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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Anshuman Mehta on Medium]]></title>
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            <title>Stories by Anshuman Mehta on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Thanks Alex.]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@anshumanmehta/thanks-alex-d5384c515448?source=rss-b03c9aaf1634------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d5384c515448</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Anshuman Mehta]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 28 Mar 2018 17:49:45 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-03-28T17:49:45.613Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Thanks Alex. You raise valid points — a bit of positivity is indeed called for. And I plan to turn positive as soon I can find tokens that serve their intended purpose , rather than creation of yet more tokens or trading of other tokens that similarly serve no purpose. It’s tote bags all the way down at the moment I’m afraid.</p><p>Re staking — too soon to talk it but if slowing down velocity to increase token value is the game, why not just use $ / EUR / GBP deposits?</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d5384c515448" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Futility Tokens]]></title>
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            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Anshuman Mehta]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 28 Mar 2018 15:52:33 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-03-29T02:38:28.524Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>(or, How Your Coin May Go To the Moon and It Doesn’t Matter)</h3><p><em>About the author: I am a banker turned entrepreneur exploring the distributed ledger tech space from first principles. Find me on </em><a href="https://twitter.com/anshumancrypto"><em>Twitter</em></a><em> or </em><a href="/service/mailto:anshuman@getcasteller.com"><em>send me an email</em></a><em>.</em></p><h4>Introduction</h4><p>Welcome to the third and (hopefully) final installment of my analysis of utility tokens.</p><p><a href="https://medium.com/@anshumanmehta/debunking-bitcoins-remittance-valuation-featuring-a-lead-pipe-b84c30622b17">In the first piece (aka The Lead Pipe Analogy)</a>, I highlighted blockchain world’s principal-agency problem, and identified agent reward as the determinant of transmission token valuation.</p><p><a href="https://medium.com/@anshumanmehta/mv-p-que-love-and-circularity-in-the-time-of-crypto-db70c9d5c015">In the second (MV = P…Que?)</a>, I explored the importance of inflation in monetary policy and token design, and determined that current token pricing methodologies were wholly inappropriate.</p><p>This final piece concludes the trilogy by examining <strong>the economic bounds of utility tokens</strong>. Using simple examples, we build a bottom-up narrative of how utility tokens might some day be used in a decentralized network called <strong>FaceLook</strong>.</p><p>We arrive at the surprising conclusion that in a fiat-currency world, the market or traded price of the token is completely de-linked with the usage and velocity of the token.</p><p>A few important distinctions before we start:</p><ul><li>We look past form (whether securities or not) and focus on substance — <em>utility tokens </em>that bestow upon holder the right to obtain a product or service</li><li>We define utility tokens as distinct from ‘principal’ tokens — lending- or ownership- substitutes that generate income returns and principal repayments</li><li>This exercise, as are any other posts dealing with token economics — is entirely theoretical. <strong>Because. Utility. Tokens. Do. Not. Exist. </strong>Placeholder ERC20 tokens do. And certain other tokens or currencies whose sole purpose is the generation and acquisition of yet other tokens and currencies. Not a viable scenario.</li><li>Staking or skin-in-the-game tokens are excluded from this analysis and will be subject to further examination in the future.</li></ul><h4><strong>This post is divided thus:</strong></h4><ol><li>Clarifying the Nomenclature</li><li>FaceLook and a utility token called ZUCK</li><li>Tokens as Unit of Account</li><li>Tokens as Medium of Exchange</li><li>Tokens as Store of Value</li><li>Your Tokens May Never Go ‘To The Moon’</li><li>Re-stating MV = PQ and Implications</li><li>The Future of Token Design and ‘Tokenomics’</li><li>Let’s Stop Calling It Market Cap</li><li>Special Bonus (if you read this far)</li></ol><p>Let us begin.</p><h3><strong>1. Clarifying Nomenclature</strong></h3><p>For the purposes of this piece, we look at the actions and motivation of three distinct groups and one ‘thing’ -</p><ol><li><strong>The decentralized service provider</strong> aka ‘startup’, ‘founding team’ or ‘foundation’ — a group of individuals (engineers, salespeople, account managers) that band together to create a ‘decentralized product or service’</li><li><strong>Token Investors </strong>— individuals or institutions external to group 1 and group 3, to whom utility tokens are sold</li><li><strong>End-users </strong>— the end-users of the decentralized service for whom the decentralized service is created</li><li><strong>‘Utility Tokens’ </strong>— alpha-numeric strings that entitle the holder to use a ‘service’ or ‘product’</li></ol><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*R_kaJssQ4ock30xjVbreQA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Figure 1. Introducing the Actors</figcaption></figure><h3><strong>2. FaceLook and a utility token called ZUCK</strong></h3><p>Meet Mark, a young entrepreneur who wants to raise $1M to finance the development and growth of his new social network, The FaceLook, Inc.</p><p>Accordingly, the board of FaceLook authorizes the creation of 5M utility tokens called ZUCKs, each with a face value of $1.</p><p>FaceLook issues 4M to Mark as founder and sells 1M ZUCKs to you, an external investor, for $1 per token.</p><p>Et voila, the company has a ‘market cap’ of $5M. Each ZUCK is “worth” $1, the last traded price.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Nc70mZeedEyr_r_gFeasXA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Figure 2. The FaceLook Utility Token Offering</figcaption></figure><p>Armed with this cash injection, FaceLook starts acquiring users, reaches critical mass and lands its first paying customer, car giant NIKOLA. NIKOLA wants to advertise to 1000 potential customers of its electric cars, and it is willing to pay FaceLook’s asking price of $1 for 1000 impressions.Now let’s evaluate the three scenarios that arise –</p><p>In <strong>scenario A — the Unit of Account scenario </strong>— we live in a fiat-money-world. We use USD, GBP, EUR etc. to earn paychecks and pay bills. FaceLook quotes advertising rates in USD terms (e.g. $1 per 1000 impressions) but to run ads, NIKOLA needs to buy an equivalent amount of ZUCKs. The token is used merely to measure FaceLook’s success (“Hey, we sold a billion ZUCKs of ads!”)</p><p>In <strong>Scenario B — the Medium of Exchange Scenario </strong>— we still live in a fiat world, but FaceLook ads are now denominated in ZUCKs. So to reach 1000 customer, you need to buy 1 ZUCK.</p><p>In <strong>Scenario C — the Store of Value scenario </strong>— the entire world, all 200+ countries and 7BN+ people in them, have moved over to using ZUCKs and only ZUCKs for our daily lives. We earn our paychecks in ZUCKs, use them to buy milk, bread, electricity and yes, even FaceLook ads.</p><h3><strong>3. Tokens as Unit of Account</strong></h3><p>In Scenario A, FaceLook prices its services in fiat terms — NIKOLA needs to buy $1 equivalent of ZUCKs to reach 1000 customers.</p><p>Now, FaceLook doesn’t have any retained tokens of its own. It has sold all its authorized tokens to Mark and you. So the company sends the order for ZUCKS to the marketplace, where you await. NIKOLA checks the screens for the last traded price (FaceLook issued 1M tokens to you for $1) and bids at the same price. “$1 for 1 ZUCK, please.”</p><p>You are a HODLER. Naturally, you HODL.</p><p>NIKOLA is forced to raise the bid to $2 per ZUCK, then $10, and finally $100. At this price, your resolve finally weakens. You sell 0.01 ZUCKs to NIKOLA, who uses these ZUCKs to purchase ads on FaceLook.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*IVT2KHKO_h72GL5ADwe_gA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Figure 3. A Complicated UX for NIKOLA CEO Musk Melon</figcaption></figure><p>Remember, we live in the fiat currency world in this scenario. So long as the price of FaceLook ads doesn’t change in fiat terms ($1 for 1000 impressions), all NIKOLA needs is enough ZUCKs to buy $1 of ads.</p><p>But it makes a world of difference to you because your wealth varies with the market price of ZUCKs. You make a 99c profit on the sale of that 0.01 ZUCK, and a $99.99M ‘paper’ profit on the rest of your holdings as the market cap of FaceLook jumps from $5M to $500M.</p><p>Now, two things can happen.</p><p>FaceLook can destroy this 0.01 ZUCK as ‘spent’. In theory, this leaves fewer tokens available to buy ads, pushing prices up even further. NIKOLA will need to come back to you to buy more ZUCKs, and pay the price at which you are happy to sell at least small amounts.</p><p>Or FaceLook can hold on to that 0.01 ZUCK for the next time NIKOLA wants to buy ads.</p><p>This is bad, very bad, for you the token holder. A new seller has now the market — FaceLook itself. Next time, NIKOLA can approach FaceLook directly to buy the tokens it needs to buy ads. Depending on the inventory FaceLook has accumulated, and speed with which its share of tokens are used and recycled, FaceLook’s can directly influence the buying interest you see in the open market.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*MNYEat8V_4eT1V-Pj9psTA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Figure 4. Intermediaries get dis-intermediated</figcaption></figure><p>Worse, if FaceLook and Nikola transact off-market, you could be deceived into thinking your ZUCKs are still worth $100 a pop when in reality there are no buyers at that price. <strong>Bad if you own the tokens, and worse if you are a new investor looking to buy into ZUCK.</strong></p><p>Another important consequence is that the market price of ZUCK decouples from the ‘enterprise value’ generated by FaceLook.</p><p>Remember, we live in the fiat world. In this world, FaceLook’s value as a company is the sum of all the $1 ad sales it generates. Whether a ZUCK trades at $1, $100 or $1m, whether there exist 1m, 10m or 100m tokens, the economic value captured by the sum of all $1 ad-sales remains independent of token trading activity and unaffected by token price.</p><p>All that matters is NIKOLA find sufficient $ equivalent of ZUCKs with speed and predictability. And when determining the value generated by FaceLook, we simply look through the tokens to determine the fiat currency revenues generated by FaceLook’s services.</p><p><strong>It is as if the tokens didn’t exist at all.</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*umy7lK7mGYCU7lZigTIpMQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Figure 5. It’s as if the Tokens didn’t exist at all</figcaption></figure><h3><strong>4. Tokens as Medium of Exchange</strong></h3><p>Things don’t get much better if we take this analysis a step further.</p><p>Let’s assume ZUCK is a true medium of exchange. FaceLook quotes ad rates in ZUCKs e.g. to reach 1000 potential customers, NIKOLA needs to buy 1 ZUCK of ads.</p><p><strong>In and of itself, this is a meaningless price. </strong>Is 1 ZUCK too little for NIKOLA to pay? Is it too much?</p><p>Remember, NIKOLA exists in a fiat world — it manufacturers and sells cars, pays for expenses and earns revenues in USD, EUR etc. NIKOLA needs to convert 1 ZUCK into it’s fiat-currency equivalent, and compare this cost with its break-even cost for advertising before deciding to buy or pass. In the first instance, where only you offer ZUCKs in the market, this price is determined by you, a HODL-er.</p><p>What you do not know is that NIKOLA can walk away from FaceLook if it needs to pay more than $1 equivalent for 1000 impressions. Beyond this price, it may well choose to get CEO Musk Melon to tweet out their new fancy car.</p><p>Think about this for a moment.</p><p>The price ceiling to which a ZUCK ought to appreciate is determined by the interplay of<strong> a non-public piece of information</strong> — the maximum price that the NIKOLA’s of the world are willing to pay for social media advertising — <strong>and the speculative desires of token-hodlers. </strong>Not its own tech or user traction.</p><p>The more external investors HODL, the more the token’s economics start to resemble supply-limited deflationary commodity-backed currencies that the crypto world is so fond of. The price of ZUCK spikes upwards in a parabola, <strong>rendering the network all but useless</strong> for predictable and repeatable use.</p><blockquote>FaceLook’s continuing survival is at the mercy of hodl-ers who may inadvertently sabotage their own investment.</blockquote><p>And here’s another thought — could a tech-giant like search engine Boogle potentially drive a fledgling FaceLook out of business simply by acquiring free float tokens and pricing them out of commercial viability?</p><p>Not a great, or sustainable, way to build a business.</p><h3><strong>5. Utility Tokens as Store of Value</strong></h3><p>Let’s take ZUCK adoption one step further. Let’s say we live in a ZUCK world. For the first time in human history, all of mankind uses a single currency <strong>minted by a bit of computer code and operated by a group of private companies that happen to own large computer farms</strong>.</p><p>Yep, me neither.</p><p>This is an outlandish scenario that, whilst tempting for early speculators given the riches on offer, conveniently ignores the realities on the ground.</p><p>Political power is inter-twined in with monetary control and enforced with the full force of local law. Human societies are organized in nation states based on linguistic and cultural divides. Vast differentials in concentrations of wealth between the developed and emerging world cause the latter to put up trade and capital control barriers, as much to perpetuate regimes as <strong>shield the fortunes of the underdeveloped poor from ‘asset allocation’ choices of the cash rich.</strong></p><p>A single world currency may well come to pass, but it is not likely to be minted and distributed by private hands.</p><p>We therefore ignore the crypto-utopian scenario in which crypto-tokens are superior to fiat merely because a small concentration of crypto holders bought these in a pre-sale.</p><h3><strong>6. Your Tokens May Never Go ‘To The Moon’</strong></h3><p>One final thought experiment — what if FaceLook becomes wildly successful?</p><p>Say over one particularly successful year, FaceLook racks up a record $20B of advertising revenues as the NIKOLAs of the world line up to buy ads. Surely this is good for token holders? Even a simplistic analysis shows that the price of each of those 5M tokens should soar to $20B / 5M = $4000 per token.</p><p>To the moon, right?</p><p>Still, no.</p><p>FaceLook may earn $20B of revenues per year but to earn this gross annual figure, it only needs to process c. $650 of ad purchases per second ($20B per year / 315M seconds per year). And here, ZUCKs act as LeadCoins <a href="https://medium.com/@anshumanmehta/debunking-bitcoins-remittance-valuation-featuring-a-lead-pipe-b84c30622b17">described in theLead Pipe analogy piece</a> — their purpose is merely the transmission of $650 of value per second from the pool of advertisers to FaceLook’s bank accounts. Superior user experience design links ad purchases to an internal purchase and sale of corresponding ZUCKs from FaceLook (see Figure 6 below, and also Figure 5).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*4rmtLzuDbU3u7Z2f7rA_gA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Figure 6. A few LeadCoins transmit great gold volumes</figcaption></figure><p>Could we envisage a scenario where advertisers maintain token balances? <strong>To the contrary. </strong>Utility tokens hold no utility outside the narrow use case for which they are designed. The market may well nudge application design towards a seamless user experience where customers never need to interact with tokens at all.</p><h3><strong>7. Restating MV = PQ and Implications</strong></h3><p>Clearly, our findings thus far have significant implications for the continued misuse of the monetarist identity equation we analysed in <a href="https://medium.com/@anshumanmehta/mv-p-que-love-and-circularity-in-the-time-of-crypto-db70c9d5c015">our previous analysis of token valuation — MV=P…Que”</a>.</p><p>Let’s revisit the monetarism equation as applied in crypto world:</p><blockquote><strong>M * V = P * Q</strong></blockquote><p>Where:</p><p><em>M</em> is the monetary base (i.e. number of tokens outstanding),</p><p><em>V </em>is the observed velocity</p><p><em>P * Q</em> are the fiat-currency equivalent of products and services delivered by the network (i.e. the sum of all $1 ad sales generated by FaceLook).</p><p>First off, it’s obvious that equation is ‘misspelt’ — the units don’t balance. On the left, M is denominated in crypto terms. On the right, P*Q is denominated in fiat terms.</p><p>The equation should really read:</p><blockquote><strong>M * R * V = P * Q</strong></blockquote><p>Where:</p><p><em>R</em> is the ZUCK / $ conversion rate, equivalent to the token’s trading price over a period of time.</p><p>Next, <strong>we realize that the revenues of a network (<em>P*Q)</em> are independent of token supply and trading prices.</strong></p><p>The price at which a ZUCK trades, or how many ZUCKs are available for trading, does not determine NIKOLA’s willingness to purchase advertising on FaceLook. Similarly, the aggregate of end user demand for FaceLook’s services (i.e. the sum of all $1 ad spends from all customers) is independent of token price and velocity. Unlike the real economy, and the original application of the monetarism equation, P*Q cannot be increased merely by issuing more tokens or pumping up token price.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/878/1*Rnl_6G4iIct-bJu34_ZPJg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Figure 7. The New and Improved MRV = PQ</figcaption></figure><p>Next, as we’ve already seen, in a fiat-currency world, token trading prices are irrelevant. Per our example above, at a token price of $1 per ZUCK, you need 1 ZUCK. At $100, you need 0.01 ZUCKs.</p><p>We thus realize that neither token issuance volume or nor token price are important. The availability of P*Q fiat-currency equivalent of tokens is all that matters.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*-3OYEoGneYPJ4b1PqLDdow.jpeg" /><figcaption>Figure 8. You only need $1 worth of ZUCKs</figcaption></figure><p>Here, the retained issuance base comes into play — it is incumbent upon FaceLook to make sure its customers (the advertisers) always have the amount of tokens required to conduct business on the platform.</p><p>This tranforms FaceLook’s post-activation network maintenance role into a <strong>central bank-like function of controlling token supply when necessary, NOT to support token price (which we have seen is irrelevant) but to ensure token availability at the point of need.</strong></p><h3><strong>8. Implications for Token Design and Economics</strong></h3><p>As we peel the layers back, several other and equally significant implications become apparent.</p><ul><li><strong>Decentralized Service Providers may determine that retained inventory of tokens is sufficient to service end user requirements. </strong>This would further delink token-trading markets with the process of purchasing tokens to utilize them.</li><li>Poorly designed protocols fail to create an <strong>explicit economic and legal linkages between tokens and the value </strong>of products and services created over a decentralized network (no ownership rights, no dividend, interest or principal repayment obligations either). This is a very bad outcome for holders of such tokens.</li><li><strong>Token fractionalization will become important. </strong>It does not matter if a platform issues quadrillions of tokens if a user cannot purchase a small fiat-currency-equivalent amount of utility tokens. User adoption will likely suffer as users wait to aggregate enough demand to buy a higher unit, or seek fractionalization elsewhere. In our example, unless NIKOLA can purchase 0.01 ZUCK when its price skyrockets, it cannot do business with FaceLook.</li><li><strong>Speculative price appreciation of tokens will be of no relevance to end-users</strong>— so long as they can purchase the $-equivalent necessary to get their job done. Remember, NIKOLA is in the business of making and selling cars, not speculating on ZUCKs.</li><li><strong>Trading prices can and possibly will become completely de-linked with network economics</strong> — you can trade the price of a ZUCK to a trillion dollars, so long as you find the next ‘investor’ to buy it from you. <strong>FaceLook does not sell a trillion dollars of advertising to justify this token price, and nor will it need to.</strong> The price will be supported till greater fools enter the market after you.</li><li>As a consequence, <strong>token trading prices could far outstrip ‘per-token’ revenue even when adjusted for ‘velocity’.</strong></li><li>Worse, this relationship is symmetric for price — <strong>i.e. a small issuance base and low price could support a very high revenue volume given sufficient efficiency of use. </strong>All that is required is the ease of recycling tokens and the understanding that annual revenue volumes, though seemingly large numbers, are earned over a prolonged periods of time.</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Av089VSHUTg_yZqBKmujQA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Figure 9. Frantic but ultimately irrelevant trading</figcaption></figure><ul><li><strong>End-user UX will be significantly eased if tokens can be acquired directly from FaceLook instead of coordinating in an open (securities?) marketplace.</strong> We can foresee a scenario where tokens are acquired as part of purchase process of the decentralized service, not as a separate dialogue with ‘investors’ or ‘hodlers’.</li><li>This will lead to the development of<strong> a two-pronged market</strong> — speculators and so-called<em> crypto-funds</em> frantically trading tokens at make-believe ‘intrinsic’ or ‘fair’ value with each other; and end-users directly interacting with FaceLook-like entities to get work done (see Figure 9).</li><li>Ironically, service providers could end up becoming <strong>the last resort for fiat liquidity for token holders exiting token positions for fiat</strong>, becoming a single point of failure in token design.</li><li>An extremely low barrier to entry for issuing tokens means <strong>there will be no reason not to issue tokens</strong>. Even as consumers, the prospect of buying UberToken, SubwayToken, StarbucksToken, ElevatorToken, SandwichToken etc. merely reinforces reluctance to move off fiat. Taken to its natural conclusion, if all the FaceLooks of the world tokenized their services, we could foresee<strong> deeply inefficient markets that gross up</strong> the amount of fiat-currency liquidity committed and sitting idle in individual tokens.</li></ul><blockquote><strong>This is the price we pay for a token-maximalist’s vision of a tokenized world.</strong></blockquote><ul><li>Even so, end-users users may not over purchase tokens, <strong>electing to not build up reserves and provide early investors with the outsized returns they anticipate. </strong>There is a real opportunity cost of capital to over-buying tokens. End-users are not in the business of financing vendors with advances against otherwise unusable tokens. Enterprise clients even more so, they heavily optimize working capital requirement (negative accounts receivables, positive accounts payable)</li><li>Currently, global corporates struggle to manage multiple reserves in multiple currencies to finance operations. <strong>Asset-liability matching and local currency liquidity management are a nightmare for any treasurer</strong>, necessitating cash management expertise and forecasting and multiple banking relationships. Add to that the need to maintain token balances for global vendors like FB, Twitter, eBay etc. and local tokens for local services, and the difficulty will go up several-fold. <strong>Expect push-back from enterprise users for yet more tokens.</strong></li></ul><p>Does this analysis merely reinforce the need for a so-called <em>stablecoin</em> to enable seamless transfer between such tokens?</p><p>Yes, and we already have stable coins in spades — fiat currencies.</p><p><strong>The only problem for token ‘investors’ is they don’t hand out dollars for a dime in pre-sales. They never did.</strong></p><p>Long may that continue.</p><h3><strong>9. Let’s Stop Calling It Market Cap</strong></h3><p>Whilst you’re here, let’s take a closer look at <strong>Market Cap</strong>, a metric commonly misquoted and misused in the crypto space.</p><p>Ostensibly, ‘market cap’ provides a relative measure for comparing crypto networks. By multiplying the number of tokens outstanding with traded price, the crypto universe is deemed to have a market cap of <strong>$345B</strong> (as of end-March, 2018). This figure gets compared with other large numbers such as equity or bond market caps or world GDP. <strong>Worse, illicit activity such as money laundering is expressed as a fraction of total market cap and deemed to be “not such a big deal”.</strong></p><p>We can easily demonstrate that ‘market cap’ is a meaningless construct in the crypto-space.</p><p>Say I create <strong>200M tokens</strong>. I sell you a single token for a $1. Does this mean the market cap of this particular project is $200M?</p><p>Worse, if I conspire with you to trade the same token back and forth between <strong>multiple pseudonymous addresses that both of us control</strong>, could we raise the ‘traded price’ to $2, $3 or even $5? Does this mean the market cap is now $1B?</p><blockquote>The sum-product of token volumes and prices does not reflect aggregate demand for or utility of tokens, and is therefore a flawed measure.</blockquote><p>There are still other arguments to sort through.</p><p>Crypto proponents argue that common stock capitalization (e.g. AAPL shares) is determined by the<strong> marginal trading activity of a handful of shares</strong> on any day, giving the company a multi-billion valuation. In reality, one couldn’t sell all AAPL shares at that price. So how’s that different from BTC or ETH’s market cap?</p><p>Very dissimilar, as it turns out.</p><p><strong>A stock is essentially an ownership claim</strong> — when you buy an AAPL stock, you own part a large company with many billions of revenues. Each stock assigns to you a proportionate claim to the net earnings of AAPL adjusted for the time value of money. So whilst the price may be wrong for extended periods of time, and you may buy AAPL at too much of a premium or discount, <strong>AAPL’s net profits are available to make payments to ALL its shareholders in the form of dividends.</strong></p><p>For utility tokens on the other hand, <strong>the entirety of returns derived by an owner is realized at the point of sale. </strong>These returns belong to the token holder only, and have no bearing to the returns accrued by subsequent sellers.</p><p><strong>Once sold, there are no other returns due to the token holder.</strong></p><p>Token trading may help in price discovery, but the customer demand for tokens is determined by the success of the protocol in earning real revenues ( P*Q) and not the ‘market cap’ of the tokens (M*R*V).</p><p>Another retort cites growth stocks with high stock prices that pay no dividends (e.g. AMZN) — surely <strong>zero-dividend paying stocks</strong> are similar to zero-returns utility tokens in that token holders rely on price appreciation?</p><p>Not quite — whilst AMZN doesn’t pay dividends <em>at this time</em>, at some point in the future when growth slows, it will be expected to transition to a ‘value’ stock with a dividend yield. If you were to tell AMZN shareholders they would never receive any dividends whatsoever, then the stock price would plummet as the relationship between AMZN’s financial performance and its owners’ rewards is severed.</p><h3><strong>10. Special Bonus — A Brief Introduction to ‘Principal Tokens’</strong></h3><p>We’ll break our promise at the beginning of this piece to briefly touch upon what I call <strong>Principal Tokens.</strong></p><p>Principal Tokens are tokens designed to raise a certain amount of principal that is then invested in financial assets. Think of most asset-backed tokenization plays, property investments via REITs or even crypto-backed-loans.</p><p><strong>All Principal Tokens require an adherence to The Law of Conservation of Principal.</strong></p><p>Let’s see how this works.</p><p>Say an enterprising real estate developer creates 200M BUILD tokens and sells 75M for a dollar each, raising $75M. The remaining 125M are variously retained to pay for expenses, allotted to the founding team and advisors and kept in reserve.</p><p>Bearing in mind that this set-up only contains $75M in cash, what is the market cap of BUILD now?</p><p>If you said $75M, you’re close but not in line with market practice.</p><p>If you said $200M, then problems abound.</p><p>There are 200M tokens in existence, all claiming rights to $75M of assets. The ‘fair value’ or ‘book value’ of a BUILD token is now $0.375 per token. If you were lucky enough to buy BUILD in the initial offering, <strong>congratulations, you’ve already lost 62.5% of your investment.</strong></p><p>It gets worse.</p><p>In order to recoup your investments, you will rely on the real estate developer to turn $75M of cash into $200M of assets. <strong>That is an almost 270% return just to break even on real-world assets. </strong>To make even a nominal 10% return over a holding period of 4–5 years, we’re talking a 400% return on invested capital.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*eU3zkHedQO7gwmrO01oFMg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Figure 9. $75M Cash, $200M Claims</figcaption></figure><p>It gets worse still.</p><p>If the <strong>token design is not subject to lock-up periods and a returns-allocation waterfall</strong> (e.g. external investors get their capital returned first, then profits split etc.), unscrupulous promoters dump their token positions out of turn to unsuspecting new entrants. This sale affects the transfers new money from late entrants to the founding team, leaving the former holding the bag for a woefully undercollateralized project, a variant of a ponzi scheme.</p><p><strong>Principal Tokens reinforce an age-old principal that one cannot create real money out of thin air.</strong></p><p>And of course market capital tables would list both ZUCK and BUILD tokens with comparable market cap numbers ($500M and $200M respectively).</p><p>In reality, neither is worth anywhere close to these figures.</p><p><em>[Note: Interested in discussing principal tokens further? </em><a href="/service/mailto:anshuman@getcasteller.com"><em>Get in touch!</em></a><em>]</em></p><h3><strong>Conclusion</strong></h3><p>So what have we learned from this (lengthy) examination of tokens?</p><ul><li>Utility tokens are lousy investment substitutes for common equity</li><li>The price of a token does not matter — its availability does</li><li>Token price can be delinked from network ‘value’ in either direction — very low token prices can support very high transaction volumes with sufficient efficiency of recycling</li><li>Market capitalization is grossly mis-understood and mis-used in the crypto space. And leads to dangerous conclusions.</li><li>The Law of Conservation of Principal cannot be violated.</li></ul><h3><strong>Where Next?</strong></h3><p>The token space is quickly re-branding. Gone are explicit promises of quick returns, replaced by proclamations of SEC compliance and promises of ‘asset-backed tokenization’.</p><p>In future pieces, we will focus our attention on the the evolving eco system of securities-like tokens, enumerating best practices for token design and observing the interplay between fractionalization and liquidity.</p><p>Thank you for reading.</p><p><a href="https://twitter.com/anshumancrypto">Follow the author on Twitter</a> for insights, <a href="/service/mailto:anshuman@getcasteller.com">email him</a> for a follow-up discussion or<a href="https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSe0JQc6q5iEoCPngHXl5-nG1U_Wc2_2zDfd2Rx8IPUESej8EQ/viewform"> sign up for future posts</a> on all things securities, tokens and DLT.</p><p>(Big thanks to Antony Lewis, Ciaran Murray, Biser Dimitrov … for their review and inputs).</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=6b8283c977a9" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[MV=P…Que? Love and Circularity in the Time of Crypto]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@anshumanmehta/mv-p-que-love-and-circularity-in-the-time-of-crypto-db70c9d5c015?source=rss-b03c9aaf1634------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/db70c9d5c015</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[macroeconomics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bitcoin]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[crypto]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ico]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Anshuman Mehta]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 23 Feb 2018 20:15:45 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-06-25T22:06:37.599Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Authors: <a href="http://www.linkedin.com/in/connectanshuman">Anshuman Mehta</a> and <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/briankoralewski">Brian Koralewski</a></p><p><strong>The central thesis running through the crypto-currency space is an unhealthy obsession with supply-side scarcity.</strong></p><p>The ultimate goal of creating digital-gold, a scarce resource, confers upon the holder riches beyond its ostensibly low intrinsic value. Much like the pale yellow physical-world counterpart is intrinsically useless but conferred value by social consensus. (Clearly, crypto-architects have visited India during ‘wedding season’!)</p><p>Accordingly, crypto-architects endow their creations with a limited or fixed supply schedule. When limited supply meets increasing demand, hodlers will become rich.</p><p>In this piece,<strong> we take a scalpel to this viewpoint’s core tenets:</strong></p><ul><li><strong>Deflation is good</strong> -&gt; Inflation is evil -&gt; therefore price appreciation of supply-limited crypto-currencies is evidence of supremacy over and inevitable triumph of ‘fiat’</li><li>The monetarist equation<strong> M*V = P*Q</strong> is a great valuation tool for coins and tokens</li></ul><p>Let’s begin at the beginning.</p><h3><strong>MV = PQ and the Gold Standard: A Brief History</strong></h3><p><strong>M*V = P*Q</strong>, or the <strong>Quantity Theory of Money</strong> (also known as the <strong>Equation of Exchange</strong>) was originally formulated by the economist Irving Fisher in the early 1900s.</p><p>The equation scrutinized the relationship between</p><ul><li><strong>M</strong> — the monetary base</li><li><strong>V</strong> — the velocity of money (or how many times a unit of currency is spent or used in a year)</li><li><strong>P * Q</strong> — the output of the economy, as represented by the product of</li><li>nominal price level — <strong>P</strong>, and</li><li>the quantity of goods and services produced — <strong>Q</strong></li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/796/1*XrS1HPiOf2UL1BBn4_q1-g.jpeg" /><figcaption>Figure 1. M*V = P*Q (Source: Austere Capital)</figcaption></figure><p>When Fisher first formulated the theory, the Federal Reserve had not yet been created and paper money was pegged to the amount of gold held.</p><p>This<strong> “Gold Standard”</strong> kept the economy in a low-growth mode since the flow of capital (e.g. investments in new businesses, lending etc.) was stifled by the available money supply, which in turn was capped by the quantity and growth rate of gold reserves. <strong>Gold reserves could only be increased at the rate at which they were physically mined out of the earth. </strong>The monetary base remained largely constant from one year to the next. Paper money was nominally “safe” but also scarce.</p><p>Gold-backed money was also susceptible to bank runs — in times of uncertainty, holders flocked to banks to exchange their paper money for an equivalent amount of gold. Indeed, <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/money/2011/04/27/135604828/why-we-left-the-gold-standard">the UK abandoned the gold peg in the 1930s</a> following one such run that left it precariously short on the precious metal. This was one of the many occasions on which the UK abandoned the gold standard. Not much of a standard then.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/720/1*l6e7mmdHAI9NAhMMFNklVg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Figure 2. Montagu Norman Telling the Gold Standard Where to Go</figcaption></figure><p>In the US, the Federal Reserve <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bretton_Woods_system">formally abandoned the gold standard</a> once and for all in 1971, leading to the collapse of the Bretton-Woods Agreement in place since post-war 1945. The subsequent conversion to a free-floating “fiat” system backed by the <strong>“full faith and credit” </strong>of sovereign governments initiated a new form of Monetary Policy. The Federal Reserve was handed <a href="https://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/money_12848.htm">new statutory mandates</a>, which included price stability and maximum employment and moderate long-term interest rates</p><p>This switch allowed for a speeding up of capital flow through the economy as investment and lending accelerated. It also provided Central Bankers with more tools to respond to the periodic recession or depression. When the GDP growth turned negative for two or more quarters (the definition of a <strong>recession</strong>), Central Bankers could ease the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liquidity_trap">liquidity trap</a> demand for safe assets by temporarily increasing the monetary base. This would have been impossible under the previous gold-backed system, where any increases in monetary base would need to be matched by an equivalent increase in the gold reserves.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*GPLdnE6-9hnkxBfzxy5TxA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Figure 3. “Redeemable in Gold on Demand” (Source: Wikipedia)</figcaption></figure><h3><strong>From Monetarism to Interest Rate Targeting to Monetarism</strong></h3><p>One drawback of Monetary Policy is the inability of Central Banks to influence monetary velocity <em>V</em> directly.</p><p>Since the collapse of Bretton Woods, Central Bankers realized that <strong>interest rate targeting</strong> via Open Market Operations (i.e. the buying and selling of government debt on the open market which increases/decreases the effective interest rates in the market) was <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1969-1976/nixon-shock">a more effective policy tool</a> than simply manipulating the Money Supply.</p><p>In the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008–2009, <strong>even Open Market Operations provide insufficient to stop the rot</strong>. Faced with employment and structural solvency concerns, consumers and investors flocked to the best safe haven asset they knew — cash.</p><p>The Fed and other central banks around the world began a wholesale experiment of “<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantitative_easing">Quantitative Easing</a>”, aggressively purchasing primary and secondary issuance of Govt.-issued bonds to counteract a contracting money velocity V by increasing monetary base M.</p><p>At one point, the Fed was purchasing $80B worth of asset purchases <em>per month. </em>This is also what’s known as Central Bank money printing, loathed by libertarians and fiscal hawks worldwide. Ironically they’d prefer to fix M but to their liking.</p><h3><strong>MV = PQ, Price Stability and Inflation</strong></h3><p>Back to M*V=P*Q for a moment.</p><p>The equation still has its utility, helping central bankers determine an optimal monetary base <em>M</em> required to maintain a stable and growing GDP <em>P*Q</em>, a calculation especially important after the constraints of gold-peg had been abolished.</p><p>Velocity <em>V</em> on the other hand was almost an afterthought, the multiplier they derived by dividing <em>P*Q </em>by <em>M</em>.</p><p>Once calculated, we could assume V to be constant in the short run thereby illuminating other relationships. For example, with a constant V, money base M is [directly proportional to] P*Q. In the short-run, as M increases, GDP increases. Not bad to give the economy and markets a fillip, almost like a shot of pure oxygen helps an ailing patient recover.</p><p>But Q, or the production capacity of the economy is a structural constraint and increases at a very slow pace. Beyond these constraints, increasing <em>M</em> only serves to increase price levels <em>P</em> — i.e. inflation or worse, hyper-inflation.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/738/1*yTrnD9XsrQBKuxmk4fQyNg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Figure 4. Keeping V constant, M is proportional to P * Q (Source: Austere Capital)</figcaption></figure><p>Therefore, money supply <em>M</em> can be used to influence price inflation, increasing or decreasing it to maintain price stability. In this way, Central Banks give investors and consumers comfort about the future of the economy, incentivizing investments and consumptions and keeping the economic engine going.</p><h3><strong>MV = PQ and A Misplaced Lust for Deflation</strong></h3><p>A major argument for the supremacy of crypto-currencies — at least viewed by the most libertarian or crypto-anarchist factions — is their fixed supply, or “deflationary” nature. This scarcity coincides with (and therefore causes?) price appreciation against a benchmark, usually the USD.</p><p>Point proved, case closed, we’re all Bitcoiners now. Right?</p><p>Not quite. Deflationary currencies work horribly in real world — essentially, the gold standard all over again. A deflationary environment encourages hoarding of cash, as it will be worth more tomorrow than it is today. <strong>This hoarding is magnified in economic downturns, gives rise to deflationary spirals</strong>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*VPwlckY6MsZCIG8-4QPSLg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Figure 5. A Deflationary Spiral is Bad for Everyone (Source: Innovative Advisory Group)</figcaption></figure><p>One could even theorize that in an all-crypto-currency world, with no Central Banks, there’d be no one to provide much needed liquidity injections during times of throttled capital flow. With velocity rapidly descending towards zero, <strong>CryptoLandia would swiftly and pro-cyclically descend into a prolonged and catastrophic recessions.</strong></p><p>So whilst parabolically rising crypto-currency prices are great when viewed from a fiat-currency investment perspective, they’d be terrible for the residents of CryptoLandia. Except perhaps the top 1% of Crypto owners who’d be sitting pretty, enjoying the increased spending power of their air-dropped haul.</p><p>Perhaps explaining the early adopter’s love for deflationary crypto-currencies?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*hYu0TnHHbLdVexPfdFZpZw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Figure 6. This Guy Loves Deflation (Source: <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UG7zLhEWanc">Remy and Reason TV</a>)</figcaption></figure><h3><strong>MV = PQ can be Circular</strong></h3><p>MV = PQ equation is what’s called an <em>identity equation — </em>an equation created such that both sides are always equal. In this case, sum of all purchases in an economy ought to be equal the sum of all sales. M*V represents the former, or the number of times money is ‘spent’. P*Q represents the latter, or the sum of all production sold.</p><p>We need to be cautious in using MV = PQ free of the original context and constraints. The equation can be circular, as the terms aren’t exactly independent of the other.</p><p>For example, the St Louis Fed data shows <strong><em>V = (P*Q) / M</em></strong><em> </em>falling drastically during the last crisis. We know that over this period GDP severely contracted, reducing the numerator. But also know that M was dramatically expanded in response, increasing the denominator.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*UtF8x2z2MFjSREJEm9p_nw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Figure 7. Expansion of the Monetary Base (Source: St. Louis Fed)</figcaption></figure><p>So did <em>V</em> contract because consumers hoarded cash and businesses delayed investment decisions? Or was it because the evil Central Bankers increased <em>M </em>even as the <em>P*Q</em> fell?</p><p>Or, even more nonsensically, a greater-than-proportionate reduction in <em>M</em> than the <em>P*Q </em>contraction would at least numerically restored <em>V</em>. By this measure, should the Fed have actually contracted monetary base by hiking rates and withdrawing stimulus?</p><p><strong>We say again — applying this equation free and clear of its original context and constraints can yield frankly ridiculous results.</strong></p><h3><strong>How MV=PQ Works in the Real World</strong></h3><p>Let’s go back to our old friends, the Nigerians, who we first met in <a href="https://medium.com/@anshumanmehta/what-stellar-lumens-teaches-us-about-token-economics-80e3ac14aa71">our analysis of Stellar and XLM.</a></p><p>The Nigerian monetary base is <a href="/service/file:///source%20https/::tradingeconomics.com:nigeria:money-supply-m1">NGN 11T and its annual GDP is c. NGN 18T</a>. Applying our equation, this yields to a velocity <em>V</em> of 1.7.</p><p>Now let’s assume that the Nigerian economy starts to slow down. Corporate and personal bankruptcies defaults increase, and the banks’ ability to lend is impaired. There’s bad news on the TV, sentiment generally worsens and instead of talking of the next bubble, Nigerians find themselves talking of the next crash. Families and investors start to conserve cash, reduce spending and postpone purchases. Previously referred to as the ‘liquidity trap’, this reduces Velocity <em>V</em>, because investors and consumers become naturally cautious.</p><p>A slowing economy is bad because it leads to vicious circles. Fearing the future, investors and consumers postpone purchase and investment decisions. Factories shut down, workers get laid off leading to unemployment, further suppressing demand. The economy contracts and becomes moribund.</p><p>This is why most central banks have a <strong>price stability mandate</strong> — keep inflation at a steady track at or around 2% for most developed economies.</p><p>In our example, when Nigerian economy slows, the central bank can do one of two things.</p><p>It can lower the interest rates and introduce fiscal stimulus, cutting taxes and embarking on public investment programs to stimulate the economy. The <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/nigeria-rates/update-1-nigeria-central-bank-holds-interest-rate-at-14-pct-idUSL8N1M74AF">Nigerian central bank interest rate</a> is around 14%. By lowering rates, the Nigerian CB encourages savers to spend because they don’t get much return on their bank deposits. It also induces risk taking because opportunity cost of capital, much like the actual borrowing cost, is lowered.</p><p>This approach has its limits though. You could only reduce rates to 0% (or so we thought before the crisis. There have been some notable examples of ‘mildly’ negative interest rates since.)</p><p>The second approach is a <strong>Quantitate Easing or QE </strong>program. QE has twin effects of reducing the government interest rate curve, the bedrock off which all assets in the economy are priced, and removing government bonds from the supply of investible assets in the economy.</p><p>But why do all of this? Isn’t some correction good?</p><p>Yes — some cooling of an overheated economy is good, via what’s called a <a href="http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2012-10/08/content_15799482.htm">soft-landing or a managed reduction of inflation</a>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/882/1*nYEbbZ-8D_2NkW2yPqfWNw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Figure 8. The Chinese Soft Landing of 2012-Present (Source: CCN)</figcaption></figure><p>But go too far and the economy can plunge into a deflationary spiral, a terrifying prospect. Let’s take a simple example — say the prices of new refrigerators are falling in Nairobi, week on week. Rational consumers will postpone their purchase of a new fridge, expecting lower prices in the future.</p><p>On an aggregate level, this causes demand for fridges to go down. Fridge manufacturers are stuck with costly excess inventory and cut back on manufacturing. They impose layoffs, increasing unemployment amongst fridge plant workers. Fridge workers in turn reduce their willingness to make discretionary purchases, for example buying cars. This further suppresses aggregate demand, now hitting car manufacturers and <em>their </em>employees.</p><p>Corporate failures mount, it becomes hard to earn revenue to pay off debts and the economy keeps contracting in a vicious cycle [insert diagram above].</p><p>A deflationary spiral must be avoided at all costs.</p><p>So, when our Nigerian friends are faced with a slowing economy, they try to maintain price stability by temporarily increasing M. In the short-run at least, this should have the impact of counteracting the slowing money circulation velocity V, and maintaining price stability (P*Q).</p><p>With some luck, they are able to mitigate the impact of a slowdown.</p><h3><strong>Do the Printing Presses Stay On?</strong></h3><p>In theory, when the economy recovers and confidence returns, velocity <em>V</em> should recover to pre-crisis levels.</p><p>At such a time, QE can be reversed. If it continues abated, i.e. <em>M</em> remains elevated, then either <em>Q</em> or <em>P</em>, or a combination of both, will increase to balance the equation.</p><p>While increased money supply <em>M</em> generally incentivizes investment, and we’d expect production capacity <em>Q</em> to show some increase, this is a structural change and it takes time. The more likely impact is a rapid increase in <em>P</em>, or <strong>hyperinflation</strong>, a prospect the libertarians and monetarists have been warning us of since the onset of QE.</p><p>It is important to note that <em>V</em> cannot be measured directly with ease. So as GDP growth recovers, the Central Banks will likely reduce <em>M</em> and observe the impact on the GDP, therefore deriving V. If required, they would then reduce <em>M</em> some more and repeat the observation process. This is because <em>V</em> is not an objective statistic that can be easily measured — it must be derived for GDP growth rate with a given growth in money supply <em>M.</em></p><h3><strong>Let’s MV=PQ the Crypto Way</strong></h3><p>It’s clear then that M*V = P*Q is complicated interplay of monetary base, the GDP and the economic incentives of investors, savers and consumers. But to understand how this equation is applied to crypto valuation, <strong>we have to unlearn all the intricate economic relationships we covered above.</strong></p><p>In the crypto-interpretation, MV=PQ has been variously used to determine <strong>token target price, market size, ‘market cap’, even d’app or protocol network valuations.</strong></p><p>In <a href="https://medium.com/@cburniske/cryptoasset-valuations-ac83479ffca7">his seminal piece</a>, Chris Burniske built a model for token valuation using an elegant framework of a distributed network with a native token.</p><p>The underlying assumption was that the revenues generated each year by a network or protocol are ‘earned’ by token holders by selling their tokens to protocol customers. In other words, a future expectation of USD-denominated income <em>P*Q</em> is divided by the ‘token base’ <em>M</em> circulating <em>V</em> times through the system. The result is a target price, effectively the exchange rate of the crypto-currency, back into USD.</p><p><strong>This is extremely disingenuous.</strong></p><p>The first problem is that estimating revenue or <em>P*Q</em> of a crypto-network is hard, because well, there are none. (And before you say “But trading…”, trading revenues from price appreciation do not count as these rely on a constant Ponzi-like admission of new entrants returning capital to departing holders).</p><p>Next, the author(s) <strong>confessed to estimating <em>V</em> </strong>in order to complete the equation. Unlike our previous economic examples where velocity <em>V</em> was a derived multiplier to make the equation between <em>M</em> and <em>P*Q</em> balance, here it is an active ingredient that is estimated and input to derive <em>M</em>.</p><p>An arbitrary assumption of <em>V</em>, made with no regard to the token model or economic incentives of token holders, has since become the norm in this kind of analysis.</p><p>And then there is this.</p><h3><strong>The MV = PQ Circularity</strong></h3><p>In order to determine a token’s USD price target, we need to estimate <em>P*Q</em> in USD terms. This logically makes sense — after all most goods and services are still priced in ‘fiat’ will continue to do so for a long time. US-based or USD-based customers will conduct price equivalence analyses against competitors in USD. Commercial transactions will take place in USD, and market size is measured in USD terms.</p><p>The right side of the equation M*V = P*Q is therefore in USD.</p><p><strong>This is an extremely important determination, and leads to a discovery that causes the whole experiment to unravel.</strong></p><p>Let’s go back to our friends in Nigeria.</p><p>The economy in Nigeria is denominated in Nigerian Naira. <em>M</em> and <em>P*Q </em>are both similarly denominated in Naira. <em>V</em> then is the velocity with which the Naira circulates in the Nigerian economy.</p><p><strong>Notice something?</strong></p><p>In the Nigerian MV = PQ, all these terms are denominated in the currency of the network — NGN. What we do not do, <strong>what we cannot do</strong>, is use MV= PQ <strong>to determine the target price for NGN in USD i.e. the NGN/USD FX rate.</strong></p><p>But somehow, the authors of most M*V = P*Q crypto pieces are able to do so with ease. So what gives?</p><p><a href="https://medium.com/@cburniske/cryptoasset-valuations-ac83479ffca7">Let’s look again at the linked piece again</a> — the author assumes that his startup captures a certain market share of global market, <em>equivalent to a certain USD amount.</em></p><p>Ah ha — <strong>we have already assumed USD-denominated revenues for the network</strong>.</p><p>But the proposed protocol has its own native token, much like Bitcoin or Filecoin or any similar other. To use the network, one must purchase the token. And to buy the token, you must sell USD at the prevalent … <strong>trading price or exchange rate.</strong></p><p>We spy circularity here.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*dlJFAlR8vlder0Blnp34zg.jpeg" /></figure><p>How so? A distributed network is expected to generate USD revenues by buying and selling tokens at the traded token/USD price all year long. The crypto M*V = P*Q equation turns right around and <strong>uses this very USD revenue </strong>figure to try to determine a target token/USD price.</p><p><strong>No bueno.</strong></p><p>Does this circularity show up when using real-world examples? Let’s explore.</p><h3><strong>Keeping TRAC of Your Origin (Trails)</strong></h3><p><a href="https://origintrail.io/">OriginTrail</a> is an early stage distributed ledger supply chain startup with its own token, TRAC. In order to use their ledger, whether to write to it or acquire supply chain data from a provider, a user needs to own the TRAC token.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/782/1*L4Po6Q-tFSp9OLwJxE4fIA.jpeg" /></figure><p>Let’s assume you need 1 TRAC to buy 1MB of data. And there’s demand for 100MB of data globally per year.</p><p>So what is Origin Trail’s revenue (P*Q) per year?</p><p>P*Q = 100 MB * 1 = 100 … but 100 what?</p><p><strong>100 TRAC.</strong></p><p>And what if TRACs were sold an average price of $1 through the year? Now we can calculate Origin Trail network’s USD revenues.</p><p><strong>P*Q in USD = 100 MB * 1 TRAC/MB * $1/TRAC = $100</strong></p><p>Great, we have our USD revenue but guess what — the process of earning this USD denominated revenue already baked in the the implicit ‘target price’ for TRAC. <strong>The most important ingredient in determining TRAC token price, the USD-denominated P*Q, already factors in an actual exchange price for TRAC/USD at which it was earned.</strong></p><p>This is an important result, and it holds good even for the likes of BTC. The conclusion is inescapable. <strong>M*V = P*Q simply cannot be used to calculate the target price a crypto currency.</strong></p><h3><strong>Comparing Crypto-Networks using MV=PQ</strong></h3><p><em>Ah</em>, you say, but we conduct <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_(nominal)">comparative analyses of national GDPs</a> in USD terms all the time. Perhaps there is a way to compare ‘cryptocurrency economies’, or decentralized networks, similarly?</p><p>All we’d need to do is calculate P*Q strictly in the native token terms, and then convert it to USD at a year-end traded price.</p><p><strong><em>Ne c’est pas</em>?</strong></p><p><strong>The answer sadly is still <em>non</em> — since the P*Q side of the equation is initially denominated in fiat terms.</strong></p><p>The utility of the network or protocol will always be measured in an off-chain medium-of-exchange (likely the fiat currency of the country in which the service is rendered). Networks will always capture market value in fiat terms, and the token price will be largely irrelevant to the price customers are willing to pay for the service.</p><p>It’s no surprise then that crypto-architects allow for tokens to be sub-divisible into many quadrillion smaller units to enable this ease of real-world use.</p><h3><strong>Use-Case for MV = PQ in Crypto Valuation</strong></h3><p>So, can we use M*V = P*Q for anything at all within the spectrum of cryptocurrency valuation?</p><p><strong>Well, no, not in terms of valuation.</strong></p><p>We theorize that a startup’s ability to <strong>influence the token base</strong> <em>M </em>based on observed velocity <em>V </em>can help it manage the actual price paid by end users of its service. Clever protocol design can allow the network to self-release or burn tokens as necessary.</p><p>Clever crypto-architects can also <strong>monitor the health of a functioning distributed network</strong> by keeping tabs on velocity V. Low velocity, whether by design or misaligned investor, participant and customer incentives, may push up token prices but render the networks commercially unviable.</p><p>These are still rather difficult calculations since token velocity, based as it is on projected user adoption and token holder incentives, cannot be known ahead of time.</p><p>Additionally, a more interesting question arises:</p><p>The more “successful” a crypto-network becomes — i.e. the more user-traction it receives — the more the token appreciates in value, paradoxically incentivizing speculators and hodl’ers to hoard it rather than its intended use in the decentralized platform.</p><p><strong>Arguably, the success of a decentralized network then works against its future success.</strong></p><p>The counter against this is to price services not in token terms, but in fiat currency. At that point,<strong> we question the very need for a token — why not sell the services in fiat?</strong></p><p>This circularity manifest doesn’t manifest itself more explicitly for tokens like Bitcoin. <strong>We believe this is because Bitcoin has a tradable screen price that is completely de-linked from its intrinsic value as a transmission mechanism.</strong> Other factors at play, such as speculation or evasion, push up the price of BTC beyond what is justifiable from an economic standpoint.</p><p>We also note that optimal token velocity is rarely addressed in white papers — <a href="https://basicattentiontoken.org/BasicAttentionTokenWhitePaper-4.pdf">Basic Attention Token (BAT)</a> formally addresses this in theirs. Their contention is that, based on natural supply/demand dynamics between token users and hodl-ers, an optimal token velocity is ensured. Hence, when the token becomes more profitable to hodl rather than use, users will switch to a cheaper network that provides a similar service, causing the former token’s value to decline, which will make the network cheaper to use again, and so on.</p><p>Some others, like Factom and BlockEx’s DAXT platform, utilize a specific token-burning mechanism in order to ensure an optimal balance between token hodl-ing and use.</p><h3><strong>Conclusion</strong></h3><p>And so, we find yet that another popular tool for determining crypto-currency valuation is fundamentally flawed.</p><p><strong>MV = PQ </strong>is a fine approach to monetary theory, but within the context of its derivation and limits to its use.</p><p>Applying MV = PQ to crypto-currencies might yield numbers in the same order of magnitude as on-screen trading prices. But that’s down to a careful selection of the inputs or mere happenstance than any intellectual rigor. It is akin to <strong>observing two bananas, ten oranges and five apples on a table, and suggesting that (Apples = Oranges / Bananas). </strong>Mathematically correct but not scientifically sound.</p><p>And that’s not how we like them apples.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=db70c9d5c015" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Debunking Bitcoin’s Remittance Valuation. Featuring a Lead Pipe]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@anshumanmehta/debunking-bitcoins-remittance-valuation-featuring-a-lead-pipe-b84c30622b17?source=rss-b03c9aaf1634------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b84c30622b17</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bitcoin]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Anshuman Mehta]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 22 Feb 2018 20:08:32 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-06-26T16:09:43.865Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Author: <a href="http://www.linkedin.com/in/connectanshuman">Anshuman Mehta</a>. <em>Tweet at the author </em><a href="https://twitter.com/anshumanaustere"><em>here.</em></a></p><h3><strong>Introduction</strong></h3><p>At its peak, Bitcoin has traded at a price of nearly $20k and a ‘market capitalization’ of over $300bn. If it were its own country, Bitcoin would rank 40th in the world, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_(nominal)">amongst such heavyweights</a> as Singapore and Ireland.</p><p>That’s one mighty chilli crab and Guinness combo we’re talking.</p><p>Several thought pieces have sought to justify this price, and indeed place a higher price target, on the basis of a killer use case — <strong>the global money remittance business.</strong></p><p>Proponents claim BTC will inexorable transform from medium of exchange to store of value, and forecast BTC price will continue to rise, or “go to the moon” as the ‘market cap’ becomes equal to the global remittance volume.</p><p>Enthusiasts of other transmission protocols, whether XRP, XLM or any other, use similar analysis to justify their own price targets.</p><p><strong>We believe that this analysis, whether applied to BTC or any other, is fundamentally unsound. </strong>It conflates agency with ownership, and misunderstands the basics of the global remittance value chain.</p><p>Let’s take a closer look.</p><h3><strong>Medium of Exchange Becomes Store of Value</strong></h3><p>First, we must go back to a hypothesis <a href="https://research.ark-invest.com/hubfs/1_Download_Files_ARK-Invest/White_Papers/Bitcoin-Ringing-The-Bell-For-A-New-Asset-Class.pdf">first circulated in 2015</a>, and subsequently repeated <a href="https://hackernoon.com/whats-the-true-value-of-cryptocurrencies-4409bd8528b0">over</a> and <a href="https://www.javelinstrategy.com/coverage-area/bitcoin-and-global-remittance-market">over</a> again.</p><p>The proponents assume that Bitcoin network would capture market share in <strong>the global money remittance business. </strong>10%, 20% or even, why not, 100% depending on the bullishness of the author.</p><p>At the conservative end, with a 10% market share of global remittance volume ($450B in 2014, projected to grow to ~<a href="http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2017/10/03/remittances-to-recover-modestly-after-two-years-of-decline">$550B today</a>), the Bitcoin blockchain would handle a remittance volume of c. $55B.</p><p>The author(s) then surmise that in order to transmit $55B, <strong>one would need to purchase $55B of Bitcoins.</strong></p><p><strong>Next came the critical assumption — the price of each Bitcoin would rise till the ‘market cap’ of 16M Bitcoins outstanding became equal to $55B.</strong></p><p>Divide one number by other and you get a number.</p><p>In this case, the authors derived a ‘price target’ of ($55B / 16M) = <strong>$4K per BTC.</strong></p><p>BTC trading under $4K would mean it was undervalued with room to grow.</p><blockquote><strong>Which worked great because the price at the end of 2015 was ~$430.</strong></blockquote><p>Of course, this was in 2015. Since then, market-share bullishness has vastly increased. The authors can extrapolate freely such that at the current annual remittance market of almost $600B+ and 16M BTC minted, BTC’s price should “to the moon”.</p><p>There’s only one problem with this analysis <strong>— it’s deeply flawed.</strong></p><p>To understand why, let’s look at how the remittance business really works.</p><h3><strong>Alice, Bob and a Lead Pipe</strong></h3><p>Meet our friends Alice and Bob.</p><p>Alice has a gold nugget that she needs to send to Bob.</p><p>Alice can wrap the nugget in wrapping paper and hand it directly to Bob. Bob unwraps the paper and discards it.</p><p>In this scenario, <strong>the gold nugget is still worth $1 Billion</strong>. The transmission mechanism i.e. the wrapping paper is worthless.</p><p>Or Alice can also use another transmission mechanism — <strong>say a lead pipe</strong> — to keep the gold away from prying eyes. She inserts the gold into the pipe and slides it across to Bob.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*0Kwo5dwHlfsEIiP7kQxqTA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Figure 1. One gold nugget at a time (source: Austere Capital)</figcaption></figure><p>For a few seconds, as the gold travels through the pipe, the pipe is worth a billion dollars. Once the gold reaches the other end, and Bob removes safely removes it and the pipe reverts to being just that — <strong>an empty lead pipe</strong>.</p><p>The lead pipe merely serves merely as the conduit. The gold nugget does not belong inside the lead pipe, nor does it belong to the owners of the pipe. (Unless, of course, the pipe owner blocks one end of the pipe and makes off with the pipe-gold combo. <strong>That’s just plain illegal.</strong>)</p><p>Not so in the aforementioned Bitcoin analysis.</p><p>The analysis assumed that because the Bitcoin blockchain would carry $55B of remittances per year, <strong>the value of the Bitcoin network (# of tokens * token price, also known as ‘market cap’) would equal $55B.</strong></p><p>Even before we point out that the remittance volume is an annualized figure and token prices are measured at a particular point in time, or that this analysis ignores token velocity, <strong>this logic is plain wrong.</strong></p><p><strong>The authors confused the “medium” for the “message”, the agents for the principals.</strong></p><p>Transmitting $55bn doesn’t make the transmission mechanism worth $55bn, no more than sliding a gold nugget through a lead pipe make the lead pipe worth the price of gold.</p><p><strong>The remittances channeling through a protocol belong to the remitters and the receivers, not to the protocol or the token holders.</strong></p><p>To the latter belongs only <strong>the remittance fee </strong>— the price Alice is willing to pay for the safe transmission of the gold.</p><p>And this is a small fraction of the cost of the gold nugget.</p><h3><strong>A Constant Flow of Gold Nuggets</strong></h3><p>Ah, you say, but no transmission mechanism conducts only one transaction at a time. Surely, a network that transmits $45B of remittances per year has $45B of value locked in?</p><p>To examine this point, let’s extend our Lead Pipe analogy a bit further.</p><p>Let’s assume that Alice sends 31.5M nuggets per year — quite an impressive volume.</p><p><strong>Is the lead pipe now worth the total volume of nuggets (31.5M) it transmits?</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*nb_2Blzkz6BAuaDVzso1LQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Figure 2. A Steady Flow of Nuggets (source: Austere Capital)</figcaption></figure><p>Not quite.</p><p>31.5M nuggets a year still only equates to <strong>one gold nugget per second</strong>. Assuming our lead pipe is as efficient as the Bitcoin network, therefore each nugget only takes c. 10 minutes on average to ‘settle’ i.e. reach Bob.</p><p>And Bob promptly removes the nugget from the pipe upon receipt.</p><p><strong>This means even with a high annual volume (31.5M nuggets), the lead pipe only has 10 minutes worth or 600 gold nuggets travelling through it at any given time.</strong></p><p>This is an important conclusion.</p><p>By this measure, even if the entire global remittance business of $550B moved to Bitcoin network, this would only correspond to a run rate of $17.5K/sec, assuming a steady 24x7 flow of remittances.</p><p>A 10-minute transaction settlement period means the network will only ‘contain’ 10 minutes worth of value at any time. The math is simple:</p><p>$17k/sec * 60sec/min * 10min = $10.5M</p><p><strong>This is great for the network but lousy for the BTC price.</strong></p><p>Why? Remember, almost 16M BTCs have been minted. All those free-float BTCs fighting to carry only $8.5M of value every 10 minutes — that can’t be good.</p><h3><strong>The LeadCoins Obfuscation</strong></h3><p>Our analogy is great for understanding the divide between the Principal (or the owners of the remittance i.e. Alice and Bob) and the Agent (or the transmitter of value i.e. the lead pipe).</p><p>Remittances (gold nuggets) are not the channel (lead pipe). Remittance beneficiaries (Alice and Bob) are not transmitters (the owners of the lead).</p><p>This analogy is also <strong>imperfect</strong>.</p><p>In crypto-currency implementations, distinctions can become blurred. <strong>In order to remit money through the Bitcoin network, one must purchase Bitcoins</strong>.</p><p>A closer approximation then is if Alice needs to convert her gold nuggets to a crypto-currency, let’s call it <strong>LeadCoins</strong>, minted and controlled by Charlie who owns the lead pipe.</p><p>So how does our analysis evolve? <strong>We call it The LeadCoin Obfuscation.</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*4rmtLzuDbU3u7Z2f7rA_gA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Figure 7. The Lead Coin Obfuscation (source: Austere Capital)</figcaption></figure><p>In this scenario, Alice trades her gold nuggets for LeadCoins and transmits them to Bob. She willingly pays a small fee for the transmission of gold.</p><p>At the other end, Bob receives LeadCoins and exchanges them for gold nuggets.</p><p><strong>As before, neither Alice nor Bob have any off-pipe use for LeadCoin</strong>. We also assume that <strong>Bob exchanges all LeadCoins for gold nuggets</strong>. To the extent Bob leaves LeadCoins in the pipe, whether for speculation or future use, the value of the pipe may rise by the equivalent of gold nuggets not redeemed.</p><p><strong>One could argue that the act of buying a gold nugget ‘worth’ of LeadCoins would cause one LeadCoin to rise in value. </strong>And in the short term, this relationship probably holds.</p><p>But the underlying economics are unmistakable. Alice and Bob are in the gold business, not the LeadCoin business. So long as they are able to purchase and sell LeadCoins for the purpose of transferring their gold, <strong>at predictable prices and in the right amount</strong>, the LeadCoins may as well not exist for them.</p><p>Similarly, the global remittance business accomplishes a transfer of fiat money for end-user requirements, not to build crypto-currency positions or inflate token prices.</p><p>When evaluating the intrinsic value of a payment network token, <strong>what matters is how much revenue Charlie is able to collect from Alice for the use of his LeadCoins</strong>. Printing 1B, 10B or 100B LeadCoins only serves to dilute the per-coin ‘share’ of revenues that is attributable to each token.</p><p><strong>An increase in network value caused by high token issuance volume is short-lived and unsustainable.</strong></p><p>As someone once said, <em>mo’ tokens, mo’ problems.</em></p><h3><strong>But Wait, There’s More</strong></h3><p>Our analysis above makes clear that a very large headline number ($550B remittance volume) breaks down into a fairly manageable constant volume ($17K/sec or $10.5M per settlement cycle).</p><p>We also make clear the difference between <em>principals </em>and <em>agents</em>.</p><p>So, what do the agents earn? If the entire global remittance volume were transmitted on the Bitcoin blockchain, what would that mean for BTC holders in terms of fees and revenues?</p><p>For that, let’s go back to the real world for a moment.</p><p>The <a href="https://remittanceprices.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/rpw_report_december2017.pdf">World Bank estimates that c. 10%</a> of global remittance is eaten up in fees. That’s a scandalously high figure and must be reduced. We sincerely hope that distributed ledger technologies will move us towards a seamless, legal and inexpensive way to transmit this value.</p><p>But for now, we need to work with this constraint — any disruption to the status quo only makes sense if it delivers a fee load lower than 10% of value transmitted.</p><p>Bear in mind that for the pure messaging piece, the value is much lower. For instance, in 2016, the inter-bank SWIFT network transmitted <a href="https://www.swift.com/about-us/financials">nearly 6.5B messages annually in 2016</a>, handling information related to the <a href="https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/Appendix_D.pdf">direct transfer of nearly $5T per day (!)</a> and earning c. <a href="https://www.swift.com/news-events/publications?tl=en#topic-tabs-menu">$900m in revenues</a> with operating profits of c. $50m.</p><p>The rest of the value chain involves building a to-consumer solution, finding and onboarding end-users and institutions, fulfilling know-your-customer requirements, complying with anti-money-regulations etc.</p><p>Again, we are not speculating on whether these activities can or cannot be disrupted (read: delivered cheaper) by deploying distributed tech. We are merely clarifying that the transmission aspects of remittances are but a fraction of the bigger equation.</p><p>So even assuming the <strong>Bitcoin manages to capture $55B of global remittances and the revenues of the entire value chain </strong>magically “moves to the blockchain”, and this move delivers no incremental efficiency over current infrastructure, only 10% or $5.5B is captured as revenue.</p><blockquote>That’s $5.5B. Not $55B. The remittance fee, not the remitted value. The price for using LeadCoins, not the gold.</blockquote><p>But at least we have a revenue figure. We just need to plug in the number of tokens around and hey presto! We Have A Price Target. Right? Not quite.</p><h3>Circularity Circularity</h3><p>Determining a price target is a more complicated analysis, convoluted by the fact that <strong>BTC has a traded price determined by the open market.</strong></p><p>For BTC, as with any other such transmission mechanism with a token trading price, circularity ensues as both the independently set trading price and remittance-revenue based ‘fair value’ jostle for supremacy.</p><p><strong>How? Brace yourself.</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*e-8WtqXIU64b8z55ekHw8Q.jpeg" /><figcaption>Fig 3. Circularity, circularity (source: Austere Capital)</figcaption></figure><p>BTC’s trading price determines how many tokens are required to transmit $55B of remittances. The market share in turn determines revenues earned by the network as a whole, and using the number of tokens calculated above, the per-token revenue. The per-token revenue is in turn used to calculate the token target price given an investor’s return requirements. This token-price would re-set the number of tokens we’d need to remit the $55B of market share captured, altering the revenue per token. And on and on.</p><blockquote>We delve into this circularity at the heart of crypto-valuation in a future piece.</blockquote><h3><strong>Conclusion</strong></h3><p><strong>The Lead Pipe </strong>analogy is a powerful tool for analysing any transmission protocol. The difference between principals and agents must be recognized, and therefore returns priced accordingly.</p><p>This framework is first in a series of pieces that we will publish in the coming weeks. Our mission is to foster the creation of token design best practices and the issuance of high-benchmark tokens in any distributed context.</p><p><strong>We believe this work is imperative if the distributed ledger ecosystem is to thrive.</strong></p><p><strong>To request our token design frameworks, or read more of our past research, </strong><a href="https://austere.capital/contact/"><strong>contact us here.</strong></a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b84c30622b17" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[What Stellar Lumens Teaches Us About Token Economics]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@anshumanmehta/what-stellar-lumens-teaches-us-about-token-economics-80e3ac14aa71?source=rss-b03c9aaf1634------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/80e3ac14aa71</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bitcoin]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[stellar]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Anshuman Mehta]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 09 Feb 2018 18:33:22 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-03-22T17:44:32.682Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Authors: <a href="http://www.linkedin.com/in/connectanshuman">Anshuman Mehta</a> and <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/briankoralewski">Brian Koralewski</a></p><h3><strong>Introduction</strong></h3><p>Back in December 2017, <a href="https://medium.com/@brian.koralewski/stellar-xlm-the-decentralized-multi-faced-financial-services-platform-602007b22349">we published a technical analysis</a> of the Stellar protocol and its ambitions to become a cross-asset payment platform.</p><p>We lauded the breadth of Jed McCaleb and Stellar’s vision of extending financial services and credit to the “unbanked.”</p><p>Today, we reiterate our belief. <strong>These are challenges worth fighting for. Stellar’s work is important, and it is required.</strong></p><p>However, as investors, our primary focus is a dispassionate analysis of the economic model that underpins Stellar’s investible asset — the Lumens token (XLM).</p><p>In our view, there must be a discernable economic link between increased network usage and returns to token holders.</p><p>We ask simple questions <strong>— How does the token generate returns? Is what’s good for the network also good for the token?</strong></p><p>Accordingly, we now analyze the XLM token model in context of Stellar’s vision of developing a new financial system for the world. We unpack the sources of returns and determine whether these are attributable to token holders.</p><blockquote><strong>A complicated picture emerges.</strong></blockquote><h3><strong>Our Working Hypothesis</strong></h3><p>First, we acknowledge the basic regulatory and economic constraints within which financial services firms operate:</p><p>- <a href="https://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/testimony-virtual-currencies-oversight-role-us-securities-and-exchange-commission"><strong>Local and international laws and regulations in relation to financial services must be obeyed</strong></a><strong> </strong>— if not immediately, then eventually and at a greater cost</p><p>- <strong>Prevailing regulations </strong>serve a real purpose — they safeguard customer deposits. Requiring depository institutions to issue risk-absorbing capital and submit to regulatory oversight are but a few.</p><p>- All digital money is information. The transmission of money is theoretically the non-replicable messaging of data. However, <strong>messaging is but a small part of complex money transmission business </strong><a href="http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/992371492706371662/MigrationandDevelopmentBrief27.pdf">— other costs (e.g. KYC, AML, security) are extraneous and can be substantial</a>.</p><p>- “Edge” use-cases are just that — edge cases. In order to have a meaningful impact, <strong>an upstart protocol must significantly upgrade existing infrastructure in major use cases</strong> <a href="http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2017/04/21/remittances-to-developing-countries-decline-for-second-consecutive-year">(e.g. remittances to developing countries is c. 70% of global flow)</a></p><p>- <a href="https://www.realwire.com/releases/britons-more-likely-to-get-divorced-than-switch-banks-despite-1-in-2-claiming-to-be-unhappy-with-the"><strong>There is substantial inertia to consumer behaviour</strong></a><strong> </strong>when it comes to financial services. This is why multiple legacy incumbents exist and require considerable cost effort to displace.</p><p>- Stellar’s target business segments — cross-asset payments and financial services — are <strong>heavily fragmented and extremely crowded </strong>with competing approaches.</p><p>- Consolidating market share is a far tougher proposition than consolidating technological expertise</p><h3><strong>The Lumens (XLM) Token Model</strong></h3><p>The Stellar protocol <a href="/service/mailto:https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/stellar/">authorized c. 100 Billion XLM</a> and issued 10.2B to the founding team and another 8B to the public, with a promise of more to come (via inflation and ‘airdrops’).</p><p>We asked a simple question — <strong>what are the sources of returns to an XLM investor?</strong></p><p><strong>We ignored returns solely attributable to XLM’s price appreciation.</strong></p><p><strong>Capital gains without capital returns are merely a Ponzi-like redistribution of wealth. </strong>Eventually, an investment must generate returns to create value.</p><p>A distributed protocol must create sufficient utility to an external participant that they willingly purchase its token for some use case, adding an external of monetary value to an otherwise closed ecosystem.</p><p>We identified four such sources of revenues for the Stellar ecosystem — and concluded that <strong>not all of these accrued value to XLM holders.</strong></p><ol><li>Operation Fees — write to the Stellar network’s distributed database</li><li>XLM as Medium of Exchange — Lend or sell Lumens as a ‘step-through’ currency</li><li>Asset-pair Trading</li><li>Commercialization of the Protocol</li></ol><h3><strong>Revenue Source 1 — Operation Fees</strong></h3><p>The most obvious source of revenue is <strong>operation fees.</strong></p><p>Perhaps in a nod to its Ripple-origins, Stellar prevents <strong>spam </strong>by instituting a <strong>hard-coded a fee of 0.00001XLM</strong> (100 “Stroops”) per operation.</p><p>Equivalent to the transaction fees in Bitcoin blockchain or gas limit in Ether, this is price a user pays to commit their data to Stellar’s distributed ledger.</p><p>(Note: we deliberately do not call Stellar’s ledger <em>a blockchain </em>because the protocol is not a block-based system. Also note that an ‘operation’ is not to be confused with ‘transaction’ — a transaction may contain multiple operations.)</p><p>This hard limit, coupled with Stellar’s own conservative throughput estimates of c. 1000 ops / sec, has <strong>the unintended consequence of limiting the total XLM required to run the network at peak capacity to only 315K XLM</strong>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*VGXHmYPhp15wTTueb__xhQ.jpeg" /><figcaption><em>Table1 — Peak XLM usage in Operations Fee per Year (source: Austere Capital)</em></figcaption></figure><p>At a market price of $0.36 (as of Feb 8, 2018) this stream only contributes c. $115,000 revenue to token holders.</p><p>This makes intuitive sense — Stellar wishes to keep network near free to use to enable micropayments.</p><p><strong>However, it does not bode well for Lumen holders.</strong></p><p>And there is another dynamic at play here.</p><p>We consider this part of the business model most akin the incumbent <strong>SWIFT’s messaging engine </strong>— the immutable transmission of instructions.</p><p>A member-owned entity, SWIFT generates c. $250m of earnings annually. Stellar aims to displace SWIFT. Startup wisdom dictates it must demonstrate a proverbial 10x improvement. This places a natural ceiling on the revenue potential from this stream.</p><p><strong>Clearly, then, the operation fee is unlikely to be a significant contributor to XLM token holder returns.</strong></p><h3><strong>Revenue Source 2 — Medium of Exchange</strong></h3><p>The second, and major use case of XLM is as <strong>a medium of exchange</strong>.</p><p>In order to full explore this aspect, we must first explore the part hard currencies play in global markets — as <strong>step-through currencies.</strong></p><p>Let’s consider the global FX market. The USD is the de facto reserve currency of the world, which means most other currencies trade against USD. The trading pair of a currency (e.g. GBP) and the USD tends to be the most liquid (highest flow) and frequently traded (smallest execution costs).</p><p>There are some notable exceptions (e.g. EUR/GBP is liquid and widely traded) but this principle largely holds.</p><p>A corollary is that markets for smaller currency pairs (e.g. Indian Rupee — INR vs. Nigerian Naira — NGN) are illiquid and rarely trade direct.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/858/1*iywi7oST7GNO71y3aesDcA.jpeg" /><figcaption><em>Figure 1 — USD as Step Through Currency (source: Austere Capital)</em></figcaption></figure><p>If you want to exchange your INR for NGN, you’d have to sell INR, buy USD; then sell USD, buy NGN. This transaction would require two deep and liquid markets in requisite sizes — USD/INR and USD/NGN. If either market is illiquid, or closed, then either the transaction remains incomplete or someone in the chain takes on board outright FX risk.</p><p>Stepping through USD involves <strong>a trade-off</strong> between trading costs (legacy infrastructure, middlemen and regulations) and transaction reliability.</p><p>This realization takes us back to Stellar’s original thesis.</p><p>We can send email immediately using digital protocols. All digital money is 0s and 1s. <strong>Shouldn’t we be able to send money similarly?</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*c59zNEQh2kET8FxlDwlBGA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Figure 2 — XLM as Step Through Currency Requires Creation of Additional Markets (source: Austere Capital)</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Stellar’s answer is to introduce XLM — the step-through currency of the digital age.</strong></p><p>Our NGN/INR transaction would trade thus –sell INR, buy XLM; sell XLM, buy NGN. We now need two deep and liquid XLM-XYZ markets (XLM/INR, XLM/NGN) and anchors with sufficient liquidity to process these back-to-back transactions.</p><p>Stellar’s answer to one side of the liquidity question was to <strong>print XLM — lots and lots of it. </strong>XLM was originally ‘free’ to print, as it emanated from code, and the authorized token base of 100B+ had no discernable grounding in science.</p><p>To create the other half of a liquid market, Stellar plans to on-board <strong>anchors </strong>that have natural INR and NGN liquidity (Indian and Nigerian banks) and <strong>allocate them as many free XLMs as required to ‘seed’ the market.</strong></p><p>Further, anchors that end up with bought (or sold) residual XLM positions should be able to offset these immediately.</p><p>Arguably, <strong>no one outside the Stellar universe has any need for XLM</strong>. We live in a fiat currency world, and likely won’t be using XLM to pay electricity bills or buy milk any time soon.</p><p>Thus, the Stellar protocol allows all external participants to interact with each other in an effectively XLM-free manner through the introduction of <strong>Atomic or boolean “all or nothing” transactions.</strong></p><p>To go back to our INR/NGN transaction — it will be concluded the instant XLM/INR and XLM/NGN anchors line up <strong>at the same time, at the right price and the right size</strong>.</p><p>There are exceptions, of course — <strong>an anchor may choose to run an XLM portfolio for profit or speculation.</strong> But we believe this will be a small fraction of the overall flow.</p><p>Now, in the real world, transactions are settled on a net-settled basis. FX dealers run trading books in a currency of their choice and lay off net risk in institutional markets. The process works up the chain till you reach the large international clearing banks that handle global flows on an aggregate basis.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*t3xs3wNYwQbKsEHYDg0wnA.jpeg" /><figcaption><em>Figure 3. FX Market Structure (source: </em><a href="http://www.babypips.com/"><em>www.babypips.com</em></a><em>)</em></figcaption></figure><p>In an XLM world, this institutional market will need to be created, and, <strong>because we live in a fiat currency world, this will be in ‘addition to’ rather than ‘instead of’ existing institutional FX markets.</strong></p><p>So how does a token-holder make money in this schema?</p><p>To align the INR/XLM and XLM/NGN trades above, the protocol will require, for a brief period, an adequate supply of XLM. For 4.5 seconds to be precise, which is the time required to settle a transaction.</p><p>Purchasing or leasing XLM from holders, <strong>perhaps for a small fee</strong>, can fulfill this temporary requirement for XLM. Banks run similar businesses in their Equities Finance and Repo desks. The economics are well understood and subject to market dynamics.</p><p>In theory, anchors purchasing XLM from the public to maintain trading reserves would represent an excellent source of revenue to token holders.</p><p>However, we note that the <strong>Stellar Whitepaper provisions for airdrops to anchors.</strong> It is not clear if these airdrops will suffice for the anchor’s requirements, thereby eliminating any market transaction in XLM.</p><p>This presents a substantial risk to token returns.</p><h3><strong>Revenue Stream 3 — Asset Pair Trading</strong></h3><p>Each leg of an asset-pair transaction (e.g. INR/XLM and XLM/NGN in our example) will require market makers — anchors that take the opposite side of each trade leg.</p><p>In the FX world, these are usually entities that have a natural position in that currency (e.g. Indian or Nigerian banks or corporates).</p><p>Such market making activities are a well-established business model across traded markets. Dealers generally make markets for a small bid / offer margins — i.e. the difference between buy and sell prices.</p><p>Similarly, <strong>we expect Stellar anchors to take small margins for this service.</strong></p><p>The revenue thus earned is attributable to trading operations, <strong>not to public XLM holders.</strong></p><p>FX Dealer (and likely the Stellar anchors) set bid/offer margins independently. We do not expect Stellar to dictate these margins and nor be able to control this aspect of end-user pricing.</p><p>What if atomic swaps do not perfectly align?</p><p>For example, the Indian market may be closed when an INR/USD or INR/XLM request is received.</p><p>In real-world FX market, a dealer could choose to fill the customer order but leave his own book imperfectly hedged. The dealer would trade conservatively (i.e. factor in a bigger margin) to cover for unexpected price movements.</p><p>The Stellar white paper does not suggest that anchors have this option.</p><p>Even if they did, the incremental revenue earned from running un-hedged XLM risk would still belong to the anchors and not token holders.</p><h3><strong>Revenue Stream 4</strong> — Commercializing Stellar protocol</h3><p>In 2017, the Stellar Foundation assigned some core team members to <strong>Lightyear</strong> (www.lightyear.io).</p><p>The Stellar — Lightyear relationship is based on the <strong>Linux Foundation — Red Hat model</strong>.</p><p>Lightyear will be tasked with commercializing the Stellar protocol — generating revenue through <strong>consulting, customization, implementation and maintenance contracts </strong>from its enterprise clients.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*wviH7oJ8Heu3LluHD9K2gg.jpeg" /><figcaption><em>Figure 4. Lightyear is Stellar’s commercial arm (source: </em><a href="http://www.lightyear.io)/"><em>www.lightyear.io)</em></a></figcaption></figure><p>In an oblique sense, Lightyear’s success may lead to increased demand for XLM tokens subject to the constraints described in Revenue Streams 1, 2 and 3 above.</p><p>However, whilst Lightyear’s business activities represent significant revenue potential, this revenue will be attributable to Lightyear’s own corporate structure, it’s employees and common stock shareholders.</p><p><strong>None of this revenue will funnel back to XLM holders.</strong></p><h3><strong>Explaining XLM’s Multi-Billion ‘Market Cap’</strong></h3><p>Stellar will eventually issue 100B+ Billion tokens. At a current market price of ~$0.36 per token, that suggests the market expects a total ‘market cap’ of almost $35B+.</p><p>Our investigations thus far have not come close to how XLM holders may accrue such riches.</p><p>So, what gives?</p><p>We believe the market is pricing in another dynamic — an assumed and inexorable transformation of XLM <strong>from medium of exchange to a store of value.</strong></p><p>To examine further, we must go back to <a href="https://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/533155/1_Download_Files_ARK-Invest/White_Papers/Bitcoin-Disruptive-Currency-ARKInvest.pdf">a hypothesis first circulated in 2015.</a></p><p>The proponents assumed that Bitcoin network would be used for the global remittance trade and capture 10% of the market share. The global remittance volume was $450B at the time. This gave a remittance market share of $45B.</p><p>The author(s) then surmised that in order to transmit $45B, one would need to purchase $45B of Bitcoins. Based on the then issuance volume of 14M Bitcoins, this yielded a price target of $450B / 14M = <strong>$3,000 per BTC.</strong></p><p>Similarly, some XLM holders believe that issued volume of XLM will rise in price <strong>to become equal to the transaction value the protocol is transmitting</strong>. The annual remittance market is now $550B+. Adding an even larger non-remittance addressable market, speculators believe 100B of authorized XLM will go “to the moon”.</p><p>As a result, XLM’s traded at a high of $0.85 per XLM in early January of 2018.</p><p><strong>We believe this is a deeply flawed analysis.</strong></p><p>Let’s unpack this claim further.</p><h3><strong>Alice, Bob and a Lead Pipe</strong></h3><p>Meet our friends Alice and Bob.</p><p>Alice needs to give Bob a gold nugget. She can wrap the nugget in wrapping paper and hand it directly to Bob. Bob unwraps the paper and discards it.</p><p>In this scenario, <strong>the gold nugget is still worth $1 Billion</strong>. The transmission mechanism i.e. the wrapping paper is worthless.</p><p>Or Alice can also use another transmission mechanism — <strong>say a lead pipe</strong> — to keep the gold away from prying eyes. She inserts the gold into the pipe and slides it across to Bob.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*0Kwo5dwHlfsEIiP7kQxqTA.jpeg" /><figcaption><em>Figure 5. One gold nugget at a time (source: Austere Capital)</em></figcaption></figure><p>For a few seconds, as the gold travels through the pipe, the pipe is worth a billion dollars. Once the gold reaches the other end, and Bob removes safely removes it and the pipe reverts to being just that — <strong>an empty lead pipe</strong>.</p><p>The lead pipe merely serves merely as the conduit. The gold nugget does not belong inside the lead pipe, nor does it belong to the owners of the pipe. (Unless, of course, the pipe owner blocks one end of the pipe and makes off with the gold. <strong>And that’s plain illegal.</strong>)</p><p>Not so in the aforementioned Bitcoin analysis.</p><p>The analysis assumed that because the Bitcoin network would carry $45B of remittances per year, <strong>the value of the Bitcoin network would become $45B.</strong></p><p>Even before we point out that the remittance volume is an annualized figure and token prices are measured at a particular point in time, or that this analysis ignores token velocity, <strong>this logic is plain wrong.</strong></p><p><strong>The authors confused the “medium” for the “message”, the agents for the principals.</strong></p><p>Transmitting $45bn doesn’t make the transmission mechanism worth $45bn, no more than placing a gold nugget in a lead pipe makes the lead pipe worth the price of gold.</p><p><strong>The remittances channeling through a protocol belong to the remitters and the receivers, not to the protocol or the token holders.</strong></p><p>To the latter belongs only <strong>the remittance fee </strong>— the price Alice is willing to pay for the safe transmission of the gold. And this is a small fraction of the cost of the gold nugget.</p><h3><strong>A Constant Flow of Gold Nuggets</strong></h3><p>Ah, you say, but no transmission mechanism conducts only one transaction at a time. Surely, a network that transmits $45B of remittances per year has $45B of value locked in?</p><p>To examine this point, let’s extend our Lead Pipe analogy a bit further.</p><p>Let’s assume that Alice sends 31.5M nuggets per year — quite an impressive volume. Is the lead pipe now worth the total volume of nuggets (31.5M) it transmits?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*nb_2Blzkz6BAuaDVzso1LQ.jpeg" /><figcaption><em>Figure 6. A Steady Flow of Nuggets (source: Austere Capital)</em></figcaption></figure><p>Not quite.</p><p>31.5M nuggets a year still only equates to a gold nugget each second. As our lead pipe is as efficient as the Stellar protocol, <strong>each nugget only takes 5 seconds on average to ‘settle’ i.e. reach Bob.</strong></p><p>And Bob promptly removes the nugget from the pipe upon receipt.</p><p><strong>This means even with a high annual volume (31.5M nuggets), the lead pipe only has 5 gold nuggets travelling through it at any given moment.</strong></p><p>This is an important conclusion.</p><p>By this measure, even if the now global remittance business of $550bn moves to Stellar, the network would only hold c. $75k of value at any time ($15K / sec * 5-second ‘operation’ settlement period, assuming a steady flow of remittances.)</p><p><strong>This is great for the network but lousy for the token. Why? Because this implies that we need a far lower volume of tokens to support a network than the 100B XLM.</strong></p><p>The actual answer will depend on token price, velocity and circulation friction. A functional system that efficiently recycles tokens will drive token utilization down to the minimum required.</p><p><strong>Over-issuance of this magnitude has significant consequences for token price.</strong></p><h3><strong>The LeadCoins Obfuscation</strong></h3><p>Our analogy is great for understanding the divide between the principal (or the owner of value) and the Agent (or the transmitter of value).</p><p>Remittances (gold nuggets) are not the channel (lead pipe). Remittance beneficiaries (Alice and Bob) are not XLM holders (lead pipe owner).</p><p>The analogy is also <strong>imperfect</strong>.</p><p>In crypto-currency implementations, distinctions can become blurred. <strong>In order to remit money through the Bitcoin network, one must purchase Bitcoins</strong>. To use Stellar, XLM and so on.</p><p>A closer approximation then is if Alice needs to convert her gold nuggets to a crypto-currency, let’s call it <strong>LeadCoins</strong>, minted and controlled by Charlie who owns the lead pipe.</p><p>So how does our analysis evolve? <strong>We call it The LeadCoin Obfuscation.</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*4rmtLzuDbU3u7Z2f7rA_gA.jpeg" /><figcaption><em>Figure 7. The Lead Coin Obfuscation (source: Austere Capital)</em></figcaption></figure><p>In this scenario, Alice trades her gold nuggets for LeadCoins and transmits them to Bob. She willingly pays a small fee for the transmission of gold.</p><p>At the other end, Bob receives LeadCoins and exchanges them for gold nuggets.</p><p><strong>As before, neither Alice nor Bob have any off-pipe use for LeadCoin</strong>. <strong>Bob immediately exchanges the LeadCoins for gold nuggets</strong>.</p><p><strong>One could argue that the act of buying a gold nugget ‘worth’ of LeadCoins would cause one LeadCoin to rise in value. </strong>And to the extent Bob leaves LeadCoins in the pipe, whether for speculation or future use, the value of the pipe may rise by the equivalent of gold nuggets not redeemed. In the short term, these relationships probably hold.</p><p><strong>But the underlying economics are unmistakable.</strong></p><p>Alice and Bob are in the gold business, not the LeadCoin business. So long as they are able to purchase and sell LeadCoins for the purpose of transferring their gold, <strong>at predictable prices and in the right amount</strong>, the LeadCoins may as well not exist for them.</p><p>Similarly, the global remittance business accomplishes a transfer of fiat money for end-user requirements, not to build crypto-currency positions or inflate token prices.</p><p>When evaluating the intrinsic value of a payment network token, <strong>what matters is how much revenue Charlie is able to collect from Alice for the use of his LeadCoins</strong>. Printing 1B, 10B or 100B LeadCoins only serves to dilute the per-coin ‘share’ of revenues that is attributable to each token.</p><p><strong>An increase in network value caused by high token issuance volume is short-lived and unsustainable.</strong></p><p>As someone once said, <em>mo’ tokens, mo’ problems.</em></p><h3><strong>Debunking the Network Value to Transaction (NVT) Ratio</strong></h3><p>The<strong> Lead Pipe Analogy</strong> also debunks the so-called <strong>Network Value to Transactions </strong>valuation — or <strong>NVT ratio</strong> — for payment protocols (such as XLM and even Bitcoin).</p><p>When scrutinizing utility-token platforms, where a native token is required to utilize the network, <strong>the NVT is a good indicator of platform activity,</strong> but arguably not the end-all in valuation metrics.</p><p>Payment platforms (utilizing XLM-like “step-through” currencies), decentralized exchanges (i.e. <strong>0x</strong>) and certain scaling solutions that require a native token (such as the <strong>Raiden Network</strong>) require<strong> high token velocity to function efficiently.</strong></p><p>An increase in transactions is undoubtedly positive for the protocol. <strong>However, the ratio of Network Value to Transactions, which really is the measure of transaction volume transmitted across the network, pertains to the senders and the receivers </strong>(e.g. the anchors and asset issuers in Stellar-speak) and not token holders who merely enable this transmission.</p><p>Therefore, <strong>no meaningful conclusions about intrinsic value of the tokens can or should be drawn from the ratio of Network Value to Transactions.</strong></p><p>Even <strong>store of value or digital gold </strong>use cases (as Bitcoin’s other main function is believed to be) should not be evaluated according to the NVT ratio, as <em>hodl-ing</em> artificially inflates the overall metric.</p><p><em>A piece on scrutinizing the current Crypto Valuation methodologies such as the highly touted MV, PQ equation will be released in the coming weeks. </em><a href="http://www.austere.capital/"><em>Ask to be notified here.</em></a></p><h3><strong>Revenue Sources — Our Conclusion</strong></h3><p>So we conclude that in the case of asset transmission protocols, whether Bitcoin, Stellar or any other, <strong>the total value attributable to the owners of the network is a combination of revenue sources described in Revenue Streams 1 to 4.</strong></p><p>The network never becomes that which it is transmitting.</p><p>And by the measure of token design, XLM substantially falls short of revenue expectations.</p><h3><strong>Stellar — Further Challenges</strong></h3><p>Stellar has set out to address two major challenges facing developing nations –</p><ul><li>access to financial services (or banking the underbanked); and</li><li>helping small businesses thrive through access to credit</li></ul><p>We examine the challenges ahead in achieving these goals.</p><h3><strong>Banking The Under-Banked</strong></h3><p>In our view, banking the under-banked goes <strong>beyond smartphones and XLM-only wallets.</strong></p><p>Our base assumption here is that the under-banked will continue to live in a <strong>“fiat world”</strong>. An XLM-only wallet, whilst technologically feasible, will remain impractical for daily use unless linked to a fiat-currency bank account.</p><p>Furthermore, providing fiat bank accounts to the under-banked is <strong>only in part a technological challenge </strong>for the existing banking infrastructure.</p><p>The rest is economic — meaning the economic rationale behind serving the low-income and low-wealth segments. Remote, hard to reach or uneconomical-to-serve segments still need to be accessed, provided with documentation identity and a means of accessing wallets offline or online (physical branches or network connectivity and smart phones).</p><p>This is a tough ask, and <strong>the answer is broader than ‘better technology’.</strong></p><p>We do not expect the Stellar Foundation’s enablement of financial services to extend to <strong>the recreation of financial services infrastructure from scratch</strong>. These undertakings harbor significant costs and we do not believe the Stellar Foundation or Lightyear have the wherewithal to undertake these on their own.</p><p>Instead, we welcome their proposed partnerships with local banks and money service agents.</p><p>But we note that <strong>partner cost structures and profit margins </strong>will likely remain beyond Stellar’s control.</p><h3><strong>Enabling Access to Capital</strong></h3><p>Stellar’s second key focus is enabling access to credit for under-served borrowers globally.</p><p>In the most simplistic, and most likely scenario, local clients meet their financing requirements in local currencies. E.g. Nigerian businesses borrow in the Naira from Nigerian banks and generate Naira-denominated revenues.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*TgnTDZN-hpY7i-V27ZJjSA.jpeg" /><figcaption><em>Figure 8. Simplified Domestic Borrowing (source: Austere Capital)</em></figcaption></figure><p><strong>We are not clear on what role Stellar would play in this local-to-local transmission.</strong></p><p>Would this be as payment gateway between local finance companies and local borrowers? Or would Stellar providing an immutable credit score to borrowers by recording history of borrowings and repayments?</p><h3><strong>Enabling Cross-Border Investments</strong></h3><p>Cross-border provision of credit is rare and, in the case of most emerging countries, complicated by capital controls in place on foreign investments.</p><p>It also introduces FX risk, which must be borne either by the lender or the borrower.</p><p>Let’s take an example of an Indian investor lending to a Nigerian small business through the XLM network.</p><p>In this scenario<strong>, who bears the FX risk is determined by the currency in which the borrowing is denominated.</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*pE35A8Iq4UNa1oV44zQmGw.jpeg" /><figcaption><em>Figure 9. INR Investor Lending in NGN (source: Austere Capital)</em></figcaption></figure><p>If the borrowing takes place in NGN, then the Indian investor bears INR/NGN FX risk. A depreciation of NGN against INR means the investor recoups less of his investment, when the borrower repays the same NGN amount.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*o25K8GiBNMe_Rs9ujw8M4g.jpeg" /><figcaption><em>Figure 10. Borrower borrows in INR (source: Austere Capital)</em></figcaption></figure><p>If the investment is denominated in INR, then the tables turn — now it is the borrower who suffers if the NGN weakens. The borrower needs to conjure up more NGN to repay the same INR.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*w3PcJSP1pcJpTdkHAhCLNw.jpeg" /><figcaption><em>Figure 11. Borrowing in XLM (source: Austere Capital)</em></figcaption></figure><p>Finally, some crypto lending platforms attempt to lend in the native crypto-currency or token. If the lending takes place in XLM, then both sides are exposed to FX risk. This risk does not offset, as XLM may be affected by other factors (e.g. Bitcoin price), <strong>introducing something called <em>basis risk </em>into the equation.</strong></p><p>We note that in all these scenarios, the borrower still needs a bank account or relationship with an existing money service business to actually receive physical NGN. Tech innovation has not supplanted the real world yet.</p><h3><strong>One Last Thing — How Many XLM are Enough?</strong></h3><p>The release of the <strong>authorized but as yet un-issued XLM tokens </strong>(c. 87B per the Stellar Foundation) will further dilute the revenue potential of XLM holders.</p><p>The relationship between the 100B Lumens, token price and frequency of usage isn’t clearly understood nor established by precedent.</p><p>We have already calculated that only 350K XLM tokens are required for full-capacity operation fees. If token velocity is high then even a small token volume could theoretically provide step-through function for the entire network.</p><p>Additionally, atomic swaps may further reduce the incentive to hold large XLM reserves thereby depressing price potential.</p><p>The ecosystem simply may not have enough demand to utilize all the 100B+ tokens, even at full steam.</p><h3><strong>Conclusion</strong></h3><p>Stellar is an extremely powerful application of distributed ledger tech. <strong>We greatly admire Professor David Mazieres’ innovative work in developing the consensus protocol, and greatly commend the efforts of Jed McCaleb and the Stellar team </strong>in bringing his work to life<strong>.</strong></p><p>However, we also believe that the intrinsic value of an XLM token is called into question on purely economic terms.</p><ul><li>A hard cap of 0.00001 XLM ‘write’ fee per operation</li><li>Airdropping XLM required for atomic swaps to anchors</li><li>Protocol efficiency with high token velocity and future dilution</li><li>External revenues generated in trading XLM / Asset Pairs</li><li>External Lightyear revenues from commercializing protocol</li><li>Real world barriers to “Banking the Unbanked”</li><li>A lack of pricing power over end-user pricing</li></ul><p>Stellar’s design decisions <strong>bring into sharp focus the importance of good token governance in a distributed context.</strong></p><p><strong>The Lead Pipe </strong>analogy is merely the first in a series of frameworks that we will publish in the coming weeks. Our mission is to foster the creation of token design best practices and the issuance of high-benchmark tokens in any distributed context.</p><p><strong>We believe this work is imperative if the distributed ledger ecosystem is to thrive.</strong></p><p><strong>To request our token design frameworks, or read more of our past research, </strong><a href="https://austere.capital/how-we-invest/"><strong>contact us here.</strong></a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=80e3ac14aa71" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Oracles and the ChainLink Platform]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@anshumanmehta/oracles-and-the-chainlink-platform-996b06a0f01?source=rss-b03c9aaf1634------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/996b06a0f01</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bitcoin]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ethereum]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ico]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Anshuman Mehta]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 31 Jan 2018 20:53:34 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-03-22T17:45:00.562Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>The following is a product of </em><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/briankoralewski/"><em>Brian Koralewski</em></a><em> and </em><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/connectanshuman/"><em>Anshuman Mehta</em></a><em>.</em></p><p><strong>Introducing Oracles</strong></p><p>In decentralized networks, smart contracts require specific data input from outside sources. <strong>Ensuring the validity of this data is paramount in order for smart contracts to function.</strong></p><p>An Oracle is defined as <em>a person or thing regarded as an infallible authority or guide on something.</em> In the context of decentralized networks, Oracles source and validate data from the outside world. Smart contracts then utilize Oracle-validated data to function.</p><p>Thus, when it comes to the issue of utilizing off-chain data, <strong>an Oracle acts as an intermediary, a validation and ‘formatting’ tool, between the data source and data user.</strong></p><p>Oracles can be machine-based (e.g. ChainLink — “LINK”) or human (e.g. Augur’s users incented with “REP” tokens).</p><p>Research into the need Oracles, and their importance abounds. Some information (e.g. the EURUSD exchange rate or employment data) must be necessarily derived from external sources. Similarly, not all data need be stored on the blockchain because of capacity constraints.</p><p>Indeed, <a href="https://blog.ethereum.org/2014/07/22/ethereum-and-oracles/">in a blog post from 2014</a>, Vitalik Buterin confirmed his view of the importance of Oracles, writing:</p><p><em>“…At other times, however, oracles do make sense. The most common case that will appear in reality is the case of external data… Another important case is smart contracts that actually are very hard to evaluate.“</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/468/0*nmu4AyaX7RL8swM6.jpg" /></figure><p><em>Source: ChainLink’s Whitepaper — </em><a href="https://link.smartcontract.com/whitepaper"><em>https://link.smartcontract.com/whitepaper</em></a></p><p><strong>Oracles Aren’t Perfect</strong></p><p>What <strong>Oracles do not do is verify source data.</strong></p><p><strong>No amount of data aggregation can effectively verify information that is emanating from a single-source, </strong>whether a result of flawed methodology, a compromised or a conflicted source.</p><p>Any attempt to build a network of Oracles in order decentralize a centralized (i.e. single) data-source is, in our opinion, flawed. In his blog cited above, Buterin confirms as much, implicitly stating that there is no “decentralization cure” for centralized data sources.</p><p>For example, the Bureau of Labor Statistics publishes employment and labor market data in the United States. A single Oracle, or even an Oracle network, will never be able to validate the calculations that underpin employment or wage statistics. (It should be noted that we aren’t suggesting the BLS is either compromised, conflicted or its methodology flawed).</p><p><strong>Automated Oracle Networks</strong></p><p>Given their importance in smart contracts, malicious or faulty oracles can prove to be ‘single points of failure’ like the Byzantine generals of yore. They are inherent choke points since the data they extract can be manipulated or tampered with.</p><p>An interesting experiment in Oracle design comes from <strong>Chainlink</strong> — a startup based in NYC and SF.</p><p>ChainLink tries to remedy the centralized Oracle problem, through a decentralized, Byzantine Fault Tolerant Oracle-network that effectively aggregates multiple sources. ChainLink proposes aggregating real-world data from distributed data sources. The protocol then runs this information through a distributed network of Oracles.</p><p>Note — we analyze the ChainLink protocol by utilizing Austere Capital’s proprietary five-factor distributed ledger tech evaluation framework.</p><p><a href="https://austere.capital/how-we-invest/">Please click here for our five-factor framework.</a></p><p><strong>Factor 1 — Degree of decentralization</strong></p><p>Per their whitepaper, ChainLink acknowledges that a true Oracle solution is unachievable. For this reason, ChainLink does not attempt an audit of the primary data source.</p><p>Instead, the ChainLink network attempts to eliminate distortion of reference data once it has been published. In other words, ChainLink focuses on the dissemination of data, as opposed to its initiation.</p><p>Does delegating to a decentralized network the work of a single Oracle always yield superior outcomes? We are not so sure.</p><p>We have to question the necessity of a decentralized Oracle network in order to validate data published by singular sources, even if these are non-official or private sources. Introducing additional secondary sources in an attempt to aggregate what is essentially a singular observation introduces spurious accuracy into the smart contract.</p><p>Where we do see applicability is in un-observable or obscure events where multiple parties record and report conflicting accounts or end-states of an event. Here, a distributed Oracle network may assist in alleviating data discrepancies. Multiple IoT connected sensors recording air pollution data, or parametric insurance claims settled with multiple observations of rainfall or similar weather data, could be two examples.</p><p><strong>Factor 2 — Robustness of Consensus Mechanism</strong></p><p>Faulty Oracles can technically malfunction or misread information from the outside world. Chainlink aims to correct for faulty dissemination of source data, and also account for faulty oracles feeding incorrect data into smart contracts.</p><p>In addition, malicious Oracles can cheat by copying other Oracles responses rather than sourcing the data on their own. ChainLink deals with malicious Oracles by instituting a “commit and reveal” function that prevents Oracles from cheating.</p><p>ChainLink allows the flexibility of aggregating data from multiple sources through the use of aggregation functions. Aggregation functions can be customized, presumably by smart contract writers. For example, averaging, majority function, etc.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/468/0*4AAw5PKrlKjqxxX4.jpg" /></figure><p><em>Source: ChainLink’s Whitepaper — </em><a href="https://link.smartcontract.com/whitepaper"><em>https://link.smartcontract.com/whitepaper</em></a></p><p>Oracles on the ChainLink network are ranked accordingly based on their <strong>availability</strong> — responding in a timely fashion to data queries, and <strong>correctness</strong> — as measured by the deviation of their responses from their Oracle peers.</p><p><strong>Factor 3 — Network incentive structure</strong></p><p>ChainLink is a utility-token platform. The <strong>LINK</strong> token is used to access the distributed Oracle system. Prices are set by ChainLink node operators based on the demand for off-chain data sources. At the time of writing (31st January), the LINK token has a market price of $0.57 with an authorized volume of 1Billion tokens of which 350M tokens have been issued. Market Capitalization’ stands at ~$200M.</p><p>LINK tokens are utilized by network users who require an input of outside data into smart contracts, and thus an Oracle service. ChainLink node operators establish prices based on the demand of their distributed Oracle services.</p><p>The team/advisors vesting schedule — if any — has never been disclosed, so we are not able to discern LINK token’s supply dilution rate, nor the founders ‘skin in the game’.</p><p><strong>Factor 4 — Growth in network activity</strong></p><p>There has been no evidence of network user traction (in terms of Node activity or institutional partnerships/onboarding) thus far, which gives credence to the fact that the only inherent value of the LINK token is due to speculation as opposed to platform usage. Indeed, the token has risen in value from $0.15 at the time of issue to $0.56 at the time of writing based purely on speculation of future adoption.</p><p><strong>Factor 5 — Evidence of Real World Use Cases.</strong></p><p>ChainLink’s success will be driven by external factors (adoption and traction in the Smart Contract ecosystem). This makes it hard to conduct an independent analysis of ChainLink’s intrinsic business model.</p><p>As stated above, there has been no evidence of the ChainLink network being onboarded by any institution to date.</p><p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p><p>Ensuring authenticated data feeds for Smart Contracts is a critical component of contract functionality. Thus, while attempts such as ChainLink are a noble endeavor, it remains inconceivable to decentralize a centralized data source. Decentralized protocols will continue to rely on a mix of centralized and decentralized data sources for the foreseeable future.</p><p>For protocols such as Chainlink, aggregating multiple-source off-chain data and hashing it on the blockchain, thus cementing consensus and immutability as well as an Oracle’s reputational accountability, will perhaps be the immediate use-case. We would need to see a significant uptick in the volume of smart contracts in the market in order to determine whether Chainlink’s approach is valid.</p><p>Arguably the closest we can come to data validation is to hold Oracles accountable for the data they input into specific Smart Contracts by rendering it immutable. This philosophical outcome may be the ultimate contribution of protocols such as Chainlink, long after their commercial use case has been either established or disproven.</p><p><a href="https://austere.capital/"><em>Austere Capital</em></a><em> is a </em><strong>long-only</strong><em>,</em><strong> fundamentals-based</strong><em>, hedge fund and venture capital firm that invests in distributed ledger technologies.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=996b06a0f01" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Venezuela’s Crypto(currency) Experiment]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@anshumanmehta/venezuelas-crypto-currency-experiment-138cbc0689e8?source=rss-b03c9aaf1634------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/138cbc0689e8</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bitcoin]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[venezuela]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Anshuman Mehta]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 04 Dec 2017 14:46:49 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-12-04T14:47:16.562Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*640EtnajzL_dSeA-a6ivsA.png" /><figcaption>Venezuela has the world’s largest proven reserves of oil. <a href="https://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/Venezuelas-Oil-Production-Plunges-To-13-Year-Low.html">Image Source</a></figcaption></figure><p>Venezualan president Nicolás Maduro <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-economy/enter-the-petro-venezuela-to-launch-oil-backed-cryptocurrency-idUSKBN1DX0SQ">announced plans to launch a new crypto-currency</a> backed by the country’s oil, gas, gold and diamond reserves.</p><p>A few quick thoughts on an interesting experiment with a nationalized decentralized currency.</p><h3>Will it be ‘crypto-deflationary’?</h3><p>Probably not. Petro is backed by Venezuela’s reserves of mineral assets. There is a certain inventory in place.</p><p>The country though is free to continue expanding the asset base through discovery and exploration that can presumably be used to back future issuance.</p><h3>Will it be 100x speculative?</h3><p>Unlikely. Instead it’s a hard peg to natural resources, which do not escalate in price like digital assets.</p><p>Besides, most commodities are priced in $s. That leads to an interesting pricing mechanism.</p><p>Let’s take a simple example — say each Petro is backed by one barrel of Brent crude. The <strong>fair value</strong> of one Petro today is $58, the current market price. The <strong>market price</strong> at which you should buy one Petro from Uncle Maduro is $58 less an <strong>‘evasion premium’</strong>, or whatever getting around Uncle Sam is worth to Uncle Maduro.</p><blockquote>Petro will likely price in an ‘evasion premium’, or the price benefit of getting around Uncle Sam’s restrictions.</blockquote><h3>Will it be decentralized?</h3><p>Unlikely. There will be a central ‘issuer’ and a calculation agent that in theory keeps track of issued liabilities vs. assets securing the outstanding amount. Also, I am assuming Uncle Maduro will not submit to New York as governing law for this contract. Expect hard forks if he doesn’t like the will of the crypto-people.</p><h3>Will it be legal?</h3><p>Uncertain. By hypothecating Venezuela’s most secure assets, Petro structurally subordinates the rest of Venezuala’s capital structure. Whatever Venezuelan debt you own (that’s not currently in default) will now be below the Petro in a hypothetical insolvency waterfall. Expect pushback and lawsuits from existing debt holders.</p><p>One thing is for sure — it’ll be hard to discern “The Blockchain is Here!” thought-leadership from sarcastic take-downs in the coming weeks. Farewell, my Linkedin + Twitter feeds!</p><h3>About the author</h3><p>I explore and write about disruptive technologies behind finance (and vice versa). <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/connectanshuman/"><em>Follow or connect with me </em></a>to keep up to date.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=138cbc0689e8" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Blockchain in Banking — The Early Experiments]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@anshumanmehta/blockchain-in-banking-the-early-experiments-8e434f76549b?source=rss-b03c9aaf1634------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/8e434f76549b</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[banking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hyperledger]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[fintech]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[disruption]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Anshuman Mehta]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 16 Nov 2017 16:03:21 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-11-16T16:03:21.788Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*IOp_hsMNVE-sr7f_DBTc7Q.jpeg" /><figcaption>Uncle Ben disrupts the Empire (source: Disney)</figcaption></figure><p>The recent price surge in Bitcoin has brought renewed focus to blockchain and distributed ledgers. Whether you work in financial services or technology, chances are you’ve read about how blockchain will disrupt everything. <em>It is only a matter of time.</em></p><p>What’s harder to examine is the substance behind the hype — a balanced analysis of the technology and business needs conducted from a first-principles standpoint.</p><p>In this context, a recent paper by the Japanese Exchange Group (JPX) offers details of <strong>proof-of-concept experiments conducted by bank consortia</strong>. The paper reveals key compromises made to <em>blockchain-as-we-know-it</em> to adapt to the real-world needs of the market participants and regulators.</p><p>We find that the initial use cases for Banking Blockchain v1.0 reside squarely in back office processes. Proposals of <em>mutualization</em> of expensive back-office and client on-boarding processes make intuitive sense, though regulatory and legal implications are as yet unexplored. Also missing <em>thus far</em> are suggestions of new revenue-generating opportunities.</p><p>This post explores these issues in detail.</p><p>But first, a quick (and highly simplified) blockchain primer.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*d8PDvsqJI56B0A_1.jpg" /></figure><p><em>From Alice to Bob about Charlie (with no teacher in sight). Source: The Internet</em></p><p><strong>Blockchain-as-gossip</strong></p><p><strong>Alice, Bob and Charlie</strong> are three students at Blockchain High. Alice has a secret about Charlie — a story she can only tell one other person. She’s dying to pass it to Bob, Charlie’s sworn enemy. Trouble is if she tells Bob, he might claim to be the source. Alice can’t have that. She needs the entire class to recognize her as the source.</p><p>So what is Alice to do?</p><p><strong>Luckily, Alice is up to speed on disruptive technologies. </strong>She decides to tell Bob and simultaneously transcribes the story in coded language only she knows, ending with the words “You won’t believe what I just told Bob!” Alice then passes the note to the rest of the class.</p><p><strong>Blockchain High is a magical place.</strong> Each classmate receives her note simultaneously. They observe the coded text, recognize Alice’s handwriting and come to the same conclusion. “It was Alice!” they exclaim. “She knew first! And now Bob knows.”</p><h3>Blockchain with a small ‘b’</h3><p>If all goes to plan, each classmate now holds an identical record, or a <em>ledger, </em>of how and when the story changed hands. The ledger is<strong> distributed</strong> — each classmate has a copy. It is <strong>immutable</strong> — no single classmate can single-handedly rewrite it. It tracks <strong>provenance</strong> — before Bob, Alice knew. After Alice, Bob. And it is<strong> trustless</strong> — classmates don’t need an adult in the room to reach consensus. They don’t even need to know each other or Alice or Bob to know that <em>Alice told Bob something</em>.</p><blockquote>Immutability, trust and provenance. Find a use case that needs all three and you have yourself a blockchain startup.</blockquote><h3>Which brings us to Banking Blockchain v1.0</h3><p>The original blockchain set out to <strong>create trust </strong>through mathematics and code. All classmates, or <em>nodes</em>, received and verified all transactions that added to the ledger. In order to achieve true disintermediation, no one node held pre-eminence. <strong>Trust by code — a technological, egalitarian utopia if you will.</strong></p><p>Banking Blockchain v1.0 goes down a more familiar path. <strong>Selected participants</strong> are anointed with the power to approve transactions — <strong>first amongst equals</strong>. These are variously called <em>endorsers</em> in Hyperledger Fabric or<em> notaries</em> in Corda. <strong>Trust is created by appointment.</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/996/0*C1N9e1GWVs5fkHxw.jpg" /></figure><p><em>Hyperledger Fabric’s ‘Endorsers’ are the adults in the room (source: JPX)</em></p><h3>This is not the disruption we were looking for</h3><p>Banking Blockchain thus strengthens incumbent intermediaries a free<em>-ish</em> infrastructure upgrade. Does it disrupt them? <strong>Only if you count helping them do their job better as disruption. </strong>Does it reduce the rent they charge? That bit is unclear but it sounds unlikely.</p><p>Further concessions are made to market structure and practices.</p><p>Trade-specific data should be accessible only to the parties involved in the trade. Therefore, <strong>the ledger itself is fragmented and then distributed</strong> (more below).</p><p>Market participants in financial services are known and trusted by each other. Therefore, secure loops of known participants are formed, eliminating <strong>the need for a rewards system (Bitcoin) to grease the wheels</strong>. A move which has long term implications for the price of a Bitcoin.</p><p>Regulators and central counterparts need a near real-time ‘god’s-view’ of the market. This is now possible with the all-seeing notaries and endorsers.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*1iX8xWUaruHyGtvL.jpg" /></figure><p><em>A notary examines the ledger in real-time (source: Warner Bros)</em></p><h3>The operative word being ‘distributed’</h3><p>In the original version of blockchain, all nodes store a copy of the agreed-upon ledger in a state known as <strong>consensus</strong>.<strong> The ledger is a single source of truth.</strong></p><p>In Banking Blockchain v1.0, transactions are broadcast to participants based on their authorization to view them. <strong>Each ledger is thus unique and incomplete. </strong>For example, if Goldman Sachs trades a bond position with Blackrock, this trade’s reference appears only in the ledgers held by GS and BR and not, say, Morgan Stanley.</p><p>As participants no longer need to verify transactions, <strong>consensus is dictated rather than achieved</strong>. The ledger is ‘distributed’ only in the sense that each participant receives spliced sub-sets of data. This has serious consequences for <strong>immutability</strong>, a cornerstone of blockchain’s disruptive potential.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*ubhEYNDpCIqovlDw.jpg" /></figure><p><em>Distributed, unique and incomplete (source: JPX)</em></p><h3>Starting at the back</h3><p>Early experiments in Banking Blockchain v1.0 take aim squarely at back-office processes — <strong>securities settlements, paying agency, collateral management and document etc</strong>. What’s missing is a fundamental re-imagining of revenue-generating banking activity or entirely new lines of business.</p><p>This is in part justified given <strong>a lack of product innovation in banking</strong> since the crisis. In equal measure, perhaps genuine business innovation will arise once v1.0 is fully implemented and new opportunities materialize.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/736/0*OVoiw0xlcNVYlIYB.jpg" /></figure><p><em>Blockchain is currently solving Step Two (source: Sidney Harris)</em></p><h3>Industry-wide collaboration</h3><p>Banking Blockchain v1.0 hopes to standardize industry-wide communication protocols in settlements, collateral margining and trade finance.</p><p>Another area of focus is <strong>mutualization</strong> — securely sharing information required for expensive, data-intensive processes that are usually replicated across institutions. For example, Citibank in London could request the release of a prospective client’s on-boarding file from Nomura in Japan in order to conduct Know Your Customer (KYC) and Anti-Money Laundering (AML) checks.</p><p>This raises the obvious the question — <strong>is the industry’s failure thus far to agree common standards and communicate down to<em> </em>technological failures or adversarial ones?</strong></p><p>Those long of tooth will recall the Great Dollar Shortage of 2009–2011. Counterparties leveraged their rights under bilateral CSAs to demand collateral in their currency of choice (no prizes for guessing which one). <strong>Signing up to an automated platform cedes such competitive advantages to code.</strong></p><h3>No country for young startups?</h3><p>The clear winners of Banking Blockchain will likely be the large technology vendors — IBM, MS, Oracle etc. <strong>Large-scale change projects yield greater rewards than the development of open-source protocols. </strong>Expect these change agents to ramp up white papers, recruitment and training in anticipation of client projects.</p><p>Also expect young startups to re-focus their energies. Financial services are a multi-trillion-dollar industry and so naturally attracted the first wave of blockchain entrepreneurship. They are also highly regulated. As time passes, expect startups to expend their energies in <strong>consumer-focused, poorly-intermediated use cases where regulatory oversight is low and trust requires a leap of faith or convoluted UX.</strong></p><p>But that is a discussion for another day.</p><h3>In conclusion</h3><p>It is clear that the more blockchain adapts to fit business needs, the less it resembles its old self. Herein lies the promise of this particular movement — the desire to bring automation to antiquated processes is now stronger than ever. And now it is backed by real investment. <strong>If blockchain acts as the catalyst for this change, then all involved are winners.</strong></p><p>Amara’s law states that we “<em>tend to overestimate the effect of a technology in the short run and underestimate the effect in the long run.”</em></p><p>This is apt of Banking Blockchain v1.0.</p><p>It is only a matter of time.</p><h3>About the author</h3><p>I explore and write about disruptive technologies behind finance (and vice versa). <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/connectanshuman/"><em>Follow or connect with me </em></a>to keep up to date.</p><p>The <strong>Japanese Exchange Group (JPX)</strong> recently published findings from various proof-of-concept experiments in the banking industry. <a href="http://www.jpx.co.jp/english/corporate/research-study/working-paper/b5b4pj000000i468-att/E_JPX_working_paper_Vol20.pdf">Find the paper here.</a></p><p><em>This piece was originally published on LinkedIn on October 4, 2007</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8e434f76549b" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[SEC, MAS and the ICO Dilemma]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@anshumanmehta/sec-mas-and-the-ico-dilemma-21ca9586c2f0?source=rss-b03c9aaf1634------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/21ca9586c2f0</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bitcoin]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ico]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[fintech]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Anshuman Mehta]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 16 Nov 2017 15:53:51 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-11-16T15:53:51.113Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*dqDJwsldtzDdrAjOPQo1PA.jpeg" /></figure><p>Coins, tokens, ICOs, ITOs — they are all the rage these days. If you’re not raising one, you’re investing in one or advising a FinTech startup on how to issue one.</p><p>Yet the regulatory standing of these instruments is far from clear.</p><p>The best known, and perhaps most consequential, interpretation thus far comes from <strong>the SEC </strong>in the US. The SEC uses the<strong> Howey Test</strong>, devised in 1946, to determine whether certain transactions are investment contracts — (i) an investment of money made with (ii) an expectation of profits arising from (iii) a common enterprise depending solely on the (iv) efforts of others (a promoter or third party).</p><p>Now, <strong>the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS)</strong> has weighed in on the matter of digital token offerings.</p><p>Let’s take a closer look.</p><h3>Form-over-substance</h3><p>In referencing the decades old Howey Test, the SEC indicated a willingness to <strong>look through the form and to the substance of the transaction</strong>. It ignored nomenclature changes (<em>coins, tokens, whatevers</em>) or technological structuring (<em>de-centralization, autonomy</em>) that may obscure the issue. <em>We have been here before, </em>it said, <em>we have seen this before.</em></p><p>MAS, on the other hand, has taken more of a <strong>form-over-substance</strong> approach than the SEC.</p><p><strong>MAS maintains the</strong> <strong>three classical definitions of securities</strong> — stocks, debentures (debt) and units in a collective investment scheme — and examines tokens from the conventional standpoint.</p><p>MAS then helpfully lays out six case studies that ought to cover most present day scenarios. And in true Singaporean style, it gets straight to the point.</p><h3>MAS’ Case Study 1 — The One You’re Wondering About</h3><p><strong>Company A </strong>is a startup funding the development of a “computing power” platform not yet in existence <strong>through the sale of utility tokens</strong>. The token can be used to pay for renting “computing power” provided by other platform users.</p><p>MAS concludes that such a token<strong> does not confer any additional rights or benefits</strong> to the holder <strong>other than </strong>the use of the platform in the future. Therefore, it does not represent a security.</p><p>And it gets better — even if you do fall foul of MAS’ definitions, you can still issue ICOs as securities in Singapore and to Singaporean persons so long as you meet certain size (less than $5m) and distribution (to fewer than 50 people) criteria in a twelve-month period.</p><p>(In case you’re wondering, other Case Studies are more straightforward. Company B wants to issue shares to fund development of a shopping mall. Companies C and D intend to pool funds to invest in other FinTech startups. Company E is a crowd-funding platform and Company F a virtual currency exchange.)</p><h3>An Unholy Mess</h3><p>So the SEC and MAS have taken opposing positions on ICOs as pre-development funding tools. Others, <a href="https://www.fca.org.uk/news/statements/initial-coin-offerings">like the UK regulator FCA</a>, have kicked the can down the road. Still others (<a href="https://www.finma.ch/en/news/2017/09/20170929-mm-ico/">here’s looking at you, FNMA</a>) have just started examining the goings-on in their back yard.</p><p>Meanwhile, ICOs have become a powerful tool for blockchain startups raising pre-product funding, surpassing seed stage VCs.</p><p>They can’t all be right. So what are ICOs then — securities, pre-sales, neither? <strong>The key distinction ought to be whether the tokens are acquired for use or sale.</strong></p><h3>Tokens as Pre-Revenue</h3><p>If the former, then these tokens are no different to a subscription to the New York Times or Netflix. The buyer pays a lifetime’s subscription in advance, well before an editor or a journalist is hired or the printing press bought. <strong>A questionable leap of faith but not much more.</strong></p><p><strong>But startups are an uncertain, fickle thing.</strong> Most ICOs back young companies where neither platform nor product exist, nor is there user traction. Predictions around the timing of delivery, pivots and final use cases are difficult to make.</p><p>It is therefore hard to make a convincing case for pre-payment when they simply cannot know what they are paying for.</p><h3>Tokens as Securities — The Effort of Others</h3><p>If the latter — i.e. if tokens are purchased in anticipation of future applications and therefore demand — then an ‘investor’ has <strong>invested fiat money</strong> into an enterprise <strong>expecting to profit (in fiat terms) from the effort of others</strong>.</p><p>The Howey Test is thus failed and the SEC comes knocking (eventually).</p><p>And this is where the MAS decision is critical — instead of following the SEC’s lead, they keep a vital geographical center in the FinTech space (Singapore) open for experimentation and further development.</p><p>This does not lower the burden on US-based actors. MAS may look the other way but the SEC likely will not.</p><h3>What else could ICOs be?</h3><p>There are two other alternatives that I have not mentioned so far.</p><p>The third alternative is that token purchases are a <strong>philanthropic donation</strong> made to a charitable organization to deploy as it sees fit without expectation of reward or return.</p><p>Let’s ignore this one, shall we?</p><p>The fourth postulates <strong>it does not matter what ICOs are</strong>. Global cryptocurrencies are an unstoppable movement, a fundamental re-imagining of human relationships, far beyond the comprehension of mere national regulators.</p><p>I wish you well with this defense.</p><h3>The Long Term Impact</h3><p>MAS’ interpretation raises intriguing follow-up questions — if tokens aren’t traditional securities, then do they represent a new class of security entirely? Or perhaps a new accounting practice of revenue-recognition or even pre-revenue securitization?</p><p>The answer has significant implications for how decentralized organizations will be financed, valued and accounted for in the long run.</p><p>We will look into the repercussions in the next post.</p><h3>About the author</h3><p>I explore and write about disruptive technologies behind finance (and vice versa). <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/connectanshuman/"><em>Follow or connect with me </em></a>to keep up to date.</p><p>You can find <a href="http://www.mas.gov.sg/~/media/MAS/Regulations%20and%20Financial%20Stability/Regulations%20Guidance%20and%20Licensing/Securities%20Futures%20and%20Fund%20Management/Regulations%20Guidance%20and%20Licensing/Guidelines/A%20Guide%20to%20Digital%20Token%20Offerings%20%2014%20Nov%202017.pdf">the MAS release here.</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=21ca9586c2f0" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[#brexit]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@anshumanmehta/brexit-a33137e4c40b?source=rss-b03c9aaf1634------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a33137e4c40b</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[european-union]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[brexit]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Anshuman Mehta]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 21 Jun 2016 22:10:21 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-06-21T22:10:21.049Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I write this as an Indian who lived in the Britain for over a decade, naturalised there and has now moved away. I guess you could call me an economic non-EU migrant. Turned British expat. I guess the worst of the voices of the far right might hold me up as the example of what they wish to prevent — a dilution of their sacred Britishness. Or should that read, Englishness. Because more than anything else, Br-exit has become a debate about Englishness, English values, and England.</p><p>Eng-exit, Brexit. Whatever you call it. This debate is about our future as a collective. A fearful, and fearsome, argument about what the country will become if status quo prevails. And it is this future that I wish to address.</p><blockquote>A fearful, and fearsome, argument about what the country will become if status quo prevails.</blockquote><p>Because you see, a decade of living in the UK taught me that the future lies in embracing openness and diversity, not shying away from it. It’s in rolling to the curry house next doors, a few pints of Belgian, German or (if you can’t find anything else) Dutch lager in. And when the queue is too long, staggering into the kebab shop next to that. It is in dreaming of the day a Khan or, whisper it softly, a Gupta, will pull on a home nations football shirt, even if his parents arrived here in the nineties or later and aren’t “British enough”.</p><blockquote>And yes, the future is in the baklava that the Turks will bring to the party. Won’t it go great with that picnic spread?</blockquote><p>The future is in more trips across the Eurostar, those sneaky over-the-limit wine trips back. Those inscrutable speeding tickets that are still delightfully value-for-money for how fast we were going. The future is in weeks away in a Spanish villa, a bottle of Rioja or sangria keeping us company. We could do worse than a wurst at Oktoberfest.</p><p>And yes, the future is in the baklava that the Turks will bring to the party. Won’t it go great with that picnic spread?</p><p>Brexit is more than just about England. The voices that speak up against the coming horde of foreigners, these voices talk about going back to a simpler, happier time. When “we” were “us”, our values were ours and our homes and neighbourhoods safe. And our neighbours looked like us. There is no space in this togetherness for anyone who falls beyond their definition of ‘British’ or ‘English’.</p><p>There is sameness. Staleness. Small mindedness.</p><blockquote>But there is a better way to win the argument.</blockquote><p>Too often, these debates descend to individual experiences and prejudices. “I was hurt, therefore we are all in danger”. A singular experience is extrapolated and generalised till the casual reader believes she too is in imminent danger. Votes are cast out of frustration and fear, real or imaged.</p><p>I do not have an answer to this particular dilemma.</p><p>But there is a better way to win the argument. And that is by appealing to the heart, to our better selves. This vote is about the future.</p><p>And the future is about moving forward, not going back.</p><p><a href="https://www.facebook.com/hashtag/remain?source=feed_text&amp;story_id=10156930116165315">‪#‎remain‬</a>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a33137e4c40b" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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