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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by A. P. D. G. Everett on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by A. P. D. G. Everett on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by A. P. D. G. Everett on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Often overshadowed by “Citizen Kane”, “How Green Was My Valley” was a progressive film and yet more…]]></title>
            <link>https://apdge.medium.com/often-overshadowed-by-citizen-kane-how-green-was-my-valley-was-a-progressive-film-and-yet-more-b7fe093f3574?source=rss-102ff7d2f5be------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[orson-welles]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[film-history]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[oscars]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[john-ford]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[best-picture]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[A. P. D. G. Everett]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 02 Feb 2023 18:01:12 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-02-02T19:10:39.890Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Often overshadowed by “Citizen Kane”, “How Green Was My Valley” was a progressive film and yet more fitting of its time.</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*jSFr0pfB7pH6Q2zc9Brsyg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Maureen O’Hara as Angharad in “How Green Was My Valley”</figcaption></figure><p>As my friends and family know, I’m a fan of film. I am probably more passionate about cinema than I am about most things. I own over a thousand titles, actually, that number is over 1300 (including television series, documentaries, etc). I own every Oscar Best Picture winner from Wings to Nomadland (CODA isn’t available on disc anywhere as of yet), as well as most of the best picture nominees, many of the films that have winners in the major categories, as well as a boatload of others.</p><p>One of the things I am most annoyed by is whenever a list of “Oscar Mistakes” comes out (cf <a href="https://www.cbr.com/oscars-wrong-side-of-history/#crash-beat-brokeback-mountain-and-capote-to-snag-best-picture-in-2005">https://www.cbr.com/oscars-wrong-side-of-history/#crash-beat-brokeback-mountain-and-capote-to-snag-best-picture-in-2005</a> &amp; <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/films/features/oscars-worst-films-winners-crash-b2271708.html">https://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/films/features/oscars-worst-films-winners-crash-b2271708.html</a> for recent examples), and every one of them decries how “Citizen Kane” lost best picture to “How Green Was My Valley” (and often as well the fact that Orson Welles lost Best Director to John Ford).</p><p>What critics who pan “How Green Was My Valley” seem to forget is this — the John Ford directed film was also very innovative technically, and the storyline, a multi-generational saga of a Welsh family’s triumphs and tragedies, it was a prestige film in its time that was arguably tailor-made for its era (adapted from a popular novel, as were many best picture winners, especially in the earlier years of the Academy Awards), and undeniably well reflects its values a lot more than Citizen Kane did (which with its ingrained cynicism is a better fit for the post-WW2…post-1960s era). And lets not forget that HGWMV not just beat Kane, it also beat “The Maltese Falcon” and “Sergeant York”, both of them classics in their own right that also redefined cinema.</p><p>Now, I love Orson Welles, he was a great director/producer, and he did very innovative work, and as much as “Citizen Kane” was praised, his favourite of his own films was “Chimes at Midnight”, the film that many film critics (and I) think was his finest work — it’s a comedic yet serious take on political power through the lens of Sir John Falstaff (it has been described as the best Shakespearean work on film ever — cf: <a href="https://www.csmonitor.com/The-Culture/Movies/2016/0106/Orson-Welles-Chimes-at-Midnight-is-likely-the-greatest-Shakespearean-film-ever">https://www.csmonitor.com/The-Culture/Movies/2016/0106/Orson-Welles-Chimes-at-Midnight-is-likely-the-greatest-Shakespearean-film-ever</a> ). “Citizen Kane” is great, and it changed the world, but that’s easy to see in 50–80 years of hindsight. At the time, CK was an oddball film that took a thinly veiled swipe at a very much then alive William Randolph Hearst, whilst HGWMV was in many ways also a “safer” picture to award.</p><p>In HGWMV, the older Huw says: “Empty bellies and desperation began to conquer reason” in the film, and that’s even more true now than it was then, in the midst of WW2 with recent memories of the Great Depression fresh in everyone’s mind. The depiction of fair pay and rights for workers in HGWMV remains an ever so relevant point of discussion (go look at Starbucks and Amazon for two recent examples of that).</p><p>Let me also note that How Green Was My Valley won John Ford his third of fourth best director Oscars for directing it (he also won for 1935’s The Informer, 1940’s Grapes of Wrath, and 1952’s The Quiet Man) on top of the two documentaries her directed that won the best documentary Oscar (The Battle of Midway (1942) and December 7th (1943) — although best documentary Oscars go to their producers, not their directors — meaning the US Navy was awarded both Oscars). Orson Welles was great, no doubt, but so was John Ford. The irony of it is, John Ford, who was noted as a director of Westerns…won his four Oscars for films other than Westerns.</p><p>Crash &amp; Around the World in 80 Days — the criticisms of those films are ones I generally agree with (although Crash was set in LA and Around the World in 80 Days had cameos of virtually every major star of that era, so both scratched the Academy’s itch), but sometimes, a great film loses to another great film, as happened here in this case.</p><p>[<em>Note: This Medium post was originally crafted for my personal Facebook page, but I decided that I’d share it publicly as well, ergo its share to Medium.</em>]</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b7fe093f3574" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Automation & Its Limitations, or, Why the Future is Humans & Robots/AI Working Together as…]]></title>
            <link>https://apdge.medium.com/automation-its-limitations-or-why-the-future-is-humans-robots-ai-working-together-as-b909f4a33922?source=rss-102ff7d2f5be------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[artificial-intelligence]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[human-robot-interaction]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[robotics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ai]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[algorithmic-bias]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[A. P. D. G. Everett]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 16 May 2022 20:17:57 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-05-16T20:20:09.512Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Automation &amp; Its Limitations, or, Why the Future is Humans &amp; Robots/AI Working Together as Teammates</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/480/1*cxk3WFXLUIn5WHq7IGa73A.jpeg" /><figcaption>From NIST — Test Methods and Metrics for Effective HRI in Collaborative Human-Robot Teams (<a href="https://www.nist.gov/news-events/events/2019/03/test-methods-and-metrics-effective-hri-collaborative-human-robot-teams">https://www.nist.gov/news-events/events/2019/03/test-methods-and-metrics-effective-hri-collaborative-human-robot-teams</a>)</figcaption></figure><p>Throughout history, improvements in technology have caused human labour to be supplemented, and then supplanted, by artefacts created by humanity, but after each period of technological growth, a new equilibrium between humanity and their tools occurred, although the period of disruption before a new equilibrium was reached was not fixed, and in the case of the first and second industrial revolutions, those equilibria took a while to reach. And those artefacts which humanity has created have allowed a new form of partnership between humanity and technology, and human ingenuity as expressed through technological development has undeniably led to massive benefits to the people of the Earth. There are limits though, as far as how far technology can go, or rather should go, given that technology, despite all of its promise, is not an unalloyed good. All of this drives towards an end of humans partnering with robots and/or AI to achieve tasks, not just entrusting the robots &amp; AI with the labour on their own. Let us begin with an historical survey.</p><p>Until the industrial age, the work needed to craft goods, was either performed by humans themselves, or by humans harnessing natural elements. Then came the first industrial revolution, from roughly 1770 to 1840, transitioning from hand production methods used by skilled artisans to machines which almost anyone could operate ergo boosting the demand for unskilled labour, and all of the incumbent accompanying innovations, which radically transformed the relationship between humanity and the Earth.<a href="#_ftn1">[1]</a> After the first industrial revolution, there was a lull in technological change that occurred between the end of the first industrial revolution and the beginning of the second industrial revolution (and the related first period of globalisation that arose with technologies such as the railroad, electricity, the telegraph &amp; telephone, interchangeable parts, transition from animal fats to petroleum to fuel heating and lighting, mechanisation of farming, etc.) from the 1870s to the start of the first Great Powers War in 1914.<a href="#_ftn2">[2]</a> Along with the monumental technological growth that happened in the roughly 140 year span between the beginning of the first industrial revolution and the end of the second was a massive growth rate in human population from the dawn of the industrial age to 1914, and in effect, each new stage of technological innovations drove massive population growth.<a href="#_ftn3">[3]</a> From 1770 to 1914, the population on Earth grew from 795 million to 1.797 billion in 144 years, a difference of over one billion people, an annual growth rate of 5.67 per mille (0.567 per cent). Even during the period of 1914 to 1949, a 35-year period of wars and revolutions that transformed the state of the world, the population still grew from that 1.797 billion to 2.503 billion (an annual growth rate of 9.51 per mille, even factoring the roughly 40 million killed in the 1914–1918 Great Powers war, the roughly 77 million killed in the 1939–1945 Great Powers war, the 10–15 million killed in the Russian Civil War, the 10–15 million killed in the Chinese Civil War, the 20 million killed in Stalin’s purges &amp; famines, etc — roughly 160 million dead total from conflicts in that span, are still less than a quarter of the net estimated population growth of 706 million in that 35 years).<a href="#_ftn4">[4]</a></p><p>The third industrial revolution (otherwise known as the digital revolution), which arose after the Second Thirty Years War, given the development of the ENIAC in December 1945 at the University of Pennsylvania, the development of the point-contact transistor in 1947 at Bell Laboratories by John Bardeen and Walter Brattain under the leadership of William Shockley, and the development of information theory by Claude Shannon (also of Bell Laboratories) in 1948.<a href="#_ftn5">[5]</a> From the late 1940s until the present, increasingly more devices became electronically controlled, and now, virtually everything of note relies on integrated circuits.<a href="#_ftn6">[6]</a> And again, the technological growth fuelled an even bigger population growth from 2.503 billion in 1949 to 7.875 billion as of 2021, an average annual population growth of 16 per mille (1.6 per cent) over that 72 year span, a growth rate higher than the period of the second industrial revolution, which in turn was higher than the population growth rate during the first industrial revolution. For an elucidation of the value of integrated circuits in driving technological progress, a brief discussion of the implications of Moore’s Law needs to occur. Imagine for a moment that you get in your car, and begin driving at 8 kph. In one minute, you’d travel 133.33 metres. In the second minute, imagine that you’re going twice that fast, so 16 kph. In that second minute, you’d travel 266.67 metres. In the third minute, you’d be travelling at 32 kph, and you would travel 533.33 metres. If you doubled your speed 27 times, you would travel 1.79*107 km in a minute. In five minutes at that speed, you could travel from the Earth to Mars. That is the approximately where information technology stands today, vis-à-vis when integrated circuits came into being in the late 1950s.<a href="#_ftn7">[7]</a></p><p>Along with the three industrial revolutions spread over the last 252 years and counting, and the growth of the human population from 795 million in 1770 to 7.875 billion as of 2021 has come, the replacement of human labour to do things. The first two industrial revolutions, the replacement was mostly of human physical labour by manufactured artefacts, but the third industrial revolution, also called the digital revolution, has caused the replacement of the mental capacity of humans through technological innovations as well. As Harvard University economist Kenneth Rogoff noted in 2012: “<em>Since the dawn of the industrial age, a recurrent fear has been that technological change will spawn mass unemployment. Neoclassical economists predicted that this would not happen, because people would find other jobs, albeit possibly after a long period of painful adjustment. By and large, that prediction has proven to be correct.</em>”<a href="#_ftn8">[8]</a> However, as Mr Rogoff stated in that same essay that: “<em>Vasily Leontief</em>, <em>the Nobel Prize winning economist noted in 1983, worried that the pace of modern technological change is so rapid that many workers, unable to adjust, will simply become obsolete, like horses after the rise of the automobile.</em>”<a href="#_ftn9">[9]</a> It should be noted that the rise of the first industrial revolution led to the Luddites sabotaging textile machines in England, and even the word <em>sabotage</em> is reputed to have come from labourers in francophone countries throwing their wooden shoes (called sabot), into the early machines to stop them.<a href="#_ftn10">[10]</a></p><p>As a 2017 article in <em>The Economist</em> noted that one significant factor in the rise of income inequality since the 1970s is the labour-market premium for those with university degrees, which have risen by over a third since 1963, whereas wages have dropped for those without a secondary school diploma.<a href="#_ftn11">[11]</a> This was something that Vasily Leontief forecasted in 1983, where he said: “<em>the new technology diminishes the role of human labour in production to such an extent that it is bound to bring about not only long- run technological unemployment, but-if permitted to operate within the framework of the automatic competitive price mechanism-also a shift toward a more skewed and, because of that, socially unacceptable distribution of income.</em>”<a href="#_ftn12">[12]</a><br> Related to this phenomenon is the fact that increasing automation drives productivity bonuses, and that increased productivity of machines and (higher-skilled) people together allows for that higher-skilled labour to be paid better…at a cost of replacing most of the previously employed labour pool.<a href="#_ftn13">[13]</a> What distinguishes the advances of the digital revolution from those of the industrial revolutions is that they have, up until now, favoured skilled workers. This is a phenomenon known as “skill-based technological change”.<a href="#_ftn14">[14]</a> So far, university degrees have been a reliable proxy for skill but this may change as artificial intelligence starts taking jobs away from white-collar workers.<a href="#_ftn15">[15]</a> As was demonstrated by Martin Ford in his book <strong><em>Rise of the Robots</em></strong> (as well as elsewhere by other parties), employment for many skilled professionals, including: attorneys, journalists, scientists, and pharmacists, is already being significantly eroded by advancing information technology.<a href="#_ftn16">[16]</a> Relatedly, it should be noted that to assume any current economic trend to persist is to assume an inefficient labour market, and as Kenneth Rogoff stated in a 2017 interview that as the wage premium for a particular group of workers rises, firms will have a greater incentive to replace them.<a href="#_ftn17">[17]</a> However, a 2016 study by McKinsey &amp; Co. noted that: “<em>While automation will eliminate very few occupations entirely in the next decade, it will affect portions of almost all jobs to a greater or lesser degree, depending on the type of work they entail. Automation, now going beyond routine manufacturing activities, has the potential, as least with regard to its technical feasibility, to transform sectors such as healthcare and finance, which involve a substantial share of knowledge work.</em>”<a href="#_ftn18">[18]</a></p><p>What that McKinsey study also notes is that whilst technical feasibility is a necessary precondition for automation, but it is not a complete predictor that such an activity will be automated. A second factor to consider is the cost of developing and deploying both the hardware and the software for automation. A third factor is the cost of labour and related supply-and-demand dynamics: if workers are in abundant supply and significantly less expensive than automation, this could be a decisive argument against it. A fourth factor to consider is the benefits beyond labour substitution, including higher levels of output, better quality, and fewer errors. These are often larger than those of reducing labour costs. Regulatory and social-acceptance issues, such as the degree to which machines are acceptable in any particular setting, must also be weighed. A robot may, in theory, be able to replace some of the functions of a nurse, for example. But for now, the prospect that this might actually happen in a highly visible way could prove unpalatable for many patients, who expect human contact. The potential for automation to take hold in a sector or occupation reflects a subtle interplay between these factors and the trade-offs among them.<a href="#_ftn19">[19]</a> It should be noted, that certain industries, such as most things in the health care sector, as well as in the education sector, have, over the last four decades or so, continued to grow in cost greater than the mean growth rate of wages, known as “Baumol’s Cost Disease”, which applies to sectors for which there have not been productivity increases. In effect, it takes the same number of doctors and nurses to staff a hospital now as it did 20, 40, or 60 years ago, and the same for education, for two examples of it.<a href="#_ftn20">[20]</a></p><p>Min Kyung Lee noted in a 2018 study: “<em>Advances in artificial intelligence, machine learning, and data infrastructure are transforming how people govern and manage citizens and organisations. Now more than ever, computational algorithms increasingly make decisions that human managers used to make, changing the practices of managers, policy makers, physicians, teachers, police, judges, on-demand labour platforms, online communities, and more.</em>”<a href="#_ftn21">[21]</a> Part of the reason for this transition is that decisions made by algorithm are seen as unbiased (since computers, unlike humans, only respond to data).<a href="#_ftn22">[22]</a> However, the rise in cases of algorithmic bias has demonstrated that, in many cases, the computer is being fed data that is biased, which is yielding biased outcomes, at least when the algorithm alone is doing the screening. This is because, as Nicol Turner-Lee of the Brookings Institution discussed in an interview by <em>Vox</em> in 2020, algorithmic bias happens in two primary ways: accuracy and impact. An AI can have different accuracy rates for different demographic groups. Similarly, an algorithm can make vastly different decisions when applied to different populations.<a href="#_ftn23">[23]</a> As a for instance, an AI-infused platform for human resources, might have in it, historical data for successful hires, but given that the reference dataset might stretch back a long time, it might also, as a result, bias against women, people with less “White-sounding” names, veterans, or the disabled, results that are not just morally wrong, but also illegal.<a href="#_ftn24">[24]</a> As Virginia Eubanks notes in her book <strong><em>Automating Inequality</em></strong>, algorithms used by social services agencies in administering to the poor and needy often times increase adverse impact versus human bureaucrats. Algorithms used by the criminal justice system are demonstrably worse in predicting recidivism rates amongst Blacks (and to a lesser degree Latinos) than Whites.<a href="#_ftn25">[25]</a> Yael Eisenstat, former CIA officer and national security adviser to (then Vice President) Joe Biden, noted in a 2019 article in <em>Wired</em>, that: “<em>No matter how trained or skilled you may be, it is 100 percent human to rely on cognitive bias to make decisions. Daniel Kahneman’s work challenging the assumptions of human rationality, among other theories of behavioural economics and heuristics, drives home the point that human beings cannot overcome all forms of bias. But slowing down and learning what those traps are — as well as how to recognize and challenge them — is critical. As humans continue to train models on everything from stopping hate speech online to labelling political advertising to more fair and equitable hiring and promotion practices, such work is crucial. Becoming overly reliant on data — which in itself is a product of availability bias — is a huge part of the problem. In my time at Facebook, I was frustrated by the immediate jump to “data” as the solution to all questions. That impulse often overshadowed necessary critical thinking to ensure that the information provided wasn’t tainted by issues of confirmation, pattern, or other cognitive biases.</em>”<a href="#_ftn26">[26]</a> This sort of thing is undeniably problematic. As that same 2018 study by Min Kyung Lee discussed above also noted about the limitations of algorithmic based hiring decisions, roughly half of the participants in the study thought that the decisions the algorithm made were unfair. To quote: “<em>Most participants thought that the algorithm would not have the ability to discern good candidates because it would lack human intuition, make judgments based on keywords, or ignore qualities that are hard to quantify. ‘‘An algorithm or program cannot logically decide who is best for a position. I believe it takes human knowledge and intuition to make the best judgment.’’ (P169). ‘‘He could have a great resume but not hit the key phrases.’’ (P174).</em>”<a href="#_ftn27">[27]</a> The Lee 2018 study demonstrates that knowledge of if the decision-maker is human or computer can influence perceptions of the decisions made, but also whether or not the tasks required more human or mechanical skills also influenced perceptions of the decisions made, which can offer insights into helping to create trustworthy, fair, and positive workplaces with algorithms. This correlates to what was found by Pamela Hinds <em>et al.</em> in their 2011 study, whose finding suggest that there are significant differences in the extent to which people will rely on robots as compared with human work partners. When working with a person instead of a robot, participants relied more on the partner’s advice and were less likely to ignore their counsel.<a href="#_ftn28">[28]</a> The McKinsey 2016 study also illustrates that the tasks least likely to be subject to automation, from a technical feasibility perspective are “managing others” (9 per cent) and “applying expertise” (18 per cent), which are the exact kind of tasks that the Lee 2018 study is discussing.<a href="#_ftn29">[29]</a></p><p>These sorts of issues, which are most certainly difficult to overcome using a solely data-driven approach, and in fact may be made harder to achieve through such, as has been discussed. Meaning that the best approach is probably, instead of human oversight and decision-making being replaced entirely by computers using algorithms drawing on large datasets, might in fact be a partnership of sorts, humans being assisted by such algorithmic tools, given the lack of trust in management solely by algorithm (as Ms Lee has demonstrated in her research) &amp; given that the data itself may be flawed (as has been noted by many sources), with regular reviews of the input data and output decisions to avoid an algorithmic bias problem brought on by biased data. In the context of humans and machines working together, the future is most presumably humans doing the “nice” tasks, whilst robots doing the dirtier and/or more dangerous tasks, this has been repeatedly discussed in popular and academic literature.<a href="#_ftn30">[30]</a> The SARS-CoV-2/COVID-19 pandemic has, most likely, accelerated the pace of automation for two main factors: 1) The pandemic has induced social changes that are likely to endure, including the “Great Resignation”, wherein millions around the world have quit their jobs, may in part be a consequence of lockdowns creating new opportunities for home working, and 2) the AI &amp; robots are getting better, and more capable of taking on higher-order tasks.<a href="#_ftn31">[31]</a></p><p>Now, what might a team of humans and robots working together, look like? As was discussed by Victoria Groom and Clifford Nass in their 2007 study: “<em>The experiences of the few groups dedicated to developing true human–robot teams offer enough information to identify specific challenges to human–robot teams. Finding solutions to some of these problems appears inevitable. For example, human teammates often refer to objects by points of reference, and the objects and points of reference change frequently throughout the interaction. While robots currently struggle in this area, researchers are succeeding in improving their abilities to identify objects by reference point. Though it may be many years before robots can consistently understand human references to objects, there appears to be no major block that would prevent eventual success. Two major problem areas that show less promise of resolution are the robot’s inability to earn trust and lack of self-awareness. In high-stress situations, robot operators may experience physical and cognitive fatigue. In extreme cases, operators may forget to bring a robot to or from a disaster site (Casper &amp; Murphy, 2003). Unlike human teammates who think not only about how to do their jobs, but also how to be prepared to do their jobs, robots require an external activation of their autonomy. They must be set-up to perform, but in cases of extreme stress, human teammates may lose their ability to babysit the robot. In these cases, the robot will not be in the appropriate position to complete its task.”.</em><a href="#_ftn32">[32]</a> This, fundamentally, is a question of relatability between people and robots. And, on the basis of the literature, it seems as though, as with humans who form teams, and go through the Tuckman stages of group development (i.e., forming, storming, norming, and performing), that the only way robots will truly be trusted by their human teammates is to have enough emotional intelligence to recognise the emotional states of the human members and gain their trust, which is undeniably not a simple task when the robot doesn’t have the ability to feel.<a href="#_ftn33">[33]</a></p><p>These are the sorts of limitations that will need to be overcome in order for robots to totally supplant humans, which is why, it appears, that the future is headed to another case of specialisation of labour, where robots will be entrusted with what they are best at, the predictable &amp; repeatable tasks, and humans to be entrusted with the tasks that are unique &amp; unpredictable.</p><p><em>Note: This essay was my final project for INFO 6309: Robots &amp; Work, at Cornell University (Instructor: Malte Jung, PhD), and despite its original purpose, I do think that this essay is of value to other audiences, so share it with that intent in mind.</em></p><p><a href="#_ftnref1">[1]</a> As was noted in <em>The Economist</em> in 2017 — “<strong>What history says about inequality and technology</strong>” (17 June 2017): “<em>One study has found that the share of unskilled workers rose from 20% of the labour force in England in 1700 to 39% in 1850. The ratio of craftsmen’s wages to labourers’ started to fall in the early 1800s, and did not recover until 1960.</em>” This article references the work of Scottish economist Gregory Clark at UC Davis, who put together a comprehensive dataset of English wages that stretches back to the 13th century. Mr Clark noted that in the past the skilled-wage premium, defined as the difference in wages between craftsmen, such as carpenters and masons, and unskilled labourers has been fairly stable, save for two sharp declines, the first, coming after the Black Death of the mid 1300s, and after the first industrial revolution. That dataset can be viewed here: <a href="http://faculty.econ.ucdavis.edu/faculty/gclark/data.html">http://faculty.econ.ucdavis.edu/faculty/gclark/data.html</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref2">[2]</a> This is drawn from many sources, but the author of this essay will point to the book <strong><em>The Unbound Prometheus: Technological Change and Industrial Development in Western Europe from 1750 to the Present</em></strong> by economic historian David S. Landes published by Cambridge University Press (initially published in 1969, second edition published in 2003 — the version this author has read and referenced) for a discussion of the first and second Industrial Revolutions.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref3">[3]</a> There are many references that discuss the relationship between technology growth and human population growth. The author points to “<strong>Innovation and the growth of human population</strong>” by V. P. Weinberger <em>et al.</em> (2017); <em>Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences</em>, <em>372</em>(1735), 20160415. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2016.0415">https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2016.0415</a> as a starting reference point. It should be noted that along with the industrial revolutions was also the rise of modern medicine and public health reforms (clean water, waste removal, vaccinations for infectious diseases, etc) which are also technological innovations no doubt, but of a different kind than those covered by the increased production efficiencies wrought by the industrial revolutions.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref4">[4]</a> Population figures from worldpopulationhistory.org. the war dead listed are estimates averaged from various sources and are meant to be demonstrative, not iron-clad declarations of fact. The discussion of the massive number of dead in the 1914–1949 span due to wars is not meant to be an exercise in fascination in the macabre, but as Brian Hayes notes in the beginning of his précis into the life and work of Lewis Fry Richardson with respect to modelling wars, “Demographically, it hardly matters. War deaths amount to something like 1 per cent of all deaths; in many places, more die by suicide, and still more in accidents. If saving human lives is the great desideratum, then there is more to be gained by prevention of drowning and auto wrecks than by the abolition of war.”, the point being that even with death on this massive scale, it hardly impacted the growth in human population (this is drawn from Everett (2016), MSc Thesis, University of Virginia, short title: “<strong><em>What are the Odds?</em></strong>”, and refers to Brian Hayes, <em>Computing Science: Statistics of Deadly Quarrels</em>, <em>American Scientist</em>.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref5">[5]</a> The author recognises that the concept of a “Second Thirty Years War” to discuss the period of 1914 to 1945 was originally proposed by French general and political leader Charles de Gaulle, and also adhered to by British soldier turned author turned political leader Sir Winston Churchill in the preface of volume one (<em>The Gathering Storm</em>) of his six-volume memoir <strong><em>The Second World War </em></strong>(<a href="https://www.amazon.com/Second-World-War-Volumes/dp/B005NS30ZG">https://www.amazon.com/Second-World-War-Volumes/dp/B005NS30ZG</a>), which earnt him the 1953 Nobel Prize in Literature. The author adheres to an extension of this view, that the “war years” of the Second Thirty Years War were from the start of the first Great Powers War in 1914, through the Second Great Powers War ending in 1945 until 1949, which also encompasses the Chinese Communist Revolution in 1949, but also the Russian Revolution of 1917, etc. This is admittedly a bit arbitrary, but allows for a single period which covers both the duration of the Cold War, as well as the digital revolution, which started in the later 1940s. It also allows the demonstration of the modern social welfare state as part of that same post-bellum/modern period. For a discussion of this in the UK, see the essay by Derek Brown in <em>The Guardian</em> on 14 March 2001, “<strong>1945–51: Labour and the creation of the welfare state</strong>” (<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2001/mar/14/past.education">https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2001/mar/14/past.education</a>)</p><p><a href="#_ftnref6">[6]</a> The author was once a doctoral student at the University of Pennsylvania in electrical engineering (including taking classes in the room that once stored the ENIAC), and as such, is basically familiar with the history of digital computer technology. Other things to note, the development of the point-contact transistor (and quickly thereafter of the bipolar junction transistor (which was developed by William Shockley) which replaced the point-contact transistor given it was sturdier and easier to manufacture than the point-contact transistor) was used to replace the generally unreliable thermionic valve (aka vacuum tube) that was common in electronics such as the Colossus computer and the ENIAC until the creation of transistors. The (monolithic) integrated circuit, developed by Robert Noyce (a one-time protégé of William Shockley) at Fairchild Semiconductor in 1959, which combined multiple transistors in a single semiconductor now called a microchip, drove the miniaturisation of electronics, and their increasing ubiquity in society. There are whole papers and books that discuss this, it is summarised here to demonstrate recognition of the history of development of modern electronics.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref7">[7]</a> This example is drawn from Pg xiii of the introduction of the book <strong><em>Rise of the Robots</em></strong> by Martin Ford, Basic Books (2015). Given that it is now seven years past when this example was crafted, you’d have to multiply the example by a factor of 8, which would yield a distance of approximately 0.96 AU (or 1.432*108 km).</p><p><a href="#_ftnref8">[8]</a> Kenneth Rogoff aired this opinion in an essay on <em>Project Syndicate</em>, entitled: “<strong>King Ludd is Still Dead</strong>” (1 October 2012).</p><p><a href="#_ftnref9">[9]</a> The article that Kenneth Rogoff is referring to is: Leontief (1983); “<strong>Technological Advance, Economic Growth, and the Distribution of Income</strong>” <em>Population and Development Review</em>, <em>9</em>(3), 403–410. <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/1973315">https://doi.org/10.2307/1973315</a>. Also note that Mr Leontief, who was born in Munich on 5 August 1905, used the German spelling of his given name Василий (Wassily) in countries that use Latin-based alphabets — primarily Germany (he performed his doctoral work (dissertation title: <em>Die Wirtschaft als Kreislauf</em> ) at Friedrich Wilhelm University (now Humboldt University of Berlin) earning his PhD in 1928, and worked at the Institute for the World Economy of the University of Kiel from 1927 to 1930) and the United States (where he emigrated to in 1931, working first at the National Bureau of Economic Research before joining the economics department of Harvard University in 1932. The author prefers to use the standard English rendering of the Slavic given name, Vasily (from the Greek name Βασίλειος, Basil in English), but recognises Mr Leontief’s preferred spelling.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref10">[10]</a> This supposed origin of the word sabotage is incorrect, the word came from the French word “saboter” (to walk loudly) which came from the word for the wooden clog known as a sabot, as the wooden sabot made a lot of noise walking on paved city streets. <em>Sabotage</em>, Online Etymology Dictionary — <a href="https://www.etymonline.com/word/sabotage">https://www.etymonline.com/word/sabotage</a>. As it happens, this false history is actually reference in the film <em>Star Trek VI: The Undiscovered Country</em>.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref11">[11]</a> This is from the previously referenced article in <em>The Economist</em> “<strong>What history says about inequality and technology</strong>”</p><p><a href="#_ftnref12">[12]</a> Pg 409, Leontief (1983).</p><p><a href="#_ftnref13">[13]</a> There are many examples of this, however, a recent example is discussed by Christopher Matthews in <em>Axios</em>, “<strong>Automation: raising worker pay while killing U.S. jobs</strong>” (15 December 2017) — <a href="https://www.axios.com/2017/12/15/automation-raising-worker-pay-while-killing-us-jobs-1513301264">https://www.axios.com/2017/12/15/automation-raising-worker-pay-while-killing-us-jobs-1513301264</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref14">[14]</a> The issues surrounding SBTC are massive and much academic research has been done on the topic. The author concedes that SBTC is certainly to play in part, but not entirely, for the worker displacement issue. If there is an interest to delve into this topic in greater depth, two papers worth reading are: 1) David Card &amp; John DiNardo, <strong>Skill-Biased Technological Change and Rising Wage Inequality: Some Problems and Puzzles</strong>, <em>Journal of Labour Economics</em>, 2002, vol. 20, no. 4 — <a href="https://davidcard.berkeley.edu/papers/skill-tech-change.pdf">https://davidcard.berkeley.edu/papers/skill-tech-change.pdf</a>; and, 2) Eli Berman <em>et al.</em>, <strong>Implications of Skill-Biased Technological Change: International Evidence</strong>, <em>The Quarterly Journal of Economics</em>, Vol. 113, №4 (Nov., 1998), pp. 1245–1279 — <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2586980">https://www.jstor.org/stable/2586980</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref15">[15]</a> This is also from the previously referenced article in <em>The Economist</em> “<strong>What history says about inequality and technology</strong>”</p><p><a href="#_ftnref16">[16]</a> Page xv, Ford (2015) for the summary, multiple chapters for the details.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref17">[17]</a> This is also from the previously referenced article in <em>The Economist</em> “<strong>What history says about inequality and technology</strong>”</p><p><a href="#_ftnref18">[18]</a> Michael Chui <em>et al</em>., McKinsey &amp; Co., 8 July 2016, “<strong>Where machines could replace humans — and where they can’t (yet)</strong>” - <a href="https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/mckinsey-digital/our-insights/where-machines-could-replace-humans-and-where-they-cant-yet">https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/mckinsey-digital/our-insights/where-machines-could-replace-humans-and-where-they-cant-yet</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref19">[19]</a> McKinsey &amp; Co. (2016). In summary, the five factors are: 1) technical feasibility, 2) costs to automate, 3) the relative scarcity, cost, and skills, of the workers who might otherwise do that activity, 4) benefits of automation beyond labour-cost substitution, &amp; 5) regulatory &amp; social-acceptance considerations. A paraphrase of the original text is provided above given it was given examples that are useful.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref20">[20]</a> William Baumol started describing this phenomenon in the 1960s, published multiple papers on this topic, and distilled many of those papers into a book: <strong>The Cost Disease: Why Computers Get Cheaper and Health Care Doesn’t</strong>, Yale University Press (2012), which was the primary reference source by the author for this topic.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref21">[21]</a> Min Kyung Lee, “<strong>Understanding perception of algorithmic decisions: Fairness, trust, and emotion in response to algorithmic management</strong>”, <em>Big Data &amp; Society</em>, January–June 2018: 1–16 <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177%2F2053951718756684">https://doi.org/10.1177%2F2053951718756684</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref22">[22]</a> This assumption is discussed in the Min Kyung Lee paper discussed above.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref23">[23]</a> Rebecca Heilweil, “<strong>Why algorithms can be racist and sexist</strong>”, <em>Vox/Recode</em> (18 February 2020)</p><p><a href="#_ftnref24">[24]</a> Gideon Mann &amp; Cathy O’Neil, “<strong>Hiring Algorithms Are Not Neutral</strong>”, <em>Harvard Business Review</em>, 9 December 2018 — <a href="https://hbr.org/2016/12/hiring-algorithms-are-not-neutral">https://hbr.org/2016/12/hiring-algorithms-are-not-neutral</a>. This referenced a famous 2004 study by Marianne Bertrand &amp; Sendhil Mullainathan published by the National Bureau of Economic Research “<strong>Are Emily and Greg More Employable than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labour Market Discrimination</strong>”, American Economic Review, v94, 991–1013. The 2020 Vox piece by Rebecca Heilweil referenced before also references an example of this, the time when Amazon.com used an AI resume screening tool to improve the efficiency of screening job applications, but given the highly disproportionate number of men hired by Amazon from the sample period, that meant the system learnt, in effect, to discriminate against women, even though it wasn’t programmed with such a bias.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref25">[25]</a> This is from an essay the author wrote &amp; published on his personal Medium page, “<strong>The limits of AI and why it will not replace human knowledge workers — from the perspective of a practitioner</strong>” (21 April 2021) — <a href="https://apdge.medium.com/the-limits-of-ai-and-why-it-will-not-replace-human-knowledge-workers-from-the-perspective-of-a-b7c345f06c2d">https://apdge.medium.com/the-limits-of-ai-and-why-it-will-not-replace-human-knowledge-workers-from-the-perspective-of-a-b7c345f06c2d</a> . <br> The referenced book — <strong><em>Automating Inequality: How High-Tech Tools Profile, Police, and Punish the Poor</em></strong>, written by Virginia Eubanks, was published in 2018 by St. Martin’s Press</p><p><a href="#_ftnref26">[26]</a> Yael Eisenstat, “<strong>The Real Reason Tech Struggles With Algorithmic Bias</strong>”, <em>Wired</em> (12 February 2019) — <a href="https://www.wired.com/story/the-real-reason-tech-struggles-with-algorithmic-bias/">https://www.wired.com/story/the-real-reason-tech-struggles-with-algorithmic-bias/</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref27">[27]</a> Pg 9, Lee (2018)</p><p><a href="#_ftnref28">[28]</a> From Section 5 (Discussion) of Pamela J. Hinds, Teresa L. Roberts &amp; Hank Jones: <strong>Whose Job Is It Anyway? A Study of Human-Robot Interaction in a Collaborative Task, Human–Computer Interaction</strong>, (2004) 19:1–2, 151–181</p><p>- <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/07370024.2004.9667343">https://doi.org/10.1080/07370024.2004.9667343</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref29">[29]</a> Conversely, the McKinsey study found that the types of labour most susceptible to automation from a technical feasibility perspective are: 1) predictable physical work (78 per cent), 2) data processing (69 per cent), and 3) data collection (64 per cent).</p><p><a href="#_ftnref30">[30]</a> One example, in the field of urban search and rescue, is by Robin Roberson Murphy, <strong>Human–Robot Interaction in Rescue Robotics</strong>, IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SYSTEMS, MAN, AND CYBERNETICS — PART C: APPLICATIONS AND REVIEWS, VOL. 34, NO. 2, MAY 2004</p><p><a href="#_ftnref31">[31]</a> <em>The Economist</em>, <strong>Covid has reset relations between people and robots</strong>, 25 February 2022</p><p><a href="#_ftnref32">[32]</a> Victoria Groom and Clifford Nass; <strong>Can robots be teammates? Benchmarks in human–robot teams</strong>, <em>Interaction Studies </em>8:3 (2007), 483–500.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref33">[33]</a> Bruce W Tuckman, “<strong>Developmental sequence in small groups</strong>”. <em>Psychological Bulletin</em>. <strong>63</strong> (6): 384–399 (1965). <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Doi_(identifier)">doi</a>:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1037%2Fh0022100">10.1037/h0022100</a>. <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PMID_(identifier)">PMID</a> <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/14314073">14314073</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b909f4a33922" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The limits of AI and why it will not replace human knowledge workers —  from the perspective of a…]]></title>
            <link>https://apdge.medium.com/the-limits-of-ai-and-why-it-will-not-replace-human-knowledge-workers-from-the-perspective-of-a-b7c345f06c2d?source=rss-102ff7d2f5be------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b7c345f06c2d</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[inequality]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[machine-learning]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics-and-technology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[algorithmic-bias]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[artificial-intelligence]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[A. P. D. G. Everett]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 21 Apr 2021 19:20:22 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-04-21T20:35:26.600Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>The limits of AI and why it will not replace human knowledge workers — from the perspective of a practitioner</h3><p>Earlier this year, I saw this article in <em>The Atlantic</em> from last October about how algorithmic bias is harmful to teens that I’ve spent some time thinking about (<a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/family/archive/2020/10/algorithmic-bias-especially-dangerous-teens/616793/">https://www.theatlantic.com/family/archive/2020/10/algorithmic-bias-especially-dangerous-teens/616793/</a>) and was reflecting on the last paragraph: <br> “Algorithms powerfully shape development; they are socializing an entire generation. And though United States governmental regulations currently fail to account for the age-based effects of algorithms, there is precedent for taking age into consideration when designing media policy: When the Federal Communications Commission began regulating commercials in kids’ TV in the 1990s, for example, the policies were based on well-documented cognitive and emotional differences between children and adults. Based on input from developmentalists, data scientists, and youth advocates, 21st-century policies around data privacy and algorithmic design could also be constructed with adolescents’ particular needs in mind. If we instead continue to downplay or ignore the ways that teens are vulnerable to algorithmic racism, the harms are likely to reverberate through generations to come.”</p><p>It goes without saying, although I’ll say it again, the issue of bias baked into artificial intelligence/machine learning (AI/ML) algorithms is an important topic in the world of tech. For some of the coverage on this topic:</p><p>In a 2015 article in <em>The Atlantic</em> (<a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/09/discrimination-algorithms-disparate-impact/403969/">https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/09/discrimination-algorithms-disparate-impact/403969/</a>), entitled <strong><em>When Discrimination Is Baked Into Algorithms</em></strong>, which states:<br> “So how will the courts address algorithmic bias? From retail to real estate, from employment to criminal justice, the use of data mining, scoring software, and predictive analytics programs is proliferating at an exponential rate. Software that makes decisions based on data like a person’s zip code can reflect, or even amplify, the results of historical or institutional discrimination. “[A]n algorithm is only as good as the data it works with,” Solon Barocas and Andrew Selbst write in their article “<strong><em>Big Data’s Disparate Impact</em></strong>,” forthcoming in the California Law Review. “Even in situations where data miners are extremely careful, they can still affect discriminatory results with models that, quite unintentionally, pick out proxy variables for protected classes.” …There still exists “a large legal difference between whether there is explicit legal discrimination or implicit discrimination,” said Friedler, the computer science researcher. ‘My opinion is that, because more decisions are being made by algorithms, that these distinctions are being blurred.’”</p><p>A 2015 article in the <em>New York Times</em> (<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/26/upshot/can-an-algorithm-hire-better-than-a-human.html">https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/26/upshot/can-an-algorithm-hire-better-than-a-human.html</a>) asking if an AI algorithm can hire better than a human, contraposed with coverage in Business Insider in 2019 that AI screening tools were just as biased as humans (<a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/ai-hiring-tools-biased-as-humans-experts-warn-2019-10">https://www.businessinsider.com/ai-hiring-tools-biased-as-humans-experts-warn-2019-10</a>).</p><p>From a 2016 article in<em> Fivethirtyeight</em> (<a href="https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/an-algorithm-could-know-you-have-a-genetic-disease-before-you-do/">https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/an-algorithm-could-know-you-have-a-genetic-disease-before-you-do/</a>), a discussion of an algorithm being able to detect possession of a genetic disease before you know you have it.</p><p>As was reported in the <em>Wall Street Journal</em> in 2016, discussing Cathy O’Neil’s book <strong><em>Weapons of Math Destruction</em></strong> (<a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/algorithms-arent-biased-but-the-people-who-write-them-may-be-1476466555?mod=e2fb">https://www.wsj.com/articles/algorithms-arent-biased-but-the-people-who-write-them-may-be-1476466555?mod=e2fb</a>) that the mathematical/statistical analysis behind algorithms isn’t biased, but the people programming the algorithms may be biased.</p><p>From a 2017 article in <em>Quartz </em>(<a href="https://qz.com/work/1098954/ai-is-the-future-of-hiring-but-it-could-introduce-bias-if-were-not-careful/">https://qz.com/work/1098954/ai-is-the-future-of-hiring-but-it-could-introduce-bias-if-were-not-careful/</a>), the article lede proffers an operative word “could” introduce bias, but given the litany of examples, that ship has long since sailed.</p><p>A 2017 article in <em>MIT Technology Review</em> (<a href="https://www.technologyreview.com/2017/06/12/105804/inspecting-algorithms-for-bias/">https://www.technologyreview.com/2017/06/12/105804/inspecting-algorithms-for-bias/</a>) discussing the inspection of AI algorithms for bias.</p><p>From a 2017 article in the <em>Harvard Business Review</em> (<a href="https://hbr.org/2017/07/ai-may-soon-replace-even-the-most-elite-consultants">https://hbr.org/2017/07/ai-may-soon-replace-even-the-most-elite-consultants</a>), discussing AI moving into management consulting over the next few years, it asserts that AI is going to change the way we all gather information, make decisions, as well as connect with stakeholders. And that as of 2017, leaders were starting to use AI to automate mundane tasks such as calendar maintenance, and making phone calls. But also AI can be used to help support decisions in key areas, including: human resources, budgeting, marketing, capital allocation, and even corporate strategy — areas which have long been the bastion of major consulting &amp; marketing firms.</p><p>A 2018 article in <em>Politico </em>(<a href="https://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2018/02/07/algorithmic-bias-software-recommendations-000631/">https://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2018/02/07/algorithmic-bias-software-recommendations-000631/</a>) asking directly “Is your software racist”?</p><p>A 2018 article in <em>MIT Technology Review</em> (<a href="https://www.technologyreview.com/2018/01/26/104816/algorithms-are-making-american-inequality-worse/">https://www.technologyreview.com/2018/01/26/104816/algorithms-are-making-american-inequality-worse/</a>) discussing Virginia Eubanks’ book <strong><em>Automating Inequality</em></strong>, which discusses the increased imposition on the poor of AI-based assessments.</p><p>From a 2018 article in <em>Newsweek</em> (<a href="https://www.newsweek.com/ai-racist-yet-computer-algorithms-are-helping-decide-court-cases-789296">https://www.newsweek.com/ai-racist-yet-computer-algorithms-are-helping-decide-court-cases-789296</a>), the article title was “<strong>Artificial Intelligence Is Racist Yet Computer Algorithms Are Deciding Who Goes to Prison</strong>” but really, AI is only as racist as the data that goes into it.</p><p>From a 2019 article in the <em>New York Times</em> (<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/11/technology/artificial-intelligence-bias.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share">https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/11/technology/artificial-intelligence-bias.html</a>):</p><p>“In a blog post this week, Dr. Munro also describes how he examined cloud-computing services from Google and Amazon Web Services that help other businesses add language skills into new applications. Both services failed to recognize the word “hers” as a pronoun, though they correctly identified “his.”</p><p>“We are aware of the issue and are taking the necessary steps to address and resolve it,” a Google spokesman said. “Mitigating bias from our systems is one of our A.I. principles, and is a top priority.” Amazon, in a statement, said it “dedicates significant resources to ensuring our technology is highly accurate and reduces bias, including rigorous benchmarking, testing and investing in diverse training data.”</p><p>Researchers have long warned of bias in A.I. that learns from large amounts data, including the facial recognition systems that are used by police departments and other government agencies as well as popular internet services from tech giants like Google and Facebook. In 2015, for example, the Google Photos app was caught labelling African-Americans as “gorillas.” The services Dr. Munro scrutinized also showed bias against women and people of colour.”</p><p>In 2019, it was reported in the <em>Washington Post </em>(<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/11/11/apple-card-algorithm-sparks-gender-bias-allegations-against-goldman-sachs/?wpisrc=nl_most&amp;wpmm=1">https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/11/11/apple-card-algorithm-sparks-gender-bias-allegations-against-goldman-sachs/</a>) as well as elsewhere that a husband and wife who both applied for an Apple Card and received different credit limits were an example of sex-based discrimination (specifically he got a credit limit that was 20 times more than hers), however, as was reported earlier this year (2021), these reports were in error, and no violation of the Fair Lending Act (<a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-goldman-sachs-apple-card/apple-card-underwriter-goldman-sachs-committed-no-fair-lending-violations-idUSKBN2BF1UN">https://www.reuters.com/article/us-goldman-sachs-apple-card/apple-card-underwriter-goldman-sachs-committed-no-fair-lending-violations-idUSKBN2BF1UN</a>)</p><p>Which as a whole, these articles and similar reportage can be summarised by:</p><p>1) AI/ML algorithms are based, like regular statistical analyses, often times on historical data. <br> 2) It goes without question that there has been a history of discrimination against non-White people in the US. Blacks, Latinos, Native Americans, etc — all have histories of adverse treatment by government agencies as well as by non-government actors. <br> 3) Things like redlining, ghettoisation, etc, have undeniably adversely impacted wealth acquisition and land value appreciation in non-White neighbourhoods. Any data or analyses derived from this history, regardless of how well-meaning, will be subject to the same biases.<br> 4) There have been documented cases, a fair number of them, that indicated that for certain classes of crime, such as illicit cannabis use, that Whites and Blacks use at comparable rates, but given differences in law enforcement activity by area, Blacks have been way more likely to have stopped, arrested, and criminally charged for illicit cannabis use. <br> 5) Image classification algorithms are often written by those who are White (or Asian) and male, as well as many of the test image sets, meaning that, when doing the calculations and processing through its algorithms, you end up with things like: — Black people being “categorised” as gorillas by Google’s image processing (<a href="https://www.wired.com/story/when-it-comes-to-gorillas-google-photos-remains-blind/">https://www.wired.com/story/when-it-comes-to-gorillas-google-photos-remains-blind/</a>) — Images of prominent persons of colour, including Barack Obama, Lucy Liu, AOC, etc, when run through image processing software for low resolution images, the outputted people look White (<a href="https://www.theverge.com/21298762/face-depixelizer-ai-machine-learning-tool-pulse-stylegan-obama-bias">https://www.theverge.com/21298762/face-depixelizer-ai-machine-learning-tool-pulse-stylegan-obama-bias</a>) <br> 6) In the several centuries of published books, many of them have expressed attitudes that would be classified as sexist and racist according to modern standards. However, when the data from these books is scanned into computer systems and then enters the databases, the computer doesn’t know to recognise the limitations of the recorded data. The issues discussed here are also why you can’t just wave AI/ML over hiring processes and make them better, since hiring data is often times skewed by the same sorts of problems that other datasets are. In US law, there is the concept of disparate impact that has existed since the ruling of <strong><em>Griggs v. Duke Power</em></strong> — 401 U.S. 424 (1971) — (which SCOTUS held in short — doesn’t matter if the intent of a law or policy is racist or sexist, if the output is discriminatory, then it deserves to be challenged [also note that this case is what eliminated the use of general IQ testing for employment accessions, which lead in turn to the rise in requiring a university degree for more jobs]).</p><p>As Cathy O’Neill, a Harvard maths PhD and former Wall Street quant, wrote a book called <strong><em>Weapons of Math Destruction</em></strong>, in which she discusses why algorithms discriminate. She asserts that the problem isn’t caused by the maths, but is rooted in the biases of people who encode their notions in algorithms and apply them en masse to the public in ways that are largely invisible and therefore difficult to challenge. In particular, she expresses concern about mathematical models that rank or score individuals, institutions or places, often by using proxies to stand in for things the modelers wish to measure but can’t. Ms. O’Neill’s description of what she calls “weapons of math destruction.” WMDs, she says, share three characteristics: a) They are biased. b) They are opaque, and, 3) They are scalable. That last one is part of the reason usually unintentional adverse discrimination is becoming even more common against women and persons of colour.</p><p>As Virginia Eubanks notes in her book <strong><em>Automating Inequality</em></strong>, that algorithms used by social services agencies in administering to the poor and needy often times increase adverse impact versus human bureaucrats. Algorithms used by the criminal justice system are demonstrably worse in predicting recidivism rates amongst Blacks (and to a lesser degree Latinos) than Whites. Data-driven decision making, especially in the case of government administration, can’t be effective if it’s based on bad data. I could go on, both from a research POV as well as a commercial one. Fact of the matter is, more of our actions and opportunities are being driven, not by humans, but by machines analysing data.</p><p>It’s easy to just say “<em>Garbage In, Garbage Out</em>” (commonly abbreviated as GIGO, the British version I was told as a child is “<em>Rubbish In, Rubbish Out”)</em> — and recognising this is important, however, in many if not most cases, commercial AI systems, are built directly from research data and algorithms without any adjustment for racial or gender disparities. This is also true of government systems, considering the increasing reliance of the US Government on consulting firms, who bring to bear these commercial systems towards public policy problems. Meaning, that you end up with a putatively fair system that still in fact treats women different from men, persons of colour different from Whites. Software that makes decisions based on data like a person’s postal code can reflect, or even amplify, the results of historical or institutional discrimination. As Solon Barocas and Andrew D. Selbst argue in their article “<strong><em>Big Data’s Disparate Impact</em></strong>” (referenced in one of the cited articles above) that expanding disparate impact theory to challenge discriminatory data-mining in court “will be difficult technically, difficult legally, and difficult politically.” (<a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2477899">https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2477899</a>)</p><p>In the end, this means that AI is far from the solution to all problems of bias, it adds a pseudo-scientific sheen that makes such bias even harder to refute. It is because of this I remain utterly sceptical of AI technologies and their abilities to replace human knowledge workers. Given the technical and legal challenges, I think that the use of AI will remain proscribed, it will have to be, especially in light of equity concerns, much less legal ones.</p><p><em>Notes for the audience:</em></p><p><em>1) This essay is based off of my own personal background and knowledge as a trained engineer who has studied AI in my graduate studies and works as a software engineer. It in no way reflects any official position of any organisation with which I am affiliated and should not be taken as such.</em></p><p><em>2) This essay is also based off of a post on my personal Facebook from January 2021</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b7c345f06c2d" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The F-35, Like “Fetch”, Will Never Happen]]></title>
            <link>https://apdge.medium.com/the-f-35-like-fetch-will-never-happen-60b30e989733?source=rss-102ff7d2f5be------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/60b30e989733</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[congress]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[lockheed-martin]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[us-military]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[f-35]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[A. P. D. G. Everett]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 16 Apr 2021 14:17:02 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-06-05T18:33:05.424Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The F-35 Lightning II, the most expensive manned aircraft programme the US has ever produced with an expected lifetime cost of 1.3 trillion USD is back in the news for all the wrong reasons.<a href="#_ftn1">[1]</a> Early February 2021, Bloomberg reported that the software on the F-35 was so problematic that software subject matter experts from the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Lab, the Carnegie Mellon University Software Engineering Institute, and the Georgia Tech Research Institute were called in to fix it.<a href="#_ftn2">[2]</a> The next week, Bloomberg also reported that the US Air Force had to cut back by one-third the number of exhibition flights of the F-35 demonstration team due to lack of parts for the Raytheon produced engines.<a href="#_ftn3">[3]</a> These and other problems have caused Representative Adam Smith (D-WA), Chair of the House Armed Services Committee, in an online event with Michael O’Hanlon of the Brookings Foundation in March 2021, to describe the F-35 programme as a rathole wherein good money is continually thrown after bad.<a href="#_ftn4">[4]</a> The New York Times, in an editorial subsequent to the Brookings discussion with Chairman Smith, described it as a boondoggle that America is stuck with.<a href="#_ftn5">[5]</a> The question that is certainly on the minds of many is how did the F-35 get here and what, if anything can be done now about it?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*EB4tBoBEiD_536F83MV_Ug.jpeg" /><figcaption>First U.S. Air Force F-35 Lightning II joint strike fighter (JSF) aircraft soars over Destin, Fla., before landing at its new home at Eglin Air Force Base on 14 July 2011. Its pilot, Lt. Col. Eric Smith of the 58th Fighter Squadron, is the first USAF qualified JSF pilot (source USAF’s Flickr — <a href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/usairforce/5951802446/in/photostream/">https://www.flickr.com/photos/usairforce/5951802446/in/photostream/</a>).</figcaption></figure><p>The F-35, produced by Lockheed Martin as prime contractor, is the production run version of the X-35, which beat out Boeing’s X-32, to win the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) competition back in 2001, twenty years ago now, after a four-year competition. The premise of the JSF programme was to consolidate a wide variety of various different aircraft systems across the US air fleet as well as those of NATO partners. Each branch of the US Armed Forces that was supposed to get the JSF was supposed to get a version unique to its needs (the Navy’s to be able to deal with carrier landings so outfitted with a tailhook &amp; other carrier friendly features (the C variant), the Marine Corps’ designed to for vertical and shortened take-offs and landings (VSTOL, the B variant), and the Air Force’s conventional take-off and landing version (the A variant)). It was meant to be a jack of all trades aircraft able to do all forms of aerial missions, from air-to-air combat to close air support and everything else in between. It was also meant to be an aircraft where the three different variants shared upwards of 75 per cent of total parts in common.</p><p>Very quickly on, the F-35 had a wide range of problems that have extended to this day, those problems, as reported, have included:</p><p>- In 2012: The F-35 was described as being on the brink of budgetary disaster in a report to Congress by the Air Force and GAO.<a href="#_ftn6">[6]</a></p><p>- In 2012: a senior pilot in the US Air Force wrote of the litany of issues that an all-stealth oriented air fleet would have, stating: “Stealth technology demands significant trade-offs in range, security, weapons carriage, sortie generation, and adaptability. Stealth provides no advantage in conflicts such as those in Afghanistan or Iraq (since 2003), and (despite its obvious utility) it cannot guarantee success in future struggles with a near-peer adversary.”. He went on and also stated: “Most importantly, the cost of F-22s and F-35s threatens to reduce the size of the Air Force’s fielded fighter fleet to dangerously small numbers, particularly in the current fiscal environment.”<a href="#_ftn7">[7]</a></p><p>- In 2014: Regarding the then new budget: “The bill also includes four more F-35 planes than the Pentagon requested, for a total of 38 planes. The F-35 is already more than a decade overdue, more than 100 percent over budget, and it currently can’t fly at night, in clouds, or near lightning.”<a href="#_ftn8">[8]</a></p><p>- In 2014: The F-35 was reported to be unable to operate its 25mm autocannon because the software hadn’t been developed and tested.<a href="#_ftn9">[9]</a> In fact, it was supposed to be fixed by 2019 with a software upgrade, and as of the end of 2020…it wasn’t.<a href="#_ftn10">[10]</a></p><p>- In 2015: It was reported that the Small Diameter Bomb II (SDB II) did not fit onto F-35B without modifications to the aircraft’s weapons bay, and furthermore, that it wouldn’t get the software upgrade needed for the close air support mission until 2022.<a href="#_ftn11">[11]</a></p><p>- In 2015: The F-35, amongst the things it can’t do is dogfight. The Air Force in its infinite wisdom is saying that doesn’t matter because given its advanced sensors and long-ranged missiles, it won’t NEED to be able to dogfight (the USAF made the same claim in the Vietnam Era with respect to the F-4, which they later needed to fix by adding gun pods to F-4s so that they could engage in air-combat manoeuvring when being attacked by NVA (as well as their allies’) aircraft.)</p><p>- In 2016: The Marine Corps was suffering from a lack of usable aircraft was ploughing everything into F-35s when their production rate wasn’t such to replace older aircraft, wherein single F-35B costs a whopping $250 million per plane. That’s more than three times as much as the Navy pays for a new F/A-18E/F, an upgraded version of the basic F/A-18 that the Marines had a chance to purchase back in the 1990s but passed over in favour of waiting for the F-35. As the GAO said of the example above regarding the Marine Corps’ lack of aircraft in 2016: “The cost of extending the lives of current fighter aircraft and acquiring other major weapon systems, while continuing to produce and field new F- 35 aircraft, poses significant affordability risks in a period of austere defence budgets”.<a href="#_ftn12">[12]</a></p><p>- In 2018: Reports of the Pentagon being unhappy with the F-35 because they’ve started to realise what a lot of people already knew, that trying to make a jack of all trades combat aircraft means it can’t do any one thing well, never mind concurrent development, which drives costs upward.<a href="#_ftn13">[13]</a></p><p>- In 2019: The Pentagon said that the F-35 broke far too easily and took too long to fix (both of which severely impacts combat effectiveness).<a href="#_ftn14">[14]</a></p><p>- In 2020: The F-35 was reported, after testing, to have issues with an inaccurate gun, cybersecurity problems, and poor reliability — all of which are bad test results for a military combat aircraft.<a href="#_ftn15">[15]</a></p><p>The issues go on and on, but they can be summarised as one of three types: 1) Consistent cost overruns so severe that they imperil other DoD priorities, 2) Equipment failures &amp; reliability problems, &amp; 3) issues with stealth technology, that have been reported in a wide range of publications, including: <em>The Washington Post, The NY Times, Wired, The Daily Beast, The National Interest, American Conservative, The Atlantic, The Wall Street Journal</em>, etc. The F-35’s problems have even been parodied in <em>Duffel Blog</em>.</p><p>Furthermore, even with the promised overlap of the vast majority of the parts of the three different versions of the F-35, in fact less than 1 in 4 are common across the three versions, not the promised 3 in 4 parts in common. And yet, with all of the problems, the F-35 trudges along, up until now, immune from any of its innumerable problems. Also, from a project management perspective, the F-35 is an unmitigated disaster, no programme should be mismanaged like the F-35 has, constant changes to any project or programme, especially after changes should be locked (which is to say when you’re already into the manufacturing and operational fielding of a weapons system) drives up costs colossally.</p><p>The question is, why, despite all of its problems, has it been safe from revision or elimination for so long. The summary reason is a term of art known as “political engineering”. Thomas Christie, co-developer of the Energy-Manoeuvrability Theory as well as former Director of Operational Test and Evaluation at the Pentagon said about the F-35: “This programme is a historic case of political engineering”, and given his career history, he would know that better than most.<a href="#_ftn16">[16]</a> Political engineering is a term that means distributing the manufacturing through as many firms and locations as possible, maximising the number of constituencies that would be impacted if the programme were adversely impacted in any way.<a href="#_ftn17">[17]</a> This is an outgrowth of the advice that one time Speaker of the House Thomas P. O’Neill gave to Lido Iacocca when Chrysler was seeking a bail-out after it went bankrupt in the late 1970s was to identify how many states and congressional districts would be impacted if Chrysler were to go out of business. Lee Iacocca and his team did, and used that information to successfully lobby Congress.<a href="#_ftn18">[18]</a> Since that time, projects have been increasingly designed to draw on parts, materials, and labour, from as many different constituencies as possible to maximise the pain of their cancellation or impingement.</p><p>Another major issue, and why good money often follows bad in public projects, is the issue of the “sunk cost fallacy”. A sunk cost, in economic terms, is a cost that has already been incurred and cannot be recovered.<a href="#_ftn19">[19]</a> This means that because the money has already been spent, it should not impact what is the most optimal decision to make in the here and now. The sunk cost fallacy is, in effect, that because money has been spent, people feel the need to justify the expense by having something to show for it, and the more money that has already been spent, the higher the psychological need to feel like you get something for the money (behavioural economics tells us there are several reasons why this is so).<a href="#_ftn20">[20]</a> This is also extremely true in a political case. Do you think politicians in a representative system want to tell the constituents that they taxed they made a mistake in spending all of this money? The answer is an obvious no.</p><p>The question now becomes, what can and should be done now? There are any number of possible choices, from going on as it has been done, ploughing more money into a programme that is already well over time and budget as has been done over the last 10–15 years, hoping for a different result even when doing all the same things (paraphrasing Albert Einstein’s definition of insanity), or, accept the fact that the money’s been spent, and despite political pain, that the F-35 just needs to be ended, because like “fetch” in the movie <em>Mean Girls,</em> it’s never going to happen, so with hearings performed to learn lessons needed to make future acquisitions of major defence projects work better. What are those fixes? One of the obvious fixes comes with asking the question upfront with any defence procurement now has to be: How many congressional districts &amp; how many states does the programme touch? In this case, the fewer is the better. Also, not trying to have one combat aircraft replace all others is another easy suggestion to make. There are others, but first, the courage has to come in order to stop adding more stacks of cash what has become a massive pile of burning money.</p><p><em>Notes for the audience:</em></p><ol><li><em>This essay is based off of my own personal background and knowledge as a trained engineer, certified project manager, and lifelong aviation enthusiast. It in no way reflects any official position of any organisation with which I am affiliated and should not be taken as such.</em></li><li><em>This essay was developed as a position paper for a policy position, as such, it is intended to advocate for a particular perspective, that is to say, whilst it is fact-based, it is not meant to be purely objective, and shouldn’t be held as such.</em></li></ol><p>References:</p><p>- Atlantic, 2014 (video) — <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/video/index/384088/the-pentagons-15-trillion-mistake/">https://www.theatlantic.com/video/index/384088/the-pentagons-15-trillion-mistake/</a></p><p>- Axe, 2013, Medium/War Is Boring — <a href="https://medium.com/war-is-boring/fd-how-the-u-s-and-its-allies-got-stuck-with-the-worlds-worst-new-warplane-5c95d45f86a5">https://medium.com/war-is-boring/fd-how-the-u-s-and-its-allies-got-stuck-with-the-worlds-worst-new-warplane-5c95d45f86a5</a></p><p>- Axe, 2015, Daily Beast — <a href="https://www.thedailybeast.com/air-force-admits-our-new-stealth-fighter-cant-fight">https://www.thedailybeast.com/air-force-admits-our-new-stealth-fighter-cant-fight</a></p><p>- Axe, 2016, Daily Beast — <a href="https://www.thedailybeast.com/the-marines-are-running-out-of-fighter-jets">https://www.thedailybeast.com/the-marines-are-running-out-of-fighter-jets</a></p><p>- Barrett, 2017, Bloomberg — <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2017-04-04/is-the-f-35-a-trillion-dollar-mistake">https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2017-04-04/is-the-f-35-a-trillion-dollar-mistake</a></p><p>- Bender, 2015, BI — <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/naval-head-stealth-may-be-overrated-2015-2">https://www.businessinsider.com/naval-head-stealth-may-be-overrated-2015-2</a></p><p>- Brannan, 2014, Foreign Policy — <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/07/08/the-pentagons-399-billion-plane-to-nowhere/">https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/07/08/the-pentagons-399-billion-plane-to-nowhere/</a></p><p>- Capaccio, 2018, Bloomberg — <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-01-24/lockheed-f-35-s-reliability-progress-has-stalled-pentagon-told">https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-01-24/lockheed-f-35-s-reliability-progress-has-stalled-pentagon-told</a></p><p>- Cohen, 2015, CNN — <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2015/07/16/politics/f-35-jsf-operational-costs/index.html">https://www.cnn.com/2015/07/16/politics/f-35-jsf-operational-costs/index.html</a></p><p>- Economist, 2011 — <a href="https://www.economist.com/business/2011/07/14/the-last-manned-fighter">https://www.economist.com/business/2011/07/14/the-last-manned-fighter</a></p><p>- Fallows, 2014, Atlantic — <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/01/the-tragedy-of-the-american-military/383516/">https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/01/the-tragedy-of-the-american-military/383516/</a></p><p>- Gao, 2018, National Interest — <a href="https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-f-35-could-become-navy-killer-thanks-norway-25883">https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-f-35-could-become-navy-killer-thanks-norway-25883</a></p><p>- Grazier, 2017, American Conservative — <a href="https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/congress-hypnotized-by-plane-that-cant-get-off-the-ground/">https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/congress-hypnotized-by-plane-that-cant-get-off-the-ground/</a></p><p>- Insinna, 2019, NY Times — <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/21/magazine/f35-joint-strike-fighter-program.html">https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/21/magazine/f35-joint-strike-fighter-program.html</a></p><p>- Kennedy, 2020, AF Times — <a href="https://www.airforcetimes.com/opinion/commentary/2020/03/02/congress-is-ultimately-to-blame-for-f-35-fiasco/">https://www.airforcetimes.com/opinion/commentary/2020/03/02/congress-is-ultimately-to-blame-for-f-35-fiasco/</a></p><p>- Lamothe, 2017, Washington Post — <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2017/02/24/the-air-force-wants-the-f-35-jet-to-fight-isis-whether-that-will-happen-is-in-question/">https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2017/02/24/the-air-force-wants-the-f-35-jet-to-fight-isis-whether-that-will-happen-is-in-question/</a></p><p>- Majumdar, 2014, Daily Beast — <a href="https://www.thedailybeast.com/newest-us-stealth-fighter-10-years-behind-older-jets">https://www.thedailybeast.com/newest-us-stealth-fighter-10-years-behind-older-jets</a></p><p>- Majumdar, 2014, Daily Beast — <a href="https://www.thedailybeast.com/new-us-stealth-jet-cant-fire-its-gun-until-2019">https://www.thedailybeast.com/new-us-stealth-jet-cant-fire-its-gun-until-2019</a></p><p>- Majumdar, 2016, National Interest — <a href="https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-pentagons-emergency-plan-if-the-f-35-doesnt-work-15568">https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-pentagons-emergency-plan-if-the-f-35-doesnt-work-15568</a></p><p>- Paladino, 2020, American Conservative — <a href="https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/joint-chiefs-chair-retires-immediately-becomes-paid-f-35-cheerleader/">https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/joint-chiefs-chair-retires-immediately-becomes-paid-f-35-cheerleader/</a></p><p>- Paletta &amp; Cameron, 2016, WSJ — <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/donald-trump-targets-f-35-program-in-latest-dig-on-defense-spending-1481552242">https://www.wsj.com/articles/donald-trump-targets-f-35-program-in-latest-dig-on-defense-spending-1481552242</a></p><p>- Joe Zieja, 2016, Duffel Blog — <a href="http://www.duffelblog.com/2016/01/us-hires-george-rr-martin-isis/">http://www.duffelblog.com/2016/01/us-hires-george-rr-martin-isis/</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref1">[1]</a> Cost figures derived from several sources, including the GAO’s 2012 report discussing the affordability crisis from June 2012, GAO-12–437, JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER: DOD Actions Needed to Further Enhance Restructuring and Address Affordability Risks — <a href="https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-12-437.pdf">https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-12-437.pdf</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref2">[2]</a> Capaccio, A.; F-35’s Buggy Software Prompts Pentagon to Call in Universities (2021–02–02), Bloomberg — <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-02-02/f-35-s-buggy-software-prompts-pentagon-to-call-in-universities">https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-02-02/f-35-s-buggy-software-prompts-pentagon-to-call-in-universities</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref3">[3]</a> Capaccio, A.; Air Force Reduces Exhibition Flights on New F-35 Engine Woes (2021–02–10), Bloomberg — <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-02-10/air-force-cuts-back-exhibition-flights-on-new-f-35-engine-woes">https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-02-10/air-force-cuts-back-exhibition-flights-on-new-f-35-engine-woes</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref4">[4]</a> Gregg, A.; Powerful lawmaker calls F-35 fighter jet a ‘rathole,’ suggests Pentagon should cut its losses (2021–03–06), Washington Post — <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2021/03/05/adam-smith-f35/">https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2021/03/05/adam-smith-f35/</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref5">[5]</a> Editorial Board, NY Times; The Fighter Jet That’s Too Pricey to Fail (2021–03–12) — <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/12/opinion/f-35-fighter-jet-cost.html?searchResultPosition=1">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/12/opinion/f-35-fighter-jet-cost.html?searchResultPosition=1</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref6">[6]</a> Axe, D.; Pentagon: Trillion-Dollar Jet on Brink of Budgetary Disaster, Wired (2012–03–21) — <a href="https://www.wired.com/2012/03/f35-budget-disaster/">https://www.wired.com/2012/03/f35-budget-disaster/</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref7">[7]</a> Axe, D.; Top Pilot: Air Force Should Put Brakes on All-Stealth Arsenal, Wired (2012–11–08) — <a href="https://www.wired.com/2012/11/all-stealth-force/">https://www.wired.com/2012/11/all-stealth-force/</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref8">[8]</a> De Rugy, V.; The Pentagon Can Have Whatever It Wants. As Long As It’s Not Less Money, Reason (2014–12–12) — <a href="https://reason.com/2014/12/12/the-military-can-have-whatever-it-wants/">https://reason.com/2014/12/12/the-military-can-have-whatever-it-wants/</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref9">[9]</a> Majumdar, D.; <em>New U.S. Stealth Jet Can’t Fire Its Gun Until </em>2019, The Daily Beast (2014–12–31) — <a href="https://www.thedailybeast.com/new-us-stealth-jet-cant-fire-its-gun-until-2019">https://www.thedailybeast.com/new-us-stealth-jet-cant-fire-its-gun-until-2019</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref10">[10]</a> Capaccio, A.; F-35’s Gun That Can’t Shoot Straight Adds to Its Roster of Flaws, Bloomberg (2020–01–30) — <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-01-30/f-35-s-gun-that-can-t-shoot-straight-adds-to-its-roster-of-flaws">https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-01-30/f-35-s-gun-that-can-t-shoot-straight-adds-to-its-roster-of-flaws</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref11">[11]</a> Gady, F.; Oops: US Close-Air Support Bomb Doesn’t Fit on the F-35, The Diplomat (2015–03–14) — <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2015/03/oops-us-close-air-support-bomb-doesnt-fit-on-the-f35/">https://thediplomat.com/2015/03/oops-us-close-air-support-bomb-doesnt-fit-on-the-f35/</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref12">[12]</a> GAO Report 2016 — <a href="http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/676012.pdf">http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/676012.pdf</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref13">[13]</a> Capaccio, A.; Why the Pentagon Isn’t Happy With the F-35, Bloomberg (2018–01–24) — <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-01-24/lockheed-f-35-s-reliability-progress-has-stalled-pentagon-told">https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-01-24/lockheed-f-35-s-reliability-progress-has-stalled-pentagon-told</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref14">[14]</a> Keller, J.; The F-35 breaks too easily and takes too long to fix, Pentagon says, Task &amp; Purpose (2019–11–14) — <a href="https://taskandpurpose.com/news/f35-reliability-issues/">https://taskandpurpose.com/news/f35-reliability-issues/</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref15">[15]</a> Gallagher, S.; DOD tester’s report: F-35 is still a lemon, Ars Technica (2020–01–30) — <a href="https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2020/01/not-a-straight-shooter-dod-review-cites-fleet-of-faults-in-f-35-program/">https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2020/01/not-a-straight-shooter-dod-review-cites-fleet-of-faults-in-f-35-program/</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref16">[16]</a> Trevithick, J.; The F-35 is still horribly broken, The Week (2016–02–26) — <a href="https://theweek.com/articles/605165/f35-still-horribly-broken">https://theweek.com/articles/605165/f35-still-horribly-broken</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref17">[17]</a> There have been various discussions of the concept, including in MWI in 2017 (<a href="https://mwi.usma.edu/reassessing-ikes-warning-acquisition-unwarranted-influence/">https://mwi.usma.edu/reassessing-ikes-warning-acquisition-unwarranted-influence/</a>), on the Project of Government Oversight in 2020 (<a href="https://www.pogo.org/analysis/2020/01/never-the-pentagon/">https://www.pogo.org/analysis/2020/01/never-the-pentagon/</a>), and Political Research Quarterly back in 2000 (<a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/449259">https://doi.org/10.2307/449259</a>)</p><p><a href="#_ftnref18">[18]</a> O’Neill, T. P. (with Novak, W.): <em>Man of the House</em> (Random House, 1987), pg. 325</p><p><a href="#_ftnref19">[19]</a> Mankiw, N. G.; <em>Principles of Microeconomics</em> (5th ed., 2009), pgs. 296–297</p><p><a href="#_ftnref20">[20]</a> Daniel Kahneman, who collaborated in this area with Amos Tversky, won the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics for his extensive work in this area</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=60b30e989733" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Why did the presidential candidacy of Senator Elizabeth Warren fail?]]></title>
            <link>https://apdge.medium.com/why-did-the-presidential-candidacy-of-senator-elizabeth-warren-fail-917c8235cec0?source=rss-102ff7d2f5be------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/917c8235cec0</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[2020-democratic-primary]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[elizabeth-warren]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[joe-biden]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bernie-sanders]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[2020-presidential-race]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[A. P. D. G. Everett]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 15 Mar 2021 02:51:17 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-03-15T02:51:17.846Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>A year ago, during a weekend when I was in a science communications workshop at Cornell, I spent my evening between the Saturday and Sunday instead writing my analysis as to why the presidential campaign of Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) failed that I ended up sharing with several friends. A year later, given that former Vice-President Joe Biden is now President Joe Biden, I decided to re-read it, and figured it was worth sharing (and has only been edited to remove links to posts on my personal Facebook in which I discuss various aspects of the 2020 Democratic Presidential Primary).</p><p>=//=</p><p>In the wake of her dropping out of her run for the Democratic nomination, leaving only two major candidates left, former Vice President Joe Biden, and Senator Bernie Sanders.</p><p>In light of the fact that the Democratic nominee in 2016 was Hillary Clinton, who herself fell in the 2008 nomination contest to Barack Obama, then lost to Donald Trump in the general in 2016 losing the electoral college whilst winning the popular vote by several million votes, there were a lot of raw emotions coming into the 2020 primary cycle, and many people were highly motivated to see a woman elected as President of the United States.</p><p>In the 2020 primary nomination contest, there was seemingly a font of options for those looking to elect the first female President. There were six female candidates: Sen. Kamala Harris (Cal.), Sen. Amy Klobuchar (Minn.), Sen. Kirsten Gillibrand (NY), Sen. Elizabeth Warren (Mass.), Rep. Tulsi Gabbard (Hawaii), &amp; Ms Marianne Williamson, who is a self-help author.</p><p>As Chris Cillizza pointed out recently: “On its face, running as a woman for president is no hindrance at all. For the past five-plus decades, Gallup has been asking the public a series of questions about whether they would be willing to vote for candidates with a specific set of traits. In 1958, just 54% of people said they would vote for a woman to be president. By 1983, that number was 80%. In 2015 it was 92% and this year 93% said they would vote for a woman to be president.”</p><p>But, in the end, the only two candidates left standing after the loss of Warren are two septuagenarian white men. This result has caused a lot of consternation, and a range of other emotions, most of which I think can be centred around anger and disappointment.</p><p>Senator Amy Klobuchar expressed curiosity if, given the current inhabitant of the White House, most voters wanted a man to challenge him. This of course is a specific example of the general question of electability.</p><p>Senator Klobuchar also claimed in a debate that if someone of former Mayor Pete Buttigieg’s qualifications had been a woman trying to run, female Pete, who I’ll label “Petra Buttigieg” for this example, would have gone nowhere. As I have said before: “…go see if you can find a 38-year old female former two-term mayor who was an honours grad from Harvard, went to Oxford as a Rhodes scholar, worked at McKinsey, &amp; served in the military, and if you can, run her to find out. I’ll even not insist that this person be gay, just to increase the odds of finding someone.” The fact that Pete Buttigieg, who grew up in South Bend, Indiana, did all of the things he did before coming home and getting involved in local area politics, then running for mayor I think was part of his appeal.</p><p>I then made out a list of every politically prominent American Rhodes Scholar I could think of (other than the current Lieutenant-Governor of Washington, Cyrus Habib, since his level of political prominence could be argued) and where they were at age 38. The list I came up with was as follows:</p><p>1) Cory Booker (one of the other 2020 Democratic Presidential nomination seekers), 12 years ago, he was barely in his second year as mayor of Newark, certainly hadn’t been in the military, nor had he worked for a place like McKinsey, but he certainly could have given his resume (actually, McKinsey is on record as saying they treat Rhodes Scholars as MBA equivalents for their applications process).</p><p>2) Eric Garcetti, the current mayor of LA, is probably the closest thing, CV speaking to Pete, and 11 years ago, he was only an LA city counsellor, although he had been a Naval Reserve officer for a few years as well by that point.</p><p>3) Carl Albert, who became Speaker of the House, had just returned from WW2 (where he served in the Army Air Corps) and got elected to his first term in Congress.</p><p>4) Bobby Jindal, not a veteran, a decade ago was just in his second year as governor of Louisiana, having been a member of the US House of Representatives, Assistant Secretary of HHS for Planning &amp; Evaluation, as well as Secretary of the Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals (a position he assumed at age 24).</p><p>5) Bill Clinton, draft dodger that he was, had served a term as Arkansas AG, got elected governor, lost re-election, and then got elected again by 1984.</p><p>6) John Brademas, a US Navy veteran with brief service at the end of WW2, was a House back-bencher in his 4th term.</p><p>7) Gina Raimondo, a decade ago, hadn’t even become treasurer of RI yet, much less governor, also not a veteran.</p><p>8) Paul Sarbanes, not a veteran, was just serving his first term in Congress.</p><p>9) Heather Wilson, former Congresswoman from New Mexico, and an AF veteran, was just in her first term in Congress 21 years ago.</p><p>10) Byron White, future SCOTUS justice, football star, and a Navy vet in WW2, was still a private practice attorney in Denver at age 38, 6 years from his first DC job as Deputy AG.</p><p>11) Richard Lugar, a Navy vet and future long-time US Senator, was only in his second year as mayor of Indianapolis.</p><p>12) Russ Feingold, not a veteran, was a state legislator in Madison, two years away from the US Senate.</p><p>13) Bill Bradley, Air Force Reserve veteran and former NBA player, was only in his second year as a US Senator from New Jersey.</p><p>14) Sylvia Matthews Burwell, future OMB director and HHS Secretary for Obama, not a veteran, had finished her years as a staffer in the Clinton White House and was on her second year at the Gates Foundation.</p><p>As it happens, Senator Klobuchar, who is not a veteran and not a Rhodes Scholar, 21 years ago, when she was 38, had just been named DA of Hennepin County in Minnesota (which encompasses Minneapolis). I feel safe asserting that had there been a “Petra Buttigieg”, a late-30s veteran, with all of the accomplishments that Pete had racked up by age 38, woman, gay or straight, assuming she’d had the ambition to run for President, she’d have made it just as far as Pete did.</p><p>A question to evaluate is, assuming that Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren are comparable goods (in an economic sense), why did Bernie do a lot better as a candidate than Liz? After all, Bernie only ran in 2016 because other progressives, such as Elizabeth Warren, chose not to run. Can it be as simple as the fact that Bernie got into the space as “progressive candidate” first, crowding out Liz when she ran four years later, against Bernie? On the basis of the available evidence, including the fact that during the late fall of 2019, Elizabeth Warren was at or near the front of the pack of candidates on the basis of polling and news coverage, that question seems to be wrong. Especially since after her semi-strong initial entry, she struggled as a candidate for a while before clawing her way to the top towards the end of 2019 before falling again.</p><p>As has been noted in many places in many ways, Elizabeth Warren represented the “wine track” candidate, she may have held similar positions to Bernie Sanders on many issues, but who she appealed to was fundamentally a very different crowd. As I’ve said before, she was undeniably intelligent and diligent, and demonstrated a lot of determination to get from her working-class roots to become a tenured law professor at two Ivy League universities, the University of Pennsylvania and then Harvard. As I noted in a Facebook post citing the analysis of Megan McArdle, bringing in Matthew Stewart’s essay of the new American aristocracy as well as Annie Lowery’s review of Richard Reeves’ book “Dream Hoarders”, all of which I think are interconnected, quoting Ms McArdle: “Too many of her proposals are like this; they focus on corporate villains or billionaires while ignoring the much broader class of people that Richard Reeves of the Brookings Institution dubbed the “Dream Hoarders” — the well-educated upper-middle-class people who are desperate to pass their privilege onto their kids, and are unhappy about the steadily mounting cost of doing so. They’re Warren’s base.</p><p>Unfortunately, the Dream Hoarders — and I include myself in their number — are a much bigger problem for the rest of America than the billionaires whose wealth Warren promises to expropriate. Those billionaires got that way by building companies that disrupted cozy local monopolies, and they fund coding camps for high-school dropouts; Dream Hoarders protect their professional licensing regimes and insist on ever more extensive and expensive educations in the people they hire. Dream Hoarders also pull every lever to keep their own housing prices high — and poorer kids out of their schools — while using their wealth to carefully guide their children over the hurdles they’ve erected.””</p><p>In 1972, Pauline Kael made a remark about the re-election of Richard Nixon: “How could Nixon have won? Nobody I know voted for him”. It should be noted that in 1972, Ms Kael had been the film critic for The New Yorker for four years at that point (and served in that role until 1991). Everyone in her circle, at the forefront of intellectual and cultural life in America, was a McGovern supporter, yet Nixon beat McGovern handily, winning 49 of the 50 states and their electoral college votes (it should be noted that Massachusetts was the only state that McGovern won, along with DC). I think that gets to a solemn truth, part of the appeal of Elizabeth Warren, why it seemed she was doing so well, is that the vast majority of her fans and voters were of the professional class, and whilst that magnified her, that also served as a limiting function for her, since there are more secondary school drop outs than people with graduate degrees, and less than a third of American adults over the age of 25 even have a baccalaureate degree, most of which aren’t from the state flagships and private schools, that are the font for most of the social elite in this country, the well-educated and well-off people, who work in prestige industries including the media, the law, and academia. In short, she was a populist for the professional class.</p><p>It was noted last October that Elizabeth Warren had an elitism problem that could cost her the nomination, so it was definitely not a surprise issue that brought her down. In a country that is over two-thirds not university educated, it might be wise to try to break out of that bubble. Bill Bradley and Howard Dean were known as “wine track” candidates in previous elections, and they ended up flaming out before getting the nomination. There was historical evidence of the limits of the “wine track” and yet, in the end, Senator Warren couldn’t break free of her world. It’s obvious that not only did she not, I don’t even think she tried. If she had, she would have pushed her personal narrative as hard as Bill Clinton did his in 1992 in order to not be seen as some Ivy Leaguer elitist technocrat. Joe Biden was able to hit her effectively by stating in a post on Medium: “Some call it the “my way or the highway” approach to politics. But it’s worse than that. It’s condescending to the millions of Democrats who have a different view. It’s representative of an elitism that working and middle class people do not share: “We know best; you know nothing”. “If you were only as smart as I am you would agree with me.””</p><p>Now of course, given that she had gotten her start in electoral politics in Massachusetts, a state known to produce smart and technocratic politicians, regardless of party label, given a history of success in a place where lots of people are well-educated and argumentative, someone who has made a career at being argumentative and intellectually focused (as I think it’s safe to assert that a law professor is), it’s something that doesn’t travel well outside of an area populated by people not in the professional class. Most people don’t like being lectured to, they certainly don’t like being thought of as lesser, a perception that tends to permeate around professors, as well as Ivy League educated technocrats (a population to which I certainly belong, having attended both Penn and Cornell). This would certainly explain why there have been so few career academics in the White House. The fact that what plays well in Massachusetts doesn’t play well nationally isn’t a surprise, none of the major party nominees of the last while made it past the nomination round if they even got that far (Dukakis, Kerry, and Mitt Romney being the three examples of the modern era fitting this mould), and even though she was from Oklahoma, she was thoroughly Massachusetts, and even still the part of Massachusetts she represents is the technocratic, white-collar professional part of it. That has been enough to win her elections for the Senate in Massachusetts, running as a Democrat, but it meant she placed third in a functionally three-way primary, losing to two men, one of whom, Sanders, represents a neighbouring state in the Senate (who beat her for second place, and mostly did well in the areas near Vermont), and outright to Biden, someone who, despite being the former Senator from Delaware, is an Irish Catholic gleefully glad-handing career politician, much more in tune to a lot of the cultural zeitgeist of Massachusetts than she was. It should be noted that Warren didn’t even win women in the Massachusetts primary. It should also be noted that Warren got a lot more support from university-educated men than from non-university-educated women, more evidence that class matters more than sex with respect to voting preferences.</p><p>In an article in The Atlantic, Elaine Godfrey asked five prominent individuals, all political strategists/analysts of various stripes, each with their own theory as to why Warren fell short.</p><p>1) James Carville: “She couldn’t pick a lane — a problem symbolized by her positioning on Medicare for All.”</p><p>2) Joe Trippi: “She was hit by the curse of the front-runner: She peaked too early and never recovered.”</p><p>3) Amy Walter: “It was the scourge of electability: Warren was seen as a risky choice.”</p><p>4) Dave Wasserman: “Blame The New York Times/Siena College poll that showed President Donald Trump beating Warren in head-to-head matchups in several key swing states.”</p><p>5) Jess McIntosh: “It all comes back to sexism.”</p><p>Now, undeniably, I think all five of these assertions are true in part. Sexism exists in America; I don’t think anyone would deny it. I certainly won’t, and in some cases that sexism is quite toxic. Did it certainly impact the end result, probably. How much? Considering that Elizabeth Warren was seeking to become the second female major party presidential candidate, I think that impact wasn’t as high as has been made out in multiple fora. Millions of Americans did vote for Hillary Clinton to be President, more than the man who is now in the Oval Office, they were just not well-apportioned for the goal of winning the Electoral College. So, the best answer I can say is that it was there was some sex-based bias, I am unable to quantify exactly how much, but on the basis of available evidence, which is mostly qualitative, the effect was probably slight. Polling that indicated that she drew more support from university-educated men than from non-university-educated women I think provides evidentiary support for this. The electability assertions I do think are undeniably valid, especially given the strong desire to remove Trump from office. Peaking too early is a historical truism, many times, if you rise early, especially against an incumbent president, you get taken down before you can rack up electoral wins to push your campaign forward. The lane issue that James Carville identifies I think is a big one, probably the biggest single of this list of five.</p><p>As I’ve said previously: <br> “Jonathan Chait leads off with what I think is one of the better analyses of her candidacy in a nutshell:</p><p>“When Elizabeth Warren began her candidacy in 2018, I expected her to be the candidate who would get my vote. She had, in my view, identified the political and policy sweet spots to move her party left: corruption and financial regulation, and she designed effective populist plans to rein in Wall Street and the power of organized money. But her campaign did not quickly catch fire, and over 2019 she tried to woo progressive activists by moving left on a wide suite of social and economic positions, matching every bid put up by Bernie Sanders. As New York Times reporter Astead Herndon noted recently, her use of intersectional rhetoric won the professional left’s acclaim, but left voters in the communities it was attempting to reach cold. By the end, she was boxed out on both sides: She had lost her mainstream appeal to the center left, but was still unable to dislodge the Sanders hardcore.”</p><p>In short, in trying to prevent Bernie from getting to the left of her, she turned off everyone who wasn’t already on the left, &amp; in so doing, she turned off almost everyone else (and I should note I’m one of those latter people), and once the choices were between her &amp; the original hardcore leftie Bernie, people wanted original leftie, not new leftie.”</p><p>This would be Carville’s lack of choosing a lane and sticking to it. I also think that, whilst she was being pulled at from the left because of Bernie, she was also competing against Amy Klobuchar and Pete Buttigieg for the votes of white-collar socially-liberal professionals. Both Amy and Pete, did surprisingly well in Iowa, a fact I think stems in part from both of them having Midwestern roots, with Amy Klobuchar being from the next state over, Minnesota. Elizabeth Warren’s fourth place finish in Iowa was the beginning of the end, she had people, organisation, and money she ploughed into Iowa, and if she couldn’t win with all of that, how far could she go? Coming in third in the primary the state you represent as a state-wide official is a massive failure that would cause me to wonder not if, but when and who will challenger her for her Senate seat. She also didn’t do herself any favours by coming out initially in favour of Medicare For All, providing a convoluted plan to implement it, and then later backing away from it. It looks like she was trying to chase smoke, going where she thought there would be the most support, demonstrating a lack of consistency of belief in it, but trying to engage in strategic positioning, something that usually never goes over well.</p><p>In the end, Elizabeth Warren was fundamentally done in, not by the fact she was a woman, but by her own weaknesses as a political candidate on the national stage. She was a niche candidate running in a field with too many candidates to have much in crossover appeal, and acted in ways that boxed her in from growing her appeal. She was too leftie for the moderates, not leftie enough for the true-believers. She tried to be all things to all people, but ended up nothing to most. The Warren campaign had a plan for everything except anything that mattered, including malfunction in her campaign. Unable to tell her personal narrative that would have been a strong case for her to demonstrate why she was in the race, and caught in capture to the professional &amp; activist left who may appreciate “wokeness” from white politicians, but it’s something that is a turn off to many others, including the Latino and African-American communities that she was purporting to be trying to help. She came across as a conceited and condescending elitist in a country that dislikes condescension and conceit in its politicians, part of the enduring popularity of the “Can I have a drink with them” test that many apply to politicians. Her advisers amplified her flaws and dampened her virtues, and probably deserve to never work in professional politics given their squandering of her potential as a transformative candidate, and since she was the candidate, in the end that responsibility for her campaign’s failures lies with her. To perform a mashup of Tip O’Neill &amp; Robert Frost that I think gets to the core of the matter: “She forgot from whence she came, and it has made all of the difference”.</p><p>The analysis performed above is mine, but over the course of the 2020 Presidential Primary Cycle, I read several pieces that are reflected within this essay, and those references are listed below, many of them analyses of why the Warren Campaign failed, inspired my own work, as I felt that they all had parts missing:</p><p>1) Bacon — <a href="https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/why-warren-couldnt-win/">https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/why-warren-couldnt-win/</a></p><p>2) Carmon et al. — <a href="https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2020/03/what-doomed-elizabeth-warrens-candidacy.html">https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2020/03/what-doomed-elizabeth-warrens-candidacy.html</a></p><p>3) Cillizza — <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2020/03/05/politics/elizabeth-warren-2020-presidential/index.html">https://www.cnn.com/2020/03/05/politics/elizabeth-warren-2020-presidential/index.html</a></p><p>4) Cillizza — <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2020/03/06/politics/amy-klobuchar-elizabeth-warren-donald-trump/index.html">https://www.cnn.com/2020/03/06/politics/amy-klobuchar-elizabeth-warren-donald-trump/index.html</a></p><p>5) Glueck — <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/05/us/politics/joe-biden-elizabeth-warren.html">https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/05/us/politics/joe-biden-elizabeth-warren.html</a></p><p>6) Godfrey — <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2020/03/warren-2020/607327/">https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2020/03/warren-2020/607327/</a></p><p>7) Herzog — <a href="https://reason.com/2020/03/06/sexism-didnt-kill-the-warren-campaign-the-warren-campaign-killed-the-warren-campaign/">https://reason.com/2020/03/06/sexism-didnt-kill-the-warren-campaign-the-warren-campaign-killed-the-warren-campaign/</a></p><p>8) Khalid — <a href="https://www.npr.org/2020/03/07/812903782/why-progressives-chose-bernie-sanders-over-elizabeth-warren">https://www.npr.org/2020/03/07/812903782/why-progressives-chose-bernie-sanders-over-elizabeth-warren</a></p><p>9) McArdle — <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/03/04/elizabeth-warren-focused-her-core-voters-there-werent-enough-them/">https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/03/04/elizabeth-warren-focused-her-core-voters-there-werent-enough-them/</a></p><p>10) McArdle — <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/03/05/elizabeth-warren-is-out-no-its-not-because-her-gender/">https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/03/05/elizabeth-warren-is-out-no-its-not-because-her-gender/</a></p><p>11) Millman — <a href="https://theweek.com/articles/900163/elizabeth-warren-bet-being-right--lost">https://theweek.com/articles/900163/elizabeth-warren-bet-being-right--lost</a></p><p>12) Nilsen — <a href="https://www.vox.com/2020/3/3/21161603/bernie-sanders-beat-elizabeth-warren-in-massachusetts">https://www.vox.com/2020/3/3/21161603/bernie-sanders-beat-elizabeth-warren-in-massachusetts</a></p><p>13) Suderman — <a href="https://reason.com/2020/03/05/elizabeth-warren-drops-out-her-failed-campaign-is-a-reminder-that-even-democratic-voters-dont-want-a-woke-policy-wonk-in-the-white-house/">https://reason.com/2020/03/05/elizabeth-warren-drops-out-her-failed-campaign-is-a-reminder-that-even-democratic-voters-dont-want-a-woke-policy-wonk-in-the-white-house/</a></p><p>14) Thompson — <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2020/03/06/warren-team-wonders-how-they-blew-it-122628">https://www.politico.com/news/2020/03/06/warren-team-wonders-how-they-blew-it-122628</a></p><p>15) Weiss — <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/03/06/elizabeth-warren-strength-weakness-122975">https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/03/06/elizabeth-warren-strength-weakness-122975</a></p><p>16) Wilson — <a href="https://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/486169-on-the-trail-warren-falls-victim-to-the-electability-obsession">https://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/486169-on-the-trail-warren-falls-victim-to-the-electability-obsession</a></p><p>17) Yglesias — <a href="https://www.vox.com/2020/3/3/21162527/what-happened-to-elizabeth-warren">https://www.vox.com/2020/3/3/21162527/what-happened-to-elizabeth-warren</a></p><p>18) Yglesias — <a href="https://www.vox.com/2020/3/10/21169166/elizabeth-warren-working-class-women">https://www.vox.com/2020/3/10/21169166/elizabeth-warren-working-class-women</a></p><p>=//=</p><p>Note: Obviously, along with Joe Biden now being President and Bernie Sanders now being chair of the Senate Budget Committee, Gina Raimondo is now Secretary of Commerce and Pete Buttigieg is now Secretary of Transportation. Even though the last former Cabinet Secretary to run for and win the presidency was one-time Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover, the fact that now Secretary Raimondo and Secretary Buttigieg are still in politically prominent positions of the Cabinet of President Joe Biden, they will be discussed as future running mates for whomever becomes the Democratic Party’s nominee for President in 2024 and beyond.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=917c8235cec0" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Anti-competitive, spiteful, and other unfortunate behaviours from major tech companies will bring…]]></title>
            <link>https://apdge.medium.com/anti-competitive-spiteful-and-other-unfortunate-behaviours-from-major-tech-companies-will-bring-1ca01ee3cb94?source=rss-102ff7d2f5be------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/1ca01ee3cb94</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[politics-and-technology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[big-tech]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tech-policy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tech-industry]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[A. P. D. G. Everett]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 20 Jul 2020 01:35:45 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-07-23T19:18:48.771Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Anti-competitive, spiteful, and other unfortunate behaviours from major tech companies will bring major adverse consequences</h3><p>Recently, I was reading an article in the NY Times entitled “Tech Goliaths Act Like Davids”, which caused me to reflect on some of the articles about Big Tech over the last couple of years. The interesting thing to me, in the history of the biggest tech companies in America: Apple, Microsoft, Amazon, Google, Facebook, etc, are not just the biggest tech companies on Earth, they’re just some of the biggest companies on Earth right now, full-stop. But in the climb to become giants, they have engaged in tactics that could be described as predatory, but certainly as petty and spiteful, especially when coming from some of the biggest companies on Earth. Something that may be acceptable, or even respectable, in a small company, just looks like bullying when you’re really big.</p><p>Whilst most individuals, most companies, do not have the wherewithal to be able to endure that onslaught when it’s focused on them, so even if they may be in the right, they’ll fold when challenged by Big Tech. However, as the EU has made a long-standing habit of taking on tech companies, and the US is a lot more willing to, in no small part because, unlike in the past, the Powers that Be in DC (that is to say the political branches of the US Government), view the tech giants with suspicion, a suspicion shared by a non-trivial portion of the American people. And governments, unlike individuals or even most companies, can go as long as they have to in pursuit of their ends.</p><p>Part of the reason that tech companies have, for most of the last two decades, generally avoided the regulatory fervour of DC is because of a few factors:</p><p>1) Antitrust law, especially in the US, is focused on artificially inflated high prices that come from oligarchic or monopolistic market share, not on non-price related factors.</p><p>2) Most of the major tech companies, in furtherance of trying to achieve market dominance, have kept their prices low, in theory benefiting consumers.</p><p>3) People of a Republican bent are generally wary of regulating big business, given the pro-business orientation that has been part of the GOP for well over a century.</p><p>4) People of a Democratic bent are, or have been, adverse to regulate the tech industry, given that so many tech workers are socially liberal and support left-leaning causes, never mind the fact that Silicon Valley has replaced Wall Street as the place for Democratic power players leaving government service.</p><p>However, as a part of that, tech companies have:</p><p>1) Done a lot of things to endanger peoples’ privacy and the security of their data, not just to cyber-criminals but also to states who exploit these lapses (Russia, but especially China, which as a matter of national policy (cf the National Intelligence Law and Cybersecurity Law, both of 2017) compel Chinese citizens and organisations to cooperate with “state intelligence work”).</p><p>2) Exploding online markets for classes of goods to drive competitors out of business and/or sell themselves off (especially Amazon, but it’s not alone there) — classic anti-competitive behaviour, even if it is, in the short and medium term, causing prices to fall on consumer goods.</p><p>3) Related to the former, tech companies like Amazon and Google creating competitors to the companies that use their platforms (leading to the Elizabeth Warren tweet (https://twitter.com/ewarren/status/1120484639922110464): “Giant tech companies have too much power. My plan to #BreakUpBigTech prevents corporations like Amazon from knocking out the rest of the competition. You can be an umpire, or you can be a player — but you can’t be both. #WarrenTownHall”)</p><p>4) Using AI, machine learning, and other forms of “Big Data”, as well as the algorithms that people like me come up with, to exploit people. Cambridge Analytica is an example of this, but there are so many others to list them all here.</p><p>5) As a result of the last point, major tech companies (especially those in the social media sphere) are seen as having torn down many of the systems that have kept representative democratic states functioning well.</p><p>6) Mentioning algorithms developed by people like me, given the explosion in the amount of data that we have, they are being used in progressively more areas, meaning that progressively more decisions are being made by, or at least strongly influenced by, algorithmic tools. Meaning, that if junk data or data that is collected through bigotry-based methods is used as the basis of analysis (which is rather sadly common for many factors), then people have been, are, and will be, discriminated against, even if the tools being used to make the evaluations are not bigoted.</p><p>Attorneys-General in many of the US states have already gone after tech companies for issues surrounding anti-competitive practices and harm caused to consumers (following the example of EU regulators and lawmakers more than US federal ones, who have been more laissez-faire). Of the major tech companies, there are different issues on each, and some are more likely to be broken up than others. Facebook (the company) owns three social media services that are, by their nature, competitors (Facebook (the website/app), Instagram, &amp; WhatsApp)) but are held under the same corporate umbrella. Twitter &amp; Reddit also have a lot of impact, in the social media space, as does LinkedIn, but other than Twitter, the foci of Reddit &amp; LinkedIn are different than the general lifestyle things that get communicated through those first four, and three of them are owned by the same corporate parent. Google, the overwhelming worldwide dominant leader in internet search is also the owner of YouTube, the worldwide dominant leader in online video, putting many people at Google’s mercy if they want to get their content out. You don’t think that isn’t something that’s liable to get people to ask “Why do we let this happen”? It’s not just “enemies of big business”, such as Elizabeth Warren who are looking to regulate or break up “Big Tech” either. The power that Big Tech has is so massive, and in some cases so obvious, that one of Facebook’s co-founders (Chris Hughes) wrote an op-ed in the NY Times supporting the break-up of Facebook. It is, as University of Washington Professor Margaret O’Mara noted in an op-ed (also in the NY Times) describing why letting the tech industry regulate itself is no longer a reasonable approach: “Washington’s hands-off approach ultimately permitted a marvellous explosion of content and connectivity on social media and other platforms. But the people designing the rules of the internet didn’t reckon with the ways that bad actors could exploit the system. The people building those tools had little inkling of how powerful, and exploitable, their creations would become.”. Amazon, Facebook, and other tech platforms, will probably be restricted from selling products that compete against others that use their companies platforms. Apple is a vertically integrated company, that is to say it oversees all aspects of what goes into its devices, which generates its own complaints, however, their defence fundamentally is, “We want to make sure everything works perfectly with each other, so we have built a walled garden to protect it all”. This strategy is also something that will draw regulatory ire, as has Apple’s regular and repeated “Mea culpa” every time it comes out some child has racked up massive charges on their parents’ Apple store accounts. Most all major tech companies have aspects of their operations that draw critical looks from those in government. Almost 7 in 10 Americans recently polled said they were in favour of breaking up major tech companies, including Amazon, Google, and Facebook, so the obvious thing to consider is when a critical eye is upon you, you don’t give people excuses to go after you, yet this is a perspective that requires hard-earned experience of learning that pride going before the fall, or if you’re smart, you read the lessons of history and learn from other peoples’ mistakes.</p><p>Ironically, part of how Microsoft has been able to avoid the public spotlight and furore that many of the other Big Tech companies are enduring now is because, having endured that in the 1990s, Microsoft has become publicly humbler (arguably this was one of Steve Ballmer’s biggest contributions as Microsoft CEO, changing Microsoft’s image with the US Government, cleaning up the wreckage from years of legal battles, as well as starting the push towards enterprise services as a primary focus of Microsoft, making it less dependent on the general consumer market. It should be noted that Steve Ballmer’s other major contribution, in my opinion, other than stabilising the company and untangling it from its legal issues was in the realm of corporate revenues, arguably something for which Ballmer’s background well suited him. From January 2000, when Steve Ballmer took over as Microsoft’s CEO, to February 2014, when he left and was succeeded by Sadya Nadella, under Ballmer’s tenure, Microsoft profits doubled to 6.33 billion USD per annum and revenues trebled to 18.53 billion per annum). It’s also because of the fact that Microsoft is, other than its operating systems and Office productivity software suite, almost entirely an enterprise company at this point, that is to say a company that does business with and for businesses, not consumers. This makes it much less in a position to be in the forefront of most Americans’ minds, even if almost everyone uses Microsoft software, or have their lives impacted by Microsoft products and services. It’s also obvious in the number and types of investigations now going on at the federal and state levels, very few are against Microsoft, almost all are against the rest of Big Tech.</p><p>Why else do you think Jeff Bezos and Amazon are making such big investments in the DC area but to buy presence and protection from politicians and regulators in DC? Amazon announcing the location of HQ2 in Crystal City. Jeff Bezos buying the Washington Post. Amazon going heavily into its willingness to take government and defence contracts (in contrast to Google and most others besides Microsoft and smaller companies like Palantir) but to buy itself the good graces and protection from regulators and lawmakers. Amazon may not be an enjoyable place to work for many if not most of its employees, but it does provide a lot of goods to a lot of people quickly and cheaply, which works in its favour and buys it a lot of grace from politicians. Amazon’s focus on customer service that borders on obsessive is another thing that builds good will with customers. As does the fact that so much of Amazon’s capacities are inter-connected. Amazon, in order to solve its need to address surge capacity demands, brought online a lot more server capacity that Bezos &amp; company realised they could put to work for most of the year for external customers, and Amazon Web Services was born, a business that is now a major profit centre for Amazon. Possession of all of that server capacity is also what allowed Amazon, as a part of its Amazon Prime service, to roll out Amazon Prime Video, a free add-on for people who are already Amazon Prime subscribers, for which Amazon charges 8.99 USD a month as a stand-alone product. Amazon Prime Video is, what is in the language of the times, a “side hustle”, yet Amazon Prime Video is 2.5 times the size of Netflix in revenues, a company that is considered the market leader in streaming video, that has 4.5 times the number of streaming titles (I’m not commenting on the relative quality of the titles held by each service, just the numbers available). As a <em>Bloomberg</em> article of 21 July 2020 noted that Amazon has set a lobbying record for the second quarter of 2020 (ending 30 June), spending 4.38 million USD on lobbying during the second quarter, as Amazon has faced increasing antitrust scrutiny in DC as well as regarding the challenges of delivering goods to Americans stuck at home during the COVID-19/SARS-CoV-2 pandemic. The spending for Q2 2020 was up more than 9 per cent from the same period in 2019, and is a slight increase from its previous record, set just last quarter (Q1 2020), which <em>Bloomberg</em> notes this data is drawn from the lobbying disclosures filed with Congress.</p><p>There’s an old saying in computing, “Garbage in, garbage out”, abbreviated GIGO (and to many Britons is known as “Rubbish in, rubbish out” (RIRO)), meaning that faulty inputs invariably lead to faulty outputs. Well, think about the fact that many algorithms are increasing in what things are under their influence. What if the data that underlies many if not most of those algorithms are biased, not only in a statistical sense, but in a way based on previous racial or ethnic influenced policies? Redlining in mortgage lending, differential arrest and conviction rates for comparable crimes given different levels of enforcement in different areas, etc. have all had impacts on average income per postal code, average amount of wealth in different racial/ethnic categories, and so on. Hidden biases in both the collection and analysis stages present considerable risks, and are as important to the big-data equation as the numbers themselves. There was recent news that many major image-processing algorithms have, when processing pixelated images, output questionable if not improper outcomes, including taking a pixelated image of former President Barack Obama, a bi-racial man, and outputting a white face. Using the same technologies, a picture of Lucy Liu, a woman of Chinese descent, was transformed into a white woman. This issue that these examples highlight is a common one in image processing, given that the vast majority of those who work in image processing, as well as other aspects of machine learning and AI at large tend to be white men, so when dealing with faces that aren’t men or are of persons of colour, means their performance tends to be a lot less effective on data that such models aren’t trained on. These are examples of the concept of algorithm bias, and algorithm bias is something which can, has, and will, adversely impact many if not most, which is why, when things become more dependent on the outputs of algorithms, that the inputs be as accurate and complete as possible, however, given that so much of the data that goes into so many systems to generate conclusions that impact the lives of everyone are flawed, and include many biases, both intentional and not as intentional, that skew the outputs these systems generate, to the detriment of many.</p><p>The rising problem of deepfakes, which are getting so good that they are almost indistinguishable from the real thing, will only get worse, which will cause people to lose even more faith in the ability for tech companies to regulate themselves, leading to even more calls for governments to regulate tech companies, since such deepfakes can be used to skew electoral results. Lyndon Johnson, in one of his congressional races, decided to spread the rumour that his opponent engaged in bestiality with those of the porcine ilk (that is to say LBJ said his opponent was engaging in sexual congress with pigs). LBJ’s campaign manager is said to have responded, upon hearing this plan: “Lyndon, you know he doesn’t do that!” The future President Johnson replied, “I know. I just want to make him deny it.” This is something that may be apocryphal, but still, gets to a common issue in politics, the furore of an issue getting so massive so quickly that people are forced to respond to issues before all the facts can get out, something that happens with ever-increasing speed given the rise of technologies that can spread information (and misinformation), further and faster than ever before. The axiom “A lie can spread halfway around the world before the truth can get its boots on”, and that was in the days of newspapers and when information transmission took time, when whomever was its actual speaker (there are disputes on who it was), had no idea of the speed which the internet and social media could cause distorted perceptions of events. What protections will exist for people falsely maligned through the use of deepfakes? What are tech companies doing to prevent their dissemination? Do you think that people will stand for someone getting cashiered from public life for something that is false, once that falsehood comes to light? The potential impacts are disastrous, as Brookings noted deepfakes will cause: “distorting democratic discourse; manipulating elections; eroding trust in institutions; weakening journalism; exacerbating social divisions; undermining public safety; and inflicting hard-to-repair damage on the reputation of prominent individuals, including elected officials and candidates for office.” Societies are built on public trust, especially public institutions in representative democratic societies. What happens if trust in others is no longer possible? The impacts for societies are undeniably disastrous.</p><p>Another reason why tech companies are being looked at more critically than in the past is the fact that in the time of great need for innovative solutions to the problems caused by degrading race relations, massive educational disparities, economic disruption, the COVID-19/SARS-CoV-2 pandemic, opioid addiction, and many others, where are solutions coming out to address these pressing issues? In the past, technologies helped to solve the world’s major concerns (communicable diseases, malnutrition, literacy, etc), filled human aspirations, including the spreading of democracy and space travel. Now, all tech companies seem to deliver are the things that fill the void of wants for educated, upper-middle class, normally single and urban living, people who work in tech, as well as those who bankroll tech companies as venture capitalists (many of them former tech workers themselves). As was noted in a recent (June 2020) article in <em>MIT Technology Review</em>: “In the United States, she says, 75% of venture capital goes to software. Some 5 to 10% goes to biotech: a tiny handful of venture capitalists have mastered the longer art of building a biotech company. The other sliver goes to everything else — “transportation, sanitation, health care.”” It’s a self-perpetuating machine that shuts out many useful forms of human endeavour that could be backed, because the need for such things are outside of the experiences of those who work in, and those who fund, many if not most tech companies. Tech company leaders ask policy makers in DC “why don’t they (the policy makers) understand the tech companies and how they work?” Well, when you have an industry that draws from one part of society at large, that mostly is located only in big &amp; liberal urban areas (most US tech centres: The Bay Area, Seattle, NYC, and Boston) are in left-leaning states, states that haven’t voted for Republican candidates for state and federal office for upwards of a generation or more, etc, it’s difficult to understand a demographic you have no interaction with. Not just is this the case of demographics or political party sorting along the lines of what Bill Bishop discussed in <em>The Big Sort</em> etc. — most people who go into policy work and/or into elected office have educations in law, or in public policy &amp; administration, and more often than not will have a series of un-paid, or underpaid internships, since normally the only way into a Congressional staff or think tank is through the internships that, because they are, to tech workers, underpaying what tech workers can make interning at tech companies, so, guess what, not surprisingly, you have people with STEM educations tend not to take un(der)paying entry-level jobs that you need to make it in DC. This is even more true of elected officials, many of whom get their starts as legislative staffers, or in district attorney’s offices as prosecutors, and other forms of work that aren’t as financially remunerative as a career in tech is. The tracks to pursue a career in a tech company on one hand, or to go into policy/political work, tend to diverge and diverge early in life.</p><p>There are also the issues, not just of throwing in so heavily behind one political party, and of addressing issues really of only one socio-economic status cohort, but also of implementing technologies without thinking of the adverse consequences of those technologies. Many founders and leaders of tech companies, their educational backgrounds are in STEM fields, almost exclusively. A STEM-based education can impart how to do things, by its nature, it doesn’t often impart why things are done. The value of the humanities and social sciences are that the questions they evaluate, that they ponder, is how and why people do the things they do. I cannot think of a technology in existence that hasn’t been manipulated in ways not intended by its creators. People, even with the best of intent, can create things that can be used for great evil if not carefully monitored and controlled, something that most tech leaders, who tend to be believers in techno-utopia, are not wont to look critically at the things they create, believing unreservedly that technological progress will bring progress in all other areas. This is why, in my humble opinion, the humanities and social sciences are needed now more than ever, to provide perspectives that technically-focused educations do not provide on their own. As Sam Rayburn, long-time Speaker of the US House of Representatives, was fond of saying: “Any jackass can kick a barn down, but it takes a carpenter to build one.” Meaning that, it’s a lot easier to tear down systems and institutions than building them or replacing them, something, that many people in tech, with the desire to “move fast and break things” undoubtedly did not and in fact could not consider, what would fill the vacuum of what was being torn down. As we have seen, without care and planning, what fills the vacuum have been the dregs of human emotion and the darkness that exists in human hearts and souls.</p><p>The founders of Big Tech are purported to be the brightest minds of recent generations, yet couldn’t see the impacts of things like this? The things that were supposed to improve the lives of many in societies at large are often spreading despair, distrust, and discord instead. People will question, and in fact are already questioning, how much we as a society can actually trust such people. The public embarrassment of, and loss of trust in, tech leaders is only compounded by the fact that, when such breakdowns in their technologies happen, either from exploitation from malicious actors, or by mistakes from tech companies, compounded by the fact that they don’t immediately and fully expose themselves, say “We screwed up and we’re sorry”. It’s certainly this lack of humility to admit fault &amp; to their limitations that is causing many of the major tech companies to come under the more watchful gaze of the PTB in DC and in the capitals of the 50 US states. It’s also openly and deeply embracing causes that may appeal to its mostly left-leaning workforce, but of course, in so doing, have made it suspicious to those on the political right, who control most of the state capitals. A major reason that public companies, especially the largest and most influential corporations have, as a matter of history, tried to keep politics out of their business is because it is internally divisive and it places a giant target on your back for your political enemies. Meaning whatever external rewards you get from like-minded politicians or from internal cohesion from having a group of like-minded employees, it almost always generates way more in blowback than that’s worth. It also means, now that both sides are looking at regulating tech companies, those tech companies, other than Microsoft (who learnt its lessons from its brash challenging of politicians and regulators back in the 1990s), and probably Amazon, who do they think will defend them? I wonder if they thought that far ahead? Or just thought, if we spend enough money on lobbying in DC, we can go on as we are, without changing in any real way?</p><p>In summary, for major tech companies, the consequences of their actions, of their choices, will be, I think severe, and I’m pretty sure most of tech isn’t going to be ready for the whirlwind that they will reap from the wind they have sown. Tech companies have demonstrated a generally stunning lack of ability to police themselves, along with a remarkable lack of self-awareness of the impacts of the technologies they’ve created on society at large, which will mean that, unless tech companies develop the maturity and foresight to make changes quickly and decisively to themselves and how they operate (which I severely doubt), those changes will be made for them in DC, Brussels, London, Tokyo, etc, and major tech companies will have no one to blame for themselves for the outcome.</p><p><em>This post was updated on 23 July 2020 to fix minor phrasing issues, as well as include the reference to Amazon’s Q2 2020 lobbying expenditures setting a record.</em></p><p>References:</p><ol><li><a href="https://bgr.com/2019/01/28/amazon-prime-video-vs-netflix-movie-selection/">https://bgr.com/2019/01/28/amazon-prime-video-vs-netflix-movie-selection/</a></li><li><a href="https://hbr.org/2013/04/the-hidden-biases-in-big-data">https://hbr.org/2013/04/the-hidden-biases-in-big-data</a></li><li><a href="https://marketingland.com/almost-70-of-digital-ad-spending-going-to-google-facebook-amazon-says-analyst-firm-262565">https://marketingland.com/almost-70-of-digital-ad-spending-going-to-google-facebook-amazon-says-analyst-firm-262565</a></li><li><a href="https://techcrunch.com/2016/07/02/andy-jassys-brief-history-of-the-genesis-of-aws/">https://techcrunch.com/2016/07/02/andy-jassys-brief-history-of-the-genesis-of-aws/</a></li><li><a href="https://theweek.com/articles/832948/algorithms-have-gotten-control-time-regulate">https://theweek.com/articles/832948/algorithms-have-gotten-control-time-regulate</a></li><li><a href="https://washingtonmonthly.com/2006/09/25/did-he-or-didnt-he/">https://washingtonmonthly.com/2006/09/25/did-he-or-didnt-he/</a></li><li><a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-01-12/silicon-valley-will-pay-the-price-for-its-lefty-leanings">https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-01-12/silicon-valley-will-pay-the-price-for-its-lefty-leanings</a></li><li><a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-08-12/mark-zuckerberg-is-totally-out-of-his-depth">https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-08-12/mark-zuckerberg-is-totally-out-of-his-depth</a></li><li><a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-07-21/amazon-sets-new-lobbying-record-as-tech-antitrust-scrutiny-grows">https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-07-21/amazon-sets-new-lobbying-record-as-tech-antitrust-scrutiny-grows</a></li><li><a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/05/09/how-misinformation-spreads-on-social-media-and-what-to-do-about-it/">https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/05/09/how-misinformation-spreads-on-social-media-and-what-to-do-about-it/</a></li><li><a href="https://www.brookings.edu/research/is-seeing-still-believing-the-deepfake-challenge-to-truth-in-politics/#cancel">https://www.brookings.edu/research/is-seeing-still-believing-the-deepfake-challenge-to-truth-in-politics/#cancel</a></li><li><a href="https://www.cnas.org/publications/congressional-testimony/how-corporations-and-big-tech-leave-our-data-exposed-to-criminals-china-and-other-bad-actors">https://www.cnas.org/publications/congressional-testimony/how-corporations-and-big-tech-leave-our-data-exposed-to-criminals-china-and-other-bad-actors</a></li><li><a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/15/amazon-is-eating-into-googles-dominance-in-search-ads.html">https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/15/amazon-is-eating-into-googles-dominance-in-search-ads.html</a></li><li><a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2020/06/05/states-lean-toward-pushing-to-break-up-googles-ad-tech-business.html">https://www.cnbc.com/2020/06/05/states-lean-toward-pushing-to-break-up-googles-ad-tech-business.html</a></li><li><a href="https://www.fastcompany.com/90518126/amazons-media-business-is-worth-two-and-a-half-netflixes-and-its-their-side-hustle">https://www.fastcompany.com/90518126/amazons-media-business-is-worth-two-and-a-half-netflixes-and-its-their-side-hustle</a></li><li><a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2020/02/04/breaking-up-facebook-google-apple-and-amazon-dont-hold-your-breath/#517c16fa6d64">https://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2020/02/04/breaking-up-facebook-google-apple-and-amazon-dont-hold-your-breath/#517c16fa6d64</a></li><li><a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/robtoews/2020/05/25/deepfakes-are-going-to-wreak-havoc-on-society-we-are-not-prepared/#41efd4ea7494">https://www.forbes.com/sites/robtoews/2020/05/25/deepfakes-are-going-to-wreak-havoc-on-society-we-are-not-prepared/#41efd4ea7494</a></li><li><a href="https://www.marketwatch.com/story/how-amazon-created-aws-and-changed-technology-forever-2019-12-03">https://www.marketwatch.com/story/how-amazon-created-aws-and-changed-technology-forever-2019-12-03</a></li><li><a href="https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/09/30/the-dark-side-of-techno-utopianism">https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/09/30/the-dark-side-of-techno-utopianism</a></li><li><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/14/technology/facebook-data-russia-election-racism.html">https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/14/technology/facebook-data-russia-election-racism.html</a></li><li><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/05/opinion/tech-regulation-facebook.html">https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/05/opinion/tech-regulation-facebook.html</a></li><li><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/22/technology/big-tech-underdogs.html">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/22/technology/big-tech-underdogs.html</a></li><li><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/technology/tech-investigations.html">https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/technology/tech-investigations.html</a></li><li><a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2020/05/01/amazon-coronavirus-229763">https://www.politico.com/news/2020/05/01/amazon-coronavirus-229763</a></li><li><a href="https://www.technologyreview.com/2019/02/04/137602/this-is-how-ai-bias-really-happensand-why-its-so-hard-to-fix/">https://www.technologyreview.com/2019/02/04/137602/this-is-how-ai-bias-really-happensand-why-its-so-hard-to-fix/</a></li><li><a href="https://www.technologyreview.com/2019/10/08/75349/meet-americas-newest-military-giant-amazon/">https://www.technologyreview.com/2019/10/08/75349/meet-americas-newest-military-giant-amazon/</a></li><li><a href="https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/06/17/1003318/why-venture-capital-doesnt-build-the-things-we-really-need/">https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/06/17/1003318/why-venture-capital-doesnt-build-the-things-we-really-need/</a></li><li><a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2020/01/why-silicon-valley-and-big-tech-dont-innovate-anymore/604969/">https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2020/01/why-silicon-valley-and-big-tech-dont-innovate-anymore/604969/</a></li><li><a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2020/02/tech-experts-think-internet-ruining-democracy/606919/">https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2020/02/tech-experts-think-internet-ruining-democracy/606919/</a></li><li><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/nov/19/how-tech-leaders-delivered-us-into-evil-john-naughton">https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/nov/19/how-tech-leaders-delivered-us-into-evil-john-naughton</a></li><li><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/apr/29/facebook-zuckerberg-obama-clinton-democrats">https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/apr/29/facebook-zuckerberg-obama-clinton-democrats</a></li><li><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/may/03/why-silicon-valley-cant-fix-itself-tech-humanism">https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/may/03/why-silicon-valley-cant-fix-itself-tech-humanism</a></li><li><a href="https://www.theinformation.com/articles/amazon-alums-exit-from-tv-firm-shows-pitfalls-for-tech-execs-in-media">https://www.theinformation.com/articles/amazon-alums-exit-from-tv-firm-shows-pitfalls-for-tech-execs-in-media</a></li><li><a href="https://www.theverge.com/2013/8/26/4659606/steve-ballmer-microsoft-ceo-history-shadow-of-gates">https://www.theverge.com/2013/8/26/4659606/steve-ballmer-microsoft-ceo-history-shadow-of-gates</a></li><li><a href="https://www.theverge.com/21298762/face-depixelizer-ai-machine-learning-tool-pulse-stylegan-obama-bias">https://www.theverge.com/21298762/face-depixelizer-ai-machine-learning-tool-pulse-stylegan-obama-bias</a></li><li><a href="https://www.vox.com/recode/2019/5/3/18520703/big-tech-break-up-explained">https://www.vox.com/recode/2019/5/3/18520703/big-tech-break-up-explained</a></li><li><a href="https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/9/18/20870938/break-up-big-tech-google-facebook-amazon-poll">https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/9/18/20870938/break-up-big-tech-google-facebook-amazon-poll</a></li><li><a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/09/08/facebook-google-face-off-against-formidable-new-foe-state-attorneys-general/">https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/09/08/facebook-google-face-off-against-formidable-new-foe-state-attorneys-general/</a></li><li><a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/opinions/systemic-racism-police-evidence-criminal-justice-system/">https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/opinions/systemic-racism-police-evidence-criminal-justice-system/</a></li><li><a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/07/10/personal-data-industry-is-complicit-bad-policing-it-must-be-held-accountable/">https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/07/10/personal-data-industry-is-complicit-bad-policing-it-must-be-held-accountable/</a></li><li><a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/silicon-valley-to-washington-why-dont-you-get-us-1523451203">https://www.wsj.com/articles/silicon-valley-to-washington-why-dont-you-get-us-1523451203</a></li></ol><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1ca01ee3cb94" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Imperial Stormtrooper vs. Red Shirt — who wins the engagement?]]></title>
            <link>https://apdge.medium.com/imperial-stormtrooper-vs-red-shirt-who-wins-the-engagement-9d1ae0442efc?source=rss-102ff7d2f5be------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/9d1ae0442efc</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[marksmanship]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[science-fiction]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[star-wars]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hypotheticals]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[star-trek]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[A. P. D. G. Everett]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 16 Jun 2020 00:58:48 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-10-09T00:58:34.108Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Imperial Stormtrooper vs. Red Shirt — who wins the engagement?</h3><p>Eight years ago, this last weekend, in a Facebook post, I posted the following question that I’d been asked in a job interview:</p><p>“How do you answer the question:</p><p>If a red-shirt from Star Trek gets shot &amp; hit by a Stormtrooper from Star Wars, does he die?”</p><p>At the time, I proffered that it was a paradox. A guy who always dies getting shot by someone who never hits anything is impossible to answer definitively one way or another.</p><p>In the last eight years, I’ve thought about this question some more and some other things come to mind (especially being reminded on the eighth anniversary of the post at issue):</p><p>1) Early on in A New Hope (aka the original Star Wars film of 1977), Obi-Wan Kenobi and Luke have the following discussion:</p><p>Luke Skywalker : It *looks* like the Sandpeople did this, alright. Look, there’s gaffi sticks, Bantha tracks. It’s just, I never heard of them hit anything this big before.</p><p>Ben Obi-Wan Kenobi : They didn’t, but we are meant to think they did. These tracks are side-by-side. Sandpeople always ride single file to hide their numbers.</p><p>Luke Skywalker : These are the same Jawas that sold us R2 and 3PO.</p><p>Ben Obi-Wan Kenobi : And these blast points, too accurate for Sandpeople. Only Imperial Stormtroopers are so precise.</p><p>2) The films of the Star Wars saga show Imperial Stormtroopers often miss targets (certainly of major protagonists), however, given what I know of marksmanship, as well as other references I saw (that show shot counts, hit rates, etc) demonstrate:</p><p>a) disciplined fires</p><p>b) respectable assault tactics</p><p>c) the movies normally ONLY depict engagements between protagonists and the nameless Stormtroopers or slivers of engagements so big we don’t know what’s happening globally.</p><p>As a couple of online resources I’ve seen (which conform to other information I’ve seen), the Stormtroopers are pretty good:</p><p>- <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P2TA9coGLzM">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P2TA9coGLzM</a></p><p>- <a href="https://logicalmisery.wordpress.com/2016/01/13/how-bad-is-stormtrooper-aim-exactly/">https://logicalmisery.wordpress.com/2016/01/13/how-bad-is-stormtrooper-aim-exactly/</a></p><p>Especially if you think of the cases where the Stormtroopers are ordered to take a dive and fake it, make it look like they’re trying to win although in fact not trying to win engagements against the “heroes” of Star Wars.</p><p>3) Conversely, on Star Trek (the original series), the “red shirts”, other than Scotty and Chekov, are all pretty much not-essential show characters, so not immortal in show terms, and really, given the disproportionate number of “red shirts” sent out on away missions relative to blue or yellow shirts, and given their assigned specialities (security and engineering), they are in fact more likely to be put in positions of risk. A webpage with a video I found talled TOS deaths by shirt colour here (https://redshirtsalwaysdie.com/2017/08/17/star-trek-red-safest/). I’d be curious, since, in all of the newer canon Star Trek shows, the uniform colour of security and engineering personnel is yellow, not red, how many of them die vis-a-vis the blue/green and red shirts (blue/green still being science/medicine, however red is now the command colour).</p><p>That is to say, we have factors that cannot be separated, so it’s not something that can just be analysed statistically, however, it can be distilled as:</p><p>Side 1) People who are well-trained but often ordered to fake pursuit in an attempt to lull the protagonists into a false sense of security.</p><p>Side 2) People who are much more likely to be sent on away missions on the basis of the types of jobs they have, so putting them at disproportionately more risk on raw numbers, but lower on relative percentages of those who die because of the fact these are the people who more often have the dirty and dangerous jobs, so are more skilled when on field operations.</p><p>Meaning, that, in the end, whilst we cannot know for absolute certainty the answer to the question, what we can know is that it would suck to be a Stormtrooper or a red shirt, so you might want to avoid such work if these fictional universes ever come to pass.</p><p>Note: this doesn’t account for in-universe constraints, such as the fact that Force-sensitive characters may have a form of forcefield that inhibits being attacked by those who aren’t Force sensitive, another variable I can’t account for.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9d1ae0442efc" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The sad truth of Ivy League admissions and why it’s not likely changing any time soon.]]></title>
            <link>https://apdge.medium.com/the-sad-truth-of-ivy-league-admissions-and-why-its-not-likely-changing-any-time-soon-605b750b2b66?source=rss-102ff7d2f5be------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/605b750b2b66</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[ivy-league]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[higher-education]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[college-admissions]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[helicopter-parents]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[operation-varsity-blues]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[A. P. D. G. Everett]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 21 Apr 2020 02:30:09 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-04-21T09:05:22.292Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><strong>The sad truth of admissions to Ivy League and other highly selective institutions and why this situation is not likely to change at any time soon</strong></h3><p>With respect to a question that is on the minds of many high-achieving and/or status-oriented students growing up who seek to earn the “brass ring” that is admission into an Ivy League or other highly selective institution, especially during the season in which admissions or rejection letters (or emails more likely these days) have recently gone out and are continuing to go out to students all across America, there is one brief, and definitely disheartening to many, fact regarding such admissions, which is:</p><p><strong><em>Unless you’re demonstrably unique as well as high-achieving, you’ll probably not get in there, and even if you are, you still may not.</em></strong></p><p>To be simply excellent is not enough, but also distinctive in some way, especially if you’re not one of the groups I specify below.</p><p>Most every Ivy has an undergraduate admissions rate of under 10% (<a href="https://www.ivycoach.com/ivy-league-statistics-by-college/">Ivy League Statistics by College | Ivy Coach</a>). And every single one has a downward trend on admit percentages, meaning it’s harder to get into every Ivy than it was 5, 10, 15, 20, or 25 years ago. This is because, even though Ivy League universities have not really expanded their sizes, yet they have increasingly more applicants each and every year. And there’s an incentive to increase the applicant numbers, which drive down admit percentages even further, which in turn help boost their US News rankings. There are other prestigious institutions, including the University of Chicago (UChicago) and the University of Southern California (USC), that in the last quarter century or so have seen their admissions rates plunge markedly from letting in upwards of half of their applicants to near Ivy League levels within a quarter-century time frame. In the case of UChicago as an example, in the 1990s, their admissions rate was upwards of 70 per cent of applicants, whereas in by 2019, <a href="https://www.chicagomaroon.com/article/2019/4/1/uchicago-acceptance-rate-drops-record-low/">it was at 5.9 per cent</a>, lower than several Ivies. I should note that some of that is explained by UChicago’s reputation as a place “where fun goes to die” so in years past there was also a self-selection effect at play which depressed applications from otherwise interested students who were not interested in the UChicago way of things.</p><p>As one of the Ivy League admissions people surveyed for an article in The Daily Beast a few years ago put it (<a href="https://www.thedailybeast.com/dirty-secrets-of-college-admissions">Dirty Secrets of College Admissions</a>):</p><p>“<em>Some 70 percent of kids who apply are qualified to come to school here, and we have space for one in ten. We can be as choosy as we like. It almost always comes down to whether or not you’re a likeable person. Let’s face it, some people are just more affable or more likeable than others. An admissions officer is really asking himself, ‘Would I like to hang out with this guy or gal for the next four years?’ So if you come off as just another Asian math genius with no personality, then it’s going to be tough for you. An admissions officer is not going to push very hard for you.</em>”</p><p>If you’re the sort of applicant who took a lot of AP courses, were involved in STEM-oriented clubs, volunteering in some “clean” activity (such as in libraries and/or musea), the only sport you participated in was also “clean” (for instance a racket sport or maybe fencing, although the latter can be viewed positively, given the number of high prestige universities that have fencing teams), you’re seen as an academic over-achiever and you better make sure you’re perfect academically, because, those are the only people who pass through that pathway into an Ivy. That may come across as rank discrimination, but it’s a seller’s market as far as the Ivies as well as other highly selective institutions are concerned, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/09/us/led-by-stanfords-5-top-colleges-acceptance-rates-hit-new-lows.html">given they reject 90 to 95 people out of every 100 applicants</a>. So yes, being “interesting” matters.</p><p>All Ivy League institutions are private (Cornell has contract colleges as well that are supported by the state of New York, but that’s fundamentally irrelevant for this discussion). Because Ivies are not owned/operated by state governments or the federal government in the case of the service academies, they are unable to rely on tax revenue to fund their operations (Cornell again being the partial exception to this rule). So, there is a focus towards maintaining and expanding financial viability at private universities that doesn’t exist at State U.</p><p>This means that a portion of admits for Ivy League and other highly selective institutions (hereinafter normally referred to as Ivy Plus institutions) are what is known as development cases (those with really rich parents who can fund the building of buildings and the endowment of professorships — Jared Kushner is a really famous example of this when his father Charles (a graduate of NYU &amp; Hofstra) who donated 2.5 million dollars in 1998 to Harvard prior to Jared’s admission there, and this situation was well before he married Donald Trump’s daughter Ivanka, see Daniel Golden’s reporting in the <strong><em>Wall Street Journal</em></strong> for a discussion on that). USC has traditionally also had been majorly influenced for admissions in development cases (cf <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/father-is-surgeon-1-mil-pledge-the-role-of-money-in-usc-admissions-11567548124">‘Father Is Surgeon,’ ‘1 Mil Pledge’: The Role of Money in USC Admissions</a>). It goes without saying though that Harvard and USC are far from the only two higher educational institutions that have been influenced by such development case candidates or that money is the only form of influence. As a for instance, this also means that if your parent (or sometimes grandparent) is a state governor, US Senator, member of Congress, or other powerful elected official, admissions committees tend to let in their kids as well, because of course, it doesn’t hurt to have a hook with someone who helps control the US Government’s budget or other such political influence. It also doesn’t hurt to be someone who’s already famous for being a talented entertainer when it comes to admissions to an Ivy either (Emma Watson (Brown), Brooke Shields (Princeton), and Jodie Foster (Yale) are all proof of that, so is Yo-Yo Ma (Harvard)).</p><p>This focus on financial stability also means that Ivies have to maintain good relationships with their alumni (since alumni are the biggest source of donors), which means that legacy admissions is a thing (cf <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970204653604577249230164868846">Should Colleges Consider Legacies in the Admissions Process?</a>, <a href="https://www.huffpost.com/entry/do-legacy-students-get-a_b_8604572">Do Legacy Students Get a Leg Up in College Admissions?</a>, or <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970204653604577249230164868846">Should Colleges Consider Legacies in the Admissions Process?</a>) and yes it is seen as unfair to many (cf <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/legacy-kids-have-an-admissions-advantage-2013-6">Legacies Still Get A Staggeringly Unfair College Admissions Advantage</a>). If you’re unaware of what that is, a legacy admit is someone who is directly related to an alumnus of the institution, parents always count, siblings or grandparents sometimes count, ditto aunts and uncles. Legacy admissions policies exist for Ivy League institutions, other private universities, as well as a few state flagships including Michigan and UVA. It must be noted in fairness that there has been a push to eliminate legacy admits in recent years (cf <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/25/opinion/end-college-legacy-preferences.html">End College Legacy Preferences</a>) however, the easiest way to turn off the donation tap of an alumnus is to deny their progeny an admit to the same university they attended unless there’s a very good reason. I do not deny that legacy admissions originally had been used as a means to discriminate against Jews (Jerome Karabel in <strong><em>The Chosen</em></strong> and others have written on this topic), and undeniably that is problematic to say the least. However, now, the use of legacy admissions is engaged in for less insidious reasons, and ones that are prima facie reasonable. Yes, schools like Caltech, UC Berkeley, &amp; UCLA, get a great crop of students without legacy admits, and don’t suffer for donors, but not every school wants to be Caltech or one of the UC schools. Johns Hopkins just got rid of legacy admissions policy, so I will be interested to see how they fare in future years regarding donations from alumni and other things such as reputation in future years as a result of this change, however initial results indicate that <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/hopkins-scraps-legacy-preference-for-children-of-alumni-who-seek-admission/2020/01/13/d559314a-3624-11ea-bb7b-265f4554af6d_story.html">it has broadened Hopkins from a socio-economic status perspective</a>.</p><p>Another thing that alumni tend to love are winning athletic teams, so a portion of the class that every Ivy and other highly selective institution lets in every year are athletes. To which I point to an aphorism of Clark Kerr’s: “<em>The three purposes of the University? To provide sex for the students, sports for the alumni, and parking for the faculty.</em>” Clark Kerr was the first chancellor of UC Berkeley and then president of the whole University of California, so knew well of what he was speaking, and was well-known for making serious points with humour. It’s been reported that several Ivies as well as other highly selective institutions have upwards of 10 per cent of their undergraduate student bodies as student-athletes, no small part of this is a numbers issue, if you have 900 student-athletes attending a university, where a university is an undergraduate population of 9,000 students (based off of the numbers I had from 2018, the (arithmetic) mean for undergraduates at Ivies was 7985.125, the geometric mean was 7457.157, given Brown (7043), Columbia (9001), Cornell (15043), Dartmouth (4459), Harvard (6788), Penn (10019), Princeton (5428), &amp; Yale (6092)), it’s a lot more noticeable than at a university of 45,000 or more (including universities such as Michigan (46k), Michigan State (50k), Arizona State (72k), Ohio State (61k), USC (48.5k), &amp; Washington (46k) — these latter figures are all consolidated undergrad/grad numbers but given that undergrads make up 2/3ds or more at all of these universities, it still makes the point). Furthermore, a lot of sports at Ivy Plus institutions are the sports and activities that are common only amongst upper-class people (e.g. crew, fencing, polo, lacrosse, squash, sailing, water polo, etc). This factor is part of the reason that student-athletes at many selective institutions skew heavily rich and white, which in turn skews the university’s race/ethnicity percentages as a whole. Part of the reason for the Operation Varsity Blues scandal was precisely because athletics coaches at many prestigious universities do have a lot of leeway in designating recruited athletes, which was why Rick Singer targeted coaches for bribes. USC is a bit of an extreme case in that it has had a rapid rise in its selectivity since the 1990s (the joke used to be that USC stood for “University of Spoiled Children” or “University of Second Chances”, now it has admissions rates of less than 1 in 6, or not that much better than the Ivy League institutions), but because of its long tradition of athletic success &amp; the power that coaches have there to serve as the de facto admissions officers for recruited athletes, this left them especially open to the fraud that Rick Singer helped perpetrate at USC, but coaches at Yale and Stanford amongst other places were bribed as well by him and his associates. It bears reminding people that the Ivy League is in fact an athletic conference, and the universities that comprise it do in fact care how well they do athletically, since athletic accomplishment does also drive alumni donations. A recent <strong><em>Washington Post</em></strong> article (<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/bribery-scandal-points-to-the-athletic-factor-a-major-force-in-college-admissions/2019/06/12/b2fc39dc-7e3a-11e9-8bb7-0fc796cf2ec0_story.html">Bribery scandal points to the athletic factor: A major force in college admissions</a>) noted Brown had as many student-athletes as Michigan did in 2017 (910), although Michigan’s student population is several multiples bigger in student population. This same article also notes that:</p><p>“<em>There were more varsity athletes at Cornell University (1,116) and Harvard (1,115) in 2017 than at much larger Ohio State University (1,065) and the University of Michigan (910), according to federal data. Outside the Ivy League, Stanford University had 840 — including 22 sailors — and Duke University had 659. Duke said about 5 percent of its admission offers go to athletic recruits.</em>”</p><p>Even at Harvard, where coaches don’t have de facto automatic admissions authority for recruited athletes as exists at other universities, including elite ones, those athletes the coaches did recruit had an admissions rate of better than 5 in 6, as it was roughly 87 per cent (cf <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2018/10/college-sports-benefits-white-students/573688/">College Sports Are Affirmative Action for Rich White Students</a>, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/education/2019/03/13/who-gets-largest-college-admissions-advantage-lets-look-athletes/">Who gets the largest college admissions advantage? Let’s look at the athletes</a>, <a href="https://www.insidehighered.com/views/2019/04/03/how-admissions-and-athletics-intertwine-ivy-league-colleges-opinion">How admissions and athletics intertwine at Ivy League colleges</a>, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/education/2020/02/15/theres-lot-talk-about-changing-college-admissions-after-varsity-blues-scandal-dont-hold-your-breath/">There’s a lot of talk about changing college admissions after ‘Varsity Blues’, don’t hold your breath</a>, <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/books/page-turner/the-unseen-student-victims-of-the-varsity-blues-college-admissions-scandal">The Unseen Student Victims of the “Varsity Blues” College-Admissions Scandal</a>, <a href="https://www.chronicle.com/article/The-U-of-Southern-California/245912?fbclid=IwAR2SSvqoImd2p5XMovAVHHC7SWSMR2-1S7P9NY-iSvmLPJK8xrfgMRupTrM">https://www.chronicle.com/article/The-U-of-Southern-California/245912?fbclid=IwAR2SSvqoImd2p5XMovAVHHC7SWSMR2-1S7P9NY-iSvmLPJK8xrfgMRupTrM</a>, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/14/us/usc-college-cheating-scandal-bribes.html?smid=fb-nytimes&amp;smtyp=cur">Bribes and Big-Time Sports: U.S.C. Finds Itself, Once Again, Facing Scandal</a>).</p><p>For all sorts of reasons based in US history, traditionally underrepresented minorities (by which I mean African-Americans and Latinos primarily) often have a percentage of admits that universities tend to grant them. Call it “affirmative action” or “attempted recompense for centuries of adverse discrimination” or whatever you want, but that’s also a portion of each class at each Ivy, same with “hardship” cases (the kid who was homeless or had a drug-addicted parent who was able to climb above their station, or the disabled veteran who had a struggle adapting to civilian life, etc). At a minimum, if you’re cynical, this is because the Ivy Plus universities want the good press coverage that comes with these sorts of admissions, although there is recognition within such institutions that those who have overcome long odds also have what it takes to contribute to society at large in a major way, even if it’s not reflected in a near perfect standardised test score or a maxed out GPA. Ivies also have a geographic distribution target they’d like to meet as well (getting a percentage of kids from the Mountain West, West Coast, etc). As an example of this, Harvard’s admissions process, as well as how they categorise applicants into various segments, is described here: <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/29/us/harvard-admissions-asian-americans.html">‘Lopping,’ ‘Tips’ and the ‘Z-List’: Bias Lawsuit Explores Harvard’s Admissions Secrets</a>.</p><p>Undeniably, Asians get the short end of the stick on a percentage basis (cf <a href="https://reason.com/2014/11/18/rejected-for-being-asian-students-sue-ha/">Rejected for Being Asian: Students Sue Harvard, UNC Over Race-Based Admissions</a>, <a href="https://www.economist.com/briefing/2015/10/03/the-model-minority-is-losing-patience">The model minority is losing patience</a>, <a href="https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/the-myth-of-american-meritocracy/">The Myth of American Meritocracy,</a> <a href="https://www.city-journal.org/html/fewer-asians-need-apply-14180.html">Fewer Asians Need Apply</a>, for examples), but of course, it’s not going to change, since any example that people in those lawsuits will bring up in any such claim, the selective institutions being sued would, or in fact had, probably combed through their admissions files to find 10-20 kids who were rejected that were of a similar profile to the one making such a claim that they admitted that was better on metrics than the one making such a claim. As Harvard Law School professor Jeannie Suk Gersen highlights in an essay she wrote in <strong><em>The New Yorker</em></strong> in 2017, “<a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-uncomfortable-truth-about-affirmative-action-and-asian-americans">The Uncomfortable Truth About Affirmative Action and Asian-Americans</a>”:<br> <br> <em>The Harvard lawsuit does raise uncomfortable questions, especially in a time when it is also becoming less comfortable to be an immigrant. Is an admissions process that disadvantages a minority group benign, or even desirable, if that minority group is demographically overrepresented in higher education? Should colleges pursue their interest in a diverse class by limiting admissions of a minority group whose numbers may otherwise overwhelm the class?<br> </em><br> As she notes within that essay after the excerpt I cite, given that US legal doctrine prohibits explicit racial quotas, that this question can’t be discussed openly, and implies (I think correctly) that race-neutral methods of selection that still have that racially-disparate impact are used as a means of balancing (tests such as school districts with percentage of free/reduced lunches for students or median income levels at x percentage of the poverty level being two examples that would disproportionately positively impact traditionally underrepresented minority applicants without being explicitly racially-based). She later states in that essay:<br> <br> “<em>In the pursuit of diversity, some amount of racial balancing seems unavoidable, however taboo. We should not want the composition of our elite universities to be wildly out of proportion to the racial composition of our country.</em>”<br> <br> The recent lawsuits against Harvard have had heretofore failed (<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/01/us/harvard-admissions-lawsuit.html">Harvard Does Not Discriminate Against Asian-Americans in Admissions, Judge Rules</a>), something I think is utterly predictable as an outcome. Never mind the legal issues which Judge Allison D. Burroughs noted in her decision of October 2019, I think from a practical perspective that it is undeniably a difficult burden to prove that a class you belong to is being adversely impacted when that class is disproportionately positively represented in something like university admissions relative to population percentage in the United States. Judge Burroughs noted in her decision that Asian-Americans were accepted at rates equivalent to other applicants and made up more than 20 per cent of the admitted class at Harvard whilst making up roughly 6 per cent of the US population. A fair amount of research exists, including by John Carey et al., the authors of the recently published book <strong><em>Campus Diversity</em></strong>, that states <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/04/14/its-college-admissions-season-students-are-looking-diverse-campuses/">regardless of what demographic groups that a university student may hail from, that on the whole, those students do support racial/ethnic diversity at their universities</a>. It should be noted that affirmative action based admissions make up such a small percentage of elite universities’ intake it’s not what fundamentally skews the numbers away from Asians and towards whites, it’s because, as has been detailed in many places (and elsewhere in this essay) that because a non-trivial percentage of the white students at Ivy Plus institutions are development and other special cases, legacies, and recruited athletes, which are all prima facie legitimate reasons to admit someone, even if they skew heavily white and rich, and that admission on the basis on one or more of those factors are much more likely to survive legal challenge than affirmative action is, which fundamentally also so far has survived legal challenges, even if those legal challenges have restricted the scope of affirmative action programmes somewhat since the 1970s. As an example of this, over two in five of white undergraduate students at Harvard were those who were recruited athletes, legacies, or other special categories including development cases and children of Harvard staff and faculty, the last notably being the smallest of those groups (cf <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/24/opinion/affirmative-action-new-york-harvard.html">NY Times: How Elite Schools Stay So White</a>, <a href="https://slate.com/business/2019/09/harvard-admissions-affirmative-action-white-students-legacy-athletes-donors.html">Slate: 43 Percent of White Students Harvard Admits Are Legacies, Jocks, or the Kids of Donors and Faculty</a>). It should be noted that many universities cover the tuition payments of the dependants of their employees as part of the benefits package it provides to their employees as a means of recruitment and retention of its faculty and staff, which gives the universities in question a fiduciary incentive to let those children (and occasionally spouses) of their staff and faculty matriculate at their university, keeping the money for themselves (or at least minimising the loss of the imputed income that such a seat is worth), instead of sending that money elsewhere which is a direct loss financially to the institution. It often benefits the university employee family-member as well, as at many institutions, it’s full tuition remission at one’s own institution but a fractional remission if their dependant goes elsewhere (a cap of 50 to 75 per cent of total tuition &amp; fees cost is common for such plans). Those sitting on admissions committees know this, and will certainly be inclined to help each other out in this way. Tuition-remission benefits are very longstanding at many higher-education institutions, and in some cases, such as Vanderbilt, they extend back to the foundation of the institution itself. (<a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB861056804824958500">Many Employees on Campus Don’t Pay Their Kids’ Tuition</a>). However, I think it’s certainly fair to note that if you grow up in an academic environment all of your life, you’re usually well-prepared to engage in advanced study, as well as have been culturally exposed to many things that would make you an attractive candidate to a university (as a for instance: professors or staff researchers who take their children on summer research trips to various places, those children will usually have something interesting to say in their personal essays when applying to university). Having a career academic as a parent also means, that even though they may not have the same income level as people with graduate and professional degrees in more financially remunerative fields (to use the term David Brooks coined in a column for <strong><em>The Weekly Standard</em></strong> in 1996: “<a href="https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/weekly-standard/the-tragedy-of-sid">status-income disequilibrium</a>” (which later got a lengthy discussion in his book <strong><em>BOBOs in Paradise</em></strong> (2000)), university professors and others with status-income disequilibrium also know what universities tend to look for in students they admit (as they often serve on committees that influence student admissions and curricula in the case of university staff and faculty or have attended those same universities in the case of others of that ilk). That is to say, as an example, that the child of an Ivy League educated university professor, federal regulator, or journalist in a household making 100,000–150,000 a year will have more of the appropriate resources and be better moulded growing up to be able to climb the <em>cursus honorum</em> of the new elite in America than the child of two immigrants (or even two native-born Americans) who are successful business people making double or even treble that amount, even if these two example children grew up in similar neighbourhoods or attended similar educational institutions growing up. There is a lot of <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/03/opinion/03brooks.html">cultural capital &amp; other insider knowledge that the former household tends to have</a> (as well as other status-oriented rivalries) that the latter does not, which causes a steeper learning curve for those who are first-generation students at an elite institution.</p><p>As an article in <strong><em>Vox</em></strong> pointed out after the Varsity Blues operation became reported about is what universities can legally get away with in their admissions policies (<a href="https://www.vox.com/2019/3/12/18262037/college-admissions-scandal-felicity-huffman">The real college admissions scandal is what’s legal</a>). The lawsuits filed by Students for Fair Admission against Harvard et al. are still ongoing, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/18/us/affirmative-action-harvard.html">as an appeal to that ruling was filed recently in the First Circuit Court of Appeals</a> in February 2020 regarding the Harvard case, and I expect will, as the Fisher v. University of Texas cases did, go all the way to the US Supreme Court for final adjudication there. It also needs to be noted that even with affirmative action policies in place, an analysis in the <strong><em>NY Times</em></strong> in 2017 found that African-American and Latino students make up a lower percentage of students at America’s top institutions (their pool of 100 institutions included the Ivies, several liberal-arts colleges and other selective private institutions, as well as state flagships) than they did 35 years prior, with the share of African-American first-year university students being fundamentally unchanged from 1980 to the end of the study period (2015), and Latino students having a positive growth rate in elite university attendance, but this increase hasn’t kept up with the growth rate of young Latinos in America, causing a widening gap. This means that even as the percentage of white students at the vast majority of these universities has decreased, the vast majority of the students replacing them are of Asian descent (<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/08/24/us/affirmative-action.html">Even With Affirmative Action, Blacks and Hispanics Are More Underrepresented at Top Colleges Than 35 Years Ago</a>).</p><p>Because so many of America’s elite these days aren’t people who own their own businesses, but people who have passed through a series of meritocratic gates in many ways equivalent to the <em>cursus honorum</em> of the Roman Republic and Empire or the mandarin system of imperial China, they also shape in large part how their children are raised in such ways that maximise their chances to pass through those same gates of achievement, so the institutions on one’s CV matter a whole lot more than they used to. That is to say that the phenomenon known as “helicopter parenting” is, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/07/opinion/helicopter-parents-economy.html">despite seeming to be insane to an external observer, the product of fundamentally rational choices in a highly competitive environment, as Pamela Druckerman pointed out in an op-ed in 2019</a>, even if <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/25/upshot/the-relentlessness-of-modern-parenting.html">the costs to do so in both money and effort continue to climb</a>. The achievements gained on this path don’t tend to make people happier of course, because there’s always more to achieve, as well as the fact that one’s educational pedigree isn’t technically inheritable, so it means the child has to recreate all of the things the parents have done (even if the odds of getting into the same university increase markedly for you on the basis of being a legacy applicant or even more generally that parents who have attended elite universities know what it takes to prepare someone to matriculate at one). This means that their lives are way more tightly controlled, in order to compete against everyone else attempting to achieve success in the modern era, which is why so many of the most “successful” people according to conventional measurements aren’t very adventurous anymore, there’s not a lot of room for experimentation or much else anymore, since the road to professional success is, for the most part, so very narrow, and doesn’t tend to reward the inquisitiveness and rebelliousness that many great people of the past had going for them. All of this in no small part plays to why so many people aren’t happy, or even outright anxious or angry at the current way of things. It also means that the reaction to the lack of economic mobility amongst so many is also so strong (cf <a href="https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2016/10/13/13259860/twilight-elites-trump-meritocracy">How the Chris Hayes book Twilight of the Elites explains Trump’s appeal</a>, <a href="https://www.economist.com/leaders/2015/01/22/americas-new-aristocracy">America’s new aristocracy</a>, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/02/21/magazine/elite-professionals-jobs-happiness.html?rref=collection%2Fbyline%2Fcharles-duhigg&amp;action=click&amp;contentCollection=undefined&amp;region=stream&amp;module=stream_unit&amp;version=latest&amp;contentPlacement=1&amp;pgtype=collection">America’s Professional Elite: Wealthy, Successful and Miserable</a>, <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2019/09/meritocracys-miserable-winners/594760/">How Life Became an Endless, Terrible Competition</a>, <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/the-worlds-nicest-most-law-abiding-generation/article25249936/">The world’s nicest, most law-abiding generation</a>, <a href="https://www.thedailybeast.com/americas-new-mandarins">America’s New Mandarins</a>, <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2013/11/after-school-activities-make-educational-inequality-even-worse/281416/">After-School Activities Make Educational Inequality Even Worse</a>).</p><p>In the early 2000s, Daniel Golden wrote a series of articles in the <strong><em>Wall Street Journal</em></strong> that won him a Pulitzer (which can be found here — <a href="https://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/PulitzerDG04052004.htm">Daniel Golden’s Pulitzer Prize-Winning Articles</a>), that later became the basis of his book <strong><em>The Price of Admission</em></strong>, in which he went into many of the issues discussed here, so if you were aware of the situation surrounding admissions in higher education, none of the news that came out about Varsity Blues etc. was in any way surprising. Mr Golden also followed up that analysis with one in <strong><em>Town and Country</em></strong> in 2016 (<a href="https://www.townandcountrymag.com/society/money-and-power/news/a8718/daniel-golden-college-admission/">How Wealthy Families Manipulate Admissions at Elite Universities</a>). The bribery scandal that Rick Singer was at the centre of was more extreme in how far it went, but it wasn’t exactly novel as to its intent. It was driven by the increasing cost that it takes to secure a place in a highly selective institution seen as necessary to career success, either through direct means as development cases, or through merit-based pathways such as recruited athletes and other folks whose families often pay a great deal of money to develop that natural talent, as well as the cost of things like standardised test preparation, private tutoring, admissions counsellors, etc. which are all seen as necessary expenses given how prevalent they are amongst such families (or even that such services are necessary, which many families just aren’t aware of), even though that competition is generally harmful to those who participate in it, regardless of if they “win” or not (cf <a href="https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2019/03/12/how-rich-really-play-who-wants-ivy-leaguer/Kvkvpv5mL35YG9pdKHiq1O/story.html">How the rich really play ‘Who Wants To Be an Ivy Leaguer’</a>, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/on-parenting/consumed-by-competition-parents-fuel-a-college-admissions-game-that-few-can-play/2019/03/13/4a594d5e-459e-11e9-8aab-95b8d80a1e4f_story.html">Consumed by competition, parents fuel a college admissions game that few can play</a>, <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/03/college-bribe-scandal-shows-elite-college-obsession/584719/">Kids Are the Victims of the Elite-College Obsession</a>).</p><p>I should note that I’m not saying that Ivies and other highly selective institutions as a norm can’t do with an overhaul of their admissions processes, there was a good article in <strong><em>The Atlantic</em></strong> about that (<a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2016/02/whats-wrong-with-college-admissions/462063/">Why Elite-College Admissions Need an Overhaul</a>), although it can simply be described as an arms race with students (or their parents) trying to one-up each other to make themselves more distinctive thus attractive to admissions committees, and another about how we got here (<a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2016/03/where-admissions-went-wrong/475575/">When Did Applying to College Start Making Students Crazy?</a>). Few of the elite universities in America, including the Ivies, claim they only admit on academic merit, as far as I know most of them never have made such a claim, which is one of the flaws in those claiming discrimination against their admissions applications being rejected even though they had better standardised test scores and grades than others who were admitted. Ivy Plus institutions admit world-class athletes, actors, and musicians as well as those of other forms of talent/merit as well, as part of their cohorts each year, especially under the modern premise of how admissions are conducted at such institutions. This means for the most part that to be very smart and high achieving academically won’t be enough, as the recent lawsuits revealed, every Ivy could fill up its entire cohort every year of people with perfect standardised test scores and GPAs (or very close to them), and still reject the vast majority of applicants. To quote one of the subjects that Daniel Golden interviewed for the <strong><em>Price of Admission</em></strong> (Daniel Saracino, then Notre Dame’s assistant provost for enrolment): “<em>The poor shmuck who has to get in on his own has to walk on water.</em>” This also means, that for those that aren’t in one of the “special” admissions categories, and even more than a few that are, that the aleatoric, that is to say random chance, also plays a role in who gets admitted and who gets rejected.</p><p>I hope the system can be changed, it doesn’t do a lot of good for most people including those who make it into and through Ivy League institutions (cf Alexandra Robbins’ <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/03/college-bribe-scandal-shows-elite-college-obsession/584719/">piece in The Atlantic from 2019</a> describing how the Ivy League obsession is hurting the young adults competing in that admissions race), however, given that most of the premises which undergird the current system are valid, at least with how Americans see themselves and see how things are granted to people — that is to say, since many of those who attend Ivy Plus institutions are generally smart, persistent, and hard-working, as well as have racked up achievements all of their lives before making it to university, so in many cases are quite individually deserving, even if in many ways, the odds are skewed in their favour because of their parents’ education and wealth and cultural awareness of what it takes to make it into the modern American meritocracy. It also means that those who have achieved their position in society because of passing through those seemingly meritocratic gates will have a lot harder time giving up what they believe they rightfully earned through their intelligence, persistence, and hard work, instead of the value of a fortunate birth to intelligent and high-achieving parents who had placed a glass floor underneath their children (cf <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/06/the-hoarding-of-the-american-dream/530481/">The Hoarding of the American Dream</a>). It should be noted that with respect to legacy admissions, that the children of those who get into a selective university that has legacy admissions preferences benefits from them…it however does take a lot of time to grow non-white alumni pools though, although over the last two generations they have in fact grown. This means that those non-white students who are matriculated at Ivy League institutions in turn become alumni and defenders of the very privilege of legacy preference they had to work against in order to get in, because to cite an essay on this topic by Scott Turow, no one wants to start a revolution with his or her own children, which means that even if you recognise that legacy admissions policies are collectively sub-optimal, you would be foolish to voluntarily give up such a benefit for your children if they can claim it because of you or your spouse (cf <a href="https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2019/03/colleges-bribes-and-the-lesson-of-legacy-kids">“No One Wants to Start the Revolution”: Colleges, Bribes, and the Lesson of Legacy Kids</a>). This is a collective action issue comparable to (for one well-known example) the NHL in the 1970s in which many hockey players wanted to wear helmets, but didn’t want to do it unless forced, because of the fact that doing it of their own accord would put them at a competitive disadvantage even if it was better for their health and safety, but knowing if everyone did, they would be all better off. In August 1979, John Zeigler, then President of the NHL, imposed a mandate for all incoming players into the NHL starting that season, but allowed for those who were already in the NHL that helmet wear would be at their own preference, and 70 per cent of players who were exempt from the rule chose to do so within a season of Zeigler’s mandate coming into force, which imposed a solution to this collective action problem (cf <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/173406">Thomas Schelling’s paper in the Journal of Conflict Resolution from 1973</a> for additional details). As has been noted by Lauren Rivera in her book <strong><em>Pedigree</em></strong>, the <a href="https://hbr.org/2015/10/firms-are-wasting-millions-recruiting-on-only-a-few-campuses">related article of hers in the Harvard Business Review</a> in which she discusses how much talent and money is wasted in so doing, and other works by other authors, the obsession with Ivy Plus institutions is unfortunately justified as long as elite professional services firms restrict the vast majority of their hiring to Ivy Plus institutions.</p><p>All of this means, realistically, unless or until there is sufficient pressure on the institutions to change or changes in law force those changes in the behaviour of institutions (or even changes from the prestigious institutions themselves in how they and their ilk recruit their employees), they have no incentive to do so, and as a result won’t. Meaning that the obsession with Ivy Plus institutions will remain and in fact only get worse, making it even harder to get into one of those select institutions, collectively impacting us all for the worse. That’s the bitter truth as I see it, and I don’t see it changing in our lifetime.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=605b750b2b66" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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