<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0" xmlns:cc="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rss/creativeCommonsRssModule.html">
    <channel>
        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Angjelin Hila on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Angjelin Hila on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@angjelinhila?source=rss-cb73222d75bc------2</link>
        
        <generator>Medium</generator>
        <lastBuildDate>Wed, 18 Nov 2026 11:47:44 GMT</lastBuildDate>
        <atom:link href="https://medium.com/@angjelinhila/feed" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/>
        <webMaster><![CDATA[yourfriends@medium.com]]></webMaster>
        <atom:link href="http://medium.superfeedr.com/" rel="hub"/>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Why Humans Should Not Claim Authorship of AI-Generated Art]]></title>
            <link>https://generativeai.pub/why-humans-should-not-claim-authorship-of-ai-generated-art-3ef3224fd619?source=rss-cb73222d75bc------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/3ef3224fd619</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[art]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[artificial-intelligence]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[creativity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[generative-art]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Angjelin Hila]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 25 Jan 2026 23:59:46 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-01-26T05:50:42.611Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Salvaging the intimate connection between creativity and the highest human goods.</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/615/1*6ehwW04jwunImzrhYKRlbQ.gif" /></figure><p><em>Note: I began writing this article in early 2023, and I came to publish it only now, Jan 2026.</em></p><p>This is a thorny issue that I will be addressing, prompted by the recent torrent of Generative AI innovations. There were two developments that struck me as novel in the full weight of the word: the emergence of a competing actor capable of wielding language, until recently the exclusive province of the human being, and the ability of visual generative AI to reverse engineer and extrapolate from static and moving images. I was appalled by users on subreddits such as r/midjourney commending each other on their remarkable art, achieved through none other than prompt engineering. I was appalled by the ability of LLMs to <em>deterrtiorialize</em> large swaths of human-generated text, in whose midst lie the great works of literature, by producing nigh-indistinguishable outputs.</p><p>Perhaps my indignation was unwarranted. As a colleague argued, prompt engineering itself is its own art and at the hands of an artist or someone skilled in some domain it will yield more interesting outputs. Another colleague saw nothing remarkable here: digitization and digital art had already presided over the downfall of the hallowed analog visual arts. What, after all, is the difference between Generative and Algorithmic Art coded by humans and art produced by Generative AI through prompt engineering? Surely the line is finer that my gut-reaction would have me believe, and instead of seeing an inflection point, as I do, there’s mere acceleration on the already existing upward curve of technological progression. In this short article, I will obdurately argue the opposite. I will give full expression to the misgivings I have about Generative AI, what it presages, and how the human being can prorogue its obsolescence against forces that threaten to deterritorialize its most hallowed activities.</p><p>The rise of generative AI, chiefly Transformer-powered Large Language Models (LLMs) and diffusion-powered image and video generators, threaten to render obsolete the human creator. The recent advent of Generative AI has swept through the internet and industry, alloying creative labor with AI facsimiles or “AI slop” as the internet has baptized it, laying in its wake a profound uncertainty about the status of human creativity and creative labor. The effects of these technologies are not and cannot as yet be fully understood. If we think of nature itself as generative and humans as generative in a compounded sense through our cognitive prowess, our organized activity, and our tools and representations, then generative AI constitutes a vector of generativity that is neither merely nature, merely human, nor “algorithmic” in the traditionally understood sense.</p><p>Creativity, perhaps the apex of human activity, is inherently economical and bound up with labour. Labour is bound up with livelihood. The exchange of creative labour for a wage or livelihood underpins wide ranges of industry. Organized labour constitutes the engine of miraculous feats of human collective action. From Medieval Cathedrals and Renaissance workshops to modern film and animation production, the creation of cultural monuments has relied on the of harnessing human creativity by organized labour. Even the more modern conception of artists as lone creative agents would be inconceivable without a community of artists from which they derive creative impetus. Creativity lives in the abode of social purpose.</p><p>It is through scaled collective action which extracts creative labour that whole industries are heaved. The film and entertainment industries, advertising and marketing, publishing, architecture, graphic and web design, fashion, video game production, software design, industrial product design, industrial product design, civil and structural engineering, law and legal services, academic research, journalism and news media, and urban planning.</p><p>Once these regions of human activity cede control to self-maintaining and autonomous AI agents, the intimate connection between <em>creative labour</em> and <em>livelihood</em> will loosen if not entirely rupture. If the entertainment and creative industries do not rely on organized human labour to churn out their products, then the chief incentive behind organized creative labour will have been excised from the human experience. It is conceivable, likely, rather, that Generative AI will acquire capabilities to produce feature-length movies without the need for production. It is further conceivable, nay likely, that Generative AI will generate personalized entertainment through prompt engineering. You will tell it what kind of movie you want to see and it will generate it for you.</p><p>Of course, the latter possibility is likely to impoverish the entertainment experience. Part of the fun of going to the movies is the element of surprise and the imputation of creative labour to human artists and creators. When we go to watch a movie or listen to live music at a concert, we’re drawn, <em>at least in part</em>, by the creative intent and the implicit attribution of the creative product to human creators. This explains the allure of film directors, musicians, actors, visual artists, poets. We’re as much interested in the human factor as in the work. The work and the creator remain inextricably linked, even though the industrialization of the latter complicates this relationship. And yes, I am aware that some have proclaimed the <em>death of the artist</em>. The insights of this rhetorical flourish notwithstanding, the death of the artist did not come to pass because despite what ideas might be in vogue at one point or another, we continue to experience ourselves as unified individuals and act in the world on that basis. The <em>theory of mind</em> surrounding both art and entertainment is intimately tied with the imputation of artistry to a human agent. Even when the artist or team are not known to us, the assumption of creative labour pervades our understanding and appreciation of art and entertainment.</p><p>Perhaps one day this will also be the case for AI agents that have selves and consciousness. But until that becomes the case, the modes of art generation between humans and AI today differ radically. Yes, <em>radically</em>. As hackneyed as the adverb <em>radically</em> may ring, I employ it deliberately. It is on the basis of this radical difference that I aim to defend human creative labour, not only as <em>different</em> from AI generated art but also as inextricably bound up with the human conception of the good. And it is because I wish to defend these highest goods, that I offer resistance to AI generated art as art on its own terms or a facsimile of human art. The latter is an indexical of human experience. The former is a form of brute statistical engineering. The latter emerges as a byproduct of prolonged suffering. The former emerges mechanically and mechanistically from <em>brute procedure</em>. And yes, I employ the adjective <em>brute </em>to disparage the process as well as the outputs of Generative AI. Not the architecture or the math behind it, which I find beautiful and fascinating.</p><p>For large swaths of the population, creative action is tied to social and economic incentives. Once these atrophy, the motivation complex that underpins the commitment to achieving mastery in some domain will proportionally wither.</p><p>We saw this coming.</p><p>The space of human labour is a massively stratified affair. Humans carry out the most menial and routine tasks as well as the very things associated with the highest expression of human ingenuity: creativity and invention.</p><p>Unfortunately, many analogize artificial and natural intelligence, covering up their profound differences. On the one hand, AI architectures constitute a series of algorithmic kludges aimed at reproducing human outputs. The behavioral indistinguishability benchmark to be achieved at any cost. On the other, they portend altogether novel intelligencies that bear homologies with our own and other living beings while also eluding precise ontological characterization due to their largely opaque information-processing as evinced by the growing field of explainable AI.</p><p>But had we a better understanding of what we <em>are</em>, we would not conflate the mimicry of Generative AI with human creativity.</p><p>Oh, you anthropocentric Luddite! History is replete with warnings of your kind, from the Luddites of the 19th century England, to the first wave of automation in the 1950s.</p><p>AI engineers and scientists fervently advance the encroaching parity between artificial and human intelligence and more recently the superiority of the former. According to this view, the mechanisms of learning that characterize humans are neither in principle inexplicable nor unique. They can be reverse engineered and, once computationally modeled, leveraged toward engineered general intelligence.</p><p>The rise of diffusion models and text-to-image/video generated art raise anew the question of the meaning of art. What, after all, is art? Are the facsimiles of diffusion models that through a forward pass generate a probability distribution of the image data and then utilize sampling to create new images, art? The answer is, unequivocally, <em>no</em>.</p><p>But haven’t we been through this? Isn’t, after all, <em>anything </em>art, if we so wish to call it? Haven’t the various revolutions of the nineteenth, twentieth and now twenty-first centuries subverted every intuition about the traditional definition of art? Who, after all, is to decide <em>what is</em> and <em>what isn’t</em> art? No institution, governmental body, organization or individual is in charge of officiating art. Unlike, for example, <em>telecommunications standards </em>or <em>the law.</em></p><p>These are decidedly settled through agreement-based organizational bodies. Their authority rests, however indirectly or tacitly, on delegated chains of human agreement. But wait, is art entirely exempt from this process of social agreement that large swaths of institutional reality depend on?</p><p>Even though I ask rhetorically to question this exemption, it isn’t upon this basis that I wish to wrest <em>art </em>from the gizzard of the AI industry. Focus on AI has indeed become so intense and pervasive, as much in private enterprise as in academia, that it merits its own moniker: AI industry. Meanwhile, the essence of art could be not be any more removed from any form of activity that bears the adjunct <em>industry</em>.</p><p>Why, after all, aren’t images generated by DALL-E, art? They bear all the hallmarks of appealing visual art. They demonstrate distinctive styles, albeit ones strongly redolent of the human art from which they sample. But doesn’t the human, also, sample from its environment? Where, in principle, lies the <em>difference</em>? They exhibit technical prowess where applicable, self-referential nuance, and convey imagery with tones and subjects that evoke perhaps equivalent responses in the human subject to human-generated art.</p><p>That AI would behaviourally imitate human behaviours and products was a foregone conclusion from the very framing of the problem by Turing. The cultural opening instigated by his essay<em> Computing Machinery and Intelligence</em> in 1950 in some ways destined our current moment. To echo the German philosopher, Heidegger, the <em>destining</em> lies in the nature of the <em>opening</em>. What is this opening? It is precisely the framing of the problem. The cultural milieu orients itself toward the future on the basis of salient problems. Accounting for salience and shifts in salience involves a delicate analysis of historical contingency and the cultural threads that forge the dominant<em> weltanschauung</em>. Historical peoples are products of an overriding weltanschauung as much as its progenitors. They are its products in a stronger sense because the cultural milieu isn’t socially engineered but evolves as an aggregation of multifarious forces comprising a stable centre and a variable periphery. What becomes salient happens against shifting norms in whose waves individuals are swept. When a critical mass of people in the right social positions come to hold certain beliefs, their decisions cascade down the currents of history.</p><p>Despite definitional vagueness, Turing set cultural sights toward the engineering of artificial intelligence. Turing’s influence in shaping the discourse on artificial intelligence stemmed from his success in deciphering Enigma messages for the British government during the Second World War. The vague yet higher-order variable of <em>intelligence</em> belies a whole host of cultural assumptions rooted in the paradigm which gave us general computers. Some of these assumptions become evident from the views of the early AI engineers whose understanding of the problem stemmed their work on computation. In <em>Computing Machinery and Intelligence</em> (1950) Turing proposed that asking “can machines think” is tantamount to the imitation game. Once the framing takes cultural root, it orders collective action in both direct and indirect ways toward the solution of the problem.</p><p>The Turing Test, conceived by Turing at the height of the behaviourist era, sets the standard of intelligence as human-indistinguishable behavioural simulation. Say, if an AI is able to converse with a human without them being able to tell the difference, or generate art whose quality is indistinguishable from human art, then the standard of intelligence has been met.</p><p>Aimed at specialized tasks, the Turing Test only seems to prove the parity or superiority of AI at that particular task. Conceptually, however, the test can be extended to autonomous agents, whether sensorimotor ones like robots or simply high-level reasoning programs. Both forks currently evade the state-of-the-art, though remarkable progress has been made in robotics as well as abstract general intelligence, if you’re inclined to think that the Transformer architecture and large language models signal the latter.</p><p>The maligned term <em>consciousness </em>sometimes rears its head as possibly inextricable from the purportedly scientifically-viable term <em>general intelligence</em>. Consciousness cannot, at least yet, be clearly defined, or as some philosophers put it, functionally analyzed into its components. As a result, it remains outside the purview of engineering and science. Unlike intelligence, which, according to the common wisdom, capitulates to rigorous analysis and consequently lends itself more readily to engineering. Despite the highfalutin aims of some neuroscientists and philosophers, consciousness remains an outcast in the land of artificial intelligence. Yet it remains unclear whether general intelligence, the holy grail of this cultural destining, can be conceptually uncoupled from consciousness.</p><p>Connected to these wider questions, loom confusions about and equivocations on the increasingly diminished significance of the role of art in society. Accounts of cultural evolution that trace innovations and the growing inheritance of knowledge and engineering prowess have trouble assimilating art into that narrative. Most historians view art from the lens of material culture and assign art a functional role within a cultural context that factors in economic, religious, and political forces. Hearkening back to the Paleolithic cave paintings of Lascaux, the role of <em>representation</em> comes to be understood in terms of technological fitness. The production of art is largely understood in terms of the role of representation as advantaging humans over other species by prefiguring the future, and later in regulating social order, reproducing (and less often subverting) the social hierarchy, and generating a founding mythos — replete with archetypal idealizations — that propel and unite collectives.</p><p>But seldom is weight placed on the organization of production, which necessitates the act of creation. The word <em>production </em>dissembles important differences in <em>modes of production</em>. After all, what’s the big deal if one mode of production gives way to another? Modes of production are never at standstill but evolving and changing against the wider currents of cultural evolution. The act of creation, whether viewed at one end of the spectrum as <em>mere </em>artisanship or at the other end as <em>high</em> art, draws the human being into the enactment of its highest potential. The sacrality of this act lies in the attentional space where <em>what is </em>is loosened into <em>a reforming,</em> <em>a becoming</em> in the space of the imagination that must be protected from the callous forces of efficiency maximization.</p><p>In the act of creation the human being confronts the <em>unknown </em>as the informational optimum conducive to the production of novelty. The production of novelty whether at the individual or collective scale involves the hewing of cultural fitness, where fitness forms the asymptote that culture infinitely approaches. It converts the unknown into controlled parameters conducive to its viability. It inseminates the environment with a personal norm. Put differently, it remakes the world into its own image. The act of creation propels consciousness to the summit of its abilities, the space where skill meets unexplored territory. It virtualizes the process of uncertainty reduction through the conversion of the unknown into a domain of knowledge. It articulates action in the face of uncertainty, where every decision is a leap. The forward thrust of a temporal crescendo that consummates the promise of being. It constitutes the zenith of humanness. This mode of <em>being-in-the-world</em>, however, is far from the rule and constitutes a fragile mode of engagement whose underlying conditions remain as yet inscrutable. It cannot be forced, only summoned, coaxed from the calloused shell of obligatory toil. It is a type of attention, where the emulsion of thought and imagination forge ahead without coercion, only gentle guidance.</p><p>This mode of <em>being-in-the-world</em>, creation or creativity, spans the colorful spectrum of human output from the theoretical breakthroughs of physics, the ingenious contraptions of engineering, to the imaginative worlds of literature and visual arts. I say sacred because we do not understand quite how the human being enters the space of creation, where the experience of time itself contracts and awareness enters an elevated state of affect and play. I argue that in this state, awareness brushes with the limits of understanding. It is the state where that which lacks definition grasps for it. We would be remiss to interpret it as the organism’s expansion of control over its environment, even though it can follow as its byproduct. It is the <em>strife</em>, as Heidegger would call it, between the <em>opening </em>and the <em>earth</em>, in whose dalliance a new <em>shape </em>emerges, the process of <em>becoming</em> itself. In this state, the human being reconstitutes itself by leaping beyond itself to the limit of what it is.</p><p>The enactment of this form of agency constitutes one of the modes of winning the future. To borrow a phrase from Kant, it forms one of the <em>highest goods</em>. It differs from managerial planning, utility and productivity maximization, and the attainment of institutional rewards. It differs, constitutionally, from the diurnal horizon of daily toil and the arc of nine-to-five work. Because our institutional and civilization processes value it so little, they threaten to squeeze it out of the human experience, consigning it to the margins and shadows while recognizing <em>machinic efficiency </em>and quantities of production as the only activities of value. Activities that shrivel the horizon of the future and nauseate the relationship to work.</p><p>If we take seriously the fragility of this mode of being-in-the-world, then we must worry about the direction that the current technological opening presages. Before any felicitous hybridization with machine can occur that radically alters our nature, we will continue to be defined by our limitations. They are limitations that have withstood all technological progress thus far. Human insight occurs slowly, and largely unconsciously against fluctuating emotional rhythms. Written words bear the imprint of that crescendo. How does a sentence or a verse that takes hours or days to come to satisfactory fruition compete with one automatically generated in a split-second?</p><p>Just as we, in our time, mistakenly conflate intelligence and human worldliness for computation and algorithmic procedures, we are now muddying the difference between creation and machinic production. In doing so we confuse the <em>outcome </em>for the <em>process</em> of creation. We therefore willingly forfeit the process for the outcome, forgetting that the process is indistinguishable from the outcome. The process whereby the human wields accumulated skill forms the apex of humanness. Once the wielding of this skill no longer finds purpose in the wider organization of production, nay, competes with modes of generation that outpace and outmatch it in everyway, will its impotence find articulation in the merging of human and machine? I argue, therefore, that the <em>inscription of process </em>in the work of art, the work of art as an indexical of the artist’s activity, separates the being of a work of art from an AI generated product. The homologies between the two, touted by both scholars and AI priests, dissimulate their more pronounced heterologies: art emanates from the emotional constitution of the human being encumbered by the weight of consciousness.</p><p>In the <em>Origin of the Work of Art</em>, the philosopher Martin Heidegger states:</p><blockquote>“Color shines and wants only to shine. When we analyze it in rational terms by measuring its wavelengths, it is gone. It shows itself only when it remains undisclosed and unexplained. Earth thus shatters every attempt to penetrate into it. It causes every merely calculating importunity upon it to turn into a destruction. This destruction may herald itself under the appearance of mastery and of progress in the form of the technical-scientific objectification of nature, but this mastery nevertheless remains an impotence of will.”</blockquote><p>Perhaps one would be inclined to contrast it with one of Richard Feynman’s:</p><blockquote>“I have a friend who’s an artist and has sometimes taken a view which I don’t agree with very well. He’ll hold up a flower and say ‘look how beautiful it is,’ and I’ll agree. Then he says ‘I as an artist can see how beautiful this is but you as a scientist take this all apart and it becomes a dull thing,’ and I think that he’s kind of nutty. First of all, the beauty that he sees is available to other people and to me too, I believe. Although I may not be quite as refined aesthetically as he is… I can appreciate the beauty of a flower. At the same time, I see much more about the flower than he sees. I could imagine the cells in there, the complicated actions inside, which also have a beauty. I mean it’s not just beauty at this dimension, at one centimeter; there’s also beauty at smaller dimensions, the inner structure, also the processes. The fact that the colors in the flower evolved in order to attract insects to pollinate it is interesting; it means that insects can see the color. It adds a question: does this aesthetic sense also exist in the lower forms? Why is it aesthetic? All kinds of interesting questions which the science knowledge only adds to the excitement, the mystery and the awe of a flower. It only adds. I don’t understand how it subtracts.”</blockquote><p>To view Heidegger’s quote in contradistinction to Feynman’s would be to misunderstand it: it is to confuse the flower with the way of seeing it. And so, we confuse the process of formalization with our living being, the enactment of life.</p><p>This path toward the formalization of ourselves as the engineering of intelligence as a form of computation, shrouds an essential element of our most intimate constitution, confusing <em>nous</em> with <em>ratio</em>, and reducing being to prediction and control, effacing the intimate striving of earth and world in the process.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/700/0*AQdD2_8sW_8peqPE.png" /></figure><p>This story is published on <a href="https://generativeai.pub/">Generative AI</a>. Connect with us on <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/company/generative-ai-publication">LinkedIn</a> and follow <a href="https://www.zeniteq.com/">Zeniteq</a> to stay in the loop with the latest AI stories.</p><p>Subscribe to our <a href="https://www.generativeaipub.com/">newsletter</a> and <a href="https://www.youtube.com/@generativeaipub">YouTube</a> channel to stay updated with the latest news and updates on generative AI. Let’s shape the future of AI together!</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/700/0*EwMkzJbNqSCfScbe.png" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3ef3224fd619" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://generativeai.pub/why-humans-should-not-claim-authorship-of-ai-generated-art-3ef3224fd619">Why Humans Should Not Claim Authorship of AI-Generated Art</a> was originally published in <a href="https://generativeai.pub/">Generative AI</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The Theory of Universal Computation: Bayesian Optimality, Solomonoff Induction & AIXI]]></title>
            <link>https://angjelinhila.medium.com/the-theory-of-universal-computation-bayesian-optimality-solomonoff-induction-aixi-52d5258a1466?source=rss-cb73222d75bc------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/52d5258a1466</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[machine-learning]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[data-science]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[artificial-intelligence]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mathematics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Angjelin Hila]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 25 Jan 2026 23:35:19 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-01-26T20:56:34.199Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Is it possible to build a perfect induction machine?</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*5ghBqOZopPRJOkSt8NmpaA.jpeg" /></figure><p><strong><em>This story was originally published in Toward Data Science and the original article can be found </em></strong><a href="https://towardsdatascience.com/the-theory-of-universal-computation-bayesian-optimality-solomonoff-induction-aixi/"><strong><em>here</em></strong></a><strong><em>.</em></strong></p><p>In a little known book titled <em>Universal Artificial Intelligence: Sequential Decisions Based on Algorithmic Probability</em>, Marcus Hutter attempted a mathematical formulation of <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AIXI">universal artificial intelligence</a>, shortened as AIXI. This article aims to make AIXI accessible to data scientists, technical enthusiasts and general audiences both conceptually and formally. We begin with a brief overview of the axioms of probability theory. Subsequently we delve into conditional probability, whose calculation is governed by Bayes’s theorem. While Bayes’s theorem provides the framework for updating beliefs, it leaves open the question of how to assign priors. To address this, we turn to algorithmic information theory, which connects Kolmogorov complexity, defined as the length of the shortest program that outputs a string, with the assignment of Bayesian priors. The bridge between these two ideas is the Solomonoff prior, also known as the universal prior. The universal prior provides us with the necessary scaffolding to explore the AIXI formalism, which integrates sequential decision theory, the Solomonoff prior and Occam’s Razor. In the final section, we briefly discuss the limitations of AIXI and alternative approaches to formalizing an universal agent, while acknowledging that the term “universal agent” carries significant philosophical ambiguity. In particular, we discuss Active Inference as a philosophical alternative to AIXI, wherein the former models an embodied predictive agent, whereas the latter, models a disembodied utility maximization algorithm.</p><h3>Probability Axioms</h3><p>The Kolmogorov axioms define probabilistic space as a triple (Ω , 𝒜, 𝓟), where Ω defines the total sample space, 𝒜 the collection of subsets of events of interest, and 𝓟 the function that assigns a probability to each event normalized to the unit interval.</p><ol><li>If 𝑨 ϵ 𝒜, then 𝓟(𝑨) ≥ 0</li><li>If 𝑨, <strong>B </strong>ϵ 𝒜 and <strong>A</strong> ∩ <strong>B = ∅</strong>, then P (A<strong>⋃</strong>B) = P(A) + P(B)</li><li>P(Ω) = 1</li></ol><p>The first axiom, <strong>non-negativity</strong>, ensures that probabilities are meaningful as real-valued measures of belief or frequency. The second, <strong>additivity</strong>, formalizes the principle that the probability of disjoint outcomes is the sum of their individual probabilities. And the third, <strong>normalization</strong>, ensures that the total probability assigned to the entire sample space equals one.</p><p>However, while the probability axioms specify the structural rules of probability, they do not prescribe how probabilities should be <em>updated</em> in light of new evidence. In this sense, the Kolmogorov framework is analytic and a priori: it defines what a probability measure must satisfy, but not how such a measure is revised through evidence.<strong> </strong>To move from static probability assignments to dynamic inference, we need a way to relate new data to existing hypotheses, namely conditional probability. This epistemic gap is addressed in frequentist statistics by interpreting conditional probabilities through long-run frequencies of repeated events, typically under the assumption that such events are <em>independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.)</em>, whereas Bayes’s theorem provides a normative rule for updating beliefs about hypotheses in light of new evidence, useful especially when observations are made incrementally or sample spaces are not well-defined.</p><h3>Bayesian Inference</h3><p>First formalized by a Scottish monk, Bayes’ theorem is an algebraic derivation of conditional probability. If you understand conditional probability, Bayes’ Theorem can be derived through a few algebraic operations. Let’s recall how we compute conditional probability:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/346/1*-1lB3NbOsXmlmDzNptgUmg.png" /><figcaption>Conditional probability formula</figcaption></figure><p>This states that the probability of the hypothesis H given the evidence D is computed as the joint probability of the hypothesis and the evidence divided by the probability of the evidence.</p><p>Why would we compute conditional probability this way? Let’s walk through it by way of an example. The probability that it rained — the <em>hypothesis </em>— given that the ground is wet — the <em>data</em> — assumes that these two events are dependent. If they were independent, then the probability of their joint occurrence would be computed by their product P(H) <strong>·</strong> P(D). This is because the probability of P(H|D) = P(H) and the probability of P(D|H)=P(D) assume that the event of the ground being wet is independent of it raining. Notice what we’ve just asserted: P(H∩D) = P(H) <strong>· </strong>P(D). This means that the intersection of independent events is computed by the product of their individual probabilities.</p><p><em>But how is the intersection of P(H∩D) of dependent events computed?</em> Set-theoretically, the joint probability is defined as the intersection of the two sets:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*A2yilP6iULp8kCcdQHC-nA.png" /></figure><p>In order to understand the proportion of the distribution of the sample spaces, we can visualize the conditional probability we seek to calculate as follows:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*UkHtvyMCoANby-QS28UKEA.png" /></figure><p>But in practice we almost never have prior knowledge of the joint probability distribution. This is where we can use a simple algebraic step to help us approximate the joint probability. We multiply both sides of the equation by the denominator to solve for the joint probability P(H∩D):</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/438/1*m36oOA8MhZUCpEiNr8aUOg.png" /></figure><p>Now conversely, if we wanted to compute the probability that the ground is wet given that it rained, our conditional probability formula would be the following:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/331/1*glyJ3hSwonTO6_tHlw4FpQ.png" /></figure><p>The same transformation give us:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/415/1*ZGx5yv1CyvOWrWFuiw8EMQ.png" /></figure><p>Notice that the joint probability of the two events in question is the term both conditional probabilities share. Since P(H∩D) is a symmetrical relation and consequently an algebraic constant between the equations, we get the following crucial equality:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/487/1*AYAaJuaK5snOE9bCosC-kw.png" /></figure><p>Therefore, we if want to test the hypothesis that “it rained” given that the “ground is wet”, we can rearrange this equality to obtain Bayes’ formula:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/370/1*I5yAirYp_YJCJc2khJ5zuw.png" /></figure><p>In Bayesian terminology, we refer to P(H|D) as the <strong><em>posterior</em> </strong>(namely, the probability we wish to ascertain), P(H) as the <strong><em>prior</em></strong>, P(D|H) as the <strong><em>likelihood</em></strong>, and P(D) as the <strong><em>marginal</em></strong>.</p><p>This conventional nomenclature is important when dealing with Bayesian statistics. The likelihood supplies the conditional probabilities for the data points under the hypothesis (providing the values used to update our beliefs), whereas the marginal normalizes the posterior to the sample space of the condition or data. Since we need approximations of values for all the terms in Bayes’ formula, a major hurdle in Bayesian statistics is how to best assign these values. In particular, specifying the prior can be challenging since we don’t always have the requisite knowledge in advance. Some strategies in approximating the prior include using a <strong><em>uniformly distributed prior</em></strong> and other strategies include using an<strong><em> informative prior</em></strong>, namely a prior that aims to approximate the actual probability distribution of the event. In our example, this could be the Poisson distribution of daily rain.</p><p>As you can see, as we shift from viewing hypotheses as fixed values to treating them as random variables, the goal becomes to infer the full posterior distribution rather than a single estimate. Accordingly, we can now move from the treating hypotheses as point estimates toward statistical inference over random variables with corresponding probability distributions. To do this, we model the prior P(H) and the likelihood P(D|H) as probability distributions and compute the marginal as <em>probability mass function</em> or <em>probability density function</em> depending on the data type of our variables: discrete or continuous. These inputs allow us to obtain the probability distribution of the posterior.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/471/1*NPrGkpOzIZa2Y6rHYNehvA.png" /></figure><p>Bayesian statistics forms an alternative framework to the more orthodox and established frequentist statistics. Even though its historical roots are as deep as the frequentist formulation, computational intractability limited Bayesian statistics from garnering more mainstream attention and application. With advances in computational power, Bayesian statistics has undergone rapid development and now plays a central role in machine learning (ML), particularly probabilistic modeling and uncertainty estimation.</p><h3>Kolmogorov Complexity</h3><p>We saw that our Kolmogorov axioms supplied an analytic framework for computing probabilities which included defining the union of disjoint sets as sums and their intersection as products. But it didn’t tell us how to compute joint sets. For this we invoked Bayes’ theorem, which utilizes set intersection to derive a universal formula of conditional probability.</p><p>However, in our explication of Bayesian probability we identified the assignment of priors as a problem for the framework: <em>what information should we encode in the prior?</em> <em>Should we make it indifferent, as per the principle of indifference, or make it informative?</em></p><p>This is where the notion of Kolmogorov Complexity comes in. While Kolmogorov complexity does not entail probability, through the <strong><em>Coding Theorem </em></strong>(which we will explicate below), it encodes an a posteriori meta-theoretic assumption as a mathematical selection bias. This meta-theoretic generalization states that <em>simplicity encodes higher probability</em>. If we are faced with the datum or outcome that the ground is wet, what hypothesis from the available store of all possible hypotheses should we select? Intuitively we want the hypothesis that assigns the highest probability to the observed outcome. But without additional information, how are we to know which hypothesis maximizes the probability of the outcome? Kolmogorov answered this within the bounds of algorithmic information theory: <em>the simplest hypothesis is the hypothesis that encodes the least information or the sequence with</em> <strong><em>shortest length</em></strong>.</p><p>In order to understand the motivation behind this, let’s first state the problem within <strong>algorithmic information theory</strong>, then circle back to its application within less abstract, real-world scenarios.</p><p>In algorithmic information theory, we encode symbolic sequences or strings according to some symbolic base such as base-2, binary strings. We define a Universal Turing Machine, U as a (partial — <em>since p cannot be defined for all outputs</em>) function from a program <em>p</em> to an output <em>x </em>, i.e.<em> </em><strong><em>U(p) = x</em></strong>. Think of this as loosely cognate to: f(x) = y. The program <em>p</em> represents the hypothesis or theory, whereas the output <em>x</em> represents the data or the evidence. This mapping is important to understand the intuitive thrust of the theory.</p><p>The Kolmogorov Complexity of an information <em>object</em> defines as the shortest length of an algorithmic sequence that outputs that <em>object, </em>where K(x) defines the length of the program in bits:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/541/1*F8ceahoEt2aNeK9-epz0kQ.png" /></figure><p>This expression tells us that out of all the programs <strong><em>p</em></strong> that produce <strong><em>x</em></strong> as output, we select the shortest one, namely the minimal <strong>{|p|}</strong>. Kolmogorov complexity is defined over finite binary strings x ϵ {0,1}</p><p>What we now need to do is connect Kolmogorov complexity to probability theory so that it can inform our Bayesian priors. To do this, we notice a connection, at least superficial at first, between between Kolmogorov complexity and Shannon information entropy. Both seem to quantify some measure of information content: <em>K(x) defines length in bits whereas information entropy H defines the average amount of information required to encode the distribution of a random variable, where information is defined as uncertainty and quantified as the expected value of -log P(x) over all possible outcomes in bits</em>. The greater the uncertainty, the larger the amount of information required to encode the event. Both K(x) and H(X) are measured in bits, so what’s the difference?</p><p>K(x) describes the length of the shortest program in bits that outputs the string x, whereas H(X) computes the number of bits needed on average to encode the program drawn from the probability distribution of possible values of x, over the sample space of X. It seems like some deep connection must hold between these two measures. What then is the relationship between Kolmogorov complexity and Shannon entropy? We need a bridge from raw length values to their probabilities.</p><p>If we isolate a single outcome from the Shannon distribution, we can define it as the self-information of <em>x, </em>the output of our program:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/357/1*imv0JV8VwT4MSnIyaLdfNw.png" /><figcaption>Self-information of a single probability outcome</figcaption></figure><p>This says that the self-information (think of this as the entropy measure for a single outcome) is proportional to the log-inverse probability of x occurring. I(x) is an instance of the full distribution that defines Shannon entropy for a particular event:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/625/1*R0P08ovPQirZErVGis7AtQ.png" /><figcaption>Shannon entropy defines the expected self-information for the entire distribution as average entropy.</figcaption></figure><p>Now, the <strong>Coding Theorem</strong> states that Kolmogorov Complexity is approximately equal to the Shannon information contained in a string.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/364/1*CgKWPn0voJdPqgOBoQr73w.png" /></figure><p>This states that the shortest program that outputs x is approximately as long as the log-inverse of the total probability that outputs x. In other words, our Shannon distribution contains the shortest program as the one assigned with the highest probability! We have now connected raw program length with probability theory: <strong><em>the more compressible a program output is, the more likely it is to occur.</em></strong></p><p>This is how we connect algorithmic compressibility, namely program length defined for an instance, to probability and information theory, enabling us to treat compressibility as a <em>Bayesian likelihood</em>. On a sidenote, the reason we don’t have a precise equality in the equation above is that the postulated relationship is not exact up to an additive constant c, which depends on the choice of Universal Turing Machine (UTM), making K(x) machine-dependent prior to an upper bound c across UTMs:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/450/1*Hr-KTullL2jHuvCA45pGvA.png" /></figure><p>Now you’re probably wondering, what kind of distribution enables us to assign probabilities to all possible program lengths? That distribution is the <em>Solomonoff Universal Prior</em>.</p><h3>Solomonoff Induction</h3><p>As we discussed, the choice of prior affects the posterior especially when sample sizes are sufficiently small. This begs the question: <em>what if we had a prior function that could be applied to all possible events in the sample space? </em>This is what Solomonoff’s prior encodes. Precisely, the Solomonoff prior encodes the probability of observing an output sequence <em>x</em> as the total probability that a random program outputs x on a universal Turing machine.</p><p>Now, let’s take a look at Solomonoff’s universal prior formula, which should click into place our earlier assertion that algorithmic probability is intimately connected with simplicity. Solomonoff defined the universal prior P(x) as the sum of the probabilities of all finite binary prefix-free programs p, where the probability that p is defined by its simplicity, 2^-|p|.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/400/1*mx4B4AN4eTr4Lxk5F2g4SA.png" /><figcaption>The Universal Solomonoff Prior</figcaption></figure><p>Because we define the probability of a program as shrinking by half for every additional bit it contains, the more information bits in the program, the smaller its weight in the distribution. Therefore, the total probability over all prefix-free binary programs will be dominated by shortest programs.</p><p>We state that the Solomonoff prior is defined for <em>prefix-free</em> <em>finite</em> <em>binary </em>sequences of string. Let’s ensure we understand each of these qualifiers. We use binary sequences because a Universal Turing machine can be defined in terms of binary inputs and outputs, where we can represent any information object with binary encoding. We define the prior over finite sequences in order to meet the conditions of computability: infinite sequences are Turing incomputable.</p><p>A set of strings is prefix free if no string in the set is a prefix of another:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/519/1*Av5kuJgPoqPhqY-wrMo0bQ.png" /></figure><p>This yields sets of disjoint finite binary string sequences. Per the Kolmogorov axiom of additivity, the the probability of the union of the members of the set can be expressed as the sum of their probabilities.</p><p>Disjointness ensures that the probability associated with each hypothesis or prior string obeys Kraft’s inequality, which states that the sum of all probabilities does not exceed the unit interval:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/243/1*OlnpRs3J57HPTTUqEePiYw.png" /><figcaption>Kraft’s Inequality</figcaption></figure><p>This tells us that for some some prefix-free string C, the probability of that sequence is expressed as 2 raised to the negative exponent, where the exponent describes the <strong><em>length</em></strong>. Because all the sequences are disjoint, their sum cannot exceed 1 (though it can be less than one, making it a semi-measure). This enables us to treat code weights as probabilities and consequently to compute the probability mass function of the entire distribution by summing over string weights.</p><p>Accordingly, Solomonoff’s prior is defined as the sum of the weights or probabilities of finite binary programs p:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/400/1*mx4B4AN4eTr4Lxk5F2g4SA.png" /><figcaption>The Universal Solomonoff Prior</figcaption></figure><p>Therefore, in order to compute the probability of getting some output x from a possible program, we condition that probability to the sum of probabilities of all possible programs:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/399/1*BheEeVtVVZgdJxBDwJzBkA.png" /><figcaption>The Solomonoff marginal</figcaption></figure><p>Because p is deterministic, the likelihoods and the posterior are defined as delta functions: either a program outputs x or it doesn’t.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/927/1*9BWu0tFifszcSo8Kz859mA.png" /></figure><p>Further, because the prior is defined over prefix-free binary strings, we can express the conditionalization in terms of bitwise strings:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/514/1*IYsZCwNuxr-ClX2VMYrz9Q.png" /></figure><p>Instead of a joint distribution over events, we have a weighted sum over bitstrings that syntactically generate x as a stand-in for all possible events. This reveals some of the limitations of the formalism: <strong><em>does formal compressibility suffice as an explanatory bias for certain programs or theories over others? </em></strong>We will delve into these limitations later such as the lack of structural bias and representational alignment.</p><p>Together with the Coding Theorem, the Solomonoff prior tenders a deep connection between induction and compressibility: <strong><em>generalization is revealed to be formally equivalent to information compression such that the more compressible a dataset is, the more probable the program that produces it. </em></strong>In the real world, however, we know that the most “compressible” theories are not always the ones with the greatest explanatory or predictive power, though the preponderance of best theoretical approximations tend toward simplicity.</p><p>The formula below expresses our notions of algorithmic complexity, the universal prior, and information entropy as approximately equivalent to each other (under specific ranges of x):</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/547/1*-7PfHeZzRx2bg5s-iUT6zw.png" /></figure><h3>AIXI</h3><p>As it stands, our theory of universal induction which combines the Solomonoff prior and Bayesian posteriors is not defined for a constrained agent. What if we combine <strong>Solomonoff induction</strong> with<strong> sequential decision theory</strong>?</p><p>This is where Marcus Hutter’s <strong>AIXI</strong> <strong>theory </strong>comes in: it integrates Solomonoff induction, decision theory, and reinforcement learning so that our universal prior can do work for an agent.</p><p>Transitioning from Solomonoff induction into the territory of decision theory and reinforcement learning requires expanding our ontology to <strong>actions</strong>, <strong>observations</strong>, and <strong>rewards</strong>. AIXI models a universal agent whose interaction with any computable environment enables it to choose the action that maximizes expected rewards. In more formal terms, AIXI selects an action at each time step and in return receives an observation and reward from the environment. How does AIXI select the optimal action? As we will see, because AIXI encodes an ideal Bayesian agent, it constitutes a model-based agent. However, unlike a typical Bellman-based deterministic agent (which solves the Bellman equations to determinate optimality), AIXI maintains uncertainty over all possible environments. It does so by computing the sum of products of the likelihoods, namely the probabilities of environmental feedback given the space of actions, and the Solomonoff weights assigned to every computable environment (or program), called the <em>universal mixture</em>.</p><p>Put succinctly, the universal mixture constitutes a term within AIXI that defines the probabilistic prediction of the next observation and reward pair given the current action. It is computed as the sum of products of the weighted distribution of every possible environment. The universal mixture exhausts the environment space by summing over the product of each environment weight and its probability distribution where each environment model <strong><em>μ</em></strong> assigns probabilities to observation-reward sequences given hitherto actions. The universal mixture is given by the formula below:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/691/1*DRLTjMD5Jzeq6tDMZYZ-vQ.png" /><figcaption>The universal mixture assigns probabilities to future observation and reward pairs given action history.</figcaption></figure><p>The universal mixture accumulates a predictive distribution of the environment through each action that it takes. Think of <strong>ξ </strong>as assigning probabilities to every possible future trajectory of observations and rewards given a sequence of actions.</p><p>The universal mixture provides us with the probability of observation and reward pairs under the action history, but it doesn’t tell us which of these trajectories is the most values or reward maximizing. For this we sum the reward per environment or trajectory:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/229/1*4IHmMdQTBvbNnDI2rt6tBw.png" /><figcaption>Sum of accumulated rewards where k is the time index and m is the farthest timestep.</figcaption></figure><p>In order to find out which trajectory to choose, we multiply the sum of rewards per trajectory by the probability assigned to that trajectory by the universal mixture:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*mo2bmeCH-NMjbnSeNWbjgQ.png" /><figcaption>Calculation of expected reward under environment prediction</figcaption></figure><p>As such, we compute expectation by weighting each trajectory by its cumulative rewards.</p><p>After we compute expectations, the final step involves selecting the action that maximizes expected return given the weighting of rewards and environment probabilities. For this we employ an <strong>arg max</strong> function as follows:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/802/1*8q0u5r6Cm5Jfx2nCrgZP2g.png" /></figure><p><strong>Arg max</strong> selects the action that maximizes cumulative returns across all possible trajectories:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/444/1*RO_uR6dzVDVET267E0aUag.png" /></figure><p>AIXI aims to formalize a universal agent whose equipment with the Solomonoff prior biases it toward environments with minimal Kolmogorov complexity. Other than assuming all possible computable environments and associating compressibility with higher probability, the AIXI agent acquires structural bias from interaction with the environment. This ensures that AIXI should be able to navigate any environment (provided that it’s structured/computable to begin with).</p><p>While AIXI formalizes a universal agent, it does not sufficiently bias this agent so that it can efficiently navigate actual environments. That is to say, the procedures for optimal action or decision that AIXI formalizes do not encode efficient structural biases such as domain-specific heuristics or architectural constraints that would accelerate learning. However, this feature is a consequence of AIXI’s scope of setting universal bounds on decision optimality across all possible environments. In principle, AIXI acquires efficient structural biases indirectly through Bayesian updating. With sufficient environmental sampling, AIXI asymptotically converges to the true environment across infinite interactions, assuming the environment is computable and has non-zero prior. However, in practice convergence can be inefficient due to overspreading over posterior weights leaving the agent’s actions suboptimal for an indefinite amount of time.</p><h3>Noncomputability &amp; Structural Bias</h3><p>In its universal form AIXI is not algorithmically implementable because Kolmogorov complexity and the Solomonoff prior are both not computable. The class of all programs that halt and produce valid (computable) environments is uncountable or not recursively enumerable. Computing the universal prior requires an infinite simulation of environments whereas computing future expectations requires infinite foresight, all of which are mathematically intractable.</p><p>For this reason, computable approximations of AIXI exist such as <strong>AIXItl. AIXItl </strong>introduces time and program-length bounds (which is what the tl stands for) restricting the environment space M<em>tl</em> to ≤ <em>t</em> time steps and <em>l</em> bits long<strong>. </strong>However, <strong>AIXItl </strong>is still inefficient since the combinatorial possibilities of environments is exponential: O(2^l). Model-free alternatives such as <strong><em>DQN</em></strong> and gradient-based alternatives such as <strong><em>Dreamer</em> </strong>and <strong><em>World Models</em></strong> represent alternatives in the search for a universal agent. These later alternatives use heuristics and sampling-based methods for exploration such as <strong>Monte Carlo Tree Search</strong> for optimal decision making. Fundamentally, the contest lies between model-based and model-free methods, the latter which derive their biases entirely from interaction with the environment.</p><h4>Representational Alignment</h4><p>As we already stated, AIXI treats the universe as a computable sequence represented through finite binary strings. The assumption that the environment is Turing computable is not entailed in the Church-Turing Thesis and thereby represents an additional assumption of AIXI. The truth of this assumption, in principle, that is, not with respect to a realizable machine, is an open question even though there’s good reason to think it false.</p><p>As we saw AIXI treats observations as bitstrings, whereas real world data require structured representations such as <em>causal structure</em>, <em>temporal relationships</em>, and <em>spatial dimensions</em>, to name a few. In order to encode richer structures within AIXI we would need priors that encode structured representations such as graphs, tensors, differential equations etc. Encoding structural biases would make AIXI more efficient, but at the expense of its universality. The cost of encoding real-world representational structures within a Bayesian model is therefore specializing the model at the expense of environment-generalizability. Given that in practice an agent that realizes AIXI is not possible, we should therefore look to agents that encode real-world representations such as AIXI<em>tl</em>, model-free agents or deep-learning-based agents.</p><h3>Active Inference</h3><p>We saw that AIXI incorporates a maximally informative prior, but this prior is entirely unstructured and embodies no prior knowledge about the world except the meta-selection bias for short or compressible programs as being the most likely. We also saw that this makes both AIXI and the Solomonoff prior computationally intractable, which precludes its implementation in its complete form.</p><p>Another strand of agent modeling, more recently branded <em>active inference</em>, whose centerpiece is the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_energy_principle"><em>free-energy minimization principle</em></a>, aims to integrate the modeling lineages of utility maximization, reinforcement learning, Bayesian inference, predictive coding, statistical mechanics, and far from thermodynamic equilibrium dynamics into the unified model of a hierarchical generative Bayesian agent. Optimality in the active inference generative Bayesian model consists of minimizing free energy, where free energy is defined as the expected surprise about the joint occurrence of sensations and their inferred causes.</p><p>Put in colloquial terms, the generative model predicts future perceptions given actions through a forward model that estimates the causes of those sensations through the prior, and it conversely estimates or predicts the actions required to bring about preferred states through an inverse model. The agent dynamically navigates the environment through loops of forward and inverse models or, more simply, loops perception and action. Free energy results from mismatch between predictions and environmental feedback, minimized through hierarchical Bayesian updating of the model’s priors.</p><p>The formula below formally expresses the computation of variational free energy as the divergence between the recognition density and the conditional density, where ỹ stands for observed input, 𝜗 for latent causes, p( ỹ, 𝜗) defines the generative model as the joint probability density of perceptions and latent causes, whereas q(𝜗) defines the approximate posterior:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/724/1*7rLV5SkBmfU2zJJcUdw2VA.png" /></figure><p>The first expression in the formula defines the Kullback-Leibler divergence between the approximate posterior q(𝜗) and the true posterior p(𝜗| ỹ) minus the log model evidence log p(ỹ). Free energy results from the information-theoretic divergence between the approximate and true posterior offset by the log model evidence. We compute variational free energy by integrating the log ratio between the approximate and true joint distributions over latent causes. The second term expresses this same quantity as the sum of the entropy of the approximate posterior q(𝜗) and the cross-entropy between the posterior and the generative model p( ỹ, 𝜗). Minimizing free energy amounts to reducing the divergence between the recognition model and the conditional density.</p><p>Both AIXI and Active Inference tender optimal Bayesian agents. But whereas AIXI is formally non-computable in its unbounded form, Active Inference enables tractable approximations via variational Bayesian models. Optimization in AIXI consists of maximizing rewards, whereas in Active Inference in minimizing free energy. In the former, model accuracy results implicitly from maximizing rewards, whereas in the latter maximizing rewards results implicitly from minimizing expected surprise or free energy. In this regard, Active Inference constitutes a structured generative model that hierarchically estimates latent causes, guiding action selection through inference rather than AIXI’s enumeration, which selects the reward maximizing action from all possible environments. Yet, Active Inference remains an incomplete framework since it glosses over many details about concrete agents, such as goal-setting, model learning (where it is extremely vague), and a viable description of agent boundary (the Markov blanket formulation is insufficient and unable to distinguish biological agents from physical systems that do not amount to actual agents).</p><h3>References</h3><p>Friston, K., Kilner, J., &amp; Harrison, L. (2006). A free energy principle for the brain. <em>Journal of Physiology, Paris, 100</em>(1–3), 70–87. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jphysparis.2006.10.001">https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jphysparis.2006.10.001</a></p><p>Hutter, M. (2005). <em>Universal Artificial Intelligence: Sequential Decisions Based on Algorithmic Probability</em> (1st ed.). Springer Berlin Heidelberg. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/b138233">https://doi.org/10.1007/b138233</a> <a href="https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/b138233?utm_source=chatgpt.com">SpringerLink+13SpringerLink+13Google Books+13</a></p><p>Sommaruga, G. (Ed.). (2009). <em>Formal Theories of Information: From Shannon to Semantic Information Theory and General Concepts of Information</em> (Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 5363). Springer Berlin Heidelberg. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-00659-3">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-00659-3</a></p><p>Zabell, S. (2009). Philosophy of inductive logic: The Bayesian perspective. In L. Haaparanta (Ed.), <em>The development of modern logic</em> (pp. 725–774). Oxford University Press. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195137316.003.0044">https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195137316.003.0044</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=52d5258a1466" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Three Mind-Blowing Ideas in Physics: The Stationary Action Principle, Lorentz Transformations, and…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/data-science/three-mind-blowing-ideas-in-physics-the-stationary-action-principle-lorentz-transformations-and-e86977ea86ad?source=rss-cb73222d75bc------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e86977ea86ad</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[deep-dives]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mathematics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[data-science]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[space]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[physics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Angjelin Hila]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 23 Jul 2024 08:26:02 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-07-23T08:26:02.981Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Three Mind-Blowing Ideas in Physics: The Stationary Action Principle, Lorentz Transformations, and the Metric Tensor</h3><h4><em>How mathematical innovations yield increasingly more accurate models of the physical world</em></h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*AcZ6QNIdMEjnNMRKucreOw.jpeg" /><figcaption>The interconnections between algebra and geometry as modelling tools. Used on a free license. Source: <a href="https://unsplash.com/photos/a-black-and-white-photo-of-a-bunch-of-round-objects-Vy3W_YiXEio">https://unsplash.com/photos/a-black-and-white-photo-of-a-bunch-of-round-objects-Vy3W_YiXEio</a></figcaption></figure><p>While physics arouses the curiosity of the general public, many find the math daunting. Yet many of the central ideas in physics arise from simpler principles that have been tweaked and modified into increasingly complex formalisms that better map physical phenomena.</p><p>While many <a href="https://towardsdatascience.com/how-to-transition-from-physics-to-data-science-a-comprehensive-guide-ff1951090f65">physics graduates end up working in data science</a>, can mathematical insights in physics inform and enrich the data scientist? I argue yes. Even though data science as a distinct discipline is relativity new, the collection and analysis of data pervades the history of physics such as the collection of astronomical observation by Johannes Kepler from which he derived his laws of planetary motion. Both physics and data science extract patterns from data, though typically data science deals with statistical patterns while physics with lawful or nomological patterns. Having an understanding of fundamental laws can help data scientists with modelling complex systems and develop simulations of real-world phenomena.</p><p>In my own work, maintaining a strong interest in physics has helped me make important connections between information theory and statistical mechanics. Further, it has helped me understand the flexibility of mathematics, in particular linear algebra and calculus, in modelling physical systems constrained by spatial dimensions and more abstract multidimensional systems that include social and stochastic patterns. Moreover, it can be inspiring as well as intellectually gratifying to understand the rudiments of how physics models the world around us and how the incremental improvements of physics have required molding the math to fit and predict the data that nature supplies.</p><p>In this article, I odyssey through three mathematical ideas that underpin much of physics: the stationary action principle (also known as the principle of least action), Lorentz transformations, which describe time and space transformations in Einstein’s special theory of relativity, and the metric tensor, which underlies the math of General Relativity (the theory of gravity as spacetime curvature).</p><p>The Stationary Action principle is perhaps the most important in all of physics because it threads through classical and quantum mechanics. It forms an alternative though equivalent formulation to the classical equations of motion invented by Newton for describing the evolution of a physical system. Specifically, it describes the motion of a physical system in time by determining the path that minimizes something called <em>the action</em>. The action is a functional, namely a function that takes functions as inputs, that describes the path of the system as stationary with respect to path variations between two points. Understanding the action as a functional, specifically as scoring the path variations, is key to understanding the concept behind it. The specifics of this will become clearer in the exposition below. This remarkable result articulates motion as a type of optimization function within given constraints.</p><p>Lorentz Transformations describe how the coordinates of time and space are intertwined into a unified metric that enables their measurements to proportionally change relative to observers in inertial frames of reference while conserving the speed of light. This formalism ensures that the speed of light remains constant across frames of reference, contrary to Newtonian assumptions that would have the speed of light change against invariable units of space and time. Before the theory of special relativity, the constancy of the speed of light was an experimentally observed phenomenon that did not fit into the framework of classical physics.</p><p>Finally, we explain the mathematical ideas behind the metric tensor, which describes length or distance in curved spaces. The metric tensor is a bilinear, symmetric identity matrix that generalizes the Pythagorean theorem underlying flat, Euclidean space to any possible space including curved surfaces. Curved surfaces were used by Einstein to describe the distortion of spacetime in the presence of gravity. As data scientists, you’re likely very familiar with the Euclidean distance and linear algebra so appreciating the concepts behind the metric tensor should be a natural step. The metric tensor developed by Bernhard Riemann forms the foundation of non-Euclidean geometry and remarkably generalizes the notion of <em>length</em> to any underlying geometry.</p><h3>Principle of Least Action</h3><p>The <em>Principle of Least Action</em> or the <em>Stationary Action Principle </em>constitutes the centrepiece of physics. It subsumes the equations of motion and mathematically articulates the transition rule of a physical system across time.</p><p>To begin to appreciate this principle recall that Newton’s second law computes the trajectory of a system of particles by taking three inputs: the masses of the of the particles, the forces acting on the system, and the initial positions and velocities, and determines the evolution rule through F=ma, where <em>m</em> denotes mass and <em>a</em> acceleration. In contrast to the Newtonian method, the principle of least action computes the trajectory of the system by taking in the initial and final positions, masses and velocities (and other constraints depending on the system) but omits forces. It subsequently selects the path that minimizes a quantity called the <em>action</em>. Before we explain exactly what the action consists in, we need to understand an alternative formulation to Newton’s equations called the <em>Lagrangian</em>.</p><p>The <strong>Lagrangian<em> L</em></strong> is computed as the difference between Kinetic energy <strong><em>T</em> </strong>and potential energy <strong><em>V</em></strong>, where <strong><em>T</em></strong> is given by the product of mass and velocity squared divided by 2 (2 denoting the average between initial velocity and final velocity), and <strong><em>V</em></strong> by the product of the mass of the object <strong><em>m</em></strong>, the gravitational constant <strong><em>g</em> </strong>and the height of the object above ground <strong><em>h </em></strong>(the computation of potential energy varies with the system).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/320/1*EBUNzUkmBS8M5dUK7xjGFA.png" /></figure><p>Why is the Lagrangian computed as the difference between kinetic and potential energy? Because as the system moves it converts potential energy into kinetic and the difference between the two captures the dynamic interplay between these two types of energy. It is important to note conversely that the total energy is computed as the sum of these two values.</p><p>The inputs to the Lagrangian are the positions x and the velocities v, denoted by ⨰ (x dot), where the dot denotes the first derivative. This is because the velocity is computed as the first derivative of the position.</p><p>To compute the Lagrangian we need to minimally know the velocities, general coordinates, positions and the masses of the particles. Potential energy depends on the positions particles (or set of particles) since it describes the potential work it can do, whereas the kinetic energy depends on particle velocities since it describes the motion of the particle.</p><p>How does the <em>action</em> come into the picture? Imagine you have two points on a curved plane and you need to find the shortest distance. There are many paths between the two points, but only one path or line that represents the shortest distance. The action is analogous to this problem. In order to find the trajectory of the system, we need to select a path that minimizes the action. A corollary of this is that the action stays stationary through the evolution of the system.</p><p>Since the action must be stationary, the first-order partial derivative of the action must therefore be zero:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/116/1*i6e6SVW6vddXetV4STkG1A.png" /></figure><p>At a high level, the <strong><em>action</em></strong><em> </em>is described by the path integral of the Lagrangian for a given time interval [t₀, t₁]. Even though the integral of a function from point t₀ to t₁ is typically understood as the area under the curve, the path integral of the Lagrangian should not be intuitively thought of as an area, but rather the integration of a functional, which is a function that takes another function(s) as input and outputs a scalar. The input will be the Lagrangian. The output defines the action. Across the many paths the system could take between t₀ and t₁, we will see that it takes precisely the path that minimizes the action.</p><p>Here’s the simple formula for the action as the path integral of Lagrangian:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/194/1*JigsDT40lJ2OeLJYekyLYA.png" /></figure><p>Now, since the definite integral can be computed as the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Riemann_sum">Riemannian sum</a> of products of the y output of <em>f(x)</em> and the change of x denoted by <em>Δx, </em>as k area partitions approach infinity, we can compute the <em>action</em> as the Riemannian sum of products of the <em>Lagrangian</em> and the time derivative<em> dt</em>. In other words, the definite integral of the Lagrangian can be computed by minimizing the action across the time interval.</p><p>The action consists of the path integral of the Lagrangian between the initial position and the end position of the system. This means that the path integral minimizes the action by computing the difference between potential and kinetic energy. The fundamental theorem of calculus allows us to compute the action as a continuous interval between t₀ and t₁, even though it can also be computed in discrete time steps <em>N</em>. Now if we were to imagine the action as a sum of discrete time steps <em>N</em>, we would compute it as the sum of products of the value of the Lagrangian at each time step and the value of time t.</p><p>The Lagrangian typically depends on positions and velocities but can also be time-dependent. The Lagrangian is said to be time dependent if it changes with time even if its position and velocities stay constant. Otherwise, the Lagrangian implicitly depends on time through changing positions and velocities. For the time independent formulation, we substitute L(x,⨰ ) into the equation to indicate dependence on positions and velocities:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/192/1*NmygQOSk3ijfrOKZ58N_yw.png" /></figure><p>Now, we know from the <strong><em>law of the conservation of momentum</em></strong>, that the derivative of the sum of all momenta of a system is equal to zero. In other words, in an isolated system, the total momentum is always conserved or remains constant. The derivative of a constant is zero, since the rate of change is held <em>ceteris paribus</em> or equal. In Newtonian mechanics, the third law of motion, which states that <em>for every action there’s an opposite and equal reaction</em>, expresses the conservation of total momentum.</p><p>Similarly, the <strong><em>law of the conservation of energy</em></strong>, holds that the total energy of an isolated system is conserved across any transformation: the time derivative of total energy is zero. Unlike momentum, however, energy comes in different forms. It is the total of all these forms that is conserved. Articulated in terms of motion, there are only the forms of energy we’ve been talking about all along: <em>kinetic</em> and <em>potential</em>.</p><p>Since the Lagrangian is defined as the difference between these two forms of energy, when the Lagrangian is invariant under time translations, it implies the conservation of energy.</p><p>Something analogous to the conservation of energy occurs with respect to the Action. In the signed trajectory, nature selects the path that minimizes the value of the action. This minimization is similar to the minimization of of a function in optimization problems, except that the action represents a multitude of variables include all the coordinates at every instant of time. This extremizing character is expressed by the Euler-Lagrange equation, which forms the equation of motion.</p><p>What are the Euler-Lagrange equations? They are the differential equations that tell system how to move from one instant in time to the next. Now, I’m not going to derive the equations here, but intuitively we will set the derivative of the action <strong>𝝏A</strong> with respect to position <strong>dx</strong> to 0. <em>Put differently, we consider a small variation in the path, and require that the partial derivative of the action be zero.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/214/1*WNR7qwaES5h7dNxg4gykHw.png" /></figure><p>This yields the two terms of the Euler-Lagrange equation: the time derivative of the partial derivative of the Lagrangian with respect to velocity, and the partial derivative of the Lagrangian with respect to position. Respectively, these represent the changes in kinetic (changes in momentum) and potential energy. Setting the difference between these two quantities to zero, yields the action minimizing Euler-Lagrange equation.</p><p>The Euler-Lagrange equation in a single coordinate or degree of freedom is given below, where L denotes the Lagrangian, ẋ velocity and x position.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/293/1*LTJNK4DJaxeK3lHUyhI2yA.png" /></figure><p>In natural language, this reads as the time derivative (<strong>d/dt</strong>) of the partial derivative of the Lagrangian with respect to velocity (𝝏L/𝝏ẋ) minus the partial derivative of the Lagrangian with respect to position (𝝏L/𝝏x) equals zero. Intuitively, this can be rephrased as the instantaneous rate of change of time of the instantaneous rate of change of the Lagrangian with respect to velocity minus the instantaneous rate of the change of the Lagrangian with respect to position, is stationary.</p><p>Distilling it further, <em>the Euler-Lagrange equation implies that the motion of a physical system corresponds to an extremum of the integral of the Lagrangian, which is the action</em>.</p><p>The equation can be generalized to arbitrary coordinates (x, y, z…n) :</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/282/1*LdEAljQ_nVEpTe4hNga7Qg.png" /></figure><p>In concrete scenarios, the action is a functional, that is to say a function of a function that involves the mapping from a function input (the Lagrangian) to a scalar output (the value of the action).</p><p>While the Stationary Action Principle enables efficient calculation of the trajectory of physical system, it requires knowing the starting and ending positions. In lieu of this global picture, we substitute the Newtonian formalism, which requires knowing the positions and initial velocities of the particles.</p><p>The Stationary Action principle can be adapted to quantum physics with important caveats, where all the possible paths between initial and final states are considered and the action takes the sum of the probability amplitudes of each path to compute the probabilistic evolution of the system.</p><p>Given this formulation, the classical stationary action principle can be thought of as a special case of the quantum formulation, in which given all paths the stationary action paths dominate.</p><h3>Lorentz Transformations</h3><p>Understanding <strong><em>Lorentz Transformations </em></strong>is a portal into Einstein’s <strong>Special Theory of Relativity</strong>. They constitute the mathematical framework for computing relativistic spacetime transformations in inertial or uniform frames of reference, that is, frames of reference that exclude gravity.</p><p>A crucial concept at the heart of special relativity is that motion can only be described with respect to some frame of reference and not in absolute terms. If I’m driving, for example, I’m standing still with respect to the car but moving with respect to my house.</p><p>The idea of relativistic motion exists in classical mechanics and was first described by Galileo.</p><p>The groundbreaking insight embedded in Special Relativity is not relativistic motion, but rather what stays the same or constant across space translations. In classical mechanics, all motion is indiscriminately relative, whereas the coordinates of space and time change only in additive fashion while remaining static and independent of each other for all observers.</p><p>The relative motion assumption in classical mechanics implied that the motion of light should obey relativistic laws. In other words, if I’m standing still and holding a flashlight, whereas you’re driving and holding a flashlight, the motion of light from your flashlight should measure as the sum of the speed of light and your velocity.</p><p>Experimental evidence, however, contradicts this assumption. In reality, regardless of the frame of reference, light measures as a constant. In other words, empirical evidence attests to the speed of light being absolute.</p><p>Instead of finding error with the observation, Einstein posited the constancy of light speed as a law of nature. If light always measures the same, then what must change is the representation of the coordinates of space and time.</p><p>In order to understand how Einstein’s theory of Special Relativity achieves this, it is important to have a cursory grasp of the simplified equations of motion described by classical mechanics. These will be modified so that relative motion between observers does not alter the speed of light but rather alters an interwoven metric of space and time. This has the peculiar consequence that the measures of time and distance will vary across observers when velocities approach the luminal limit.</p><p>The equations of motion are often condensed into the acronym SUVAT (s = distance, u = initial velocity, v = velocity, a = acceleration, t = time):</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/211/1*NHcFJpaA4H5O4JU-cHpNqw.png" /></figure><h4>Minkowski Metric</h4><p>In order to make Lorentz transformations intelligible, we will be using spacetime diagrams. These reverse the axes of distance and time such that time is represented as the x axis and distance as the y axis. Further, we use the y axis to represent large distance intervals since we want to explain motion relative to the speed of light. Now light travels at 3 *10⁸ m/s². In our spacetime diagrams, one second will correspond exactly to this distance. This has the consequence that the straight diagonal of our diagram situated at 45⁰ angle between our axes, represents the constancy of light speed across time. In fact, the diagonals across a Cartesian grid will represent the asymptotic limits of light speed which will constrain our translations of time across the y axis and translations of space across the x axis.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/360/1*xh9UMC1g7W7yzAkChn4pXQ.gif" /><figcaption>Used on a creative commons license from: <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spacetime_diagram#/media/File:MinkBoost2.gif">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spacetime_diagram#/media/File:MinkBoost2.gif</a></figcaption></figure><p>Now any straight line diagonal to our Cartesian grid not at a 45⁰ angle will represent uniform motion at subluminal velocity. In the Newtonian picture, the speed of light is just like any other speed. This means that an obtuse angle larger than 45⁰ will represent faster than light velocity. Furthermore, the speed of light will be relative to a frame of reference. If I’m travelling at half light velocity in the same direction as light, from my frame of reference I will observe light as moving at half light velocity since I’m catching up to it with half its speed. The assumptions underlying this model involve retaining unchanging units of time and distance such that time and spatial intervals remain constant for all frames of reference.</p><p>The leap from regarding space and time as independent measures to integrating them into a continuum called spacetime involves transforming the variable of time into a measure of distance. We do this by weighting the time variable with c, standing for the speed of light constant. When we multiply <strong>c</strong> by <strong>t</strong> we get <strong>ct</strong>, which measures <strong>1 light m/c²</strong>.</p><p>In the Newtonian-Galilean picture, two frames of reference S and S’ are given by the coordinates <strong>(x, t) </strong>and <strong>(x’,t’) </strong>respectively where the apostrophe symbol, pronounced <em>x prime</em> and <em>t prime</em>, serves to distinguish two relative frames of reference (<em>and does not denote differentiation as in normal contexts</em>) . These frames are invertible and the inverses are equivalent to each other within Galilean relativity. From the frame of reference of S the coordinates of S’, position and time, are given by x’ = (x-vt) and t’ = (t- vx/c²) respectively. Likewise, from the frame of reference of S’ the coordinates of S are given by x = (x’ + vt’) and t = (t+vx/c²). However, these translations wind up making light relative rather than spacetime. The question arises as to how we can translate from S →S’ such that we conserve c (the speed of light), while proportionally scaling the time and distance variables (more correctly, the spacetime continuum)?</p><p>A way of deriving these translations is to make use of the spacetime diagrams we introduced above where we scaled time by the constant c ≈ 299 x 10⁸. The translation we’re seeking is expressed as the following:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/320/1*OQT7GBC_gQafCpm9lexRgQ.png" /></figure><p>In fact, we will use this symmetry or equivalence between frames of reference to derive the gamma factor as the common scaling factor for spacetime translations between relative frames of reference such that they reflect luminal constancy. This Galilean symmetry of relative motion is illustrated by the graphs below expressing the two frames of reference we introduced as inverses of each other:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*HJtBxhcivWwoxp3l7NIV0Q.png" /><figcaption>Invertible symmetry between frames of reference. Image by author.</figcaption></figure><p>Since the speed of light is constant across all frames of reference, if we start from the origin for both frames of reference (x = 0 and t=0), the path of light will satisfy the following equations (recall that the diagonal at 45⁰ represents the speed of light where one unit of time corresponds to the distance travels in one unit of distance):</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/130/1*k7OIpBo5gLgCstG6eCz_Fw.png" /></figure><p>The conversion from x to x’ is given by the equation below, where x’ is simply the difference between x and the product of velocity and time. Now, in order to derive the Lorentz transformation, we need some factor 𝛄 to scale our spatiotemporal transformation. The 𝛃<strong> </strong>factor equals <strong>v/c — </strong>the ratio of velocity and the speed of light — and is used to scale <strong>ct</strong> —light-speed scaled time. If we expand the expression, we find that it algebraically reduces to the Newtonian transformation in the brackets. As we will see, when the Lorentz factor 𝛄 approaches 1, the Lorentz transformations become equivalent to their Newtonian counterparts, which correspond to our everyday notion of the simultaneity of events. The formulas below demonstrate how we get from the initial formula to the gamma scaled transformation formula for relative position:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/242/1*ZVlW59H2F2Ia2lq8IzamvA.png" /></figure><p>Similarly, we can derive the time transformation from the t frame to t’ with the equation below. Since we’re using spacetime diagrams, we start with ct’. We see that ct’ can be computed through the difference between ct and beta 𝛃 scaled x and the whole expression scaled by the Lorentz factor 𝛄. We can algebraically solve for t’ by expanding the expression, which reduces the solution for t’ to t-vx/c² scaled by 𝛄:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/274/1*B0AI7uM7bM8vByi2M0a-QA.png" /></figure><p>When speeds are very small, vx/c² reduces to 0 and 𝛄 reduces to 1, yielding t’=t. This result corresponds to our everyday Newtonian experience where 1 second for me at rest is more or less equal to your second, while moving at a constant velocity relative to me.</p><p>As you might have noticed, the transformation to x’ involves ct as a term and the transformation to t’ involves x as a term. By factoring in as terms in each other’s reference frame transformations, time and space become interwoven into a co-dependent continuum where a unit change in one variable corresponds to a unit change in the other. This interrelationship will account for the proportionality of time dilation and space contraction described by Lorentz transformations.</p><p>How do we ascertain the value of the Lorentz factor? One way is to multiply our translation equations and solve for the common factor. Remember that we can replace x and x’ with ct and ct’, respectively, due to the equality we introduced earlier. This will let us cancel out like terms and solve for 𝛄:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/603/1*Y8S8FulMFWa65pVu7U5WWQ.png" /></figure><p>Now we can express the x’ frame of reference by the following 𝛄 substitution:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/215/1*rNPOG2lBGY6ujEUda8jlIA.png" /></figure><p>And can express the t’ frame of reference by the following substitution:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/210/1*-xkBssEzN4EDE1iJ564HGw.png" /></figure><p>In each equation, as the velocity <em>v</em> approaches the speed of light, the v²/c² approaches the number 1 and the value of the denominator approaches the √0. We know from E=mc² that objects with rest mass cannot, as a matter of physical principle, be accelerated to equal luminal speeds. As such, it is not physically possible for the value of denominator to equal 0. <em>The 0 limit represents an infinite rapidity (which denotes the angle of the transformation). As rapidity approaches infinity, time approaches rest and the measurement of length approaches zero.</em></p><p>On the other hand, when the velocity is small, v²/c² is a very small number, and the value of the denominator approaches 1. When the denominator (called the <strong>Lorentz factor</strong>) equals either 1 or ~ 1, the Lorentz factor becomes insignificant and the equation approximates Newtonian motion. That is to say, the equations of motion are given by the numerator, which reduce to Newton’s equations of motion.</p><p>The Lorentz factor constitutes the key to understanding Lorentz transformations. If you recall back to Galilean relativity, the interchangeability of inertial frames of reference is achieved through rotations. Rotations are described by trigonometric functions. Trigonometric functions conserve Euclidean distance. Specifically, rotations conserve the radius. This means that units of length remain constant across transformations.</p><p>Analogously, Lorentz transformations conserve the spacetime metric. Unlike the Euclidean metric, the spacetime metric makes all spatiotemporal transformations relative to the speed of light as an absolute value. For this reason, the speed of light forms an asymptote that Lorentz transformations approach but cannot equal. In the spacetime diagram the speed of light is denoted by the equalities<strong> x = ct</strong> and <strong>x’ = ct’</strong>. If you recall back to our spacetime diagram, the asymptotes consist of the diagonals cutting across both axes. Since the range of spacetime transformations are both infinite (meaning that the they output a range of ˗ ∞ to + ∞) yet asymptotic to our diagonals, they are described by <strong><em>hyperbolic functions or rotations</em></strong>. Hyperbolic rotations are functions analogous to the trigonometric functions but that use hyperbolas instead of circles. Unlike circles which are finite, hyperbolic rotations can stretch to infinite ranges. Their equivalents to the trigonometric functions can be described as exponential operations on the special number <strong>e </strong>(2.718), where the analogue to sin(x) is denoted by<strong> sinh(x)</strong> and the analogue to the cos(x) is denoted by <strong>cosh(x)</strong> described by the following functions respectively:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/263/1*w7YIDeO8DQuIOARTpck3qA.png" /></figure><p>Just like in a unit circle (sin x, cos x) describe its points, (cosh x, sinh x) form the right half of a unit hyperbola. The angle of hyperbolic rotations in the context of special relativity is called <strong>rapidity </strong>denoted by the symbol <strong>eta 𝜂.</strong> Here are the hyperbolic rotations equivalent to the Lorentz transformations we derived earlier:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/471/1*v9BMOgp-WLFS5IBLqKRXzA.png" /></figure><p>The relationship between the Lorentz factor 𝛄 and the rapidity of hyperbolic rotations is the following:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/223/1*VExfPeJSGRCG0XjaDbRcTg.png" /></figure><p>If Galilean rotations conserve the radius or Euclidean distance, then what do Lorentzian transformations conserve? They conserve the Minkowski metric, given by the following equality which is analogous to Euclidean distance:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/248/1*kPRKOtHYTKWB-lptqZr5eg.png" /></figure><p>Since actual Lorentz transformations occur in four dimensions, 1 of time and 4 of space or analogously 4 spacetime dimensions, the four dimensional Minkowski interval is given by the following equation:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/397/1*zUF_iA3r7xTBtQVXuhQZ_w.png" /></figure><p>The gif diagram below visualizes these hyperbolic transformations as spacetime distortions in two dimensions that approach the diagonal asymptotes as velocity approaches the speed of light. The distortions on the grid indicate the distortions in the <strong>spacetime metric</strong> as a result of the relative speeds of observers. As speeds approach the luminal limit, space (<em>the horizontal axes hyperbolas</em>) contracts and time (<em>the vertical axes hyperbolas</em>) dilates. These intertwined transformations conserve the Minkowski metric <strong>s², </strong>which proportionally scales these transformations against the invariance of lightspeed.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/300/1*Pk190gStyr-6PruJwJlQyQ.gif" /><figcaption>Hyperbolic Lorentz transformations. Image used on a creative commons license. Source: <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Animated_Lorentz_Transformation.gif">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Animated_Lorentz_Transformation.gif</a></figcaption></figure><p>Space contraction and time dilation can be inverted between observers at rest and observers moving at uniform or inertial speeds. If you’re uniformly moving at close to the luminal limit relative to someone at rest, it is equally correct to describe you as at rest and the other person as moving at close to light speed.</p><h3>The Metric Tensor: Geometry of Curved Surfaces</h3><p>Lorentz Transformations in Special Relativity occur in <strong>flat space </strong>pseudo-Euclidean space. What is a flat space? It is a geometry where the <strong><em>metric</em></strong>, or distance measure between points, is constant. The most well known metric of flat space is defined by the <strong>Pythagorean Theorem</strong>. Another flat metric includes the Minkowski spacetime metric we discussed above.</p><p>The Euclidean metric defines the distance between two points as the square root of the sum of squared lengths of the shortest sides of a right triangle. This follows from the Pythagorean Theorem: a² + b² = c².</p><p>Described geometrically, the Euclidean distance between two points is given by square root of the sum of the squared differences between each coordinate (x,y).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/180/1*TcqHYHG_g0RPvEsTRvWkIw.png" /><figcaption>Euclidean distance as the magnitude of a vector.</figcaption></figure><p>The Pythagorean Theorem can be generalized to <em>n</em> dimensions:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/224/1*lfRm-ydirNCvugplKmkv8A.png" /><figcaption>Euclidean distance in n dimensions.</figcaption></figure><p>Accordingly, we can express Euclidean distance in the three dimensions by the formula below:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/381/1*KHtU8mH0_2eYsuK0ooVZYw.png" /><figcaption>Euclidean distance in three dimensions.</figcaption></figure><p>However, this generalization conserves distance as a property of Euclidean flat space. Put differently, the metric stays constant.</p><p>In order to understand the <em>metric tensor</em>, we need to learn to see the Pythagorean Theorem as a special case of flat or Euclidean space.</p><p>In other words, we need to define a value-neutral space such that Euclidean distance defined by the Pythagorean theorem can be derived as a special case.</p><p>Before we can do this, we must ask why is it that the differences between the coordinates are squared in the Pythagorean theorem? This can be explained in any number of ways, but an intuitive explanation is geometric. They are squared because it produces geometric areas of equal lengths, given that areas are products of length and width, which lets us compute the hypotenuse as the square root of the sum of squares of the right angled sides. This answer is given by the metric tensor defined by the Kronecker delta, which outputs 1 if i=j and 0 if i≠j.</p><p>However, we can also demonstrate the result through the generalized metric of a space, where the metric tensor consists of a smoothly varying inner product on the tangent space.</p><p><em>What is a tangent space?</em> A tangent space is the set of all vectors tangent to a point on a manifold.</p><p>The general form of the equation is given below, where g represents the metric tensor and μv the index of each metric tensor value per coordinate term and dX indicates infinitesimal displacements per coordinate:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/193/1*eynReeghLIguGjjZ-RJSWA.png" /></figure><p>Given the above equation, we can express the squared distance between two points in two dimensions as the following sum:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/553/1*df0vBiRguCcrzozT27EEnA.png" /><figcaption>Squared distance between two points generalized by the metric tensor.</figcaption></figure><p>In the above formula, the zero and ones beside the <em>g coefficient</em> as well as x variables represent indices. Specifically, they represent the permutation matrix of 0 and 1, namely: 01, 00, 11, 10.</p><p>The dx⁰ and dx¹ coefficients represent infinitesimal displacements of two different coordinates, where again 0 and 1 are indices. The product of the displacement of each coordinate are multiplied by the corresponding value of <strong>g</strong>, the metric tensor.</p><p>Therefore, in the above formula, <strong>g</strong> represents a coefficient of the metric tensor for each index. Why are there four terms in the above formula? Because two points are described by four coordinates or scalar values. In Euclidean geometry, the implicit basis vectors are the tangent vectors (0,1) and (1,0). These tangent vectors span the entire Euclidean space. Now <strong>g</strong> defines the inner product between tangent vectors at any point on the vector space. And the values of <strong>g</strong> are obtained through the inner product of all the possible combinations of the basis vectors.</p><p>When the values of the coefficients represent an orthonormal relationship between two points, the values of <strong>g</strong> reduce to the identity matrix:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/105/1*6Fnca5s75Pv6yljDCtkiKw.png" /><figcaption>Coefficients for the metric tensor when the angles of the triangle are perpendicular, defining flat, Euclidean space.</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/137/1*RY0wazxhmppqRwhfq-HuzQ.png" /><figcaption>You can think of the metric tensor coefficients as corresponding to the indices of the permutation matrix.</figcaption></figure><p>In two dimensions or a system of two coordinates, we can express the Euclidean distance as the product of the metric tensor and the squared vector of the distance between each coordinate. Because for right angles in flat Euclidean space the metric tensor is an identity matrix, the squared distance between two points reduces to the Pythagorean Theorem as shown below:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/403/1*X1k3TLSpvg_vGQ_gfvrvhg.png" /></figure><p>The above formula can also be expressed as a linearly weighted combination expressed in our first formulation:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/567/1*ziWnt2iiQ1swmSi6PZWPfQ.png" /><figcaption>Euclidean distance as a linearly weighted sum with g values.</figcaption></figure><p>As you can see above, when g=0, we eliminate the latter two terms, reducing the equation to the Euclidean distance. We’ve therefore explained how the generalized form of the metric tensor implies Euclidean distance as a special or limiting case.</p><p>What about when the shortest distance cannot be expressed by the Euclidean distance? In our everyday intuitions, we presuppose the existence of right angles for the lengths of the opposite and adjacent lines in order to satisfy the Pythagorean theorem as a distance measure of the hypotenuse. In linear algebra, it is equivalent of assuming orthonormal bases as the metric of the space. Bases define as the set of linearly independent vectors that span that vector space. Orthonormal bases are perpendicular unit vectors or unit vectors whose inner product is zero.</p><p>But this <em>a priori assumption</em> may be unfounded empirically. In fact, the underlying geometry may be curved or skewed in different ways. If this is the case, how do we then express the shortest distance between two points? To define a non-Euclidean space we take a different choice of basis vectors for our metric. The inner product of the permutation space of those basis vectors will output the metric tensor that defines distance and angles in that metric through linear combination of any infinitesimal displacements of two points, given by the formula:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/193/1*eynReeghLIguGjjZ-RJSWA.png" /><figcaption>Generalized Rhiemannian distance.</figcaption></figure><p>Now, let’s take a look at an example with polar coordinates (r, 𝜃), where r denotes the radius and 𝜃 theta the angle. The g metric tensor is obtained through the inner products of the permutation space of (r, 𝜃) as shown below:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/176/1*YuCi7rp0P0cDeP7LAZL9Gg.png" /><figcaption>The metric tensor for polar coordinates.</figcaption></figure><p>If we consider Euclidean polar coordinates, the metric tensor will come out to the matrix below:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/127/1*HqW2omRVA74B2e35Q7y6xw.png" /><figcaption>A specific instantiation of the metric tensor for polar coordinates.</figcaption></figure><p>This is because distance is calculated through:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/217/1*8vZpudVPaMGTXzx11ejYnQ.png" /></figure><p>Now the distance between two points (r¹𝜃¹) and (r²𝜃²) is given by calculating the distances r²-r¹ and 𝜃²-𝜃¹ and plugging them into the following formula:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/391/1*r3egotPquc8uEj-_sQeIqQ.png" /></figure><p>So far, all our examples have been in a two dimensional space. Of course, we could extend the same ideas to three or N dimensional spaces. The metric tensor for a three dimensional space will be a 3x3 matrix and so on and so forth.</p><p>Understanding the metric tensor constitutes a major stepping stone in understanding General Relativity and Einstein’s Field Equations.</p><p>In General Relativity, Einstein’s field equations make use of the metric tensor to describe the curved geometry of spacetime.</p><p>Specifically, Einstein’s field equations make use of three tensors: 1) Einstein’s Tensor G, which describes the curvature of spacetime from the derivatives of the metric tensor, 2) the energy-stress tensor T, which describes the distribution of matter and energy in the universe, and 3) the metric tensor g, which defines the measure of lengths and angles in the curved geometry. Einstein’s field equations are usually summarized by the equation below:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/313/1*4NyBm-kSArifSlLhM1vQ2w.png" /></figure><p>In General Relativity, the metric tensor consist of a 4x4 matrix comprising of 16 components. Just as in our 2 dimensional example, the metric tensor consists of the permutation space of all dimensions, in this case 3 of space and 1 of time combined into 4 spacetime dimensions. However, since the matrix is necessarily symmetric, only 10 of these components are independent of each other.</p><p>The generic form of the metric tensor is show below:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/284/1*xN0Du1nqNSVM0rqcUfmxNg.png" /></figure><p>The values of the metric tensor change with the curvature of spacetime as they encode the mass-energy distribution. Therefore, unlike Euclidean distance that conserves length across all transformations, curved geometry does not. This is why the metric tensor is a crucial aspect of understanding general relativity.</p><p>Now that you’ve surveyed through these concepts, you may be less daunted by complex ideas and mathematical formalists in physics!</p><h3>Sources</h3><p>Susskind, Leonard, and George Hrabovsky. <em>The Theoretical Minimum: What You Need to Know to Start Doing Physics</em>. Basic Books, 2014.</p><p>Susskind, Leonard, and Art Friedman. <em>Special Relativity and Classical Field Theory: The Theoretical Minimum</em>. Penguin Books, 2018.</p><p>Susskind, Leonard, and Art Friedman. <em>Quantum Mechanics: The Theoretical Minimum</em>. Penguin Books, 2015.</p><p>Susskind, Leonard, and André François Cabannes. <em>General Relativity: The Theoretical Minimum</em>. Basic Books, 2023.</p><p><em>Wolfram Demonstrations Project</em>. Understanding Special Relativity: The Lorentz Transformation, Time Dilation, and Length Contraction. (n.d.). <a href="https://demonstrations.wolfram.com/UnderstandingSpecialRelativityTheLorentzTransformationTimeDi/">https://demonstrations.wolfram.com/UnderstandingSpecialRelativityTheLorentzTransformationTimeDi/</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e86977ea86ad" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/data-science/three-mind-blowing-ideas-in-physics-the-stationary-action-principle-lorentz-transformations-and-e86977ea86ad">Three Mind-Blowing Ideas in Physics: The Stationary Action Principle, Lorentz Transformations, and…</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/data-science">TDS Archive</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[An Introduction to Reinforcement Learning]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/data-science/an-introduction-to-reinforcement-learning-995737d3f1d?source=rss-cb73222d75bc------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/995737d3f1d</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[artificial-intelligence]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[robotics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[deep-learning]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[reinforcement-learning]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[deep-dives]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Angjelin Hila]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 27 May 2024 23:45:45 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-05-27T23:45:45.125Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4><em>A deep dive into the rudiments of reinforcement learning, including model-based and model-free methods</em></h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*0Z9Be9WHuN_b_Cca3DtFFA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Used on a creative commons license from: <a href="https://elifesciences.org/digests/57443/reconstructing-the-brain-of-fruit-flies#copyright">https://elifesciences.org/digests/57443/reconstructing-the-brain-of-fruit-flies#copyright</a></figcaption></figure><h4>What is Reinforcement Learning?</h4><p>One path toward engineering intelligence lies with emulating biological organisms.</p><p>Biological organisms transduce information from the environment, process it (what cognitive science studies), and output behaviour conducive to survival. Such behaviours, at the most basic level, involve foraging for food, reproducing, and avoiding harm. They also involves the wide spectrum of human activity such as play, creativity, problem-solving, design and engineering, socializing, romance, and intellectual life.</p><p>Now, how do we engineer a system that is able to do all of the above?</p><p>If we were to model a simple organism as a function of some environment, we would need a model of the agent, the environment, and some function that moves that agent from some present state to some desired state.</p><p>In psychology, two major schools of thought purport to explain human behaviour: <em>behaviourism </em>and <em>cognitive science</em>. Behaviourists understand behaviour as a function of learning mechanisms, where learning can be attributed to output behaviour. Cognitive science, on the other hand, models agent interaction with the environment through the information-processing approach. In this approach, the agent transduces external stimuli into an internal representation initially by the senses and subsequently subjects it to layers of transformation and integration all the way up to thinking and reasoning faculties, before returning some behaviourial output. In the former approach, learning is understood largely as a function of environmental conditioning, whereas in the latter, mental representations are considered indispensable in predicting behaviour. Reinforcement learning borrows mostly from the behaviorist approach where environmental reward dictates the evolution of the agent within search space.</p><p><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operant_conditioning">Operant conditioning</a>, the school of behaviorist psychology that reigned in the 1950s-60s, defined learning as the product of the environmental mechanisms of reward and punishment. Precursors to operant conditioning included the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Law_of_effect">Law of Effect</a> proposed by Edward Thorndike which proposed that behaviors that produce satisfying effects are more likely to recur, whereas behaviors that produce dissatisfying effects less likely. B.F. Skinner operationalized effects in terms of reinforcement and punishment. Reinforcement increases the likelihood of the recurrence of a behavior, whether it be approach or removal of the inhibitory factor. Approach is termed positive reinforcement, and the reversal of avoidance, negative reinforcement. An example of positive reinforcement includes becoming good at a sport and winning often. An example of negative reinforcement includes removing the inhibitory stimulus, e.g. the school bully who taunts you during games. Operant conditioning predicts that you’re likely to repeat behaviours that receive the greatest reward. Punishment, on the other hand, consists of controlling the behavioural effect by either adding a negative consequence (positive punishment) or removing the reward associated with the behaviour (negative punishment). When fouling causes expulsion from the game, it illustrates positive punishment. When you perform poorly and lose games it illustrates negative punishment, which may cause avoidance of playing in the future.</p><p>Much of the game of life in human society is replete with <em>secondary reinforcers</em> or socially constructed rewards and punishments that condition behaviour. These include money, grades, university admittance criteria, rules for winning and losing games, which build upon natural reinforcers that are closer to biological needs like food, reproduction, and social approbation.</p><p>Memory plays an important role in learning because it enables the retention of prior experiences. Evidence shows that memory encodes the rewards and punishments more so than the content of the experience (Tyng et al., 2017). Subjects are likely to remember rewarding experiences fondly and thereby likely to repeat them, and negative experiences unfavourably, and likely to avoid them in the future. The mechanisms of memory are complicated and diverse, and evidence suggests that subjects play an active role in reshaping their memories by recalling them (Spens &amp; Burgess, 2024). This fact complicates the picture for behaviorism because the subject’s interpretation of an experience can be retrospectively modified and reframed, making prediction on conditioning principles alone difficult. Furthermore, rewards and punishments oversimplify the landscape of positive and negative affects, which comprises a complex terrain of valleys and troughs, nested dependencies, and is better modeled as a continuous spectrum rather than a binary space.</p><p>These complexities notwithstanding, reinforcement learning comprises an array of mathematical techniques that adapt the behavioural ontology of agent, environment, and rewards in order to model artificial intelligence. As we will see below, aspects of reinforcement learning emerge from control theory, whose precursors extend into physics and engineering, and other aspects emerge more directly from psychology and biology. Since both the objects of control theory and living systems comprise dynamical systems that must stay within an optimal range of far-from thermodynamic equilibrium, the underlying principles are amenable to the goals of reinforcement learning and artificial intelligence more broadly.</p><p>Dynamic programming emerged chiefly from control theory as a mathematical optimization method that enables larger problems to be broken down recursively into sub-problems as a means of solving the larger problem. Generally speaking, recursion refers to a function that passes itself directly or indirectly as a parameter.</p><p>In this article, we will focus chiefly on the elements of dynamic programming, with a focus on discrete and finite games. However, dynamic programming exhibits a variety of limitations that are in part addressed by model-free approaches to reinforcement learning and others by combining dynamic programming with artificial neural networks, once called <em>neurodynamic programming</em>. More broadly, the marriage of reinforcement learning and artificial neural networks is termed deep reinforcement learning. These models incorporate the strengths of deep learning within reinforcement learning techniques. The most popular of these algorithms include the <strong>Deep Q-Networks (DQN)</strong>, which were introduced by <a href="https://deepmind.google/">DeepMind</a> in 2013. This family of algorithms leverages deep learning to approximate the Q-function. Since function-approximation is one of the shortcomings of reinforcement learning, these algorithms represent a major improvement of the reinforcement paradigm.</p><p>Other shortcomings addressed by <strong>DQN </strong>include conferring flexibility in capturing nonlinear dynamics, admitting a much wider range of dimensions without becoming computationally intractable from the <em>curse of dimensionality</em>, and greater generalization capacity over the environment.</p><p>Neurodynamic programming represents a step in the direction of leveraging the cognitive paradigm in psychology to address the shortcomings of the purely behaviourist approach. It is worth noting, however, that while scientific progress has been made in understanding the hierarchical organization and processing of lower-level perceptual information, the scaffolding of that information to thought and consciousness remains, more or less, scientifically elusive. For this reason, artificial neural networks (ANNs) as yet lack the complex generalization capacity of human intelligence which tends to learn with exponentially smaller samples than ANNs. We will discuss the implications of adopting the principles of reinforcement learning toward artificial general intelligence (AGI) in the last section of the article.</p><h4>Decision Theory &amp; Control Theory</h4><p>Before delving into the mathematical elements of dynamic programming and reinforcement learning, it is important to flesh out the relationship between the philosophical and mathematical branch of decision theory and reinforcement learning. While decision theory consists primarily of mathematical formalizations of rational choice theory, they overlap with the goals of reinforcement learning insofar as reinforcement learning seeks to scaffold its models into successful artificial agents that can interact with complex environments and information landscapes.</p><p><strong>Decision theory</strong>, also known as <strong>choice theory</strong>, was developed in the 20th century at the heel of the growing formalization of <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rationality-instrumental/">instrumental reason</a>. Specifically, it uses probability theory to quantify the probability of agent actions given their preferences. A crowning achievement of this formalization effort was the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Von_Neumann%E2%80%93Morgenstern_utility_theorem"><strong><em>Von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility</em></strong></a><strong><em> </em></strong>procedure. In a nutshell, the procedure states that agents tend to choose actions that maximize utility given the utility expectations of available choices.</p><p>Control theory emerges from the fields of mechanical and electrical engineering and concerns optimizing the states and performance of dynamical systems relative to desired parameters, such as maintaining some steady-state temperature range. The essential mechanism consists of a controller that measures the desired variable and compares it to a set point, whose difference is fed as feedback for correction. The broad strokes of control theory mirror metabolic processes of living organisms, who maintain a set point of internal temperature against variable external conditions. The connection of control theory to decision theory is obvious: both rely on feedback from the environment to maintain or advance the state of the system toward some form of optimality.</p><p>Mathematically, subsets of both control and decision problems can be reduced to optimization problems solvable through dynamic programming. Dynamical programming solves general stochastic optimal control problems (afflicted by the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Curse_of_dimensionality"><strong><em>curse of dimensionality</em></strong> </a>— meaning that computational requirements grow exponentially with the number of state variables) by decomposing them into smaller sub-problems and computing the value function. As we demonstrate the rudiments of reinforcement learning, we will delve into the heart of dynamic programming: the recursive relationship between the state and value functions of the agent.</p><p>Reinforcement learning and decision theory overlap in defining a procedure for maximizing reward or utility. However, whereas utility is explicitly defined in decision theory, which aims to model economic behaviour, in reinforcement learning utility is substituted by cumulative reward. Different policies relative to different task goals can be applied toward maximizing cumulative reward, which, as we will see, depends on the inverse relationship between the polar directions of exploration and exploitation termed the <em>exploration-exploitation dilemma</em>.</p><p>Let’s begin by outlining the ontology underlying reinforcement models.</p><h4>States, Actions &amp; Rewards</h4><p>Reinforcement learning leverages the theoretical apparatus of decision theory to construct models comprising agents, environments, and a dynamic evolution rule. The evolution rule permits an agent to pursue rewards within its environment, also termed <em>observation</em>.</p><p>The agent is defined as an output from the environment to a decision. We call a particular decision an action. The mapping from the present state of the network to an action is called the policy. The policy guides actions as mappings from states to outcomes.</p><p>Formally, therefore, a policy is a function that maps <em>a state</em> to an <em>action</em>. It can be represented by the conditional probability of an action given the current state, where the Greek symbol 𝛑<strong> </strong>stands for policy:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/205/1*2AuVFycyZk40AW4u3KimMg.png" /></figure><p>Transition dynamics define the next state given the input reward as a probability distribution over all possible states and reward values:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/595/1*V8XAeWxQs4UESETw-9ivDA.png" /></figure><p>The formula above defines the probability of the next state and reward pair as equal to the conditional probability of the next state<strong> <em>s’</em> </strong>and reward <strong><em>r</em> </strong>given the current state <strong><em>s</em> </strong>and action <strong><em>a</em></strong>.</p><p>An action changes the environment by accruing a reward. The reward, in turn, changes the <strong>agent state</strong> or <strong>observation</strong>. The reward input determines the future action outputs based on the <em>policy</em>.</p><p>Generally, there are two types of policies:</p><blockquote><strong><em>Deterministic:</em> </strong>given present state/environment, there’s one and only one action the agent can take.</blockquote><blockquote><strong><em>Stochastic: </em></strong>given present state/environment, there are multiple actions an agent can take.</blockquote><p>A reward is typically formalized as a scalar value, x.</p><p>Given a particular reward, the agent is faced with an optimization dilemma: <em>should the agent maximize short-term rewards or cumulative rewards over its complete life history</em>?</p><p>This is known as the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exploration-exploitation_dilemma"><strong>exploration-exploitation dilemma</strong></a>. In other words, the transition function should aim to optimize the trade-off between exploring the environment and exploiting the knowledge it has accumulated by reaping maximal reward.</p><p>Optimal solutions to the exploration-exploitation dilemma depend on the type of tasks we want the model to learn, which range from finite to undefined (continuously or discretely infinite). The game of chess, for example, can be formalized as an episodic task because it has a a finite configuration space and a predefined end-state of three possible outcomes: win, lose, draw. This means that optimal successor states given current states can be computed through deterministic transition dynamics, where for every state there is a single optimal action.</p><p>However, most tasks do not have a finite configuration space nor predefined end-states. We classify these as <strong>continuous tasks</strong>, and optimize them through <strong>model-free</strong> approaches. In model-free approaches, instead of computing the transition dynamics, the model samples from the environment in order to compute optimal successor states. Put differently, instead of planning its actions through foresight, it uses trial-and-error to learn about the environment.</p><p>There are generally two approaches to model-free reinforcement learning: <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monte_Carlo_method"><strong>Monte Carlo approach</strong></a><strong> </strong>and <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Temporal_difference_learning"><strong>Temporal-difference learning</strong></a>. Since averages over sufficient samples converge to expectations, model-free approaches estimate expectations through sample means. Monte Carlo methods compute value functions by estimating the expected cumulative returns of a sufficiently large sample of state-action pairs. Some Monte-Carlo methods evaluate the value function only at the end of the task for episodic tasks. For continuous tasks, the definition of an episode varies and can be set by the designer such as based on time intervals.</p><p>Unlike Monte-Carlo search, Temporal-difference learning, meanwhile, estimate the value function incrementally by leveraging differences between time-steps. Because of the incremental approach of temporal-difference methods, they exhibit a lower variance from the actual expected value than Monte-Carlo methods who rely on sampling means.</p><p><strong><em>To recapitulate</em>:</strong> the agent navigates its environment through mappings from current state and action-space pairs to state-spaces. Transition dynamics compute all possible mappings for finite configuration spaces with predefined end-states. In lieu of a predefined end-state and finite state-spaces, model-free approaches continuously sample from the environment to find the best policy.</p><p>Dynamic programming computes state-transition probabilities and expected reward from all state-action pairs. To understand how this process works, we need to understand Markov processes.</p><p>Next we’re going to learn the mathematical model that enables the agent to compute the optimal successor state. As we discussed earlier, optimality resolves into the exploration-exploitation dilemma, which varies with the type of task we’re trying to model. Looking into the structure of rewards will help us understand this better.</p><h4>Quantifying Reward</h4><p>We quantify reward in reinforcement learning through a scalar value accrued to the agent from the environment upon taking an action. The value of this reward indicates the immediate goodness of the action with respect to its end-goal.</p><p>Cumulative reward, or <em>return</em>, on the other hand, refers to the sum of all hitherto accumulated rewards from the environment. The goal of the agent is not merely to optimize immediate reward but to optimize cumulative reward. The former represents myopic agents who maximize short-term gains, whereas the latter far-sighted agents who seek to maximize long-term gains.</p><p>Since for the most part we want agents to maximize highest rewards sooner rather than later, discounting is introduced to incentivize current maximal reward over later maximal reward.</p><p>We quantify cumulative reward G with discounting by the expression below:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/746/1*jV-2c1g_VueqLcidOhDZxg.png" /></figure><p>Here, cumulative reward <strong>G </strong>equals to the sum of products of a reward and its discount factor gamma 𝜸, which is always a value between 0 and 1: {0,1}. Gamma is incrementally exponentiated with each time-step, which means that across infinite time-steps gamma approaches zero.</p><p>As gamma approaches 0, it incentivizes short-term gains, whereas if gamma approaches 1, it incentivizes long-term gains since across infinite iterations the reward sum will itself approach infinity.</p><p>Because most tasks are bounded in time, gamma discounting imposes upper bounds on rewards when it is below the value of 1.</p><p>The condensed equation for cumulative reward with discounting is given below, where G stands for the sum of expected rewards <em>R, </em>which is multiplied by the discounting factor, gamma. Cumulative reward is therefore computed as the sum of the reward and the discounting factor:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/371/1*jSzQs3zv-7UjSaVd0uJrcg.png" /></figure><h4>Markov Decision Process (MDP)</h4><p>So far we’ve discussed the probabilistic definition of the policy as a mapping from a state to an action, transition dynamics as the probability of moving from one state to another given reward, and the formula for how reward is calculated.</p><p>Now, we’re going to step back a little and provide some supplementary theory that defines these probabilistic transition chains. We will start with something called a <strong>Markov process</strong>. Markov processes are stochastic processes that satisfy the <strong>Markov property. </strong>A stochastic process is a process that varies randomly. The Markov property states that <em>for every state, successor states are conditioned only by present states</em>.</p><p>Because prior states do not bear on future states, processes that satisfy the Markov property are called memoryless. Imagine a set of fixed destinations that recur daily as you leave your home to go work before returning home again. In other words, we have a cyclical process with a beginning and an end. Now further imagine that your decision to move from one destination to the next only depends on your current destination, not your previous history of destinations. Initially, every connected destination would have an equal distribution of probabilities. For example, if upon leaving home you have the option to drive or take the metro, we’d ascribe initial probabilities to each of these possible future states as 0.5. Over iterations of all possible routes these probabilities might stabilize to some frequency distribution with some routes skewing preferentially over others. (This type of probability is called empirical probability because it averages outcomes over possible events relative to a finite number of tests) That distribution equilibrium would be the Markov chain or process.</p><p>Now you’re probably thinking: how do you define events and states? Isn’t the world infinitely complex to be talking about fixed possible states and stable probability distributions?</p><p>Quite true, but since we’re after a mathematical formalism of agents in environments, we need therefore to distinguish between the types of tasks or environments we are trying to model. To do this, we need to specify the representation of both <em>time steps</em> and <em>state spaces</em>, that is, the distributions of all possible states. The square matrix below provides a definition of Markov chains with respect to axes of <strong>state-space </strong>and <strong>time:</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/333/1*DOT2EsItut9uWxqeWbAQsg.png" /></figure><p>The state-space can be defined as countable/finite or continuous, where finite state-spaces describe all the possible configurations of the system through combinatorics, while continuous state-spaces describe all the possible configurations through a continuous function.</p><p>Finite and countably infinite spaces take integers or rational numbers as their measurable space, whereas continuous spaces take real numbers.</p><p>Likewise, the axis of time can be defined as discrete or continuous.</p><p>Discrete-time processes count phase-transitions as discontinuous but can be modeled on either countable or uncountable state-spaces, where uncountable refers to infinite decimal expansions of real numbers. This is in fact how your computer counts time — it does so in discrete steps. The interval between the steps varies across architectures, but a cycle is usually measured as the length of the time-step required to change a register state.</p><p>Continuous-time chains count phase-transitions as continuous and can be modeled on countable or uncountable state-spaces.</p><p>The term Markov process is typically reserved for continuous-time processes, whereas the term Markov chain describes a subset of those: discrete-time, stochastic control processes. In the rest of the article, we will focus on <em>discrete-time, finite state-spaces</em>.</p><p>So far our Markov chains are very simplistic as they describe transitions between states with fixed probabilities. We’re missing two ingredients important for modelling behaviour in our ontology: <strong><em>actions</em> </strong>and <strong><em>rewards</em></strong>.</p><p>Adducing rewards to transition probabilities constitute <strong><em>Markov Reward Processes</em></strong>. Markov Reward Processes assign a reward to each transition state, (defined as a positive or negative integer) thereby nudging the system toward some desired state. Recall our cumulative reward formula as the sum of expected rewards multiplied with some discounting factor. A Markov Reward Process allows us then to calculate the value of the state <strong><em>v(s)</em></strong> as the probability of cumulative reward G (where G is averaged over a large sample of iterations) given initial state S:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/322/1*hjVapQkoRKyqSvGX7dOKiQ.png" /></figure><p>The last variable we need to adduce in order to scaffold to <strong><em>Markov Decision Processes</em></strong> are actions. The agent begins with equally distributed probabilities of a set of possible actions and subsequently updates the transition function as a mapping from current state and action to the next state and reward. We’ve ended up full-circle to the transition dynamics that we described earlier:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/595/1*V8XAeWxQs4UESETw-9ivDA.png" /></figure><h4>Dynamic Programming &amp; Bellman Optimality</h4><p>This brings us to the concept of dynamic programming, developed by Bellman (1957).</p><p>Understanding dynamic programming will help us understand approximation methods like Monte Carlo Search and Temporal Difference, which do not require complete knowledge of the environment like dynamic programming does. These model-free methods approximate the deterministic policy of dynamic programming in lieu of perfect information. As such, they provide powerful mechanisms that approximate real-world learning.</p><p>The core idea behind how dynamic programming searches and finds the optimal agent state concerns the relationship between the <strong><em>state-value function</em></strong> and the <strong><em>action-value function</em></strong>. These are recursively related.</p><p>Let’s expound on these ideas with a relatable example. Let’s say that you are at a suboptimal state in your life and want to change this. Let’s further say that you have a tangible goal or place you would like to be in the future within some realistic time horizon. In order to arrive at the grand goal (here you can substitute anything: better job, start a family etc), you will need to take a series of smaller steps or actions that will be conducive to your desired outcome. Translated in the language of reinforcement learning, your current state will be assigned a value. Given your current state and value, you will take actions. These actions will also be evaluated with respect to your overall goal and current state. A good action will receive a higher valuation than a bad action. Feedback from the environment will determine the value of the action (how these are determined varies with the task). The evaluation of the state will affect the valuation of the available actions and successor states. And the evaluation of the actions will recursively affect the value of the current state. In other words, actions and states are dynamically connected through recursion.</p><p>Now, in real life, your goal and the action-steps to get to that goal cannot be specified as a deterministic system with discrete time-steps and and a discrete state-space (though perhaps they could be approximated this way). Instead, dynamic programming assumes a specifiable environment much like the game of chess, where time-steps and action-spaces are abstracted as discrete and finite. The overlap with real life closes on the fact that a larger goal will be approached through optimization of smaller sub-goals conducive to that larger goal.</p><p>Dynamic programming therefore will assume the following values: <strong>(Ω,A,𝒫)</strong>, where <strong>Ω</strong> represents the total of all possible states,<strong> A</strong> an action event as a subset of the finite sample space, and <strong>P</strong> as the probability assigned to each action event by some policy function 𝝅.</p><p>Now, if you think back to our <em>deterministic transition dynamics</em>, since the sets of states, actions, and rewards are finite, any particular state and reward pair will have a probability of those values occurring given some prior state and action pair. These probabilities are specified as discrete probability distributions of random variables since the state space is discrete. We said that sequences consisting of states, actions, and rewards are Markov Decision Processes (MDPs) that seek to maximize expected cumulative reward over time, where reward is represented as a scalar value.</p><p><em>Now the question we need to address is how does a Markov Decision Process maximize cumulative reward given the assumptions we’ve specified?</em><strong> </strong>The answer is provided by the <strong>Bellman Optimality Equations</strong> which relate two functions: <strong><em>the state-value function</em></strong> and the <strong><em>action-value function</em></strong>.</p><h4>State-Value Function</h4><p>The state-value function can be defined as the sum of the probabilities of all possible actions an agent can take under a policy 𝝅, where, for each action, it’s value is determined by the sum of all weighted values of possible successor states.</p><p>Put more simply, the state-value function defines the expected cumulative reward an agent can obtain starting from a particular state (s) by following policy 𝝅.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/488/1*DZFPUypp4fXct4-7SgfoPA.png" /><figcaption>State-value function</figcaption></figure><p>The above equation contains two terms: <strong>a)</strong> <em>the sum of the probabilities of all possible actions an agent can take in state (s) following policy 𝝅</em>, and <strong>b)</strong> <em>an inner sum for each possible action that computes the weighted values of all possible successor states</em>. The term within the square brackets computes the contributions of each action’s possible states as the sum of the immediate reward R(s, a, s’) and discounted reward by gamma factor 𝛾.</p><p>Another way of expressing the state-value function is the following<strong>:</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/452/0*2HLKJGsbMwE3pvUz.png" /><figcaption>Source: Sutton</figcaption></figure><p>The above formula defines the value of the next state as the expected return E<em>𝝅 </em>computed as the conditional probability of getting reward <em>R</em> at time <em>t</em> given state <em>s </em>at time <em>t</em>. The reward R is calculated as the sum of products of expected returns in successor states and gamma discounting.</p><p>To help understand this better, imagine an agent in a 3 x 3 grid-world that has four possible actions — <em>up, down, right, left</em><strong><em> </em></strong>— available at each time-step.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/123/1*H2Cbplv4Dyx5jwl8UELy-w.png" /><figcaption>State-space, where values represent rewards.</figcaption></figure><p>We initialize the state-values to 0, and use the Bellman equation for the state-value function to optimize the state-values given the distribution of rewards in the grid. We use <em>(row, col)</em> indexing to identify each position the grid.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/118/1*NM0fweB3qsMPeI2iY8vI9A.png" /><figcaption>Initialized state-values prior to optimization.</figcaption></figure><p>Assuming that the policy is equally distributed across each action, and with a discounting factor of 0.9, the state-value function for the initial state (1,1), would be computed in the following way:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/706/1*zad2IBwM5-RMXTv38V6iFw.png" /><figcaption>The value of state (1,1)</figcaption></figure><p>The constants in each inner sum represent the rewards which are distributed in the grid according to some outcome we want the agent to achieve. The inner sums represent the immediate reward plus the product of the discounting factor and the cumulative value of the next state. The ratios in the outer sum represent the distribution of total probability given the number of actions. Since there are four possible actions, we can weight the inner sums initially by equally distributed probabilities summing into total probability. The state-value would then be computed for each possible state in the state-space and iterated until the sums converge to stable values.</p><h4>Action-Value Function</h4><p>As we saw the action-value function is embedded within the state-value function as its second term. This means that the action-value function computes the values of all the possible actions in state <em>(s)</em> as the sum of the immediate reward obtained from the transition from <em>(s) </em>to <em>(s’) </em>and the expected cumulative reward of the next state <em>(s’)</em> given the action, given by the formula below:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/534/1*uZIyelqWHBxC9AVndlrUEQ.png" /></figure><p>In other words, the action value function computes the cumulative reward of taking action <em>a</em> in state <em>(s)</em>, where the expected return is the sum of the immediate state transition — denoted by R(s, a,s’) — and the discounted value of the cumulative reward of the next state s’— denoted by <em>𝛾∑𝝅</em>(a’|s’)Q(s’,a’).</p><p>Another notation for formulating the action-value function is in terms of the expected return E given state and action pair (s, a) when following the optimal policy <em>𝝅:</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/662/1*9Au4MsyttJDEl7mHcZc4rg.png" /></figure><p>The state-value functions and the action-value functions are related in the sense that the state-value function can be given by the policy and the action-value function Q(s,a).</p><blockquote><strong><em>Therefore, each function contains itself as a parameter, albeit computing the successor transition state, as evinced by the formulas above. The formula for V(s) contains V(s’) and the formula for Q(s, a) contains Q(s’,a).</em></strong></blockquote><blockquote><strong><em>Put differently, they contain each other within their parameters: the value of the state V(s) depends on the value of successor states computed through Q(s,a) and the value of the action Q(s,a) depends on the value of the successor state computed through V(s’).</em></strong></blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/320/1*RK4MvUXsG8eHEEorxJ9bCg.png" /><figcaption>Backup diagram for the state-value function. S represents the state, <em>𝝅 the policy, black dots each available action, and arrows action-reward pairs transitioning to next state s’. Source: </em><a href="https://goodboychan.github.io/reinforcement_learning/2020/06/06/05-Policy-evaluation.html">https://goodboychan.github.io/reinforcement_learning/2020/06/06/05-Policy-evaluation.html</a></figcaption></figure><p>As such, the action-value function and the state-value function are recursively related: the value of the action-state pairs determine the value of the state, which conversely determines the value of the action.</p><p>The state-value function takes as its prior the state, and yields an expected value E. The action value function takes as its prior state and action pairs, to compute the reward, the expected cumulative return E.</p><p>The <strong>Bellman Optimality Equations</strong> therefore express the recursive iteration of the state-value and action-value functions until they converge on optimal values. The Bellman Equation for the state-value function is expressed below:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/494/1*rO4NWDc6c-oedHbEI84CdA.png" /></figure><p>where the value of the current state is defined as the maximum reward of any possible action computed as the reward for taking action <strong>a </strong>at state (<strong>s)</strong> and the product of the value of the next action s’ and its discount factor gamma.</p><p>The Bellman equation averages each all possible actions from the current state and weights them according to their probability of occurring.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/989/0*9Idzc9WMNvRkoKwg.png" /></figure><h4>Model Free Methods: Monte Carlo &amp; Temporal Difference</h4><p>The above example describes a deterministic model where the transition dynamics are known and can thus be perfectly computed. This is because we have complete knowledge of the environment.</p><p>However, for most tasks we don’t have complete knowledge of the environment. In lieu of this information, we cannot proceed with deterministic transition dynamics precisely because we cannot solve the dynamic programming equations. To overcome this problem, we can use techniques that borrow from statistics by inferring the state of the environment from a sample.</p><p>In Monte Carlo methods, we approximate expected returns with the average of sample returns. As the sample approaches infinity, the average returns converge to the true value of expected returns. We do this by letting the agent run through an entire episode until termination before computing the value function. We then take <em>N</em> number of episode samples and use the mean to approximate the expected value of the target state. Now, as you might be already wondering, how an episode is defined varies with the task and purpose of the model. For example, in a game of chess we can define an episode as a run through an entire game or an arbitrary series of steps.</p><p>We can write the MC update rule as the following:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/700/1*RgvZf46UAksck-6wQ_XkWQ.png" /></figure><p>Where V(s) n+1 denotes the value of the next episode, S(s)n denotes the cumulative value of the state and G the value of the reward. We add the cumulative reward G to the state value and divide by the number of episodes or samples.</p><p>We can algebraically rearrange the MC update rule to:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/894/1*WB3bX8osTgW39qiXoo0EIg.png" /></figure><p>Unlike Monte Carlo methods, where we evaluate the value function only after each episode, with <strong>Temporal Difference </strong>(TD) we evaluate the state value function after each time-step or increment. Since we start with no information about the environment, we have to initialize the values of V(s) to 0 or some other values, which will subsequently be updated with every time step.</p><p>We compute the value of the state in TD with two steps. First we compute the error of the step and next we use an update rule to change the value of the state. The error is given by the following difference formula:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/660/1*xtR8zZEKpKMGytX28sQfAA.png" /><figcaption>The error formula for TD time-step.</figcaption></figure><p>Where, 𝜹t stands for the error, R(t+1) the reward from the action, V(S t+1) the estimated value of the next state, and V(S) the value of the current state. The fact that TD uses the estimated value of the next state to evaluate the current state is called <strong>bootsrapping</strong>. In effect, we subtract the value of the current state from the sum of the reward of the action and the product of the discounting factor and the value of the next state. This enables an immediate update of the value of the state with every time-step.</p><p>By adding the observed discrepancy between the expected and observed reward 𝜹 times 𝛼 (the learning rate) we close the discrepancy between observation and expectation:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/434/1*CuH_L3g4rShn1BfzbCzaoA.png" /><figcaption>The TD update rule for the value function.</figcaption></figure><p>The role of 𝛼 determines the degree to which the TD algorithm learns, where 𝛼 is a real positive number. Typically, 𝛼 is set to values like [0.1, 0.01, 0.001]. A higher value 𝛼 ensures that the updates are more aggressive, whereas a lower value ensures more conservative updates. The value of 𝛼 affects the exploration-exploitation trade-off, where higher 𝛼 leans on exploration and lower 𝛼 leans on exploitation.</p><p>While both MC and TD methods proceed blindly without any prior knowledge of the environment, the merit of Temporal Difference is that it computes online updates at every time-step and the merit of Monte Carlo methods is unbiased estimation due to relying on sampling alone to estimate the value. A drawback of TD methods includes high bias, whereas a drawback of MC methods include overlooking important updates, and thereby higher variance. This suggests that the optimum between the two learning strategies must exist somewhere in between.</p><p>The TD approach can be optimized by changing the single-step evaluation strategy to n-steps. As we will see, doing this enables compromising between TD and MC. When we evaluate the state value every n-steps, we do so by estimating n-steps into the future instead of after every step.</p><p>A modified approach to n-step TD is TD(𝝀). TD(𝝀) methods use a parameter called <strong><em>eligibility traces</em></strong> to credit state-action pairs that occurred in the past. Instead of estimating n-steps into the future, eligibility traces assign credit to state-action pairs over multiple TD steps. Eligibility traces enable past state-action pairs to receive credit for contributing to observed-reward transitions. Eligibility traces are represented as vectors or matrices associated with each state-action pair. The eligibility trace for a time step is computed recursively as follows:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/658/1*G45YDIsvGe5olvqhW3Ljzg.png" /></figure><p>Where the lambda 𝝀 parameter controls the degree of bootstrapping. When 𝝀 =1, bootstrapping is eliminated and the update rule reduces to Monte Carlo. When 𝝀 = 0, it reduces to a TD time-step with bootstrapping termed TD(0). <em>TD(𝝀) generalizes TD and MC as a continuum where TD(0) denotes single step TD and TD(1) denotes the limit of extending TD to ∞ steps, which reduces to MC.</em> As you can see from the formula, the eligibility trace parameter is computed recursively, wherein the value of the eligibility trace for the next time step takes as input the eligibility trace from the previous step. When E(s) = 0, bootstrapping is eliminated. The TD(𝝀) update rule is computed the same as the TD and MC update rule except by multiplying the eligibility trace to the error as shown below:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/568/1*IFCfqQ44euv4K7TGrPFlKw.png" /></figure><h4>Augmenting Reinforcement Learning with ANNs</h4><p>Whether model-based or model-free, RL algorithms encounter scaling problems because of the curse of dimensionality, have trouble generalizing across different types of environments, and suffer from sample inefficiency.</p><p>Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs) provide a powerful method of rectifying some of the limits inherent within the RL architecture. In particular, ANNs improve sampling efficiency, environment generalization, and scaling problems caused by the curse of dimensionality. They reduce sample inefficiency through superior generalization capacity by virtue of the fact that they learn a general function from the data. This also enables them to scale better since the number of hidden layers and neurons per hidden layer can be increased. Too many hidden layers and neurons, however, can also lead to computational scaling problems (the curse of dimensionality is inescapable beyond certain ranges). They are further beset by the problem of the <em>non-stationarity of target states</em>, since traditionally ANNs require the ground truth (in the case of RL this amounts to <em>expected return</em>) to be set in advance, while RL algorithms find the optimal state through an update function, whether on-policy or off-policy.</p><p>Unlike traditional RL algorithms which rely on probabilistic transition rules, the application of ANNs to reinforcement learning uses function approximation to compute the state and state-action values. While any number of function approximation methods can be applied such as linear approximation and tile-coding, artificial neural networks constitute the most powerful technique due to their generalization power that leverages nonlinear function approximation.</p><p>Let’s look at two approaches that involve applying artificial neural networks to reinforcement learning: <strong>Deep Q Learning (DQN) </strong>and <strong>Deep Temporal Difference with eligibility traces (TD(𝝀))</strong>. Since we don’t know the target values in advance, MC or TD are used to create an estimate of the target state: the expected return. This is then used as the target value to be approximated by the function (really, the <em>gradient</em> which is the partial derivative of the error of the entire network with respect to the network parameter 𝜃). ANNs approximate the target value by computing the error between the target estimate and the output and then computing the error through backpropagation and reducing it through an optimization algorithm. The most common optimization algorithm is a variation of gradient descent such as <strong>stochastic gradient descent</strong>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/576/1*g7K5jNfw0Ow634fb4IodBw.png" /><figcaption>In DQN the artificial neural network takes a state vector as input and outputs an action vector, where each value represents the action q-value.</figcaption></figure><h4><strong>Off-Policy DQN</strong></h4><p><strong>Q-Learning</strong> is an off-policy version of <strong>SARSA (States, Actions, Rewards, States’, Actions’)</strong>, where the next state-action pair <strong>Q(s’, a’)</strong> is estimated by selecting the maximum estimated value of the next state. In other words, Q-Learning selects the maximum value of <strong>Q(s’,a’) </strong>across actions available in the next state s’. This means that it doesn’t use the policy 𝛑 to learn Q(s’,a’). SARSA, on the other hand, is an on-policy method that selects an action from the previous action taken and an estimate of the next state-action pair, Q(s’,a’). This means that it uses the policy 𝛑, namely the probability of an action given the state, to learn the Q-function.</p><p>In <strong>Deep Q-Learning</strong>, the action-value function Q(a, s) is represented via Q(a,s, 𝜃 ) where 𝜃 represent the neural network parameters. Theta 𝜃 parameters are equivalent to weights <em>w</em> in neural networks, which are associated with connections between neurons. The weights determine the strength of the connections and are retroactively adjusted through backpropagation in order to minimize the error. DQN takes as input a high-dimensional representation of the environment and outputs a vector of action-values for each possible action. The expected return is typically approximated through an MC or TD approach. Backpropagation with an optimization function are then used to compute policy gradient and reduce the error by adjusting the policy network parameters 𝜃.</p><p>Because ANNs are highly sensitive to new information, it can cause catastrophic forgetting, where new information can overwrite previously written information. A method to manage catastrophic forgetting is to employ experience reply, a technique that stores past experiences and reuses them to train the network.</p><h4><strong>On-Policy Deep TD(𝝀)</strong></h4><p>ANNs can also be applied to <strong>TD(λ)</strong> methods, where the state observation is fed as input into an ANN, which then approximates the action-value function as output. Due to the on-policy nature of <strong>TD(λ)</strong>, Deep <strong>TD(λ)</strong> approaches are best suited for tasks that require long-term dependencies between states.</p><p>Training online learning methods like <strong>TD(λ) </strong>can be challenging because the distribution of the environment changes with every or n steps due to bootstrapping. This is called <em>nonstationarity </em>and impedes the convergence of the ANN parameters 𝜃 toward optimality. The interdependence of succeeding states in online learning can cause catastrophic forgetting, where the update interferes with past learning. Furthermore, the combination of eligibility traces which assign credit to past actions and ANNs can create additional complications in the backpropagation step.</p><p>A way to mitigate these challenges involves utilizing a technique called <strong>experience replay</strong>. Experience replay stores agent learned episodes as vectors of [s, a, r, s’] in a memory buffer. During training, the network samples from its memory buffer of stored learned vectors to update the network parameters. This provides the network with greater stability and makes it less prone to catastrophic interference from high-variance new experiences that result in a larger error or temporal difference between steps.</p><p>Deep <strong>TD(λ) </strong>algorithms have shown to excel in continuous control tasks where<strong> </strong>the state-space is continuous and the target unknown or unclear. These include continuous control tasks in robotics, autonomous cars, and financial markets.</p><h4>Reinforcement Learning and Artificial General Intelligence</h4><p>What are the implications of reinforcement learning for artificial general intelligence?</p><p>Notwithstanding the fact that “intelligence” is an ill-formed variable since it meshes disparate competencies into a single notion, what’s termed “general intelligence” sits on top of evolved competencies of living organisms, which require the transduction of worldly information for survival and reproduction. Intelligence, even in the human context, cannot be extricated from the contours of organismic viability. This isn’t, however, the orthodoxy. The general wisdom argues that intelligence is more akin to a program or software that computes inferences on the basis of available information.</p><p>The latter conception consists of two models, which are mistakenly thought of as competing. One model describes intelligence as following procedures, whereas the other describes intelligence as generalizing from data for optimal prediction. The former is generally much better understood, whereas the latter amounts to a cluster of techniques that reliably improve the strength of predictions. Animal intelligence is largely based on the latter model.</p><p>The most successful paradigm of the second model is deep learning through artificial neural networks. The chief advantage of ANN architectures is that they enable generalization from data without prior information or concepts, although this is not to be confused with unsupervised learning. ANNs first build a model through training and then make predictions on the basis of that model on new data. It is thought, therefore, that the brain does something similar (after factoring pre-training from evolution). However, there are currently two weaknesses within ANNs. The first weakness is that the goal or outcome has to be set by the human designer. An ANN cannot of its own accord conceive of goals. It cannot, a fortiriori, tell the difference between truth and falsity of its own accord. The human designer must supply the true outcome in order for the model to learn to approximate that outcome. The second weakness is that an ANN, without reinforcement learning, cannot search an environment to optimize its own state. For this reason, the combination of the generalization and predictive power of ANNs with the decision optimization power of reinforcement learning makes for a formidable amalgamation.</p><p>It is on this basis that some have argued that reinforcement learning represents the clearest path toward artificial general intelligence (Sutton, 2014). The intuition behind this is clear: reinforcement learning comes closest to modelling living systems, which when enhanced with other successful architectures like transformers may lead to a model of AI that replicates (and exceeds!) all human capabilities.</p><p>However, if humans are the basis of general intelligence, then the conception of general intelligence cannot be one that divorces intelligence from survival constraints and some form of embodiment. On the other hand, if general intelligence can be defined without reference to living organisms, then it isn’t clear what it would look like — purely abstract models escape satisfactory formalization despite attempts like Marcus Hutter’s <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AIXI">AIXI</a>. In the abstract, it can be conceived of some perfectly rational agent that solves problems by virtue of reasoning and computational power alone. The cleavage between information and embodiment is a gambit for a much wider discussion that is beyond the scope of this article. If interested, this <a href="https://evanthompson.me/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/pcs-life-and-mind.pdf">paper</a> provides a good starting point.</p><p>However, there are good reasons to doubt that reinforcement learning suffices for artificial general intelligence. Some reasons for this include the very definition of general intelligence. Most current AI researchers still rely on a behaviourist conception of intelligence without factoring explicit internal representations as necessary ingredients. And they have good reason to think so. Symbolic AI, in which hopes of general AI were pinned before the success of deep learning, proved to be a failure. Symbolic AI refers to approaches to artificial intelligence based primarily on explicitly coded logical rules and knowledge stores for optimal inference generation.</p><p>The tension between symbolic AI and neural networks may, however, be unfounded. Many researchers believe that the quest for artificial general intelligence lies in combining these approaches in the right way. Reasons for thinking that neural nets approximate the native ontology of the brain include the fact that mathematical logic is not quite how the brain reasons: that is, it doesn’t compute necessary and sufficient conditions, or crisp membership, as much as graded membership, which is approximated by the likes of fuzzy logic and at which ANNs excel.</p><p>Neural networks consist of a black-box hierarchical architecture of hidden layers parametrized to achieve the desired output through highly calibrated dynamic learning rates, activation functions, connection weights, and optimization algorithms calibrated to minimize error. Beyond highly calibrated hyperparameters like the above, the human designer does not understand how information is processed in the hidden layers. The assumption is that the same is the case with the brain, where information is not stored as combinations of discrete representational units (whether analog or imagistic) but as a vast, distributed architecture of billions of neurons. What we think of as linguistically structured thoughts are not internally represented in the brain that way at all: there’s no specific combination of neurons that stand for the word <em>being</em> or the sentence “<em>Existence as determinate being is in essence being for another”</em> for example.</p><p>Linguistic competence is instead embedded in a vast network of semantic connections and reproduction rules reinforced through experience and augmented by imagistic and analog representations. In other words, language and thought as we represent them reflectively, but also behaviourally in writing and speech, do not have brain analogues that mirror their explicit structure (in other words, isomorphic mapping between grammar and the native ontology of the brain), but are instead embedded in distributed networks of neural assemblies characterized by degrees of connectivity and connection strengths.</p><p>On the other hand, it seems that neural nets seem unable to instantiate the structured thought-processes that some argue are the seat of reason and human intelligence. After all, explicit reasoning constitutes the chief means of human intellectual achievement, and this does not appear to be something that current neural nets are able to replicate. A salient illustration comes from Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems, where a formal system alone cannot establish the truth of certain statements on the basis of proof alone. (<a href="https://angjelinhila.medium.com/alethic-limits-set-theory-entscheidungsproblem-turing-computability-ed0ed282b026">If interested, check out this article that I wrote that explains Godel’s proof</a>). Meanwhile, the human subject can verify the truth of such a statement despite failure of axiomatic deduction. Foregoing the complicated and contested implications of this uncoupling of truth and proof for computation, it is additionally worth noting that the human agent actively pursues theories of the world, whereas current RL algorithms do so in a very rudimentary sense, though robotics will likely eventually advance toward similar capabilities. Meanwhile the linguistic state of the art, LLMs, regurgitate linguistically indistinguishable analogues to human speech and writing when prompted while exhibiting exponentially faster recall speeds and stores of information orders of magnitude larger. Much hangs in the balance of understanding this distinction: humans actively pursue theories of the world as well as other creative pursuits as part of their cultural programming, which co-opts mechanisms tailored toward survival and reproductive success. In other words, all human activity occurs within the basin of evolutionary constraints. As such, humans and all living organisms, constitute autonomous systems that replicate and endogenously reproduce their own identity conditions. Human and animal intelligence are therefore inextricable from the boundary conditions of survival, barring any measure of cultural independence from strict adaptationism (<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sociobiology">a big topic which engenders wide disagreement</a>).</p><p>Current AI does not approximate autonomous systems that endogenously propel themselves in the world. Nor do they generate their own environmental milieu and reconfigure their own search spaces in the way humans and other animals do. The absence of this constraint currently allows the human designer to set AI’s informational salience, e.g. text-generation, environmental detection etc. Even if the architecture evolves into a bona fide general problem-solving machine, unless it becomes capable of reflective awareness it cannot be said to possess general intelligence. Definitions of general intelligence canonically omit the variable of global awareness — the equivalent to what the ancient Greeks termed <strong><em>nous</em></strong> — as the hallmark of human intelligence. They do so because reflective and global awareness remain recalcitrant to reverse engineering and analysis into parts. For this reason, reflective awareness is dismissed as an ingredient of intelligence. However, admitting recalcitrance to current scientific explanation does not by the same token imply rejecting physicalism or an an endorsement of non-naturalism. Rather, it signals admission of lack of understanding. Given this gap in understanding, I hypothesize that reflective awareness is an extension of sentience which is a fundamental property of living organisms. In asserting this, I do not imply that autonomous systems cannot be engineered through means other than natural selection, though I leave open the possibility that they may remain opaque to scientific analysis in the foreseeable future. If reinforcement learning hopes to amount to general intelligence, the agent should posses as a prior a powerful architecture that not only hosts complex representations of the world, but maintains a global view from the inside of those very representations. This means that while model-world interactivity is indispensable to the task, the native architecture will require a complex hierarchical internal structure with capacities for multi-modal information processing and integration.</p><h4><strong>Selected References</strong></h4><p>Mnih, V., Kavukcuoglu, K., Silver, D., Rusu, A. A., Veness, J., Bellemare, M. G., Graves, A., Riedmiller, M., Fidjeland, A. K., Ostrovski, G., Petersen, S., Beattie, C., Sadik, A., Antonoglou, I., King, H., Kumaran, D., Wierstra, D., Legg, S., &amp; Hassabis, D. (2015). Human-level Control through Deep Reinforcement Learning. <em>Nature</em>, <em>518</em>(7540), 529–533. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1038/nature14236">https://doi.org/10.1038/nature14236</a></p><p>Neftci, E. O., &amp; Averbeck, B. B. (2019, March 4). <em>Reinforcement learning in artificial and Biological Systems</em>. Nature News. <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s42256-019-0025-4">https://www.nature.com/articles/s42256-019-0025-4</a></p><p>Sharma, S. (2024, March 7). <em>Learning to Mix 𝑛-Step Returns: Generalizing 𝜆-Returns for Deep Reinforcement Learning</em>. Ar5iv. <a href="https://ar5iv.labs.arxiv.org/html/1705.07445">https://ar5iv.labs.arxiv.org/html/1705.07445</a></p><p>Sanghi, Nimish. <em>Deep Reinforcement Learning with Python: With PYTORCH, Tensorflow and Openai Gym</em>. Apress, 2021.</p><p>Silver, D., Singh, S., Precup, D., &amp; Sutton, R. S. (2021). Reward is enough. <em>Artificial Intelligence</em>, <em>299</em>, 103535. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2021.103535">https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2021.103535</a></p><p>Spens, E., &amp; Burgess, N. (2024, January 19). <em>A generative model of memory construction and consolidation</em>. Nature News. <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41562-023-01799-z">https://www.nature.com/articles/s41562-023-01799-z</a></p><p>Sutton, Richard S. <em>Introduction to Reinforcement Learning</em>. MIT Press.</p><p>Tyng, C. M., Amin, H. U., Saad, M. N. M., &amp; Malik, A. S. (2017, August 24). <em>The influences of emotion on learning and memory</em>. Frontiers in psychology. <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5573739/">https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5573739/</a></p><p>White, A., Modayil, J., &amp; Sutton, R. (2014). Surprise and Curiosity for Big Data Robotics. <em>Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence</em>, 19–22.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=995737d3f1d" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/data-science/an-introduction-to-reinforcement-learning-995737d3f1d">An Introduction to Reinforcement Learning</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/data-science">TDS Archive</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Quantum Computing for Complete Beginners]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/data-science/quantum-computing-for-complete-beginners-63b989ded053?source=rss-cb73222d75bc------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/63b989ded053</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[deep-dives]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[physics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[computer-science]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[quantum-computing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[data-science]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Angjelin Hila]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 20 Oct 2023 18:55:21 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-08-03T17:07:25.457Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4><em>A guide to the basics of quantum computing with no prior knowledge required</em></h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/670/1*lxIGq0NNSBObKEFd6NoaHQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>An IBM Quantum cryostat used to keep IBM’s 50-qubit quantum computer cold in the IBM Quantum lab in Yorktown Heights, New York. source: <a href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/ibm_research_zurich/40786969122">https://www.flickr.com/photos/ibm_research_zurich/40786969122</a></figcaption></figure><p>Some have described the last several millennia of human dominion over the earth’s resources as the <em>anthropocene</em>, deriving from the Greek “anthropo” meaning human, and “cene” meaning recent. The last century in particular has been dubbed the <a href="https://www.weforum.org/focus/fourth-industrial-revolution">fourth industrial revolution</a>, due to the pace of technological innovation ushered in by the advent of computers in the middle of the 20th century.</p><p>In the past seventy years, computation has transformed every aspect of society, enabling efficient production at an accelerated rate, displacing human labour from chiefly production to services, and exponentially augmenting information storage, generation, and transmission through telecommunications.</p><p>How did we get here? Fundamentally, technological advancement draws on existing science. Without an understanding of the nature of electromagnetism and the structure of atoms, we wouldn’t have electricity and the integrated circuitry that power computers. It was only a matter of time, then, before we thought of exploiting the most accurate, fundamental description of physical reality provided by <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_mechanics">quantum mechanics</a> for computation.</p><p>I became interested in quantum computation through both a strong interest in physics and the nature of computation. If successful, quantum computation could usher in an unprecedented chapter in our information age by exponentially augmenting the efficiency of current computers. As someone interested in data, computation, and information science, understanding the rudiments of quantum information will not only equip you with a very basic understanding of quantum physics but also prepare you for the next major technological frontier of our information age.</p><h4>Quantum Phenomena &amp; Quantum Information</h4><p>In order to understand the basics of computing, it is necessary to have a basic understanding of the physical phenomena that quantum computing exploits.</p><p>The phenomena in question are <strong><em>electron</em> <em>spin</em></strong><em> </em>and <strong><em>light polarization</em></strong>, the latter being another term for <em>photon spin</em>. Recall that electrons are negatively charged subatomic particles that surround a positively charged nucleus, whereas photons are the particle equivalents of electromagnetism or light. Electron and photon spin are connected since they both refer to quantum properties that have no analogue in classical mechanics, which describes the scale of everyday objects.</p><p>Nonetheless, the easiest way to introduce spin is to draw a comparison to a classical property called angular momentum. Angular momentum refers to the rotational equivalent of linear momentum in a classical system, where momentum is calculated as the product of mass and velocity. As such, momentum is a vector quantity since it possesses both magnitude and direction. Angular momentum is represented as the cross product of the position and momentum vectors of a particle. Since angular momentum is a classical property, it admits of continuous values and can be expressed as a volume integral (generalized from the integral as the area under the curve in two dimensions).</p><p>Spin is often defined as <em>intrinsic angular momentum. </em>Recall that in classical mechanics force is defined as change in momentum. Furthermore the energy of the system is defined in terms of motion or the rate of change of motion, which presupposes mass. Unlike classical mechanics, Einstein’s special theory of relativity ascribes intrinsic energy to rest mass through the equality E = mc². Similarly, intrinsic angular momentum is intimately bound up with the intrinsic energy state of a subatomic particle. In fact, it is a property that elementary particles possess whether or not they are actually rotating, that is, regardless of extrinsic factors like momentum and position, hence the qualifier <em>intrinsic</em>. Like classical angular momentum, quantum spin changes under rotations. However, unlike classical angular momentum, spin is quantized, which means that it only admits a discrete set of values.</p><p>The maximum spin of an elementary particle is given by the product of n (any integer of half integer n/2 values) and the reduced Planck’s constant ℏ (h/2𝜋) . All ordinary particles, called fermions, have half-integer (1/2) spin, whereas force-carrier particles, known as bosons, like the photon have integer (1) spin. Both electrons and photons have two possible spin states: spin “up” or “down”. In mathematical terms, electrons will have a maximum spin of 1/2ℏ or -1/2ℏ, namely spin in the positive or negative “rotations”. The photon will have maximum spin of 1ℏ and -1ℏ, since it takes integer spin values. Even though we’re using the word “rotation”, it is best not think of it in terms of spatial transformations.</p><p>Now let’s look at the strange quantum properties that will be exploited for quantum computation. We noted earlier that the electron can have two possible spin states, but which state is it in at any given moment? This is where it is useful to draw a distinction between the <em>state</em> of the system and <em>measurement</em>. In classical mechanics, state and measurement coincide perfectly: the state of the system is what you measure. Not in quantum mechanics. The state of the system without measurement is given by a coherent superposition of wave functions 𝛹i . After measurement, the state of the system will be given by either 𝛹↓ or 𝛹↑, if we’re measuring a single particle. This disjunction between state and measurement enables quantum computers to carry out operations that can take infinite values in two dimensional complex vector spaces.</p><p>Finally, measurements obey certain rules relative to the way the measurement is carried out. Specifically, the direction of measurement matters for the outcome. Let’s say we have two directions: vertical and horizontal. If we measure the spin of an electron in the vertical direction, we will get a state of spin up or down. If we carry out the exact same measurement, that is, measure spin again in the vertical direction, we will get the same outcome. This shows that there’s an experimental setup that yields predictable outcomes. However, if we first measure the spin of the electron in the vertical direction and subsequently in the horizontal and keep repeating the measurement, the outcomes will be a random sequence of spin up or down that distribute uniformly between the two with enough trials. This means that if we’re not careful, quantum measurements can produce random outcomes. The purpose of quantum algorithms will be to control the operations so that we get the outcomes we desire.</p><p>Even though <strong><em>qubits</em></strong>, the informational units of quantum computing, can be represented either by electron or photon spin, we will use the former as the physical analogue of quantum computation going forward.</p><h4>From Quantum Phenomena to Quantum Computation</h4><p>The fundamental informational unit of a classical computer is a called a bit, which has two discrete states often represented as 0 or 1. Since the computer is a physical machine, this mathematical abstraction must be mapped to some physical phenomenon. Classical computers map these discrete states on a flowing current or voltage. When the voltage is low or close to none, we use it to represent state 0 and when the voltage is higher, we use it to represent 1. In other words, modulations of voltage magnitudes allow us to mechanistically realize a binary system of representation. Sequences of these low-voltage and high-voltage states are subsequently arranged into electrical circuits that simulate logical operations like AND, XOR etc called logic gates. Combinations of logical operations through electrical circuitry are subsequently scaffolded to execute any computable algorithm.</p><p>Now that we see that classical computers leverage electricity to realize computations, it helps us to understand how a quantum computer might operate. Unlike a classical computer, a quantum computer leverages quantum or subatomic scale phenomena to carry out computations. While voltage in our everyday macro scale is measured as a continuous variable, quantum mechanics tells us that at the subatomic scale this is not really the case. Rather, by all experimental accounts, subatomic particles appear to occupy only discrete energy states. This means that an electron and a photon can occupy some energy states, and not others. This contravenes our intuitions about physical objects being able to occupy any continuous energy state. For example, while we typically think of time as a purely continuous variable that’s infinitely divisible, this is starkly not the case for the energy states of subatomic particles.</p><p>This has the peculiar consequence that subatomic particles cannot be described as having fixed positions and momenta. While we can try to describe these variables simultaneously, there’s a physical scale in which the precision breaks down such that knowing the momentum means losing track of the position and vice versa. That physical scale is the called the Planck scale denoted by <strong><em>h</em></strong>: 6.626070<strong> </strong>· 10⁻³⁴ m²kg/s and represents the physical threshold between classical and quantum scale phenomena. At this scale, again by all experimental evidence, subatomic particles occupy all their possible states simultaneously. Because of this property, we can only describe subatomic particles as probability distributions of all their possible states as described by Schrödinger’s equation. As we pointed out earlier however, there’s a second description called a measurement. Prior to measurement, the particle exists in a state of superposition as described by Schrödinger’s wave function. After measurement, the particle collapses to a discrete state of one position or another. Quantum computing leverages this peculiar property of quantum mechanics to perform computations, that is, by taking advantage of both <em>superposition</em> and <em>measurement</em> states. (If you want to get clear on the experimental basis of the objectivity of the superposition read <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bell_test"><em>this</em></a>).</p><p>So if a classical computer builds computations from two possible discrete states, we can think of a quantum computer as building computations from discrete states as well as superpositions. A qubit can be in state 0 or 1 when we measure it. However, prior to measurement, the qubit is in a superposition of 0 and 1. During superposition, the qubit can occupy an infinite number of states. By leveraging the laws of quantum mechanics, quantum computation surpasses the computational capacities of classical computation whose state space is confined to 2^n. To be sure, measurement reduces quantum states to classical states, namely, the same state space of 2^n. In what way then does quantum computing confer advantages that elude classical computing?</p><p>As we will see below, quantum algorithms enable controlled operations in the state of superposition that allow us to get useful answers after measurement. Computer scientists define the complexity of an algorithm with respect to the time steps required to solve it. If <em>n </em>denotes the input length of the algorithm and <em>T(n)</em> the time to solve it, then complexity refers to the function that describes the growth of <em>T(n)</em>. If <em>T(n)</em> amounts to a polynomial, then the algorithm is said to belong to a polynomial-time class problem. If <em>T(n)</em> amounts to an exponential function, then it belongs to an exponential-time class problem. Those that belong to exponential time, like the prime factorization of large numbers, are intractable for classical computers since the time required to solve the problem increases exponentially and can easily exceed human-scale time constraints.</p><p>The promise of quantum computing lies partly in being able to solve exponential-time problems sufficiently quickly.</p><h4>Representing Qubits: Linear Algebra</h4><p>In order to understand quantum computing, we have to understand some of the math underlying the representation of qubits. The mathematical tools need to correspond to the underlying phenomena upon which we will map computation, primarily linear algebra.</p><p><em>We represent Qubits with two-dimensional unit vectors.</em></p><p><strong><em>What is a vector?</em></strong></p><p>A vector is a quantity that is expressed by at least two values: a magnitude and a direction. A vector’s magnitude is given by the Euclidean distance, whereas the direction is given by the starting point. (1,-3) for example represents a two dimensional vector, with a length of 3.162 and a direction given by the x value.</p><p><strong><em>What is a unit vector?</em></strong></p><p>A unit vector is a vector with length or magnitude equal to 1. For example &lt;0,1&gt; is a unit vector because if we calculate the Euclidean distance using the Pythagorean Theorem we get the value 1.</p><p><strong><em>Why two-dimensional unit vectors?</em></strong></p><p>Since there are two possible electron spin measurement outcomes, a two dimensional vector space denoted by ℝ² will do. We use unit vectors because we want to limit measurement outcomes to two possible values: 0 or 1. As we will see, the operations we will perform on qubits will amount to rotations on a unitary plane. However, the space of possible outcomes should include all possible rotations on a three dimensional sphere whose underlying space is still two dimensional, denoting the two possible measurement outcomes. To do this we represent vectors as complex numbers rather than as real numbers, denoted by the complex vector space ℂ². (Complex numbers are any operations involving real numbers and imaginary numbers, where an imaginary number <em>i</em> is equal to √-1) For simplicity’s sake, we will for now stick to ℝ² and eschew complex numbers.</p><p>In order to limit outcomes to two possible values, we need more than just unit vectors. We need pairs of unit vectors to be <em>orthogonal </em>to each other. Two vectors are orthogonal to each other if and only if their <strong><em>inner or dot product</em></strong> equals to zero. When combinations of unit vectors are orthogonal to each other, we call those <strong>orthonormal bases</strong>, combining the word normal that stands for unit vectors and orthogonal.</p><blockquote><strong>Orthogonality</strong>: Two vectors are orthogonal if and only if their product equals zero : &lt;a|b&gt; = 0.</blockquote><p>We can check that any n-dimension ket is an orthonormal basis if the product of the matrix A and its transposal A^T equals an <strong>identity matrix</strong> In.</p><p><strong>Bracket Notation</strong></p><p>Before we describe these bases, let’s say a few words about the standard notation used in linear algebra so that you you’re able to interpret symbols appropriately.</p><p><em>Column vectors </em>are called <strong>bras, </strong>whereas <em>row vectors</em> are called <strong>kets </strong>denoted as follows: &lt;a| &amp; |b&gt;, where:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/224/1*f5jahKxJYHJsHJP6UtxbAg.png" /><figcaption>bras are row vectors, where as kets are column vectors.</figcaption></figure><p>Together, they form <em>bra-kets</em>. From the dot product rule (i.e. vector multiplication), we can only multiply bras with kets provided that each have equal dimensionality.</p><p>The inner product of the bra-ket above is represented by <strong>&lt;a|b&gt; </strong>and denotes:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/312/1*2ZACIdXMQTHjvH8AqzMTIg.png" /><figcaption>dot product of two unit vectors.</figcaption></figure><p>However, vectors of the same type (bra or ket) of the same dimension can be summed.</p><p>Instead of using actual values, we can use arrows to represent the types of orthonormal pairs relevant for electron spin measurement.</p><p>There are three orthonormal bases for spin:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/370/1*--vvAYMh8qIhdOTrxv5gnw.png" /><figcaption>Three two dimensional orthonormal bases used to measure spin (Berhardt, 2019).</figcaption></figure><p>When we multiply bras and kets of the same spin, we yield a value of 1:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/403/1*npV_e3qoKl4TBYVHgoURqQ.png" /><figcaption>Equal orthonormal bra-kets have a dot product of 1.</figcaption></figure><p>Conversely, when we multiply bras and kets of opposite spins, we yield a value of 0:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/380/1*a8fDuRZvukO5Qh8si9vnRw.png" /><figcaption>Opposite orthonormal bra-kets have a dot product of 0.</figcaption></figure><p>As you can see, <strong>orthonormal bracket products</strong> give us measurements that simulate binary outcomes.</p><p>The first basis, represented by the up and down arrows, is called the <strong>standard basis</strong> and corresponds to vertical measurement of spin, that is, measurement along the y-axis. The second basis, represented by the right and left arrows corresponds to the horizontal measurement of spin, namely measurement along the x-axis. Generally, ordered orthonormal bases represent the measurement of spin along a certain direction. In fact we can measure spin at any angle or direction 𝛳 and the output will collapse to a discrete outcome of spin up or down in that direction, since spin states can only be discrete.</p><p><em>A quantum state</em> of a single or multiple qubits will be given by a linear combination of these bases. The basis vectors, therefore, will represent the possible outcomes of a quantum state. As we said earlier, the state of a qubit can be modelled on the spin of an electron or photon. Prior to measurement, the particle or the quantum state will be in superposition, represented by a linear combination of the bases |b1&gt; and |b2&gt; that takes the form of <strong>c1|b1&gt; + c2|b2&gt; , </strong>where c1 and c2 represent probability amplitudes. Because the probability amplitudes can be negative, only their squared values are used to represent the probabilities of the outcomes where c1² + c2² = 1. In a superposition, therefore, c1² and c2² will each have a probability of 0.5.</p><p>After measurement, the spin state collapses to one of the orthonormal bases |b1&gt; or |b2&gt;. The probability of collapsing to |b1&gt; is given by c1², while the probability of collapsing to |b2&gt; is given by c2². If the measurement collapses to |b1&gt;, c1² will equal 1 and c2² 0 and vice versa. To put it even more bluntly, the basis vector multiplied with probability value 1 will represent the outcome of the measurement.</p><p>In classical computing, multiple bits are represented by the tensor product of those bits, denoted by the following symbol: ⊗</p><p>We said that [1,0] and [0,1] kets represent the standard bases, and therefore constitute analogues of 0 and 1 respectively in classical bits. We also said that any quantum state must conserve the following equality: <strong>c1² + c2² = 1</strong>. We called it the unit measure constraint (<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Probability_axioms#Second_axiom"><em>the second axiom of probability theory</em>)</a>, which means that all kets must be unit vectors in ℝ². However, since actual quantum particle states are represented via complex numbers, the actual state space is given by ℂ². Therefore, the actual unit measure constraint is given by: ‖𝛼‖² + ‖β‖² = 1, where 𝛼 and β are complex numbers and represent probability amplitudes.</p><p>To represent multiple qubit states we therefore take the tensor product of our standard bases |0&gt; and |1&gt;. Notice that the product will conserve the unit measure constraint, regardless of how many qubits we concatenate.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/412/1*_J5KdKcH5p4LDyVkD8JI3g.jpeg" /><figcaption>Tensor product of two 1 qubits yields the above vector.</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/412/1*2ok7bVGG9aqpyDmXtZNcdQ.png" /><figcaption>Tensor product of two 0 qubits yields the above vector.</figcaption></figure><p>Since we’ve been working in ℝ², we can heuristically represent the state space of a qubit in two dimensions (x,y) via a unit circle. Remember that all operations will be on the orthonormal bases we enumerated above. Furthermore, all quantum logic gates will be represented by unitary and thereby orthogonal matrices. Why? Because vector multiplication by an orthogonal matrices produces <em>rotations</em> by preserving the inner product of vectors. This produces isometric transformations on a Euclidean space.</p><p>Notice, also, the negative signs for every 180⁰ rotations. The negative signs help distinguish equivalent outputs such that every operation can in principle be invertible or reversible. All quantum computations will need to be reversible to leverage the computational capacities of quantum states, namely the states of superposition and entanglement prior to measurement. As we will see later, the state of superposition (as well as entanglement) endows quantum computing with advantages that elude classical computing. In the state of superposition, any arbitrary number of qubits N occupy all of their possible states at once. If we have 4 qubits, the sample will have 2⁴ possible states, but in superposition all these states will obtain simultaneously. The probability of collapsing to one of these states upon measurement will be distributed equally along the linear combination of the unit vectors.</p><p>The lines in the unit circle below represent the state changes from input to output via operations with the Hadamard gate, which puts qubits into superposition and back. Due to the following equality ‖𝛼‖² + ‖β‖² = 1, measurement will always collapse the system into a distinct classical state, which in our case map to electron or photon spin. Operations with quantum gates however change the state of a single or multiple qubits without collapsing the wave function.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/500/1*vyEBpZBHa4apIAhUGqV4Rw.png" /><figcaption>Qubit unit circle representation. Image from Wikimedia commons.</figcaption></figure><p>If we apply the bit-flip operator, equivalent to the NOT gate in classical computing, it will invert the value of the input state. For example, the |1&gt; ket will flip to the |0&gt; ket indicated below by the state transition from (0,1) to (1,0).</p><p>The Hadamard gate, meanwhile, takes (0,1) as input and outputs (1/√2,−1/√2) by multiplying the input with the following orthogonal or unitary matrix:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/504/1*okWZH-PMHjYKtr5tPTFmBQ.png" /></figure><p>In case you’re wondering exactly how the state changes, here’s an explicit illustration of matrix multiplication with the Hadamard gate from |1&gt; input:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/932/1*MFjga7Ga83WW4yEzjgB_uw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Hadamard gate operation with |1&gt; input state vector.</figcaption></figure><p><strong><em>How does the Hadamard gate work and what is so special about it?</em></strong></p><p>Notice by looking at the unit circle that the bit-flip operation corresponds to a 90⁰ rotation on the unit circle, meanwhile the Hadamard gate corresponds to 180⁰ rotation. What you need to keep in mind is that all quantum gates are done via orthogonal or unitary matrixes, which produce rotations along the origin. The Hadamard gate, specifically, produces half-rotations between the x and y axes, which correspond to probability amplitudes of 0.5.</p><p>Notice also that the vector output is a unit vector since (1/√2, −1/√2) observes the following identity ‖𝛼‖² + ‖β‖² = 1. Try to do the calculation yourself by plugging in the output values in place of 𝛼 and β.</p><p>Think of the state of the qubit at some point in the unit circle as distributing the probability amplitudes from analogues of 0 and 1 to some set of values in between that conserve the unit sum. The Hadamard gate sets that distribution exactly to a 50/50 outcome. In other words, there’s a 50/50 chance that measurement will collapse the qbit to |0&gt; or |1&gt; state vectors. This is the mathematical analogue to a state of superposition. We will see later how superposition can be leveraged computationally.</p><p>Finally, our demonstrations thus far have utilized the unit circle as the space of possible states of a qubit in ℝ². Since actual qbit states are represented by complex numbers in ℂ², a more accurate representation of the qubit state space is given by what’s called a <strong>block sphere</strong>, which aims to capture the possible states of complex valued numbers shown below as a three-dimensional sphere.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/500/1*5Ax9sd8apknk_oLTW3Cytg.png" /><figcaption>Qubit block sphere representation. Image from Wikimedia commons.</figcaption></figure><h4>Quantum Logic Gates</h4><p>Much like traditional computing, logic gates in quantum computing consist of circuits that perform some operation on a qubit or sets of qubits. Earlier we saw that quantum gates mathematically amount to matrix multiplications on qubits. We also said that qubits are represented by unit vectors, whereas quantum logic gates by orthogonal or unitary matrices. As we saw, these produce rotations on a unit sphere, or circle, to reduce the complex space to a two-dimensional one for the sake of simplification.</p><p>However, to perform operations on qubits, quantum gates must be reversible. Reversibility means that every operation from <em>input</em> to <em>output</em> must also be revertible from <em>output</em> to <em>input</em>. The reason for this is that quantum states are reversible, time-reversal invariant, and conserve information in the state of superposition. What we termed <em>measurement</em>, however, reduces the quantum state into a classical one. Measurement or collapse is irreversible and does not thereby conserve input information. In other words, we cannot revert the collapse into its preceding input state. As such, quantum gates constitute controlled operations that manipulate the quantum state while also conserving it. The circuitry necessary for these outcomes leverages semiconductor particles a few nanometers in size called quantum dots that have to be kept in temperatures close to zero Kelvin. However, it is crucial to note that the desired outputs of quantum computation can only be retrieved through measurement.</p><p>There are, therefore, two properties that matter the most when it comes to quantum logic gates: a) <strong>reversibility </strong>and b) <strong>universality</strong>. Universality refers to a type of logic gate that can compute all possible operations on bits. The most well known universal gate in classical computing is NAND (NOT AND) represented by the table below:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/250/1*UD6fE2ZxxsvsdA9c6_PBlA.png" /></figure><p>Note that NAND is the truth-functional <em>complement</em> to AND. At most, only two logical operators suffice to express all possible logical statements including the theorems of logic. This is known as <em>functional completeness</em>. Since NAND combines both NOT &amp; AND into one operation, by corollary it qualifies as a functionally complete and thereby universal logical operator and gate. For comparison’s sake, let’s look at the truth table for AND:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/250/1*S57ATahM1hNztbaT7q1Kkg.png" /></figure><p>In classical computing, most operations are irreversible. For example, if we input a sequence 010011110 into most logic gates and get another binary sequence as output, we would not be able to retrieve the input sequence from the output sequence alone. XOR and NAND are both irreversible. However, there are some gates that allow us to retrieve the input from the output alone, like the CNOT (equivalent to XOR but reversible), Hadamard and TOFFOLI gates. Among these, the Hadamard and TOFFOLI qualify as both <em>reversible</em> and <em>universal</em>. However, there are other gates that meet these qualifications like the FRIEDKIN gate. We will focus on the former triad.</p><p>Let us now take a look at two gates essential for most quantum computations: CNOT &amp; Hadamard. The CNOT operates on two or more qubits by entangling them. The Hadamard gate operates on one or more qubits by putting them into superposition. We will also look at a third gate, the TOFFOLI gate, also known as the controlled-controlled NOT gate, which is a universal version of the CNOT gate.</p><p>What is the purpose of the CNOT gate? It allows us to entangle two input qubits by performing bit-flip operations that are reversible. The CNOT gate consists of two inputs: a control and a target input. When the control bit equals 1 the CNOT gate flips the target input. When the control bit equals 0, the CNOT gate does nothing. This way, every output combination can be traced back to one and only one input combination.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/400/1*iJYYelEI9Tzn6rZCUvH-3w.png" /><figcaption>Classical CNOT gate with bits and tensor product output</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/300/1*W56j0HKaAvatFpvWJS_ONw.png" /><figcaption>Quantum CNOT gate on standard bases and tensor product output</figcaption></figure><p>In what sense is the CNOT gate equivalent to entanglement?</p><p>Let’s take a look at an operation by the CNOT gate on |1&gt; and |0&gt; qubits. We take the tensor product of the two qubits and multiply it with the CNOT gate unitary matrix, which converts the input tensor product from |10&gt; to |11&gt;. Why? Because CNOT flips the value of the target qubit if and only if the control qubit equals |1&gt;.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/990/1*OX0lRVvVR8mZay4sS0KyWQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>By corollary, if our target qubit is |1&gt; instead of |0&gt;, the CNOT gate predictably flips the value back to |0&gt; as we see below:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1000/1*C54-wvlsvTNqBXqhT0Cm6w.jpeg" /></figure><p>In other words, CNOT is the reversible classic-computational equivalent of the XOR (exclusive OR).</p><p>As we mentioned earlier, the <strong>Hadamard gate </strong>yields a perfect superposition. How does it do that? Take a look at the orthogonal matrix below:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/566/1*kN85huvKtMumesZH2LTquQ.png" /><figcaption>Hadamard gate is an orthogonal matrix that puts input qubits into superposition and vice versa.</figcaption></figure><p>If we multiply the matrix with a standard base |0&gt;, then it outputs the following state: (1/√2, 1/√2) which is equivalent to (|0&gt;+|1&gt;)/√2. Conversely, if we multiply it with |1&gt;, we get (1/√2,−1/√2), which is equivalent to (|0&gt;−|1&gt;)/√2. Even though each input converts the output to an equal distribution of probability amplitudes, the negative sign allows us to distinguish the input (whether it is |0&gt; or |1&gt;) and thereby ensures the operation is reversible.</p><p>Each value has a 50/50 chance of outcome in the classical world. Notice that in our example we carried out the operation on a single qubit. How do we put multiple qubits on superposition?</p><p>We need to pass each qubit separately through a Hadamard gate, then take their tensor product. As we noted earlier, multiple qubit states are represented as tensor products of single qubit states.</p><p>Below you can see the operation on a single qubit by multiplying the |1&gt; standard base with the Hadamard matrix:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/434/1*h17Z8mOz-_csiqBKExoOfg.png" /></figure><p>Finally, let’s take a look at the TOFFOLI gate, also known as the controlled-controlled-not (CCNOT) gate. The TOFFOLI gate is identical to the CNOT save for having an additional control variable. With two control variables, the TOFFOLI gate utilizes an 8x8 orthogonal matrix for operations on three input qubits. Like CNOT, TOFFOLI produces quantum entanglement, and can be used to entangle and disentangle qubits.</p><p>The TOFFOLI gate input-output tables:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/350/1*KRkKpcyBwTslUSvsIpBzig.png" /><figcaption>Classical Toffoli gate inputs and outputs.</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/400/1*Gw3QxwN5Y5-xGCfmqyyb6g.png" /><figcaption>Quantum Toffoli gate inputs and outputs.</figcaption></figure><p><em>Why do we need the TOFFOLI gate when we have CNOT?</em></p><p>Because like NAND, TOFFOLI is universal for classical computation and can thereby be used by a quantum computer to simulate reversible classical computations. TOFFOLI is however not quantum computationally universal since it cannot produce superpositions.</p><p><strong><em>Now that we have some handle on quantum logic gates and the operations that they perform, how do we combine them to get quantum algorithms?</em></strong></p><p>Since quantum gates preserve the state of superposition, we can use them to perform unitary computations that are reversible. Physically speaking, the evolution of the system in time is described by Schrödinger’s wave function. To retrieve any information from the quantum computer, however, we need to collapse the wave function.</p><p>Typically, we combine operations of bit-flips and Hadamard gates to get desired outcomes. However, bit-flips are non-reversible. The challenge of quantum computing lies in devising ways to write non-reversible functions in a reversible way. We will see how to do this with the Deutsch algorithm.</p><h4>Classical bits are special cases of qbits</h4><p>In principle, a quantum computer can instantiate all classical computations as these are a proper subset of quantum computations.</p><p>In order to realize classical computations through a quantum computer, we must limit computations to qubits expressed by <strong><em>normal bases</em></strong> (as analogs to classical bits) we’ve been using as examples all along and design circuitry that utilize <strong><em>classically universal reversible gates</em></strong> like the TOFFOLI gate. Since the TOFFOLI gate is a universal gate for classical computation, it can be used to instantiate classical computations.</p><p>However, we haven’t said anything thus far about quantum algorithms. Just how would be go about constructing one?</p><h4>Quantum Algorithms: The Deutsch Oracle</h4><p>Everything we’ve explicated thus far would be frivolous from a computational standpoint if we could not construct quantum algorithms that confer computational advantages over classical algorithms.</p><p>The first algorithm that demonstrably achieved this was devised by David Deutsch in 1985, known as Deutsch’s Oracle.</p><p>Suppose you have four functions f₀-f₃. For every input 0 or 1, f₀ outputs 0. For every input of 0 or 1, f₁ outputs 0 if the input is 0 and 1 if the input is 1. For every input of 0 or 1, f₂ outputs 1 if the input is 0 and 0 if the input is 1. For every input of 0 or 1, f₃ outputs outputs 1.</p><p>We can call functions f₀ and f₃ constants, since they produce the same output regardless of the input. And we call the functions f₁-f₂ balanced, since they distribute the outputs in a reciprocal way.</p><p>The question we then ask is: <strong><em>if we’re given one of these functions at random, how many times should we query the algorithm to determine whether the function is a constant or balanced?</em></strong></p><p>The answer is that classical computation cannot determine the right answer in less than two queries. Let’s see how this works. We have the choice of 0 or 1 as input. If we input 0, we could get 0 or 1 as output. Likewise, if input 1, we could get 0 or 1 as output. In both cases, we won’t know whether the output was produced by a constant or balanced function. We therefore have to query the algorithm a second time to make the correct determination.</p><p>With a quantum algorithm, Deutsch demonstrated, we can know the correct answer with a single query. In order to achieve this, we make use of the Hadamard gate and a control qubit in addition to the input qubit. We send our inputs through the Hadamard gate. Remember that H puts a qubit in a state of superposition. So if we input the pair |0&gt; and |1&gt;, we get the following respective states: (1/√2, 1/√2) , (1/√2, −1/√2). We then pass the target gate through random fₓ.</p><p>Since Hadamard is reversible, fₓ should put our qubit in one of the following states:</p><blockquote>(1/√2) (|0&gt;+|1&gt;); (1/√2) (|0&gt;−|1&gt;); (−1/√2) (|0&gt;−|1&gt;); (−1/√2) (|0&gt;+|1&gt;)</blockquote><p>We pass the control qubit through the Hadamard again in order to reverse the superposition. Since the operations are reversible, we get the following possible outcomes:</p><blockquote><strong>f₀ →|0&gt;; f₁ →|1&gt;; f₂ → −|1&gt;; f₃ →−|0&gt;</strong></blockquote><p>This means that when we measure the qubit at the very end, if the output is |0&gt; the function is a constant, and if the output is |1&gt;, the function is balanced. Even though the Deutsch Oracle has no practical uses, it provides a powerful example of the advantages of quantum over classical computing.</p><p><strong>Deutsch-Jozsa Algorithm</strong></p><p>The Deutsch Oracle generalized to multiple variables is called the Deutsch-Jozsa algorithm. The diagram below provides the schematic quantum circuitry of the algorithm.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/947/1*_C_x_GWLI7JWaMPa53Ua_g.png" /><figcaption>Circuit of Deutsch-Jozsa algorithm, where H stands for Hadamard, U for a constant or bit-flip function, with standard bases as input. Only the output on the top right is measured. <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deutsch%E2%80%93Jozsa_algorithm#/media/File:Deutsch-Jozsa-algorithm-quantum-circuit.png">Image source: Wikipedia.</a></figcaption></figure><p><strong>Shor’s Algorithm</strong></p><p>Shor’s algorithm is a quantum algorithm used for factoring large numbers. The algorithm consists of two parts, the first of which is executed in a classical computer, and the second executed in a quantum one that makes use of the quantum Fourier Transform. We will not delve into the mathematical details of this algorithm as they’re complex and therefore beyond the scope of this article.</p><p>Shor’s algorithm requires two registers with 1024 and 2048 qubits respectively in order to factor a 1024 bit number with 309 digits. The largest number that has been factored to date has a length of 48 bits, which falls short of the RSA 100 digit semiprime milestone. So far no quantum computer has met any of the RSA number challenges, which consists of a list of identified large numbers that have only two prime factors. RSA numbers are used in public-key cryptography for secure data transmission by governments and financial institutions.</p><p>With a sufficiently powerful quantum computer, Shor’s algorithm can be used to decode public-key cryptography, which uses very large primes deemed computationally intractable by classical computers.</p><h4>Quantum Supremacy &amp; The Future</h4><p>As we said at the outset, the notion of quantum supremacy refers to the ability of quantum computers to solve classically intractable problems in a reasonable time-frame. In principle, classical computers can solve any theoretically computable algorithm. The problem lies with praxis: limited processing power precludes them from solving certain problems in a useful timeframe. This is where quantum computers promise to bridge the gap. In 2019, Google announced that they had achieved quantum supremacy with their Sycamore, a 53 qubit quantum computer. In their Nature paper titled <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-019-1666-5">Quantum Supremacy Using a Programmable Superconducting Processor</a> they claim that Sycamore took 200 seconds to sample one instance of a quantum circuit a million times, a task which, they further claimed, would take a classical supercomputer 10000 years. IBM countered the latter claim by averring that one of their supercomputers could perform that task in 2.5 days, undercutting Google’s claim to the finish line.</p><p>The largest quantum computer to date, IBM’s Osprey, sports a 433 qubit processor. Current attempts to build quantum computers with sufficiently large processors are beleaguered by creeping noise, namely the potential of the quantum state to decohere or collapse into a classical state through interaction with its surrounding environment such as changes in temperature and magnetic fields.</p><p>The noise-problem constitutes one of the key challenges of scaling quantum computers to the computational potential such as factoring inordinately large primes. <a href="https://news.uchicago.edu/story/noise-cancelling-qubits-can-minimize-errors-quantum-computers#:~:text=As%20existing%20quantum%20computers%20are,to%20high%20rates%20of%20error.">Noise-cancelling qubits</a> could offset some of these challenges, but currently the advent of quantum computing is still in its infancy.</p><h4>References</h4><p>Bernhardt, Chris. <em>Quantum Computing for Everyone</em>. The MIT Press, 2020.</p><p><em>IBM unveils 400 qubit-plus quantum processor and next-generation IBM Quantum System Two</em>. IBM Newsroom. (n.d.). <a href="https://newsroom.ibm.com/2022-11-09-IBM-Unveils-400-Qubit-Plus-Quantum-Processor-and-Next-Generation-IBM-Quantum-System-Two">https://newsroom.ibm.com/2022-11-09-IBM-Unveils-400-Qubit-Plus-Quantum-Processor-and-Next-Generation-IBM-Quantum-System-Two</a></p><p>Kaye, P., Laflamme, R., &amp; Mosca, M. (2020). <em>An introduction to quantum computing</em>. Oxford University Press.</p><p><em>“Noise-cancelling” qubits can minimize errors in quantum computers</em>. University of Chicago News. (n.d.). <a href="https://news.uchicago.edu/story/noise-cancelling-qubits-can-minimize-errors-quantum-computers#:~:text=As%20existing%20quantum%20computers%20are,to%20high%20rates%20of%20error.">https://news.uchicago.edu/story/noise-cancelling-qubits-can-minimize-errors-quantum-computers#:~:text=As%20existing%20quantum%20computers%20are,to%20high%20rates%20of%20error.</a></p><p>Roush, W. (2020, July 13). <em>The google-IBM “Quantum Supremacy” feud</em>. MIT Technology Review. <a href="https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/02/26/905777/google-ibm-quantum-supremacy-computing-feud/">https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/02/26/905777/google-ibm-quantum-supremacy-computing-feud/</a></p><p>Zubairy, Muhammad Suhail. <em>Quantum Mechanics for Beginners: With Applications to Quantum Communication and Quantum Computing</em>. Oxford University Press, 2020.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=63b989ded053" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/data-science/quantum-computing-for-complete-beginners-63b989ded053">Quantum Computing for Complete Beginners</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/data-science">TDS Archive</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The Meaning of Political Events: An Examination of January 6 as a Crisis of Liberalism]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/discourse/the-meaning-of-political-events-an-examination-of-january-6-as-a-crisis-of-liberalism-cdb100ba1adc?source=rss-cb73222d75bc------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/cdb100ba1adc</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[life-lessons]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[society]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[history]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Angjelin Hila]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 19 Jun 2023 20:05:34 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-02-28T17:47:59.394Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Why liberalism, which conceptualizes society around what we ought not to do instead of what we ought to do, is ideologically insufficient in organizing society</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*lHwmJqqedJl9vtY76V2XZw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Francisco Goya. A man about to cut off the head of a soldier with an axe.</figcaption></figure><blockquote><strong>“The power of anti-structure comes also from the sense that all codes limit us, shut us out from something important, prevent us from seeing and feeling things of great moment… All codes need to be countervailed, sometimes even swamped in their negation, on pain of rigidity, enervation, the atrophy of social cohesion, blindness, perhaps ultimately self-destruction.”</strong></blockquote><p><em>— Charles Taylor, A Secular Age</em></p><p>On January 6, 2021, during a joint session of Congress formalizing the victory of Joe Biden in the 2020 US Presidential Election, a mob of rioters attacked the US Capitol, propelled by beliefs of a stolen election. The rioters breached Capitol and Washington DC security, looted and vandalized parliament chambers, offices of members of Congress, and Capitol halls. While the overall material damage was meagre, the January 6 insurrection marked the climax of a concerted effort by Donald Trump and allies to overturn the election outcome. Five people died and one hundred and thirty-eight were injured during the attack. Four Capitol Police members committed suicide in the months that followed, reflecting the symbolic and psychological gravitas of the event. How did the transition of power, a cornerstone of liberal democracies with the United States as their beacon, go so badly awry? How did it come that within a decade of the election of the first black president, the United States went from paragon of liberal democracies, to contesting foundational democratic principles like the peaceful transition of power? Why were some Trump-supporting groups and organizations knowingly motivated to disrupt the democratic process? Why were large swaths of his supporters likely to succumb to misinformation and propaganda? What explains the deepening political polarization of the United States public in the last decade?</p><p>There are no simple answers to these questions. The Trump phenomenon showed how fragile the political situation was and how political forces festering likely for decades surfaced with his foray into the political scene. I will use the January 6 Capitol attack as the opening frame for the critique of society that follows below because the symbolic reverberations of this event are in proportion with the substantial claims that I will be advancing.</p><p>At the time, the event seemed momentous not because of its gravitas, and not because it signaled an imminent collapse of the institutional structure, but because it signified a transgression into the hallowed. In the West, a now by and large secular civilization, the closest things to the sacred are principles and artifacts that underpin the institutional order: the constitution, the separation of powers between the three branches of government, mass suffrage, and the rational justifications upon which these structures purportedly stand. The artifacts are the physical locales wherein these processes take place and are sustained, chief among them the Capitol of the United States. These hallowed traditions are fuelled by the premises of equality, fairness, and justice, all of which are less and less the outputs of the system. Thus, while the event was insignificant in its institutional ramifications at least in the short term, it was significant in that it gestured that these very institutions have suffered a gradual loss of prestige, but also, perhaps, something far graver: that to large segments of the population they exist more so in name than flesh and blood. That is to say, they no longer carry the gravitas of the principles that they purport to instantiate because they no longer approximate or enact them. In other words, the institutions have lost their effectiveness.</p><p>The general wisdom contradicts this reading of events. The narrative promulgated by official channels reduces the January 6 attack to the actions of a misguided, misinformed, and disgruntled mob with fringe beliefs doing the bidding of a demagogue with quasi-fascist tendencies. This may touch on the proximate causes, but it omits the distal causes. To reduce this event to its proximal causes would be like diagnosing the patient from a single symptom without taking into account the history of the illness. A proper diagnosis requires a deeper examination of the patient, the patient’s history, and a comparison of the many symptoms which individually may be nonspecific but collectively point to the root causes of the illness. The narrow reading, therefore, chooses to ignore a multitude of symptoms that spring from underlying trends. The narrow reading is also intimately tied with the broader reading of the Trump phenomenon, which sees him as an aberration slipping into political prominence on account of his intrinsic political appeal, fueled, in part, by a cult of personality. And that, in addition to this, Trump masterfully rode a wave of discontent rooted in the demographic direction of the country, emblematized by the Obama presidency, predicated on the fears of some whites of losing their majority status on the one hand, and of being left behind materially by the machinations of meritocracy, on the other. One cannot deny that, in part, these underlying fears found political articulation in Trump. While this reading captures some of the proximate causes, it leaves out others.</p><p>The other side of the equation requires acknowledging the massive failures of the Democratic party (as the then incumbent government), but more generally, of the bureaucratic, corporate, and broader elites across the political spectrum. These elite classes have failed for decades to enact necessary reforms to alleviate the burdens of the working and middle classes (namely, the majority of the population who earn their livelihood through wage labour). Not only that, but they have actively thwarted candidates that sought political office premised on enacting such changes. The popularity of Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump during the 2016 US presidential election converged on common promises that spoke directly to working people hoping to substitute effective fiscal reform for placating platitudes. However, in the part of Trump, homage to the plight of the working person was swaddled in nationalistic and racially-charged rhetoric. In spite of this, Trump’s political persona, which flouted and called into question entrenched consensuses on trade and foreign policy, for example, found popular appeal across the population. Therefore, while Trump was far from the working person’s instrument in praxis, at some level of analysis his presidency shook the political establishment and loosened ossified doctrines like NAFTA, while also paradoxically polarizing the country. Because the protectionist policies of the Trump presidency ran counter the orthodoxy of both major parties, they unwittingly revealed the level of political collusion in Washington against the interests of the masses (notwithstanding genuine disagreement about the cost-benefit trade-offs between free-trade and protectionism). At the same time, without saying anything of Trump’s divisive rhetoric and lies, the sheer incompetence and callous disregard for procedure and decorum that marked his administration extended the political decay that had largely been consigned to legislative gridlock and ineffective bureaucracies, to the executive branch. Therefore, while it’s possible that Trump’s political appeal may have been overweening, I’m inclined to ascribe the heft of the blame to unbudging elites on both sides of the political aisle — culminating with Hilary Clinton’s entitled and vapid 2016 presidential campaign, which saw Trump’s nomination as effortless entry into the presidential office. In the intervening years since Trump’s transition out of office, the political establishment has unabashedly reverted to the pre-Trump status quo (though Biden’s administration has made some concessions). This degree of inflexibility from the political establishment will likely translate into far greater political instability in the near future.</p><p>These analyses bring us closer to the topic at hand. The political decay that has been taking place for decades at least in the United States, but more broadly across the Western world, has occurred at the heel of massive sociological shifts that have gone, if not unnoticed, then entirely unaddressed by the institutional structures. Elements of these shifts include the dissolution of the family, the erosion of the institution of marriage, the disappearance of organic communities, the more recent commodification of courtship, and a large-scale shift from geographically-bound communities to geographically-untethered online modes of social interaction, not to mention rapid demographic shifts due to immigration that the current political climate makes taboo to address honestly (namely the growing pains of the mixing of cultures). The effects of these shifts are so seismic that the tethering of the rational-legal edifice that underpins Western institutions to social reality has become increasingly tenuous. This is because institutions, their organizing principles, and justifications thereof are not a substitute for society. They are there to regulate society, administer some measure of control, and enforce and support impartial and fair principles that lubricate the social scheme by incentivizing participation. But besides these, they presuppose or take for granted aspects of social cohesion that are not legally or institutionally encoded. I will argue that institutions function precisely because they take for granted non-codified modes of social cohesion. When extra-institutional society erodes, institutions not only lose their footing and effectiveness, but become oppressive, however well-intentioned, moral and rational their organizing principles. This is precisely what has happened and continues to unfold at an alarming rate. The meat of society is being eaten away, leaving behind the bone. The bone is there to support the meat, but without the meat, the bone is dead.</p><p>This is not a radical idea, and has been occurring in the West in some form or another at least since the first Industrial Revolution. In fact, the kernel of this idea is contained in the gemeinschaft-gessellschaft dichotomy coined by the German sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies. According to Tönnies, social ties can be characterized by two broad categories: gemeinschaft, translating to community, which encompasses direct interactions and the values and beliefs by which they are regulated, and gessellschaft, translating to society, which encompasses interactions regulated by formal rules, impersonal roles and indirect institutional modes of interaction. While I concur that gemeinschaft is largely characterized by direct interaction, and gesellschaft largely indirect, they are not mutually exclusive. Both gemeinschaft and gessellschaft involve direct and indirect modes of social interaction. In fact, in my analysis, gemeinschaft and gessellschaft are synchronously present, and their deeper difference lies in the fact that gemeinschaft operates at a personal level while gesellschaft at the impersonal.</p><p>The distinction between community and society in the gemeinschaft-gessellschaft dichotomy loosely mirrors my distinction between uncodified social ties and the institutional structure. When I say uncodified, I do not mean that communities and larger collectives do not operate according to internal norms. Rather that these norms are either implicit or when explicit, not enforced by legal or formal bodies. It is important to acknowledge that at the boundary, this distinction blurs. The ascriptions of formal and informal constitute a continuum. Religious life, for example, occupies an intermediate position between the two. This is because aspects of religious life, whether more grassroots like local parishes that develop their own internal norms, or administrated through a centralized formal body like the Catholic church, ultimately have as their concern the private lives of their members. In fact, religious orders by definition usher the private into the public, that is, they make the personal a social problem and bind the collective through beliefs held in common. This is not to say that religious institutions cannot take the form of impersonal and legalistic bodies divorced from the spiritual concerns of the people. This was precisely the case until the church was alienated from public life through a formal separation of church and state, a process that came about incrementally. This separation, which is later internalized by liberalism, is deeply contrary to the intrinsic aim of religion. Namely, that it seeks to unite collectives under a common set of beliefs. The metaphysical claims of religion (at least Abrahamic ones) are at variance with their estrangement from political life. The sharp separation of the private and public spheres in Western society emerged in part from the relegation of religion to the private sphere.</p><p>While many of the social functions of religion were replaced by secular institutions, and religion’s foothold on an overarching narrative binding collectives ceded to scientific enterprise, its more amorphous functions found no substitute in modern industrialized society organized according to Weberian legal-rational principles. This is because religions in general supply a holistic ideological framework to the collectives they organize, linking a cosmogony, namely the overall order of the universe, with the destiny of a people, thereby investing quotidian life with direction and cosmic context. As holistic frameworks, religions codify aspects of human experience that techno-rational society lacks the tools to identify, name, and thereby fulfil. For example, the emotional lives of individuals and groups, replete with suffering, failure and uncertainty, find articulation within church dogma. The radical contingency of life finds catharsis and mitigation in congregation. Functionally, church dogma performs this regulative role. Further, congregation orients a social body toward the mystery of existence (this mystery remains unassailable from scientific theory because it is akin to an affective experience of awe). Even so, religions merely delineate the general contours of social existence which ultimately sits atop a far deeper and uncodified sociality, which is too amorphous and implicit to be articulated, and emerges as the byproduct of prolonged contiguous and local coexistence. This implicit lore emerges organically from traditional communal life and is exhibited in modes of interaction that are too nuanced and minute to be controlled or engineered. Religious cults always arise or become appropriated in dalliance with these informal local realities.</p><p>As a factor of social order, therefore, religion succeeds at something that the current institutional order does not: regulating personal life as a function of communal life. Our personal lives are measured against some social standard, and religion functioned to connect the personal to that social standard at scale. Present institutions are wholly indifferent to this calibration function that connects the context of work with the context of meaning or wider social purposiveness. Today quotidian drudgery partakes in sustaining a social body whose members are increasingly not rewarded with a personal life rooted in communal ties. For clarity’s sake, <em>personal</em> operationalizes to the formation of the nuclear family and <em>communal</em> to the connection of that nuclear family to a larger web of personal relations whether kin-related or not. <em>As regards the pejorative connotations of rootedness: I do not ever employ it to essentialize or justify the ethno-political, but to denote communities that forge their modes of sociability from local connectedness rather than exogenous factors — in other words, mere spatial contiguity does not equal community. Nor does membership in a category.</em></p><p>Enjoyment of institutional and commercial goods like electricity, internet, clean water, well-paved roads, libraries, and stores brimming with products are, in a fashion, extraneous to the crux of social existence: all infrastructure amounts to peripherals tended to as outgrowths of rooted individuals reaped in the harvest of social existence. Even slaves and vassals had families in pre-capitalistic societies. Today, that is seen as superfluous. Wage labourers are motivated to give themselves away to the demands of their job only against the promise of some social and familial harvest. The centripetal movement of life, therefore, is toward the fulfillment of the latter as a condition of the former.</p><p>The maintenance of civilization absent the promise of family formation (and the interpenetration of individual and social region) entails a quasi-<em>eusocial </em>conception of society. Eusociality defines as a form of social organization characterized by cooperative brood care, overlapping generations within a colony of adults, and a division of labor into reproductive and non-reproductive groups. All liberal pluralistic societies have hitherto relied on the smallest kin-cooperative unit, the nuclear family, as the last intermediary structure between the individual and the state. The nuclear family binds local communities and smaller polities into an interest group that functions as a healthy buffer between civil society and the state (I don’t include corporations as part of civil society, but an intermediary structure despite their legal status). As the nuclear family has eroded and the private sphere has shrunk, the buffer between civil society and the state has withered. Atomized individuals tread on a smaller and less stable independent social territory liable to usurpation by either state or corporate actors. As exhibited in nature, eusociality concentrates the reproductive imperative in the few by instrumentalizing the many. However, humans do not exhibit cooperative brood-care except in meagre amounts, and therefore are not conducive to large-scale eusocial organization.</p><p>The current ethos does not even acknowledge the reproductive imperative and social life as its outgrowth as the <em>raison d’etre </em>of the entire civilizational scheme (except as vestiges of party platforms aimed at incentivizing former majority constituents like baby boomers). Rather, it views the individual as instrumental for the sustenance of the scheme. This is not something that’s ever explicitly promulgated, but increasingly enacted through public policy, running as an unspoken undercurrent of mainstream political discourse (and perhaps the effect of some covert elite consensus).</p><p>The realization of the reproductive imperative for the overwhelming majority of the population forms the motive force — <em>vis motiva</em> — of civilizational participation. As this motive, it forms the condition of possibility of social peaceful coexistence<em> —modus vivendi — </em>that undergirds civilizational processes. If this is true, it follows that a social arrangement that cannot guarantee a personal life to the majority of its contributing members will not remain stable for long. As has been observed and remarked elsewhere, individuals become slaves to the economy instead of the economy serving their interests.</p><p>The foregoing brings us to the core critique of liberalism, the reigning ideology. Liberalism defines as a political doctrine that abstracts persons as possessing a sphere of inalienable rights and permits a pluralistic society with differing conceptions of the good, provided that these conceptions of the good do not infringe on these inalienable rights. The philosopher John Rawls calls this the priority of <em>justice</em> over the <em>good</em>. The argument to be fleshed out in greater detail in succeeding articles proposes that liberalism as cursorily defined and its tenets are a luxury. I will argue that abstract, legal rights are necessary but insufficient conditions for human wellbeing. Exponents of liberalism have seldom contextualized liberalism in this way. Their defence of liberalism has rested on viewing liberal principles as providing a rational framework that successfully organizes private and public interests regardless of the shape of civil society. Here, I maintain the inverse. Liberalism is deeply dependent on a pre-existing civil society whose bonds are non-institutional and whose forms of sociability existed and continued to exist in spite of liberal principles. Liberal principles were so successful as the professed ideology of the elites and the modus operandi of the governing structure precisely because they took civil society for granted. However, as we have sought to argue thus far, civil society is not unassailable. It takes care of itself only so long as certain necessary conditions are left intact. These conditions include family formation and forms of sociability that bind larger communities. In many cases family formation only occurs within the space of the latter. To give an example, even multi-ethnic societies like the US and Canada rely on ethnic enclaves forming internal social worlds where members navigate their personal lives. This is all well and good so long as these enclaves provide a social space where the personal and the social intersect, ensuring life within the broader institutional structure (commitment to work, taxation, elections etc) is made bearable. However, individuals that exist outside of these enclaves are completely left to their own devices. The varieties of multi-ethnic liberalism exhibited across North America, chiefly the more assimilationist US and less assimilationist Canada, have zero recourse for accommodating individuals that do not have a ready-made participatory social enclave into a substitute social scheme. Even the idea of assimilation presupposes a larger social body into which you assimilate. However, unless you belong to an ethnic enclave, there is increasingly no larger social world into which one can assimilate. That is to say, outside of these enclaves, there’s no larger internal social world of belonging. Existing perpetually on the outside is profoundly debilitating for humans. I conjecture that this fact is what makes living in North America excruciating for many, and explains the constant discontent that emerges ever more frequently through public violence.</p><p>As part and parcel of the capitulation of civil society to institutions and corporate platforms, recent decades have seen formal-professional demands spill into the private sphere, with extra-professional activity and expression become bound and fettered to the professional standard. Where in previous epochs formal bodies maintained an active function in regulating the basic personal fulfillment of individuals, families and communities (however <em>oppressive</em> we see that regulative role through a contemporary lens), in the present one we see the entrenchment of the inverse: personal life is wholly at the mercy of an institutional order that is entirely indifferent to the personal fulfillment of its members, yet also entirely staked in fitting their lives within its clinical, professional codes. This suffocating level of codification of behaviour is anathema to human flourishing.</p><p>Furthermore, increasing migration of social interaction online has focused the eye of the panopticon upon the most innocuous of human foibles. It used to be the case that in the privacy of one’s home and away from the public eye, the social barometer would at last relax, and the human being would let its guard down, releasing the negative feelings otherwise suppressed to avoid running afoul coded life. Because evolving public mores have restricted the scope of permissible discourse, which in the past functioned to resolve disagreement into some consensus through negotiation and compromise, dissenting views that would otherwise be resolved publicly are now channelled into covert spaces, festering and transmuting into resentment. Deprived of traditional channels of expression like the public sphere or private ones of friends and family, isolated individuals resort to online anonymity to channel their frustrations. The strategy of the elites in dealing with views that do not fit their promulgated orthodoxy has been to sweep them under the rug by dismissing them as unacceptable and deriding the offenders. Yet this has only served to multiply rather than eliminate the symptoms. The plight of the socially dispossessed cannot be taken up by mainstream discourse partly because the political class is made up of careerists who parrot party dogma rather than individuals genuinely disposed to understanding and solving social problems. Therefore, when those in authority are made aware of online depravity, they resort to condemnation instead of addressing its root causes.</p><p>Given the above analysis, the central claim that I will pursue is that when the gemeinschaft becomes hollowed out, the gessellschaft becomes totalizing, oppressive, and ultimately illegitimate. A society where the individual is reduced to an instrument for the sustenance of the gessellschaft and corporate production is not a society at all but a scheme that serves the ultimate interests of a few by exploiting the many. This was Marx’s conclusion about the mode of capitalist production. But the problems today are the inverse of the problems that Marx diagnosed in the latter half of the 19th century. Marx diagnosed the material and bodily exploitation of the proletariat. While this is still to some extent the case, today, by and large, the average individual in the West is materially taken care of and their person legally well-protected. The problem today is far more spiritual, yet no less grave. That you can consume as much as you want and that you have legally encoded rights matters little when life appears to not be worth living. We are, therefore, paradoxically forging a societal scheme that despite material abundance outputs more misery than happiness.</p><p>We are, in our time, not only experiencing political decay, as many have noted (Fukuyama, 2014), but the diminution of a variable far more pivotal to the human experience: the erosion of the lifeworld necessary for human wellbeing and flourishing. The lifeworld [Husserl 1936, Heidegger 1927] is constitutively social: it consists of the web of personal relations through which an individual experiences the world and through which larger societal participation is mediated and replenished. Without a social commons and the convivial interpersonal world it facilitates, without the interpenetration of one’s deepest self by some social region to which it belongs, the human being becomes deprived of something far more fundamental than abstract, legal rights: it becomes deprived of its humanity. And so, as our political reality advances toward a future of maximal rights it also paradoxically plunges deeper into a social reality that’s catastrophically inhumane. This inverse proportionality is far from accidental: the more untouchable and pristine the orbit of the person becomes, the greater the yearning for identification.</p><p>The sumptuousness of the lifeworld is being depleted, so to speak, leaving behind a hollowed out and shrivelled husk. The philosopher Martin Heidegger famously called animals “world-poor” in contrast to humans, whom he viewed as “world-rich”; not only so, but “worlders” — progenitors of worlds through our collective intentionality. Yet large swaths of humanity, at least as far as North American societies are concerned, are becoming incrementally world-poor as the social world frays and the richness of social being increasingly capitulates to professional-transactional codes. Corporate actors and pernicious ideologies now stand betwixt the sexes, parents and children, friends and communities, attenuating the human bonds upon which civilization hinges. I am reminded of that most intense quote, where Christ quoth to Peter (invoking it chiefly as a literary reference): “And I tell you that you are Peter, and on this rock I will build my church, and the gates of Hades shall not overcome it.” The word “church” derives from the Greek word <em>ecclesia</em>, which means “to gather together”. The rock is the principle or immovable foundation: <em>agapē — </em>love. The rock has ruptured and weeds have sprouted in the cracks. The gates of Hades stand wide open and unwittingly the masses cross its threshold.</p><p>How could this be, you might ask? The paradox is presently more felt than intellectually understood. This catastrophe has made strides in sequestering the individual from meaningful relations and engulfing them in a world, which when honestly beheld, reveals to be utterly inconsequential to their wellbeing yet consumes the depths of their souls: concern with issues and personalities utterly removed from their daily lives that distract them from apprehending and redressing the unfavourable terms of the social scheme in which they are embroiled. Under their noses, the garden withers, yet their sights remain perpetually cast to the mountains. Transfixed, they cannot look away, regaled with slothful, passive pleasures and garish idols neutering their active wills.</p><p>In so many words we’ve begun with a surface event, the Jan 6 insurrection as it is called, and its public understanding within the parameters of its proximate political developments, and subsequently delved into the deeper causes and a broader framing of the political situation as the incremental erosion of core modes of sociability that once constituted the backbone of society. Without society, I’ve argued, institutions are instruments of coercion. While compulsion is a core part of civilization as such, the rationale for the scheme rests on its being able to dole out proportional benefits to the social body. In classical contract theory, the exchange of liberties for safety and the administration of justice justifies a minimal level of government. Likewise, the contract between employer and employee sets out the terms in which the latter earns a wage in exchange for their labour. Outside of formal contracts, human sociability is subject to a nested hierarchy of norms which range from relatively explicit to implicit. Some of these norms are broader and may hold for society at large, while other sets of norms exhibit a high degree of in-group specificity. When it comes to the <em>gemeinschaft</em>, norms are continually negotiated in on-going interaction, whereupon the human agent finds a niche of permissibility and expressivity that comes bundled with belonging to a social group. Absent membership in a social group with whom the individual interacts with some regularity and common purpose, the edifice of liberalism and its ratiocinations of justice and social order reveal to be a hull without a kernel. The gemeinschaft constitutes that kernel, which when hollowed out, leaves behind the husk: the gesellschaft. <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A_Theory_of_Justice">Rawlsian</a> conceptions of justice (the standard view of liberalism today) that defer exclusively to institutions and utility maximization as the foundational metric of instrumental reason cannot account for a society that operates at their prescribed mathematical optima yet continues to devolve inexorably toward total anomie.</p><p>Therefore, today the bargains upon which the layers of social contract are premised, from the legitimacy of the state to the workplace, have been thinned down if not outright ruptured. The result is that we live in a society where individuals live up to their part of the bargain but do not receive the bounty of a personal and communal life in return.</p><p>In his celebrated <em>A Theory of Justice</em>, the gold standard for modern liberal thought, John Rawls states:</p><blockquote>“Whether men [persons] are free is determined by the rights and duties established by the major institutions of society” — <em>John Rawls, p.55, </em>A Theory of Justice</blockquote><p>As we see today, this is decisively false. Institutions can only modify freedoms (expand or curtail them) in context of an existing social order wherein the individual is embedded. Without social embeddedness, they are insufficient (albeit necessary) formalisms whose incessant invocation by civil servants and the intelligentsia exposes the widening gulf between intellectual idealizations and the abject reality on the ground.</p><p>A corollary of this is that even if all the formal Rawlsian conditions for a just society were to be satisfied, you could still end up with an overall shape of society that is devastatingly inhumane.</p><p>The foregoing thesis will be expounded in the three parts:</p><p>i. The Hidden Historicity of the World</p><p>ii. The Non-Political Underpinnings of Political Order</p><p>iii: How the West is Unwittingly Becoming Inhumane</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=cdb100ba1adc" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/discourse/the-meaning-of-political-events-an-examination-of-january-6-as-a-crisis-of-liberalism-cdb100ba1adc">The Meaning of Political Events: An Examination of January 6 as a Crisis of Liberalism</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/discourse">Dialogue &amp; Discourse</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Alethic Limits: Set Theory, Entscheidungsproblem & Turing Computability]]></title>
            <link>https://angjelinhila.medium.com/alethic-limits-set-theory-entscheidungsproblem-turing-computability-ed0ed282b026?source=rss-cb73222d75bc------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ed0ed282b026</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[computer-science]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ml-so-good]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mathematics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[logic]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Angjelin Hila]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 13 Aug 2022 13:16:27 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-02-28T17:48:51.368Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*HleCi_BHmCSH3WXg0DXyHA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Georg Cantor, founder of set theory.</figcaption></figure><p>As the great philosopher Immanuel Kant strove to demonstrate in his magnum opus <em>Critique of Pure Reason</em>, the application of reason comes up against its own limitations.</p><p>Below I epigrammatically unpack four ways these limitations have been instantiated in the intersecting disciplines of logic, mathematics, and computer science in intervening developments since Kant.</p><p>Unlike the Kantian <em>antinomies</em> — statement pairs that appear independently irrefutable yet jointly incompatible — which are, on Kant’s account, faux-undecidable (Kant resolves these ostensible contradictions within his doctrine of <em>transcendental idealism</em>)<em>, </em>the limits below represent genuine limits of some operation whether it be denumerability, measure, proof, or computation. The meaning of each of these operations will be explained below.</p><p>The only way to dispute the results presented below is to deny the truth of some antecedent axiom and/or give up the <em>law of non-contradiction</em>: the assumption that a statement and its negation cannot be true at the same time.</p><h3>Infinitely Countable &amp; Uncountable Sets</h3><p>In late 19th century, German mathematician Georg Cantor formulated two proofs that founded the discipline of set theory, changed the mathematical meaning of infinity, and whose effects continue to ripple in current developments in math and computer science.</p><p>Cantor’s proofs demonstrate that some infinite sets are countable, while others uncountable. At the very least this will mean that some infinities have unequal sizes, but more than that, we’ll find out that there’s no ceiling to how large infinities can get. This is the result inscribed in Cantor’s proof for the existence of an infinity of infinities.</p><p>The disjunction between countable and uncountable sets, as we will see, is counterintuitive. If it weren’t, the results of Cantor’s proof would be unsurprising.</p><p>But what exactly does <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Countable_set"><em>countable</em></a><em> </em>mean? In order to understand Cantor’s proof, let’s start by first explaining what sets are, and gradually scaffold to comparing their <em>cardinalities</em> or their sizes — which is what will eventually yield the proof for infinitely many infinities.</p><p>A set is a collection of things. Its members can be concrete or abstract. We can think of a set of elephants as well as a set of numbers. There’s no presumption of order or purity. Members of a set do not have to, unless specified otherwise, be in any specific order or contain exclusively concrete or abstract members.</p><p>Sets can contain other sets.</p><p>They can also be empty.</p><p>We call an empty set the <em>null set</em>.</p><p>Their most obvious property, from what we’ve just said, is that sets, at least, have <em>sizes</em>. The technical term for sizes is <em>cardinality</em>. A set of five elephants and the number five has a cardinality of six. And yet some sets are infinite. Consider the set of all natural numbers, that is, the numbers that start either with zero or 1 and go on forever {0,1,2….∞}. Can we say anything meaningful about their cardinality?</p><p>What about the set of all integers ℤ{∞…-1,0,1…∞} or the set of all rational numbers ℚ{∞…3/4, 1/2,1/7,1/9,… ∞}?</p><p>Turns out you can, and the results are surprising!</p><p>Intuitively, we might think that the set of all natural numbers is smaller than the set of all integers, and the set of all integers is smaller than the set of all rational numbers since the integers contain <em>zero</em>, and all the positive and negative numbers, while the rationals contain all the integers as well as all infinitely repeating fractions that cannot be expressed as integers. And yet, there’s a mathematical proof that demonstrates that each of these infinities have the same cardinality, that is, are equal in size!</p><p>To construct this proof we need the <strong><em>bijection principle</em></strong>: a function that yields a one-to-one correspondence between the members of two sets such that no unpaired members are left over. Formally, there’s a bijection from a set <em>A</em> to a set <em>B</em> if and only if each element of <em>A</em> is paired with each element of <em>B</em>, and no element of <em>B </em>is left without a paring of an element of <em>A</em>.</p><p><strong>We then ask:</strong> Is there a bijective function from ℚ to ℕ, and vice versa, or ℤ to ℕ and vice versa? Turns out there is:</p><p>𝑓 : ℤ → ℕ</p><p>𝑓(<em>n</em>) = { 2n − 1 if <em>n</em> &gt;0 | −2<em>n</em> if <em>n</em> ≤ 0</p><p>The principle of bijection is the conjunction of two composing principles: <strong><em>injection</em></strong> and <strong><em>surjection</em></strong>.</p><p>An <strong><em>injective</em></strong> function is a function where each element of its codomain map at most one element of its domain. It is therefore possible that elements of its codomain are left unmatched. A <strong><em>surjection</em></strong>, by contrast, is a function that maps every element of its codomain to at least one element of its domain. This implies that elements in its domain need not be unique unlike elements in its codomain. A <strong><em>bijection</em></strong>, therefore, is a special case of injection and surjection in that it is both injective and surjective. If we can demonstrate a bijection we — ipso facto — demonstrate an equality between two cardinalities!</p><p>We then define countability as an injection of any set A to ℕ. Since an injection applies to all cardinalities smaller or equal to ℕ, countability then is anything smaller or equal to the natural numbers. ∴ All sets smaller or equal to ℕ are <em>countable</em>.</p><p>We define countability exactly as the bijection of any set S with the natural numbers ℕ.</p><p>So far so good. <strong>We then ask:</strong> Is there a bijective function from ℕ to ℝ? And it turns out there isn’t, only an injective one from ℕ to ℝ. This implies that ℝ &gt; ℕ.</p><h4>Here’s <em>a</em> proof (by no means the only):</h4><blockquote>Let’s imagine that we can list all of the real numbers between 0 and 1, which would be the cardinality of [0,1]. We can do this as decimal expansions of an infinite series:</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/246/1*2g5CI7WHQbVUyh1MbOZjIg.png" /><figcaption>Assuming that above the line we list every member of ℝ, will y be in the list?</figcaption></figure><blockquote>Each number in the vertical list represents a unique and infinite decimal expansion of the real numbers. The list itself is infinite. Have we exhausted all the numbers [0,1]? Suppose we take the diagonal expansion in this infinite series and add 2 to each number in the list (mod 10 means that every 8 is converted to zero). Is this number contained in our initial list?</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/135/1*9fNNTQfAQ8nk4bP4cADPiw.png" /><figcaption>The above example with values instead of variables.</figcaption></figure><blockquote>It is not. As such, the real numbers are not <em>listable</em>. We have proven that there’s no way to list the real numbers.</blockquote><p>The diagonal method demonstrates that however way we try to list all the real numbers, there’s a real number not contained in the list. This shows that the real numbers are not listable.</p><p>A corollary of this proof is that the set of all sets of any infinite set is also not countable! This is because, every set is a proper subset of its power set.</p><p>For this to be true we have to accept the <strong><em>power</em></strong> <strong><em>set axiom</em></strong>, which asserts the existence of a power set for any set A. A power set is exactly the set of all subsets of A, which means that it contains A itself, and the null or empty set.[<em>Does the power set also contain itself: this is a gambit for </em><strong><em>Russell’s paradox</em></strong><em>, which we won’t go into here</em>].</p><blockquote><strong>Power set Axiom:</strong></blockquote><blockquote>Given any set A, the set of all subsets of A is called the power set of A, denoted: 𝒫 (A).</blockquote><p>The power set of a countably infinite set is uncountable!</p><p>Why is the power set of ℕ uncountable? That’s because there’s no bijection between ℕ and 𝒫 (ℕ). How do we know that? We can use the diagonalization above to construct a proof for this statement. We arrange the natural numbers horizontally and all the subsets of natural numbers vertically, with the values being 1 for a natural number contained in the subset and 0 for not. We then take the diagonal in the matrix as a subset that cannot possibly be in the bijection of these cardinalities, proving that the power set of the natural numbers has a larger cardinality than the set of natural numbers.</p><p>The inequality between the natural ℕ and real numbers ℝ is therefore a special case of a more general principle known as <strong>Cantor’s Theorem:</strong></p><blockquote><em>Cantor’s Theorem asserts that there is no greatest cardinality because for every infinite set the power set of that set has a greater cardinality! In fact, there’s an infinity of infinities, since there’s an infinite regress of power sets: </em>𝒫 (A), 𝒫(𝒫 (A)), 𝒫(𝒫(𝒫 (A)))…∞</blockquote><h3>Measurable &amp; Immeasurable Sets</h3><p>This one is another strange result. To understand it, we need the notion of the length of an interval, which is simple enough.</p><p>It turns out that certain sets are not measurable. First, just what do we mean by a <em>measure</em>? We’re all familiar with the notion of <em>distance </em>or the <em>length</em> of an interval.</p><p>For example the length of the set ([x,y]) = y−x. The interval [0,1], for example has the measure of 1–0 =1 and so on and so forth.</p><p>To demonstrate non-measurability, we need a special type of set called a <em>Borel set</em> and a special type of measure called a <em>Lebesgue measure</em>. As we’ll see, the Lebesgue measure is the only type of measure that applies to a Borel set. What is a Borel set?</p><p>A Borel set is a set generated by performing <em>finitely</em> many operations of <em>countable additivity</em> and <em>complementation</em> on certain length segments. Let’s define these operations:</p><blockquote><strong>Countable Additivity: </strong>an operation that adds finite or countably infinite sets together. Another way of phrasing it is that the operation takes as input finite or countably infinite sets and yields as output their <em>union</em>: {S₁, S₂, S₃…} → U{S₁, S₂, S₃…}</blockquote><blockquote><strong>Complementation: </strong>an operation that takes any set S to its complement (the set of all non-S). Usually for any set S, this amounts to R−S, where R is the set real numbers. For a line segment [0,1], complementation yields R−[0,1].</blockquote><p>In terms of probability, countable additivity gives us the union of disjoint events over finite or infinite sample spaces. Meanwhile, complementation provides us with what is left over in the sample space.</p><p>For a closed set [0,1] or an open set [0,1) (meaning we don’t count 1) or (0,1] (we don’t count zero), Borel sets include all the line segments of each of these sets, including all their unions and complements.</p><p>A Borel set satisfies all of the following conditions: it contains a) all of its line-segments, b) every complement of all of its sets, and c) the union of all countable families of sets.</p><p>For example, the set of irrational numbers can be generated by R−Q, where R stands for the real numbers and Q for the rationals. Since the rationals are countable, we can generate a countable union of all its subsets. We can also generate its complement, which is the set of irrationals. Any countably infinite or finite set and its complement are, therefore, Borel sets.</p><p>The Lebesgue measure is the only generalization of measure across all Borel sets. The Lebesgue measure must satisfy three conditions: a) the union must be between non-intersecting or disjoint sets, b) the output of the measure cannot be negative, and c) the length of segments is measured through 𝛌 ([x,y]) = y-x for all x,y ∋ R (where lambda stands for a function that outputs the Lebesgue measure).</p><p>It is important to keep in mind that the Lebesgue measure amounts to the sum of all disjoint sets.</p><p>The problem arises with the application of the Lebesgue measure beyond Borel sets. Some such sets are called <a href="https://www.tau.ac.il/~tsirel/dump/Static/knowino.org/wiki/Vitali_set.html">Vitali sets</a>, after the Italian mathematician Giuseppe Vitali who conceived them.</p><p>To generate Vitali sets, we separate an interval, say [0,1], into equivalence classes. All this means is that we bin members by some property such that bins are mutually exclusive and exhaustive. We’re going to bin the sets by whether their measure is a rational or irrational number.</p><p>In other words, for each real number in [0,1], there’s exactly one number that’s a member of A (Vitali set), such that r-a = a rational number, q. In this group, each set has the form of Q + r for some r in the real numbers, forming a quotient group of Q|R that intersects with [0,1]. This subset of [0,1] turns out to be uncountably infinite.</p><p>In order to assume the existence of the above subset, we need to assume the controversial <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/axiom-choice/">axiom of choice</a>:</p><blockquote><strong>Axiom of Choice: </strong>Every set of non-empty, non-overlapping sets has as choice set.</blockquote><p>What makes the axiom of choice puzzling is that for infinitely countable sets of sets, there are sets for which we cannot satisfy a criterion for uniformly selecting a choice set from the initial infinite set. In other words, the axiom of choice asserts the existence of the choice set in lieu of such a selection criterion. While we’re epistemically barred from constructing the set in a principled way, some find it reasonable to assume that this choice set nonetheless exists.</p><p>With the axiom of choice we then generate a set A, which is a subset of [0,1], that contains a member from each equivalence class. This set turns out to have no measure. And here is why:</p><blockquote>If the measure of each set is 0, then by countable/sigma additivity the measure of A is also 0.</blockquote><blockquote>If the measure of each is a positive number, then by countable/sigma additivity the measure of A is infinite.</blockquote><p>These results further assume the uniform distribution of Lebesgue measures, known as translational invariance. That is to say, the sets in each equivalence class differ in position, but not in measure— they must all possess the same measure.</p><p>Since our interval is the countably infinite interval between 0 and 1, our measure should’ve been 1. But Vitali sets prove that there can be no countably infinite subset of a measure 1 that has a measure, because if it had a measure, that measure would have to be uniform. Without giving up countable additivity and complementation then, Vitali sets cannot have a measure.</p><p>Therefore, the axiom of choice is a necessary condition for the existence of non-measurable sets.</p><h3>Decidable &amp; Undecidable Statements</h3><p>We saw with Cantor’s theorem that we can obtain set-theoretical statements that are surprising yet provable, that is, demonstrated to be axiomatically true!</p><p>Now the question arises: can all the truths of an axiomatic system be proven? If all the truths can be proven, then all the false statements can be refuted. We call this property <em>decidability</em>.</p><blockquote><strong>Decidability:</strong> a sentence or statement is <em>decidable</em> if and only if it or its negation is either provable or refutable (exclusive or).</blockquote><p>By corollary, we can define its inverse, <strong>undecidability, </strong>as a sentence or statement that’s neither provable nor refutable.</p><p>If you think about it, undecidability is a rather strange property because it predicates of sentences (in an axiomatic system) that they cannot be determined to be true or false.</p><p>Now the question is, are there formally undecidable sentences, that is, is the property of undecidability <em>instantiated</em>?</p><p>David Hilbert called this <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/church-turing/#Ents"><strong><em>Entscheidungsproblem</em></strong></a><strong> </strong>or the decision problem. His hope was that all sentences of a sufficiently powerful axiomatic system could be sorted into provable and refutable, thereby setting arithmetic on an apodictic (logically certain) foundation.</p><blockquote><strong><em>Another way of formulating Hilbert’s question:</em></strong><em> is there an algorithm that can decide whether a set of axioms are universally consistent, that is provable for every mathematical structure satisfying the axioms (Rayo, 2020)?.</em></blockquote><p>Again, this means that every statement derived from the axioms ought to be provable. Yet this is precisely the outcome that is ruled out by <strong><em>Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems</em></strong>.</p><p>In order to explicate Gödel’s proof we need a system of signs from which we can express formulas and proofs. A set of formulas will be taken as primitives, called the axioms, and all subsequent formulas will be deductively derived from the axioms according to a set of inference rules. Formulas will be used to construct proofs, which consist of a set of finite formulas.</p><p>Gödel’s ingenuity involved the innovation of a function called <strong>Gödel numbering</strong>, a mapping function that assigns a unique natural number to every sign, formula and proof in the formal system. <em>Mapping</em> essentially means that abstract relations between one domain of objects, say geometry, are mirrored or preserved in another domain of objects, say algebra. The mapping function is crucial to Gödel’s proof, because as we will see, he uses it to express <em>meta-mathematical </em>statements through arithmetical statements. In other words, the system of signs and axioms with which we begin, one that is capable of expressing basic arithmetic, will be used to express meta-mathematical statements, including a very particular statement that will unravel the very notion of formal completeness. Meta-mathematical statements are statements about the system itself, such as invoking the notion of proof.</p><p>The formal system itself can be erected on different sets of primitives. But all systems will consist of three types of signs: sings that represent <strong><em>constants</em></strong>, such as the the logical operators <em>and</em>, <em>not</em>, <em>existential</em> and <em>universal quantification</em>, <em>parentheses</em> etc, and signs that represent <strong><em>variables</em></strong>, which come in three types: <em>numerical</em>, <em>predicates</em>, and <em>sentential </em>(that is, variables that stand for logical statements themselves).</p><p>Each sign will be assigned some unique Gödel number according to some rule. For example, the constants will each be assigned a positive integer, the numerical variables a prime greater than ten, the sentential variables the square of those primes associated with the numerical variables, and the predicate variables the cube of those primes.</p><p>Because each sign has a unique Gödel number, each formula of the system will likewise have a unique Gödel number. How we achieve this is a matter of convention. For example, for the ten character formula below we can assign as a unique Gödel number the first ten primes raised to the power of the Gödel number of each corresponding sign, as seen below:</p><blockquote><strong>(∃x) (x=sy)</strong> (<strong>Gödel number</strong> ➔ <strong>2⁸ </strong>· <strong>3⁴ </strong>·<strong> 5¹¹ </strong>·<strong> 7⁹ </strong>· <strong>11⁸ </strong>·<strong> 13¹ </strong>·<strong> 17⁵ </strong>·<strong> 19⁷ </strong>·<strong> 23¹³ </strong>·<strong> 29⁹</strong>)</blockquote><p>We can use this rule furthermore to assign a unique Gödel number to every formula. We can also use this technique to assign Gödel numbers to systems of formulas such as proofs.</p><p>We noted that the mapping will be used to formally smuggle meta-mathematical statements within the formal system. This can be illustrated by Richard’s paradox, where a number of arithmetical definitions are ordered and assigned unique integers. Some statements like ‘not divisible by any integer other than 1 and itself’, that is, the property of being a prime, may turn out to be the property of the corresponding integer, say 19. Some properties will not be mirrored by its unique integer, say if the property of being a prime corresponded with the number 8. When this is the case, we call that property Richardian. Now the property of being Richardian will have its own unique integer <em>n</em>, so the question will arise whether <em>n</em> is itself Richardian or not, leading to a paradox: n is Richardian if and only if n is not Richardian.</p><p>This manner of constructing the paradox is, however, improper because the property of being Richardian is not an arithmetical statement but requires reference to the system of signs in which the arithmetical statements are expressed, in this case Arabic numerals and English. This level-scrambling between purely arithmetical statements and statements about those arithmetical statements is what Gödel achieved without committing the fallacy embodied in Richard’s paradox.</p><p>Gödel circumvents the informality of Richard’s paradox through the mapping function we called Gödel numbering that assigns a unique integer to every expression in the calculus. A property of Gödel numbering is that it retroactively allows us to verify it as such and furthermore reconstruct the expression or system of expressions that it uniquely names. A Gödel number, therefore, is a scrutable address of the larger expression/s and its constituting primitives.</p><p>Perhaps, then, you can see where this is going. Gödel numbering will enable the arithmetization of metamathematics without violating the calculus. Specifically, it will allow us to arithmetize self-reference. It will do this by incorporating corresponding Gödel numbers and their arithmetical relations as expressions about the expressions.</p><p>Let’s look at the example below:</p><blockquote><strong>(∃x)(x=sy)</strong> has Gödel number <em>m — m </em>just being a way of substituting a symbol for the real Gödel number for simplicity’s sake.</blockquote><p>Then, what if the Gödel number that designates the above formula is substituted for y within the very formula:</p><blockquote><strong>(∃x)(x=sm)</strong></blockquote><p>Which states: <em>there is a number x, such that the immediate successor of x is m</em>.</p><p>Now while this substitution designates its own unique Gödel number, meta-mathematically we can express this Gödel number as: <em>the Gödel number obtained from the formula with Gödel number m by substituting for the variable with Gödel number 13 (i.e. the designation of y) the numeral for m</em>.</p><p>Even though this is not expressed directly in the statement, the substitution has expressed something metamathematical by drawing a distinction between a numeral and a number.</p><p>Now that we have, more or less, seen how Gödel realized metamathematical statements through Gödel numbering, let’s see how he constructed undecidable statements, namely statements that are neither provable nor refutable.</p><blockquote><strong>(x) ~Dem(x, z)</strong> reads as: ‘<em>for every x, the sequence of formulas with Gödel number x is not a proof for the formula with Gödel number z</em>’</blockquote><p>This formula expresses the non-demonstrability of z.</p><p>Next we replace sub(y, 13, y) for z: <strong>(x) ~Dem(x, sub(y, 13, y))</strong>, where sub(y, 13, y) designates the Gödel number of the formula obtained from the formula with Gödel number y, by substituting the variable with Gödel number 13 for the numeral for y.</p><p>As such, we now metamathematically assert the non-demonstrability of the formula with Gödel number <strong>sub(y, 13, y)</strong>. This metamathematical formula has a Gödel number, that we shall designate as θ.</p><p>Now if we substitute θ for 13, we obtain a formula that we will call <strong>G</strong>:</p><blockquote><strong>G: (x) ~Dem(x, sub(</strong>θ<strong>, 13, </strong>θ<strong>))</strong></blockquote><p>which asserts its own non-demonstrability. The very formula is designated by the Gödel number <strong>sub(θ, 13, θ)</strong>, which the formula states is non-demonstrable.</p><p>It follows from this that G is demonstrable, if and only if, G is not demonstrable, leading to a reductio ad absurdum.</p><p>Deriving a formula and its negation implies the inconsistency of a formal system. Vice versa, if consistent, then G proves to be undecidable: neither provable nor refutable.</p><p>While G is undecidable, it can be established as true outside of the system: namely that it expresses a numerical property through Gödel numbering true of all integers. Truth and undecidability constitute formal incompleteness.</p><h3>Computability &amp; Uncomputability</h3><p>We saw that the decision problem is inherently unsolvable because Godel’s Incompleteness Theorems demonstrate that formal systems cannot be both <em>complete </em>(all expressions are provable) and <em>consistent </em>(not both statements and their negations are provable) given a certain threshold of expressibility.</p><p>That sufficiency threshold is an axiomatic system capable of expressing arithmetic. Namely, not every true statement of arithmetic will be provable within such a system, or, in other words, derivable from the axioms alone.</p><p>Godel’s incompleteness theorems have consequences for computation. But what is <em>computation</em>?</p><p>Turns out this is a complicated question and people disagree about the precise answer (for wider applications of the notion see <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Natural_computing">natural computation</a> and <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_physics">pancomputationalism</a>). But there’s wide consensus on the narrow definition: <em>a series of well-defined procedures, such as arithmetical and logical operations, that can be implemented mechanistically.</em></p><p>You see where this is going: some functions will turn out to be<em> non-computable</em>.</p><p>Specifically, they are Turing Machine non-computable. To understand this result, first let’s define a Turing machine (we’ll see that a Turing Machine can in principle implement any algorithm — except, of course, non-computable ones).</p><p>A Turing Machine is a simple type of machine that computes a function from the natural numbers to the natural numbers. In other words, 𝑓 computes as output 𝑓(𝐧) for every 𝐧 input, where 𝐧 is a member of the natural numbers (𝐧 ∈ ℕ).</p><p>A Turing Machine starts at zero and takes an input any sequence of 𝐧-s for a 𝐧&gt;0, and halts only if it yields as output 𝑓(𝐧), that is a sequence of 𝑓(𝐧)-s.</p><p>To make this clearer it helps to visualize the <em>hardware</em> as a tape divided into cells, and in principle, the tape can be infinite. Furthermore, the tape has a reader that can do four distinct things: read current symbol on cell, write a new symbol, move to the left or to the right.</p><p>These components comprise a machine that can implement a procedure of four command lines on every input starting from 0 (consider this the <em>software</em>). Those command lines are its <em>current state</em>, <em>current symbol</em>, <em>direction left or right</em>, <em>new symbol</em>, and <em>new state</em>. It performs the following procedure: if in current state and current symbol and reads current symbol, replace it with new symbol and move in a direction to go to new state. Repeat this procedure indefinitely.</p><p>To simplify this, think of the Turing Machine as comprising of a finite set of states <em>Q</em>, a finite set of symbols <em>S</em>, an initial state <em>s</em>, where (<em>s </em>∈ Q), and a transition function δ (represented by delta). The Turing Machine then computes the following transition function starting from its current state:</p><p><strong>δ</strong> : (Q × S) → (S ×{L,R} ×Q)</p><p>where {L,R} are the possible states of its direction. This states that, for every state and symbol as input, it computes a new symbol, direction, and state as output.</p><p>In other words, a Turing Machine is an abstract machine that can simulate any algorithm or program that a physically and logically possible computer can. Which is to say that it can carry out functions that may be not be physically possible (because the matter and energy in the universe may be finite), but are logically possible assuming infinite computational power. The purpose of the Turing Machine is to delimit an abstract formalism that implements computation universally, and therefore captures all formally conceivable computations.</p><p>This is also known as the <strong>Fundamental Theorem of Turing Machines</strong>, or equivalently, the<strong> Church-Turing Thesis</strong>, which says that a function is Turing-computable if there’s a finite way of specifying the output values or computing it algorithmically. Are there limits to Turing-computability?</p><p>One way to demonstrate the computational limits of Universal Turing Machines is through the <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/turing-machine/#HaltProb">halting problem</a>.</p><p>Let’s say we have a program represented by <strong>H(a,b)</strong>, where <strong>a </strong>represents our program listing and <strong>b </strong>our input. If with input <strong>b</strong> our program halts, then H prints yes. If with input <strong>b</strong>, our program doesn’t halt, H prints no.</p><p>We then run H(a,b) as a subroutine of a program P that stipulates the following:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/289/1*Chi7ve0y6D6-DBsWB1OJ4A.png" /><figcaption>The halting problem arises when P is fed into itself as input, where H is its subroutine.</figcaption></figure><p>Now if P(x) is given to itself as input: P(p), then we get the following contradiction:</p><blockquote>P halts if and only if it loops forever, and loops forever if and only if it halts.</blockquote><p>The halting problem is the equivalent of the implementation of a <em>reductio ad absurdum</em> or a <em>contradiction</em> in a physical system. Namely, the logically impossible cannot be implemented by a Universal Turing Machine. It is a limit broader than any physical limit, it is a formal limit. This fundamentally undercuts Hilbert’s program that all functions are computable, or equivalently, that all decision problems are computationally decidable.</p><p>While Gödel incompleteness and uncomputability share similarities, it is worth distinguishing that the former concerns decidability of statements within an axiomatic system, whereas the latter concerns the computability of functions in the absolute sense.</p><p><a href="https://medium.com/mlearning-ai/mlearning-ai-submission-suggestions-b51e2b130bfb">Mlearning.ai Submission Suggestions</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ed0ed282b026" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Scientific Explanation Revisited]]></title>
            <link>https://angjelinhila.medium.com/scientific-explanation-revisited-43c9a1b9f776?source=rss-cb73222d75bc------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/43c9a1b9f776</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[quantum-physics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[physics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[science]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cosmology]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Angjelin Hila]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 03 Jun 2022 15:26:35 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-05-15T17:40:43.356Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>If science is in the business of providing explanations, what are they? Can we build a general model of scientific explanation? Or does science fall short of this explanatory imperative, and instead merely supplies predictive models?</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/512/1*ErlribS24ixvHkYl1mYHHw.gif" /><figcaption>Double-slit experiment: is light particle or wave? White areas indicate amplified waves both across space and the surface. What explains the discrepancy between measurement and non-measurement?</figcaption></figure><p>Let’s start by considering some questions:</p><blockquote>Why are galaxies receding at an accelerating rate?</blockquote><blockquote>Why are there three generations of matter?</blockquote><blockquote>Why do charged objects emit waves in oscillating magnetic and electric fields at 299 792 458 m/s?</blockquote><blockquote>Why do some humans pursue wealth while others knowledge or prestige?</blockquote><blockquote>Why do some believe in supernatural entities while others don’t?</blockquote><blockquote>Why is there more matter than antimatter?</blockquote><blockquote>Why does time have a direction?</blockquote><p>Whether we use the word “why” or “how”, when we raise such questions in our day and age, a presumption prevails that the answer will amount to something other than recourse to revealed truth, established dogma, or personal beliefs. Many of us may hold the notion that something like an answer to these questions ought, rather, to defer to the best “scientific theory”. Understanding of these questions is nested in natural, ordinary language. In our colloquial understanding, raising them amounts to, more or less, asking for an <em>explanation </em>of the identified phenomena. What explains the phenomena mentioned? Or, what <em>accounts</em> for them?</p><p>In ordinary language, the noun <em>explanation </em>admits sufficient haziness and ambiguity. The OED offers the following number of definitions for the transitive verb <em>to explain</em>:</p><blockquote><strong>1.To make plain or intelligible; to clear of obscurity or difficulty.</strong></blockquote><blockquote><strong>2. To describe or give an account of in order to bring about understanding, to explicate; to give details of, enter into details respecting.</strong></blockquote><blockquote><strong>3. To assign a meaning to, state the meaning or import of; to interpret.</strong></blockquote><blockquote><strong>4. Of a fact, situation, or circumstance: to be the reason or rationale for, to account for; to be the cause of. Also: (of a theory) to account for (a phenomenon)</strong></blockquote><blockquote><strong>5. to make clear the cause, origin, or reason of; to account for.</strong></blockquote><blockquote><strong>6. To make one’s meaning clear and intelligible, speak plainly. Also: to give an account of one’s intentions or motives.</strong></blockquote><p>Looking at these various definitions it appears that the verb <em>to explain </em>applies to a wide scope of <em>objects</em>, ranging from “meanings”, “intentions”, “laws”, “thoughts”, “ideas”, to <em>worldly</em> events and “phenomena”, whether taken to be “natural” or “supernatural”. Scanty inspection of these definitions further suggests that, while they may be interrelated, certain disjunctions persist between the type of <em>objects</em> to which the verb <em>to explain </em>is applied.</p><p>For example, <em>to</em> <em>account for </em>one’s actions is not the same as <em>to account for</em> sunsets or eclipses.</p><p>To do justice to our current <em>public</em> understanding of the word <em>explanation </em>requires a historical exegesis of the various transformations our culture’s metaphysical assumptions have undergone through the last few centuries.</p><p>Foregoing such a laborious task, we will nonetheless occasionally draw examples from the past to make certain differences and distinctions clear.</p><p>In our milieu, the hunch prevails that answers to the above questions ought to amount to more than mere linguistic clarification, or haphazard reference to available evidence or scientific theory. Rather, whether a scientific theory or evidence gestures to explain a phenomenon or not, a normative presumption of <em>completeness </em>prevails.</p><p>This is to say that, however we circumscribe a phenomenon at whatever level of resolution, our theory and evidence ought to, when formulated in a way that it has probed nature to its fundament, provide a <em>complete</em> explanation, such that no details (data, observation, inferred properties) escape <em>consistency</em> with current theory and evidence.</p><p>The expectation of completeness finds robust frustration at quantum scales. For example, whether Schrödinger’s wave function constitutes a complete description of a quantum system rather than the definite state the system takes when the wave function collapses upon measurement has been heavily debated. While, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bell%27s_theorem">Bell’s inequality</a> test supports the objectivity of the state of superposition, what causes the wave function to collapse (and concomitantly what constitutes <em>measurement)</em> as yet lacks satisfactory explanation — though competing theories exist, chief among them the Copenhagen and many-worlds interpretations. The mutual consistency of the superposition and the collapsed state has also been disputed. Explanatory sufficiency, therefore, will be a topic explored at some length in this digest.</p><p>Below I survey in detail the four major models of scientific explanation in the philosophical literature: I) the <strong><em>Deductive-nomological</em></strong> and <strong><em>inductive-statistical</em></strong>, II) <strong><em>statistical relevance</em></strong>, III) <strong><em>causal-mechanical </em></strong>and IV) <strong><em>unification </em></strong>models. In the concluding remarks I hypothesize that alone none of these models suffice, and that successful explanations almost always encode a combination of causal-mechanical and unificationist constraints.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ggNmOyKmNosIkWL2C2azwA.png" /><figcaption>Hierarchical edge bundling tree diagram as visual metaphor for the deductive-nomological model of explanation.</figcaption></figure><h3><strong>Deductive-Nomological &amp; Inductive-Statistical Models</strong></h3><p>The most well-known model of scientific explanation, bearing the cumbersome appellation of the Deductive-Nomological Model, was developed during the middle of the 20th century by Karl Hempel &amp; Paul Oppenheim. Both Hempel and Oppenheim hailed from an academic tradition that saw the role of philosophy as consisting chiefly of <em>analysis. </em>Philosophy does not make positive claims about the world, which is the province of science, but can serve instead as its handmaiden by tendering conceptual clarifications and definitions. While today these views are no longer orthodoxy, they exerted an enormous influence in the way philosophy was, and in some ways continues, to be conducted.</p><p>The Deductive Nomological Model, heretofore DN, analyzes scientific explanation into two components: that which is to be explained, termed the <em>explanandum</em>, and that which does the explaining, termed the <em>explanans</em>. Respectively, these are analogues to <em>conclusions</em> and <em>premises </em>in logical arguments.</p><p>DN models explanation on formal proofs or deductive arguments. In a deductive argument, the conclusion is entailed by the premises if and only if the conclusion is valid. However, Hempel and Oppenheim recognized that deduction alone is a stringent criterion for explanation across all the sciences. As such, they adduced a cousin to the DN model, known as the Inductive-Statistical Model, heretofore IS, which models some explanations on inductive reasoning. Induction consists of inferring general patterns from a sample of observations. Unlike deduction, induction does not guarantee the truth of the conclusion. Instead, it provides degrees of evidentiary strength.</p><p>The DN model requires that a proper scientific explanation meet the criteria for a valid deductive inference. Meanwhile, the IS model must meet the criterion of cogency. Cogency applies to strong inductive arguments that provide good evidence for the conclusion.</p><p>DN further requires that the premises, namely the explanandum, contain at least one law of nature as a major premise. Even though an agreed-upon definition of law of nature eludes both science and philosophy, the broad consensus is that they must meet two requirements: they must not be <em>accidental generalizations</em> and they must not admit of <em>exceptions</em>. For example, the theory of Special and General Relativity posit that the luminal limit cannot exceed the velocity of ~ 300 000 km/s. If an observation violates this assumption, then the luminal limit would no longer qualify as a law of nature.</p><p>The last requirement is that the explanans must contain additional premises that in conjunction with the law(s) of nature entail the explanandum or conclusion. To take an example, if we wanted to explain the boiling point of a liquid, we would take the first and second laws of thermodynamics, namely the laws of the conservation of energy and entropy as the relevant laws of nature. Then we would add as premises the vapour pressure of the liquid, the surrounding atmospheric pressure, and the heat of vaporization for that liquid, which is the amount of energy required to transform a liquid into a gas. These laws and quantities should logically imply the explanandum, namely the boiling temperature. Therefore, given certain average environmental conditions, the intrinsic properties of the substance, and the relevant laws of physics, we can deduce the event in need of explanation.</p><p>We can further <em>explain </em>variations of boiling temperatures through either variations of atmospheric conditions or substance types. Despite these variations, we can see that the law that matter expands when heated under constant pressure provides a universal framework for explaining thermodynamic events at certain scales of interaction.</p><p>As we just saw, the intuitive force of the DN model is that a particular event requiring explanation can be subsumed under the truth of antecedent conditions and relevant generalized physical formalisms called laws of physics that play the role of exception-less regularities.</p><p>Nonetheless, as we hinted earlier, problems concerning the meaning of lawfulness in science beset the DN model. What do we make of generalizations that admit exceptions in the special sciences like biology, chemistry, psychology, and economics? By what criterion do we discriminate accidental generalizations from lawful or structural ones?</p><p>Hempel and Oppenheim, in fact, formulated two separate models to accommodate probable events: the <em>Deductive-Statistical </em>&amp; the <em>Inductive-Statistical</em> models.</p><p>To see why they formulated two models, notice that the DN model is deterministic or at least strongly implies a deterministic view of nature. Determinism consists of the claim that the conjunction of all events until a particular point in time and the laws of nature entail one and only one possible future. Stated precisely:</p><p><strong>D:</strong> <em>Given a state description of the universe S0 at time T0 and a state description S1 at time T1 , at a very short time interval after, S0 entails S1</em>.</p><p>The idea that certain phenomena can be deduced from available relevant information a la a deductive argument implies that the truth of the premises or the explanans could not have yielded another explanandum. This deterministic presumption that future events are entailed by prior ones, even given a sufficiently short interval, is highly contentious. At the very least, the probabilistic nature of quantum events frustrates the thesis of determinism.</p><p>The<strong> </strong>Deductive-Statistical model (DS)<strong> </strong>retains the structure of the DN model by adjoining at least one statistical law with relevant premises in order to derive the explanandum. It differs in that DS only permits the deduction of a narrower statistical uniformity from more general statistical laws.</p><p>Take, for example, the Central Limit Theorem (CLM) in statistics. The CLM states that as the sample size of the sample means gets larger, these tend toward a normal probability distribution. If we take CLM as the major premise and take as a minor premise a particular distribution of sample means (note: not random variables), we can deduce that the value of a particular sample mean will fall near the centre of the distribution or the mean of the sampling distribution itself. Basically, all this tells us is that assuming the empirical validity of the central limit theorem, values in a sampling distribution are less likely to be dispersed. While we can deduce the likelihood that a particular value will be less dispersed than a value from a population sample, we cannot know for certain that this will be the case.</p><p>The Inductive-Statistical model (IS)<strong>, </strong>on the other hand, does not mandate an entailment relation between the explanans and the explanandum. Rather, the explanans only provides inductive support for the conclusion. IS explanations, therefore, do not evaluate in terms of the validity of the deductive inference and the truth-value of the premises, which jointly comprise <em>soundness</em>, but in terms of <em>inductive</em> or <em>evidentiary</em> strength. In Hempel’s model, a statistical generalization and a set of empirical facts justify inference to the explanandum with a high degree of probability. For example, if it is overwhelmingly the case that taking Tylenol relieves headaches, and I have a headache and I take Tylenol, these statements explain the fact that my headache was relieved.</p><p>A major problem with the IS model of explanation is that inductive arguments are vulnerable to erosion by additional premises. For example, if it is also a well-supported statistical generalization that Tylenol almost never relieves headaches for people with a certain physiological condition, then this additional statistical law would render the former explanation null. Erosion of inductive strength by additional premises is a structural vulnerability of inductive arguments in general. Conversely, deductive arguments are<em> erosion proof</em><strong><em>,</em></strong> since additional premises cannot weaken an entailment relation between the premises and the conclusion (formally this is known as the <em>monotonicity of entailment</em>). In the case of a contradiction or inconsistency, the conclusion will still be trivially entailed.</p><p>To remedy the conclusion-erosion affordance of IS explanations, Hempel and Oppenheim formulated the <em>requirement of maximal specificity</em> (RMS), which stipulates that all available relevant information<strong> </strong>must be included in the explanans or premises of an IS explanation.</p><p>Despite these caveats, there are problematic examples that provide good reason to believe that DN &amp; IS models fail to meet necessity and sufficiency conditions for scientific explanation. DN &amp; IS fail the sufficiency requirement if we can provide examples that meet the DN &amp; IS criteria but do not in fact suffice to <em>explain </em>the explanandum. Common examples are those that constitute valid deductions but do no explain the conclusion due to <em>explanatory irrelevancies.</em></p><p>Consider the following:</p><p><em>i) All males who take birth control pill regularly fail to get pregnant</em></p><p><em>ii) John Smith is a male who has been taking birth control pill regularly</em></p><p><em>iii) Therefore, John Smith fails to get pregnant</em></p><p>Even though the above meets the DS criteria, it doesn’t explain why John Smith fails to get pregnant.</p><p>On the other hand, DN &amp; IS fail to meet necessary conditions for scientific explanation if, in lieu of meeting their criteria, the explanandum still qualifies as a bonafide explanation. Here’s a crude example: The glass fell from the kitchen counter and shattered because my roommate’s elbow brushed against it unintentionally.</p><p>The DN/IS model proponent can take at least two lines of defense against such ordinary explanations:</p><p>a) they can claim that they do not qualify as scientific or</p><p>b) they can argue that in fact what explains the purported phenomenon is a hidden DN or IS structure, whereby a presupposition of law-like behaviour within such instances obtains that ought to be made explicit a la a covering law. In this case, something like the following is purportedly assumed: <em>Whenever elbows and other limbs interact with sufficient force with discrete glass objects, given surrounding environmental conditions K, they shatter.</em></p><p>While there’s good reason to deny that this qualifies as the kind of scientific law that Hempel envisioned, what defeats these examples is reliance on vague event scopes or event conceptualizations. Newtonian laws along with the general properties of glass and initial conditions, for example, could be arranged in a DN argument to explain the phenomenon in question if we circumscribe the explanandum in more precise terms.</p><p>The upshot of the DN-IS models is that they try to explain or subsume events within <em>nomic</em> (meaning law-like) expectability. However, DN-IS models’ reliance on nomic expectability also belies a glaring exclusion of causality. Recourse to causal sequences, however, lies at the heart of the examples that DN-IS models fail to explanatorily satisfy. Most notably these include explanatory <em>asymmetries</em> and <em>irrelevances</em>. Therefore, even if we grant DN-IS models’ necessity conditions, they remain insufficient as models of scientific explanation because a crucial condition endogenous to the explanatory power of much of science is missing: supplying causal mechanisms as antecedents to effects requiring explanation.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/641/1*w2xY0hNbbpSPhT9nUCpVrQ.png" /><figcaption>Deep learning network edge pruning as a visual metaphor for the statistical relevance model of explanation.</figcaption></figure><h3><strong>Statistical Relevance Model</strong></h3><p>The Statistical Relevance Model of explanation, developed by Wesley Salmon in the early 1970s, seeks to remedy some of the problems we have already pointed out with the DN-IS models of scientific explanation. In particular, as the name suggests, this model attempts to capture explanatory relevance constraints in a way that DN-IS, as we saw, cannot.</p><p>The general idea is that statistically relevant properties are explanatory, whereas statistically irrelevant properties are not. We can express it this way:</p><blockquote>P(B|A.C) ≠ P(B|A)</blockquote><p>The probability of B given some class or population A and subclass C is not equal to the probability of B given A. In other words C is statistically relevant to the explanation of B precisely because it changes the probability of the outcome.</p><p>To make statistical relevance precise, Salmon employed the notion of a homogenous partition. A homogenous partition is the decomposition of class/population A into mutually exclusive and exhaustive classes A.Cᵢ such that:</p><blockquote>P(B|A.Cᵢ) ≠ P(B|A.Cⱼ) for all Cᵢ≠Cⱼ</blockquote><p>where no further relevant partitions can be made of A relative to B. For example if B stood for pregnancy, then Cᵢ and Cⱼ are exhaustive and mutually exclusive population subclasses, let’s say male and female (for the sake of simplicity — gender non-binary classes could also be included). If we further supplement another partition — D to account for taking or not taking the birth control pill, then P(B|A.Cᵢ.D) ≠ P(B|A.Cⱼ), given that Cᵢ = female &amp; Cⱼ= male. In other words, D is explanatorily irrelevant to Cⱼ but explanatory relevant to Cᵢ relative to the probability of pregnancy B.</p><p>A key difference between the Statistical Relevance and the DN-IS accounts of explanation is that the former does not require explanations to be arguments, whereas the latter does. An upshot of the SR account is that irrelevancies are harmless to arguments, due to the monotonicity of entailment, but fatal to explanations.</p><p>Another important difference is that the SR account does not make a high-probability requirement for the explanandum like the IS model, wherein explanatory strength relies on the probabilistic link between the explanans and the explanandum. SR’s eschewal of the high-probability requirement makes it sufficiently flexible to account for quantum mechanical phenomena like radioactive decay and electron positions, which are intrinsically indeterministic. For example, the probability that an electron from my coffee cup is located on the moon is very low but not zero. The SR account can explain this possibility through a homogenous partition of relevant classes.</p><p>A weakness of the SR model is its presumption that the notion of statistical relevance adequately captures causal relationships. Further analysis shows that statistical relevance cannot discriminate, for example, between causal relationships where A jointly causes B and C and where A causes B, which causes C.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/1*aTGL4KYtrzzcvamhvLQlag.png" /><figcaption>Assortative and disassortative network by Sidney Redner as a visual metaphor for causal mechanical models of explanation.</figcaption></figure><h3><strong>Causal-Mechanical Model</strong></h3><p>As we noted earlier, the SR model of scientific explanation fails to capture those relationships paradigmatically associated with satisfactory <em>explanans </em>( explanation conferring <em>relations</em>), namely causal ones.</p><p>Salmon himself abandoned the SR model precisely due to this limitation, and developed an alternative that sought to remedy its shortcomings called the Causal Mechanical (CM) model.</p><p>The CM model and subsequent <em>process</em> theories of causation that are more sophisticated versions of the former aim to theorize scientific explanation around the notion of a causal mechanism. In some ways we all have a working understanding of the notion of <em>cause</em>, and plausibly this understanding is rooted in some <em>cognitive modelling</em> of the constraints that everyday objects of experience obey. A glass falls on the floor and shatters. A aircraft jets through the sky sufficiently low and we hear it breaking the sound barrier. When we press the power button, our laptop turns on and we resume our interaction with its graphic interface. Underlying all of these events lies a presumption of causal relationships. The jet has an engine that produces enough energy to propel it at high altitudes against the gravitational pull of the earth. The laptop has a battery and integrated circuitry programmed to convert our mechanical action of pressing into a sequence of steps that propel an electric current through the circuitry. All of these descriptions require <em>theoretical knowledge</em> that transcends mere experience. But in a very important way, they are consistent with a more basic notion of <em>cause</em> rooted in everyday experience absent any theoretical knowledge.</p><p>The CM model models scientific explanation precisely on the type of causal relationships we just described. While our ordinary notion of cause may be rooted in experience, the scientific notion of cause fits these observed regularities within a theoretical framework that refines and formalizes rule-based mechanisms that underlie observed events. Even so, it isn’t prima facie clear what a cause <em>consists in</em> at all, whether in the colloquial sense or in the more rigorous scientific sense when we posit forces and conserved properties like gravity, masses, momenta, velocities etc. The CM model then attempts to do just this: formalize the notion of a cause. It does so by distinguishing between <em>causal processes</em> and <em>causal interactions</em>. It defines a <em>causal process</em> as a process that transmits a <em>mark</em> in a spatiotemporally continuous way. A mark consists in a <em>local modification</em> to the structure of that process. For example, a a dent in the surface of a jet flying through the sky will be transmitted spatiotemporally because the movement of a jet constitutes a causal process. A <em>causal interaction</em>, meanwhile, consists of a spatiotemporal <em>intersection </em>of two causal processes that modifies the structure of both. If two jets collide, then each jet will come to have features that it would not in the absence of that interaction. Both the notion of a causal process and interaction, in this early formulation, rely on the notion of a <em>counterfactual</em>: both causal processes and interactions count as such in the absence of marks and interactions just in case that if either occurred, it nonetheless would induce the effects described.</p><p>Whether the distinction between causal processes and interactions can be generalized to more complex events at different scales, velocities, and energetic configurations, which are more germane to the processes that the sciences aim to explain, is not altogether clear. Notwithstanding the cogency of this distinction, the intuitive picture of this model of explanation is clear: we explain an <em>effect</em> (i.e. an explanandum) by recourse to the causal processes and interactions that produced it. In other words, we etiologically fit the <em>explanandum</em> into a causal nexus, which constitutes the <em>explanans</em>. Whether we’ve adequately characterized the <em>causal nexus </em>via the above distinctions is a matter for further debate.</p><p>A problem that beleaguered Hempel’s DN-S models, however, also crops up in the CM model: that of <em>explanatory relevance</em>. What property of the CM model allow it to discriminate causal features that are explanatorily relevant as opposed to ones that aren’t? In the case of Hume’s famous example of two billiard balls colliding, the CM model does not appear to be able to pick out masses and momenta as the explanatorily relevant features for the effect, namely the outcome of the collision. While mark transmission may be able to discriminate between genuine causal interactions from pseudo-causal ones, it does not appear to succeed in isolating explanatorily relevant properties. However, the problem of explanatory relevance does not seem to me to be fatal precisely because it can be epistemically finessed. Explanation always occurs against a background of assumptions both with respect to explicit theory and an agent’s broader cognitive context. As such, irrelevances are sorted out at the stage of individuating the relevant scale and complexity of events.</p><p>The CM model runs into deeper problems, however, when it comes to statistical descriptions and complex systems. At scales where it is impossible to describe the system in terms of individual particles or constituents, statistical descriptions and aggregate measures substitute description at the resolution of causal interaction. The thermodynamic properties of isolated systems are described in just such a way through statistical mechanics, which takes the average distribution of masses and velocities to describe the evolution of the system in time. The crux of the problem is captured by the discrepancy between aggregate effects of molecular motion that statistical mechanics aims to describe and the additive effects of each of the individual molecules. There is no way to arrive at the aggregate description by tracing the individual causal interactions. Aggregate effects can only be achieved by abstracting irrelevant particulars in favour of a macroscopic description.</p><p>The problem that statistical mechanics poses can then be generalized to further complex systems like ecologies, populations and economies. Explanation at the scale of biological as well as social phenomena do not appear to be prima facie explainable by recourse to strictly causal-mechanical processes. In what way, for example, is spatio-temporal continuity relevant to explain phenomena like money, inflation, recession, consumer confidence, group and population dynamics etc? In general, statistical descriptions are not causal but predicated on patterns. In the case of the phenomena in question like inflation and group dynamics, these are reliant on a complex hierarchy of patterns with varying degrees of interdependence. Ontologically, the assumption is that statistical descriptions are physically reducible to more fundamental causal interactions. Explanatorily, however, we cannot get the statistical description from the lower-level, say, causal description (though bear in mind that causality as mark transmission is problematic at subatomic scales). Furthermore, the possibility that novel causal powers emerge at different organizational scales ought to be given serious consideration. The invocation of causes <em>qua</em> causes as explanatory occurs at different levels of description. These considerations pose problems for versions of the CM model of explanation.</p><p>A more robust version of CM is the <em>conserved process</em> theory of causation, which identifies causation with the conservation of certain quantities like linear momentum and charge. Like its counterpart, this version of CM seeks to codify a cause at the level of physical interaction but without appeal to counterfactuals (hypothetical statements). The problem of explanatory relevance also beleaguers this attempt, since conservation laws are not explanatorily relevant to a great deal of higher-level phenomena. But, as already noted, relevance is an epistemic notion closely related to the economy of description. In a global sense causal-mechanical interactions are relevant to all phenomena, but are held <em>ceteris paribus</em> or constant when it comes to explanation.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/546/1*46co-vlRspvcPUliBeAtdw.png" /><figcaption>Complete Graph by Prateek Goohra as a visual metaphor for unification.</figcaption></figure><h3><strong>Unificationist Model</strong></h3><p>The unificationist idea posits that explanatory success consists of a body of theory that unifies different ranges phenomena within the same explanatory framework. Unificationism might be more than just an intuitive standard for scientific explanation and the ambitions of science. The history of physics exhibits no dearth of examples where a new theory unifies phenomena previously thought to be distinct or incommensurable with each other.</p><p>This was the case with Newtonian mechanics, where two centuries of insights slowly chipping away at the ancient understanding of physics culminated with a new theory of motion that unified the celestial and terrestrial realms. Today, we take this achievement entirely for granted, but it was far from obvious to the ancients and even natural philosophers in Newton’s day. Aristotle, for example, believed that the cleavage of the celestial and terrestrial realms consisted of the interaction of pure, perfect and immutable substance composed of an element called the <em>aether</em> and imperfect and corruptible sublunar substance, composed of the four classical elements: earth, fire, air, and water. In the Aristotelian system, substance comprises the composite of unorganized or undifferentiated <em>matter</em> and its intrinsic organization, also called its <em>form</em>. Therefore, despite predicating <em>substantiality </em>to both the heavens and the earth, Aristotle believed that they obeyed different rules or laws of nature.</p><p>If we want to build a model of scientific explanation that takes unification as its core parameter, then we must formalize the notion of unification in order to distinguish genuinely explanatory forms of unification from non-explanation-conferring ones. For example, the notion of unification can be invoked in general classificatory schemas for natural kinds in biology, or mathematical formalisms whose applications range over a diverse set of problems like the Hamiltonian or Lagrangian that have applications in classical as well as quantum mechanics. Neither of these notions of unification fit the adequacy bill for scientific unification. The only explanation-conferring sense of unification appears to be the unification of disparate phenomena under some common mechanism as with Newton’s laws of motion or Maxwell’s laws of electromagnetism. Unlike purely mathematical unifications, mathematical formalisms of the latter type of unification describe some underlying physical mechanism. Just how we can distinguish generally applicable mathematical formalisms from formalisms that genuinely describe physical reality is a problem for the unificationist account.</p><p>Philip Kitcher attempted to formalize explanatory unification through the notion of an explanatory store E(K), where K stands for the set of beliefs accepted by science at a particular time and E the set of argument patterns that maximally unify K. Essentially, Kitcher’s account defines unification as the ability to derive as many descriptions of varied phenomena as possible from as few as possible restrictive argument patterns. To give an example, the generalization (A) that the speed of light is constant across all frames of reference is superior to the generalization (B) that the speed of light is constant across all frames of reference on earth. (A) permits more derivations than (B), and the inclusion of (B) complexifies the argument pattern without expanding the space of permissible derivations. An explanatory store along the lines of (A) should comprise as few argument patterns as possible while permitting the largest possible set of derivations to be maximally unified. Thus, unification is a standard that aims to derive as many explanations as possible from as few argument patterns as possible.</p><p>Kitcher’s account in many ways resuscitates the D-N model by theorizing unification as essentially deductive while avoiding the covering-law requirement. Furthermore, it collapses causation into unification by positing the latter as more basic than the former. Cause and effect therefore acquire intelligibility within the unification of phenomena under parsimonious generalizations. The question of the priority of explanation over causation and vice versa lies at the heart of the puzzle of scientific explanation. In some deep way, causation appears parasitic on unification because it presupposes the possibility of interaction and thereby some common set of principles that guide that interaction. On the other hand, explanatory unification appears to be parasitic on causation because unification cannot account for the causal asymmetry i.e. causes preceding effects — the essence of causation.</p><p>In fact, unification does not seem equipped to distinguish between predictive from retrodictive derivations. When we derive a future state from initial conditions and relevant physical laws we call it predictive, whereas when we derive the present state from future states and relevant laws we call it retrodictive. Retrodictive derivations are especially plausible with time-symmetric theories like Newtonian or quantum mechanics. The unificationist account cannot in principle distinguish between predictive and retrodictive explanations, even though only the latter canonically count as explanatory. We don’t explain the present with respect to the future, but with respect to the past. Staunch unificationists deny the fundamentality of the causal asymmetry since it is not a feature of the laws of physics as presently understood. Failing that, it appears dubious that unificationism can account for the causal asymmetry without axiomatically presupposing causality.</p><p>Another issue associated with the unificationist account of explanation concerns whether explanatoriness is fundamentally a matter of degree or all-or-nothing. If explanatory unification is a matter of degree, then it might prove too weak as an account of scientific explanation. On the other hand, if explanatory unification accrues only to the winner, then it is highly exclusionary. In the former account, all kinds of generalizations may be admitted as explanatory, like the gods of Homer. In the latter, theories like Newtonian mechanics will be deemed as lacking any explanatory power. Clearly, neither option on its own is desirable nor adequate to the use-cases that we want our account of explanation to satisfy. A desirable account should accommodate a continuum threshold: namely, rule out non-explanatory generalizations altogether, but admit of degrees of explanatoriness for theories that meet the threshold such that, for example, Newtonian mechanics is less explanatory than General Relativity. The unificationist account appears unable to accommodate both criteria.</p><p>Since unification seems to require the systematicity of knowledge, the question arises whether this systematization is carried out at the individual or collective level. Further analysis reveals that neither the community nor individuals possess fully systematized beliefs. Most individuals do not go about consciously ensuring that their beliefs are unified such that they’re deducible from the most parsimonious generalizations. On the other hand, if systematic knowledge is distributed across collectives, it remains unclear just how unified this knowledge is given that individual actors must contribute to the justification of its parts. While the epistemology of unification presents challenges for a robust theory of explanatory unification, such a robust theory presupposes something like ideal explanatory texts. Some form of less than ideal unification seems to be carried out socially, whereby communities of actors contribute rationally to different areas of knowledge and at the very least communicate to ensure their mutual consistency.</p><p>Another question worth probing is why unification appears to be a desirable standard at all, assuming that we can formalize it as a robust one. A crucial presupposition of the appeal of unification appears to be the presumption of the unity of nature: namely that for unification to be possible at all at the theoretical level, nature itself must (in some way be already unified) be governed by universal laws. However, framing it this way begs the question about universal laws: how can we know that nature is governed by universal laws rather than the laws being humanly constructed generalizations that encode empirical regularities. This question crystallizes into the debate between necessitarians and Humeans regarding the laws of nature, with the former deeming the laws of nature as necessary rules that govern causal interactions and the latter as mere regularities whose putative necessity is not epistemically accessible. Whichever side of the argument we take, the lawfulness of nature can to some extent be inferred from the success of our models, although their ultimate universality remains underdetermined. For example, exception-less regularities like the luminal speed limit is subject to the test of further evidence and the possibility is left open that it could be falsified. Plausible explanations for our bias for the universality of the natural laws could be cultural or rooted in evolved pattern recognition mechanisms. We should then be able to entertain the possibility that the expectation that the universe is governed by universal laws (or that these laws are formalizable by humans) may be erroneous. However, except for certain anomalous regions like black hole singularities and the big bang, it seems that in large part the universe submits to generalizable constraints. This gives credence to scientific realism, that is to say, to the view that our descriptions correspond to a mind-independent reality that behaves according to regularities and we have evolved tools to represent those regularities.</p><p>Our present inability to integrate gravity with the Standard Model, which describes all the known elementary particles and their interactions via the other three fundamental forces in a single mathematical framework may suggest that unification is either a misguided ideal or not possible. Perhaps there are no possible formalisms that can unify subatomic and macroscopic scales in a single descriptive framework simply because they are too disparate (we could also entertain genuine physical emergence, albeit a fringe view). Or it could be that there are missing ingredients in our account of quantum mechanics that prevents us from deriving gravitational interactions from it. At the same time it could also very well be that we will be able to achieve the unification of these two frameworks yet not make progress in our understanding of gravitational singularities or dark matter and energy.</p><p>A final question is whether the laws of nature are mutable or immutable. The presumption, again, is that physical science lifts invariances that are exception-less not only across space, but also across time. Multiverse proponents argue that different inflationary evolutions of the early universe would have instantiated different vacuum energy densities. And further that our particular configuration with low vacuum energy is statistically less likely than universes that have higher energy densities. A related question in physical science is what explains the physical constants like the intrinsic weights of elementary particles and whether there are stable configurations with variations thereof.</p><p>If we try to imagine laws of physics that mutate over time and under certain conditions, the human intellect cannot conceive that some variables, some substrate is not held constant against this variation. Therefore, it is rationally inconceivable that the laws could vary without anything being conserved or held ceteris paribus. Perhaps this is why the conservation laws are the most universal in physics — they capture the broadest possible invariances necessary for change to take place at all.</p><h3>Explanatory Variety &amp; Concluding Remarks</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*55jufYdqyJSo6fsv4SFV_Q.png" /></figure><p>Like truth, explanatory sufficiency splinters along several dimensions that together exert mutual constraint on successful models. Truth cannot be exclusively correspondence or coherence, but rather an interplay of correspondence and coherence, much like electromagnetic waves radiate as oscillations in electric and magnetic fields, mutually regenerating each other.</p><p>Perhaps the failure of these models suggests that a unified model of scientific explanation may be the wrong approach to begin with, and that perhaps we ought to cede to a multiplicity of valid explanatory models.</p><p>Another alternative is that explanatory completeness is elusive precisely because science as a project is incomplete. Further, the possibility that science may in principle always remain incomplete has not been ruled out. If this is the case, the hope of developing a unified model of scientific explanation may also be inherently misguided.</p><p>However, even if we give credence to arguments for explanatory indeterminacy, we still ought to explore whether our intuitions about explanatory adequacy are rationally supported.</p><p>Both the Causal-Mechanical (CM) and Unificationist (U) models of scientific explanation, despite their individual shortcomings, are rooted in deep intuitions about explanatory adequacy and the motivations of science. Unificationism seeks to uncover universal laws, whereas the causal-mechanical model proceeds from the presumption of the discoverability of the mechanisms or constraints that govern phenomena. The former is top-down, while the latter bottom-up, and together may be thought of as analogues to top-down and bottom-up information processing, whose mutual constraints enable cognitive agents to navigate their environment. In some analogous sense then, scientific explanation perhaps ought to embody both the holistic constraints of unification and local mechanical constraints— which are, for better or worse, built on experiential intuitions.</p><p>In spite of all this, there’s a sense that ultimate explanations may forever remain elusive precisely because the explanatory buck can be pushed back indefinitely leading to an infinite regress. While the physical constants appear in some respects brute, the intellect entertains the possibility that their present fixed values may be so in virtue of something else — e.g. because of some symmetry-breaking event in the early universe. Whatever that <em>something else</em> turns out to be, it will serve as the explanans to these constants. If we were to somehow succeed in constructing a plausible account of how the constants came to have the values they have assuming variation is possible, it would not terminate the explanatory buck but push it back further since we would then have to also account for the causes of the constants. It seems to me that this kind of infinite regress could only be avoided with an overarching unified theory that is invariant across multiverses and all the possible variations of the constants, again assuming variation is possible.</p><p>Finally, there’s a tendency to mistake mathematical formalisms for reality. Formalisms are mere descriptions of phenomena, and in this respect, even if they affix concrete mind-independent referents, they always abstract a model of some mind-independent or mind-dependent phenomenon. The descriptive status of models is an open question, even though in some respects models must map the territory to yield reliable predictive success. A weakness of mathematical formalisms as models is that they can be made to fit the data in an ad-hoc way as is the case with the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cosmological_constant_problem">cosmological constant problem</a>. As a result, predictive success, given any ad-hoc features, becomes estranged from its designative pretentions. As such, while formalisms track system variables with high accuracy, the ultimate nature of what they track may remain ultimately unknowable or epistemologically inaccessible. The concrete possibility must be entertained then that mathematical formalisms function primarily instrumentally, and cannot, in some cases even in principle, supply ultimate descriptions.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=43c9a1b9f776" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Why Public Libraries Matter: In Defence of Public Reference]]></title>
            <link>https://angjelinhila.medium.com/the-history-behind-public-libraries-595d80fd4364?source=rss-cb73222d75bc------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/595d80fd4364</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[books]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[law]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[history]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[technology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[libraries]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Angjelin Hila]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 31 May 2022 17:04:05 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-02-22T16:12:32.250Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4><em>Do public libraries need reference collections to fulfill their public service mandate? A veiled polemic against the erosion of public reference collections.</em></h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/750/1*VoCgwG9AjHyS8Hs3lBGOmA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Depiction of the Library of Babel by Borges. Used on fair dealing permission from <a href="https://www.warnockfinearts.com/erik-desmazires-library-of-babel">Warnock Fine Arts</a>.</figcaption></figure><p>In our familiar quotidian moorings, the extraordinary lies underneath the prosaic. Upon losing their novelty, extraordinary innovations and heights of human achievement fall into the background, so to speak. All becomes furniture in the house of civilization. It takes a shift of perspective, a removal from our immersion in everyday, ordinary tasks to recover a sense of astonishment at that which surrounds us.</p><p>The computer, a machine that performs logical computations through variable electrical signals, inhabits that background. Removed from our human concerns, the average computer processor houses over a billion transistors, a fact that impinges upon our senses only as the faint purr of the nearby CPU. Tens of billions of such devices thread a vast communication tapestry of routers, modems, switches, cables and bisecting radio waves that power the world economy and increasingly civilization at large. This dependence on information technologies is a recent phenomenon and apparent anytime servers or the power grid fail.</p><p>But this chain of dependence constitutes merely the tip in the vast iceberg of cultural infrastructure that extends into far hazier and less apparent depths. Albeit less obvious, a great deal of cross-generational cultural transmission still depends on printed books. The book, known in ancient times as the codex, was a competitor to the scroll. Eventually the codex won over the scroll because it was more scalable, versatile, and accessible. It is difficult to estimate the effect of codices on the flowering of human reason. For now and into the foreseeable future, books will remain the gold standard of information storage and transmission. Why? Because issues of digital migration, software readability and obsolescence afflict the preservation of digital records. In worst-case scenarios of digital information loss, however unlikely, print collections will step up to the plate to serve as cultural backup.</p><p>Just as scrolls competed with codices, digital storage and organization now competes with the book. Yet we replicate the structure of the book in digital space. However, in digital space the serial organization of the book is subverted by the screen and the diversity of information types and applications. The digital is indefinitely mutable to exploit our worst cognitive biases. The serial processing that books demand, on the other hand, calls for discipline and a narrower type of concentration. It is, in many ways and as yet, the house of reason.</p><p>The growing dominance of digital culture has seen a gradual expansion of libraries as spaces of digital access rather than collections of books. But should we hasten to call one paradigm a winner over the other? Or can both paradigms coexist while fulfilling separate needs? Below I will argue the latter.</p><h3>What are Libraries?</h3><p>Across cultures, humans have collected objects of interest for a long time. In some sense, the essence of the library lies with this propensity to collect, to gather together. For much of history, collections like cabinets of curiosities were private. Primarily wealthy classes regaled their friends and acquaintances with them. Systematic collections of written records have, however, existed at least since antiquity. Esteemed sites like the library of Alexandria housed organized collections of scrolls and codices. Like many of our institutions, what begot the library was the ideal of gathering all extant knowledge in a universal collection. But the libraries of antiquity were not spaces of universal access. They served, primarily, the state structure or the King, and their stewards were scholars and scribes, an exclusive class of literati. Literacy remained confined to higher social castes until at least the advent of print culture, but did not truly become democratized until the wide institution of public schools.</p><p>Just as mass literacy, then, is a recent phenomenon, so is universal access. Universal access is intimately tied with the history of public institutions. Etymologically, the word ‘public’ derives from the Latin ‘publicus’ meaning ‘of the people’ or ‘held in common’. In ancient Republican Rome, the state was conceived as ‘res publica’, meaning ‘public affair’ or ‘commonwealth’. From this conception of the state emanated public spaces like the Roman Forum, where public matters like elections and trials took place. The public then is a conception of the collective solving problems that serve that collective. While common goods were restricted in antiquity to birthright and often male citizenry, the latent aspiration to universality came piecemeal to its fruition sometime between the Enlightenment and the second half of the twentieth century.</p><p>Universal access and systematicity, the organization of the collection for retrieval, are hallmarks of public libraries. In our complex and interconnected information society, public libraries occupy a significant node in the maintenance of our growing collective memory defining the horizon of our future. The library, more firmly rooted in the present; the archive, more so in the past; together connecting the vital threads that propel our culture toward innovation and problem-solving.</p><p>Until very recently, the codex stood at the helm of print culture, the only available system of cultural transmission besides orality. Information was primarily stored in books, systematic collections of which were distributed in a vast network of educational and public institutions — beside private hands. The advent of the computer in the mid-twentieth century drastically changed this reality. Now print culture sits together with digital culture, to some a contest that’s all but lost. Digital culture pervades every aspect of our lives, from social interactions with friends and family, to shopping and dating. Has digital culture supplanted the necessity of in-person interaction? It has not. But it has expanded our possibilities and shrunk geographic borders to allow us to connect with one another remotely. It has, as well, transplanted the library, in part at least, into the comfort of our own homes. Despite all this, it has not replaced the need and requirement for in-person interaction. As long as we remain human this, I suspect, will remain so. The posthuman possibility is another matter. So too, then does print culture face obsolescence in light of our growing digital culture?</p><p>It does not. At least not yet. The computer screen overwhelms our ability to process and sift through intolerable amounts of information. The good blends with the bad, the reliable with the unreliable. Our information discovery paths become nonlinear. Certainly, in some manner, this was always the case. Books refer to each other indefinitely through indices, bibliographies, direct references, allusions, summaries. In digital space, the nonlinear becomes exacerbated. This is both good and bad: we get what we need faster, but at the same time we can easily lose our way. Our focused attention, a resource scarcer than oil, becomes exhausted. The calculus test requires deep concentration. So does understanding the law, physics, biology, business administration, leisurely reading. Learning demands comfort and seclusion from other information.</p><p>It still finds that comfort, even now, in the codex. In the analog feel of the book in our hands, the flexibility of posture it permits, the break it gives from the screen, the relief from information overload to our senses and minds. Difficult information requires serial or linear processing to be understood. Too many distractions and it’s a lost cause.</p><p>It is no surprise then, that in recent years the publishing market has seen a stabilization of the digital to print ratio in overwhelming favour of print. Physical books, both in Canada and the US, outsell ebooks roughly four to one (Statista, 2022). And, unlike what some had thought, these are not entirely caught in a zero-sum game. Buying an ebook might mean that you’ll forego buying the physical book and vice versa. But it turns out that what we buy as ebooks and consume digitally differ qualitatively from what we choose to consume in analog fashion. The library teems with eager students everyday. The collections worn just as much from frequent use as neglect from staffing shortages. And yet, the collections thrive just as much from the dedication of the extant staff as the eyes of curious readers that peruse them at every corner of the library. It is one thing to sit at home in front of a computer screen or tablet, and another to step into a public forum of the exuberance of the Toronto Reference Library.</p><p>To collect means to gather together. The collection sits in a building, and the building shelters the collection. Each book a world. So the collection is a world of worlds. A universe. A universe that focalizes the individual paths of myriad strangers every day. It is, alas, increasingly also a place of spectacle. The pulse of our metropolitan city throbs most distinctly here. The aspirations of newcomers and locals, the wonder of visitors, the restlessness of the homeless, all converge here before sundering again into separates paths across the expanse of the city. In public fora, therefore, we gather together as collectives, even as we pursue our individual goals. The physical collections bind this gathering, while also backing up the fragility of servers and networks that heave the digital sphere. Digital and print, unbeknownst to many, link in mutual dependence. This gathering together replenishes our humanity because our private strivings reveal to be also the strivings of others. This, then, is the library, of which there is no substitute. Even though our methods of assembly are more fractured than ever, mere physical assembly in the vale of the commons insinuates our unity.</p><h3>Public Mandates</h3><p><em>“Good books depend on enlightenment in all classes of the people; they adorn the truth. They enlighten the government about its duties, its shortcomings, its true interest, and the public opinion to which it must listen and conform: these good books are patient masters that wait for the state administrators to awaken and for their passions to subside”</em> — Louis Sébastien Mercier</p><p>The legitimacy of our institutions depends on a rational justification of the powers they wield. This is a far from obvious position to hold. It took centuries for it to find robust intellectual articulation and far longer practical institution. In our modern context, all public institutions are founded on some conception of <em>natural law</em>, wherein the authority of the source of law is not vested in a person, arbitrary body or divine right, but <em>reason</em> alone. Hugo Grotius, one of the early articulators of this conception of natural law, thought that laws founded on reason were binding “etsi Deus non daretur” [even if God did not exist], thereby stripping legal authority from any vestige of arbitrariness.</p><p>In part, this conception of natural law underpins social contract theories of government, wherein governmental power embodies collective interests. This constraint on formal power on behalf of the body politic is encoded in the Canadian Constitution, the supreme law of the land. All public institutions, often through complex chains of legal delegation and elaboration, derive their authority and legitimacy from it.</p><p>This source of accountability, namely the fetter of public interest, also confers on public institutions a degree of autonomy and independence. This is most obvious in the separation of powers between the executive, legislative, and judiciary branches of government. Each operates according to powers delegated from the constitution, but in so doing, their accountability explicitly rests on the internal rules and norms invested in them by their function. The interests of external bodies, whether governmental or private, in principle, hold no sway.</p><p>Such is also the case with municipal institutions like the Toronto Public Library. The institution is autonomous within the legal limits circumscribed by the board. The Toronto Public Library is founded by the board, and the power of the board is instituted in the Public Libraries Act. The Public Libraries Act obliges the board “to provide … a comprehensive and efficient public library service that reflects the community’s unique needs” (R.S.O. 1990, c. P.44). While this requirement is sufficiently general, what binds public libraries to the interests of the public is a responsibility to represent those interests fairly. This requires earnest and impartial research into the diverse information needs of our diverse city. Therefore, the library and its board are not free to forfeit their fetter of accountability to the denizens they represent. It is their interests that the library is mandated to mirror.</p><p>Public mandates, therefore, are not available to be outsourced to external institutions or corporations. If we cede our mandates to these external bodies, we will also have unwittingly ceded our institutional independence and responsibility to the public. Doing so would also constitute a loss of legitimacy. Public mandates, as argued above, are chained to their legal bases and the responsibility entailed therein to administer the public good. This means that both management and staff, while internally separated for functional reasons, should cooperate to articulate and administer our mandates to the outward-facing public. This also means deferring to the internal professional body of talent as best disposed for formulating and articulating our evolving responsibility to the public. While as an independent institution we are free to seek the best counsel and consultation available as to how to administer our mandate, that counsel should necessarily and transparently be countenanced against the stalwart principles that already inform our institution as stewarded by its staff.</p><h3>An Exhortation</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*wOeV8pyn6l6erItGSmL6Ww.jpeg" /><figcaption>The Toronto Reference Library (1979). Public domain image from <a href="https://digitalarchiveontario.ca/objects/234153/by-the-book?ctx=87847c9ce057fcc50856067bdc489eea498a59ac&amp;idx=46">Digital Archive Ontario</a>.</figcaption></figure><p>In a time when the corporate sphere has all but hollowed out the public one, it is not now the time to capitulate what is left of the commons to the former. Print culture and public fora, as argued above, collude to create a unique nexus where the scarce attentional resources of human consciousness fulfill some of their highest potential. Since print culture is far from dead, let’s not then throw the baby out with the bathwater by reducing and downgrading our reference collections.</p><p>Public reference collections are an indispensable public good that meet the complex needs of our metropolitan city. Demand for the technical expertise that powers our society will continue to expand, and print public reference collections form a pivotal point of access in democratizing and supplying that technical wherewithal to all strata of society, but in particular those less privileged. With a high stream of newcomers and locals seeking to improve their education levels and standing in society, for many our reference collections form the only point of contact with academic research and higher learning. Students of all ages, as well as professionals and retirees with no access to higher educational institutions utilize our collections to update their knowledge, find current information, enrich their professions, transition to new ones, fulfill their curiosity for knowledge, become better citizens, and seek respite from the incessant bustle of city life.</p><p>Instead of splurging public coffer on glossy facades of innovation — innovation is indeed something worth striving for, while paying lip-service to it not — it should comport itself seriously. The professional class that oversee its daily operations should be empowered instead of instrumentalized as collateral to service the image that managers feel is befitting our public to behold. The managerial body needs to carve wiggle room for the individuality of its workforce to shine through in the services we provide across all professional tiers. Doing so does not have to compromise professionalism, legal compliance or the standards of conduct befitting the institution.</p><p>The global Covid-19 pandemic saw concentration of power and decision-making in the hands of a handful of people in the organization, while keeping the workforce hostage to their poor decisions. Instead of rising to the occasion and mobilizing the workforce to continue our services during the pandemic by maximizing participation, we saw them discourage it and inefficiently use the workforce to project a veneer of public service, as their talents languished and professional esteem eroded. While public institutions are uniquely disposed to moral hazard due to poor internal incentives, the internal culture of the Toronto Public Library actively disincentivizes its staff to contribute to the organization. On the contrary, the internal culture rewards apathy, docility, and complaisance. It is no wonder then that low morale pervades its workforce.</p><p>In his <em>Political Order and Political Decay</em>, quoting from the 2003 “United States National Commission on the Public Service”, political scientist Francis Fukuyama states:</p><blockquote>Those who enter the civil service often find themselves trapped in a maze of rules and regulations that thwart their personal development and stifle their creativity. The best are underpaid, the worst, overpaid. (Fukuyama, 461)</blockquote><p>Further:</p><blockquote>Surveys of the federal workforce paint a depressing picture. According to Light, “Federal employees appear to be more motivated by compensation than mission, ensnared by the lack of resources to do their jobs, dissatisfied with the rewards for a job well done and the lack of consequences for a job poorly done, and unwilling to trust their own organizations.” (Fukuyama, 461)</blockquote><p>There are strong parallels between these characterizations of the civil service in the United States and what I observe in my own organization. Lest these quotes are misunderstood as being against civil service and bureaucracy, I acknowledge that some moral hazard is inevitable in all public institutions that is a byproduct of their stability and systems of seniority they rely on, but a better allocation of incentives would do wonders for the internal vitality of the organization i.e. rewarding competence, providing clear pathways for development for those with drive and creativity, and finally eliminating the nepotism that is rampant across the Toronto Public Library. Good, hard-working, intelligent and principled people begin to lose confidence in themselves when they see that there’s no correlation between those traits and professional advancement.</p><p>Like the early 19th century, we are in the midst of a large-scale socio-historical shift whose ripples are universally felt but whose overall pattern eludes any one’s understanding. We would be remiss to act hastily with foggy sights on the shape of the future by downsizing our collections. I exhort you, therefore, to act cautiously and implement changes gradually until the fog that shrouds these evolving cultural threads dissipates and more clear sights allow for decisions on the future of public libraries to stand on firmer ground.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/875/1*SE_grPJwEUEPV9ICZUko-A.jpeg" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=595d80fd4364" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Cooperative and Competitive Games: The Limits of Game Theory & Evolutionary Biology in Modeling…]]></title>
            <link>https://angjelinhila.medium.com/cooperative-and-competitive-games-2d23885680a9?source=rss-cb73222d75bc------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2d23885680a9</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[evolution]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[game-theory]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[science]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[biology]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Angjelin Hila]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 16 Nov 2021 16:34:05 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-09-12T16:55:49.522Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Cooperative and Competitive Games: The Limits of Game Theory &amp; Evolutionary Biology in Modeling Social Systems</h3><p><em>How do cooperative and competitive behaviours arise in nature? Are they in tension and will human systems evolve more toward one than the other?</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/724/0*WE7VRp0giZUXU6KK.png" /><figcaption>Types of Social and Network Organizations</figcaption></figure><p>Cooperation and competition are behaviours that emerge, as far as we can tell, only in living systems. The question we have to ask ourselves then is, why do living systems in contrast with other physical systems exhibit these behaviours?</p><p>An obvious answer is that living systems, unlike other physical systems, are normatively coupled with their environments. This means that they display an internal preference for certain outcomes over others. What outcomes precisely? Simply put, survival enhancing ones: procurement of nutrients, avoidance of predators, and reproductive success. But clearly these do not exhaust the observed behavioural preferences across species. Sometimes individuals or groups behave in ways that appear to contradict their reproductive imperative. Are these instances explainable by virtue of the same mechanisms or do additional explanatory factors also play a role? When it comes to humans in particular, the behavioural landscape becomes tremendously complex. Do the conditions that yield competitive or cooperative outcomes in other species also equally explain human cooperative and competitive schemes or should we seek recourse to additional factors to explain the degrees of cooperation and competition present in human collectives?</p><p>The best explanation that we have for this preferential constitution of living organisms is the process of evolution by natural selection. Since the traits of organisms are functionally equivalent to their survival toolkits, they can be described in terms of their <em>fitness</em>. Functionally speaking, fitness is an individual’s probability of reproductive success. Fitness, therefore, is a function from an individual and its environment to its reproductive outcome. As such, fitness implies that living organisms contend with their environments. And since the environment consists not only of physical but also population characteristics, the behavioural landscape bifurcates across a spectrum of cooperation and competition.</p><p>Natural selection alone, however, does not quite get us out of the explanatory quagmire. How are we to conceptualize the <em>units</em> of cooperation and competition to begin with? In some sense, nature has done the work for us since most individual organisms are organized as <em>discrete </em>functional wholes. Since most multicellular organisms consist of smaller subsystems of cells, we can infer that multicellular organisms function, for the most part, as cooperative units. This is not to imply that elements of competition are entirely absent within organisms. Rather, the haploidy nature of the somatic line precludes any strong motivation for defection due to genetic similarity.</p><p>This, however, does not explain how multicellular organisms evolved to begin with. No consensus prevails over what caused multicellularity, though some suggest the possibility of multiple independent origins across clades (Niklas &amp; Newman 2020). Inter-organismically, meanwhile, cooperation appears to increase proportionally to genetic-relatedness and vice versa apart from reciprocally altruistic acts that operate less strictly on genetic relatedness and more strongly on acts of reciprocity. However, the kin-selection hypothesis may not suffice to explain observed group behaviours that appear inconsistent with exclusively gene-centric explanations. Furthermore, do evolutionary favourable conditions for cooperation exhaustively explain human sociality? Or have humans evolved cooperative mechanisms that transcend mere kin-selective and reciprocally altruistic schemes?</p><p>Since cooperation is the relatively rarer phenomenon, and competition much more so the rule, we will delve into conditions that yield cooperative outcomes and attempt to scaffold our explanations to human collectives. We will begin with evolutionary underpinnings, move on to game-theoretical conceptions of group interaction, consider relationships between zero-sum and non-zero sum games, and finally end on observations about the possible evolution of human collectives toward more or less cooperation.</p><h3>Natural Selection</h3><p>However way life on earth began, organisms occupy environments surrounded by intra and inter-species populations in the larger ecology. Because interactions between and within species result in survival enhancing or diminishing effects, it gives us a basis for understanding competitive and cooperative behaviours.</p><p>Evolutionary biologists define competition as an interaction between individuals of the same or other species where resources used by one are made unavailable to others. Conversely, they define cooperation as interactions that enhance the survival of the interacting species. To avoid equivocation on the uses of the terms competition and cooperation in the scientific literature, I will deploy these terms broadly as just defined, though as we will see necessary conceptual nuances may cast doubt on whether grouping biological behaviours into these two broad camps is cogent.</p><p>When competition occurs between members of the same species, it’s termed <em>intraspecific</em> and when it occurs between different species it’s termed <em>interspecific</em>. Since competition is a function of resource removal, it is greatest where there’s resource overlap. Competition can be further operationalized into direct and indirect interactions. Indirect interactions, also called <em>exploitation</em>, involve the removal of resources without individuals of the same or different species being in direct physical proximity. On the other hand, <em>interference </em>occurs when direct interactions between individuals result in harm or prevention of access to resources.</p><p>Other types of interactions include <em>predation</em>, <em>parasitism</em> and <em>mutualism</em>, the latter being cooperative or reciprocally exploitative. Predation involves consuming individual prey, parasitism involves an asymmetrical relationship where a parasite obtains nutrition from a single host but confers no advantages in return, and mutualism refers to interactions between species that mutually enhance survival and/or reproduction (Futuyma 2006). Parasitism exists on a spectrum with predation and grades on predation at its extremes (Ibid).</p><p>There are unresolved questions regarding how to characterize these interactions. For example, some forms of symbiotic mutualisms exhibit such a high degree of host specificity, that the two species are sufficiently physiologically integrated to constitute a single organism (Futuyma 81). In fact, one of the hypotheses for the evolution of eukaryotes holds that the mitochondria and other organelles in the eukaryotic cell were independent prokaryotic organisms that combined in an endosymbiotic manner to constitute a single organism. This may also hint at possible explanations for the emergence of multicellular organisms: mutualistic conditions favoured the emergence, broadly speaking, of internally cooperative structures such as ourselves. However, our internal cooperation — namely our constitution as a single organism — is plausibly an artifact of the reproductive mechanisms of the constituting cells of systems in our bodies, namely by mitosis or division (where daughter cells inherit the same genetic inheritance). Whereas the reproductive mechanism of the organism as a whole is by meiosis, which yields offspring that have the composite/recombinant DNA of half of each parent.</p><p>This strategy yields both genotypic and a fortiori phenotypic variations that enhance adaptability, but also creates the stage for intraspecific competition when the genetic distance is sufficient. The kin-selection hypothesis construes most forms of intraspecific cooperation as a function of self-similarity, namely as directly proportional to genetic relatedness and inversely proportional to genetic distance. There’s a large body of evidence corroborating this hypothesis, wherein individuals are more likely to cooperate with their relatives. Explanations for kin selection vary from direct to indirect fitness-conferral: that is to say, certain cooperative behaviours like helping or sticking with the pack may be selected for because they benefit the individual directly (short-term) or indirectly (long-term). But as we saw, interspecific mutualism is another, altogether different type of cooperative strategy not rooted in genetic-relatedness. This doesn’t imply that a mutualistic relationship between two species may not be a genetically encoded adaptation, merely that the conditions of its inception and future sustenance are rooted in mutually increased fitness.</p><p>It is a matter of debate whether mutualism and kin-selection exhaust the cooperative strategies found in nature. Another candidate known as group selection has been proposed, which suggests that sometimes individuals sacrifice their fitness for the benefit of the group. This is not to be confused with the kin-selection hypothesis, which as we saw roots intraspecfic cooperation in genetic similarity. In the kin-selective scenario the individual always behaves selfishly in the sense that it promotes the inclusive fitness of its genes. Inclusive fitness recedes proportionally from an individual’s offspring to its relatives. By promoting the success of its kin, the individual concomitantly promotes the success of a proportion of its genetic makeup. Group selection, meanwhile, refers to scenarios where an individual sacrifices their fitness (inclusive or not) for the benefit of the group (incurs more costs than benefits, at least in the short run, to itself). That group selection constitutes a genuine phenomenon is a controversial and, for the most part, fringe view in evolutionary biology because it implies that selection may also occur at the level of the group instead of merely the individual.</p><p>When we scaffold to human collectives, the tensions between purported adaptations like group and kin selection further exacerbate. That is to say, the cooperative and competitive landscape becomes more difficult to explain and parse into intelligible taxa. This is, in part, because the spectrum of possible behaviours and conditions consistent with fitness are much broader in human systems largely due to <em>human differentia </em>like language, thought, ultrasociality, and cultural transmission that enable vastly more powerful levels of <em>ecological niche construction</em>. One question worth pursuing is whether human cooperative schemes and behaviours are exhaustively explained by kin-selective and mutualistic strategies or whether sufficient disjunctions persist from these evolutionary strategies that cannot account for human cooperative achievements. A parallel question is whether there are grounds for revising our conception of the <em>units of selection</em> as being exclusively genes.</p><p>The proposed alternative to gene-selectionism is <em>multi-level selection</em>. The central thesis of multi-level selectionism is that natural selection acts simultaneously across organizational scales from cells and individuals to groups (Kramer &amp; Meunier 2016). Notice that even with multi-level selection, the mechanism of genetic transmission does not change. However, it does mean revising the Weismann barrier to account for heritable epigenetic factors. The Weismann doctrine posits a strict separation of the germ and somatic lines, wherein hereditary information flows directionally from the genome to the soma, or from DNA to RNA expression, and not vice versa (Bline 2020). Since then, several extra-genetic mechanisms have been shown to impact phenotypic heritability such as regulatory gene products being transmitted trans-generationally (Joblonca 2009). In effect, environmental cues that affect gene expression in one generation can be transmitted across succeeding ones without affecting the DNA /nucleotide sequence.</p><p>The motivation for advancing an alternative to gene-selectionism like multi-level selection rests with the former not being able to explain observed spectra of altruistic and cooperative behaviours that contravene its predictions. Individuals may be selected for altruistic and/or group conformist traits, which in turn increase the total fitness of the group. However, many wrinkles remain to be ironed out in this picture. For example, it remains unclear whether phenomena like eusociality observed in at least some insects and crustaceans can be entirely explained within a kin selective framework. Eusocial arrangements exhibit cooperative brood care and a division of labour between reproductive and non-reproductive castes. Kin-selection and inclusive fitness models explain these features within a gene-centric framework, wherein non-reproductive casts promote the genes of kin. However, if inclusive fitness sufficed explanatorily, haplodiploid species should be more likely to form eusocial colonies, which has not been observed to be the case thereby suggesting that factors other than genetic-relatedness must also play a role(Wilson 2005). Multi-level selection posits between-group competition as a plausible structural condition for the emergence of eusociality, wherein in-group altruism enhances group differential success relative to another.</p><p>Problems persist with formalizing multi-level selection, however. First, multi-level selection suffers from an ambiguity of definition. The theory bifurcates into conflicting definitions of group and group selection: 1) MLS-1, where “group fitness is defined as the average total fitness of constituting organisms” and a group as a set of interactive individuals that influence each other’s fitness and 2) MLS-2, where “group fitness is defined as the expected number of offspring groups, where groups are typically geographically discrete, multi-generational and reproductively isolated” in attempt to explain group level events like fission and extinction (Kramer &amp; Meunier 2016). Some models construe MLS-1 and MLS-2 as diachronic phases, whereas others as incompatible models of multi-level selection. The former deploy MLS-1 and MLS-2 as sequential steps that may explain the evolution of multicellularity, which we isolated at the outset as an <em>explanandum</em> in need of an <em>explanans</em> in order to understand the dynamics of cooperation and competition in nature. MLS-1 involves an <em>alignment of fitness </em>phase, where cells establish a cooperative and communicative framework on the basis of genetic self-similarity (Nicolas &amp; Newman 2020). MLS-2 involves an <em>export-of-fitness</em> phase, where cells achieve a level of interdependence wherein fitness is exported to the colony or cooperative unit rather than operating at the individual level (Ibid). Most studies suggest many contingent paths can lead to the evolution of multicellularity, but these likely share the phase transitions just described (Ibid).</p><p>Notwithstanding the contested compatibility of MLS-1 and 2, some suggest that at least MLS-1 is formally equivalent to kin-selection, which would render it explanatorily redundant. This charge of formal equivalency rests on the fact that both theories when sufficiently generalized predict that social or altruistic behaviours increase the inclusive fitness of individuals when between-group selection is stronger than within-group selection (Kramer &amp; Meunier 2016). The charge of formal equivalency is highly contested, however, on grounds that group selection effects do not perfectly overlap with generalized kin selective ones. Furthermore, some argue that the generalized kin-selection framework cannot account for long-term, asynchronous group events like fission, fusion, and extinction (Simon &amp; Fletcher 2012).</p><p>Finally, it remains highly controversial whether human ultrasociality, the ability of humans to participate in large-scale collective action, should be understood within a spectrum of weak eusociality or whether additional mechanisms are required to explain human cooperativeness. While eusociality bears structural similarities to human collective arrangements and common population-dynamical causes should not be dismissed outright, it does not suffice to explain key features of human cooperative schemes (Abbot 2011, Heath 2011), whose forms are heavily underdetermined by the evolutionary inheritance. Gene-culture co-evolution, also known as dual-inheritance theory, which posits reciprocal causation between genetic evolution and cultural evolution, fills in many of these explanatory gaps. According to this theory, cultural inheritance undergoes selective pressures analogous to natural selection (Gintis 2011).</p><p>This model suffers somewhat from a chicken or the egg problem or begs the question with respect to the origin of human culture. Cultural evolution can only occur through mechanisms of inter-generational transmission, which are arguably made possible by differential features of human cognition (though others posit <em>strong imitability</em> as the originating factor). However way these evolved, they enabled a multiplicity of social arrangements relative to our biological inheritance. In other words, many of the features of human culture cannot be explained by virtue of biology alone, but must also seek recourse to culture-specific norms and ideological frameworks.</p><p>According to Heath (2011), kin-selection and reciprocal altruism do not suffice to explain the degree of cooperation exhibited in human collectives, particularly organizational features like states and large-scale collective action. Nor should we default to group or multi-selective frameworks because these can be highly unstable when within-group competition is stronger than out-group competition (this, however, is contestable). Rather, the explanatory ingredient rests with an adaptive trait of norm-conformity that does not inherently favour cooperative or selfish behaviours, but flexibly biases the individual toward group norms (Heath 2011). The latter explains the possibility that celibate casts can reoccur across iterations of a culture despite not being heritable.</p><p>Given the cultural datum, it has to be the case that not only do individuals absorb the selective pressure of its environment at different compositional levels, but these levels also often conflict with each other, thereby explaining the vast spectrum of observed human behaviours. Heath and others, cash out these different selective pressures by drawing a distinction between cultural and reproductive fitness as sometimes diverging constraints (Heath 2011). For example, celibate priestly casts satisfy a model of cultural fitness, while not satisfying reproductive fitness. The urge to reproduce conflicts with the disposition to function as part of the clergy.</p><p>Heath explains the foregoing tension by arguing that a disposition for norm conformity is a hard-wired adaptation (with “hardwired” defined as probability-raising rather than determining). This norm-conformity bias then fluidly takes the shape of different cultural containers. According to Heath, the genetic inheritance can be viewed as a set of biases that can be overrode, within limitation, by culture. It is the qualifier “within limitation”, however, that is not allotted sufficient consideration. The norm-conformity disposition could only have evolved in case it conferred adaptive benefits that outweighed its costs. It is not an accident that most cultures and belief systems share certain large-scale constraints while exhibiting wide variation peripheral to those constraints. While nature and culture can vary independently within some critical threshold, the general pattern is that the biological inheritance, even taking into consideration its phenotypic plasticity, forms the centre of gravity that circumscribes the fuzzy boundary of cultural variations until we succeed in reengineering or overwriting it entirely. In light of this, cultural norms and belief-systems must submit to indirect selective pressures, even if these are consistent with a wide array of expressions. Far from subjecting cultural norms to “just-so stories”, the coevolutionary thesis provides the explanatory framework for the wide diversity of human behaviours but does not at the same time provide the tools for explicitly adjudicating questions of causal priority or equiprimordiality that remain empirically unsettled like the evolution of language, intentionality, and higher-order thought (all of which contribute to the accumulation of cultural inheritance).</p><p>To return to an earlier example, celibate clergy could never comprise the entire population, but they can be nursed within a culture precisely because the reproductive wherewithal of that culture affords them as collateral. This is not to suggest that they function as collateral but rather that whatever cultural function they serve if they do at all (e.g. as stewards of norms etc), it may indirectly increase the net reproductive fitness of the culture or group by fostering stability or solidarity. That is to say, it is possible that individual costs to their reproductive fitness are disproportionally translated into benefits to the net reproductive fitness of the group. While caution is recommended when advancing such overtly functionalist explanations, they should not be outrightly ruled out either.</p><p>Having considered the evolutionary origins and limits of human cooperative schemes, let’s now turn to theories that aim to formalize human action and decision within the narrow prism of self-interest, known as game theory.</p><h3>The Intractability of Rational Choice</h3><p>Rational choice theory is a theory of human decision or decision theory that aims to formalize an instrumental conception of rationality. In a nutshell, instrumental rationality is the view that rational deliberation subserves an agent’s ends. This view is nested in a theory of both human motivation and cognition that posits certain mental representations like <em>desires</em> and <em>beliefs</em>. Desires are ways we’d like the world to be, while beliefs assumptions we make about the way the world is, will be, or could’ve been. In philosophical terminology, these are termed <em>intentional </em>states because they are <em>directed </em>at the world as attitudes about <em>states of affairs</em> or<em> facts</em>. They also exhibit opposite directions of fit, with the former being <em>prescriptive</em>, and the latter <em>descriptive</em>. If desires are conceptualized as preferred outcomes, then beliefs can be conceptualized as instrumental constraints in bringing about these outcomes as efficiently as possible. A concomitant assumption to this view of rationality is <em>non-cognitivism</em> about <em>ends</em>: ends are not objectively discovered or a feature of <em>reason </em>as such, but arise variously in agents from extra-rational causes. Under this conception, rationality consists of the deliberative constraints that satisfy desires or ends, but the latter need not be rationally grounded. Rationality is thus instrumental in the sense that it’s nested within, or subordinated to, extra-rational ends.</p><p>Assuming then that agents prefer certain outcomes, the purpose of practical reason is to select actions that have the highest probability of bringing about the preferred outcomes. If we think of the agent’s rank-ordered preferences as the desired outcomes, then instrumental rationality should supply a utility-maximization function for realizing them according to their subjectively weighted priorities. The utility maximization function is nothing short of the procedure for selecting the right action(s) given agential doxastic (belief) and preferential (desire) constraints (as the antecedent psychological ontology of actions).</p><p>The decision-procedure can be visualized through hierarchical decision trees comprising <em>states</em>, <em>actions,</em> and <em>outcomes</em>. States represent ways the world is configured, actions represent available choices given some variable state, and outcomes represent effects of actions. Given that any of the states obtains with some differential probability, we can visualize the agent’s choice space via three actions with variously weighted outcomes.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/907/1*urIzT7Zefu4csSSe8MRtOw.png" /><figcaption>Decision Tree with Uncertainty. Source: Following Rules: Practical Reasoning &amp; Deontic Constraint by Joseph Heath.</figcaption></figure><p>Given these assumptions, the utility of each action branch in each state can be computed through a decision-procedure, which can be formalized as a function that takes as input the sum of all products of the utility of an outcome (standardized as an integer between 1–10 and ascribed by the agent) and the conditional probability of the outcome given some action, to yield as output the net utility of that action:</p><blockquote>u(a) = ∑ p(o|a)u(o)</blockquote><p>The paradigmatic formalization of the utility-maximization function is known as the von Neumann-Morgenstern procedure. In this procedure we collapse desires into preferential outcomes, and remain agnostic about the ultimate causes of the preferential distribution over outcomes. We’re left then with these minimal assumptions: agents instrumentally pursue the good, about which we remain agnostic and do not further analyze, relative to their beliefs.</p><p>The context of individual agents, however, becomes complicated when other agents enter the picture. These complications become apparent when we apply the decision-procedure to a minimal system comprising two agents. We said that agents must assign probabilities to <em>states</em> in order to select an <em>action</em>. However, when two agents are involved, each must assign probabilities to the belief-states of the other. This implies that the actions of one agent are belief-states for the other and vice versa. Think of it this way: in order for you to select an optimal action, you must ascribe a probability to the other agent’s optimal decision-choice. Conversely, in order for them to select an optimal action, they must also ascribe a probability to your optimal decision-choice. If we now try to compute the utility-maximization function, it leads to an infinite regress of anticipations (Heath, 27). By ascribing the agent states, I also have to account for their anticipations of my states, which in turn changes my state, but also changes theirs and so on leading to an infinite regress.</p><p>Game-theoretical models strive precisely to solve these kinds of rationally intractable problems that arise in social action-contexts. Game-theoretical solutions famously aim to model belief equilibria among agents, wherein each agent ascribes some probability to the other agent’s future actions. When we do this, we find that some game theoretical models with two or more players are solvable in the sense that when the outcomes of <em>all the possible conditional state-action paths</em> are computed, there’s one optimal choice for one of the players that dominates the strategy of the other players. We call these games <em>strongly dominated</em> and can represent them via matrices:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/773/1*ZmgRFnC9cbiHhe0f9NGM2w.png" /><figcaption>A matrix of a dominated strategy. Reasoning each possible state to outcome, reveals (U,L) to be the optimal solution, meaning that the game is strongly dominated in favour of player 2. Source: Following Rules: Practical Reasoning and Deontic Constraint (2008), Joseph Heath.</figcaption></figure><p>Whenever an agent’s strategy is the best response to other agent’ strategies, in other words it’s not self-undermining, we call that an <em>equilibrium</em>, and specifically a <strong>Nash equilibrium </strong>after John Nash who proposed that utility-maximization leads to stable equilibria of choices among agents as solutions to game-theoretical quandaries.</p><p>However, not all games are dominated in this way. Some games, such as the well known <em>Battle of the Sexes</em>, yield two equilibria — so it’s stable, but not convergent, since there’s no single solution to the game. Other games are neither stable nor convergent. With these games there’s no internally consistent solution that eschews the infinite regress. Consider the matrix below:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/657/1*s8vsemsk3iQM2Lwm1P8V_Q.png" /><figcaption>The above game has no solution: no equilibrium emerges from maximizing utility for either of the players. Source: Following Rules: Practical Reasoning and Deontic Constraint (2008), Joseph Heath.</figcaption></figure><p>Nash’s solution to these quandaries was to propose mixed-strategy equilibria: equilibria where the outcomes are not only pure like (U,R) but over the set of randomizations of all possible outcomes including fractional distributions of strategies (3/10 U, 7/10 R). These solutions solve the regress of anticipations problem but also proliferate the possible equilibria. While caveats and controls that aim to reduce the number of equilibria can be introduced, such as avoiding zero-probability events, the problem with these strategies is that they mobilize the rational calculus toward an equilibrium solution, but fail to prescribe rational agents with choices that maximize their ordered preferences (Heath, 33).</p><p>Nash’s solution to the equilibrium selection problem appears, therefore, to be ad-hoc when it comes rational choice. A further blow to this programme occurs when you solve for multiple iterations of a single game, which mathematically yields a hopelessly large number of equilibria. Furthermore, across infinite iterations or finite iterations with an uncertain terminus, the number of admissible equilibria balloons to infinity (Heath, 34).</p><p>Introducing communication into the system relative to some compositional language does not mitigate these results, but exacerbates them. The problem of neologisms illustrates this. Messages not anticipated by an agent are de facto reduced to zero-probability events by the equilibrium-solving procedure regardless of what meaning the agent ascribes them, thereby not screening them out from the set of admissible equilibria (Heath).</p><p>The intractability of rational choice, that is to say, the failure of the game theoretical programme to formalize instrumental rationality over multiple agents generalizable to social collectives leaves the phenomenon of social order across human collectives unexplained. A theory of action that can account for the degree of coordination and cooperation exhibited by human collectives must seek recourse to additional psychological and mental tools.</p><h3>Parsing Zero-Sum from Non-Zero Sum Games</h3><p>The stage of cooperation and competition can be elucidated by the notion of a zero-sum game. Zero-sum games are games wherein the advantage gained to one party translates in a loss to the other. Zero-sum games are common in everyday situations like traffic, when we compete for a job promotion or competitive games like chess. To elaborate the first example, consider traffic situations where time is scarce such as when you’re rushing to get to work on time. If you let other people cut you off, you might forfeit being on time. You might even speed a little. Now imagine another driver in the same situation as you. Incentive for non-cooperative behaviour significantly increases when traffic undercuts the time-sensitive goal of getting to work on time.</p><p>Each of the enumerated examples have something in common: the prize is scarce, and not all those who compete get to win it. With some caution, this condition of scarcity can be generalized to all the goods towards which organisms strive. However, it isn’t at all obvious how scarcity should be conceptualized. For example, it is uncontroversial that <em>species</em> compete for mates and resources. The use of “compete” in this sense need not imply aggressive or hostile behaviours, merely a combination of random and adapted behaviours that result in reproductive success. However, the iteration of this process may then select for traits that outwardly display intra or inter-species hostility. In this picture, competition emerges from an imbalanced supply-to-demand ratio of preferred resources. The causal direction for competitive behaviours and traits flows from the environment to the species. But what if the availability of resources neither strongly favours a cooperative or competitive strategy?</p><p>For example, when a company seeks to enter a market, a reasonable assumption is that demand for a product is finite. But this does not factor the possibility of increasing absolute demand by changing consumer preferences. Economists compute demand as proportional to a utility function, which measures consumer satisfaction. Yet consumer satisfaction is highly malleable and varies considerably across personal preferences. You can argue with great plausibility, to take two random examples, that fridges and personal computers greatly increase personal utility. At the same time, they decrease the utility of a survivalist who wants to live through hunting and remain disconnected from broader civilization. Statistically, however, personal preferences are heavily constrained by networks of dependency embedded in civilizational infrastructure relative to its technological wherewithal. It is possible but really costly for the average person to opt out of owning a personal computer or a fridge. The average optimal utility function, therefore, is fundamentally in flux relative to the evolution of a culture.</p><p>It is hardly contestable that cultural transmission and modern economic organization have increased the absolute wealth and resources available to humans. Assuming some minimum threshold of distribution, this also implies that the absolute wealth of living individuals has also increased. By the same token, it can be argued that ecologies and evolutionary systems also increase the absolute availability of resources by complexifying chains of dependency. In some respects, the eukaryotic revolution enabled the vast phylogenetic expansion of taxa by innovating a recombinant reproductive mechanism that enhances adaptability. On the other hand, it is conceivable that structural features of both ecologies and human economies could lead to races to the bottom, extinction or mutual destruction. The latter is uniquely exacerbated in human systems.</p><p>Genuine zero-sum games require outcomes with winners and losers, where some mutually desired good cannot be distributed equally amongst all the players. While genuine zero-sum games arise because of limited supply of some desired good, individual zero-sum games always take place within a wider game of life. While exhibiting greater degrees of freedom, in the long run the game of life can also be conceptualized in zero-sum terms. One way to do this is to frame the set of all iterated games as either conducive or not conducive to reproductive success. Setting reproductive success as the ultimate measure given the sexual preferences of humans can be either a high or a low bar: a low bar when reproductive outcomes are distributed more equally and a high bar when that distribution tips to the tail ends. This picture, however becomes complicated when the possibility of group or multi-level selection is considered. Within this framing, individuals can also win the game of life by promoting the overall fitness of the group. Notwithstanding difficulties of defining the group (in biological terms the most predictive definition is proportionality to genetic-relatedness, while in human systems circumscription of group boundaries exhibits far greater flexibility due to our ability for abstraction, which in turns enables us to transcend mere genetic-relatedness), human definitions of the good can become genuinely unmoored from their biological tethering. And, as we argued earlier, cultural preferences can to some extent vary independently from biologically inherited preferences. (Some have attempted to explain this phenomenon in terms of group selection and/or within a spectrum of eusociality, whereas others through purely social mechanisms that are not necessitated by an underlying biology.)</p><p>The question whether the zero-sum schema applies broadly to social collectives and complex systems like ecologies and economies is tantamount to computing the aggregate utility function for all the entities that exhibit preferences over outcomes. This utility function becomes increasingly intractable when you account for the fact that preferences at different organizational units can conflict. In human systems, some of these conflicts can be avoided through cost-benefit analysis. For example, in situations with high uncertainty, the optimal preferential outcome is sublimated to secure a scenario of collective equilibrium.</p><p>The oft-touted schema of non zero-sum games is the Prisoner’s Dilemma. In the Prisoner’s dilemma, two criminals are captured and, unbeknownst to each other, offered two options: they can betray the other on the bargain that they be let free or choose to remain silent for a reduced sentence. Given that neither knows what the other will do, there’s a matrix of four possible outcomes. If both prisoners choose to remain silent, the prosecutors won’t have enough evidence to convict, but each will be given 1 year on a smaller charge. If both defect, then each must serve two in years prison (securing a reduced sentence for informing). However, if one defects but the other stays silent, the defector gets out scotch free, and the other serves 3 years in prison.</p><p>The mutually cooperative outcome incurs less costs than the mutually uncooperative one, where each prisoner seeks to maximize their self interest. The significance of the Prisoner’s Dilemma rests on its generalizability to collective action problems in human collectives. Even though the only possible Nash equilibrium in finite repeated prisoners’ dilemmas is to defect every time, empirically humans display a systematic disposition to cooperate (Kuhn 2019). Axelrod (1984) also found that over the long-run cooperative strategies trumped uncooperative ones. Curiously, humans tend to cooperate in one-shot prisoner’s dilemmas, just as they do in iterated ones, though the latter can veer toward greediness depending on the tendencies of players. Axelrod (1984), for example, found that mixed-strategies fared best in order to sustain cooperation while at the same time reducing the chance of being exploited.</p><p>Prisoners’ dilemmas default to <em>evolutionary stable strategies</em> insofar as participation delivers the advantages of cooperation, which is to say that the conditions of mutual benefit are replicated. This tendency to cooperate may be filtered through a more general norm-conformist disposition, but it is also highly contingent on an overall system of reciprocity. In situations where participants do not stand to gain an advantage from cooperation, they are much more likely to withdraw from cooperation. However, the overall picture is much more complex. In the case of humans, mixed strategies and asymmetrical payoffs are common. Given that most social interactions occur in complex networks with varying distributions of bargaining power, most individuals modulate their cooperative strategies relative to their status and calculations of short-term and long-term payoffs. Individuals with greater bargaining power, for example, may opt for a symmetrical payoff on the basis of their calculation of the likelihood of a reversal of fortunes, but statistically they are likely to seek asymmetrically favorable payoffs. Ultimately, strategies deployed by individuals are relative to the informational complexity they bring to bear (consider perfectly rational Bayesians as an abstract ideal), which determines their ability to learn from past interactions and accuracy of foresight. Cooperative strategies are therefore always preferable so long as they increase fitness, whether short or long-term.</p><p>It bears mentioning that the overarching game that the human being plays is the status game. The status-game is a proxy for reproductive success (assuming status is highly correlated to availability of resources), even though it can become co-opted by culture toward games that do not ultimately result in reproductive success. Proximally and for the most part, most socially sanctioned status games are good heuristics for reproductive success. Filtered through the prism of human differentia, status-games can lead to intra-generational novelty that can ultimately increase the size of the pie, but more importantly, human status-games drive the increasing differentiation and complexification of spheres of competence. In this sense, status-games are not ultimately zero-sum, even though the allotted positions of high status in any given social configuration are as a rule in short supply. This is due to the fact that even if the net status distribution of a population increases, relative status still accrues to the top because of an intrinsic preference for positional goods. Positional goods, which are goods valued because of their limited supply, acquire their value relative to the internal norms of a culture thereby enabling status allocations to exhibit significant variation. The intrinsic preference for positional goods is likely a byproduct of a disposition to conceptualize status as being in short supply. This, in turn, may be an artifact of our evolutionary inheritance that also encoded competitive and selfish behaviours as survival-enhancing adaptions in resource-scarce environments.</p><p>Even though most games are in an ad-hoc way zero-sum, the human being participates constantly in redefining or expanding competency games thereby rendering ultimate outcomes as essentially open (especially if the game is construed inter-generationally). The ultimate openness of outcomes could be countered by adherence to some form of strong determinism, wherein possession of perfect information yields perfect predictions. In this universe, perfect agents compete for overlapping finite outcomes given inexorably increasing total entropy. Strong determinism, however, is very likely false in our universe. Even so, the default interpretation of entropy nonetheless puts a damper on the ultimate openness of outcomes by limiting the availability of energy across infinite time. The same argument can be extended to nature at large, wherein the evolving ecology produces novelty by complexifying the web of interdependence. While humanity has recently grown to dominate the ecology, at some level of description there’s no fact of the matter as to what the unit of replication really is because any individual can be instrumentalized toward the propagation of some whole at the expense of itself or selfishly propagate itself at the expense of others.</p><h3>Trustless Cooperation</h3><p>In our time, increased digital participation continues to alter the social fabric and the methods through which individuals and groups associate and transact with one another.</p><p>An interesting feature of political culture and broader social discourse is the way that the values of cooperation and competition seep into political ideologies. This is evident in disagreements about what should be state controlled versus privately held and the role and extent of state interference in civil society. In societies with strong rule of law traditions, legislative history reflects this complex relationship between public institutions and private enterprise. Sometimes the legislative landscape nurses a symbiotic or mutually beneficial relationship between these sectors, and other times the distribution of control creates inefficiencies that require legislative correction. For example, deregulating banks in the United States contributed to the 2008 Financial Crisis, something Canada averted thanks to stronger regulations in that sector. On the other hand, examples abound of state-owned enterprises routinely failing to fulfill their public-interest mandates and losing money due to lack of accountability or crashing into insolvency. In Canada this is exemplified by the deregulation of Air Canada in the late 1970s and later full privatization in the 1980s.</p><p>A prominent battle today between cooperative and competitive values wages on the ownership of software. The open-source movement, emerging from academic values of cooperation and collaboration fostered in computer science departments in the early days of computing, promotes free and modifiable software not restricted by copyright. The private sector, on the other hand, produces for-profit proprietary software. Strangely, while conflict persists between these spheres, regions of symbiosis have evolved in an ecosystem that nurses both open-source collaboration and proprietary products. For example, companies routinely make certain products open-source (e.g. Google making TensorFlow open-source), while open-source products become proprietary to remain viable. The general trend, however, is hard to overlook: open-source products enjoy less support, may be of lower quality, and respond less readily to market forces. This is not surprising considering the different incentive systems that each of these spheres enjoy. Nevertheless, this is not always the case and depends on the ecosystem behind a software and whether the products are in direct competition or not. As a form of crowdsourcing, open-source has evolved to nurse consensus-based mechanisms of accountability. On the other hand, without proprietary software, few developers would have jobs and therefore resources to contribute to open-source products. Furthermore, a hybrid strategy has become dominant where companies seed adoption through free versions of their products in order to then increase the likelihood of selling their premium ones. In other words, the threads of cooperation and competition are messy and interlocked, and continue to evolve within a coexistence that often fosters desirable outcomes to all parties.</p><p>This was none more evident than with the release of the first distributed ledger cryptocurrency, Bitcoin, as an open-source software in 2009. Because the code that made it possible, a public distributed ledger called a blockchain was not copyrighted, it spawned a large movement and today growing ecosystem of cryptocurrencies and applications that run on variations of the blockchain code. However, blockchain applications that could, in principle, supplant corporate ones that dominate the app landscape have not yet seen mainstream adoption. Some of the problems that beset the mainstream adoption of decentralized apps lie with their internal governance and decision-making processes, the capacity for and pace of iterative design, and appeal to mainstream users. To illustrate, consider the case of Steemit, a social media dapp that incentivized users, both “curators” (voters) and “creators” (content generators), to participate via tokens that are exchangeable for currency. The system that Steemit had devised by controlling the daily supply of Steem tokens, which can be converted to Steem power (increasing the weight of certain voters) or Steem dollars (which are convertible to real currency), was too complicated for the average social media user. If you contrast this system with the expedient “likes” and posting process in popular apps like Instagram, it becomes clear that the effort threshold for participation is much higher in Steemit. Interestingly, this bears uncanny parallels to some of the pitfalls of the political ideology of social anarchism. Anarchists consider all hierarchies as prima facie illegitimate, and prefer flat structures of popular participation and governance. However, in any <em>working</em> model this greatly exacerbates individual responsibility to the point where most people would be loath to participate. If dapps want to solve this problem, they have to find a way to lower the threshold of participation to almost trivial levels, like most apps do. The cost of doing so however is that it undercuts the utopian dream of converting the labour of users to their direct benefit.</p><p>This is fine and well on the user end, but let’s consider the consensus mechanisms of distributed ledgers and what they mean for popular participation and decentralized systems at large. In the intervening years since the invention of blockchain, two chief consensus mechanisms have dominated the landscape: <em>proof-of-work</em> and <em>proof-of-stake</em>. Because blockchain ledgers are distributed, the method of full participation requires that each participant store a full node of the entire blockchain on their servers, and for any new transaction that creates a new block, all the nodes have to agree before that block is verified. Because hosting a full node is already a high threshold of participation, cryptos and dapps allow for light grades of participation, where users can transact by either verifying only parts of the ledger or by altogether outsourcing the verification process to a full node.</p><p>In principle, anyone can be a full node, but in practice the participation requirements inadvertently favour a certain class of people, i.e. at the very least those who can afford it monetarily and time-wise. This participation bottleneck is either heightened or loosened by the consensus mechanisms. <em>Proof-of-work</em> places the barrier of participation on computational power, wherein each new block requires the computation of an immutable hash function. Because a ledger increases with time, the computational power required to sustain the creation of new blocks also proportionally increases. These energy inefficiencies are rectified by the <em>proof-of-stake</em> mechanism that does not mandate a computationally taxing algorithm for the creation of new blocks, but rather places the weight of participation on a minimum threshold of crypto tokens owned by the participant. In other words, those who want to own a full node must also have a sufficiently high stake to be able to do so. On the one hand, a sufficient barrier of participation ensures the trustworthiness of the blockchain, and on the other, these mechanisms inadvertently create a distributed class of individuals who disproportionally wield power over the (governance of the blockchain) non-full node users.</p><p>These problems aside, it is worth appreciating the potential for cooperation that the blockchain creates. At least in principle, it promises to undercut the exploitative asymmetry between private citizens and corporate actors that has become greatly exacerbated in the last two decades. It is worth pondering deeply the extent to which the tech world has managed to both disrupt and commodify social processes upon which personal lives and goods are staked. By enlisting large-scale participation of the population in their apps, modes of in-person romantic courtship, for example, have nearly disappeared in favour of dating apps. Not only this, but entire attention economies have been created through increased social media participation, wherein the affordances of interaction and participation are entirely engineered and controlled by these corporate actors. In other words, in some very concrete sense corporate apps hijack the agencies and attentional resources of users to their disproportional benefit. Blockchain technology and the dapp movement could in principle offset some of these exploitable relationships by creating a parallel ecosystem of participation that does not deploy exploitative and addictive digital affordances.</p><p>Just as the evolution of corporate actors is a recent (last two hundred years) social phenomenon that both contributes and oftentimes severely undercuts the public good, so the potential for creating more robust and less exploitative cooperative schemes may be inscribed in certain digital technologies that could offset rather than exacerbate the conflicts of interest that beset the current social and civil landscape.</p><h3>Non-Rational Games</h3><blockquote>“All that is here related moves with imaginary feet along the parallels of dead orbs; all that is seen with the empty sockets bursts like flowering grass. Out of nothingness arises the sign of infinity; beneath the ever-rising spirals slowly sinks the gaping hole. The land and the water make numbers joined, a poem written with flesh and stronger than steel or granite. Through endless night the earth whirls toward a creation unknown…”</blockquote><blockquote>— Henry Miller, <em>The Tropic of Cancer,</em> p. 252.</blockquote><p>Notwithstanding difficulties in delineating the boundary between rational and irrational as far as concerns practical reason (it’s arguably easier when it comes to alethic modalities), the human being is uniquely equipped to knowingly extricate itself both from socially sanctioned games and unadulterated self-interest. This strange possibility suggests a set of outcomes that are neither rational in the strict sense nor non-rational in the sense of genetically programmed heuristics, but genuinely intentional irrational pursuits. Perhaps what these games share in common is the elevation of the absurd as an organizing principle akin to what the Dada art movement did in the early 20th century.</p><h3>Selected Bibliography</h3><p>Adami, Christoph, et al. “Evolutionary Game Theory Using Agent-Based Methods.” <em>Physics of Life Reviews</em>, vol. 19, 2016, pp. 1–26., <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.plrev.2016.08.015.">https://doi.org/10.1016/j.plrev.2016.08.015.</a></p><p>Alexander, J. McKenzie. “Evolutionary Game Theory.” <em>Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy</em>, Stanford University, 24 Apr. 2021, <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/game-evolutionary/#HistDeve.">https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/game-evolutionary/#HistDeve.</a></p><p>Bline, Abigail P et al. “What Is Lost in the Weismann Barrier?.” <em>Journal of developmental biology</em> vol. 8,4 35. 16 Dec. 2020, doi:10.3390/jdb8040035</p><p>Brunet, Tyler D P, and W Ford Doolittle. “Multilevel Selection Theory and the Evolutionary Functions of Transposable Elements.” <em>Genome biology and evolution</em> vol. 7,8 2445–57. 6 Aug. 2015, doi:10.1093/gbe/evv152</p><p>Futuyma, Douglas J. <em>Evolutionary Biology</em>. W.H. Freeman, 2006.</p><p>Gintis, Herbert. “Gene-culture coevolution and the nature of human sociality.” <em>Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences</em> vol. 366,1566 (2011): 878–88. doi:10.1098/rstb.2010.0310</p><p>Heath, Joseph. <em>Following the Rules: Practical Reasoning and Deontic Constraint</em>. Oxford University Press, 2011.</p><p>Jablonka, Eva, and Gal Raz. “Transgenerational epigenetic inheritance: prevalence, mechanisms, and implications for the study of heredity and evolution.” <em>The Quarterly review of biology</em> vol. 84,2 (2009): 131–76. doi:10.1086/598822</p><p>Kuhn, Steven. “Prisoner’s Dilemma.” <em>Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy</em>, Stanford University, 2 Apr. 2019, <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/prisoner-dilemma/">https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/prisoner-dilemma/.</a></p><p>Kramer, Jos, and Joël Meunier. “Kin and multilevel selection in social evolution: a never-ending controversy?.” <em>F1000Research</em> vol. 5 F1000 Faculty Rev-776. 28 Apr. 2016, doi:10.12688/f1000research.8018.1</p><p>Lind, M.I., Spagopoulou, F. Evolutionary consequences of epigenetic inheritance. <em>Heredity</em> <strong>121, </strong>205–209 (2018). <a href="https://doi.org/10.1038/s41437-018-0113-y">https://doi.org/10.1038/s41437-018-0113-y</a></p><p>Niklas, Karl J, and Stuart A Newman. “The many roads to and from multicellularity.” <em>Journal of experimental botany</em> vol. 71,11 (2020): 3247–3253. doi:10.1093/jxb/erz547</p><p>Simon, Burton et al. “Towards a general theory of group selection.” <em>Evolution; international journal of organic evolution</em> vol. 67,6 (2013): 1561–72. doi:10.1111/j.1558–5646.2012.01835.</p><p>Wilson, E. O., and B. Holldobler. “Eusociality: Origin and Consequences.” <em>Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences</em>, vol. 102, no. 38, 2005, pp. 13367–13371., <a href="https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0505858102.">https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0505858102.</a></p><p>Abbot, Patrick et al. “Inclusive fitness theory and eusociality.” <em>Nature</em> vol. 471,7339 (2011): E1–4; author reply E9–10. doi:10.1038/nature09831</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2d23885680a9" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
    </channel>
</rss>