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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Alvaro Serrano Rivas on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Alvaro Serrano Rivas on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Alvaro Serrano Rivas on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Dollar Down, DeFi Up]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/sentora/dollar-down-defi-up-423d644fc034?source=rss-ee1bf7a912ac------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/423d644fc034</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[defi]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[analysis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[macro]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[newsletter]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Alvaro Serrano Rivas]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 16 May 2025 14:36:07 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-05-19T08:40:36.149Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/699/1*dKU7cn94QAyrZWtOjVsaeg.png" /></figure><p>Gm,</p><p>This week’s risk-on tone rests on three pillars. First, Washington-Beijing slashed <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/what-have-china-united-states-agreed-geneva-2025-05-12/">headline</a> tariffs from 145 %/125 % to 30 %/10 % for the next 90 days, trimming supply-chain costs. Stocks and crypto reacted positively to the news on Monday’s open. Second, <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/live-blog/2025-05-13/us-cpi-report-for-april">April CPI</a> landed at 2.3 % headline and 2.8 % core, which is one of the softest prints since 2021. Third, institutional uptake is accelerating: Tether-backed Twenty One Capital <a href="https://www.theblock.co/post/354198/tether-bitcoin-investment-twenty-one-capital">bought</a> 4,812 BTC ($458 m), and Coinbase will <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/coinbase-shares-jump-addition-sp-500-index-2025-05-13/?utm_source=chatgpt.com">enter</a> the S&amp;P 500 on May 19, forcing passive index funds to own the first pure‑play crypto stock.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/585/1*PjJtuh3eEKErVDFSkcUgpw.png" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="https://app.intotheblock.com/">ITB Analytics</a></figcaption></figure><p><strong>Network Fees</strong> — Sum of total fees spent to use a particular blockchain. This tracks the willingness to spend and demand to use Bitcoin or Ether</p><ul><li>Bitcoin fees saw a substantial increases, lagging behind the price appreciation of the past week.</li><li>Ethereum fees followed the same dynamic but amplified, in line with price performance.</li></ul><p><strong>Exchanges Netflows</strong> — The net amount of inflows minus outflows of a specific crypto-asset going in/out of centralized exchanges</p><ul><li>BTC reversed its netflows trend with respect to last week, now showing outflows from exchanges.</li><li>ETH’s exchange outflows paint a similar picture and continue accelerating for the fourth week in a row, fueled by its large price appreciation.</li></ul><h3>Big Picture Moves</h3><p>The 90-day US-China tariff pause lifted the market on Monday’s open, and Tuesday’s CPI print amplified optimism across the board as the <a href="https://www.cmegroup.com/markets/interest-rates/cme-fedwatch-tool.html">odds</a> of rate cuts started to increase. Fed-funds futures now price the first 25 bp cut for the 18 September FOMC and a second before year-end.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*lDOJEdRsP63cQS7U" /><figcaption><strong>Source: </strong><a href="https://www.cmegroup.com/markets/interest-rates/cme-fedwatch-tool.html">CME FedWatch</a> — September Target Rate Probabilities</figcaption></figure><p>The <a href="https://www.tradingview.com/symbols/TVC-DXY/">dollar index</a> has now slipped to 100.9, its weakest level since early March. It is now down 11 % year-to-date and sitting at a two-month low. A weaker dollar historically cheapens offshore USD funding and unlocks risk-asset beta that could lift the equity and crypto markets.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*5fer-sJ17CZshnHb" /><figcaption><strong>Source: </strong><a href="https://www.tradingview.com/symbols/TVC-DXY/">TradingView</a> — DXY (YTD)</figcaption></figure><p>Within crypto, $ETH has seized the spotlight, increasing by 38% in just three sessions after the Pectra upgrade was activated on May 7. This was its larger three-day gain since January 2021 and the second biggest in 8 years.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*Lqgpj9aMnuKX6ATT" /><figcaption><strong>Source: </strong><a href="https://app.intotheblock.com/coin/ETH/deep-dive?group=financials&amp;subgroup=all">ITB Analytics</a> — ETH Global In/Out of the Money addresses</figcaption></figure><h3>More Pathways to Institutional Engagement</h3><p>After the close on May 18, COIN will be <a href="https://www.barrons.com/articles/coinbase-stock-join-sp-500-crypto-016fc576">entering</a> the S&amp;P 500. The announcement sent the price of the stock up 24% and will expose the corporation to billions of combined passive and active buying. This turns the exchange into the first pure-play crypto equity embedded in every benchmark portfolio.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*-eubLosOErBO6Loz" /><figcaption><strong>Source: </strong><a href="https://app.intotheblock.com/insights/markets/stocks/crypto-related">ITB Analytics</a> — ETH still ran the show</figcaption></figure><p>While equity benchmarks embed crypto exposure, global payment networks are wiring crypto back into commerce. Stripe <a href="https://stripe.com/en-es/newsroom/news/sessions-2025">activated</a> stablecoin financial accounts in 101 countries, letting businesses hold, send, and spend Circle’s USDC and Bridge’s USDB alongside ACH and SEPA rails. Merchants in high-inflation or capital-controlled markets will now be able to park working capital in digital dollars and pay suppliers 24/7 without correspondent banks. With Stripe now bypassing legacy correspondent networks it could undercut PayPal’s PYUSD offering.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*c7I6sEkD9FMI9u1W" /><figcaption><strong>Source: </strong><a href="https://app.intotheblock.com/coin/PYUSD/deep-dive?group=financials&amp;subgroup=supply">ITB Analytics</a> — PYUSD Supply (YTD), +127% 365-day change</figcaption></figure><h3>On-Chain Liquidity Shifts</h3><p>After Berachain’s $2.7 b Boyco vaults unlocked on May 6, TVL and stablecoin balances continued on a <a href="https://defillama.com/chain/berachain">downtrend</a>. Meanwhile, the first CDPs were launched on Hyperliquid’s HyperEVM, but they also experienced their first <a href="https://x.com/stablealt/status/1921619672614514702?utm_source=chatgpt.com">de-peg events</a> rather soon as they got minted for cheap rates and instantly sold off for other stables offering better yield opportunities. This is a known <a href="https://www.dlnews.com/articles/defi/why-aave-stablecoin-gho-trades-below-its-intended-dollar-peg/#:~:text=Stablecoins%20are%20meant%20to%20be,brief%20moment%20on%20August%208">issue</a> with CDP-based stables when borrow demand outpaces on-chain use cases, exposing structural weaknesses when there are no direct arbitrage mechanisms to enforce USD parity.</p><p>Meanwhile, Ethereum’s lending sector continues going vertical and demonstrating the power of composability, led by protocols like Aave, Ethena, or Pendle. Aave has broken the <a href="https://x.com/aave/status/1921918275610358211">$40 b TVL</a> barrier, the highest ever for any DeFi protocol, and its native GHO stablecoin now <a href="https://x.com/Token_Logic/status/1922317439066636730">holds</a> $250 m+ in collateralized supply. Ethena’s dollar stack is expanding fast too: USDe’s supply cap on Aave was lifted toward ~$1 b, E-Mode was enabled to 90 % LTV, and the global debt ceiling was removed; sUSDe caps will reset to ~$1.5 b once filled. USDtb — the tokenized-Treasury-backed dollar — has also been onboarded to Aave with a 50 m supply cap. These parameter hikes pull more real-yield collateral into the lending loop, which has also become more attractive with the entry of Pendle PTs as collateral. This week, eUSD and sUSDe PTs <a href="https://x.com/aave/status/1922316418453746023">hit</a> $800 m+ supplied.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*BM_E6rdSjvT-9BkX" /><figcaption><strong>Source: </strong><a href="https://app.intotheblock.com/perspectives/aave_v3_across_blockchains">ITB AAVE v3 Perspectives</a> — Supply Share by Category USD</figcaption></figure><p>Unichain incentives kickstarted Round 3 this week. After one month the program has <a href="https://x.com/gauntlet_xyz/status/1922301479844450631">attracted</a> $672 m in TVL and $6.9 b in cumulative volume on the targeted pools. Another early DeFi protocol, Synthetic, has proposed an all-stock <a href="https://forums.derive.xyz/t/dip-synthetix-acquires-derive/277">deal</a> to acquire the derivatives exchange Derive, swapping 27 DRV for 1 SNX (≈ US $27 m value) and issuing up to 29.3 m new SNX. The transaction would pull in Derive’s options-and-perps tech, treasury (~US $5 m), and 70 % on-chain options market share, while DRV holders face a 3-month lock and 9-month linear vest on the new SNX.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=423d644fc034" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/sentora/dollar-down-defi-up-423d644fc034">Dollar Down, DeFi Up</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/sentora">Sentora</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Bitcoin Surge, Gold at $20T: Risk-On or Safe Haven Shift?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/sentora/bitcoin-surge-gold-at-20t-risk-on-or-safe-haven-shift-7af793c69f97?source=rss-ee1bf7a912ac------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/7af793c69f97</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[vitalik-buterin]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[gold]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bitcoin]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ethereum]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[crypto]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Alvaro Serrano Rivas]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 25 Apr 2025 15:06:02 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-04-25T15:06:02.743Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*FM6JlRFgFDgx2KwMuSsVqg.png" /></figure><p>Gm,</p><p>The Bitcoin rally started during the weekend and continued during the week while traditional markets showed mixed reactions to tariff news, with gold surging above $20T market cap as a preferred safe haven asset. Major indices on equities demonstrated resilience, recovering partially amid possible optimism for de-escalation. Uncertainty persists as market participants weigh potential trade war scenarios and inflationary pressures against technical indicators. Time will tell if the bottom is in or if this is just a relief rally.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/576/0*F20q-PmZDIsXAOpu" /><figcaption><a href="https://app.intotheblock.com/">ITB analytics</a></figcaption></figure><p><strong>Network Fees</strong> — Sum of total fees spent to use a particular blockchain. This tracks the willingness to spend and demand to use Bitcoin or Ether</p><ul><li>Bitcoin fees have surged back up along with the positive price action in the last week.</li><li>Ethereum fees have experienced a similar dynamic, although more modest, with a 20% increase versus BTC’s 40% rise.</li></ul><p><strong>Exchanges Netflows</strong> — The net amount of inflows minus outflows of a specific crypto-asset going in/out of centralized exchanges</p><ul><li>Bitcoin’s outflows trend continues but has slowed down, from nearly $1.3B going out of exchanges last week to this week’s more modest 350M.</li><li>ETH’s exchange outflows were nearly flat at $36M last week, and that amount increased by 90M this week as part of the trend continuation.</li></ul><h3>Bitcoin ETF Inflows Signal Institutional Re-engagement</h3><p>US spot Bitcoin ETFs recorded $380 million in net inflows on April 21, the highest single-day total since January 30, coinciding with BTC surpassing $90,000. One day later, that amount more than doubled to a total of $912 million.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*dRGx5hFl8Cq2y-dSGgX2qw.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://www.theblock.co/data/crypto-markets/bitcoin-etf/spot-bitcoin-etf-flows">The Block Spot Bitcoin ETF Flows</a></figcaption></figure><p>BlackRock’s IBIT led with $4.2 billion in trading volume on April 22, while Fidelity’s FBTC also saw substantial activity as major institutions demonstrated renewed conviction. The positive Coinbase Premium Index further indicates US institutional buyers’ willingness to pay higher prices on regulated platforms, prioritizing compliance over cost efficiency.</p><h3>SOL Institutional Wave: ETFs and Treasury Shifts</h3><p>Solana’s institutional momentum accelerates as Canadian regulators greenlit four Solana staking ETFs and GSR anchored a $100M private placement into Upexi (NASDAQ: UPXI) to fund a Solana-based treasury strategy.</p><p>The ETFs from 3iQ, Purpose, Evolve, and CI Financial <a href="https://www.coindesk.com/markets/2025/04/17/solana-surges-4-5-as-canada-launches-first-spot-etfs">launched</a> April 16 on the Toronto Stock Exchange, delivering 2–3.5% staking yields on top of SOL’s underlying price performance. This structure allows delegation of up to 50% of assets to staking partners, creating the first regulated crypto vehicle offering native on-chain yield generation.</p><p>Meanwhile, GSR’s strategic <a href="https://www.gsr.io/reports/gsr-leads-100m-private-placement-into-nasdaq-listed-upexi-inc-to-back-solana-based-treasury-strategy/#:~:text=products,accumulation%20and%20staking%20of%20Solana">backing</a> of Upexi represents one of the largest on-chain treasury allocations by a NASDAQ-listed entity, with the company pivoting its balance sheet toward SOL accumulation and validation activities. Market response was immediate and significant, with Upexi shares surging approximately 700% following the announcement.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*QbqTUAIf-dPMYW3-" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="https://www.tradingview.com/symbols/NASDAQ-UPXI/#:~:text=The%20current%20price%20of%20UPXI,more%20closely%20on%20the%20chart.">TradingView — Upexi, Inc. stock price performance</a></figcaption></figure><h3>ETH Technical Crossroads: Vitalik’s EVM-to-RISC-V Proposal</h3><p>Vitalik’s most recent <a href="https://ethereum-magicians.org/t/long-term-l1-execution-layer-proposal-replace-the-evm-with-risc-v/23617?utm_source=chatgpt.com">post</a> on Ethereum Magicians proposed replacing Ethereum’s Virtual Machine (EVM) with a RISC-V architecture, targeting 50–100x efficiency gains for zero-knowledge (ZK) proofs. Ethereum’s execution layer is now the main L1 bottleneck. ZK-rollup provers burn half their cycles on block execution, and Ethereum’s founder proposal suggests that a RISC-V engine plus Poseidon hashing could cut prover costs by several orders of magnitude and slash code complexity.</p><p>This idea would transform how smart contracts execute while maintaining backward compatibility through dual VMs or interpreter mechanisms. If implemented, the change would significantly enhance layer-1 execution efficiency. Technical improvements include replacing standard operations with RISC-V syscalls and adopting optimizations like Poseidon hash (2 million hashes/sec vs. keccak’s 15,000) and removing bloom filters (<a href="https://ethereum-magicians.org/t/eip-7668-remove-bloom-filters/19447">EIP-7668</a>).</p><h3>Synthetix’s Path to sUSD Repeg: 420 Pool Rebalancing</h3><p>After a prolonged period trading under the $1 intended peg, a <a href="https://mirror.xyz/kain.eth/-bXlXUx52ckKaev5ru2ygSm5ULXd6C5ZC5T--qTz-2k">plan</a> was finally proposed to reverse the situation. It was Kain Warwick himself, founder of Synthetix, that outlined a strategic framework to restore sUSD’s dollar peg.</p><p>sUSD slipped from $0.98 in early March to $0.73 on 18 Apr, even touching $0.60 after Curve liquidity drained and 420-Pool stakers stopped buying back debt. The plan addresses fundamental challenges that emerged after the “420 Pool Debt Jubilee” averted a liquidation crisis but undermined peg stability by removing the primary arbitrage mechanism. Historical debt inflation factors — including oracle front-running ($10M+), price manipulation attacks ($2–5M), and wrapper imbalances ($20M+) — contributed to systemic misalignment that required intervention.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*1k-SfApFUf7noPVE" /><figcaption>Source: IntoTheBlock <a href="https://defirisk.intotheblock.com/metrics/ethereum/curve/0xa5407eae9ba41422680e2e00537571bcc53efbfd">sUSD peg — Curve Risk Radar</a></figcaption></figure><p>Kain’s approach implements dual incentive structures: positive rewards through SNX emissions for sUSD deposits and stable-only pools, alongside negative reinforcement via mandatory debt-to-deposit ratios (5–10%) that scale with peg deviation. The strategy would require relatively modest buying pressure, which Kain estimates around $5M to reestablish equilibrium while laying groundwork for Perps V4 on Ethereum mainnet and snaxChain deployment.</p><h3>Key Takeaways of the Week</h3><ul><li><strong>Bitcoin ETF Inflows Signal Institutional Re-engagement</strong>: Record $380M single-day inflow on April 21 (highest since January) more than doubled to $912M the following day, with BlackRock’s IBIT leading at $4.2B trading volume.</li><li><strong>Solana’s Institutional Momentum Accelerates</strong>: Four Canadian staking ETFs launched with 2–3.5% yields while GSR anchored $100M into Upexi for SOL treasury strategy, triggering 700% stock price surge.</li><li><strong>Ethereum’s Core Architecture Faces Potential Overhaul</strong>: Vitalik proposed replacing EVM with RISC-V targeting 50–100x ZK-proof efficiency gains, potentially enhancing L1 execution through syscall optimizations and Poseidon hashing.</li><li><strong>Synthetix Addresses sUSD Depeg</strong>: Kain Warwick outlined dual incentive plan to restore peg from $0.60–0.73 range through SNX emissions rewards and mandatory debt-to-deposit ratios, requiring estimated $5M buying pressure.</li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=7af793c69f97" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/sentora/bitcoin-surge-gold-at-20t-risk-on-or-safe-haven-shift-7af793c69f97">Bitcoin Surge, Gold at $20T: Risk-On or Safe Haven Shift?</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/sentora">Sentora</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Institutional Structural Shifts]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/sentora/institutional-structural-shifts-937d0c28b9cd?source=rss-ee1bf7a912ac------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/937d0c28b9cd</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[analytics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[institutions]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[defi]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[berachain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[crypto]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Alvaro Serrano Rivas]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 28 Mar 2025 14:20:26 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-03-28T14:20:26.163Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*OoYEgTLYJe2PKIpCUlOjXA.png" /></figure><p>As Q1 2025 draws to a close, ITB analytics reveal an emerging structural divergence between institutional positioning and retail sentiment metrics. USDtb’s acceleration to the $1B supply milestone coincides with funding rates registering a statistically significant deviation below risk-free benchmarks across major derivatives venues. This funding anomaly, coupled with rapid stablecoin adoption, has historically been associated with capital redeployment from stablecoin positions into higher-beta market segments.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/587/1*V0UAgpTBlp3aQ1scdpkWmQ.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://app.intotheblock.com/">ITB Analytics</a></figcaption></figure><p><strong>Network Fees</strong> — Sum of total fees spent to use a particular blockchain. This tracks the willingness to spend and demand to use Bitcoin or Ether</p><ul><li>Bitcoin fees rose by over 76%, putting an end to the ongoing decline of the past few weeks</li><li>Ethereum fees didn’t manage to rise up as Bitcoin did and are slightly down on the weekly</li></ul><p><strong>Exchanges Netflows</strong> — The net amount of inflows minus outflows of a specific crypto-asset going in/out of centralized exchanges</p><ul><li>Bitcoin netflows, combined with increasing activity on-chain suggest that capital is leaving exchanges and moving on-chain</li><li>Ethereum netflows are also leaving exchanges, but on a smaller scale as $BTC</li></ul><h3>Berachain POL Rewards Go Live</h3><p>Berachain officially <a href="https://blog.berachain.com/blog/berachain-governance-phase-1-first-whitelisted-reward-vaults-approved">expanded</a> its Proof of Liquidity (PoL) rewards beyond BEX (its native DEX) to include third-party applications — a significant milestone for the chain’s incentive structure and ecosystem protocols. PoL consensus is designed to align the incentives between validators, applications, and users by directing $BGT token rewards to liquidity providers across the ecosystem. This differentiates it from traditional PoS systems by directly incentivizing application-layer activity.</p><ul><li>$<strong>BERA</strong> (gas/staking token): Determines validator selection probability among validators</li><li>$<strong>BGT</strong> (soulbound governance token): Directs emissions to application reward vaults</li></ul><p>The system creates a self-reinforcing cycle where validators must direct $BGT emissions (approximately 54.52M annually) to whitelisted <a href="https://docs.berachain.com/learn/pol/rewardvaults">reward vaults</a> across multiple DEXs — now including BEX, Kodiak, and Beradrome — in exchange for protocol incentives.</p><ul><li><strong>Validators</strong>: Direct $BGT to reward vaults in exchange for protocol bribes</li><li><strong>Protocols</strong>: Compete for liquidity by offering incentives per $BGT directed</li><li><strong>Liquidity Providers</strong>: Earn $BGT by providing pool liquidity</li><li><strong>$BGT Holders</strong>: Face a binary decision matrix between delegating to validators (yield optimization strategy) or redeeming for $BERA at a 1:1 ratio (extractive strategy)</li></ul><p>Thus, capital efficiency depends on the differential between delegation yields and immediate redemption value, with the irreversible redemption mechanism establishing a perpetual deflationary sink in the system — as $BGT can be redeemed (or burned) 1:1 for $BERA but $BERA cannot be converted back to $BGT.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1000/0*gTfmzWQSt8FKSvQO" /><figcaption><a href="https://docs.berachain.com/learn/pol/participants">Berachain Proof-of-Liquidity Participants</a></figcaption></figure><p>With a current TVL of $3B+, PoL rewards going live will increase competitiveness between protocols as they vie for liquidity. The first wave is focused on DEX liquidity, prioritizing key trading pairs such as BERA, BGT, HONEY, and major stablecoins. For users, they can earn BGT rewards by providing liquidity to approved pools and staking their LP tokens in corresponding reward vaults.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1000/0*0woXKkZzCea4vWs9" /><figcaption><a href="https://docs.berachain.com/learn/what-is-proof-of-liquidity">Berachain Proof of Liquidity</a></figcaption></figure><p>As protocols compete for $BGT emissions through validator bribes, additional reward vaults are expected to be approved weekly following this initial expansion, with plans to extend beyond DEXs to other application categories.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/680/0*ZkFO78IlIBFjkCcy" /><figcaption><a href="https://docs.berachain.com/learn/pol/incentives">Berachain Incentive Marketplace</a></figcaption></figure><p>This creates significant short-term yield opportunities while establishing longer-term incentive alignment with network growth, as Berachain’s economic model creates three deflationary sinks:</p><ul><li>$BERA staking requirements for block production</li><li>$BGT delegation for yield optimization</li><li>Irreversible BGT-to-BERA redemption</li></ul><h3>Buybacks: Strategic Allocation or Value Dilution?</h3><p>dYdX joined the buyback wave this week, <a href="https://www.dydx.xyz/blog/dydx-buyback-program">announcing</a> an allocation of 25% of net protocol revenue to monthly $DYDX purchases, staking the tokens to boost network security. This follows similar moves by <a href="https://governance.aave.com/t/arfc-aavenomics-implementation-part-one/21248">AAVE</a> ($1M weekly for six months from its $100M treasury) and Hyperliquid’s aggressive daily $1.5–2.5M <a href="https://assistancefund.top/">repurchases</a> (removing ~1.6% of circulating supply monthly).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/595/0*sjy9Zu8ZofVGTqdk" /><figcaption><a href="https://x.com/AntonioMJuliano/status/1904185430901170550">Antonio Juliano, Founder of dYdX on X</a></figcaption></figure><p>This trend spotlights a fundamental capital allocation dilemma that most protocols face at different stages of their lifecycle, with strategic considerations such as:</p><ul><li><strong>Value distribution timing</strong> (reinvestment in protocol growth vs. sharing returns with token holders)</li><li><strong>Execution efficiency </strong>(avoiding the “treasury trap” of idle repurchased tokens without defined utilization strategies)</li><li><strong>Market impact assessment</strong> (short-term price support vs. sustainable value creation)</li></ul><p>Data indicates post-announcement positive sentiment and price appreciation (+10% for $DYDX), but sustainability remains questionable. With programmatic buybacks creating potential misalignment between protocol cash flows and market conditions, properly structured mechanisms must address two critical dimensions:</p><ul><li><strong>Strategic decision</strong>: Whether accumulated value should flow to stakeholders</li><li><strong>Tactical execution</strong>: How to optimize distribution methodology without creating artificial supply constraints</li></ul><p>As the sector matures, protocols demonstrating sophisticated capital allocation strategies aligned with their growth stage will likely outperform those applying standardized approaches without consideration for their unique market positioning.</p><h3>USDtb Reaches $1B Milestone</h3><p>USDtb has <a href="https://x.com/ethena_labs/status/1904247837141152061">officially</a> crossed the $1 billion supply threshold, positioning as the dominant holder of BlackRock’s BUIDL. USDtb now controls over 70% of BUIDL’s supply , accounting for more than 95% of the token’s growth over the past three weeks. The rising interest in crypto-backed stablecoins with TradFi integrations coincides with a <a href="https://x.com/gdog97_/status/1904151324222189876">pattern</a> that has only occurred twice in the past two years: funding rates averaging below risk-free rates for more than two consecutive weeks.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/596/0*gvZHJzNLnY-0duRd" /><figcaption><a href="https://x.com/gdog97_/status/1904151324222189876">Guy Young, founder of Ethena, on X</a></figcaption></figure><p>USDtb’s supply growth and rise in concentration among a few but well-capitalized holders confirms a trend we have been observing and recently covered in our Webinar about the institutional adoption of DeFi. This trend accelerates on assets closer to large TradFi institutions, as exemplified by USDtb’s increase in holders with $10M in the last month. As institutional capital deepens its crypto exposure through regulated vehicles, we expect this concentration dynamic to intensify further through H1 2025.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/822/0*mePuuvboZXEARLVA" /><figcaption><a href="https://app.intotheblock.com/coin/USDTB/deep-dive?group=ownership&amp;subgroup=all">ITB Analytics USDtb</a></figcaption></figure><p>Defined by a technical divergence between institutional positioning and retail sentiment, on-chain metrics indicate substantial stablecoin adoption precisely as funding rates establish historically predictive configurations. Approaching Q2, we highlight three interconnected trends reshaping market dynamics: self-sustaining protocol economics, strategic buybacks and other value accrual decisions, as well as the transition towards more mature capital allocation frameworks accounting for derivatives positioning and stablecoin velocity patterns as leading indicators for the next market phase.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=937d0c28b9cd" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/sentora/institutional-structural-shifts-937d0c28b9cd">Institutional Structural Shifts</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/sentora">Sentora</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[A Week of Extremes: Crypto’s Dual Pressure Points]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/sentora/a-week-of-extremes-cryptos-dual-pressure-points-98c361087fca?source=rss-ee1bf7a912ac------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/98c361087fca</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[crypto]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bitcoin]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bybit]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Alvaro Serrano Rivas]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 28 Feb 2025 12:04:38 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-02-28T12:04:38.115Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*goa6w8FGbwLKCo_uvAQZKg.png" /></figure><p>Gm,</p><p>This week delivered stark reminders of crypto’s vulnerability to both security and macroeconomic pressures. Bybit suffered a $1.5 billion ETH heist on Friday — the largest theft since Ronin in 2022. Tuesday followed with $1.59 billion in liquidations and $BTC tested $83k on Wednesday. NVIDIA’s earnings provided temporary stability, yet economic uncertainty persists, and Trump’s March 4th tariff speech looms as a key event. By Friday, the $80k level was broken on $BTC as $ETH declined by more than 20% on the weekly chart.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/588/1*18NPOp6og2F_HIfACm312w.png" /></figure><p><strong>Network Fees</strong> — Sum of total fees spent to use a particular blockchain. This tracks the willingness to spend and demand to use Bitcoin or Ether</p><ul><li>Bitcoin fees increased significantly despite the price selloff</li><li>Ethereum fees declined by 10% — a complete different reaction to Bitcoin</li></ul><p><strong>Exchanges Netflows</strong> — The net amount of inflows minus outflows of a specific crypto-asset going in/out of centralized exchanges</p><ul><li>Both BTC and ETH recorded positive netflows on the week following Bybit’s $1.5B ETH theft</li></ul><h3>CEX Resilience Under Attack</h3><p>Last Friday <a href="https://x.com/benbybit/status/1892963530422505586">Bybit’s $1.5B ETH heist</a> caught the industry by surprise. Just as FTX began repaying its creditors, the CEX suffered the <a href="https://defillama.com/hacks">largest loss to an exploit</a> since the Ronin hack in 2022. A multi-signature compromise during a routine transfer resulted in 401,347 ETH, 90,376 stETH, 15,000 cmETH, and 8,000 mETH being laundered by North Korea’s state-sponsored Lazarus Group. Without pausing withdrawals at any time and with the help of a bridge loan from Binance and Bitget, Bybit managed to continue operations, and by Monday the full recovery of ETH reserves was <a href="https://x.com/benbybit/status/1893865556840775758">announced</a> along with an <a href="https://x.com/benbybit/status/1893952056962273746">updated Proof of Reserves</a>. This hack was caused by a <a href="https://x.com/benbybit/status/1894768736084885929">compromise</a> affecting Gnosis SAFE’s servers, where the attackers swapped Gnosis’ UI code with malicious JavaScript code that directly targeted Bybit’s cold wallet. An <a href="https://x.com/safe/status/1894768522720350673">official post-mortem</a> was published by SAFE on the topic, and Bybit has also announced a bounty program.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/585/1*6qEbVLblb_TIGjtBIQX89g.png" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="https://x.com/benbybit/status/1894397098323579333">Bybit CEO Ben Zhou on X</a></figcaption></figure><h3>USDe’s Stress-Test Response</h3><p>In the wake of what’s being labeled as the largest crypto theft in history, all eyes turned at Ethena. In addition to the claims of “full backing” during the incident, Ethena Labs provided a more <a href="https://mirror.xyz/0xF99d0E4E3435cc9C9868D1C6274DfaB3e2721341/do-wd95fuiW1r_HE0UuT_PYmTCcewxtW5b-PdK_Hgz8">comprehensive analysis</a> explaining how USDe weathered the storm. This incident served as another stress test to validate Ethena’s architecture and risk management systems.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/873/1*vw4t99DdI9Jc8NNRNs6jEw.png" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="https://defirisk.intotheblock.com/metrics/ethereum/ethena">IntoTheBlock Ethena Risk Radar</a></figcaption></figure><ul><li><strong>Redemption Volume</strong>: Over $120 million processed within hours of the hack announcement</li><li><strong>Peg Stability</strong>: USDe briefly dipped to a 50bps discount on Curve pools before recovering within minutes</li><li><strong>Exposure Management</strong>: $30 million in unrealized profits on Bybit positions realized within 90 minutes</li><li><strong>Liquidity Buffer</strong>: Increased from $30 million to $250 million during the incident</li></ul><p>The critical safeguard was Ethena’s off-exchange settlement. The use of institutional-grade custody solutions proved instrumental during the crisis, as no USDe-backing assets were directly held on Bybit and delegation/undelegation operations could be performed in seconds without delays. As soon as the hack was confirmed, Ethena immediately undelegated assets from Bybit and redistributed them to other venues, reducing its Bybit-hedged exposure from 21% ($1.2 billion) to 15% ($800 million) within hours.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/713/1*ewfSPgW-OVCq4CBJLdyOjQ.png" /><figcaption><strong>Source: </strong><a href="https://mirror.xyz/0xF99d0E4E3435cc9C9868D1C6274DfaB3e2721341/do-wd95fuiW1r_HE0UuT_PYmTCcewxtW5b-PdK_Hgz8">Ethena and Exchange Risk: Bybit Case Study</a></figcaption></figure><h3>A Turning Tide for DeFi</h3><p>DeFi’s resilience on-chain is nothing new. However, there are also reasons to be even more optimistic as we are witnessing an inflection point in the US. With the new administration, regulatory frameworks are starting to acknowledge the benefits of decentralization and the SEC’s evolving posture marks a transition from antagonistic enforcement to nuanced engagement:</p><ul><li><strong>Uniswap’s Vindication</strong>: The <a href="https://www.coindesk.com/policy/2025/02/25/sec-drops-investigation-into-uniswap-will-not-file-enforcement-action">withdrawal of allegations</a> against DeFi’s foundational exchange protocol signals recognition that decentralized mechanisms demand distinct regulatory frameworks.</li><li><strong>Robinhood’s Resolution</strong>: The <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2025/02/24/robinhood-says-sec-dismissed-crypto-unit-investigation-in-latest-sign-of-easier-regulation-for-industry.html">dismissed investigation</a> acknowledges that retail access to digital assets serves as a bridge between traditional and emergent financial systems</li><li><strong>Coinbase’s Reconciliation</strong>: The <a href="https://www.ark-invest.com/newsletters/issue-452">lawsuit dismissal</a> suggests a maturing understanding that exchanges functioning as technological infrastructure cannot be confined within securities paradigms designed for previous eras</li><li><strong>Gemini’s Advancement: </strong>After 699 days of investigation and 277 days following a Wells Notice, the <a href="https://x.com/cameron/status/1894876433979154893?s=43">SEC closed its inquiry into Gemini</a> without pursuing enforcement action. This outcome adds to the growing list of withdrawn cases and represents another step forward in the evolving regulatory landscape</li></ul><p>While regulatory boundaries reconfigure, decentralized protocols demonstrate unprecedented vitality. To the latest announcements of Lido v3, Unichain, and Uniswap v4, this week we add <a href="https://x.com/aave/status/1894064656810926572">AAVE’s v3.3 upgrade</a>, which introduces Umbrella: a replacement for AAVE’s current Safety Module to use staked aTokens to absorb bad debt without governance intervention. The upgrade introduces an objective definition of bad debt: zero collateral with remaining obligations. When this threshold is crossed, Umbrella automatically slashes staked aTokens, burning them to directly absorb deficits without governance delays.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/592/1*_G1qZzA4Ja1meUAIm4dREA.png" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=98c361087fca" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/sentora/a-week-of-extremes-cryptos-dual-pressure-points-98c361087fca">A Week of Extremes: Crypto’s Dual Pressure Points</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/sentora">Sentora</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[DeepSeek & Powell’s Wait-and-See]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/sentora/deepseek-powells-wait-and-see-9975788fca52?source=rss-ee1bf7a912ac------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/9975788fca52</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[deepseek]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[fomc]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ethereum]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[crypto]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Alvaro Serrano Rivas]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 31 Jan 2025 13:34:15 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-01-31T13:34:15.078Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Despite the initial news coming out on Inauguration Day, it took the market one week to fully digest the implications of DeepSeek’s breakthroughs in AI. With a significant downside repricing of NVIDIA and the Nasdaq before Monday’s market open, it has been an eventful week where we also saw FOMC resulting in unchanged rates, which helped to regain some optimism.</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*r43c4LReJlZuo36R7DOaXQ.png" /></figure><p><em>Based on IntoTheBlock’s weekly newsletter. If you enjoy it, and would like to receive it every Friday make sure to </em><a href="https://share.hsforms.com/1BIGbqGDERICP-iS0RGI1eg39rm8?utm_campaign=ITB+Newsletter&amp;utm_source=hs_email&amp;utm_medium=email&amp;_hsenc=p2ANqtz-_njDennpwhKmneqVzl5v4ods3UDdS5fFGgacPAtHduWtPaCK1toi5beRuoP2w8seFW6m0g"><em>sign up here</em></a><em>!</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/528/1*CtfhcbeP3_VXbQJlCZBtDQ.png" /><figcaption>As per 1/31/2025</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Network Fees</strong> — Sum of total fees spent to use a particular blockchain. This tracks the willingness to spend and demand to use Bitcoin or Ether</p><ul><li>Bitcoin fees declined by 35% as onchain activity saw a downturn after the market’s tumble at the start of the week</li><li>Ethereum fees followed a similar trajectory declining by almost 65%</li></ul><p><strong>Exchanges Netflows</strong> — The net amount of inflows minus outflows of a specific crypto-asset going in/out of centralized exchanges</p><ul><li>BTC recorded almost $450M in net outflows from exchanges, continuing to show strong demand for holding the asset onchain</li><li>ETH recorded almost $528M in net inflows, continuing the positive trajectory despite the price barely reacting to these moves</li></ul><h3>The DeepSeek Effect</h3><p>Amid fears of “The Great Deflation”, we experienced firsthand what “intelligence being on sale” means — great for consumers, but not that good news for producers.</p><p>The release of <a href="https://github.com/deepseek-ai/DeepSeek-R1/blob/main/DeepSeek_R1.pdf">DeepSeek’s R1 reasoning model</a> triggered both panic and a shift in market valuations, impacting both the NASDAQ and crypto markets. Traditional markets experienced significant sell pressure on Monday, particularly affecting the MAG7 stocks as Chinese large-cap stocks started moving in the opposite direction.</p><p>Operating with 32B active parameters (compared to GPT-4’s estimated 220B), DeepSeek not only achieved superior performance on leading benchmarks, but it also did so at 1/20th of competitor costs (although these claims come with some <a href="https://x.com/GavinSBaker/status/1883891311473782995">nuances</a>). Noteworthy is the fact that the model was made available fully open source, including distillations and training methodology. This makes it possible to run the model completely <a href="https://x.com/carrigmat/status/1884244369907278106">locally</a> and circumvent any possible concerns one may have about data privacy.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/974/1*QnddZl0EOyo2lLwovX5NDQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="https://github.com/deepseek-ai/DeepSeek-R1/blob/main/DeepSeek_R1.pdf">DeepSeek R1 Release Paper</a></figcaption></figure><p>DeepSeek achieved these results by employing strategies like a mixture-of-experts architecture and optimizing resource use. This put investments such as the $500B Stargate project or Meta’s $60B private investment in the spotlight, potentially requiring a strategic recalibration.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/512/1*--12q39ReBIOSXM6RSXskA.png" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="https://x.com/adamdangelo/status/1883578900846096762">Adam D’Angelo — CEO of Quora on X</a></figcaption></figure><p>For context, DeepSeek’s previous model, DeepSeek v3, was reported to have been trained for approximately $5.6 million (a 10x cost reduction when compared to GPT-4o or Claude 3.5 Sonnet), and DeepSeek-R1’s <a href="https://api-docs.deepseek.com/quick_start/pricing">API costs</a> are dramatically lower than those of comparable models. It charges $0.14 per million input tokens for cache hits, making it 98% cheaper than OpenAI’s o1 model, which costs $60 per million tokens. The output cost for DeepSeek-R1 is $2.19 per million output tokens, compared to OpenAI’s $60 per million output tokens.</p><h3>FOMC: Threading the Needle</h3><p>While the immediate market reaction on Monday emphasized downside risk, price action remained uncertain until the FOMC decision on Wednesday. The Federal Reserve’s first meeting of 2025 and with the Trump Administration in place arrived at a critical juncture, following 100 basis points of cuts since September 2024 that helped fuel Bitcoin’s 80% rally from $60,000 to $109,000.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*-NsRDUMMAv1tz63uVShLlA.png" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="https://www.tradingview.com/chart/">Tradingview — BTCUSD</a></figcaption></figure><p>Powell headed into the meeting with Treasury yields reaching 4.79%, a level not seen since October 2023, and with CPI at 3.2%, significantly above the Federal Reserve’s target. But with the labor markets showing resilience after December’s impressive addition of 256,000 jobs and a decrease in the unemployment rate to 4.1%, suggesting that the economy may be ready to keep up with higher rates for longer.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*2Yxf4Xp050aLOQxE7Wd8Wg.png" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="https://www.tradingview.com/chart/">Tradingview — US 10 YEAR Government Bonds Yield</a></figcaption></figure><p>Even though Polymarket’s data suggested an overwhelming 98% probability that rates would remain unchanged at the upcoming meeting, the market’s slow sideways crawl at the beginning of the week suggested heightened sensitivity to the Fed’s forward guidance.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/883/1*degiUrjUcuaYqmDLQTYfNg.png" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="https://polymarket.com/event/fed-interest-rates-january-2025?tid=1738227178497">Polymarket — FED Decision in January</a></figcaption></figure><p>Finally, as expected, the Federal Reserve decided to keep interest rates unchanged, as was widely anticipated. With Jerome Powell suggesting that they aren’t in a rush to cut rates further until more progress is seen in inflation and jobs data, we saw a slight relief with $BTC moving from $102,000 to $105,000 amidst this wait-and-see environment.</p><h3>Onchain Pulse</h3><p>Even though panic kicked in at the beginning of the week, $BTC (still maintaining a <a href="https://app.intotheblock.com/insights/markets/indices/western">30-day correlation above 0.92 to the S&amp;P 500</a>) managed to hold above the $100k key psychological level and testing the $105k mark. The initial fear helped to calm down the waters and reduce the overall “greed” levels, especially for altcoins. To put things into perspective, <a href="https://app.intotheblock.com/coin/BTC">97% of $BTC holders are in the money at these levels</a> despite some outflows to exchanges at the beginning of the week, most likely for risk management of shorter term positions.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*In2EHxA_EFUvLSa_s7xGyA.png" /><figcaption>Source: ITB — <a href="https://app.intotheblock.com/coin/BTC/deep-dive?group=all&amp;chart=all">BTC Global In/Out of the Money</a></figcaption></figure><p>$ETH remains largely uncorrelated to $BTC, showing a <a href="https://app.intotheblock.com/coin/ETH">30-day price correlation of -0.06</a>, and with an <a href="https://app.intotheblock.com/coin/ETH/deep-dive?group=network&amp;subgroup=avgTimeTokenIsHeld">average holding time of 2.4 years</a> we are yet to see new buyers stepping in. The advent of L2s and new L1s, each with their own tokens, is certainly not helping and further complicating market dynamics by fragmenting both liquidity and attention. With so many up-and-coming narratives and still decoupled from $BTC, the opportunity cost for $ETH remains too high, largely unattractive to short-term traders despite the conviction of longer-term believers.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*mtP5BKOTMSYFCTj-CUFdEw.png" /><figcaption>Source: ITB — <a href="https://app.intotheblock.com/coin/ETH/deep-dive?group=ownership&amp;subgroup=timeHeld">ETH Addresses by Time Held</a></figcaption></figure><p><strong>The bottom line: intelligence on sale, money still expensive.</strong></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9975788fca52" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/sentora/deepseek-powells-wait-and-see-9975788fca52">DeepSeek &amp; Powell’s Wait-and-See</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/sentora">Sentora</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[DeFi Interest Rates Derivatives: Swaps VS Yield Stripping]]></title>
            <link>https://blog.ipor.io/defi-interest-rates-derivatives-swaps-vs-yield-stripping-243ddebd9232?source=rss-ee1bf7a912ac------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/243ddebd9232</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[defi]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[derivatives]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[pendle-finance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[education]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[interest-rates]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Alvaro Serrano Rivas]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 26 Sep 2023 08:10:20 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-09-26T08:10:20.331Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Why are interest rate derivatives essential to any healthy financial market and is there a “best” approach to offering them onchain?</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*rBDNfjG-uiW1JUHuMlrj5A.jpeg" /></figure><p><strong><em>Key takeaways:</em></strong></p><ul><li><em>Interest derivatives are becoming more popular in DeFi due to increased demand for risk management.</em></li><li><em>In DeFi, there are mainly two different approaches to interest derivatives — vanilla interest rate swaps and yield stripping.</em></li><li><em>Interest rate swaps are the most common type of derivative in TradFi, reference a benchmark rate, and offer highly capital-efficient hedging with risk limited to interest rate fluctuations only.</em></li><li><em>Yield stripping is a more DeFi-native approach enabled by composability. Instead of referencing a benchmark, the actual interest-bearing assets are used to price the instrument.</em></li><li><em>Yield stripping is a mechanism built on the premise that there is an inversely correlated relationship between yield. A premise that market data does not support.</em></li><li><em>Yield-stripping AMMs are very attractive to speculators who manage to find mispricing in the market. Although less capital efficient, they are highly composable, making it possible to trade yield for long-tail assets that are difficult to price in a swap setting.</em></li><li><em>Both approaches to DeFi interest rate derivatives have their advantages and disadvantages depending on the case at hand. It is a mistake to think that one design will replace the other.</em></li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/1*9hCXo_yJkxoh2U2mvQ71Zw.png" /></figure><p>Enduring long bear markets helps us to realize how important interest rates are for any given economy. Since the FED pivot in late 2021, <a href="https://blog.ipor.io/high-interest-rates-the-arbitrage-between-defi-and-tradfi-rates-b394424a56cd">DeFi and TradFi rates have inverted</a>, with US T-Bills offering higher returns than DeFi money markets. Under these conditions, institutions and individuals are less likely to take on risk.</p><blockquote>When interest rates are high, impatience is expensive, and vice versa.</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/850/0*G-RCXM_WGT6F_0Ul" /></figure><p>As shown by the increasing number of initiatives attempting to <a href="https://blog.ipor.io/ipor-and-flux-finance-integrate-to-enable-a-tradfi-defi-yield-portal-5a0b8118cadf">bring TradFi yield on-chain</a>, we are starting to see signs of maturity and demand for better risk management practices. In this context, interest rate derivatives (IRD) are becoming more popular in DeFi.</p><p>But what are interest rate derivatives, and why are they such a big deal?</p><h3>Understanding Interest Rate Derivatives</h3><p>An interest rate derivative is an instrument whose value is based on an underlying interest rate or interest-bearing asset. This underlying rate can be fixed (<a href="https://www.notional.finance/">Notional</a> and <a href="https://term.finance/">Term Finance</a>), floating (<a href="https://aave.com/">Aave</a> or <a href="https://compound.finance/">Compound</a>), or a spread between the two interest rates paid/earned by borrowers/lenders (<a href="https://morpho.org/">Morpho</a>).</p><p>TradFi&#39;s most common interest rate derivatives are interest rate swaps (IRS), interest rate futures, interest rate options, and forward rate agreements (FRAs). In DeFi, however, due to the lack of a yield curve, two different types of derivatives stand out. These instruments are <strong>vanilla interest rate swaps</strong> (<a href="https://ipor.io/">IPOR</a>, <a href="https://www.voltz.xyz/">Voltz</a>), and <strong>yield stripping protocols</strong> (<a href="https://www.pendle.finance/">Pendle</a>, <a href="https://www.spectra.finance/">Spectra</a>, <a href="https://sense.finance/">Sense Finance</a>, <a href="https://www.element.fi/">Element</a>). While both can be used to hedge against interest rate risk, speculate on interest rate movements, or arbitrage, both implementations have some notable differences.</p><h3>Interest Rate Swaps</h3><p>First, consider how vanilla interest rate swaps work in traditional finance. This will help to understand why they are a more efficient and flexible way to manage interest rate risk than other methods, such as forward contracts or options.</p><p>Investment and commercial banks with strong credit ratings are swap market makers, offering fixed and floating rate cash flows to counterparties, which are often corporations, banks, or an investor (bank client) on one side and an investment or commercial bank on the other. They are one of the most traded types of over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives, reaching a <a href="https://www.isda.org/a/L6xgE/Key-Trends-in-the-Size-and-Composition-of-OTC-Derivatives-Markets-in-the-First-Half-of-2022.pdf">market size of $414.2T at mid-year 2022</a> and accounting for <a href="https://www.isda.org/a/L6xgE/Key-Trends-in-the-Size-and-Composition-of-OTC-Derivatives-Markets-in-the-First-Half-of-2022.pdf">82.4% of the total IRD notional</a>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/543/0*nG8kyfT-pc2aTb4s" /></figure><p>A vanilla interest rate swap is a type of interest rate derivative in which two parties agree to <strong>exchange interest payments on a notional amount of money</strong>. The most common type of vanilla interest rate swap is a fixed-for-floating swap, in which one party pays a fixed interest rate and the other pays a floating interest rate. The fixed rate is typically set at a spread above or below the benchmark interest rate (such as the <a href="https://www.investopedia.com/terms/l/libor.asp">LIBOR</a>, the <a href="https://www.euribor.com.es/">Euribor</a>, the <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/interest-rates/TextView?type=daily_treasury_yield_curve">Treasury bill rate</a>, and now the <a href="https://app.ipor.io/swaps/usdc">IPOR</a>), and this benchmark rate determines the value of the floating rate. It is the reference rate used as a basis for pricing, and it is so important because it helps to set the price of money and manage the economy.</p><blockquote>When the benchmark interest rate goes up, the cost of borrowing money goes up, and vice versa.</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*UkTMsH-A4O6rbScx76x-Aw.png" /></figure><p>In an interest rate swap, the notional amount is the amount of money being swapped. However, the notional amount does not actually change hands. Instead, it is only used to calculate the interest payments, which are often made periodically (quarterly, semi-annually, or annually) for the entire length of the swap (1, 5, 10, 30 years etc.). One party receives fixed-rate interest payments, while the other receives floating-rate payments. As a result, <strong>this arrangement isolates risk to interest rate fluctuations only</strong>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/426/0*EjpwCeSnlLL3ASn6" /></figure><blockquote>Because interest rate swaps allow two parties to <strong>exchange interest payments on a notional amount of money without actually exchanging the underlying capital</strong>, they stand out for being extremely capital efficient.</blockquote><p>This is reflected in the amount of leverage that can be offered. As the benchmark rate changes over time, the interest rate implied by the curve will also fluctuate, and the balance between the two payoff zones will shift accordingly.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/767/1*PIm2jqGlWfGeA-uynf_Etw.png" /></figure><p>Using the image below as an example:</p><ul><li>If interest rates fall or stay lower than expected, the “receiver” of fixed will profit (the green area will expand relative to the blue).</li><li>If rates rise and hold higher than expected, the “receiver” will lose (blue expands relative to green).</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/489/0*qDCrmgb1dX-kP9zB" /></figure><h3>DeFi Interest Rates Swaps by IPOR</h3><p>All the complexity behind a protocol working on IRS like IPOR can be easily abstracted away when thinking about it from first principles.</p><p>Similar to how decentralized lending works in protocols like Aave and Compound, where loans are overcollateralized, and market participants enter a peer-to-pool agreement, IPOR does exactly the same.</p><blockquote>IPOR offers a liquidity pool for each asset, <strong>isolating risk to interest rate fluctuations for that asset only</strong>. And since the pool comprises only one asset, there is zero impermanent loss — a single-sided deposit in one asset entitles you to earn yield in that <strong>asset</strong>.</blockquote><p>When someone opens a swap in IPOR, they enter an agreement against the liquidity pool. Therefore, the capital provided by liquidity providers is being used to underwrite outstanding positions in the AMM. To compensate for this counterparty risk, liquidity providers (LPs) are paid from 3 revenue streams: swap fees, SOAP (Sum Of All Payoffs), and asset management. You can learn more about the sources of yield in the following <a href="https://blog.ipor.io/real-yield-and-risks-in-ipor-protocol-e987008f269e">article</a>.</p><p>In addition to this, there is also a benchmark interest rate, the IPOR index, which is used as the basis for pricing.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*l7z_zAbAdvw6SLWLdE1utA.png" /></figure><p>IPOR requires traders to deposit collateral to open a swap. However, this barely reduces the capital efficiency since the AMM allows users to deposit a collateral amount of up to 1000x less than the notional value of the IRS.</p><blockquote>In other words, traders can get up to 1000x leverage.</blockquote><p>Note that <strong>interest rate swaps are time-sensitive</strong> and are opened for a period of time called <em>tenor</em>. Similar to the periodic payments and exchange of cash flow in a traditional setting, <strong>the PnL of traders in IPOR is earned over time</strong>. As a result, your PnL accrual is not instantaneous, like in perpetual futures — where positions have no time value.</p><blockquote>Even if you use 1000x leverage and there is a sudden move in the opposite direction, your position will not get liquidated. This gives traders plenty of time to reconsider their positions.</blockquote><p>For example, a sudden 50% move on the IPOR index will not liquidate a position even if you use 1000x leverage. In perpetuals, a 50% move would cause the trader to lose their entire collateral even if they only used 2x leverage.</p><p>Furthermore, IPOR v1 offered 28-day cancellable swaps, where traders could close their swaps before maturity without penalty. With v2, IPOR will offer three maturity periods (or tenors): 28 days, 60 days, and 90 days.</p><p>Longer tenors will follow over time, <strong>allowing for the development of an on-chain yield curve</strong> that can bootstrap new structured products and enable the development of fixed-income products.</p><blockquote>The plot of swap rates across all available maturities will draw the swap curve, and because it incorporates a predictive forward expectation of the IPOR as well as the market’s perception of liquidity, supply, and demand dynamics, this public good becomes a critical component of the DeFi economy, allowing retail, institutions, and DAOs to manage their risk, fostering the development of structured products, and enabling fixed income opportunities.</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/481/0*83Q0VawRNfjw7JtE" /></figure><p>In TradFi, after a bank executes a swap, they typically offset the swap through an inter-dealer broker and retain a fee for setting up the original swap (if the swap transaction is large, the inter-dealer broker may sell it to several counterparties). This is how banks that provide swaps routinely shed the risk, or interest rate exposure, associated with them.</p><blockquote>IPOR v2 offers a similar but <a href="https://blog.ipor.io/unwinding-swaps-540abbe974a">more flexible solution</a> that allows traders to close their positions anytime before maturity.</blockquote><p>Behind the scenes, an offsetting swap is opened in the opposite direction for a matching period. This, of course, happens automatically.</p><h3>Yield Stripping</h3><p>Unlike interest rate swaps, where users get exposure to an underlying interest rate, <strong>yield stripping protocols utilize actual interest-bearing assets as the basis for pricing</strong>. This is a completely different approach and mechanism design enabled by the composability of DeFi.</p><p>Yield stripping involves wrapping and splitting an interest-bearing asset into <em>principal</em> and <em>yield</em> components. This results in two separate tokens, often referred to as PT (Principal Token) and YT (Yield Token). The PT represents the principal amount, while the YT represents the yield of the underlying asset. When this yield is tokenized and split into a PT and a YT, the AMM assigns a maturity period to the position.</p><ul><li>Holding the PT entitles the user to redeem the principal amount after maturity — like <a href="https://www.investopedia.com/terms/z/zero-couponbond.asp">zero-coupon bonds</a>.</li><li>Holding the YT entitles the user to continuously receive the yield from the underlying — like <a href="https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/coupon.asp">coupon payments</a>.</li></ul><p>To allow for trading, the protocol implements an AMM that is designed specifically for yield trading. This allows users to take advantage of the specific properties of PTs and YTs. For that, PTs and YTs are minted from an underlying interest-bearing asset (e.g. stETH -&gt; SY-stETH -&gt; PT-stETH + YT-stETH )</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*NBrTw3vpV8KjIrjpvk0PzA.png" /></figure><p>In the past, PTs and YTs had separate liquidity pools, which led to liquidity fragmentation. This issue has been fixed now with modern implementations that use a single pool of SY-PT liquidity, where SY stands for Standard Yield (a wrapped version of the interest-bearing asset), such that:</p><blockquote>P(PT) + P(YT) = P(Underlying)</blockquote><p>This way, from a single PT/SY pool, users can buy/sell PTs against the underlying asset, facilitating swaps between YTs and PTs in the process. More specifically, the AMM does not hold any YTs. Instead, it mints YT out of SY tokens to fill buy orders (and the opposite for sell orders).</p><ul><li>Buying PTs increases the price of PT and decreases the price of the underlying, hence decreasing the implied interest rate.</li><li>Selling PTs decreases the price of PT and increases the price of the underlying, hence increasing the implied interest rate.</li></ul><p>As time goes by and traders buy/sell against the AMM, the curve changes in response to the amount of yield that is earned over time — the curve narrows the price range of PT as the maturity date approaches. In this regard, there will be some differences based on the actual implementation of the AMM (constant geometric mean, constant power sum formula, variants of the Notional AMM with customizable scalar root and rate anchor…).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*5wWAEQvlj060JYg5jNj9Mw.png" /></figure><p>In this context, the slope of the curve represents how much price (and implied interest rate) changes as the proportion of assets in the AMM changes. A steeper slope means that a small change in the notional amount will cause a large change in the price, while a gentler slope means that a small change in the notional amount will cause a small change in the price. Therefore, the red line in the image below is more capital-efficient than the black or blue lines.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/408/0*-9Gwb-4xAf8VEU6X" /></figure><p>This makes it possible to reduce impermanent loss (IL) due to the liquidity being concentrated in a specific price range. And<strong> if the PT is held until maturity, there is no IL</strong> (you can redeem 1:1).</p><p>Research conducted by Pendle shows that (see Performance of Pendle Liquidity Pools <a href="https://medium.com/pendle/evaluating-performance-of-pendle-liquidity-pools-part-1-f81e6957837d">Part 1</a> and <a href="https://medium.com/pendle/evaluating-performance-of-pendle-liquidity-pools-part-2-3d085872a603">Part 2</a>.) :</p><ul><li>A positive correlation exists between the length of time deposited and the LP performance.</li><li>LPs in Pendle’s SY/PT AMM often outperform the underlying asset.</li><li>In all cases, IL can be eliminated with token incentives.</li></ul><p>Depending on the underlying AMM, some yield-stripping implementations are also more efficient than others. For instance, constant geometric mean models and constant power sum models lack customizability, and as a result, the same curve is used for every interest-bearing asset. Other AMMs like Notional or Pendle introduce two main parameters that can be set and optimized for each pool (the scalar root and the initial rate anchor). This higher customizability is a benefit since each pool will be more <strong>specialized in trading the yield of a particular asset.</strong></p><p>Once we understand the mechanics of the AMM, let’s devise a practical example where a user wants to leverage the utility and capital efficiency of interest rate derivatives.</p><ul><li>If the user has a pessimistic outlook on the future yield of the underlying (they expect yield to go down), they can purchase PTs.</li><li>If the user has an optimistic outlook on the future yield of the underlying (they expect the yield to go up), they can purchase YTs.</li></ul><p>See the example taken below from <a href="https://app.pendle.finance/trade/education/learn?level=3">Pendle’s guide to yield trading</a>:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/699/0*tNK1Y2zuiiv-7E6D" /></figure><p>To achieve that position, it is required to interact with the AMM. As a result, the leveraged yield you can earn from buying YTs will be negatively impacted by the price impact of the swap.</p><blockquote>Since the YT will always be a tiny portion of the PT, the capital exposure required to obtain a fixed rate versus a floating rate is highly disproportionate, resulting in an <strong>asymmetric exposure to risk</strong>.</blockquote><p>For instance, if you are holding 10 $ETH worth of YT and would like to pivot to a fixed rate strategy, you will need to deploy even more capital in addition to accepting the risk of exposing your initial amount of 10 $ETH to the market&#39;s volatility.</p><blockquote>By design, <strong>a yield-stripping AMM creates an imbalance in the exposure between PTs and YTs</strong>. This is completely different from a swap between a spot-fixed rate and a spot-floating rate.</blockquote><p>As a thought experiment, under what circumstances would anyone consider swapping a spot exposure for a leveraged one?</p><p>This often leads to illiquid conditions for YTs, and because of that, it only takes a few buys for the yield to turn negative, even if the APY of the underlying stays constant until maturity.</p><blockquote>Therefore, if the future yield of the underlying is greater than the cost of acquiring the equivalent in YTs you make a profit, otherwise you incur a loss.</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1020/1*I_GsEEiwHhUswui3AdwPzw.png" /></figure><p>Because of their relationship, <strong>the prices of YT and PT are meant to be inversely correlated</strong>. When YT drops in price, PT increases, and vice versa. And because the price of YT trends towards zero as it approaches maturity, the PT increases in price such that it is redeemable for the underlying asset at maturity.</p><p>From the above, it can be inferred that the long-yield APY usually displayed on the UI is based on the assumption that the underlying APY stays constant until maturity. Unfortunately, this is often not the case.</p><blockquote>In fact, <strong>the longevity of each maturity period offered by a yield-stripping pool is inherently tied to the longevity of the underlying asset’s yield </strong>— it is only useful as long as the yield lasts.</blockquote><p>If you are a YT holder and the APY of the underlying increases, your long yield APY will go up higher because of the low initial acquisition cost when you bought the YT. However, if the APY of the underlying asset tanks, your long yield APY might even go negative.</p><p>The reason is that the yield you earn cannot make up for the cost of acquiring the YT (e.g. you might have spent $1,000 to buy the YT, but you will only manage to earn $500 by the time it matures). You can already see how different it is to entering an IRS, where your risk exposure is isolated to fluctuation in interest rates only.</p><h3>There Are No Solutions. There Are Only Trade-Offs.</h3><p>While you might think that a crypto-native design like yield stripping is a more suitable solution to tackle DeFi interest rates, this idea can be misunderstood depending on the context. For instance, because of how DeFi money markets work, where interest rates are a function of the utilization of the lending pool, these rates are highly volatile and reactive to market dynamics. When liquidity is concentrated in a couple of large money markets, coming up with a benchmark is a feasible solution that can be used in pricing models to reflect “the cost of money.”</p><p>The same occurs with liquid staking tokens, where you can make the analogy that node operators (whitelisted or not) borrow $ETH from stakers to run validators and pay interest to lenders (LST holders). But since the yield varies based on MEV, fees, node operators…the index composition might need to be adjusted accordingly to make it feasible for trading.</p><p>To put things into perspective, <strong>yield stripping is a mechanism built on the premise that there is an inversely correlated relationship between yield and price </strong>— assuming the same dynamics in DeFi as in TradFi. However, we know from experience that this is not the case.</p><blockquote><strong>In DeFi, yield is not inversely correlated to price</strong>: APY goes up when the underlying asset&#39;s price goes up and vice versa.</blockquote><p>For instance, consider the returns on liquid staking tokens such as $stETH or $rETH. Looking at APY in terms of the native token, it drops when TVL increases. As more $ETH is staked, the APY drops.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*kcPay_dfN6nWfN00" /></figure><blockquote>While yield stripping protocols can enable pools for money market tokens (Aave’s aTokens, Compound’s cTokens…) and LSTs, they might be less capital efficient than a vanilla IRS. However, they are highly composable, making it possible to trade yield for long-tail assets that are difficult to price in an IRS setting.</blockquote><p>Because a drop in APY translates into a drop in YT liquidity, this also decreases the fixed yield of the PT. Eventually, when a significant discount is reached, it makes you question whether it makes sense to go for an insignificant but fixed yield or whether it makes more sense to go for a floating rate. Not only that, yield stripping forces the trader to expose the entire value of the principal amount upfront. This is far less efficient than opening an actual IRS, where little collateral is required upfront, and only the difference in cash flows is collected at predetermined time intervals.</p><p>However, other types of yield-bearing assets don’t belong to either money markets or LSTs. For instance, consider a basket of assets like GLP, where price is determined by the value of all tokens within the pool and factoring in the PnL of all current open positions. Under these conditions, yield stripping is a great solution for yield trading. Given that the underlying AMM is largely demand-driven, <strong>yield-stripping AMMs become very attractive to speculators who manage to find mispricing in the market</strong>.</p><p>In other words, any yield-bearing asset can be traded on a yield-stripping AMM. This is not possible in IRS protocols like IPOR, where the pricing of the swaps is more dependent on liquidity conditions (i.e. how easy it is to manipulate the benchmark) and quant modeling. Protocols replicating IRS need to work on pricing models and run multiple simulations against a backtesting framework for each asset (see <a href="https://docs.ipor.io/research-whitepapers">IPOR’s quant library</a>). This quant modeling makes it possible to find a sweet spot such that the spread is attractive enough for traders and useful to protect liquidity providers. In the case of yield stripping, given the price relationship between PT and YT, this is less of a problem, which means that they can deploy pools much faster and for yield-bearing assets of different nature, ranging from money market tokens, LP tokens, yield-bearing stablecoins, LSTs…</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*XQx7G8QsKAp-IzKWwiCFyA.png" /></figure><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>For fixed rates and interest rate derivatives to take off, the industry must explore solutions that make it possible to align price schemes with the ever-changing dynamics of the markets. Given the nature of these markets, that includes both vanilla IRS and yield stripping.</p><blockquote><strong>It is a mistake to think that one design will replace the other</strong>.</blockquote><p>Instead, both complement each other depending on the use case (an active borrower on Morpho might want to open an IRS to hedge, while someone else might have a preference for speculating on the yield volatility of a long-tail asset that is only tradeable on yield stripping protocols).</p><p>In the case of IPOR and IRS protocols, yield predictability and fixed income can be achieved by extending the duration of tenors, progressively drawing a yield curve over time. This enhances the stability of the industry as a whole. More specifically, the IPOR index is offered as a public good that reflects the cost of money in DeFi, while IPOR derivatives make it possible to hedge against rate volatility.</p><p>On the other hand, yield stripping is built on the assumption that yield and price are inversely correlated. The fact that an underlying position&#39;s APY increases when the underlying price increases (and vice versa) does not necessarily diminish the utility of yield trading.</p><blockquote>This design tradeoff optimizes for faster deployments of new pools and the inclusion of long-tail assets.</blockquote><p>The asymmetric risk exposure of the underlying AMMs may turn out to be very capital-inefficient for certain use cases and can impede the development of a yield curve since the long APY yield of holding a YT implies that the yield of the underlying will not fluctuate.</p><p>DeFi is still a very nascent industry, and it is often tempting to hinge on simple premises. However, most assumptions don’t always hold. Ultimately, there is no perfect solution — <strong>risk cannot be destroyed, only transformed</strong>. With that in mind, having multiple solutions to tackle the volatility and unpredictability of current interest rate dynamics is critical for the industry to mature.</p><blockquote>In the end, <strong>the most capital-efficient instrument is the one that requires less capital to offset a given amount of risk</strong>.</blockquote><p>In comparing IRS with yield stripping, one can come up with their own conclusion as to what solution provides clearer hedging mechanisms or aligns better with one&#39;s approach to managing risk.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/1*9hCXo_yJkxoh2U2mvQ71Zw.png" /></figure><p><em>Thanks for reading!</em></p><p><em>Leave a comment below if you have any questions. Be sure to join our community on Discord so you receive the most relevant updates on the IPOR Protocol and Interest Rates in DeFi. Meaningful product discussions are highly valued, and spam is strongly discouraged. Be cautious, and don’t fall for impersonators.</em></p><p><em>Follow IPOR Labs on social media so you never miss a beat!</em></p><p><a href="https://bit.ly/ipor-website-medium"><strong>Website</strong></a><strong> |</strong><a href="https://bit.ly/ipor-dapp-medium"><strong> dApp</strong></a><strong> |</strong><a href="https://bit.ly/ipor-docs-medium"><strong> Docs</strong></a><strong> |</strong><a href="https://bit.ly/ipor-discord-medium"><strong> Discord</strong></a><strong> |</strong><a href="https://bit.ly/ipor-twitter-medium"><strong> Twitter</strong></a><strong> |</strong><a href="https://bit.ly/ipor-linkedin-medium"><strong> LinkedIn</strong></a><strong> |</strong><a href="https://bit.ly/ipor-telegram-medium"><strong> Telegram</strong></a><strong> |</strong><a href="https://bit.ly/ipor-youtube-medium"><strong> YouTube</strong></a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*BscHuZ3g_un5y4AD.gif" /><figcaption>Inter Protocol Over-block Rate (IPOR) — The Credit Hub of DeFi</figcaption></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=243ddebd9232" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://blog.ipor.io/defi-interest-rates-derivatives-swaps-vs-yield-stripping-243ddebd9232">DeFi Interest Rates Derivatives: Swaps VS Yield Stripping</a> was originally published in <a href="https://blog.ipor.io/">Fusion (by IPOR)</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Fixed Income in DeFi: Risk Management for DAO Treasuries (Part 2)]]></title>
            <link>https://blog.ipor.io/fixed-income-in-defi-risk-management-for-dao-treasuries-part-2-fe1767a7582a?source=rss-ee1bf7a912ac------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/fe1767a7582a</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[dao]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ethereum]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[defi]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[education]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Alvaro Serrano Rivas]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 08 Dec 2022 11:52:23 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-11-16T12:29:52.028Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>IPOR Protocol&#39;s highly capital-efficient interest rate swaps enable access to TradFi-like capital management tools in a Web3 environment.</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*WwEB-GWIU6-GCPplRkXQQg.png" /></figure><p><strong><em>Quick takeaways:</em></strong></p><ul><li><em>Interest rate swaps are fundamental building blocks of the traditional financial system and enable protection against interest rate volatility.</em></li><li><em>Interest rate swaps have been traditionally available only to large financial institutions but thanks to blockchain technology and IPOR R&amp;D efforts, DAOs, and retail users can now access Plain Vanilla Interest Rate Swaps with a Web3 wallet.</em></li><li><em>Swaps can be used for hedging variable DeFi money market interest rates, arbitrage opportunities in DeFi and TradFi, as well as highly capital-efficient speculation.</em></li><li><em>DAOs can also make use of IPOR Protocol’s liquidity pool yields composed of fees, SOAP, and automated asset management without being exposed to impermanent loss.</em></li></ul><p>Access Part 1 <a href="https://blog.ipor.io/fixed-income-in-defi-risk-management-for-dao-treasuries-part-1-5842d8e29f04">here</a>.</p><h3>Why DeFi Needs Interest Rates Derivatives?</h3><p>Although there is room for improvement in fixed rates pricing and profit distribution models, there are still derivative products that are worth considering. Those can increase the productivity of DAO treasuries while remaining neutral in terms of risk management.</p><blockquote>In fact, risk management tools have been one of the missing pieces for institutional adoption.</blockquote><p>Given the current cash flows in DeFi and the dominance of credit markets relative to other derivatives, Interest Rate Swaps (IRS) are a relatively straightforward strategy that allows DAOs to capitalize on their exposure to interest rates.</p><blockquote>By swapping a variable (floating) rate for a fixed rate, one party reaps the rewards of hedging interest rates exposure, while the other benefits from potential earnings.</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/434/0*6vAuPjpqPdxzbPMH" /><figcaption><a href="https://www.bis.org/publ/otc_hy2205.pdf">Statistical release</a>: OTC derivatives statistics at end of December 2021. BIS.</figcaption></figure><p>IRS are fundamental building blocks of the traditional financial system. Interest Rates Derivatives enable governments, corporations, and banks to operate in a global economy where they can take advantage of better terms and be protected against interest rate volatility.</p><p>Interest rate swaps are usually referencing a specific index, such as the SOFR (Secured Overnight Financing Rate). These indices are typically constructed from survey results where investment banks and insiders can manipulate the lending rates across different markets for a profit. This was the cause of the LIBOR scandal. Access a short thread about what LIBOR was, who manipulated it, and why it below:</p><h3>IPOR Labs on Twitter: &quot;&quot;The most important number in #finance&quot;, the London Interbank Offered Rate (#LIBOR), died a shameful death at the age of 52.The interest rate benchmark underpinned more than $300 trillion in financial contracts before being marred in a scandal that lasted ~ a decade.A short🧵 pic.twitter.com/n2xvDiJN5l / Twitter&quot;</h3><p>&quot;The most important number in #finance&quot;, the London Interbank Offered Rate (#LIBOR), died a shameful death at the age of 52.The interest rate benchmark underpinned more than $300 trillion in financial contracts before being marred in a scandal that lasted ~ a decade.A short🧵 pic.twitter.com/n2xvDiJN5l</p><p>Phasing out the LIBOR was and still is not an easy process, since many derivative products continue to reference it. This carries on negative externalities and leads to liquidity fragmentation.</p><p>The transparency of the blockchain and the logic of smart contracts clearly offer a competitive advantage for DAOs.</p><blockquote>A public good like the <a href="https://docs.ipor.io/ipor-index/what-is-the-ipor-index">IPOR index</a> can be used as the reference benchmark rate for decentralized credit markets.</blockquote><p>By sourcing interest rates in real-time and synthesizing the state of the market in an index, IPOR has built an <a href="https://docs.ipor.io/automated-market-maker/the-automated-market-maker">AMM (Automated Market Maker) for Interest Rate Swaps</a>, thus bringing one of the missing and most sought-after primitives for fixed-income investors to the Ethereum blockchain. Furthermore, the composability of the <a href="https://docs.ipor.io/ipor-index/what-is-the-ipor-index">IPOR</a> allows other protocols to build derivatives on top of it. So let us evaluate the possible use cases for interest rate swaps.</p><h3>Hedging Interest Rates (“Fixing Your Rates”)</h3><p>As an example, think of a hedge fund that is already exposed to a variable-rate structured product and is expecting an increase in interest rates. They could enter an IRS to fix a future income stream by swapping their variable rate for a fixed interest rate. The same concept applies to DAOs.</p><h4><strong>Hedge a borrowing position by going long interest rates</strong></h4><p>Let’s assume that a DAO wants to borrow against its assets to take a USDC loan. For that purpose, the DAO goes to <a href="https://aave.com/">Aave</a> and takes a loan at a variable rate. If the rates go up, the DAO would have to pay higher interest on its loan. Therefore, it needs to protect itself against rising interest rates (increase in the floating rate). For example, this DAO could take a “pay fixed and receive floating” position on <a href="http://app.ipor.io/">IPOR</a> by depositing 2000 USDC as collateral and receiving a notional rate exposure of 2m USDC (assuming that’s the amount of the Aave loan size).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/690/1*HooptdNnBdf_p6akowc46Q.png" /></figure><p>By opening a capital-efficient swap on IPOR, if the Aave borrowing rate goes up, it will be offset by the profit generated by the “floating” position. Similarly, if the rates go down, the DAO can offset its swap losses by paying a lower interest on the loan. This process is known as “fixing” your rates since you are protecting yourself against interest rate volatility.</p><h4><strong>Hedge a lending position by going long interest rates</strong></h4><p>Likewise, if a DAO is lending idle treasury assets to earn a profit at variable rates, it makes sense to hedge against decreasing yield (reduction in the floating interest rate) with a “pay floating and receive fixed” swap.</p><h3>IPOR Labs on Twitter: &quot;In some [EU] countries, it is simply impossible to fix the rate for your mortgage.Retail frequently doesn&#39;t have the right risk management tools in #TradFi.#DeFi is different. It&#39;s retail-first. https://t.co/IcZpqufE2I / Twitter&quot;</h3><p>In some [EU] countries, it is simply impossible to fix the rate for your mortgage.Retail frequently doesn&#39;t have the right risk management tools in #TradFi.#DeFi is different. It&#39;s retail-first. https://t.co/IcZpqufE2I</p><h3>Arbitrage</h3><p>Given the diverse set of stablecoins in DeFi, investors can profit from arbitrage in divergent rate behaviors. After all, the assumption is that any two stables are redeemable for the same value.</p><blockquote>The <a href="https://docs.ipor.io/ipor-index/what-is-the-ipor-index">IPOR index</a> for stable assets is extremely helpful in these scenarios.</blockquote><p>Imagine a situation where the IPOR rate for USDC is 2.5%, and the IPOR rate for DAI is 5.5%. In order to capture a risk-free arbitrage, one could:</p><ol><li>Borrow USDC,</li><li>Open a “pay fixed — receive floating” contract on IPOR to lock in the borrowing cost,</li><li>Swap USDC for DAI,</li><li>Lock in the high lending rate by lending DAI,</li><li>Open a “receive fixed—pay floating” IRS on IPOR.</li></ol><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/923/0*zZe248LXSfStBJUN" /><figcaption>Arbitrage opportunity where one could try to capture the spread between interest rates in AAVE and IPOR or COMP rates. Click to enlarge.</figcaption></figure><p>An arbitrage with TradFi rates is also possible, depending on the OTC desk you use (its fees in particular). Have a look at this piece by IPOR Labs’ Chief Scientist — <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/mauhcs/">Mauricio Hernandes Ph.D.</a> — to learn more about the opportunity:</p><p><a href="https://blog.ipor.io/high-interest-rates-the-arbitrage-between-defi-and-tradfi-rates-b394424a56cd">High Interest rates: The Arbitrage between DeFi and TradFi rates.</a></p><h3>Speculation</h3><p>Most investors who are familiar with interest rate derivatives in traditional finance understand that, in the end, an interest rate swap is an agreement between two parties on a notional amount.</p><blockquote>That notional amount translates into leverage and enables a greater degree of capital efficiency.</blockquote><p>This leverage is the equivalent of a collateralization factor that gives traders exposure to a larger capital position. In <a href="http://app.ipor.io/">IPOR</a>, a 1000x leverage would be the equivalent of a collateralization factor of 0.001, which means that</p><blockquote>traders only need to deposit 0.001 of the notional amount as collateral when opening a swap.</blockquote><p>This enables capital-efficient speculation on whether interest rates will go up or down for a given asset.</p><h3>“LP and Chill”</h3><p>In DeFi credit markets you can be a borrower, a lender, or a liquidity provider. In the <a href="https://blog.ipor.io/fixed-income-in-defi-risk-management-for-dao-treasuries-part-1-5842d8e29f04">first part of this blog post</a>, we already explained why fixed-rate markets have proven to be relatively unappealing (low rates), even for the most risk-averse users.</p><blockquote>Hence, it is reasonable for protocol treasuries and DAOs to simply provide single-sided liquidity on <a href="http://app.ipor.io/">IPOR</a> and earn <a href="https://blog.ipor.io/real-yield-and-risks-in-ipor-protocol-e987008f269e">Real Yield</a> from fees, SOAP, and asset management.</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*rHG_OyMD73d99aS1o-tXRA.png" /><figcaption>The most recent APR rates on IPOR. For 30-day average APRs, go to <a href="https://app.ipor.io/">app.ipor.io</a>.</figcaption></figure><p>In simple terms, liquidity providers deposit an asset in the corresponding pool (currently USDC, USDT, and DAI) enabling traders to open IRS against the funds in the pool.</p><p>By being a liquidity provider on <a href="http://app.ipor.io/">IPOR</a>, you are earning income from 3 revenue sources:</p><ul><li><a href="https://docs.ipor.io/ipor-dao/governance/configuration-parameters#fees"><strong>Fees</strong></a>: 1% fee is collected on the collateral deposits of any trader. The entirety of the fee goes to liquidity providers.</li><li><a href="https://docs.ipor.io/automated-market-maker/soap"><strong>SOAP (Sum of all Payoffs)</strong></a><strong>:</strong> Simply put, it is a snapshot view of the unrealized profit and loss (PnL) of the liquidity pool at any given time. As traders win and lose on their positions, the pool is typically simultaneously long and short over a number of contracts. The net outcome becomes the realized profit or loss for the pool.</li><li><a href="https://docs.ipor.io/automated-market-maker/asset-management"><strong>Asset management</strong></a>: Idle funds in the liquidity pool that are not being used to underwrite swaps earn a yield on <a href="https://aave.com/">Aave</a> and <a href="https://compound.finance/">Compound</a> by lending assets on whichever one of those markets offers the higher yield.</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*urQxgTcMuXhr7jAaqfvcXg.png" /><figcaption>Statistics page on <a href="https://app.ipor.io/statistics">app.ipor.io</a>.</figcaption></figure><p>Read more about asset management in this blog post by IPOR Labs’ Head of Product — <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/lukasz-muzyka-0a599315?miniProfileUrn=urn%3Ali%3Afs_miniProfile%3AACoAAAMrqb0BcradjyutSuCP4SEkkJz-IVDlELo&amp;lipi=urn%3Ali%3Apage%3Ad_flagship3_search_srp_all%3B08yKdafESQ%2Bsj9Pj4kYHeQ%3D%3D">Lukasz Muzyka</a>:</p><p><a href="https://blog.ipor.io/launching-asset-management-f9c912a7fccf">Launching Asset Management</a></p><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>While in traditional finance a set of regulations are put in place to deal with counterparty risk, no such layer of protection exists in DeFi (yet). That makes risk management extremely important for DAOs and fixed-income investors. As more and more autonomous protocols approach decentralization, a broad spectrum of opportunities opens up to unlock the full potential of fixed-rate products.</p><blockquote>With the introduction of IPOR index-based Interest Rate Swaps, DeFi participants can now hedge their exposure by turning a variable-rate into a fixed-rate at a higher APR than available elsewhere.</blockquote><blockquote>Experience IPOR Protocol’s design ellegance at <a href="https://app.ipor.io/">app.ipor.io</a></blockquote><p>Stay up to date with the protocol documentation on <a href="https://docs.ipor.io/">GitBook</a> and <a href="https://github.com/IPOR-Labs">GitHub</a>.</p><p><em>Thanks for reading!</em></p><p><em>Leave a comment below if you have any questions. Be sure to join our community on Discord, so you receive the most relevant updates on the IPOR Protocol and Interest Rates in DeFi. Meaningful product discussions are highly valued and spam is strongly discouraged. Be cautious and don’t fall for impersonators.</em></p><p><em>Follow IPOR Labs on social media so you never miss a beat!</em></p><p><a href="https://bit.ly/ipor-website-medium"><strong>Website</strong></a><strong> |</strong><a href="https://bit.ly/ipor-dapp-medium"><strong> dApp</strong></a><strong> |</strong><a href="https://bit.ly/ipor-docs-medium"><strong> Docs</strong></a><strong> |</strong><a href="https://bit.ly/ipor-discord-medium"><strong> Discord</strong></a><strong> |</strong><a href="https://bit.ly/ipor-twitter-medium"><strong> Twitter</strong></a><strong> |</strong><a href="https://bit.ly/ipor-linkedin-medium"><strong> LinkedIn</strong></a><strong> |</strong><a href="https://bit.ly/ipor-telegram-medium"><strong> Telegram</strong></a><strong> |</strong><a href="https://bit.ly/ipor-youtube-medium"><strong> YouTube</strong></a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*DMKKSJQkv2AT8Sq2.gif" /><figcaption>Inter Protocol Over-block Rate (IPOR) — The Heartbeat of DeFi</figcaption></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=fe1767a7582a" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://blog.ipor.io/fixed-income-in-defi-risk-management-for-dao-treasuries-part-2-fe1767a7582a">Fixed Income in DeFi: Risk Management for DAO Treasuries (Part 2)</a> was originally published in <a href="https://blog.ipor.io/">Fusion (by IPOR)</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Fixed Income in DeFi: Risk Management for DAO Treasuries (Part 1)]]></title>
            <link>https://blog.ipor.io/fixed-income-in-defi-risk-management-for-dao-treasuries-part-1-5842d8e29f04?source=rss-ee1bf7a912ac------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/5842d8e29f04</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[education]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[defi]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ethereum]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[dao]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Alvaro Serrano Rivas]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 01 Nov 2022 13:58:59 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-11-16T12:31:15.537Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>DAOs are the fixed-income funds of DeFi. As such, they need better financial tooling to manage risk and ensure their long-term sustainability.</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*DMgm2eh3H7F9ohbmaeWC1w.png" /></figure><p><strong><em>Quick takeaways:</em></strong></p><ul><li><em>Planning for future expenses is a tough task for DAOs since they don’t have access to risk management tools such as structured products or derivatives.</em></li><li><em>Yields being generated on the largest money markets in DeFi — Aave and Compound — are usually insufficient for DAOs.</em></li><li><em>Overcollateralization and high price volatility put DeFi markets at a disadvantage vis-a-vis traditional finance.</em></li><li><em>Fixed-rate protocols seem to be struggling with low interest rates during both — bull and bear markets. In addition to the competition from TradFi rates, DeFi investors and DAOs are faced with the opportunity cost of picking one protocol over another.</em></li></ul><p>Navigating the volatile nature of the crypto markets is not an easy task. Every investor or a decentralized autonomous organization (DAO) knows that, at some point, the lights will turn off, and the bear market will take hold of every dollar value backing their precious magic internet money.</p><blockquote>All of a sudden the tide goes out, and it’s easy to find out who is swimming naked.</blockquote><p>A quick glance at DAOs and protocol treasuries reveals a lot more than the encouraging words of its founders boasting around on Twitter saying “Bull or bear, we keep building”. Surely, the passion of every builder is more than enough to withstand the crude reality of the markets. However, as soon as the costs start exceeding the revenue of the business (if there was any revenue, to begin with), one starts to realize how important it is to reach a level of growth that can ensure long-term sustainability regardless of the market conditions.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/500/1*y4nVSa0HonIdL2ZjBCwlug.jpeg" /></figure><h3>The Pitfalls of Treasury Management in Decentralized Markets</h3><p>While planning for future expenses is also present in traditional markets, DAOs do not have suitable analogs for structured products or derivatives instruments where a treasury manager can easily hedge and manage risk. Nonetheless, the landscape for structured products and decentralized derivatives has experienced outstanding growth over the past years.</p><blockquote>Currently, DAOs can choose to either delegate treasury management to an external manager, or do it internally.</blockquote><p>However, there currently isn’t a go-to solution for DAOs to incentivize external managers to manage their risk on their behalf. In addition, if a DAO attempts to manage the treasury internally, the shortcomings of decentralized governance could become evident. Active decision-making by a large and diverse set of token holders could be unworkable.</p><p>Decentralized protocols cannot avoid having exposure to their own native tokens due to the key role it plays in governance decisions. On a similar note, investment DAOs are forced to have most of their capital in stablecoins. In both cases, given that idle capital is often sitting in stablecoins, DAOs resort to simply lending their assets on money markets like <a href="https://aave.com/">Aave</a> and <a href="https://compound.finance/">Compound</a> and earn whatever yield these battle-tested protocols can offer.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/524/1*a2uhAef5eVxDGMiiXuxfiQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>However, such a yield may not be enough to cover the DAO’s operational expenses. Furthermore, DeFi interest rates are exceptionally unpredictable, especially during market corrections where<a href="https://blog.ipor.io/cream-exploit-is-aave-bank-run-an-over-reaction-77ebde45e52"> a decrease in rates is often followed by a drastic increase in volatility</a>.</p><blockquote>Overall, it is easy to disregard the importance of the cost of credit and risk management when the market is in “up only” mode.</blockquote><p>But it turns out that when the markets are fueled by credit, <a href="https://blog.ipor.io/why-ipor-in-a-credit-fueled-defi-market-stability-is-the-growth-driver-ae61204b15a3">stability is the driver for growth</a>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*hC-vmBmfL5VI7DJz.png" /></figure><p>Stable and predictable yield is the name of the game and there is currently no way for a DAO to issue its own token and cover administrative, legal, or compliance costs in that asset. Also, DAOs must assume the tradeoff of deploying on a given Layer 1 blockchain, which exposes them to assets like ETH, SOL, AVAX…, given the necessity to pay for gas costs. Finally, DAOs usually cover their operational costs with stables, and in some cases might even accumulate tokens of other protocols as the result of a partnership.</p><p>Due to all that, it stands to reason that most projects will not trade their own funds. After <a href="https://decrypt.co/9074/substratum-burns-through-13-million-in-ico-funds-in-two-years-lays-off-staff">similar attempts caused big losses for protocols</a>, nowadays most DAOs favor passive income strategies to earn a yield on their assets, such as</p><ul><li>automated vaults (<a href="https://yearn.finance/vaults">Yearn</a>, <a href="https://www.robo-vault.com/">Robovault</a>, etc),</li><li>overcollateralized credit markets (<a href="https://aave.com/">Aave</a>, <a href="https://compound.finance/">Compound</a>, etc),</li><li>undercollateralized lending (<a href="https://www.maple.finance/">Maple</a>, <a href="http://truefi.io/">TrueFi</a>, etc),</li><li>and liquidity provision on popular decentralized exchanges.</li></ul><h3>DAOs, the Fixed-Income Funds of DeFi</h3><blockquote>It is a well-known narrative that institutions will access DeFi credit markets once proper regulations are in place.</blockquote><p>There are certainly some competitive advantages and opportunities that DeFi can offer, such as transparency, and permissionless 24/7 access to innovative financial instruments. However, there is still room for improvement when it comes to capital efficiency, especially in credit markets.</p><blockquote>The fact that the majority of borrowing and lending markets require overcollateralization, puts the industry at a significant disadvantage.</blockquote><p>Furthermore, the unpredictability of variable interest rates and the price volatility of crypto assets, make it even harder for investors to gain access to fixed-income instruments. One could argue that fixed-rate protocols address this problem but there are still drawbacks to keep in mind, such as low-interest rates and, overall, lower attractiveness to investors, even during a bear market. Given that lending, borrowing, and CDP protocols account for ~45% of DeFi’s TVL, it is important for DAOs to be aware of the risks involved when interacting with such protocols.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Jn-Xd-ut1zNZkl8fU6zF0g.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://defillama.com/chain/Ethereum">DeFiLlama</a></figcaption></figure><h3>The State of Fixed Rates in DeFi</h3><blockquote>In traditional finance, fixed rates have become the norm for securing a future profit.</blockquote><p>In simple terms, these instruments are financial derivatives that remain at a constant rate during a loan period, regardless of market fluctuations caused by supply and demand forces. This removes uncertainty and makes profits/costs more predictable for lenders/borrowers.</p><blockquote>Predictability is the main driver of fixed-income investing strategies. That’s literally why it’s called “fixed” income.</blockquote><p>This is the preferred approach for governments, corporate bonds, or money market funds focused on preserving their capital and securing a future income.</p><p>At a first glance, this seems an attractive product for DAOs and protocol treasuries. They can put their assets to work and earn a yield on capital that would otherwise remain idle. However, this comes at the expense of devoting funds to a loan that is acceptable to borrowers and lenders at certain market conditions. So when the market fluctuates, one party enjoys the benefits while the other has to swallow the loss. In some cases, borrowers may even end up paying more than the floating market rate. For that reason, the involved parties must consider volatility and liquidity risks.</p><p>Over the past two years, protocols have come up with creative AMM designs and effective pricing formulas for setting fixed interest rates. Nevertheless, these products still lack competitiveness in the market, due to rates being as high as 4%. After all, whether it is a zero-coupon bond, a separate principal and interest, or a junior or senior bond, investors care about profit.</p><blockquote>Arguably, during a bull market, fixed-rate products lack competitiveness against variable rates due to their low yield.</blockquote><p>With that in mind, one would expect that demand for fixed rates would increase during a bear market. However, since the collapse of Terra, TVL metrics for fixed yield protocols have undergone a gradual decline as well.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*xrv7fwd82pUqFyMGK0zzkA.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*E0TjiuXr-KeWwnFH0JZrcQ.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*3MR7u4PdtW1MvAZazBYx8g.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*LH3WGB89rcQYl2eu1SoWYA.png" /><figcaption>TVL for major fixed yield protocols from <a href="https://defillama.com/">DefiLlama</a>. Click to enlarge.</figcaption></figure><p>There is already a wide variety of fixed rates products in the market. For example, we can find zero-coupon bonds like <a href="https://notional.finance/">Notional</a> or <a href="https://yieldprotocol.com/">Yield</a>, separate principal and interest like <a href="https://www.element.fi/">Element</a> and <a href="https://pendle.finance/">Pendle</a>, and even junior and senior bonds like <a href="https://barnbridge.com/">Barnbridge</a>. On the one hand, this could mean that investors require more time to figure out different strategies. On the other, all of them share a common denominator: low yield.</p><blockquote>For reference, the current fixed interest rate for stablecoins has fluctuated between 1% and 3% since the start of this year.</blockquote><p>Furthermore, not only do these protocols compete against each other, but they also compete with traditional finance, where professional investors and institutions can access higher yields in less risky scenarios.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*4ElC71mDIWRLJ5YJ.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://blog.ipor.io/high-interest-rates-the-arbitrage-between-defi-and-tradfi-rates-b394424a56cd">DeFi rates (IPOR) and TradFi Rates from 2021</a>.</figcaption></figure><blockquote>For the vast majority of DAOs, however, moving capital to #TradFi doesn’t make sense.</blockquote><p>Even if <a href="https://blog.ipor.io/high-interest-rates-the-arbitrage-between-defi-and-tradfi-rates-b394424a56cd">a new interest rates paradigm</a> is emerging, it is not worth the opportunity cost to attempt to <a href="https://blog.ipor.io/high-interest-rates-the-arbitrage-between-defi-and-tradfi-rates-b394424a56cd">arbitrage DeFi and TradFi rates</a> (setup a prop trading desk using the DAO’s treasury, tooling for execution, monitoring, risk management, transaction fees, liquidity…). As a consequence, most DAOs resort to protocols that have stood the test of time, such as <a href="https://aave.com/">Aave</a> and <a href="https://compound.finance/">Compound</a>. That has turned stablecoin interest rates there as the de-facto “risk-free” rates in DeFi.</p><blockquote>Could there be a way for DAOs to get a better deal? A rate that is both higher and fixed when compared to the lower, variable “risk-free” one?</blockquote><p>In the <a href="https://blog.ipor.io/fixed-income-in-defi-risk-management-for-dao-treasuries-part-2-fe1767a7582a">second part</a> of this series, we look at why DeFi needs interest rate derivatives and consider some of the most common fixed-income strategies involving these products that could benefit DAO treasuries.</p><blockquote>Meanwhile, you are free to explore on-chain interest rate swaps at <a href="https://app.ipor.io/">app.ipor.io.</a></blockquote><p>Part two is already available:</p><p><a href="https://blog.ipor.io/fixed-income-in-defi-risk-management-for-dao-treasuries-part-2-fe1767a7582a">Fixed Income in DeFi: Risk Management for DAO Treasuries (Part 2)</a></p><p><em>Thanks for reading!</em></p><p><em>Leave a comment below if you have any questions. Be sure to join our community on Discord, so you receive the most relevant updates on the IPOR Protocol and Interest Rates in DeFi. Meaningful product discussions are highly valued and spam is strongly discouraged. Be cautious and don’t fall for impersonators.</em></p><p><em>Follow IPOR Labs on social media so you never miss a beat!</em></p><p><a href="https://bit.ly/ipor-website-medium"><strong>Website</strong></a><strong> |</strong><a href="https://bit.ly/ipor-dapp-medium"><strong> dApp</strong></a><strong> |</strong><a href="https://bit.ly/ipor-docs-medium"><strong> Docs</strong></a><strong> |</strong><a href="https://bit.ly/ipor-discord-medium"><strong> Discord</strong></a><strong> |</strong><a href="https://bit.ly/ipor-twitter-medium"><strong> Twitter</strong></a><strong> |</strong><a href="https://bit.ly/ipor-linkedin-medium"><strong> LinkedIn</strong></a><strong> |</strong><a href="https://bit.ly/ipor-telegram-medium"><strong> Telegram</strong></a><strong> |</strong><a href="https://bit.ly/ipor-youtube-medium"><strong> YouTube</strong></a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*DMKKSJQkv2AT8Sq2.gif" /><figcaption>Inter Protocol Over-block Rate (IPOR) — The Heartbeat of DeFi</figcaption></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=5842d8e29f04" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://blog.ipor.io/fixed-income-in-defi-risk-management-for-dao-treasuries-part-1-5842d8e29f04">Fixed Income in DeFi: Risk Management for DAO Treasuries (Part 1)</a> was originally published in <a href="https://blog.ipor.io/">Fusion (by IPOR)</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Ve design , and the Nash equilibrium in a Sybil free environment. Part II]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@alvaro.serrano/ve-design-and-the-nash-equilibrium-in-a-sybil-free-environment-part-ii-986c5dcb4009?source=rss-ee1bf7a912ac------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/986c5dcb4009</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[ethereum]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[defi]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[game-theory]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Alvaro Serrano Rivas]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 11 Oct 2022 11:46:49 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-10-11T11:46:49.738Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Ve design , and the Nash equilibrium in a Sybil free environment. Part II</h3><h4>The aftermath of a be-all-end-all experiment</h4><p>At this point, as if there wasn’t enough game theory involved already, Andre Cronje and Daniele Sesta decided to join forces and use their social influence to attempt a new experiment in the Fantom blockchain, the <strong>ve(3,3)</strong> model, which combines the ve model with the prisioner’s dilemma implemented by <a href="https://www.olympusdao.finance/blog">Olympus Dao</a> and its most famous fork <a href="https://wonderland.money/">Wonderland</a>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/474/0*xEd9ANhz_mLQeL03" /><figcaption>The <strong>prisoner’s dilemma</strong> is a standard example of a game analyzed in <a href="https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Game_theory">game theory</a> that shows why two completely <a href="https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Rationality#Economics">rational</a> individuals might not cooperate, even if it appears that it is in their best interests to do so.</figcaption></figure><p>The motivation behind this experiment was based on the premise that these protocols are no longer accessible to users. Instead, they are meant to be used by other protocols that want deep liquidity. Naturally evolving from the ve model, this pair of builders was convinced that, by attaching the ve model on top of any revenue-generating protocol, they could reach a better incentives alignment among all users. According to this belief, they would manage to align long term holders’ desire to accumulate voting power, earn protocols fees, and make decisions on where to direct token emissions. Not only that, they also identified a piece of misalignment when it comes to only providing those incentives to liquidity providers. This means that the incentives are not related to the fees being captured by the protocol as much as they are to the liquidity.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*dEMr3ypbqkhj2G3u" /><figcaption>“Eventually, even the most loyal community member realizes their individual optimal move is to pop that baby and cashout the loot! The community of holders start like a family, but as individuals they have their own famiglias to think of.. Look for <a href="https://twitter.com/gametheorizing/status/1569684892031619072?s=46&amp;t=mmQfs_oZu-I6Udyb4r_Usg">the greed point of no return…</a>“</figcaption></figure><p>For example, if you look at CRV revenue from fees, you could argue that it is a function of liquidity, which lowers trading slippage, which causes more aggregators to route through your pool, which means higher fees… However, this mechanism does not actively promote the fees by itself. For instance, if you look at <a href="https://sushi.com/">Sushiswap</a>, the fee generation is not necessarily allocated to the most traded pairs.</p><p>Something similar happens with <a href="https://aave.com/">Aave</a>, whose liquidity incentives are not the result of a feedback loop initiated by borrowers. Indeed, <strong>ve</strong> would be the catalyst to initiate that feedback loop. In this manner, if we were to attach <strong>ve</strong> to Aave, we would expect that, for example, big depositors of DAI, who would also be holders of veAave, would vote for redirecting protocol fees to the borrowing rate of their desired pool, the DAI pool. Now, as the borrowing rate for DAI goes up (because there are no more incentives to borrow because the fees have been drained, it means that there are more depositors into the DAI pool because the interest rate for depositors also goes up, which in turn accrues more TVL (Total Value Locked). TVL up leads to fees going down, and now more people will borrow. So by increasing token emissions, now we can increase revenue from fees, once again as a result of a <strong>ve</strong> voting decision.</p><p>This was the beginning of <a href="https://andrecronje.medium.com/ve-3-3-44466eaa088b">ve(3,3)</a>, an experiment where Andre and Daniele attached the ve model to the most primitive protocol there is in DeFi, the constant product formula AMM.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*y8vNhGvsaat5opLa.jpeg" /><figcaption>By tokenizing the lock position, a single address can own more than one lock. Since locks balances are cumulative and each lock contributes to the overall ve balance, more locks can be traded on secondary markets as Non Fungible Tokens, participants can borrow against their locks…</figcaption></figure><p>With <a href="https://solidly.exchange/">Solidly</a>, people could use a <strong>ve</strong> token to vote on token emissions, which would reward pools with higher fees percentage, which would in turn go to <strong>ve</strong> token holders (that by voting for emissions would earn more fees as well). At a first glance, this seemed like an elegant solution that could be put on top of any protocol to solve the problem of decentralized governance and valueless tokens. But there must a caveat right?</p><ul><li>Are the long term believers in the protocol really allocating their resources to the correct revenue generating pairs in a pool?</li><li>Are token holders really rewarding the growth of the protocol?</li><li>Are the emissions being given out to the pools that are most valuable for the long term success of the protocol?</li></ul><p>And here is where Andre and Dani noticed that TVL was being favored over volume, and it should not be like that, since volume drives liquidity, which accumulates more fees… and you know how it goes. Their critic is basically that <strong>ve</strong> is positive for farmers and TVL, instead of users and trading volume.</p><p>Thereafter, <a href="https://solidly.exchange/">Solidly</a> was created with the purpose to achieve that the pool where you vote is where you earn the most protocol fees. This solves the problem that lockers in <a href="https://curve.fi/">Curve</a> would earn protocol fees independently of which pool they vote for. <a href="https://solidly.exchange/">Solidly</a> does not want its voters to sit back and earn protocol fees every week. Instead, the goal is to create a flywheel that self optimizes for fees. This was achieved with a slight modification: you only get fees from the pools you vote for, which means that, on a technical level, the protocol does not need to track TVL, volume… because <strong>ve</strong> holders will vote for the protocols that give them the best price (because they have the most liquidity), and therefore the best rewards for their liquidity, which naturally are the ones yielding more fees. In short, they will vote for the pools that give them the most fees, which will be most liquid and will attract most of the trading volume.</p><p>After such a rant, the opening question still remains, how can protocols use token incentives without negatively impacting its current and future users. Approaching the end of 2022, most protocols are still facing a huge problem: progressive decentralization and governance participation while bootstrapping protocol liquidity. Most of them are aware that, what works for <a href="https://curve.fi/">Curve </a>, doesn’t necessarily apply to others. However, protocols still want to reward long-term holders, but token emissions and economic inflation usually have a negative impact.</p><p>So far we have learnt that, if there is a lack of alignment between liquidity providers and a protocol’s long-term sustainability in terms of liquidity, the protocol in question is extremely unlikely to solve its problems with overly-aggressive liquidity mining programs. Lack of value capture outside of a speculative environment is not an easy problem to solve, and whoever comes up with the holy grail of tokenomics will definitely change the DeFi game for the good. Who that person or protocol will be? Nobody knows yet, but every experiment is taking the industry a step closer to the end goal, decentralized governance through valuable tokens.</p><p>Will there be a part 3 to this? Or will a protocol come up with a novel design that will invalidate my attempt by the end of the year? Who knows? As always, if you would like to share feedback or disagree with some of the statements made in this article, do not hesitate to reach out on <a href="https://twitter.com/FearsomeLamb789">Twitter</a>. Feel free to share and stay tuned for what’s coming next :)</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=986c5dcb4009" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Ve design , and the Nash equilibrium in a Sybil free environment. Part I]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@alvaro.serrano/ve-design-and-the-nash-equilibrium-in-a-sybil-free-environment-part-i-16fdfc82b622?source=rss-ee1bf7a912ac------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/16fdfc82b622</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[ethereum]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[game-theory]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[defi]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Alvaro Serrano Rivas]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 26 Sep 2022 11:41:41 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-09-26T11:41:41.215Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Ve design , and the Nash equilibrium in a Sybil free environment. Part I</h3><h4>The lead up to a be-all-end-all experiment</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/474/0*OfiKb9suuYPSkA_f" /><figcaption>In game theory, the Nash Equilibrium determines the optimal solution in a non-cooperative game in which each player lacks the incentive to change his/her initial strategy.</figcaption></figure><p>With the beginning of DeFi Summer in 2020 and the advent of succulent, yet imaginary yields coming out of the juiciest fruit coin around, liquidity mining programs became the de-facto standard for DeFi protocols to bootstrap their liquidity. At first, this method seemed to be vey efficient. However, its weaknesses started to show up over time, as more and more protocols imitated the model.</p><p>One farm after the other, native token issuance started to be perceived by investors as a cost-efficient manner to incentivize liquidity providers.Rushed by FOMO, retail participants also chased their piece of the pie and started to engage more actively in protocol governance and operations. Subsequently, so many protocols blindly followed the narrative without giving any further thought to the secondary effects that would later show up. Among the unintended consequences, which started to become more and more obvious, the emission of inflationary assets from a protocol treasury is the one that stood out the most, up to the point that some external actors referred to this activity as “magic internet money printing”. However, even with this magic, most protocols could not avoid the inherent selling pressure that comes from high token emission rates.</p><p>And that’s how a new design that quickly gained traction emerged, the <strong>ve</strong> model, whose goal was to achieve the perfect game theoretical equilibrium with respects to the incentive alignment of both long-term committed token holders and short-term speculators. This system consisted in giving different weights to different people in a Sybil free environment.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/proxy/0*F_9aA26xORV2HL6_" /><figcaption>Pioneered by Curve Finance, the <strong>ve token model</strong> has emerged as a popular among DAOs to solve the problem of valueless governance tokens. By encouraging long-term-oriented decision-making and incentives alignment across protocol stakeholders, this design has the goal to create favorable supply and demand dynamics for price appreciation.</figcaption></figure><p>Looking at it from a DAO perspective, where everything is on-chain, it is easy to support the argument that there must be different rewards weights assigned to each participant based on their incentives. For example, the short-term traders should have less power to influence the protocol’s trajectory and skew it on their favor. For example, if you are a token holder with a long term commitment to the protocol, you wouldn’t want things like flash loans manipulating gauges, draining community funds…</p><p>The basis for understanding this mechanism design in a Sybil free environment is that there is no credibility behind an Ethereum address. And even if there was, this credibility would be easily traded on a secondary market. Here is where the <strong>ve model</strong> intervenes by vesting tokens in a 4-year decaying ratio to the people who want long term success for the protocol.</p><ul><li>If you lock up for the maximum amount of 4 years, then you get 1 <strong>veCRV</strong> for every CRV</li><li>If you lock up for 1 year, you get 0.5 <strong>veCRV</strong> for every CRV</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*xWl5F7pJIkStcHquA3voNQ.png" /><figcaption>veCRV stands for voting escrow CRV. They are your CRV locked for voting. The longer you lock your CRV for, the more voting power you have (and the bigger boost you can reach). Your veCRV weight gradually decreases as your escrowed tokens approach their <a href="https://dao.curve.fi/locker">lock expiry</a>.</figcaption></figure><p>Since <strong>veCRV</strong> decides what pools get whitelisted, what protocols can participate in the flywheel, who gets CRV rewards… this created a whole ecosystem where bribes became the prevalent law. As a consequence, protocols saw an opportunity to create their own environment within the <a href="https://curve.fi/">Curve</a> ecosystem. In doing so, they launched their own stablecoin and attempted to direct liquidity to their own pool in order to benefit from the pegging mechanism that the <a href="https://curve.fi/">Curve</a> AMM provides.</p><p>Over time, <a href="https://curve.fi/">Curve</a> factories became a thing, which democratized access to the flywheel. However, that is not enough to attract enough liquidity. The reason why some <a href="https://curve.fi/">Curve</a> pools earn a lot of incentives is because they have a lot of liquidity. In other words, if you are a LP to one of these pools you will get the CRV token, which you could then lock up for more <strong>veCRV</strong>, which boosts your rewards even more… and now you are a player in a meta game which you thought would leave the most sophisticated game theorists in disbelief. Going back to the protocol, it is now willing to provide its own incentives on top of the CRV rewards in order to attract liquidity. The problem is that now the protocol needs to convince <strong>veCRV</strong> holders to vote for its pool. At the beginning, it was not an easy task. You had to find out who those whales were, how to talk to them…But all of a sudden bribes come into play and the Curve wars began, aka “I will give you a percentage of my native token supply so that you vote for my pool”.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1000/0*VBS8uFmWCOJeqr5S" /><figcaption>Both the total locked amount and the<a href="https://twitter.com/blockworksres/status/1549844860881944576/photo/1"> daily lock rate hit record highs in July 2022</a>, highlighting a rush to lock CRV even in the depths of a bear market. The rising length of CRV locks paired with the increasing use of locks indicates product market fit for CRV.</figcaption></figure><p>As you can see, a new meta game started. From the LPs point of view, if you are a LP and you don’t hold any veCRV, the protocol will act as if you had provided only 40% of your liquidity (you provide 100 units of liquidity and the protocol only takes 40 into account for its calculations). On the contrary, if you hold the maximum amount of veCRV, your contribution gets boosted by a 2.5x multiplier which turns those 40 units of liquidity into 100 units. There are more calculations involved, but this is the basic idea you need to understand.</p><p>Essentially, if you want to maximize your CRV rewards, then you must optimize for the amount of <strong>veCRV</strong>, which means that you have to lock up your tokens for at most 4 years, and who knows what the price of CRV will be in 4 years. Did Curve even exist 4 years ago? This is a big sacrifice considering the huge opportunity cost of being invested in a protocol for such a long period of time.</p><p>But that’s not the end of the Curve Wars, since<a href="https://www.convexfinance.com/">Convex Finance</a> entered the DeFi scene by building a governance layer on top of Curve and its <strong>ve</strong> design. This was the beginning of a new flywheel that allowed for 3 possible activities with different reward mechanisms respectively.</p><ul><li><strong>Staking LP tokens: </strong>Providing liquidity on the Curve and staking those LP tokens into <a href="https://www.convexfinance.com/">Convex</a>. This lets a user earn boosted $CRV rewards without holding <strong>veCRV</strong>.</li><li><strong>Staking CRV in exchange for yield-bearing cvxCRV. </strong>Rewards for cvxCRV are similar to those of holding veCRV, except for the upside of holding a liquid token plus a 10% CRV distribution from protocol fees.</li><li><strong>Staking and locking CRV </strong>for around 1% additional rewards</li></ul><blockquote>All these 3 action accrue value for CVX tokens while also increasing the voting power of <a href="https://www.convexfinance.com/">Convex</a> over Curve. <a href="https://www.convexfinance.com/">Convex</a> currently holds more than 50% of <strong>veCRV</strong></blockquote><p>Because of this new unexpected dynamic introduced by <a href="https://www.convexfinance.com/">Convex</a>, now <a href="https://www.convexfinance.com/">Convex</a> made it possible for any individual to boost their position, since <a href="https://www.convexfinance.com/">Convex</a> would lock up CRV in your behalf. On top of, <a href="https://www.convexfinance.com/">Convex</a> also introduced off-chain voting for emissions. Now there are two options: vote with veCRV, or use CVX tokens.</p><p>Remember how at the beginning we mentioned how beneficial Curve’s pegging mechanism was for protocols that issue their own stablecoin like MIM, FRAX…? Well, now this protocols have the alternative of using CVX, which has a lower locking period of 16 weeks.</p><p>In part II, we will not cover <a href="https://votium.app/">Votium</a>, <a href="https://redacted.finance/">Redacted Butterfly </a>accumulating CVX…but rather a more game theoretical approach that will involve well known actors like Andre Cronje and Daniele Sesta. Part II will serve as an introduction to the <strong>ve(3,3)</strong> model, which combines the ve model with the prisioner’s dilemma implemented by <a href="https://www.olympusdao.finance/blog">Olympus Dao</a> and its most famous fork <a href="https://wonderland.money/">Wonderland</a>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/474/0*xEd9ANhz_mLQeL03" /><figcaption>The <strong>prisoner’s dilemma</strong> is a standard example of a game analyzed in <a href="https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Game_theory">game theory</a> that shows why two completely <a href="https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Rationality#Economics">rational</a> individuals might not cooperate, even if it appears that it is in their best interests to do so.</figcaption></figure><p>Hope this piece was helpful to understand the origin of the Curve Wars. These series of articles aims to be a primer on the token design mechanism experiments that rode the entire impulse to the top of the 2021 bull market. If you would like to share feedback or disagree with some of the statements made in this article, do not hesitate to reach out on <a href="https://twitter.com/FearsomeLamb789">Twitter</a>. If you enjoyed Part I, feel free to share and stay tuned for what’s coming next :)</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=16fdfc82b622" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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