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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Alphonse Pace on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Alphonse Pace on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@alpalpalp?source=rss-495d97580d58------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Alphonse Pace on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@alpalpalp?source=rss-495d97580d58------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[User Activated Soft Forks and the Intolerant Minority]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@alpalpalp/user-activated-soft-forks-and-the-intolerant-minority-a54e57869f57?source=rss-495d97580d58------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a54e57869f57</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bitcoin]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Alphonse Pace]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 19 May 2017 17:33:22 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-05-19T17:43:41.946Z</atom:updated>
            <cc:license>https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/</cc:license>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<blockquote>It does not take a majority to prevail… but rather an irate, tireless minority, keen on setting brushfires of freedom in the minds of men.<br>- Samuel Adams</blockquote><p>In <a href="https://medium.com/incerto/the-most-intolerant-wins-the-dictatorship-of-the-small-minority-3f1f83ce4e15"><em>The Most Intolerant Wins: The Dictatorship of the Small Minority</em></a>, Nassim Nicholas Taleb describes how a strong enough minority with more strict preferences can end up with the majority following their preferences. He speaks of many examples — food preparation standards, languages, and taboos. This principle can also extend to Bitcoin and the concept of soft forks. By extending this principle, it can show that a soft fork that has strong support from a minority still may be enough to provide economic incentives to its enforcement, even if the majority is ambivalent.</p><p>Soft forks, by their nature, are a form of intolerance. Users who enforce a soft fork are intolerant of some types of transactions or blocks that miners can produce. They will reject those blocks that miners produce much as an Orthodox Jew will reject pork. In cases where the majority is ambivalent and the cost of producers is low to adhere to the stricter standards, then the result is producers keep everyone happy by following those stricter standards. In Bitcoin’s case, many potential soft forks fall into this category. Soft forks that do not degrade the security properties of Bitcoin, that do not take away from any currently used features, do not add costs to miners, and are preferred by some, would result in profit-maximizing miners choosing to serve a wider audience by enforcing the soft fork.</p><h3>Strong Willed Minority vs. Ambivalent Majority</h3><p>In the above case, if there were strong believers committed to a soft fork with stricter rules, miners face a choice — do they allow the chain to split or serve everyone with the new stricter rules? If they allow the chain to split, they must pick a subset of users to serve, giving them less value than if they were to serve all. This also harms the network effect, which means the sum of the two parts is now worth less than the original. Thus, as long as the minority committed to the soft fork was sufficient in size that they cannot be ignored, a profit-maximizing miner will follow them (assuming there is little to no cost of enforcement).</p><h3>Strong Willed Minority vs. Miners Interests</h3><p>In a case where a strong willed minority requires non-GMO, organically certified food, this may not result in the minority getting its way. The cost of production may be too high to be worth it. A theoretical soft fork that reduces the block reward by half would be a good example. A minority may feel the block reward is too high and wish that it be lowered, and only allow miners to claim 6.25 coins instead of 12.5 per block. In this case, miners would give up a significant amount of income to have to enforce it, and the loss of “business” from excluding these users may be less costly than reducing their income.</p><h3>Strong Willed Minority vs. Strong Willed Minority</h3><p>A third case is when a strong willed majority ends up alienating another portion of the potential consumers. If a new religious sect required that all food have bacon added to all food, Jews and Muslims would not tolerate this and splinter off, even if the majority did not care either way. In this case, a split is inevitable. In the Bitcoin case, some users may wish to have all addresses logged in a government registry to ease KYC compliance. They could demand that miners only mine blocks that adhere to these standards. This type of action would be rejected by many users who would not go along with such a plan, and in fact may even take steps to block it if it was enforced. In this case, a split would be inevitable if both factions were sufficiently intolerant of the other.</p><h3>The Importance of Commitment and Stubbornness</h3><p>This only works if users are <strong>absolutely</strong> committed to their rules being followed. Commitment must be absolute and unwilling to change, no matter what the majority does. The most important part of the intolerant minority is to truly be intolerant! If the cause is not worth putting your neck on the line for, it will not be successful. Some supporters of UASFs have stated that they intend to enforce the UASF unless it is not widely supported or followed, and then would back off. This is the surest way to guarantee failure. If you are unwilling to follow a minority chain with an economic minority, you aren’t truly an intolerant minority. You are only one with a preference.</p><h3>Guidelines for User Activated Soft Forks for Maximizing Success</h3><ul><li>Take away no existing useful features (do not create a hostile minority).</li><li>Do not add significant costs to miners (make burden for miners as low as possible).</li><li>Include functionality that users are willing to fork off for.</li><li>Ensure there is a sufficient sized minority willing to commit</li></ul><p>A sufficiently sized <strong>committed</strong> economic minority is enough to have a successful User Activated Soft Fork. While Shaolinfry said that without an economic majority behind a soft fork, it should be withdrawn, I believe that statement to be too weak. The history of intolerant minorities making changes is long enough to show otherwise.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a54e57869f57" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Economic Implications of Chain Splits and Resolution]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@alpalpalp/economic-implications-of-chain-splits-and-resolution-539c5fd0bc0c?source=rss-495d97580d58------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/539c5fd0bc0c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bitcoin]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Alphonse Pace]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 07 Mar 2017 18:46:15 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-03-08T16:03:19.429Z</atom:updated>
            <cc:license>https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/</cc:license>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In my previous article, I touched upon the technical implications of a chain split and it’s potential resolution and how the type of ruleset changes might define what is and is not possible. In this article, I will show how economics will play an important factor in deciding which scenario occurs.</p><h3>Mining Basics</h3><p>A miner’s revenue comes down to a few factors: the value of Bitcoin, the transaction fees generated per block, and the miner’s hashpower compared to the difficulty. The miner’s expenses will typically include electricity (a significant part), facilities (rent, taxes, etc…), operations (staff to make sure everything is working, cost of running the IT infrastructure to operate), and depreciation of mining equipment. The equation can be simplified in most cases to having a cost per hash, which depend on which chain someone mines, so it can be ignored for analysis.</p><h3>Mining in a Chain Split</h3><p>When a chain split occurs, each chain will have a different value, and eventually, differing difficulty. Since a miners expenses will typically not differ according to which chain they are mining, profit-motivated miners will seek the maximum revenue. The maximum revenue will depend on two factors: the expected reward per block and the difficulty of finding such a block. There are even <a href="https://www.multipool.us/">mining pools </a>that opportunistically will shift which coins they mine based on current market conditions to maximize revenue for their hashers. While some miners may mine ideologically or for strategic reasons, Bitcoin’s economic model tends to assume that hashers will seek profits Given the low barrier to entry and relative anonymity of hashing, any presence of ideological miners will be negated by profit-seeking miners who mine the opposite chain.</p><h3>Evaluating Which Chain to Mine</h3><p>When evaluating which chain to mine, a miner should use the following equation to calculate expected daily revenue:</p><p>([block reward in unit of account + expected fees in unit of account]) * (# expected blocks/day).</p><p>For simplicity, we’ll assume the block reward in coin amount and fees in coin amount are the same, although it’s easy to expand this case later.</p><p>The expected blocks/day is equal to the mining hashpower divided by the expected network hashpower (based on difficulty). The difficulty reflects the average hashpower of the previous difficulty adjustment period. The rate at which you find blocks is independent of the network’s total *actual* hashpowe. It is only based on the current difficulty. For example, if you have 10% of the hashpower average of the previous period, you will mine 14.4 blocks per day on average for the next difficulty period, even if the total hashpower changes on your chain during the next period.</p><p>Revenue mining Chain A: [Price of A] * Block Reward * [My Hashpower / Total Hashpower of last period].</p><p>Revenue of mining Chain B: [Price of B] * Block Reward * [My Hashpower/ Total Hashpower last period].</p><p>We want to know which chain is more profitable to mine. If [Revenue A] / [Revenue B] &gt; 1, then mine A, otherwise, mine B.</p><p>We can simplify the equation down to ([Price of A]/[Difficulty A]) &gt; ([Price of B]/[Difficulty B]) means you should mine A, otherwise B. <strong>Eventually both chains will reach an equilibrium where the difficulty of each chain is proportional to the price.</strong></p><h3>Implications for Resolutions of Chain Splits</h3><p>In my previous article, I outlined four types of chain splits. In the case of the Incompatible Hard Fork, both chains will never resolve and no massive reorganization is possible. For the other cases, a chain reorganization is possible. If the amount of total work on the invulnerable chain exceeds the vulnerable chain, the vulnerable chain will be annihilated.</p><p>Above, we determined that the difficulty of each chain will be proportional to the prices of each. The difficulty reflects the amount of work being added to each chain. Thus, if the difficulty of one chain exceeds the other for long enough, it will eventually contain more work. Simplifying based on the previous equations, the chain that maintains the highest value will eventually have the most work. Thus, any chain that is vulnerable to reorganization MUST remain at a higher value than the other chain for eternity for it to resist a massive reorganization.</p><p>Chris Belcher posted an interesting point on the bitcoin-dev mailing list:</p><blockquote>Because the segwit-invalid coins can be annihilated in this way and<br>segwit-valid coins cannot, segwit-invalid coins are more risky to hold<br>as an asset, all else equal.<br><br>A more risky asset has a lower price, all else equal. Because investors<br>demand higher risk premiums for holding it and also short sellers may<br>sell down the price in the hopes of making a profit if it&#39;s value goes<br>to zero.</blockquote><p>Based on this idea, it becomes an even bigger challenge for the vulnerable chain to retain a higher value, simply because it might not have a higher value at a later date.</p><h3>Adjusting for varying block rewards</h3><p>In the event of varying block rewards (including varying fees), the equation will just need a slight modification. Simply replace the price of each coin with a “reward in local currency” factor. Thus coin A with a 50 coin reward and 1 coin average fee and price of $100/coin can be compared to coin with a 25 coin reward, 2 coin average fee, and price of $150/coin. In this case, both chains will converge to difficulties ratios of (51*$100)/(27*$150). In the event that Coin B should beocme valued at $188.89 or more, it would actually begin to produce more work than Coin A, and eventually annihilate it.</p><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>Staying on a chain that is vulnerable to reorganization is a risky proposition. As long as there is any reasonable interest in both chains, not only must it maintain the majority of hashpower immediately after the fork, but it has the possibility of being annihilated at any point in the future. Due to this risk, it will push the price of that chain downward, thus becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy where it drives the value down to the point where the mining majority has economic incentives to switch to the invulnerable chain, thus leading to a single chain with the stricter rules.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=539c5fd0bc0c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Chain Splits and Resolutions]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@alpalpalp/chain-splits-and-resolutions-d3398bddf4ab?source=rss-495d97580d58------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d3398bddf4ab</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bitcoin]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[fork]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Alphonse Pace]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 07 Mar 2017 14:23:52 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-03-07T14:23:52.848Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>An often misunderstood topic is that of chain splits and how they are potentially resolved. With the recent proposal from <a href="https://www.mail-archive.com/bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org/msg04703.html">Shaolinfry</a> discussing User Activated Soft Forks (UASF) getting much attention, these misunderstandings must be clarified to fully understand the implications of chain splits and their potential resolutions.</p><h3>Types of Forks</h3><p>Miners can create chain splits through the deliberate orphaning of blocks that appear to be valid to some clients. Users maintain a set of consensus rules that they require of all blocks. When users disagree about the sets of consensus rules to enforce, they will follow a different chain. To simplify discussion, we’ll skip the case where the consensus rules are agreed upon, but miners decide to orphan blocks for other reasons, and cases where there are more than two sets of consensus rules. In the following examples, there are two sets of rules, the Red rules and the Yellow rules. In these examples, the Red rules are original rules being enforced, and the Yellow rules are the modified rules. Orange rules are the combination of both Red and Yellow rules (both rule sets agree that these blocks are valid).</p><h4>Incompatible Hard Fork</h4><p>An incompatible is the simplest type of chain split to understand. At a certain block height, some users decide to implement a new ruleset. In this case, the new ruleset is completely independent of the original rules.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/675/1*okCorYNgQboKEjzj2gGbZw.png" /><figcaption>Incompatible Hard Fork</figcaption></figure><p>A hard fork occurs after some miners decide to mine on the new ruleset, and some continue on the old ruleset. No block produced under the new rules is valid under the old rules, and vice versa. The Ethereum/Ethereum Classic split is an example of this kind of split. In this case, the chains are eternally split with no chance of ever converging, no matter how much work is mined into each chain.</p><h4>Semi-Compatible Hard Forks</h4><p>A semi-compatible hard fork occurs whenever the rulesets intersect, but there are some blocks that are valid on only one of the chains for each chain.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/623/1*mw1U8_8F6x-gHNncxCSdMQ.png" /><figcaption>Semi-Compatible Fork</figcaption></figure><p>In these cases, miners can prevent a chain split by mining only Orange rule blocks. However, once a miner mines a Red or Yellow block, the chain splits. It is possible for the chains to converge if miners eventually put together an exclusively Orange chain starting from when the users accepted Yellow rules that surpassed the total work of both of the other chains. If they ever did this, both the Red/Orange and Yellow/Orange chains would be orphaned by Red/Yellow clients, and they would see a single chain. There are no major forks of this type that I am aware of. The best bet for miners in this case (depending on the specifics) would typically be to just mine Orange blocks, preventing any chain split. By doing so, miners are effectively turning a Semi-compatible fork into a Soft Fork.</p><h4>Compatible Hard Fork</h4><p>In a hard fork, the ruleset expands, to include all of the previous rules, but also allowing other conditions.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/953/1*DZDZQHUl357XqwQKEgHboQ.png" /><figcaption>Hard Fork</figcaption></figure><p>When the rules expand, as soon as a miner mines a block with the Yellow rules, the chain splits. This type of split will diverge as long as the Yellow chain contains more work than the Orange chain. One danger in this type of split is that if the Orange chain contains more work, the Yellow chain will be orphaned. Users of the yellow chain must not only be sure that a vast majority of hashpower will be on this chain initially, but will continue to be on this chain for eternity. An example of this type of fork is Bitcoin XT, Bitcoin Classic, and Bitcoin Unlimited.</p><h4>Soft Fork</h4><p>A soft fork is when the ruleset is tightened and the Yellow rules are completely covered by the Red rules (thus only Orange and Red rulesets).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/986/1*arSrMNSAeaysXVijop9X-Q.png" /></figure><p>The chain split can occur whenever a miner creates a Red block. Users who use the Red ruleset will follow that chain, and users who use the Yellow ruleset will follow the Orange chain. In this case, if the majority of hashpower ever starts enforcing the Orange rules, the Red chain will become orphaned. This type of fork occurred in Bitcoin’s history numerous times with changes such as BIP66, CSV, CLTV, and is in the proposed SegWit Soft Fork.</p><h3>Reorganization Risk and Split Risks</h3><p>Both massive reorganizations and chain splits present dangers to users and miners. A massive reorganization can cause previously accepted transactions to disappear, which will guarantee that a large number of people will lose money in the process. In this case, perhaps a year ago you were paid 10BTC for your car, and a year later, that transaction essentially disappears from the ledger, and your chain is abandoned. You have no car and no Bitcoins. This type of behavior would cause a great loss of confidence in the currency. Depending on the type of split, a massive reorganization will only affect users of the looser ruleset. Users of the tighter ruleset will never get reorganized.</p><p>A chain split also presents risk. The value of Ethereum took a tumble after it split from Ethereum Classic. It adds confusion to the marketplace (which is <em>really</em> Ethereum? The one with the original rules, or the one with the rules the centralized Ethereum Foundation enforce today?). A chain split affects all users adversely. There are cases where a split may be preferred (say two groups have vastly different interests and are best served following their own wants, rather than compromising).</p><h3>Mitigating Risk</h3><p>Risk for most of these forks can be mitigated by both miners and users, in most cases.</p><p>For an incompatible hard fork, no mitigation plan can occur. The chain IS splitting, so long as some miners and some users want it to. There is nothing that can happen. This is the equivalent of getting a divorce decree and parting ways, never to interact again.</p><p>For a semi-compatible soft fork, miners have the power to prevent both a chain fork and massive reorganization. If the majority of miners choose to mine only Orange blocks, users will remain on one chain and reorganizations will be limited to a small number of blocks.</p><p>For a compatible hard fork, risk is exclusively on the Yellow rule users. Their best mitigation is to ensure the majority of the economy is on their side. It’s also important to make sure the majority of the miners are also on their side initially, otherwise the chain will not split. Without the majority of the economy, the value of the Orange blocks will be greater, thus pulling miners interested in profit to their side, leading to a massive reorganization. Extreme care must be taken in this scenario (something that was not present with Bitcoin XT, Bitcoin Classic, nor the proposed Bitcoin Unlimited). The former would activate with a mere 75% of hashpower, and Bitcoin Unlimited has no threshold for activation.</p><p>For a soft fork, the risk is exclusively on the Red rule users. Their best mitigation strategy is to ensure that they have the economy on their side, and the vast majority of miners following the Red rules OR the vast majority of miners on the Orange rules. This may seem a bit counterintuitive, but if the vast majority of miners are mining the Orange rules, then they will remain in consensus with the Orange users and will not get Orphaned. Miners can mitigate this by only mining blocks in the Orange set and orphaning the Red set.</p><p>Miners have a significant role in mitigating this risk. In every case except the Incompatible Hard Fork, the miners can prevent a chain fork. For the semi-compatible hard fork, they can do this by converting it into a soft fork. For the compatible hard fork, they can only do this by rejecting the hard fork. For the soft fork case, they do this by enforcing the soft fork. However, even without the miners doing this, users have an incentive to protect themselves by enforcing the Orange rules and rejecting anything does not meet them. This means rejecting hard forks and enforcing soft forks.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/988/1*H1r2CoG80-yMPffiHLzA3w.png" /></figure><h4>Epilogue: Escaping a Miner Imposed Ruleset Change</h4><p>Many, including Jeff Garzik, have cast suspicion upon soft forks because they do not give users a choice. The nature of Bitcoin and other Proof of Work based blockchains cannot prevent miners from enforcing stricter rules than users agree to. However, users do have power — by invoking an incompatible hard fork. In this case, users will force the chain to split by introducing a new ruleset (which may include a proof of work change, but does not require one). This ensures users always have an escape from a miner imposed ruleset that they reject. This way, if the economy and users truly reject a soft fork rule change, they always have the power to break away and reclaim the rules they wish. It may be inconvenient, but the same is true by any attack by the miners on users.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d3398bddf4ab" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Bitcoin Unlimited’s Placebo Controls]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@alpalpalp/bitcoin-unlimiteds-placebo-controls-6320cbc137d4?source=rss-495d97580d58------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/6320cbc137d4</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[placebo]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bitcoin]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[unlimited]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Alphonse Pace]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 01 Nov 2016 14:17:05 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-11-01T14:32:14.958Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Ky0pp98HSQkz3Go92tpd0w.png" /><figcaption>Push me — I might do something, but I probably won’t.</figcaption></figure><p>Placebo controls surround us everyday. The thermostat in your office? Probably a fake. The elevator close button? It does nothing. The button to cross the sidewalk in a major city? Wired to nothing. But every day, people push these buttons or turn these knobs, thinking it has some effect on them. Why? Because people like to feel like they’re in control, even if they aren’t. Bitcoin Unlimited offers the same kinds of Placebo Controls to its users — something that allows them to feel like they have control of the system, when in fact, they have none.</p><p>Bitcoin Unlimited uses two configurable parameters for users to give the illusion of defining a maximum block size. These parameters are the Default Accept Block Size, and Default Accept Block Depth. For users, both are utterly useless, other than to temporarily fork you onto a chain you won’t follow.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/400/1*maMddP1rjHuurh0JoKjN6A.jpeg" /><figcaption>Stopping Miners from sending blocks you cannot process — as effective as stopping Germans from invading France</figcaption></figure><p>The Default Accept Block Size parameter is much like the Block Size Limit in Bitcoin — blocks larger than this are temporarily rejected. However, they <strong>can</strong> be accepted once they get to a certain depth. That depth is defined by the Accept Block Depth, which is set as 4 by default, but can be configured. This means that miners can effectively ignore your block limit as long as they eventually produce more than the Accept Block Depth. It’s the Maginot Line of defense against blocks you are unwilling to support — something that looks nice, seems like it might stop something, but in reality, is completely sidestepped.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/500/1*TbPoEzWfTMGCedoGfWKdrg.gif" /><figcaption>A user signals miners to only accept small blocks</figcaption></figure><p>You could set your Accept Block Depth number to something arbitrarily large, but all that will do is delay the inevitable. Miners will continue doing what they are going to do, because in the end, you’ll accept what they give you. Setting this number to anything other than zero will only temporarily fork you away from the network. It’s a parameter in fact worse than a placebo — temporarily giving you the illusion of doing something when in the end, it will be overruled.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*P7Hu6AuAV1ZGifJlh9Mi-w.jpeg" /><figcaption>Chief Charlatan Peter Rizun does what he wants.</figcaption></figure><p>So why all this complication for something that does nothing? The illusion of control; the illusion of a choice. Bitcoin Unlimited more simply is a system where miners are in complete control of block sizes. Once they control the block sizes, they can price you out of other forms of validation, such as validating inflation or even the validity of transactions. Miners have zero incentive to mine anything based on user preferences. In the end, they will do what they want. But the only way to pull off such a trick is to let people believe they have a choice in the matter.</p><p>You may enjoy pressing the sidewalk crossing button, but you are going to be waiting for a green light. Press the elevator’s door close button, and you’ll have to wait for the elevator to decide when the doors should shut. Change your office thermostat, because it’s probably not even wired up. And like the engineers who put these placebos in place, to give you the illusion of control, Bitcoin Unlimited presents you with meaningless options that are designed to pacify you while you hand over your ability to control the resources needed to fully validate blocks.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=6320cbc137d4" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Breaking Through Congestion]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@alpalpalp/breaking-through-congestion-a60b6d1c9d3?source=rss-495d97580d58------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a60b6d1c9d3</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Alphonse Pace]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 25 Jun 2015 00:32:28 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-06-25T00:32:28.437Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>As Bitcoin’s blocks begin to fill, there will be more transactions waiting to be confirmed than space allows. This will cause congestion and a poor user experience. Transactions will sit unconfirmed and never clear. People will get their money stuck and be unable to access it or have the receiver receive it. However, a few changes to Bitcoin can drastically reduce the negative effects and effectively break through congestion.</p><h3>Transaction Basics</h3><p>If you already understand the basics of transactions, skip this section. However, it provides an overview for understanding the basics needed to fully understand current and proposed behavior.</p><h4>Unconfirmed vs. Confirmed Transactions</h4><p>Bitcoin exists by allowing users to send a transaction to other nodes. The act of sending a transaction does not guarantee that it will be accepted by the network, even when it is valid. Bitcoin determines consensus through Proof-of-Work, which forces miners to spend some amount to decide what transactions should be included in the next block. Miners choose through the set of transactions they have received (mempool) and determine based on their own criteria, such as if it has enough fees or if it is not considered spam, which transactions should be included. There is no requirement to include any set of transactions.</p><h4>Inputs and Outputs</h4><p>Each transaction consists of a set of inputs and a set of outputs. Inputs are sources of funds with outputs being the destinations. Each output can then be spent as an output into the future.</p><h3>Controlling the Mempool</h3><p>The mempool is the set of transactions that nodes recognize as it’s preference for including in the next block. Miners will use the mempool to determine what is mined. Since miners cannot include two transactions with the same inputs into a block, they must filter transactions that contain the same input repeatedly.</p><h4>First Seen</h4><p>This is the default behavior of Bitcoin. A node will keep track of every transaction it sees. If the inputs have never been used before, it keeps the transaction in the mempool and relays it to other nodes. If the inputs have been seen before, the transaction is rejected and not passed to other nodes. This behavior makes unconfirmed transactions appear to be safe. This isn’t always the case. Transactions could be sent in parallel to different parts of the network, and nodes would disagree what was seen first. This is why mining is so critical — it resolves the conflict of which transaction was actually seen first. This means that each node could have a different opinion on what it saw first, even when they are truthful. If unconfirmed transactions could be agreed upon for which came first, we wouldn’t need mining. Unconfirmed transactions are also safe because nodes and miners may not follow this convention. Furthermore, since these nodes aren’t being truthful, there is no way to punish dishonest nodes, as they are indistinguishable from nodes that were simply attacked.</p><p>With first-seen, a transaction without proper fees will sit in the mempool, at the back of the line, unconfirmed, with users unable to confirm, and unable for a user to access the funds, since any updated transaction gets rejected for re-using an input.</p><h3>Child Pays for Parent</h3><p><a href="https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/1647">https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/1647</a></p><p>Child pays for parent is a patch introduced by Luke Dashjr that allows miners to re-prioritize the transactions to include in a block by considering the sum of fees of chained transactions. For example, transaction X takes funds from A and sends to B, but it has no fee. A merchant wants to receive the funds and is willing to pay a fee, so he creates transaction Y, which sends from B to C (both addresses he controls) with a fee high enough to cover both transaction X and transaction Y. A miner will see this child transaction, determine that the fees are sufficiently high, and move the transaction up in the queue.</p><p>This patch is useful because it does not require relay nodes to change their rules for what transactions should be included. However, since you now must pay the fees for an entirely new transaction in addition to the original, this method will be more expensive. It also does not alter security of zero-confirmation transactions.</p><h3>Replace-by-fee</h3><p><a href="https://github.com/petertodd/bitcoin/tree/replace-by-fee-v0.10.2">https://github.com/petertodd/bitcoin/tree/replace-by-fee-v0.10.2</a></p><p>Replace-by-fee is a patch introduced by Peter Todd that allows miners to choose transactions that provide the most fees, regardless of order seen. This patch has generated some controversy, especially when adopted temporarily by F2Pool due to the way zero-confirmation transactions are now treated by the network. In the example of congestion, if a user puts too low of a fee on a transaction, he could decide to re-broadcast a transaction with a higher fee. Nodes that use replace-by-fee would prefer the second transaction, and prioritize it based on the new fees. However, this behavior could also be used to exploit those who accept unconfirmed transactions. Rather than sending to the same outputs, this patch allows for sending to completely different inputs. A malicious user could send a transaction with a small fee to a merchant, receive his goods, then rebroadcast an additional transaction with a larger fee that instead pays himself. Miners that have implemented this patch would choose the “self-payment”, leaving the merchant empty-handed</p><p>This patch has the advantage of being the lowest fee for users, as users could rebroadcast a transaction only altering the fee without increasing the size of the transaction.</p><h3>Replace-by-fee Scorched Earth</h3><p>Combining Replace-by-Fee and Child Pays for Parent, a defense exists for merchants who are attacked by a double-spend attack. Consider the case where a customer pays with Transaction X to the merchant, but then double-spends with a higher fee using Transaction Y back to himself. In this case, the merchant can make Transaction Z, which spends the output of Transaction X with higher fees. The thief could retaliate with even higher fees, but the end-game of this scenario is the neither the thief nor the merchant end up with the funds. By being able to discourage such an attack, even by not recovering money, it makes it unwise for an attacker to use this attack. However, an attacker who wishes just to harm the merchant without regard to cost would not be deterred.</p><h3>First Seen Safe Replace by Fee</h3><p>This patch, also introduced by Peter Todd, provides a more restricted set of rules for replacing transactions. This applies the replace-by-fee rules, but only in the cases where every output is at least as big as it previously was. This behavior will not impact zero-confirmation security, while giving an option for those who want to increase fees to force a transaction through congestion. Users cannot double-spend to benefit themselves, but only to increase fees. This limitation is not without cost, as it requires an additional input to be added to the transaction. This will increase the cost of the transaction fees needed to push it through compared to a strict replace-by-fee patch, which typically would not need to add inputs. F2Pool settled on using this patch to avoid upsetting users.</p><h3>Miner Game Theory</h3><p>Miners will choose how they handle including transactions. While they do have an incentive to increase the value of the Bitcoin network with time, they also are at a disadvantage to any miners who implement policies that increase revenue, even if it harms the Bitcoin ecosystem as a whole. This is the prisoner’s dilemma — where each actor wants the others to co-operate and everyone is better off under co-operation, but defection is the rational action of any individual participant. Prisoner’s dilemma is solved through binding agreements, but if defection cannot be detected, it is impossible to enforce. Since it is impossible to detect a miner that is being attacked from a malicious miner, such agreements and punishments will only benefit futher attacks.</p><p>Instead, we must assume every actor in Bitcoin is trying to lie or exploit us. By doing so, we increase our own security and the security of the network. We must weigh this against short-term problems like the transition period to remove any dangerous assumptions, such as safe unconfirmed transactions. The FSS-RBF patch is a great example of a responsible way to transition through this period, although we cannot guarantee that miners will follow this nor can we detect when they use other methods that would maximize revenue. Bitcoin can and will thrive despite bad actors, so we must be vigilant in what assumptions are being made so that we don’t require trust.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a60b6d1c9d3" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Why Decentralization Matters]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@alpalpalp/why-decentralization-matters-fa016a90f595?source=rss-495d97580d58------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/fa016a90f595</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Alphonse Pace]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 18 Jun 2015 02:08:20 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-06-18T02:08:20.979Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Bitcoin’s biggest differentiating factor comes from it’s decentralized nature. Without the need for decentralization, it’s incredibly easy to replicate the functionality of Bitcoin at a much less cost. So it’s important to understand why that decentralization is such an important feature and what we lose without it.</p><h3>What is Decentralization?</h3><blockquote><strong>Decentralization</strong> is the process of redistributing or dispersing functions, powers, people or things away from a central location or authority.</blockquote><p>Bitcoin is a decentralized Peer-to-Peer network that does not rely on a central authority. Any peer of the network is not dependent on any single node for the correct blockchain. Bitcoin works as long as each peer is connected to a single peer telling the truth, even if every other is lying. This is the key feature that distinguishes Bitcoin from other networks, that rely on trusted entities for determining truth.</p><h3>Why Does it Matter?</h3><p>To understand why decentralization matters, it’s important to know the flaws that a centralized system has. Decentralization is not cheap, as it requires an expensive (but valuable) proof-of-work mechanism for determining consensus. While transaction fees currently are cheap, the security provided for such transactions is not cheap, as a great deal of it is paid through inflation. This will change, with time, and the true costs will be exposed, or security levels will not match what currently exists. Bitcoin and other decentralized services will lose in competition to centralized services if there were not significant advantages to a decentralized system that offset this cost.</p><h4>Censorship Resistance</h4><p>Censorship resistance is one of the most important distinguishing factors of Bitcoin. Centralized systems are notoriously easy to censor. Censoring transactions allows for third parties to prevent the flow of transactions to or from certain sources.</p><p>Satoshi realized this when he said the following:</p><blockquote><strong><em>Governments are good at cutting off the heads of a centrally controlled network like Napster, but pure P2P networks like Gnutella and Tor seem to be holding their own.</em></strong></blockquote><p>While governments are one potential threat of censorship, any system that relies on centralization also is potentially threatened by any controller of the network. Even in the case of a benevolent central authority, this authority could be compelled to act against his wishes through threat of use of force by governments or criminals.</p><p>Miners currently have some ability to censor transactions. Notably, Eligius Mining Pool participates in censoring transactions he defines as spam, such as transactions to Dice sites or parasitic protocols that lie on top of the blockchain. However, as long as mining is decentralized, there is sufficient chances for a transaction to be included into a later block. Just as nodes only require a single source of truth, users only need a single miner willing to mine their transaction to avoid censorship. The greater the amount of centralization in a system, the fewer people who could agree (or be forced to agree) with uniform censorship rules. This poses one of the more serious risks with mining centralization.</p><h4>Seizure Resistance</h4><p>Centralized systems are extremely easy to seize large amounts of funds from users without their permission. While Bitcoin users would still be individually susceptible to rubber hose attacks, there is no centralized place to attack to seize a massive amount of funds. Even this threat can be mitigated through time-locked transactions or multi-signature transactions that would prevent you from even being able to access your own funds easily. No entity can compel a third party to release your funds to them without your permission, unlike every centralized financial system.</p><h4>Access Control Resistance</h4><p>Centralized services are easy to have access blocked by an ISP, government, or other authority. Even with work-arounds such as VPN and Tor, the centralized services can always be shut down at a single choke point.</p><p>Bitcoin is incredibly resilient to this type of attack. While ISPs can shut down certain types of traffic, that traffic can be disguised. Even if the internet was completely shut down, Bitcoin could survive through satellites or shortwave radio. Since there is no single point to shut down, every single node would need to be eliminated to kill Bitcoin.</p><h4>Change Resistance</h4><p>Bitcoin is also incredibly resistant to change. Bitcoin is not subject to the whims of a few individuals, and any major change requires consensus from the vast majority of participants. While some see this as a disadvantage, predictability and stability is a huge benefit. This can only be done through Bitcoin’s decentralized consensus mechanism. A single rogue developer cannot make a change and affect everyone. A government cannot mandate that the inflation rate should change. Bitcoin resists change unless absolutely necessary.</p><h3>Is Centralized Bitcoin Valuable?</h3><p>In the end, the value proposition Bitcoin offers comes through decentralization. A centralized Bitcoin would be a massively expensive version of existing networks and financial systems of today. It would lose the battle, simply because the costs are great without any benefits of decentralization. Sacrificing the decentralization, or at least being aware of the consequenecs of decentralization loss is key for understanding how Bitcoin can and should evolve with time.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=fa016a90f595" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[There is No Crisis]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@alpalpalp/there-is-no-crisis-20b58e14b09c?source=rss-495d97580d58------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/20b58e14b09c</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Alphonse Pace]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 31 May 2015 17:18:02 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-05-31T19:14:43.407Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The fork proposal has a lot of debate depending on the argument that there is an imminent crisis if we do nothing. However, this claim is being vastly overblown and does not consider what actions are very likely to occur if congestion becomes more frequent.</p><h3>The Cost of Doing Nothing</h3><p>Bitcoin Doomsday proponents argue that doing nothing will cause great harm and cripple the utility of Bitcoin. While there will be bumps in the road, the cost of doing nothing is being exaggerated. The main cause of concern is that blocks will fill up. This was tested with a brief DDOS attack on the network last week. It’s true, if there are more transactions generated than can be accommodated in the blockchain, there will be some negative impacts. Nodes were not designed with dealing with this situation and handle it poorly. Wallets handle this poorly with funds that are considered spent but not received as they wait in the mempool, possibly for a long time. The current behavior is highly undesirable and will cause a lot of pain.</p><h3>Pain is the Engine of Innovation</h3><p>The failure of this analysis is to assume that the world is static. Yes, the current systems are poorly equipped to handle congestion. But that doesn’t mean it will always stay that way. People adjust. When the network reaches capacity, it means that transactions with the highest priority (as decided by nodes) will be given priority to be added to the ledger. Given there is a pricing mechanism already built in (fees), the signaling of importance of transactions will determine a great deal access. Fees will rise. Use cases that were normal in the past become inefficient. This has happened before. Satoshi Dice had a great deal of low-value transactions filling the network in the past, and as the economics changed, they moved to sites that supported off-chain transactions. As tipping grew in popularity, tipping by sending small amounts through the blockchain became inefficient and moved off-chain to solutions like ChangeTip. These solutions existed not because of time for development, but because the motive of profit. The world will change. People will stop using Bitcoin for more trivial use cases and will consolidate as much as possible. Many small transactions will change to payment channels. Hub-and-spoke systems will now have the possibility to profit, and will actually have an incentive to be created, other than instant confirmations. Lightning Network will be given a tangible incentive to be built, other than being a neat project.</p><h3>Value Proposition</h3><p>Bitcoin offers an incredible value proposition compared to the alternatives of fiat and gold. It holds the best qualities of each- a fixed supply, non-counterfeit-able, divisible, and easily transportable money. It’s value proposition lies from its fundamental properties. This value proposition is quite apparent, as people jump through numerous hoops linking bank accounts to exchanges, paying fees. It makes no economic sense to jump through these hoops just to buy something with a low transaction fee (that merchants absorb anyway). Many people buying Bitcoin are spending a great deal of time and expense to acquire it. These use cases will be unaffected by slightly higher transaction fees. They likely will be unaffected by considerably higher transactions. For example, if I wanted to purchase $1000 of Bitcoin on Coinbase, I would have to pay 1% + $.15, which would come out to $10.15. Will I be deterred by having to spend $0.05 instead of $0.01 to transfer it to on wallet? Would I be deterred by having to spend $1.00 instead of $0.01? Probably not even then. I’m already spending $10.15 to acquire the Bitcoin to begin with. I must already consider Bitcoin to be quite valuable to jump through so many hoops, so what is another dollar more?</p><h3>Marginal Cases</h3><p>The changes that occur will occur at the most marginal cases. When fees were fractions of a penny, it made sense to send someone a nickel on the blockchain. With a $.01 fee, this use case starts to break down. Does this harm Bitcoin? Not in the least, it shows there is was significant interest to pay larger fees to use it. Users still have access to those use cases, albeit with slightly worse trust models, through other services. Even trust-free models are possible with payment channels.</p><blockquote>Nobody goes there anymore, it’s too crowded. — Yogi Berra</blockquote><p>The argument is Bitcoin will become too crowded, therefore it won’t be useful. This argument is completely ludicrous. If something is so popular that people are willing to pay high fees to access it, it is showing tremendous value. Only the marginal cases will be effected, until capacity matches demand.</p><h3>Dealing with Bad Behavior during Congestion</h3><p>The DDOS attack stress test was used to try to “prove” what would happen if nothing occurs. Of course, this is quite silly, as the network is not static and people react. But the software needs to improve. These improvements will invalidate many current assumptions, such as 0-conf transactions being “safe”. The proponents of change, such as Mike Hearn, are also strong proponents on reliance on these assumptions, even when they are not technically strong. However, Bitcoin will change with time, and it cannot forever stay what it was. There are several solutions to how to handle congestion better.</p><h4>The Root of the Problem</h4><p>Currently nodes behave in a mostly predictable manner by keeping unconfirmed transactions in their mempool. If they see any attempts to spend the same inputs again, they will ignore them. This policy is not one that is guaranteed by the protocol, but one that is a default that most nodes tend to leave alone. The mempool can grow unbounded, so any transaction considered valid and standard will be added and passed along to other nodes.</p><p>However, there is no mechanism to guarantee nodes behave the same way. Currently, good will is the only reason to follow this pattern, especially for miners. Miners may decide to include any valid transactions they wish, even if there are duplicates that do exist that are valid. Transactions that do not have sufficient fees during congestion would eventually expire and be removed from the mempool, allowing users to try to send again.</p><h4>Limit Mempool Size</h4><p>Mempools can be bounded, such that only the top priority transactions are stored. Low priority transactions are passed on or rejected once the limit is reached or are replaced by higher priority transactions. This prevents nodes from crashing due to being overwhelmed by transactions.</p><h4>Replace by Fee</h4><p>In this scenario, transactions that have too low of a fee will not be mined for a long time, if at all. However, being able to send a replacement transaction that sends a higher fee can be done to give an incentive for miners to use that transaction instead. This would allow users to react properly to changing market conditions without having money tied up for a long time.</p><h4>Child Pays For Parent</h4><p>Child pays for parent allows transactions to get priority even when the sender fails to attach sufficient funds. The receiver could then append a transaction to the end of it with large fees, such that miners would be encouraged to include both transactions in the next block.</p><h4>Wallet Improvements</h4><p>As nodes and miners improve their behavior to better deal with congestion, wallet software could be upgraded to take advantage of these changes. A user could see an incoming unconfirmed transaction that may be stuck, and choose to pay a small fee to have it confirmed faster. A user could increase the fee on his own transaction to ensure it gets confirmed faster. But to assume these changes do not occur is silly.</p><h3>Crisis Will Force Consensus</h3><p>We can all debate about what will happen in given scenarios, but an actual crisis will make this a lot easier. Speculating, when there are legitimate trade-offs, will rarely drive consensus. The crisis will not happen overnight and will not escalate all at once, so the risk in doing nothing remains low. However, once it does occur, if it does at all, the holdouts will be far more willing to change.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=20b58e14b09c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Miners Fork Dilemma]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@alpalpalp/miners-fork-dilemma-fcd17452434?source=rss-495d97580d58------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/fcd17452434</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bitcoin]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Alphonse Pace]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 30 May 2015 21:49:12 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-05-30T21:49:12.230Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Miners hold both a significant voice and a significant stake in the possibility of a forked network. The majority of miners hold veto power of any backward compatible hard fork, such as increasing the block size, which can lead to interesting scenarios in how the hard fork plays out.</p><h3>Veto Power</h3><p>Miners hold vetoing power on increasing the block size due to it being backward compatible. This means that if the majority of miners decide to require 1MB blocks to be considered valid, then even clients that allow 20MB blocks would be stuck with the old rules of the blockchain. What complicates this even further is that miners down the road changing their mind about which chain should be mined could orphan the 20MB chain even a significant time after the diversion. The 1MB blockchain would never be susceptible to such an attack, as the 20MB version would never be considered valid.</p><h3>Economics of Mining</h3><p>Miners can switch fairly effortlessly between the two chains. Difficulty will vary between the two chains as will value of the chains. While miners may have personal interest in what chain to mine, most will follow profits. Miners can mine a chain they prefer at cost if they want, but doing so only costs themselves and benefits competitors. The miners suffer a prisoners dilemma without the ability to form a cartel to punish defectors.</p><p>After the fork, I will assume both chains persist in some form. For this to occur, some reasonably significant portion of miners would decide to mine on the old chain (enough that we wouldn’t have to wait years for a block to be formed, before difficulty resets), and at least 50% decide to mine the new chain. If any of these assumptions do not hold, it is less interesting. If no miners mine the old chain, it has little value and we’d have to wait a great amount of time to ever reset difficulty. If fewer than 50% decide to mine the fork, then the old chain will win even by the new rules.</p><p>Each holder of Bitcoin will end up with equal balances on both the Bitcoin Classic and Bitcoin XT forks. However, the value of these coins will be independent (and may be lesser or greater than the previous value of Bitcoins). Once the miners have chosen a side, difficulty will reset to a proportion matching the miners on each side. If the proportion of difficulty to value on one chain varies from the others, miners will have the option to increase profits by switching sides. Miners do this today on many alt-coins- switching between various chains based on profit potential and difficulty, so there’s no reason to think miners wouldn’t do the same. Miners that prefer one chain may vary well mine the other chain, sell those coins for their preferred coin, just as alt-coin miners do today.</p><h3>Short Term Majority is not Sufficient</h3><p>This poses a very large potential threat to holders of the Bitcoin XT fork. Even when a majority of miners prefer the new coin to the old coin, if the old coin ever gains a sustained value greater than or equal to the new coin, miners will move to mining Bitcoin Classic until they make up greater than 51% of the network. Once this happens, Bitcoin Classic will outrun Bitcoin XT chain. Without checkpoints or breaking backward compatibility, its fate is sealed.</p><h3>Removing the Risk</h3><p>The risk can be drastically reduced if the forked version is not backward compatibility. For example, requiring an exact block number to be invalid on the old network would be sufficient to prevent this situation. I have yet to see this proposed by Gavin, but it seems like a necessary choice to remove the risk of the fork getting outrun. Another possibility is a checkpoint after the fork, which would be done at a single point in time, and could be discussed before the fork.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=fcd17452434" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[What is Bitcoin’s Value Proposition?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@alpalpalp/what-is-bitcoin-s-value-proposition-b7309be442e3?source=rss-495d97580d58------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b7309be442e3</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bitcoin]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Alphonse Pace]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 30 May 2015 18:13:08 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-05-30T18:13:08.777Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Bitcoin is different things to different people. Part of the reason for the conflict over the proposed block-size fork is due to the variety of positions on what Bitcoin should do and what it’s value proposition is.</p><h3>Sound Money</h3><p>Bitcoin’s principles are based heavily on that of sound money. Satoshi was not shy about this inspiration, especially with the genesis block message:</p><blockquote>The Times 03/Jan/2009 Chancellor on brink of second bailout for banks</blockquote><p>Satoshi created Bitcoin not with a set inflation rate for eternity, but with a fixed supply. The value proposition of having a fixed supply is a defining characteristic and sets it apart from fiat. Bitcoin represents the value of gold but with the power of the internet.</p><h3>Censorship Resistance</h3><p>Bitcoin by its nature is quite censorship resistant. Satoshi talked about this quite extensively. It can be summed up best in his quote:</p><blockquote>Governments are good at cutting off the heads of a centrally controlled networks like Napster, but pure P2P networks like Gnutella and Tor seem to be holding their own.<br>It’s very attractive to the libertarian viewpoint if we can explain it properly. I’m better with code than with words though.</blockquote><p>The essential nature of the P2P network in Bitcoin was done explicitly to allow censorship resistance, such that even governmental agencies would be unable to stop the network and stop its payments.</p><h3>Irrevocability</h3><p>Payments are not subject to the whims of a third party to overrule the transaction. This allows for greater fraud protection for the receiver. In transactions where the payer is unknown and the merchant is well-known and trustworthy, this works well. It also works well when the transaction can be handled directly and clearly.</p><h3>Cheap Payments</h3><p>One of the draws of many to Bitcoin is the value proposition of cheap payments. Bitpay and Coinbase are prominent in pushing this as the value proposition to merchants. Accepting Bitcoin is cheaper than accepting a Credit Card.</p><h3>Fundamental Values</h3><p>While the first two value propositions do exist fundamentally within Bitcoin and encoded in the protocol, the final one is not one that can be guaranteed. Users should not be surprised when this value proposition changes. Distributed consensus is expensive to maintain, and while this is paid through by inflation and diluting existing supply, it is partially offset by transaction fees. This is guaranteed to change with time, where the network security will be provided more and more by transaction fees.</p><h3>The Myth of the Cheap Transaction</h3><p>While higher fees would certainly make Bitcoin less desirable in some use cases, these use cases are not particularly well served by Bitcoin. Centralized solutions will almost always be cheaper and for small transactions of value, the risk is much less. This already exists today through services like ChangeTip, where it would be economically unfeasible to send tiny amounts of Bitcoin on the blockchain. If the transaction fees were to rise, you would see the most marginal use cases driven away from the blockchain, just as Dice sites and tipping services have done so. However, Bitcoin’s sound money and censorship resistant properties make it so advantageous, users would be willing to pay a premium for such value rather than requiring a discount.</p><p>Bitpay’s abysmal statistics for the merchant battle shows how terrible the cheap transaction value is. Merchant adoption of Bitcoin is also partially due to reduced fraud risk, and even then, very few merchants are able to save any significant money. This is apparent due to the lack of discounts for Bitcoin transactions, barring sites that rely on selling illiquid items such as gift cards or rely on fraud from selling stolen credit card purchases.</p><h3>These Times are a Changing</h3><p>The knee-jerk reaction from most of the armchair enthusiasts is to just immediately want to increase the blockchain without regard for consequences. This is in large part due to a nostalgia for the Bitcoin of the past. As Bitcoin grows, we cannot guarantee which parts of the accidental benefits will still be present. However, the fundamental properties must remain. Without it, Bitcoin offers nothing that isn’t already offered.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b7309be442e3" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[How the Great Fork Will Occur]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@alpalpalp/how-the-great-fork-will-occur-160f0e462371?source=rss-495d97580d58------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/160f0e462371</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bitcoin]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[technology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Alphonse Pace]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 30 May 2015 01:08:59 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-05-30T01:08:59.764Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>With Gavin’s announcement of his support of the Bitcoin-XT project, it’s clear that the first Bitcoin Civil War is inevitable. There are a great deal of misconceptions about how this will occur and what will happen. Ignoring the political and economic consequences, the actual steps taken that will ignite this war are quite clear. While this applies to the proposals for making a larger block size, any potential hard fork to Bitcoin will have the same path.</p><h3>Types of Forks</h3><p>Forks fall into one of four categories, dependent on the overlap of the rules.</p><h4>Intersecting Consensus Rules</h4><p>In this case, some blocks are valid in both consensus rules, but others are only valid in one. In this case, there will be two independent chains that can occur. Miners can choose one of three sets of consensus rules to follow. They can mine the old rules, the new rules, or the intersection of the two rules. In this case, the easiest thing for miners to do is to require both consensus rules to be met, and mine in the middle. If the majority of miners use this ruleset, users cannot do anything to separate the mine. However, if the majority does not follow these rules, two chains will exist, independently, once the first miner mines the first block that only meets the new rules, but not the old ones.</p><h4>Divergent Forks</h4><p>In this case, the two forks follow completely different rules. Switching Bitcoin to Proof of Stake would result in a divergent fork. Blocks mined with Proof of Stake would never be accepted by Blocks mined with Proof of Work, and vice versa. Miners would choose a side, and users would have coins on both chains.</p><h4>Soft Forks</h4><p>In this case, the new consensus rules are stricter than the old rules. Any block meeting the new rules will be valid by old nodes. However, blocks that are valid in the old rules may not be valid anymore. Once the majority of miners adopt the soft fork, users cannot ever “choose” the soft fork, as miners will always be able to create a longer valid chain. This has been used in the past without much controversy and are well documented. Miners can dictate stricter rules and users must follow them.</p><h4>Backwards Compatible Hard Forks</h4><p>In this case, the new consensus rules will support all previously allowed rules, but also allow additional flexibility. The 20MB proposal meets this criteria. Every block currently valid. However, once a block is mined that only meets the new rules, a fork occurs. If the majority of miners stick to the old rules, the new blocks will be orphaned, even by users who upgrade.</p><h3>The Block Size Increase Fork</h3><p>Increasing the valid block size falls into the Backwards Compatible Hard Fork category. This means, until the majority of miners are mining the new rules, what other users do or want is irrelevant. 1MB blocks will always outrun the 20MB blocks, thus orphaning any miners who decide to mine 20MB blocks.</p><h4>Why Votes Don’t Matter</h4><p>Many of the proposals for the fork include a voting mechanism for miners to signal that they are upgraded. However, miners very easily can lie about their intentions. A miner may wish to trick other miners into mining the fork, then continue to mine the small block sizes in an attempt to have less competition by having miners waste efforts on a fork that will be orphaned. Votes will be extremely hard to trust.</p><h4>The First Shots</h4><p>No matter what happens in terms of popular support or developer support, nothing can occur until the first miner decides to take sides. Eventually, some miner will have to decide that the time is right to mine a bigger block. He does so at great risk — if the other miners are not with him, he will be orphaned and lose his block reward. Continuing to mine 1MB or less blocks costs him nothing. No rational miner will take this step unless he is sure to win the battle.</p><h4>The Reaction</h4><p>Once that first block is mined, every miner must decide what to do. He can choose to follow this block, or he can choose to attempt to orphan this block. His risks are somewhat lessened — someone else made the first move and they felt comfortable doing so, so there is at least some real support for the fork. Either way, chances are likely that a few miners will attempt to orphan this block. Miners can choose to follow the large blocks or attempt to orphan. If they attempt to orphan, they do risk losing, as they are not sure how other miners will react. If they attempt to follow the new block, they also can lose, as their block could get orphaned very easily if the majority of miners do not support them.</p><p>If the next block found attempts to orphan the large block, miners will sense danger in mining larger blocks. Miners that mine small blocks on the longest chain have nothing to gain by mining big blocks, other than possibly slightly increased transaction fees, and everything to lose. If a second block is found on the large chain, even if it is small will signal even more support. Once it is clear that the majority of miners support the large chain, many will have less risk in mining on it, lessening the orphan risk. However, another key risk remains.</p><h4>User Acceptance</h4><p>While non-mining users have no power to force larger block sizes, they have complete power in accepting them. So even when a majority of miners are on the larger-block fork, users may ignore those blocks. This kind of veto power is necessary to prevent a hijacking of the network by miners, making changes such as changing the block reward rules to their own benefit. Miners must risk mining blocks that will not be accepted by users. Miners are bound by economic pressures of what coins will produce the most value for their cost. If the users prefer small coins, then they will be forced into creating smaller blocks or else they will be mining a worthless altcoin. If users strongly prefer the larger lock, once the miners upgrade, miners will mostly mine the larger chain. However, holdout miners may continue to mine the old chain collecting rewards (at a slower rate until difficulty resets) as a gamble or to serve the minority of users who do not wish to follow the new rules. Both chains could potentially live on independently.</p><h4>Forcing Divergence</h4><p>An alternative possibility is to force divergence. The consensus rules could be altered to a divergent fork, where users would specify that a certain block MUST be greater than 1 MB, forcing the hand of the miners. Blocks after that point could be allowed to be smaller, but this would force a fork at a known time. Miners would be forced to choose a side. I have not seen this proposed, although it certainly could make the break more smooth and less risky for miners by not forcing one to make the first move.</p><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>Due to the great risk the first miners to break consensus, don’t expect miners to readily adopt the new rules easily. They will only do so when it is clear that a majority of miners will follow them AND an economic majority will honor blocks they create. Regardless of your position on what should happen, this change will not go down easily.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=160f0e462371" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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