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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by alvasvoboda on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by alvasvoboda on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@alvasvoboda?source=rss-490f906544b1------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by alvasvoboda on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@alvasvoboda?source=rss-490f906544b1------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[“The Code of Capital”]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@alvasvoboda/the-code-of-capital-529876347267?source=rss-490f906544b1------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/529876347267</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[real-estate]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[alvasvoboda]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 01 Nov 2019 02:53:40 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-11-01T02:53:40.571Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I’ve just finished reading Katharina Pistor’s book, <em>The Code of Capital</em>. Pistor’s argument draws together threads of thinking about how global capitalism is increasing, and perhaps based in, wealth inequality (meaning property, or capital, inequality), but adds a longer view to recent books on the triumph of neoliberalism and economic segregation. Pistor’s view is as a historian (or thinker about the history) of law, specifically “private law” or law developed by lawyers in the course of creating new legal structures of property law, arguing cases, or getting governments to agree to arrangements that governments had little to no hand in making. Her view is accordingly less of reversals of previous controls imposed on or taken off of capitalism, than of the continuous accumulation of protections for capital over centuries, never really reversed, slow, incremental, and almost inexorable.</p><p>My own interest in law and property was not much aroused by going through the pains of buying a home, despite the many entry points into the American capitalist system such an experience provides. Like many people, I viewed the experience through the lens of meeting requirements to buy and then going through the process of buying; behind the endless initialing of contracts there was perhaps some mix of learning and cultural reinforcement about the meaning of “being middle class” in America, but I didn’t much regard it.</p><p>Last year, however, I bought a Groupon to do the course in California Real Estate required for a license, and after some procrastination, actually finished it and took the exam to prove to myself that I’d learned something. That turned out to be a way to focus my thoughts on the American legal system the way nothing else except serving on a jury has done. And where jury service inspired me with the ways in which reasoning individuals, thinking and debating on a deadly serious matter, can still be part of the American political process, real estate impressed me with the inexorable complexity of the building of the property legal system.</p><p>Katharina Pistor’s book clarified my sense of the legal superstructures of property beyond American real estate to all the asset classes worth money in 2019. And in doing so, I think she offered an account of political power in the modern world that is as fundamental as, but improves on, that of Foucault, who traced power’s mutations via the examination in <em>Discipline and Punish</em> so as to parallel his previous accounts of the treatment of madness and epistemology and his later presentations on sexuality, all in a structuralist mode.</p><p>In Pistor’s narrative of the intertwining accumulation of power by capital and lawyer’s, unlike Foucault’s, there is a granular account of the activities of creative lawyers, and of the materialization of power, at the same time as capital evolves in the seemingly dematerializing directions of legal forms (trusts and contracts etc.) and new forms of ownership (of intellectual property and genetic code, most recently, along with exotic financial derivatives). The transnational forms of law, in her telling, are a fundamental threat to democracy, but a threat that can be “decoded,” as it were, through an active commitment to dismantling legal forms that have never been subjected to a full democratic review. Her hope links, in my mind, to what I see as the greatest promise of an Elizabeth Warren presidency: a move (I won’t call it a return, though I was tempted to) to democratic control of capitalism both wide and deep.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=529876347267" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[An Optimistic Vision]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@alvasvoboda/an-optimistic-vision-8bdf8905e574?source=rss-490f906544b1------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/8bdf8905e574</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[alvasvoboda]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 30 Sep 2019 01:54:03 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-09-30T01:54:03.636Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The optimism in Elizabeth Warren’s political program appears to be outright denied or disregarded in stories like one from a few weeks back in the San Francisco Chronicle titled <a href="https://www.sfchronicle.com/politics/article/Democrats-sounding-less-aspiration-more-14376230.php?psid=lZdDk">“Where are the happy warriors?”</a> by the Chronicle’s senior political writer, Joe Garofoli. Garofoli’s premise is that “ Successful presidential candidates sell sunshine and an optimistic vision for America — along with their plans on how to get to those sunnier days,” which seems unexceptionable, except that the way he characterizes Warren is: “Massachusetts Sen. Elizabeth Warren and Vermont Sen. Bernie Sanders rail on the billionaire class and map out plans for fundamental change.” It’s problematic to lump Warren’s analysis of the corrupt and undue power of “the billionaire class” in with Sanders’ because it demonstrates Garofoli’s disinclination to listen to either of them carefully, but also because it treats “plans for fundamental change” as no more than a populist expression of anger.</p><p>Joseph E. Stiglitz’s book <em>People, Power, and Profits</em> supplies an excellent antidote to the unfortunate political memes generated by the off-hand and summary judgments of pundits like Garofoli. “Railing on the billionaire class” is a Trumpian phrase to dismiss the careful economic history that Stiglitz provides of the growth in power of the American economic elite; after all, the “billionaire class” didn’t even exist in the 1960’s when I was a kid, and its emergence has been highly correlated to the deregulation of finance and the loss of job protections that have been major economic forces over the half century since.</p><p>Stiglitz’s book is a good precis of the overall program of an optimistic progressive capitalist like Warren, and it inspires me with a hope that it may be possible, not to make America great again, but to pursue a program that builds on what is great, what has been great, what might be great in a future built on science rather than the madness of crowds.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8bdf8905e574" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[“Twilight of the Elites”]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@alvasvoboda/twilight-of-the-elites-4200a2742ab6?source=rss-490f906544b1------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/4200a2742ab6</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[inequality]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[christophe-guilluy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[alvasvoboda]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 11 Sep 2019 12:48:29 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-09-11T12:48:29.759Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Keeping in mind that France and the United States represent distinct idea-universes with common origins in the heads of eighteenth-century men of means, there has nevertheless been a mutual regard between the two manifolds as they’ve developed. Globalization has changed the nature of that dialogue: both the French and the American unities have been changed, and perhaps besmirched, by the convincing platitudes of capitalism. A particularly significant change that both polities have experienced in the past couple of decades has been a vengeful return of social and economic (and therefore racial, in terms of each country’s particular racism) segregation.</p><p>The temptation is to draw too close of an analogy between the forms of segregation experienced in France and the U.S., just because on first approximation the forms and causes look “the same”: technology-based economic activities moving into cities which at the same time become unaffordable to all but those qualified to work in the new activities, except for small enclaves of service workers preserved so someone is there to serve coffee in the morning and clean the toilets at night.</p><p>It takes a geographer to make the careful distinctions, along with the analogies, required to describe and evaluate the current states of American and French inequality and their political effects. Christophe Guilluy in <a href="https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300233766/twilight-elites"><em>Twilight of the Elites</em></a> is a persuasive, but perhaps not punctilious, geographer, in that the data he assembles about the marginalization of the working class in France is presented more to polemical than scientific effect. Like so many French structuralists preceding him, he sees and feels compelled to present data that by its nature must be messier than he allows in a way that supports a strict dichotomy: in his argument, the break between a privileged set of French metropolitan areas and the rest of France, the economic “periphery,” looks so absolute that the gulf between the two ways of life looks unbridgeable.</p><p>Presenting the “data” in this way (seemingly without ambiguity) enables Guilluy to express his sympathies for the downtrodden in France very persuasively, because part of his argument is that the anger of the working class is due to the very fact that they can’t bridge the gap to the more prosperous lives of bourgeois professionals in the big cities. However, the dichotomous does not allow for “liberal” solutions in terms of either politics or economics, even though a restoration of the French welfare state appears to be exactly what Guilluy would ultimately advocate for.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4200a2742ab6" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[“The Production of Money”]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@alvasvoboda/the-production-of-money-87fc0213d841?source=rss-490f906544b1------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/87fc0213d841</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[john-maynard-keynes]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[elizabeth-warren]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ann-pettifor]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[alvasvoboda]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 03 Sep 2019 04:05:56 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-09-09T13:38:50.423Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Credit and finance are topics that have kept me befogged for years, no matter how deeply enmeshed in their systems I’ve been as a consumer.</p><p>I got a strong inkling that a profound demystification of these topics was possible from having a look at some of Elizabeth Warren’s popular works, which point both toward the deceptive behavior of lenders involved in all the various forms of consumer credit, and point the way toward a much more strongly regulated regime in which we consumers would gain awareness and some tools to resist or get redress from credit predation.</p><p>Warren doesn’t disregard the personal responsibility of people such as myself who’ve used their credit cards as if they were their own money, but she offers a way out of the maze; and more importantly, she distinguishes between cases of mere profligacy (where I’d place myself, unfortunately), and the statistically more significant population of people in need who borrowed to deal with exigency, and now find themselves in a kind of sharecropper relationship with the too-big-to-fail lenders.</p><p>Ann Pettifor’s book <a href="https://www.versobooks.com/books/2706-the-production-of-money"><em>The Production of Money</em></a> offers a deeper insight into the corrosive effects of consumer lending as it has evolved over the past several decades, and into the larger world of national and international finance as well. If I were to summarize my understanding of her book’s main points, they would be:</p><ol><li>The responsibility for setting interest rates, the quantity of credit money available, and ultimately the standards for lending belongs squarely to national governments. They should never have yielded this responsibility to private banks, and they should take it back.</li><li>Private banks operate the credit system to make the rich richer and the poor poorer, but they lack control over a fundamental driver of credit markets: the demand for credit by customers. Advocacy by monetary activists to the left of Pettifor (referred to approvingly by Bernie Sanders and Alexandra Ocasio-Cortez) of creation of money and management of its supply for public purposes by technocrats also disregards the importance of the demand-side driver.</li><li>The middle path solution is a return to Keynes, not just Keynes the master of fiscal policies to use deficit finance for public works, but Keynes the advocate of activist central banks managing credit so that enough money is available for all the things advocates of big structural change like Elizabeth Warren want to do.</li></ol><p>The book is brief, persuasively written, and very important. I recommend that it be widely read and hope that it will influence people’s political choices. And meanwhile, I’m working very hard to pay down my credit cards, keeping in mind the signal truth both Warren and Pettifor have convinced me of: credit is best used for investment, not when treated as seeming cash for daily spending.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=87fc0213d841" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Rents versus profits in electricity markets]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@alvasvoboda/rents-versus-profits-in-electricity-markets-86971c16a244?source=rss-490f906544b1------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/86971c16a244</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[alvasvoboda]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 26 Mar 2019 03:51:04 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-03-26T03:51:04.135Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Every chapter of Schlefer’s book contains relevant gems, at least up to this point. His book makes some points similar to those in Mariana Mazzucato’s book <em>The Value of Everything</em>, which I’ve been reading at somewhat the same time as <em>The Assumptions Economists Make</em>.</p><p>Chapter 4 of the Schlefer book is all about Ricardo, a famous economist with whom I haven’t acquainted myself directly, but from whom the term “rents,” distinguished somehow from the rents I paid when I rented an apartment on Athol Avenue in Oakland, has been sourced and always struck a little bit of trepidation deep within me.</p><p>The basic idea of rent is that it is “unproductive” income, that is to say, money earned by people who own property or other rights and earn income from it without doing anything to add value to it. But it’s pretty obvious that such a concept is as much a matter of interpretation as of fact, and Schlefer describes Ricardo’s story of how economics works as a world in which the best land is taken first, then the next best, until the marginal land is being worked by the people (capitalists and labor) who are actually, on the margin, adding value and not earning anything beyond what they actually contribute to the value of the world.</p><p>Some interpretations would thus have it that anyone whose profits aren’t marginal, because they’re for example producing electricity at a cost below what the marginal producer of electricity must pay to produce, is earning rent. And because marginal producers have to work harder than anyone else in a given market, it seems from my own experience to be true that the highest cost producers of electricity feel a certain resentment of the “inframarginal” producers whose marginal costs are below their own, and hence earn much higher profits when the price is set at that marginal cost of production without doing anything in the moment to deserve it. The label of “rent” has been applied frequently to coal and nuclear plants in the past, and now gets aimed at solar and wind farms, even though in all of these cases people have had to to take substantial capital risks to pay for such production, and many workers have labored hard and dare I say productively at all of them.</p><p>But although the marginal electricity producers feel some resentment at their thin or even nonexistent profit margins, the real irony of the concept of rent as applied to electricity is felt in the same accusation of unfair profits being levelled at inframarginal producers by customers, people who may also be characterized as in some sense receiving rents because they pay far less for electricity than its true value to them as the conduit of modern life.</p><p>The concept of rent thus may have sharp edges ready to cut any who apply it too carelessly.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=86971c16a244" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Demand-side Market Power versus Supply-side Market Power: the First California Electricity Market…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@alvasvoboda/demand-side-market-power-versus-supply-side-market-power-the-first-california-electricity-market-aa8872c14183?source=rss-490f906544b1------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/aa8872c14183</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[alvasvoboda]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 09 Mar 2019 05:13:46 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-03-09T05:13:46.426Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Demand-side Market Power versus Supply-side Market Power: the First California Electricity Market and Adam Smith’s Muddle</h3><p>Chapter 3 of Jonathan Schlefer’s <em>The Assumptions Economists Make </em>presents an argument that requires, for most of us raised in the era of confident free market rhetoric, some mulling over: namely, that Adam Smith shouldn’t necessarily be trusted as gospel because, for one thing, he didn’t really have a model supporting his claims for how economies work (and that’s aside from the possibility that his claims weren’t really anything like those of his seeming exponents of the current century).</p><p>One difficulty with not having a quantitative model to represent a market, even a hypothetical market, is that concepts like “market power” which have both qualitative and quantitative interpretations are given quantitative “weight” when it really isn’t justified. An example that occurs to me is the degree to which the first California electricity market was designed, in 1998, to not just mitigate but prevent any possibility of market power being exerted by load serving entities.</p><p>One of the state legislature’s intentions in the deregulation was to strip the three California utilities of their monopoly power and encourage competitive entry, on both the supply and the demand sides. The utilities were required to divest themselves of many generation assets, and to bid almost all of the customer load they managed into the California Power Exchange’s “power pool.” Although they could refuse (and ultimately did refuse) to pay day ahead power pool prices if they were too exorbitant, and take some or all of their load to the real time balancing market run by the California Independent System Operator, they were not permitted to hedge most of the risk of the day ahead power pool via forward transactions. The restriction on forward transactions was intended to prevent the utilities from exercising market power by artificially depressing market prices, thereby driving suppliers out of the market and giving the edge to their own remaining sources of supply.</p><p>The lack of a model which is the subject of this post showed in a market design that set no quantitative guardrails, but rather presumed that the utilities would always have the ability to exercise market power, no matter what the countervailing powers on the supply side might be. In this sense the market design was the foremost culprit when clever suppliers determined they could use it to their advantage, artificially restricting supply until demand cleared helplessly at $9999/MWh day ahead (at which point the utilities “got permission” to refuse to pay such extortionate prices; then became insolvent; then required the state government, the same state government so concerned about their market power, to cover the supply they could no longer provide themselves by paying very high prices— ultimately almost as extortionate as the sky-high day ahead prices, but spread over many years — with long-term forward contracts covered by government bonds).</p><p>I take Schlefer’s critique to apply not only to Adam Smith, who didn’t have the mathematical armature to create a modern economic model, but to modern free marketers who do have the armature but choose to not use it, or use it sloppily — and likewise to those political entities that implement market reforms from the gut-brain rather than the brain-brain.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=aa8872c14183" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[“Equity and efficiency of unit commitment in competitive electric markets” and the turn of the…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@alvasvoboda/equity-and-efficiency-of-unit-commitment-in-competitive-electric-markets-and-the-turn-of-the-983d38230126?source=rss-490f906544b1------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/983d38230126</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[energy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economic-models]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[enron]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[california]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[electricity-market]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[alvasvoboda]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 24 Feb 2019 03:26:40 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-02-24T03:26:40.210Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>“Equity and efficiency of unit commitment in competitive electric markets” and the turn of the century California electric market crisis</h3><p>The second chapter of Jonathan Schlefer’s <em>The Assumptions Economists Make </em>has as its title the question “What Do Economists Do?” To which Schlefer provides the answer “They make, analyze and argue about models.”</p><p>That reminds me of the one academic paper I’ve really had a creative hand in, over a long career of “collaborating” with people smarter than myself who actually did all the work of research and writing papers which included me as a co-author. That paper had various titles, but was finally published as<a href="https://ei.haas.berkeley.edu/research/papers/PWP/pwp039.pdf"> “Equity and efficiency of unit commitment in competitive electric markets,”</a> by the Program on Workable Energy Regulation at U.C. Berkeley. The paper argued that because the anticipated electricity market in California, like the ones previously developed in England and Norway, would be based on an algorithm run by a central system operator, it was paradoxically important that market participants be able to “internalize” their fixed costs and lumpy decisions, rather than representing them explicitly to the operator.</p><p>The reason for the paradox was that, according to us, the solutions of a mixed integer unit commitment that represented fixed costs and lumpy decisions, being combinatorial, were prone to leaving suppliers dissatisfied — indeed, leaving apparently economic offers on the table — even at the “near-optimal” solution such algorithms could produce based on my own experience at the time. So in one solution, one generator that had properly represented its willingness to serve might find itself left out of the market, while another generator whose bids were actually slightly less economic was chosen instead — but it would be almost impossible to divine which bids were actually more or less economic at that point, because of the complexity of the problem.</p><p>My role in the paper was primarily to provide a working unit commitment model and some solutions demonstrating the case we were making: a simulation, in other words, of an electricity market. Or to go back to Schlefer, a model of a market that was also an algorithm that might be used to actually <em>run</em> an electricity market. We advocated for a simpler model that just matched linear supply bids against linear demand bids, segment by segment, until supply matched demand in each market hour; the premise being that market participants would escalate their bid segments by whatever they needed to recover the costs and risks of starting up and shutting down their plants. This market algorithm, originally implemented in California as the “California Power Exchange,” is known as an “energy-only” market and is what is still the fundamental structure of the Texan and Australian electricity markets, and maybe some others.</p><p>I leave it to the reader to determine, through assiduous research, whether our paper actually had an effect on decisions of market structure; but if it did, I’m inclined to believe in retrospect that our influence was not positive, and that the energy-only original structure of the California electricity market was one ingredient among many in the flawed market design, taken advantage of by cunning but not really smart people (else they would have realized their games were unsustainable and self-destructive as well as more generally destructive) in the slow then fast collapse of the first California electricity market in 2001.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=983d38230126" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[General Equilibrium Models and the Genealogy of Electricity Markets]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@alvasvoboda/general-equilibrium-models-and-the-genealogy-of-electricity-markets-e29ae05d855d?source=rss-490f906544b1------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e29ae05d855d</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[energy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[markets-in-action]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[alvasvoboda]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 18 Feb 2019 16:36:53 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-02-18T16:36:53.745Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Reading Jonathan Schlefer’s book <a href="http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674975408"><em>The Assumptions Economists Make</em></a> this weekend — actually just the first chapter of the book, titled “The Metaphor of the Invisible Hand” — I realized that in the course of thirty-five years working on the modeling side of the electricity business, it had never occurred to me to think hard about the relationship between electricity markets and markets as economists define them, whether free or otherwise. I’ve probably had the occasional thought about comparing the elaborate structures of electricity markets to forms of central planning, but it turns out, reading Schlefer in light of some other presentations I tried to absorb over the weekend at <a href="https://ieor.berkeley.edu/people/faculty/oren">Shmuel Oren</a>’s 75th birthday/retirement symposium (Oren was my thesis advisor, a quarter century ago), that I haven’t really learned the most important economic lessons my experience should have taught me.</p><p>I summarize the message Schlefer’s chapter had for me as: first, the notion that free trading among participants alone (equivalently, the setting and changing of prices by participants) will lead to an economic solution that is in any sense “best” is without theoretical or empirical foundation. This I have “known,” semi-consciously, because terrible bubbles happen and because I don’t really have a role in setting most prices for markets I personally participate in and because that’s how the math works out, convergence isn’t guaranteed when the problem being solved doesn’t have nice convexity properties, in general. But what’s amazing is that I hadn’t drawn a connection between pricing in general (where in fact I accept <a href="https://blogs.lawrence.edu/economics/2013/05/hayek-on-the-price-system.html">Hayek’s thesis</a> that there is no better way of coordinating a dynamic economy, optimal or not, and indeed free market or not) and the way prices are set in contemporary algorithmic electricity markets, such as those run by the California Independent System Operator in which my company participates.</p><p>Which brings me to the second part of Schlefer’s message: general-equilibrium models are a better representation of how markets solve or don’t solve than any ideological just-so stories provided by the “invisible hand” orthodoxy (better also, though he doesn’t quite say so, than Keynesian models based largely on “animal spirits” fixing market dysfunctions or not).</p><p>General-equilibrium models, Schlefer writes, are models that solve for stable price points in systems involving many products and prices, and a variety of supply and demand functions. These models demonstrate, in mathematical terms, that stable price solutions don’t always exist, and that even when stable price solutions (equilibria) do exist, purely price-based optimizations don’t generally find them, and shocks can knock systems out of equilibrium without hope of return. He compares economies not to the aerodynamic stability of passenger planes, but the tenuous and challenging control of fighter jets.</p><p>What I realized at Shmuel Oren’s symposium, listening to <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/254982765_Generalized_equilibrium_modeling_the_methodology_of_the_SRI-Gulf_energy_model_Final_report">Robert Phillips</a> and others describe the history of general-equilibrium models specifically for energy markets, and then hearing <a href="https://eccointl.com/about-us/principal-bios.html">Alex Papalexopoulos</a> provide his superhero-origin story for the design of California ISO’s electricity markets (the original ones that got smashed up in the 2001 electricity market crisis in California, but also and especially the redesigned ones that the California ISO has continued to work with up to the present day/hour/second), is that the California electricity market is a general equilibrium model, solved by a central optimizer to yield a stable set of prices that no market participant can do <em>much</em> better than, but <em>not </em>representing some hypothetical process of trading or free market pricing that would converge on that solution if only participants could trade fast enough and (for their own little objective functions) optimally enough.</p><p>So from one vantage it’s almost a misnomer to define daily spot electricity markets as markets at all; and from another vantage they are markets that do better than any possible real market could do, but do what such markets <em>should</em> do — more or less, and with no guarantee of true “optimality,” though that may be neither really important nor achievable anyway.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e29ae05d855d" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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