel backdrop. “This was in Syria right before he died,” the 44-year-old mother said (she asked to be referred to as Umm Jihad, or “Mother of Jihad,” rather than by her formal name). Umm Jihad clicked on a folder labeled “Jojo” to show more pictures: Jihad leading a protest for government reform at Amman’s al-Dakhiliya circle; Jihad giving a speech at the University of Jordan; Jihad dressed in white for a pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia; Jihad taking a selfie with his younger brother; Jihad with a full beard, holding a gun, wading through a stream, and waving a black flag inscribed with Jabhat al-Nusra’s white letters: “There is no God but God. Muhammad is the prophet of God.”</p><p>The last file in her folder is an amateur diptych, two photos of Jihad in the same pose: sprawled on the floor, chest forward, arms outstretched. On the right, he’s asleep at home on a pile of books and papers, exhausted from studying for <em>tawjihi</em>, the Jordanian college-entrance exam. On the left, blood is pooling from the bullet holes in his bare back. He’s 20 years old, a foreign fighter in Syria, dead.</p><p>Jihad Ghaban was one of at least 2,000 Jordanians who have joined factions in the Syrian civil war since it began in 2011, according to <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/foreign-fighters-flow-to-syria/2014/10/11/3d2549fa-5195-11e4-8c24-487e92bc997b_graphic.html">analysts’ estimates</a>. As the war enters its fifth year, neighboring Jordan finds itself caught up in the conflict — hosting more than <a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/07/jordans-quiet-emergency/374803/">a million refugees</a> from Syria and Iraq while participating in the <a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/02/jordan-isis-pilot-response/385199/">U.S.-led military coalition</a> against ISIS. Jordan is now <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/04/jordan-king-abdullah-views-is-syria-iraq-terrorism-coalition.html">the only Arab country</a> left in that coalition.</p><p>Still, Jordan’s more acute fight is internal. Its stability is evidence of its strong security, as tightened borders and surveillance prevent Jordanians from joining or forming domestic cells of groups like the Islamic State. And ISIS’s filmed killing of the captured Jordanian pilot Muath al-Kaseasbeh, broadcast in February, helped <a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/02/jordan-isis-pilot-response/385199/">shift Jordanian public opinion</a> against the Islamic extremist group. But Jordanian opposition to ISIS doesn’t necessarily indicate a broader rejection of militant jihad. Instead, many Jordanians are engaged in a debate about the boundaries and legitimacy of violent extremism.</p><p>Umm Jihad’s son left Jordan to fight back in 2013, before the rise of ISIS and subsequent strife between militant jihadist groups in Syria. But the lack of democratic reform after the Arab Spring, along with the spread of religious extremism amid regional instability, continue to undermine many Jordanians’ belief in the country’s political leaders and religious institutions. Interpretation of Islam, and particularly the concept of jihad, is in flux, leaving an exegetical gray zone for passionate, disempowered youth like Jihad Ghaban.</p><p>Mo’men Jaabo was 23 when he first met Jihad as a 16-year-old in 2011, the first year of the Arab Spring. Jaabo, who was a schoolteacher at the time, marched next to Jihad through downtown Amman, shouting slogans about freedom and political reform. They used to protest at al-Dakhiliya circle in the daytime, then spend nights writing graffiti in the East Amman neighborhood of Hay Nazzal, where Jihad lived. The neighborhood is poor, conservative, and mostly Palestinian, with a growing Syrian population including older people who fled the Assad government’s <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/theguardian/from-the-archive-blog/2011/aug/01/hama-syria-massacre-1982-archive">Hama massacre</a> in the 1980s and new refugees from the latest conflict. Jaabo showed me a wall bearing Jihad’s handwriting, partially covered over with red paint but still visible: “Why does the king live in a castle while the people die of poverty?”</p><p>A few streets away, Jaabo pointed out a large mosque overlooking Hay Nazzal’s main traffic circle. “That’s where Jihad prayed,” Jaabo said, adding that the mosque was well known for Salafi preaching that called for a fundamentalist return to Islam as practiced by the first generations of Muslims. Preachers there interpreted jihad as literal warfare in defense of the Muslim community.</p><p>Jihad was an early participant in <a href="http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/jordans_youth_avenues_activism.pdf">Herak</a>, Jordan’s largest youth-activist movement. During the Arab Spring, its members protested weekly for democratic change, constitutional reform, and action against corruption. “All the young guys, we were full of hope that we would make lots of changes,” Jaabo said. “We saw the Egyptian revolution, Syria, Tunisia — the governments were scared. We were the strong side.”</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/630/1*lLxRIchZCxkVO2G8jWKbhw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Jihad Ghaban (far right) in 2012 (Mo’men Jaabo)</figcaption></figure><p>Four years later, the Jordanian government’s promised reform initiatives have largely <a href="http://www.hrw.org/news/2015/01/29/jordan-reforms-fall-short">fallen short</a> of the activists’ demands. Freedoms of expression and assembly are more limited than before the region’s uprisings, especially with expanded anti-terrorism laws that authorities can use to arrest and try dissidents in military court. Herak still exists, but as the Arab Spring gave way to chaos across the region, many of its most ardent followers became disillusioned, Jihad included.</p><p>“When things went down after the first year in Syria, then Libya, we lost hope. It felt like our effort was nonsense,” Jaabo said. “In Jordan, we felt everyone was laughing at the youth. The government and parties were all laughing. Nobody was serious about making reform.”</p><p>Jaabo is now 26 and works as the manager of a falafel restaurant. Other Herak members, many from more privileged backgrounds in West Amman, left to study abroad or work in Gulf countries, he said. But Jihad was still a teenager, the son of a factory worker, and struggling to afford his first year of college tuition. Aside from studying, Jihad worked in Jordan’s Sharawi chewing-gum factory. He’d get off work and cross Amman on foot to attend Herak protests, walking for hours because he couldn’t afford taxi fares. His friends nicknamed him Abu Sharawi for the gum he’d pass around every time he arrived.</p><p>When Bashar al-Assad’s regime cracked down on Syrian protesters, Umm Jihad said, Jihad spent hours watching Al Jazeera and crying. In the middle of winter, Jaabo said, he and Jihad walked to the Syrian embassy to protest in the snow, waving Free Syria flags to demonstrate Jordanian solidarity against Assad.</p><blockquote>“Jihad was the Arab Spring personified. He wasn’t a spectator.”</blockquote><p>As the situation in Syria worsened and Jordan’s activists lost traction, Jihad started thinking about joining the fight. He’d ask his friends what they thought was the best way to help Syrians, said Jihad’s 22-year-old friend Laith Alawneh. “He started thinking that our fight in Jordan is not the priority,” Alawneh said. “There is no bloodshed here, but people in Syria were being killed.” In June 2013, Jihad went on a pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia with a group of young people from his local mosque. When he came back, Umm Jihad said, Jihad told her he wanted to spend a few days in Cairo with friends before returning to school. Jihad flew from Jordan to Egypt to Turkey. After a few days, he called his mother from the Syrian city of Aleppo and told her he’d joined Jabhat al-Nusra.</p><p>At the time, ISIS was a <a href="http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/isis-terror/tracing-rise-isis-menace-terror-n214266">fairly low-profile</a> group operating as al-Qaeda in Iraq. In Syria, it had recently announced a short-lived merger with Jabhat al-Nusra, al-Qaeda’s Syrian branch and one of the most prominent rebel groups fighting the Assad regime. Nusra enjoyed considerable popular support. But it had also been <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/11/world/middleeast/us-designates-syrian-al-nusra-front-as-terrorist-group.html">designated</a> a terrorist organization by the U.S. government.</p><p>During his first year in Syria, Jihad worked for Jabhat al-Nusra’s media office. He had once dreamed of being a journalist; he’d interned at a community radio station in Jordan and filmed youth protests during the Arab Spring. Now he filmed Nusra fighters, spread the footage on social media, and peppered Facebook with increasingly extremist posts.</p><p>“Jihad changed then,” Jaabo said. “I couldn’t believe the things he started to say.” In Jordan, Jihad had had friends of all stripes: Muslim Brotherhood supporters, communists, even conservatives who weren’t politically active. He’d swung across the political spectrum, considering joining the Brotherhood, then the leftist parties, but rejecting them all in the end. “The parties can’t criticize the [Jordanian] king because they are part of the system. Jihad wasn’t satisfied with this,” Jaabo said. “He’d rather be independent than compromise.”</p><p>Jihad was religious before going to Syria, his friends and family said, but not radical. “He loved Islam,” said Alawneh, Jihad’s leftist friend. “But he was also talking to girls and going out. He wasn’t strict at all.”</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/375/1*KJUwlZmwhc1Vcsni5kNgLQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Jihad Ghaban and his brother at home (Umm Jihad)</figcaption></figure><p>After Jihad went to Syria, he changed his Facebook profile photo from the Free Syria flag to the Jabhat al-Nusra flag. His purist tendencies took a religious bent, manifesting in his Facebook declarations that communists were <em>kuffar</em>, or infidels, and had to be killed. Did that mean, Jihad’s friends in Jordan wondered, that he would fight them if they were in Syria? Jihad was getting caught in an ideological and religious war, his friends told him, not a freedom fight. “Still he didn’t change his mind,” Jaabo said.</p><p>“He’d tell us, ‘You’re not helping people. You’re in the house while people are suffering,’” said Jihad’s Syrian childhood friend Mulham al-Ahdab. He thought Jihad was being abrasive on Facebook, but then again, Syria was burning. At least Jihad was doing something. “I hate this world that stays silent while young guys like Jihad sacrifice themselves,” Ahdab said. “We all still loved him.”</p><p>Eventually, Jihad took up arms for Nusra. In October 2014, one year and four months after entering Syria, he was shot by Syrian government forces and killed.</p><p>From the Jordanian government’s perspective, combating extremism requires a combination of security policy — guarding the country’s borders to prevent fighters from flowing in or out of the Kingdom — and ideological persuasion. “Our strategy is to secure people’s way of thinking,” said the Ministry of the Interior spokesperson Ziad al-Zoubi. “We must support moderate ideologies before extremist ones become popular.” Jordanian authorities attempt to do so by holding dialogues and workshops with youth via civil-society organizations, Zoubi said, and by promoting moderate Islam through the Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs, the government entity that manages Islamic property.</p><p>Ashraf al-Kilani, the director of the Jordanian civil-society organization Friends of National Security, said his organization recruits religious leaders, often from the state institution Dar al-Ifta, to engage young people in dissecting ISIS material and to point out why the group’s interpretation of Islam is wrong. Sometimes participants are then brought to the King Abdullah Special Operations Training Center (KASOTC), a <a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/05/a-dispatch-from-the-counterterrorism-olympics/370781/">military training ground</a> in the desert outside Amman, where they meet with officials from the public-security directorate.</p><p>“The youth are happy to have real talk with us and to meet with security officials,” Kilani said, adding that many request photos with the KASOTC officers. “We as Jordanians really adore the army, the security forces, and the king.”</p><blockquote>“Our strategy is to secure people’s way of thinking,” a government spokesperson said. “We must support moderate ideologies.”</blockquote><p>On the religious side, Minister of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs Hayel Daoud said that there are 6,300 mosques in Jordan delivering some 5,000 Friday sermons every week. The country’s mosques are all overseen by the government, Daoud added, so every message preached on Fridays should adhere to an Awqaf-approved version of moderate Islam. “We want them to talk about mutual topics that everyone agrees on, not anything that causes division,” Daoud said. “We want topics that encourage people to live in unity and peace.” Fifty ministry employees monitor the mosques and report any preachers who stray from approved content. Since the Muath al-Kaseasbeh video in February, Daoud said, the ministry has relieved 50 preachers of their duties.</p><p>But critics say the Jordanian government’s attempts to control the religious sphere have had a limited impact, if any at all. “I’ve never met anyone who changed his mind from extremist ideas because of someone from the Awqaf,” said the Amman-based Islamist expert Hassan Abu Hanieh. Official religious institutions lack credibility among the people, he said, because they’re seen as part of the political system. At the University of Jordan, Alawneh laughed at the idea that government monitoring could stop extremist ideas. “Awqaf stopped 50 people who support extremist ideas in the whole country?” he said. “Go walk on our campus for 10 minutes and I’ll find you 50 more.”</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/960/1*4_UgKM6I_B7ALh4AuNmgCQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Jihad Ghaban as a freshman at the University of Jordan (Umm Jihad)</figcaption></figure><p>Fewer Jordanian youth are going to fight in Syria now than when Jihad went, Alawneh observed, but that’s not necessarily because the government has changed young people’s minds about the merits of jihad. The interpretation of jihad, a duty to literally “struggle” for Islam, is disputed. Some Muslims understand the struggle as spiritual and internal; others speak in terms of social justice, of educational, missionary, intellectual, or economic endeavor; and still others of holy warfare.</p><p>“When Jihad died, all these Salafi guys were making speeches at his wake, saying how he was brave and martyred,” Jaabo said. “Nowadays the situation is very different with <em>Daesh </em>[an Arabic term for ISIS], but even so, people believe in the war in Syria. There’s no problem [with most Jordanians] if anyone goes to fight.”</p><p>A university memorial service for Jihad was filled with youth who supported Jihad’s decision to go to Syria, according to Alawneh. “They were all praying for God to take revenge on the Shi’a and help the <em>mujahideen</em>,” Alawneh said, referring to Sunni rebel groups fighting the Shiite Assad regime. The reasons young people aren’t crossing the border to fight these days are often not ideological but practical: tightened security, no way of returning to Jordan, and reservations about the chaos and uncertainty in Syria.</p><blockquote>“There is an extremely thin line between being a very good Muslim who follows the prophet’s rules and becoming extremist.”</blockquote><p>“Jihad was brave. We are weak,” said Ahdab, explaining why he didn’t go to Syria as well. “We are creating different excuses for ourselves, but in the end we know that he is a hero and that he did the right thing.”</p><p>Alawneh, for his part, believes waging war in Syria isn’t the best way to help the Syrian people. “Syria is a game. You have the Saudis, Turkey, Iran, America, Qatar — why would I let myself be an instrument in the hands of these people?” he said. Young fighters on every side are being manipulated in a cycle of weapons, blood, and money that only advances the political interests of the big powers, Alawneh added. “I wouldn’t join the Jordanian army and become a tool for America either.”</p><p>Nasser Abu Abdulrahman, a 48-year-old Salafi sheikh from the conservative Jordanian town of Rusaifeh, said he wouldn’t encourage the younger generation to fight in Syria — not because doing so conflicted with his interpretation of jihad in Islam, but because of the split between jihadist groups there. “This is a time of <em>fitnah</em> [infighting and division among Muslims]. The <em>mujahideen</em> are split,” Abu Abdulrahman said, referring to the schism between ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra that first developed in the summer of 2013. It’s better for Jordanians to stay home for now, Abu Abdulrahman said, rather than exacerbate internal Islamic disunity by joining factions that are battling one another.</p><p>Abu Abdulrahman characterized ISIS as an overly zealous group that had made serious mistakes in ideology and action, particularly in burning to death Muath al-Kaseasbeh. “But no one says that <em>Daesh</em> is not Muslim. We don’t call them infidels,” he said. Even if the Islamic State employs illegitimate methods of Quranic exegesis, he added, people will support the Sunni group out of desperation amid war, oppression, and suffering. “If a drunk man protects your son from being raped, you will defend [the drunk man]. He is better than others because he protected your son,” Abu Abdulrahman explained. Likewise, people suffering in Syria and Iraq, especially Sunnis, will overlook ISIS’s theological illegitimacy to support its military success, especially given the seeming lack of international will to end Syria’s war.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/630/1*fGuHhtJr0RxllaWAWZnrVw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Jihad Ghaban (left) and Mo’men Jaabo protest against the Syrian regime at the Syrian embassy in Amman. (Mo’men Jaabo)</figcaption></figure><p>According to his friends, Jihad was driven to join Nusra for many of those same reasons: intolerance of injustice, frustration with international inaction, and a determination to make a difference. “Jihad was the Arab Spring personified. He wasn’t a spectator,” said Ahdab.</p><p>“Jihad was like a white page that anyone could write on. It was easy to affect him because he was so passionate,” Alawneh noted. He had argued with Jihad about the legitimacy of extremist religious ideology. But bring up the chemical-weapons attacks, dying children, and raped women in Syria, and Jihad would cry.</p><p>“Jihad had fire in his chest,” Umm Jihad said. She recalled the time she and Jihad passed a man beating his donkey on the street. Her son stopped and rebuked the man even though Umm Jihad insisted it was none of their business. “If that’s how he cared about donkeys, what about Syria?” she mused. “Jihad was tired from Jordan and the government. He was always talking and no one listened to him. He wanted action, not words.” Jihad went to Syria to die, Umm Jihad said, and she had no choice but to accept it.</p><p>On the streets of Amman, bold signs in patriotic red, green, and black declare, “Raise your head, you are Jordanian.” The state’s message is clear: Jordan is one; Jordan is strong; Jordan is proud to stand against the terrorists.</p><p>The death of the pilot Muath al-Kaseasbeh has made this government message more of a reality, according to a recent <a href="http://www.jcss.org/Photos/635663460639723359.pdf">survey</a> by the Center for Strategic Studies (CSS) at the University of Jordan. In December 2014, 72 percent of respondents considered ISIS a terrorist group; in February 2015, after video of the Islamic State burning the pilot came out, that number went up to 95 percent. Meanwhile, 37 percent of respondents considered Jabhat al-Nusra a terrorist organization in December 2014 compared with 55 percent in February 2015 and 62 percent in April 2015. “Kaseasbeh changed one-fifth of the population’s opinion in two weeks,” said Walid al-Khatib, CSS’s head of public-opinion polls and surveys. “That’s more than what the government did after campaigning against ISIS for four months.”</p><p>Still, the best way to describe how many Jordanians view Islamic extremist groups is in shades of gray, according to Khatib. “There is an extremely thin line between being a very good Muslim who follows the prophet’s rules and becoming extremist,” he explained. The government may try to convince people that it knows where these lines are, but state-affiliated voices lack legitimacy on the Jordanian street. “The government places its personal interests above religious correctness,” Abu Abdulrahman said.</p><p>While Jordanians often trust and depend on the government to preserve national security, they are not so quick to believe its opinions on God’s will. Umm Jihad, for example, doesn’t have faith in official talk about nonviolent jihad. “Look at how barrel bombs are destroying hospitals in Syria. Look at how Muslims are being killed in Burma. Isn’t this injustice?” she asked. “Our religion is clear. If a Muslim needs help, you must go and fight for them.”</p><p>At the same time, Umm Jihad hadn’t known Jihad was going to Syria, nor was she able to make him come back. “I want to tell you I believe he made the right decision,” she said. She’d cried and begged her son to return every time he called, despite believing that jihad is a duty and that her son’s motives were pure. “Those without much faith will say, ‘Stay here with me and don’t go.’ She with strong faith will tell her son, ‘You must go and fight,’” Umm Jihad said. “But as a mother, this is difficult. This is right, but difficult.”</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/960/1*zlit72THPeNnELs6_fYItA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Graffiti scrawled by Jihad Ghaban in his neighborhood reads, “Why does the king live in a castle while the people die of poverty?” (Alice Su)</figcaption></figure><p>The real conversations in Jordan on religion and the nature of jihad are happening not at state-sponsored dialogue sessions, but on the Internet and social media, according to Abu Hanieh, the expert on Islamism. He opened Facebook as an example, scrolling down his news feed through an endless stream of posts: a video message from extremists establishing the “state of Sinai,” a photo of the Islamic State creating roads in the Sinjar Mountains in Iraqi Kurdistan, congratulations for the ISIS victory in the Iraqi city of Ramadi, condemnation of Muslims being burned in Burma, and so on. “If the state wanted to silence the jihadis, they’d have to silence everyone,” Abu Hanieh said.</p><p>Abu Hanieh noted that after the release of the Kaseasbeh video, he didn’t see many Jordanians rejecting extremist groups outright; instead, he witnessed Jordanians discussing nuanced questions about the permissibility of burning as a punishment in Islam. “The ideology of extremism has become more flexible,” Abu Hanieh said. “People are thinking about jihad more than before, and the discussions are loud, passionate, and spreading.”</p><p>If the Jordanian government can’t fight extremism through ideological control, what can it do? The opposite, Abu Hanieh suggested: democratic reform and political opening. “Jordan is moving away from democracy in the name of combating extremism,” he said, citing state crackdowns on communists, Herak, and the Jordanian wing of the Muslim Brotherhood. “If you let the moderates back into the light, that will push the extremists to the margin.” Jihad’s friends agreed. “We need bread, freedom, and social justice,” Alawneh said.</p><p>As a 16-year-old, Jihad had once demanded those exact things. “Jihad cared so much, but he felt like nobody was listening in Jordan,” Jaabo said. “If he had found real reform here, I think he never would have gone.”</p><p><em>Reporting for this article was supported by the Pulitzer Center on Crisis Reporting.</em></p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/06/jihad-jordan-syria-isis/396041/"><em>www.theatlantic.com</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=93f149878d6" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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