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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Amin Sabeti on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Amin Sabeti on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Amin Sabeti on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Hackers Are Infecting Android Devices and Iranians Don’t Even Know It]]></title>
            <link>https://aminsabeti.medium.com/hackers-are-infecting-android-devices-and-iranians-dont-even-know-it-f31dff5f48ca?source=rss-3b7083dd5e81------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[malware]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iran]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybercrime]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[digital-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Amin Sabeti]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 02 Sep 2018 17:20:05 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-09-02T17:20:05.373Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*7-wfqHqFRrgInPk_QgwUAw.jpeg" /><figcaption>The botnet of fraudulent advertising in Iran (Certfa)</figcaption></figure><p>Iran is no stranger to the global digital security community. This week, cybersecurity firm FireEye released a <a href="https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/08/suspected-iranian-influence-operation.html">report</a> about a network of Iranian accounts and groups on social media platforms attempting to manipulate users and also hack their accounts. Though big stories like this tend to focus on Iranian cyber attacks against Western government interests and infrastructure, these networks of hackers are also causing major trouble for Iranian citizens as well.</p><p>Certfa, a digital security <a href="https://blog.certfa.com/">firm</a> focusing on Iranian cyber threats, recently discovered a new range of criminal activities by Iranian hackers, which is costing Iran’s citizens millions of dollars each year. Their latest scheme is <a href="https://blog.certfa.com/posts/pushiran-dl-malware-family/">PushIran.DL</a>, a malware that allows fraudulent ads to pop-up on Android devices, the most popular mobile device used by Iranians. According to Certfa’s investigation, over 1.3 million Android devices are infected with PushIran.DL, although it’s believed that up to 10 million devices may be infected.</p><p>PushIran.DL was developed by Raman and Raaz, two registered companies in Iran that have <a href="https://blog.certfa.com/posts/pushiran-dl-malware-family/app-list.pdf">published</a> at least 220 different Android apps. Some of their popular apps include: Super Mario, Smart Antivirus AppLock, My File Management, and XoXo Girl Game. The main money-making feature of PushIran.DL works through Value-Added Services (VAS), a service that provides mobile advertisements among other things to online businesses.</p><p>When PushIran.DL developers signed agreements with companies and VAS providers, they added text message-based activation to their apps, which abused the service by providing uninformed consent to users or not offering consent at all. As a result, Iranian users pay daily fees of 2,000 to 4,000 Iranian rials (0.04 to 0.09 US cents) on their monthly mobile phone bills — money that ends up in cyber criminals’ bank accounts.</p><p>According to Certfa’s investigation, businesses that have agreements with telecommunication companies receive an approximate sum of 1.17 billion Iranian rials ($25,570) per day through VAS just from ten malicious apps alone.</p><p>Apart from making revenue from VAS, developers have been using PushIran.DL to offer the following services to businesses: Install Android apps on users’ devices without their permission; Share targeted notifications based on users’ operator, location, age, gender and device model; Increase Instagram and Telegram post views by automatically opening Instagram pages or Telegram channels on infected devices; Display commercial pop-ups to infected devices; Clickjack to increase the views of different websites, by forcing users to visit websites or load websites in the background of infected devices without user consent; Redirect users to various web pages including VAS websites.</p><p>PushIran.DL has been using seven different methods to infect Iranian Android devices. These methods allow hackers to create different networks that can feed back into each other. For example, a developer can send a command to ask its malicious app — which the user has already installed on his/her device — to start downloading another malicious app with its own functionalities.</p><p>Given that PushIran.DL has tens of thousands of users, the total number of unwilling installations of these second wave malicious apps on Android markets such as Google Play and Cafe Bazaar — an Iranian app store — can increase rapidly, and on some occasions they have appeared in the top trending section. Consequently, these apps are then able to infect new devices, which allows developers of PushIran.DL to easily distribute new versions of malicious apps at an exponential rate.</p><p>But that’s not all. Iranian intelligence services can use these malicious apps to conduct large-scale surveillance operations. This isn’t unprecedented since Iranian intelligence has collaborated in the past with well-known hackers to target dissidents and activists inside and outside the country.</p><p>The Iranian intelligence services work above the law, but the developers and companies behind PushIran.DL don’t. Online fraud and holding unauthorised access to users’ data is illegal according to Iranian computer crimes <a href="https://www.article19.org/data/files/medialibrary/2921/12-01-30-FINAL-iran-WEB%5B4%5D.pdf">law</a>. Therefore, the patrons of PushIran.DL could be sentenced up to five years in prison for these offences. Despite Certfa bringing attention to the malware, the Iranian Ministry of Information and Communications Technology and Iran’s Computer Emergency Response <a href="https://www.certcc.ir/">Team</a> haven’t addressed the problem.</p><p>Though Iranian authorities haven’t taken any action against PushIran.DL or its developers, there are several ways to mitigate the risks posed by this malware. Policymakers and tech companies such as Google should push Google Play to take down these apps. Currently, Google Play is a playground for Iranian hackers, who can freely upload their malicious apps to the online store with little or no ramifications. Similarly, only some anti-virus software companies are able to identify PushIran.DL’s signature. There needs to be a greater push for all companies to update their software to not just identify PushIran.DL, but other Iranian-made malware as well.</p><p>It’s also important for civil society and Iranian diaspora media outlets to raise public awareness inside Iran about the threat of malware through traditional and social media. Most victims of these cyber crimes are completely oblivious about the risks posed by malware, and in some cases don’t even realise that their mobile phone is infected.</p><p>Now that PushIran.DL intentions are known, it’s up to civil society and tech companies to take action before this malware spreads, infecting all Iranian Android devices.</p><p><a href="https://blog.certfa.com/posts/pushiran-dl-malware-family/">Read CERTFA’s comprehensive report on PushIran.DL</a>.</p><p><em>This article was initially published on </em><a href="http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/hackers-are-infecting-android-devices-and-iranians-don-t-even-know-it"><em>Atlantic Council</em></a><em>. Amin Sabeti is the founder of </em><a href="https://blog.certfa.com/"><em>Certfa</em></a><em>, a digital security team with far-ranging expertise in the resolution of cybersecurity threats in Iran. He is a regular commentator on Persian and English media outlets about internet freedom and digital security in Iran. Follow him on Twitter: </em><a href="https://twitter.com/AminSabeti"><em>@AminSabeti</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f31dff5f48ca" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Iran’s Cyber Police or FATA is the cyber arm of Iran’s Police which tries to protect Iranian people…]]></title>
            <link>https://aminsabeti.medium.com/iran-s-cyber-police-or-fata-is-the-cyber-arm-of-iran-s-police-which-tries-to-protect-iranian-people-85f8066db542?source=rss-3b7083dd5e81------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[iran]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[digital-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cyber-police]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Amin Sabeti]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 11 Oct 2015 19:28:41 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-10-11T19:28:41.139Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://www.cyberpolice.ir/">Iran’s Cyber Police or FATA</a> is the cyber arm of Iran’s Police which tries to protect Iranian people against cyber criminals and cyber threats.</p><p>Today, I tried to check their website and I was shocked. Why?</p><p>Because as you can see, their SSL certification has not been valid since 7th of November 2012. It’s nearly 3 years! It means no one in FATA has checked it since 2012 while their main duty is about digital security.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/507/1*PXf0egmxkubhiE65MyEhgg.png" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=85f8066db542" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Top 10 Passwords in Iran]]></title>
            <link>https://aminsabeti.medium.com/top-10-passwords-in-iran-a48cf0a3a4be?source=rss-3b7083dd5e81------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[passwords]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[digital-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iran]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Amin Sabeti]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 25 Feb 2015 16:50:40 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-02-25T16:50:40.718Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In the last days of 2014, <a href="http://facenama.com/">Facenama</a>- an Iranian version of Facebook- was hacked by anonymous hacker(s) and details of more than 116,000 users were published.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/652/1*DJFaGKv-ugH9tnEhlsNetQ.png" /><figcaption>Leaked database of Facenama. Note: Due to users’ privacy, I blurred the image.</figcaption></figure><p>A few days after disclosing database, I downloaded it due to my curiosity that I really liked to know what kind of passwords is used by Iranians. Why?</p><p>Because we had not had such information that helped us to find out the most popular passwords in Iran.</p><p>The data volume was massive (more than 160,000 records) and it was difficult to analyse them. So, I decided to clean it and only keep the passwords that were repeated more than 10 times.</p><p>By filtering leaked passwords based on number of frequency, I identify <a href="https://github.com/aminsabeti/Facenama-Top-Passwords">347 common passwords</a>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/270/1*wKwisZvoIvcAS3l0trmfFg.png" /><figcaption>Top 10 passwords on Facenama in the MD5 format.</figcaption></figure><p>As you can see, all passwords are in the MD5 format that is nonsense! Hence, I did a simple search for a website that can decrypt MD5 format. I found <a href="http://www.hashkiller.co.uk/">HashKiller</a> can decrypt the most and obvious MD5 without any problem.</p><p>By using of HashKiller, I managed to decrypt near all passwords (99.42%) that you can see the result on <a href="https://github.com/aminsabeti/Facenama-Top-Passwords">GitHub</a> or <a href="https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1NOwITKsK6SyLXt-zh7qFh6lgFRUzkx8xcUfSI-9VYsM/edit#gid=0">Google Spreadsheet</a>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*Q8dJDItgqB9xCpBLTcrgjw.png" /><figcaption>Top 10 passwords on Facenama.com</figcaption></figure><p>The number one password that has been used by Iranians is <strong><em>123456</em></strong> which is the most popular password <a href="http://gizmodo.com/the-25-most-popular-passwords-of-2014-were-all-doomed-1680596951">in the world</a>.</p><p>In addition, I notice that Facenama did not have a confirmation process for email addresses because there are invalid email addresses in the database such as ……@yahoo.com!</p><p><em>If you would like to have conversation about this story, you can send an email to aminsabeti [at] gmail [dot] com or poke me @AminSabeti on Twitter.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a48cf0a3a4be" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[‘5-second rule’ for Phishing]]></title>
            <link>https://aminsabeti.medium.com/5-second-rule-for-phishing-ebd8de2ce689?source=rss-3b7083dd5e81------2</link>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Amin Sabeti]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 24 Oct 2014 16:02:45 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2014-10-24T16:03:38.530Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Since 2009, I have worked in the digital security sector and have been involved in training many people from a wide variety of background and countries. In addition to this, I have had practical experience in helping a number of victims secure their accounts after <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phishing">Phishing attacks</a>.</p><p>In my experience, the main reason why the majority of people lose their accounts is due to the increasing incidence of Phishing; a recent <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-21508660">high-profile example</a> of this is The Associated Press’ (AP) Twitter account being hacked by the Syrian Electronic Army (SEA).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/640/0*mgxpP8P6AU2MCh5I." /><figcaption>The fake Tweet was sent by the SEA on @AP (Source: <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-21508660">BBC</a>)</figcaption></figure><p>So, whenever I talk about Phishing at digital security workshops, the majority of people ask how they can protect themselves and what is <em>the easiest way </em>to protect themselves. I always preface my answer by saying that no one can guarantee your digital security on the Internet and, if someone shows you a method and claims you are 100% secure, you should be sceptical.</p><p>But what is the easiest method of identifying Phishing attacks?</p><p>The answer is the ‘5-second rule’ — you only need to invest 5 seconds of your time before typing in any of your sensitive data.</p><p>What does this mean in practice?</p><p>It means whenever you want to type in any sensitive data, such as your username and password, you must first check your browser’s address bar to verify that the website address is correct in all details. For example, if you log in to Gmail, the login address always ends in gmail.com or mail.google.com, not for instance, g-maail.com, ggmaal.com, etc.</p><p>It’s as simple as that! The ‘5-second rule’ for Phishing can protect you against this type of cyber attack.</p><p>Do not forget you <strong>must </strong>always follow this rule <strong>whenever you have to enter any of your sensitive data.</strong></p><p><em>If you would like to have conversation about this story, you can send an email to aminsabeti [at] gmail [dot] com or poke me @AminSabeti on Twitter.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ebd8de2ce689" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Iranian government hackers hunting the political and civic activists]]></title>
            <link>https://aminsabeti.medium.com/iranian-government-hackers-hunting-the-political-and-civic-activists-9342c9228a6b?source=rss-3b7083dd5e81------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/9342c9228a6b</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Amin Sabeti]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 06 Sep 2014 22:55:31 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2014-09-06T22:55:31.055Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In past few weeks, different reports came out regarding hacking of Gmail accounts of Iranians inside the country. Sometimes even the two factor authentication method of Gmail were discussed. But maybe the most important reasons for these speculations in’t enough information about these attacks in the first place.</p><h4>What is the story behind the recent attacks?</h4><p>The recent attacks probably is one of the most sophisticated attacks ever happened. In these attacks, hackers with great deal of information about their target persons tried to hack their gmails accounts and in some cases they were successful, too.</p><p>This is obvious that this attacks are systematic and very well planned. Unlike traditional bulk attacks, the hackers tried to brake very systemically into different accounts of certain targets, including their gmail account.</p><h4>Structure of recent attacks</h4><p>Structure of these recent attacks is a mixture of Phishing and social engineering. After braking into the target’s email, they have sent emails with very precise literature the victim would use, including some personal details of the victim to their network of their close friends and colleagues in an attempt to hack their email accounts as well.</p><p>Lets review one of the used tactics: The hackers created a fake website, like human rights activist news or woman’s rights news, which they knew the victim will be attracted to. Then they would introduce the website from hacked account, as if the email account owner himself / herself would right with the same literature, and send them to other victims in the contact lists and asked them to click on the link and visit their new website and become a member.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/304/1*AkRkZtqiMmjMRricx_k68w.jpeg" /></figure><p>Now, when the other parties would visit the website, they would see a page that let them login with their Facebook / Google / Yahoo or WindowsLive ID. Now, the attacker would receive their user and password to their email account. At the same time, the phishing website would send a real request to google to send the 2 factor authentication code to the victim’s phone. once the code is also entered to the phishing website, attackers would immediately login to their account and disable the 2 authentication factor login. Using the same method, the attackers managed to gain access to several email accounts.</p><p>When this attacks has been reviewed, it came to light that the hackers once gained access to the victim’s account, initiated correspondence with his / her close friends, using the same literature and language of the victim and also deleting the messages from SENT folder afterwards, and using the same method to hack other accounts.</p><p>One thing needs to be mentioned is that the victims of this system received the 2nd authentication code from Google by SMS, not the Google authenticator. From this mechanics it came to light that 2nd factor generated by google authenticator can not be used for a second time, but codes received via SMS can be used for multiple logins.</p><p>Considering the above, paying attention to 3 points can – almost – mitigate these types of attacks :</p><ol><li>Google APP will never ask for a second factor authentication response: if you wanted to login to a 3rd party website with your google account, you should know google will never ask for a response and if you saw such a request you should know this is a phishing website.</li><li>Never open a website by a link in an email: Either search for the website in google or type the address manually. using this, you may avoid a large portion of phishing attacks.</li><li>Don’t use your main email address for 3rd party website memberships: for subscribing to newsletters and 3rd party memberships use a dedicated email address which you made for this purpose. This way, if your email is hacked, the attacker accessed a useless account and not your main email account.</li></ol><p>Generally you should know there is no silver bullet in digital security and you can’t be 100% sure about your security. But you can make sure you to pay attention to digital security aspects as much as possible.</p><p><em>I published this article for the first time on the </em><a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/science/2014/09/140901_l12_hacked_iran_email_fb.shtml"><em>BBC Persian website</em></a><em> and </em><a href="https://ainita.net/2014/09/05/iranian-government-hackers-hunting-the-political-and-civic-activists/"><em>Project Anita</em></a><em> translated into English.</em></p><p><em>If you would like to have conversation about this story, you can send an email to aminsabeti [at] gmail [dot] com or poke me </em><a href="https://twitter.com/AminSabeti"><em>@AminSabeti</em></a><em> on Twitter.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9342c9228a6b" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Me, The Economist & Iran- everyday tale]]></title>
            <link>https://aminsabeti.medium.com/me-the-economist-iran-everyday-tale-7e9870207f11?source=rss-3b7083dd5e81------2</link>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Amin Sabeti]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 31 Jul 2014 12:52:54 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2014-07-31T12:52:54.923Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h2></h2><p>Back on 2nd May, I wrote an article about <a href="https://medium.com/iran-affaris/irans-startup-bubble-43facd638afa">Iran’s startup bubble</a> and made the point that the startup ecosystem in Iran is still in its infancy and needs more time to mature.</p><p>In mid-July, The Economist published <a href="http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2014/07/daily-chart-6">a chart</a> and naming the top 3 startups in Iran. The first version of the article listed <a href="http://www.digikala.com/">Digikala</a>, <a href="http://cafebazaar.ir/">Cafe Bazaar</a> and <a href="http://anetwork.ir/">Anetwork</a> as the most valuable startups. On reviewing the chart, my suspicions were aroused by the data, especially the fact that Anetwork, was valued at USD 3 million.</p><p>To find out the source of the data. I tweeted on Twitter. With the help of Nasser Ghanemzadeh, I traced the source to a <a href="https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1K4FynaiFKgGv37e-1Iutoqi8ZEL0vP-y0oh0kSb62t8/edit?pli=1#gid=312726808">World Startup Report (WSR) document</a>.</p><h3>Twitter / ghanemzadeh: @arashzd @AminSabeti منبع ...</h3><p>Connect with your friends - and other fascinating people. Get in-the-moment updates on the things that interest you. And watch events unfold, in real time, from every angle.</p><p>On studying the document, I came across the name of <a href="https://medium.com/@malayeri">Mr. Mohsen Malayeri</a> who is the contributor of the data on Iran included in The Economist’s chart. This story became even more interesting when I noticed that Malayeri is <a href="http://www.freezepage.com/1405123208BHNXXJBWWK">cofounder and business development adviser</a> for Anetwork. After further investigation, I discovered a company called <a href="http://saravapars.com/">Sarava Pars</a> is behind all three startups that appeared in the report and Malayeri is one of its board members.</p><h3>Twitter / _dariush_a: @AminSabeti http://t.co/Hbn8Y0cIVd</h3><p>@AminSabeti pic.twitter.com/Hbn8Y0cIVd</p><p>At this stage, I was sure that there was a clear conflict of interest in- that Malayeri was trying to promote his own startups as the top 3 startups in Iran! So, I decided to contact The Economist and raise the important point that Iran’s data could not possibly be valid. I sent an email to The Economist’s editor on 8 July explaining there was a clear conflict of interest based on concrete evidences.</p><p>The Economist responded on 12 July asking for more information. I replied to their email that I was not in a position to give them accurate data but that I was sure the current data had not been validated; and also told them some Iranians on social networks such as Twitter had their suspicions about the data too.</p><p>A few hours after The Economist’s email, the WSR approached me and asked why I believed the data was not valid, and for me the main reason was conflict of interest, in that Malayeri only submitted the companies that he has a financial interest in, while there are lots of startups in the country that did not have a chance to be considered.</p><p>After a series of emails and Skype chats, The Economist announced that Iran would be removed from the report due to lack of reliable information, unless Iranian entrepreneurs could supply accurate data within the following 24-48 hours.</p><h3>Twitter / mahdi: Iran data removed from ...</h3><p>Iran data removed from @TheEconomist report on the biggest Internet companies in various countries. [HT @AminSabeti] pic.twitter.com/r6LbDN57Yf</p><p>Following the above group email, more than 10 Iranians on the circulation tried to keep Iran’s name in the list by finding and submitting validated data. Fortunately, those people managed to send accurate and validated data as requested and Anetwork was removed from the list. According to the updated and validated data, the top 3 companies are:</p><ol><li>DigiKala (USD 150 million)</li><li>Aparat Group (USD 30 million)</li><li>Cafe Bazaar (USD 20 million)</li></ol><p>And mission accomplished (!), as the main aim had always been to demonstrate transparency and the use of accurate data.</p><p>Why?</p><p>I have been blogging since 2003 and over this time I have found there is a lack of information about Iran and in such circumstances, there are some people who will always exploit the situation. For me, I always try to portray the real image of Iran to non-Iranian people and tell them what is really happening in the country. For instance, when most Iranian and western media were praising President Hassan Rouhani’s lifting of some restrictions against Twitter and Facebook, I wrote <a href="https://medium.com/iran-affaris/when-will-iran-unblock-social-networks-ad62b50bead9">an article</a> and saying it would not be feasible in the short term.</p><p>In conclusion, the reason I followed up The Economist story was that I truly believe in transparency and without transparency I believe we cannot have a productive and healthy community.</p><p><em>If you would like to have conversation about this story, you can send an email to aminsabeti [at] gmail [dot] com or poke me </em><a href="https://twitter.com/AminSabeti"><em>@AminSabeti</em></a><em> on Twitter.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=7e9870207f11" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Iran’s Startup Bubble]]></title>
            <link>https://aminsabeti.medium.com/irans-startup-bubble-43facd638afa?source=rss-3b7083dd5e81------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/43facd638afa</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Amin Sabeti]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 02 May 2014 16:36:51 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2014-06-13T11:34:05.813Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The word ‘startup’ has become ubiquitous in Iran and I have seen lots of events, workshops, etc. in which the word startup figures, the most famous being <a href="http://startupweekend.ir/">Startup Weekend</a>.</p><p>One of the questions that I have had from the first day of the startup phenomenon in Iran was “Is this phenomenon is bubble or not?”</p><p>My answer is ‘yes’ to this question and I have different reasons for it. The two most important reasons are lack of both financial resources and experience.</p><h4><strong>Lack of financial resources</strong></h4><p>The first reason why I think the startup phenomenon is a kind of bubble is funding. By that I mean Iran’s government and private sector have not been investing funds in Iranian startups.</p><p>In my view, the government would like to support ideological innovations with specific goals. For instance, the government prefers to help a religious mobile app instead of an educational app with no religious contents.</p><p>The private sector story is, however, totally different in that most of them are not invest for two two reasons: Security and economy.</p><p>Red lines are not clear in Iran and they can be changed at anytime. This situation causes the private sector not to like to invest their funds in startups and innovations (especially Internet/ technology related ones) as the risk of them being shut down by the Iranian authorities is very high.</p><p>In addition, working with international companies and corporations is dangerous for Iranian startups. It might look strange if you got money for your startup from Google, you might be accused as of being a spy or collaboration with foreign intelligence services in worst case scenario.</p><h4><strong>Lack of experience</strong></h4><p>My work has brought me into contact with many tech savvy and innovative Iranians, but none has gained commercial experience in this field up to now. For instance, most Iranian startups do not have a proper business plan for their ideas and they only thing that they think about is the idea.</p><p>I believe there is a myth in Iran that if you have a good idea, you can be a good entrepreneur. The most important point that many Iranian innovators have overlooked it is that implementation of the idea is more important than the idea itself.</p><p>Also, some people think startup and entrepreneurship are prestigious words and in using them as a founder or co-founder of X sounds cool!</p><p>Anyway, Iran is very young in the startup field and it needs more time to learn. Iran is not Silicon Valley although some Iranians have been trying to copy the Silicon Valley’s methods in Iran which is impossible.</p><p><strong>Update 1:</strong> I am not against the startup phenomenon in Iran. I believe the method that has been implemented is not correct. Startup is not an event, it is more than it.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=43facd638afa" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Does Rouhani really support freer Internet?]]></title>
            <link>https://aminsabeti.medium.com/does-rouhani-really-support-freer-internet-a88a8fa012ef?source=rss-3b7083dd5e81------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a88a8fa012ef</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Amin Sabeti]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 31 Jan 2014 11:51:46 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2014-01-31T11:51:46.632Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>When Hassan Rouhani became President of Iran, most Iranian users and media talked about the easing of Internet censorship under Rouhani’s government. Previously, I have written <a href="https://medium.com/iran-affaris/ad62b50bead9">a short post</a> and explained when we can expect users to have unrestricted access to social network websites.</p><h3>Twitter / jack: @HassanRouhani Good evening, ...</h3><p>@HassanRouhani Good evening, President. Are citizens of Iran able to read your tweets?</p><h3>Twitter / HassanRouhani: Evening, @Jack. As I told ...</h3><p>@HassanRouhani Good evening, President. Are citizens of Iran able to read your tweets?</p><p>Rouhani has now been President of Iran for more than 5 months and his policies on freedom of expression in Iran are becoming clearer especially after two recent incidents: <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/08/arrested-iranian-activists-bloggers-accused-bbc-links">The arrest of IT specialists</a> by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the <a href="http://mashable.com/2013/12/29/iran-blocks-unblocks-instagram/">blocking of some mobile apps</a> such as WeChat.</p><p>These kinds of incident have highlighted an important point which most media both inside and outside the country have missed which is actually the answer to the title of this post: “Does Rouhani really support freer Internet?”</p><p>All evidence points to the fact that Internet freedom is not the President’s primary concern and he does not wish to act on it. For instance, Rouhani and his government have not said anything about the crackdown on the IT specialists directly or indirectly, or when the WeChat app was blocked by Iran’s Filtering Committee, <a href="http://www.roozonline.com/persian/news/newsitem/article/5-41.html">only one out of six government representatives disagreed with the filtering decision</a> whereas Mahmood Vaezi, the Minister of Information and Communications Technology (ICT), said <a href="http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13921004000755">the government disagreed</a>.</p><p>Despite Rouhani’s claim, he does not seem to support freedom of expression. He just talks about it without acting on it. This means the priority for the President is not to improve the situation of the Internet in Iran although non-Iranians think it should be his concern.</p><p>For this reason, the answer to the question “Does Rouhani really support freer Internet?” must definitely be <em>No </em>based on the current evidence, although we can hope the President will change his policy and move from saying find words to putting them into action.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a88a8fa012ef" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[When will Iran unblock social networks?]]></title>
            <link>https://aminsabeti.medium.com/when-will-iran-unblock-social-networks-ad62b50bead9?source=rss-3b7083dd5e81------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ad62b50bead9</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Amin Sabeti]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 29 Oct 2013 11:25:20 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2013-10-29T11:25:20.100Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/518/1*Rgx6FeMLpA_pgC1knsYe5A.png" /></figure><h4>Iranian users cannot expect in the short term to open Facebook or Twitter without circumvention tools.</h4><p><a href="https://twitter.com/HassanRouhani">Hassan Rouhani</a> is the first Iranian president that has a Twitter account and the Foreign Minister, <a href="https://twitter.com/jzarif">Mohammad Javad Zairf</a>, is the first politician in Iran that has a verified account on Twitter. In addition, Zarif is active on <a href="https://www.facebook.com/jzarif?fref=ts">Facebook</a> and posts his daily reports regularly.</p><p>Rouhani and his cabinet members have been active on social networks whilst most of them like Facebook and Twitter are blocked in Iran. It means Iranian users must use circumvention tools to access Facebook and Twitter and say hello to Mr. Zarif.</p><p>Most Iranian people have recently been optimistic due to the government’s use of social networks and that this would ease the censorship of social networks. For example, on 16 September 2013, many Iranian users reported that they had access to Facebook and Twitter without any circumvention tools. This incident which was due to the ‘<a href="http://smallmedia.org.uk/sites/default/files/u8/iiipjuly.pdf">technical glitch</a>’, fuelled the theory that the government had removed the filtering of Facebook and Twitter.</p><p>Iran has censored the Internet since 2002/03 and invested millions of dollars to build the filtering system. In addition, after the controversial presidential election in 2009, the Iranian authorities have attacked and accused social networks such as Facebook and Twitter of being spying tools for the Western intelligence services.</p><p>Therefore, it is very optimistic that someone thinks the Iranian regime would eliminate or even ease Internet censorship in the short term. It means no one can expect that Iranian users have easy access to Facebook or Twitter without using circumvention tools because the filtering of Internet is not solely motivated by politics.</p><p>The purpose of filtering system is twofold: political and economic.</p><p>Internet censorship has been a good tool to suppress opposition and all dissidents by blocking their websites/weblogs based on <a href="http://www.article19.org/data/files/medialibrary/2921/12-01-30-FINAL-iran-WEB[4].pdf">Iran’s Cyber Crime Law</a>. There is no kind of guarantee for anyone even though the website/weblog is registered on the whitelist. For instance, many weblogs that set up by pro <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ahmadinejad">Ahmadinejad</a> and anti <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Larijani">Larijani brothers</a> have been <a href="http://storify.com/smallmedia/a-new-era-for-iran-s-conservative-bloggers-filteri">blocked or shut down</a>.</p><p>Moreover, there is a huge black market for VPNs in Iran. According to the <a href="http://www.biznews.ir/prte.z8vbjh8on9bij.html">BizNews website</a>, Iranian users spend around 360 billion tomans (120 million USD) per year on VPNs and SOCKs. This level spend on VPNs/SOCKs is conducted openly whereas selling circumvention tools is illegal in Iran.</p><p>As a consequence, filtering will not be lifted soon although it maybe achievable in the long term. For instance, the Rouhani government might lift censorship on the internet at the end of first term. The only certainty that Iranian users cannot expect in the short term to open Facebook or Twitter without circumvention tools.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ad62b50bead9" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Why Google Reader was important for Iranians?]]></title>
            <link>https://aminsabeti.medium.com/why-google-reader-was-important-for-iranians-f02de1dc3dad?source=rss-3b7083dd5e81------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f02de1dc3dad</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Amin Sabeti]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 02 Jul 2013 17:40:04 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2013-10-29T11:35:35.216Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/610/0*5w_L7Ih54Rq7Rsv6.jpeg" /></figure><h4>Google Reader was a circumvention tool.</h4><p><a href="https://google.com/reader">Google Reader</a> has been shut down today and to be honest, it’s not a big issue for most internet users around the world except some of them such as Iranian users.</p><p>The main reason is due to the current state of the Internet in Iran which a friend of mine mentioned it previously: “<a href="https://medium.com/this-happened-to-me/155f4d928e0b">Filternet</a>”</p><p>Internet censorship is very sophisticated in Iran although after the 2013 presidential elections, the filtering situation is better and users can access Facebook, Twitter, etc. through VPNs and other circumvention tools. But the main issue remaines and most websites and blogs are blocked in Iran. For instance, <a href="http://wordpress.com/">Wordpress</a> and <a href="http://blogger.com/">Blogger</a> are completely blocked! It means if you open a blog on either of them, your blog cannot be followed by users inside the country, without the use of circumvention tools.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/952/0*ygZ99FcfN96Reshz.png" /><figcaption>This page is shown when the user in Iran wants to visit blocked websites such as Wordpress.com.</figcaption></figure><p>In this difficult situation, Google Reader had a vital role in helping Iranian users to bypass the filtering system because blocking of Google and its services has not been easy in Iran. Whenever the authorities have wanted to block Google, they have be faced with a storm of protest from users to MPs which forced them to change their decision and unblock the website.</p><p>Therefore, Google Reader was one of the few services that users could count on it as the last solution. For instance, if they couldn’t connect through circumvention tools to open news websites, they could read latest news, posts, etc. on Google Reader.</p><p>Anyway, Google Reader has gone and Iranian users have lost one of their emergency circumvention tools. The tool they nicknamed: <strong>‘Gooder’</strong></p><p>R.I.P. Google Reader or Gooder…</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f02de1dc3dad" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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