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    <channel>
        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Andrew Scott Riley on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Andrew Scott Riley on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@andrewscottriley?source=rss-eec37ee4b66f------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Andrew Scott Riley on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@andrewscottriley?source=rss-eec37ee4b66f------2</link>
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        <lastBuildDate>Sat, 21 Nov 2026 16:24:42 GMT</lastBuildDate>
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            <title><![CDATA[Proof: The Incompatibility of Free Will with Determinism and Randomness]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@andrewscottriley/proof-the-incompatibility-of-free-will-with-determinism-and-randomness-26d779fde4a4?source=rss-eec37ee4b66f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/26d779fde4a4</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[science]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[physics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Andrew Scott Riley]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 20 Jun 2024 21:11:30 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-07-16T02:11:37.600Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Proof: The Incompatibility of Free Will with Determinism and Randomness</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*G2VWnGtfK92OgBuB" /></figure><p>Definitions:</p><ul><li>Free Will: The ability to make choices that are not entirely determined by prior causes or pure randomness.</li><li>Determinism: The view that all events are caused by prior events according to natural laws (Newtonian).</li><li>Randomness: The quality of lacking a pattern or principle of organization; unpredictability (Quantum Indeterminacy).</li></ul><p>Premises:</p><ol><li>All events in the universe are either deterministic or random. (Law of Excluded Middle)</li><li>Human decisions are events in the universe.</li><li>If an event is deterministic, it is caused entirely by prior events and natural laws.</li><li>If an event is random, it is not caused by any prior events or natural laws.</li><li>Free will requires that a decision is neither entirely caused by prior events nor completely random.</li></ol><p>Argument:</p><ol><li>Consider any human decision. (From Premise 2)</li><li>This decision must be either deterministic or random. (From Premises 1 and 2)</li><li>If the decision is deterministic: a. It is entirely caused by prior events and natural laws. (From Premise 3) b. Therefore, it is not free will. (From Premise 5 and 3a)</li><li>If the decision is random: a. It is not caused by any prior events or natural laws. (From Premise 4) b. Therefore, it is not free will. (From Premise 5 and 4a)</li><li>The decision must be either deterministic or random, and in neither case does it qualify as free will. (From steps 2, 3b, and 4b)</li></ol><p>Conclusion: Therefore, free will, as defined, is incompatible with our understanding of the universe as composed of only deterministic and random events.</p><p>Notes:</p><ol><li>This proof relies on the definitions provided and the acceptance of the premises.</li><li>The strongest potential objections would likely challenge Premise 1 (by proposing a third category beyond determinism and randomness) or Premise 5 (by redefining free will in a way that’s compatible with determinism or randomness).</li></ol><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=26d779fde4a4" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Systemic Security Flaws in L2 Modularity — Explained in 2.95 KB]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/cyber-capital/systemic-security-flaws-in-l2-modularity-explained-in-2-95-kb-2b3418e67384?source=rss-eec37ee4b66f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2b3418e67384</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[l2]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ethereum]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[finance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[solana-network]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[crypto]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Andrew Scott Riley]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 03 May 2024 15:34:35 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-05-03T15:37:07.497Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><strong>Systemic Security Flaws in L2 Modularity — Explained in 2.95 KB</strong></h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*tl6rZHyOo12jLX59ckUu5Q.jpeg" /></figure><p>The congestion of L1s over the past few years has led to the development of various scaling solutions to address the limitations, such as high transaction costs and slow throughput. One such solution is L2 modularity, which aims to improve the scalability and efficiency of the L1 by offloading some transactions and computations to a secondary layer which allegedly inherits the security of the L1.</p><p>However, as with any new technology, L2 modularity comes with its own set of security challenges. In particular, the upgrade process for L1 smart contracts has revealed some systemic security paradoxes that could potentially put user funds at risk. This article will explore these paradoxes in detail, focusing on two main issues: code upgrade delays and the potential for a mass exodus of users.</p><h3>Smart Contract Upgrade Delays</h3><p>On Arbitrum, an upgrade to the L1 smart contract will only go live 12 days after it’s initiated. The reasoning for this delay is that it gives users time to withdraw to the L1 if they suspect that the upgrade contains malicious code. Currently however, the Security Council has the ability to instantly upgrade in emergency situations. All 13 smart contracts in the Arbitrum system have: “Upgrade delay: 12d 8h or 0 if overridden by Security Council” attributed to them. -<a href="https://l2beat.com/scaling/projects/arbitrum#contracts">Source</a></p><p>If we take a look at both of these methods of upgrading, they reveal a systemic flaw. Assume they do away with the instant upgrades as the L2s mature into <a href="https://medium.com/l2beat/introducing-stages-a-framework-to-evaluate-rollups-maturity-d290bb22befe">Stage 3</a>. If the Security Council doesn’t have the power to instantly upgrade in the face of a zero day exploit (and instead must wait 12 days), then user funds would be at risk from that exploit. However, if they do have the power to address a zero day exploit, they also have the power to steal all native L1 ETH locked in the L1 smart contract.</p><h3>Mass Exodus</h3><p>Assume point number 1 will be solved with a novel and unforeseen solution. The next problem is, can the L1 even handle the mass exodus from an L2 in a 12 day period? As of today, Base has 8,220,000 users. Given the L1 TPS of 13.63 on ETH, if all blockspace were dedicated to this mass exodus (it wouldn’t be), it would take ~7 days for all withdrawals to clear. This is also assuming L2-&gt;L1 withdrawal require the same amount of gas as a regular transfer (they doesn’t, if anyone can point me in the direction of seeing gas amounts for L2-&gt;L1 withdrawals please do). Already this is half the upgrade window of Arbitrum. We’ve also been very lenient with the 7 days and need to reiterate the fact that: 1. There would be much more L1 activity bidding for blockspace other than the exodus and, 2. the amount of gas used per exodus transaction would be higher than a normal transfer.</p><p>A Mass Exodus would also require that the rollup validators are still producting blocks. If none are there to produce then funds will remain locked in the L1 smart contract.</p><p>For Base there is currently no delay on code upgrades via multisig. But if they intended to implement one in the future, the window would become increasingly large with the adoption of users into Base to the point where it may not be practical at all for users to mass exodus if the situation arose.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2b3418e67384" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/cyber-capital/systemic-security-flaws-in-l2-modularity-explained-in-2-95-kb-2b3418e67384">Systemic Security Flaws in L2 Modularity — Explained in 2.95 KB</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/cyber-capital">Cyber Capital</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[ETH as an L2 for Solana — A Brief Thought Experiment]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@andrewscottriley/eth-as-an-l2-for-solana-72759c2c63ee?source=rss-eec37ee4b66f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/72759c2c63ee</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[finance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bitcoin]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ethereum]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[solana-network]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Andrew Scott Riley]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 14 Jul 2023 23:38:03 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-07-14T23:46:49.670Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*subuxGr2BP0XhSyiy_b8jg.png" /></figure><p>Anatoly Yakovenko, co-founder of Solana Labs, introduced this crazy idea into the cryptoverse with <a href="https://twitter.com/aeyakovenko/status/1675514068738924544">this</a> tweet. Let’s examine it and see what would actually be possible:</p><p>This topic is very confusing so I’ll preface with this — when I say ETH L2 I mean a transaction that takes place on ETH L1 as it “serves” as an L2 for SOL. This won’t involve an ETH L2 like Optimism or Arbitrum, <em>yet</em>. We need a third term other than ETH or SOL to make it a bit more clear, let’s call it: Soy — ETH as a rollup for SOL.</p><ol><li>SOL would have a Soy rollup smart contract on it.</li><li>ETH would have a Soy rollup smart contract on it.</li><li>When a user submits a Soy transaction it would go into the Soy rollup smart contract on ETH where it would be added to the Soy rollup chain.</li><li>Every few minutes the Soy rollup smart contract on ETH would submit the state of the Soy rollup chain to the Soy rollup smart contract on SOL via a bridge. The Soy rollup smart contract on SOL would update its version of the Soy rollup chain. Despite the low transaction fees on SOL, having this occur more frequently would be price prohibitive because it still requires an ETH transaction to occur, calling the bridge smart contract.</li><li>Why is this superior to traditional bridges?<br>If for whatever reason a user wants to circumvent ETH in performing a Soy rollup transaction, for instance if the Ethereum network were unavailable or compromised, the user can still make a SOL L1 transaction straight to the Soy rollup contract on SOL in order to redeem/unlock their L1 SOL tokens. However, in order to do this ETH would need to know the state of the Soy rollup’s chain within the smart contract on SOL.<br>For example: ETH is censoring my Soy L2 transaction, but I need to withdraw to the SOL L1. I make a SOL L1 transaction straight to the Soy contract. It changes the state of the rollup on SOL. But the state of the rollup on ETH needs to be updated to reflect this new change. The only way to do that is if the Soy rollup smart contract on ETH can know the state of the rollup according to SOL. This is the most difficult part.</li></ol><p>To understand rollups in greater depth, feel free to check out: <a href="https://medium.com/cyber-capital/arbitrum-explained-how-do-rollups-work-c0dba0a24c8a">Arbitrum Explained — How do rollups work?</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=72759c2c63ee" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[What is a zkSNARKed EVM and why is it important to the scalability of Ethereum?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/cyber-capital/what-is-a-zksnarked-evm-and-why-is-it-important-to-the-scalability-of-ethereum-a68631948f1a?source=rss-eec37ee4b66f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a68631948f1a</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ethereum]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[finance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[crypto]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Andrew Scott Riley]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 09 Jul 2023 22:09:26 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-07-10T13:03:20.352Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*dRqiH4fc7ZIbAm7z.jpg" /></figure><p>Currently all nodes execute all smart contract logic associated with each transaction in order to deem it valid. So even if you spin up a full node, as it downloads all historic blocks your node will also execute all of the historic smart contract transactions.</p><p>It’s easy to see how this can be a barrier to scalability as higher transactional capacity (of complex transactions) is needed.</p><p>Once the EVM undergoes snarkification, it will enable the execution of all smart contract logic off-chain, generating proofs that can subsequently be posted on-chain.</p><p>This means that validators won’t actually have to execute the smart contract logic for a particular transaction and can quickly verify that the proposed results of the transaction is accurate.</p><p>This can theoretically increase total transactional throughput for the same amount of validator compute as the compute is offloaded onto other parties which specifically handle the execution of the smart contract logic.</p><p>Additionally, it adds privacy because the validator doesn’t know exactly what happened during execution it just knows the beginning and the ending state for a given account.</p><p>As chatGPT said: “This allows for the verification of the computation’s integrity without revealing the underlying data or steps taken during the computation.”</p><p>“By executing computations off-chain and submitting proofs to the blockchain, smart contracts can benefit from improved scalability, reduced transaction costs, and enhanced privacy. Off-chain execution enables complex and resource-intensive computations to be performed without burdening the blockchain, making it a powerful technique for optimizing smart contract performance.”</p><p><strong>About the author</strong></p><p><a href="https://twitter.com/0xAndrewRiley">Andrew Scott Riley</a> is a research consultant at Cyber Capital. With his computer science background, he analyzes cryptocurrency projects and whitepapers and compiles extensive research reports.</p><p><strong>About Cyber Capital</strong></p><p>Cyber Capital, Europe’s oldest cryptocurrency investment fund, is a fund manager that specialized in providing exposure to the crypto-asset markets as an alternative asset class. Cyber Capital is fully registered by the Dutch Authority for the Financial Markets under the AIFMD-light regime and the Dutch Central Bank.</p><p>Follow us on <a href="https://medium.com/cyber-capital/about">Medium</a> and <a href="https://twitter.com/CyberCapital">Twitter</a>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a68631948f1a" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/cyber-capital/what-is-a-zksnarked-evm-and-why-is-it-important-to-the-scalability-of-ethereum-a68631948f1a">What is a zkSNARKed EVM and why is it important to the scalability of Ethereum?</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/cyber-capital">Cyber Capital</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[What is a ZKSNARKed EVM —  a conversation with chatGPT.]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/cyber-capital/what-is-a-zksnarked-evm-a-conversation-with-chatgpt-e36a2d48911e?source=rss-eec37ee4b66f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e36a2d48911e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ethereum]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bitcoin]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[investing]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Andrew Scott Riley]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 03 May 2023 04:02:31 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-07-09T22:02:30.443Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>What is a ZKSNARKed EVM — a conversation with chatGPT.</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/860/1*VYrHKB4PK-phRDgJNQUjFA.jpeg" /></figure><p><em>DISCLAIMER: chatGPT is trained on models from before 2022, the accuracy of its information is not assured, but maybe it can shed some light regarding this topic.</em></p><p><strong><em>What does Snarkifying the EVM mean?</em></strong></p><p>“Snarkifying the EVM” refers to the process of integrating ZK-SNARKs (Zero-Knowledge Succinct Non-Interactive Arguments of Knowledge) into the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM). This concept aims to enhance the privacy and scalability of the Ethereum blockchain by enabling the execution of private and efficient smart contracts.</p><p>By incorporating ZK-SNARK technology into the EVM, developers can create smart contracts that execute computations off-chain while providing succinct proofs of the correctness of those computations. This allows for the verification of the computation’s integrity without revealing the underlying data or steps taken during the computation.</p><p>Snarkifying the EVM can bring several benefits to the Ethereum ecosystem. It can significantly enhance privacy by keeping sensitive data confidential while still allowing for verification of the contract’s execution. It also has the potential to improve scalability by moving computationally expensive operations off-chain and reducing the computational burden on the Ethereum network.</p><p>Additionally, snarkifying the EVM can enable the execution of complex computations with increased efficiency, as the use of ZK-SNARKs allows for succinct proofs that are much smaller in size compared to the original computation. This can lead to faster transaction processing and reduced costs.</p><p>Overall, snarkifying the EVM is an ongoing area of research and development aimed at leveraging the power of ZK-SNARKs to enhance privacy, scalability, and efficiency in the execution of smart contracts on the Ethereum blockchain.</p><p><strong><em>How do the smart contracts work that execute computations off-chain?</em></strong></p><p>Smart contracts that execute computations off-chain typically follow a process known as “off-chain computation” or “off-chain execution.” Here’s a general overview of how it works:</p><ol><li>Contract Deployment: The smart contract is initially deployed on the blockchain. The contract defines the logic and rules for the computation that will be executed off-chain.</li><li>Off-chain Computation: The actual computation is performed off-chain, typically on a separate server or a network of nodes. This off-chain execution can involve complex computations, data processing, or interactions with external systems.</li><li>Input Parameters: The off-chain computation requires input parameters to process. These parameters can be passed to the off-chain component through various means, such as off-chain messages, oracles, or API calls.</li><li>Computation Execution: The off-chain component executes the computation using the provided input parameters. It performs the necessary calculations, data processing, or interactions with external systems to derive the desired results.</li><li>Generating a Proof: After completing the off-chain computation, a proof is generated. This proof is a cryptographic construct that demonstrates the correctness of the computation without revealing any sensitive information about the inputs or intermediate steps.</li><li>Proof Verification: The generated proof is submitted back to the smart contract on the blockchain. The smart contract acts as the verifier and checks the validity of the proof using the pre-agreed verification mechanism.</li><li>Result Verification and Execution: Once the proof is verified on-chain, the smart contract can trust the off-chain computation and execute the desired actions or store the computed result on the blockchain.</li></ol><p>By executing computations off-chain and submitting proofs to the blockchain, smart contracts can benefit from improved scalability, reduced transaction costs, and enhanced privacy. Off-chain execution enables complex and resource-intensive computations to be performed without burdening the blockchain, making it a powerful technique for optimizing smart contract performance.</p><p><strong>About the author</strong></p><p><a href="https://twitter.com/0xAndrewRiley">Andrew Scott Riley</a> is a research consultant at Cyber Capital. With his computer science background, he analyzes cryptocurrency projects and whitepapers and compiles extensive research reports.</p><p><strong>About Cyber Capital</strong></p><p>Cyber Capital, Europe’s oldest cryptocurrency investment fund, is a fund manager that specialized in providing exposure to the crypto-asset markets as an alternative asset class. Cyber Capital is fully registered by the Dutch Authority for the Financial Markets under the AIFMD-light regime and the Dutch Central Bank.</p><p>Follow us on <a href="https://medium.com/cyber-capital/about">Medium</a> and <a href="https://twitter.com/CyberCapital">Twitter</a>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e36a2d48911e" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/cyber-capital/what-is-a-zksnarked-evm-a-conversation-with-chatgpt-e36a2d48911e">What is a ZKSNARKed EVM —  a conversation with chatGPT.</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/cyber-capital">Cyber Capital</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Is traditional sharding necessary for a highly scalable L1 blockchain?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/cyber-capital/is-traditional-sharding-necessary-for-a-highly-scalable-l1-blockchain-6814cab4144e?source=rss-eec37ee4b66f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/6814cab4144e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ethereum]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[finance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[crypto]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Andrew Scott Riley]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 16 Nov 2022 00:59:31 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-11-16T12:04:10.258Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*joKpWDz4eUVwYaWoIMD4qw.png" /></figure><h3>Traditional Sharding</h3><p>Traditional sharding refers to the sharding design that was initially described in the Ethereum 2.0 roadmap before the pivot to a rollup centric approach with danksharding. A current implementation of traditional sharding can be seen in MultiversX (formerly known as Elrond) which has a metachain (similar to the beacon chain) along with 3 other shards. Traditional sharding usually exists with the understanding that the amount of shards can increase as demand for blockspace increases, allowing for the accommodation of a large volume of transactions. Each shard is essentially its own blockchain that produces blocks in parallel with the other shards. The validators then post proofs of the shards to the main chain (beacon chain in ETH, meta chain in MultiversX). As the number of shards increases, so too does the amount of blocks being produced by the entire system. We will use the term meta chain to describe the primary chain where shard proofs are posted.</p><h3>What does sharding accomplish?</h3><p>The benefits of sharding can be distilled into two aspects:</p><ol><li>Reducing validator hardware requirements — parallel processing of transactions of many validators.<br>• It’s difficult for a single validator’s computer to process tens of thousands of TPS, but sharding allows many validators to create blocks in parallel thus reducing the hardware requirements needed for each validator. As the validator hardware requirements get lower, the decentralization of the blockchain increases.</li><li>Auditing account balances and partitioning state data into smaller pieces — easier to download and audit.<br>• Instead of downloading an entire blockchain, a user can download just the meta chain and their shard in order to properly audit their account balance.</li><li>Both of these aspects work together in order to add more transactional capacity to a blockchain.</li></ol><p>The problems with sharding:</p><ol><li>Redundant transactions — When a cross-shard transaction is made it’s written in three places: on the sender’s shard, on the receivers shard, and on the metachain. If we can imagine a world where a sharded blockchain has 1000 shards, it becomes clear that many of these transactions will be cross-shard transactions. Validator’s are assigned to different shards frequently (for instance in the case of MultiversX, roughly every 3 days). Assuming that each shard gets sufficiently large, three days may not be enough time to download a new shard in which case it would push validators to download all the shards anyway.</li><li>Fractured Liquidity — A liquidity pool would only be able to live on one shard and if a user exists on a different one, they must make a cross-shard transaction to deposit or withdraw from that liquidity pool. But since a shard has a hard cap TPS on it, transactions to and from the liquidity pool would also be bottlenecked by the shard’s capacity.</li></ol><p>Let’s now compare and contrast the benefits and problems of sharding against a Monolithic (Aka: non-sharded in this context) blockchain that has additional tools necessary to achieve the same benefits of sharding.</p><h3>Validator Hardware Requirements</h3><ol><li>Traditional Sharding:<br>• Allowing different blocks to be added in parallel (to their respective shard chain), so long as the shard chains are attached to some parent chain. This splits up the computation among many validators allowing them to have lower hardware requirements.</li><li>Monolithic:<br>• A monolithic chain with traditional block production will only add one block at a time to the chain. The implication is that if block times are to be short, then validators will have to have robust hardware to process all the transactions within a short period of time.<br>• <em>However,</em> with proposer-builder separation, the builder does the processing, the validator just checks the proofs then proposes the block, so the validator hardware requirements may still remain low even with a high throughput monolithic chain. -<a href="https://www.eip4844.com/#faq">Source</a></li><li>Conclusion:<br>• Proposer-Builder Separation reduces the need for high validator hardware requirements, this is necessary for any high throughput L1 imo (sharded or monolithic). Additionally it has the added benefits of censorship resistance and protection from MEV centralization (which are both necessary). One drawback would be if transaction volume got so high that only a few builders would be able to keep up. This could create centralization among builders, but at least the centralization would be separate from the validator set and their consensus, otherwise it would threaten decentralization. Since there would be non-parallel execution, the computational power of the builders would be the bottleneck. A devil’s advocate argument would be: What if the centralized builders amass so much power that they then buy up tokens and become validators to further centralize? The answer is that this is no different than any other industry. Google can make billions per year and buy up validators in this same manner. The important distinction here is that the roles of proposer and builder are divided. The problem arises when there is no separation between proposer and builder so a few proposers end up being the only ones that can build profitably. With PBS all validators equally profit from the work of a few centralized builders thus maintaining decentralization within the consensus framework.</li></ol><h3>Auditing Account Balances</h3><ol><li>Traditional Sharding:<br>• Each address’s state lives on a particular shard.<br>• In order to check the balance of a particular address, one can download the shard and verify that its current state proof is posted on the beacon chain.</li><li>Monolithic:<br>• Having the ability to audit a single shard may be unnecessary if validators (or full nodes) can serve a zkproof of a particular data point to a user without the user having to download the entire shard/blockchain.</li><li>Conclusion:<br>• Data Availability Sampling is superior to having to download an entire shard to check the validity of something. Therefore sharding is not necessary for being able to audit a chain. With Data Availability Sampling, the audibility can remain very high even with a large monolithic chain.</li></ol><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>It’s not sharding that’s important, what’s important is:</p><ol><li>Maintaining low hardware requirements for validators — Achieved by Proposer-Builder Separation</li><li>Allowing audibility of the chain — Achieved by Data Availability Sampling</li><li>If we mix these two tools <strong>without</strong> a rollup centric approach, we get all the benefits of both traditional sharding and L2 centric approach plus more, such as:<br>• Theoretical Infinite scalability (same as sharding, better than L2)<br>• Superior user experience (slightly better than sharding, better than L2)<br>• Non-fractured liquidity (better than sharding, better than L2)<br>• Reduces redundant transactions when transacting from one shard (or L2 chain) to another. (better than sharding, better than L2)</li><li>If we want even further improvement, we can add Danksharding architecture in order to have pruning. My idea of this would be fundamentally different from Ethereum’s version of Danksharding where each shard is a blob of arbitrary data. Each shard could be and should be L1 transactional data. This is more expensive than blob data as L1 transactional data has to run through the EVM. But would save users from poor UX and fractured liquidity.</li><li>I think Ethereum has a LOT right, Proposer-Builder Separation, Data Availability Sampling, Danksharding, but of course the fundamental flaw is significantly favoring the L2 data above the L1 data. With proper pruning under danksharding, the high L1 capacity wouldn’t be a problem.</li></ol><p><strong>About the author</strong></p><p><a href="https://twitter.com/0xAndrewRiley">Andrew Scott Riley</a> is a research consultant at Cyber Capital. With his computer science background, he analyzes cryptocurrency projects and whitepapers and compiles extensive research reports.</p><p><strong>About Cyber Capital</strong></p><p>Cyber Capital, Europe’s oldest cryptocurrency investment fund, is a fund manager that specialized in providing exposure to the crypto-asset markets as an alternative asset class. Cyber Capital is fully registered by the Dutch Authority for the Financial Markets under the AIFMD-light regime and the Dutch Central Bank.</p><p>Follow us on <a href="https://medium.com/cyber-capital/about">Medium</a> and <a href="https://twitter.com/CyberCapital">Twitter</a>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=6814cab4144e" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/cyber-capital/is-traditional-sharding-necessary-for-a-highly-scalable-l1-blockchain-6814cab4144e">Is traditional sharding necessary for a highly scalable L1 blockchain?</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/cyber-capital">Cyber Capital</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Arbitrum Explained — How do rollups work?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/cyber-capital/arbitrum-explained-how-do-rollups-work-c0dba0a24c8a?source=rss-eec37ee4b66f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/c0dba0a24c8a</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ethereum]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[finance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[crypto]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Andrew Scott Riley]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 07 Nov 2022 05:45:12 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-07-14T23:41:45.329Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Arbitrum Explained — How do rollups work ?</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*s5OhaHtJtMgNS17A.png" /></figure><p>The below diagram visually describes the workflow of an Arbitrum transaction in extensive detail. Below the diagram is a link to a doc which explains everything from two different angles: one from a chronological perspective (Life of a Transaction) and the other from an object oriented perspective (Architecture). If there is any incorrect information in either of these please leave a comment down below. I’m currently working on the same sort of explanation for Optimism and after that I’ll move on to other L2 projects with the intention of explaining them in as fine grained detail as possible. Please give a follow if you’re interested in these future works.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*QkscZl8p9nD_ssti.png" /></figure><ol><li><a href="https://docs.google.com/document/d/1drKNoCwcFHmDeo00_ke7TUKbbBbgsQ3ofu7ui0sImP0/edit#">The Notes</a><br>Unfortunately Medium does not allow for nested points, which were critical to the format of explanation I wanted to deliver. Please use the above link to view the notes.</li></ol><h3>Warnings and Risks:</h3><p>Arbitrum is set up with a 4/6 multisig — When the threshold is met these signers have absolute power over the system by being able to force upgrades. In other words, they can upgrade the smart contract instantly at any point, allowing them to do virtually anything.</p><p>Multisig Address — <a href="https://etherscan.io/address/0xC234E41AE2cb00311956Aa7109fC801ae8c80941">0xC234E41AE2cb00311956Aa7109fC801ae8c80941</a></p><p>“The admin of all contracts in the system, capable of issuing upgrades without notice and delay. This allows it to censor transactions, upgrade bridge implementation potentially gaining access to all funds stored in a bridge and change the sequencer or any other system component (unlimited upgrade power). It is also the admin of the special purpose smart contracts used by validators.” -<a href="https://l2beat.com/scaling/projects/arbitrum/">Source</a><br>Validators are permissioned. -<a href="https://developer.offchainlabs.com/mainnet-beta#:~:text=validator%20whitelisting">Source</a><br>According to L2 Beat all of the contracts are upgradable including the bridge.</p><p>“We believe temporarily maintaining these capabilities is the only responsible way to launch while we continue to harden our system; as we progressively decentralized, these controls will be phased and eventually eliminated entirely.” -<a href="https://developer.offchainlabs.com/mainnet-beta#:~:text=We%20believe%20temporarily%20maintaining%20these%20capabilities%20is%20the%20only%20responsible%20way%20to%20launch%20while%20we%20continue%20to%20harden%20our%20system%3B%20as%20we%20progressively%20decentralized%2C%20these%20controls%20will%20be%20phased%20and%20eventually%20eliminated%20entirely.">Source<br></a><em>While they probably have good intentions, probably do intend to do this, and probably will do this, we cannot judge a project based on a future promise.</em></p><p><strong>About the author</strong></p><p><a href="https://twitter.com/0xAndrewRiley">Andrew Scott Riley</a> is a research consultant at Cyber Capital. With his computer science background, he analyzes cryptocurrency projects and whitepapers and compiles extensive research reports.</p><p><strong>About Cyber Capital</strong></p><p>Cyber Capital, Europe’s oldest cryptocurrency investment fund, is a fund manager that specialized in providing exposure to the crypto-asset markets as an alternative asset class. Cyber Capital is fully registered by the Dutch Authority for the Financial Markets under the AIFMD-light regime and the Dutch Central Bank.</p><p>Follow us on <a href="https://medium.com/cyber-capital/about">Medium</a> and <a href="https://twitter.com/CyberCapital">Twitter</a>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c0dba0a24c8a" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/cyber-capital/arbitrum-explained-how-do-rollups-work-c0dba0a24c8a">Arbitrum Explained — How do rollups work?</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/cyber-capital">Cyber Capital</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Why Proof-of-Stake is Superior to Proof-of-Work in All Cases]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/cyber-capital/why-proof-of-stake-is-superior-to-proof-of-work-in-all-cases-69e7ddbb2874?source=rss-eec37ee4b66f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/69e7ddbb2874</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bitcoin]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[finance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[crypto]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ethereum]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Andrew Scott Riley]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 10 Sep 2022 20:29:40 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-09-12T19:31:19.058Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*bvkfgPyFSAT3PRlTkFAQLg.png" /></figure><h3>1. Resilient to Majority Stake Acquisition</h3><p>In a proof-of-work system, the hashpower that’s required is of a potentially unlimited supply. For instance: If a mining firm has 51% of current hashpower, their competitors can easily displace the mining firm’s dominance by acquiring ASICs and electricity. There is virtually no limit (within reason) to the amount of ASICs that can be produced or the amount of electricity that can be produced. Supporters of Bitcoin regard this quality of PoW as an asset and there is indeed some truth to it. But this means there is a theoretic unlimited amount of hash that can be weaponized against the protocol. It also fails to be a good solution when mixed with the centralizing effect of economies of scale (which Bitcoin miners benefit from, see part 4 for more detail).</p><p>In a proof-of-stake system, the main element of resilience to attacker accumulation is that acquiring stake is tied to the price of ETH. As an attacker buys the ETH necessary to mount such an attack, the slippage will become increasingly unsustainable. The fact that the resource (ETH) is scarce compared to the PoW resource (ASICs + energy) means that acquiring such a large stake in the network is far more difficult than acquiring majority hashrate because its a zero sum game. There is a bit of nuance here: PoW still has the centralizing effect of economies of scale (which make it hard to compete with majority hashrate), but large operations (of any variety of business) can acquire majority hash easier than they can acquire majority stake. The economies of scale aspect still holds true but so too does the relative ease of acquiring majority hashrate.</p><p>An ancillary reason supporting the previous paragraph is that, by nature, a lot of ETH will be locked in staking contracts. Validators won’t want to part with any of their ETH because they need it to earn a profit via validation. Currently there is <a href="https://beaconcha.in/">~13 million ETH staked</a> out of <a href="https://coinmarketcap.com/">~122 million total ETH</a>. But it’s certainly worth noting that there will most likely be much more ETH staked once the merge actually happens. And then even more once withdrawals are enabled. Some consider the risks associated with these two pending events quite high and it discourages them as potential stakers. Liquid staking solutions are irrelevant to this equation because behind every liquid staking token is real ETH that is out of circulation and an attacker needs real ETH to attack the network.</p><h3>2. Resilient to Repetitious Attacks</h3><p>In a PoW system an attacker can attack the network for little to no cost. There is no penalty for doing so and this can be attempted an indefinite amount of times in theory. Even if there were public outcry about a malicious miner executing many double spend attacks, the only resolution available is to change the hashing algorithm of Bitcoin, thereby rendering all mining equipment null (and fundamentally altering the ‘ossified’ protocol, which would require burnings and stakes but not of the Ethereum variety). Since hashpower can change IP addresses and point to different BTC deposit addresses, there is no way to surgically remove the malicious hashpower from the equation without first altering the fundamentals of the entire protocol. Even after the hashing algorithm is changed, the same problem could eventually creep up again.</p><p>Due to the very low consequence of attacking BTC, renting out hashpower to attack becomes a very profitable business. The miner gets a guaranteed profit without any negative consequences.</p><p>PoS handles attacks in a much different way than PoW. In PoS since every validators’ ETH address is known, and since the validators need their stake to perform an attack, the solution to an objectively malicious validator is to slash their stake, thereby reducing their consensus power.</p><p>A recent collective brainstorm goes something like this: Coinbase holds 1/3rd of active stake. If they censor all sanctioned transactions via attesting against any blocks with sanctioned transactions, then social consensus becomes activated. There are two solutions, the first of which is an outright slash reducing their stake below the 1/3rd necessary to censor. The other solution is to create a softfork where their stake would be made inactive. This would consistently slash them for their inactivity until they are below the 1/3rd threshold, then kick them out of the validation set.</p><h3>3. Resilient to State Surveillance and Geolocation Capture</h3><p>This is perhaps one of the less talked about benefits of PoS: that it’s harder if not impossible (with proper measures taken by validators) to physically locate where validation is occurring in order to shut it down.</p><p>Since PoW requires a lot of physical infrastructure and electricity to operate, it’s easier (than PoS) to locate and shut down if governments decides to make mining or cryptocurrency illegal. Additionally, governments can seize the physical infrastructure in order to commit their own mining operations. A recent example was when China banned Bitcoin mining and there was a mass exodus of miners from China. Where would they go if most countries banned it?</p><p>A PoS validator client runs normal software, so detection is extremely difficult if the validator is shielding their IP address via VPN routing. Even in the unlikely scenario that their physical location is compromised, their actual stake would be protected so long as they took protective measures regarding how they store their ETH. Sure, they would no longer be validating, but the government wouldn’t be able to seize the stake and use it for their own validation operation/attack on the network. The user could then run the PoS software on another computer, perhaps in another country, and continue staking as if nothing happened. But assuming that every validator can successfully hide their IP address, it would be nearly impossible to locate them and shut them down.</p><p>Since Bitcoin mining infrastructure is physical and in the real world (a feature not a bug according to Bitcoiners), it’s also capturable. Organizations/governments can physically seize all the mining operations. In the case that the miners are allowed to flee a certain jurisdiction: It’s quite difficult and expensive to move billions of dollars worth of mining infrastructure. However, it’s significantly easier to transport billions of dollars worth of stake.</p><h3>4. Resilient Against Centralization of Stakers Over Time</h3><p>While in theory anyone can amass PoW hashpower to competitively mine, it’s much more difficult to do so when large PoW miners benefit from economies of scale. Large mining operations get a higher percent yield on their investment than small mining operations. For instance: a $100 million investment in mining infrastructure will earn more percent return on investment than a $1 million investment. This is due to the nature of wholesale value, whether it’s in buying a lot of ASICs at one time, to electricity contracts, intellectual capital, etc. Having this benefit allows big mining operations to strangle and out compete smaller ones, trending toward centralization at the top.</p><p>In PoS everyone gets the same yield whether you’re staking 0.1 ETH (via liquid staking services) or 10 million ETH. However in PoW mining not only is the yield unequal depending on invested amount, but also earning a profit mining as an average person is extremely difficult. It’s hard to purchase the new ASICs when they are in such high demand and when they are shipping to the largest operations first. And if you don’t have new ASIC then your margins are destroyed by those who do.</p><h3>5. Resilient Against Being Weak Money</h3><p>Since miners requiring spending a large amount of money on electricity costs in order to sustain their operations, this makes the cost of security for Bitcoin higher than PoS. Miner profit margins are slim, and a vast amount of their total revenue goes toward electricity costs which are being subsidized via inflation. Even when the subsidization approaches 0, it will spell a security vulnerability for the network as it fails to accrue enough transaction fees to maintain a healthy security budget. (A common fallacy is that BTC fees will increase with the price of BTC. Demand for blockspace may be very losely correlated with the price of BTC but not directly correlated as the block subsidy is with regard to the security budget. In other words if the price of BTC doubles, so too does the security budget denominated in dollars, but not necessarily the average fee.)</p><p>With PoS, since there is little to no operational cost (electricity), it’s essentially free for an ETH holder to become a validator. Therefore the protocol doesn’t have to subsidize validators with a lot of inflation, though some is still given for incentive to be a validator and secure the network.</p><p>Due to the extremely low cost of being a validator, we can assume that there will always be healthy security in PoS. Even when accounting for the opportunity cost of staking — assuming staking yield is only 1% for example, there are still liquid staking solutions allowing one to earn that 1% yield on stake and also utilize their liquid staking token. Whether that be selling it for another asset, lending it out, or using it as collateral for a more profitable venture.</p><p><strong>About the author</strong></p><p><a href="https://twitter.com/0xAndrewRiley">Andrew Scott Riley</a> is a research consultant at Cyber Capital. With his computer science background, he analyzes cryptocurrency projects and whitepapers and compiles extensive research reports.</p><p><strong>About Cyber Capital</strong></p><p>Cyber Capital, Europe’s oldest cryptocurrency investment fund, is a fund manager that specialized in providing exposure to the crypto-asset markets as an alternative asset class. Cyber Capital is fully registered by the Dutch Authority for the Financial Markets under the AIFMD-light regime and the Dutch Central Bank.</p><p>Follow us on <a href="https://medium.com/cyber-capital/about">Medium</a> and <a href="https://twitter.com/CyberCapital">Twitter</a>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=69e7ddbb2874" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/cyber-capital/why-proof-of-stake-is-superior-to-proof-of-work-in-all-cases-69e7ddbb2874">Why Proof-of-Stake is Superior to Proof-of-Work in All Cases</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/cyber-capital">Cyber Capital</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Is MINA’s blockchain really only 22kb — forever?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/coinmonks/is-minas-blockchain-really-only-22kb-forever-55ddf8aa9022?source=rss-eec37ee4b66f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/55ddf8aa9022</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bitcoin]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[crypto]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[finance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ethereum]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Andrew Scott Riley]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 26 Jul 2022 23:01:44 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-07-27T07:32:10.609Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Is MINA’s blockchain really only 22kb — forever?</h3><p>MINA claims that its blockchain is only 22kb in size and that it will never increase — ever, just take a look at their first excerpt in the docs:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/877/1*ofcmL_SmvIXVdl5K7pkViw.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://docs.minaprotocol.com/en">https://docs.minaprotocol.com/en</a></figcaption></figure><p>The documents compare Bitcoin and Ethereum’s full chains of hundreds of gigabytes of data (and counting) to MINA’s always consistent 22kb “blockchain”. The comparison that they’re making and the language that they use is clear and undeniable: they want investors to believe that MINA’s blockchain, the whole chain, is 22kb and that it will always be. They want investors to believe that they have solved scaling by reaching the holy grail of cryptography. They want investors to believe that all the other chains (like Bitcoin and Ethereum) will always grow to an ever more burdensome size, unlike the novel and perfect innovation that is MINA.</p><p>However in the next paragraph they refer to it as “the small proof, as opposed to the entire chain”. They don’t explicitly state that “the small proof” aka “SNARK proof” is the 22kb object referred to in the first paragraph, but it’s easy enough to realize this is what they meant.</p><p>“No matter how much the usage grows, the blockchain always stays the same size — about 22kb”. So this begs the question: How exactly does MINA fit a hypothetical million transactions in the space where only 22k letters can fit? Well, it can’t. Whoever created the MINA docs and whoever runs their marketing is lying when they say that MINA’s blockchain is 22kb. The 22kb string is just a proof of the whole blockchain, in other words, you can use the 22kb to ensure that the whole blockchain, or parts of it, is valid. This is for sure a great feature, but they market it through deception claiming that it is the whole blockchain, and it is clearly the number one selling point of MINA, the thing that is vastly focused upon. The only way a blockchain can be of a static size is if it: 1. No longer adds transactions 2. Deletes transactions in order to add new ones.</p><p>A Metaphor:<br>It would be like taking the Bible and putting it through a hash generator in order to produce a SHA-256 hash (which I did, see below) and then claiming that the bible is this string of hexidecimal: “30b1b5adfb1c35980eae65c15b60dd8590598ee062076d611d8d7a53b7c227bd”</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ujfvjkjXobvDiM8PQt-MTw.png" /></figure><p>In this metaphor MINA would say that 64 characters is all you need to have the Bible. What can you do with these 64 characters? If I give you the Bible I uploaded and then you do the same process of creating a hash, you will find that our hashes match. That’s why it’s useful, to ensure the integrity of the data. But if all the Bibles on earth were to be destroyed and deleted, the hash wouldn’t do you much good, because the hash isn’t the Bible. In this same regard, the MINA 22kb proof is not the blockchain. The MINA blockchain cannot be recreated from the 22kb proof any more than you can recreate the Bible from the 64 character string.</p><p>MINA uses very clear and deceptive language in order to make people think the actual blockchain is 22kb, which is just not true.</p><blockquote>New to trading? Try <a href="https://medium.com/coinmonks/crypto-trading-bot-c2ffce8acb2a">crypto trading bots</a> or <a href="https://medium.com/coinmonks/top-10-crypto-copy-trading-platforms-for-beginners-d0c37c7d698c">copy trading</a></blockquote><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=55ddf8aa9022" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/coinmonks/is-minas-blockchain-really-only-22kb-forever-55ddf8aa9022">Is MINA’s blockchain really only 22kb — forever?</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/coinmonks">Coinmonks</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[What happens to miners when all the Bitcoins run out?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/coinmonks/what-happens-to-miners-when-all-the-bitcoins-run-out-88784a2c950c?source=rss-eec37ee4b66f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/88784a2c950c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bitcoin]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ethereum]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[investing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[finance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Andrew Scott Riley]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 30 Jun 2022 00:22:59 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-06-30T05:45:35.142Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/959/1*KCSbneu7eEydHuWiIEhUPA.png" /></figure><p>Bitcoin’s security is fueled by the block subsidy which is what miners get paid every time they successfully mine a block. Miners use this revenue to pay for their various business expenses such as electricity cost, new ASICS, and payroll. A majority of their revenue usually goes towards electricity so having cheap electricity is essential to remaining competitive. The higher the block subsidy is, the more miners can come online and be profitable, resulting in higher security for the Bitcoin network. However, every four years this amount (in BTC) gets cut in half, known as a halving event. Currently miners get paid 6.25 BTC per block. Every ten minutes only one miner gets selected to mine a block and gets rewarded with 6.25 BTC.</p><p>Though, despite the block subsidy going down, mining has continued to be profitable due to the price of BTC increasing accordingly. So if the price of BTC is $10k at 6.25 BTC per block, the block subsidy is $62,500. If the block subsidy gets cut in half to 3.125 BTC per block, the price of Bitcoin would have to double to $20,000 for the block subsidy to remain at $62,500 per block. So in order for Bitcoin to maintain its security from one halving to the next, the price must double in that same time frame.</p><p><strong>What this means for security:</strong><br>When the miner revenue begins to decrease, the unprofitable miners have to shut down their rigs, reducing the total hash power of the network which also reduces the security of the network. The more miners and hash power that is on the network, the higher the security is. So if the block subsidy gets too low and the price of Bitcoin doesn’t double every four years, the security budget will decrease.</p><blockquote>New to trading? Try <a href="https://medium.com/coinmonks/crypto-trading-bot-c2ffce8acb2a">crypto trading bots</a> or <a href="https://medium.com/coinmonks/top-10-crypto-copy-trading-platforms-for-beginners-d0c37c7d698c">copy trading</a></blockquote><p><strong>But what about the transaction fees!<br></strong>The rationalization of how Bitcoin will maintain high security is that transaction fees will eventually eclipse the block subsidy, thus securing the security budget ad infinitum.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*9GwfkRFSGT8uobZVb1NGSA.png" /><figcaption>Transaction fees as a percentage of block reward</figcaption></figure><p>The block reward = block subsidy + transaction fees, and currently the transaction fees represent less than 2% of the block reward. So if the block subsidy were to stop today, Bitcoin’s security would decrease by almost 98%.</p><p>So what would the fees have to be for the security to not be affected? As of today’s prices, 6.25 BTC = $129,550. The Bitcoin network averages about <a href="https://towardsdatascience.com/the-blockchain-scalability-problem-the-race-for-visa-like-transaction-speed-5cce48f9d44#:~:text=The%20current%20Bitcoin%20block%20generation,only%204.6%20transactions%20per%20second.">2,759.12 transactions per block</a>. To match the block subsidy fees would have to be ~$50 per transaction. This would ensure the current crypto economic security of the chain. Unfortunately we can’t guarantee that fees will be a certain price in the future. Also, there may be periods of high fees and periods of low fees, this volatility would allow attackers to time their attack when the security is the weakest. The question becomes, what is the appropriate level of security. Because if we were to use our example but before the halving of 2020 when the block Subsidy was 12.5 BTC, then in this case transaction fees would have to be ~$100 per transaction to match that level of security. The halving before that ~$200 per transaction etc. Another way to look at it is if BTC’s price were currently $60,000 and the block subsidy in dollar value were (6.25 * 60,000 = $375,000 then to match that same level of security without a block subsidy would require each transaction to be ~$150.</p><p>Even if Bitcoin’s transaction fees do end up being very high while the block subsidy approaches 0, with Ethereum’s leveraging of ZK-rollups + Optimistic-rollups + EIP1559 + PoS, it has a better long term security model.</p><p><strong>EIP-1559<br></strong>With the introduction of EIP-1559, a majority of the transaction fee on Ethereum gets burned (destroyed). This offsets the block subsidy going to the miners, so it allows the block subsidy to remain consistent unlike Bitcoin’s ever decreasing block subsidy. There have been periods of time in late 2021 where there were more Ethereum being destroyed than created, resulting in deflationary pressure. With the introduction of PoS, the deflation will be an almost permanent state.</p><p><strong>Proof-of-Stake</strong><br>When the Ethereum PoS chain finally merges with the current PoW chain, there will be much less issuance due to no longer having to pay miners high amounts of ETH in order to cover their electricity bills. It will be cheap to be a staker and therefore the chain can afford to pay stakers accordingly. This will almost certainly push Ethereum into net deflation. This provides Ethereum the same strength of Bitcoin’s 21 million hardcap, but without inheriting the long term security problems. The security budget for Ethereum will still be consistent and always present regardless of any external circumstances that the macro economy may face.</p><p><strong>ZK-rollups and Optimistic-rollups</strong><br>The innovation of these rollup types allow users to make transactions off-chain but in a secure way (unlike the lightning network). For instance if a user uses ZK-rollups and commits many transactions to the rollup and then the sequencer of the rollup goes offline, the user can still withdraw their funds from the rollup via the Ethereum L1. This allows for higher transactional throughput which results in cheaper fees.</p><p>The long term security model for Bitcoin is definitely flawed, but possibly manageable. There may be a future in which people and institutions are okay with paying high on-chain fees. But this certainly limits what people can do with their Bitcoin and how custodial the services they use may have to be. However Ethereum’s long term security model is perhaps the best out of all the other projects because it ensures high long term security, it creates a deflationary environment ideal for saving, and it allows for immense usability in Ethereum’s bustling and innovative ecosystem. If you’re interested you can also <a href="https://medium.com/coinmonks/is-proof-of-stake-really-like-the-current-fiat-system-a259e3bcc36d">read</a> about how Ethereum’s PoS is superior to Bitcon’s PoW (in general).</p><blockquote>Join Coinmonks<a href="https://t.me/coincodecap"> Telegram Channel</a> and<a href="https://www.youtube.com/c/coinmonks/videos"> Youtube Channel</a> learn about crypto trading and investing</blockquote><h3>Also, Read</h3><ul><li><a href="https://coincodecap.com/best-crypto-to-invest-in-india-in-2021">Best Crypto to Invest in India</a> |<a href="https://coincodecap.com/wazirx-p2p"> WazirX P2P</a> |<a href="https://coincodecap.com/hi-dollar-review"> Hi Dollar Review</a></li><li><a href="https://coincodecap.com/5-best-crypto-trading-bots-in-canada">Best Crypto Trading bots in Canada</a> |<a href="https://coincodecap.com/kucoin-review"> KuCoin Review</a></li><li><a href="https://coincodecap.com/huobi-crypto-trading-signals">Crypto Trading Signals for Huobi</a> |<a href="https://medium.com/coinmonks/hitbtc-review-c5143c5d53c2"> HitBTC Review</a></li><li><a href="https://coincodecap.com/traderwagon-review">TraderWagon Review</a> | <a href="https://coincodecap.com/kraken-vs-gemini-vs-bityard">Kraken vs Gemini vs BitYard</a></li><li><a href="https://coincodecap.com/ftx-futures-trading">How to trade Futures on FTX Exchange</a></li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=88784a2c950c" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/coinmonks/what-happens-to-miners-when-all-the-bitcoins-run-out-88784a2c950c">What happens to miners when all the Bitcoins run out?</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/coinmonks">Coinmonks</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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