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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Raiz Bara Aman on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Raiz Bara Aman on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Raiz Bara Aman on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@arabaman69?source=rss-a51133870705------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[Indonesia can no longer afford to stay outside the CISG]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@arabaman69/indonesia-can-no-longer-afford-to-stay-outside-the-cisg-cb16314ba230?source=rss-a51133870705------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[international-law]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[international-trade]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[international-relations]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Raiz Bara Aman]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 07 Jul 2026 09:41:55 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-07-07T09:41:55.966Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*s54N1bgjXYz2IJhW.jpg" /></figure><p><strong>I. The Status Quo</strong></p><p>As international trade becomes more connected, it creates a highly interdependent global economy where the demand for coherent cross-border legal frameworks to facilitate trade and investment has increased. Therefore, international bodies such as the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (“<strong>UNCITRAL</strong>”), are essential in harmonizing these legal norms. They accomplish this by developing frameworks that reduce legal uncertainty and enable predictable cross-border transactions. This resulted in the creation of the 1980 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (“<strong>CISG</strong>”), which provides a uniform framework for international sales contracts. The CISG’s goal is to offer a contemporary, standard, and fair system for international sales contracts by creating certainty for international sales contracts between parties in different states. Despite being regarded as one of UNCITRAL’s most significant achievements, there are major absentees to the treaty including the United Kingdom, India, the United Arab Emirates, and more relevant here, Indonesia.</p><p>As of 2026, Indonesia is not a Contracting State to the CISG. Despite this, Indonesia is heavily involved in international trade with more than three-quarters of their trade partners being members of the CISG. Further, in 2019, the World Trade Organization estimated that Indonesia contributes to the top 30 export and import operations in the world, indicating that Indonesian business procedures are closely related to international norms. Indonesian Contract Law itself still uses their Civil Code or <em>Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Perdata </em>or <em>Burgerlijk Wetboek </em>(“<strong>BW</strong>”) which originates from the Dutch Colonial administration and put into Indonesian legislation in 1848. Because of this, it is commonly regarded as no longer relevant for 21st-century contracts There is also no particular Indonesian legislation that governs international contracts and the BW does not distinguish between the regulations of local and international sales and buy activities.</p><p>Practically, Indonesian economic actors participating in cross-border transactions rely heavily on alternative legal frameworks. For example, because more than three-quarters of overseas business partners are from CISG member states, they would utilize their national law instead, which frequently leads to the CISG being applied to their contract automatically. Another example is to employ Indonesia’s Law Number 11 of 2008 on Electronic Information and Transactions (“<strong>EIT Law</strong>”) for electronic cross-border transactions.</p><p>With this in mind, this short article will argue why Indonesia should ratify the CISG. Not only will it discuss the benefits of ratifying, but also the challenges ahead, and analyzing through the lense of Private International Law (“<strong>PIL</strong>”).</p><p><strong>II. This is a Private International Law issue?</strong></p><p>There are several critical Private International Law (“<strong>PIL</strong>”) issues related to the CISG. The First PIL issue concerns the Choice of Law and Applicable Law in international sales contracts, where parties choose the law governing their contracts. The CISG allows this,<strong> </strong>even if the parties do not explicitly adopt the CISG, it may apply automatically under two conditions. This can be seen in Article 1(1)(a), where the CISG automatically applies when the parties have their places of business in separate countries, and both nations are CISG Contracting States or in Article 1(1)(b) where a Contracting State’s laws are applied due to the principles of PIL.<strong> </strong>Nonetheless, parties may exclude the CISG altogether under Article 6.<strong> </strong>It is also worth noting that Article 95 of the CISG allows member states to issue reservations, which means that governments can declare that they are not bound by Article 1(1)(b), affecting the CISG’s application in circumstances involving non-contracting states.<strong> </strong>The second PIL issue concerns the implementation of PIL regulations where the parties have not agreed on a choice of law.<strong> </strong>For this, the governing law is often chosen based on the connecting factors found between the parties. Factors frequently examined include the location of the agreement, the location of duties, and the location of the party holding the most substantial responsibility.<strong> </strong>The third PIL issue is contract validity, which is not normally governed by the CISG’s provisions.<strong> </strong>As a result, these are sent back to appropriate domestic law under PIL regulations. Nevertheless, the CISG is understood to regulate certain aspects of validity, including formal validity (lack of requirement for writing in Article 11),<strong> </strong>initial impossibility of performance,<strong> </strong>and open-price contracts pursuant to Article 14.</p><p>With respect to Indonesia, this raises specific PIL concerns.<strong> </strong>Indonesia’s status as a non-participant means that its contract law uses the BW from the colonial era<strong> </strong>and not to mention that international trade is not specifically regulated in Indonesia, leads to further PIL issues. The first concern is exposure to international law, as Indonesian parties are typically subject to either foreign law or the CISG. When this occurs, Indonesian parties may be in a vulnerable situation since they frequently lack comprehension of the CISG.<strong> </strong>To worsen the situation, if an Indonesian party enters into a contract with a partner from a nation that has made a reservation under Article 95, the CISG will not apply according to the procedure outlined in Article 1(1)(b) of the CISG. In this context, Indonesian practitioners are frequently obliged to rely completely on their partners’ national laws, putting Indonesian parties at a disadvantage by subjecting them to a foreign domestic law that they may not fully comprehend.<strong> </strong>To counteract this, Indonesian parties might try to expressly waive the CISG’s application or remove particular elements from their international contracts.<strong> </strong>However, ratification of the CISG is considered critical for Indonesia since it would provide legal clarity and uniformity in the legal framework for international trade.</p><p><strong>III. Relevant Indonesian laws</strong></p><p>Considering Indonesia’s non participation with the CISG, the relevant Indonesian laws applicable primarily consist of domestic contract law, which controls sales agreements, as well as the framework that determines when a foreign law, such as the CISG, may apply to an Indonesian party. The necessary legal bases include the following:</p><p><em>i. BW</em></p><p>As mentioned beforehand, the BW originated from the Dutch Colonization Era in 1848 and is considered outdated and inadequate for modern international trade. Article 1313 contains the major provisions, whereas Article 1338 establishes the binding power of contracts based on the idea of <em>pacta sunt servanda</em>. The BW also regulates sales provisions, in Article 1457, which defines a sale as a transaction in which the seller relinquishes possession of items in return for an agreed-upon price. Despite this, the main difficulty is that Indonesian law has not directly addressed foreign trade. The BW covers overseas sales in the same way as domestic sales. This deficiency should be seen as a primary motivator in talks concerning CISG ratification.</p><p><em>ii. Algemeene Bepalingen van Wetgeving voor Nederlands Indië</em></p><p>Because the BW does not address foreign sales, PIL guidelines are utilized to establish which country’s law governs international issues involving Indonesian parties. Indonesia’s PIL framework is mostly based also on colonial law, namely the <em>Algemeene Bepalingen van Wetgeving voor Nederlands Indië</em> (“<strong>AB</strong>”). The AB are the regulations of Indonesian PIL, specifically Article 16–18 AB. Article 16 determines a person’s ability to enter into a contract based on their nationality, Article 17 applies the law of the state where immovable goods are located in disputes involving them, and Article 18 applies the law of the place where an act is performed, and are primarily used for matters concerning the formal validity of a contract.</p><p><em>iii. Law Number 11 of 2008 on Electronic Information and Transactions</em></p><p>The EIT law controls electronic transactions, including those conducted outside of Indonesia’s jurisdiction if they harm Indonesian interests. Importantly, electronic papers and printouts are regarded as legitimate legal evidence.</p><p><strong>IV. So why should Indonesia join the CISG?</strong></p><p>Ratification of the CISG should be viewed as crucial for Indonesia as it would establish legal certainty and uniformity in international trade. There are at least 4 crucial reasons as to why Indonesia should ratify the CISG urgently which are as follows:</p><p><em>i. Legal certainty and modernization</em></p><p>Ratifying the CISG would provide legal stability for foreign business transactions and is an important step in modernizing Indonesian private law by setting higher standards for the source of national law.<em> </em>Ratifying the CISG, which is a balance of legal concepts from key worldwide legal traditions (Common Law, Civil Law, Socialist Law, and is flexible enough for Sharia law), will enable Indonesia’s Civil Law tradition to align with other systems.<em> </em>Ratification would also provide a unique set of legal standards for the worldwide sale and acquisition of products, filling a void left by the BW’s lack of particular legislation for foreign sales transactions.</p><p><em>ii. Strengthening Indonesia’s position internationally</em></p><p>Because the vast majority of Indonesia’s trading partners (roughly 75% of business partners in one study) come from nations that have ratified the CISG, including Singapore, the European Union, the United States, Canada, Australia, and South Korea, Indonesian parties are already regularly exposed to the CISG. As was previously indicated, Indonesian parties are placed in a precarious situation where they are effectively doing business with partners in CISG member nations meaning that the<em> </em>lack of understanding of the CISG by Indonesian businesses and attorneys puts Indonesian parties in a less advantageous negotiating position and may result in legal damages.</p><p><em>iii. Fulfilling regional and international commitments</em></p><p>Indonesia’s commitment to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (“<strong>ASEAN</strong><em>”</em>) Economic Community, which has suggested that member nations ratify the CISG to standardize the law of international sales contracts regionally, would be fulfilled by becoming a party to the CISG. The ASEAN region’s trade and economic integration would be aided by membership in the CISG.<em> </em>Due to the CISG’s widespread adoption and the fact that most of Indonesia’s main trading partners, including Australia, China, Japan, Korea, the United States of America, and members of the European Union, have joined it, it would also assist Indonesia’s standing internationally.</p><p><em>iv. Improving legal competence</em></p><p>Ratification would make it necessary for Indonesian legal practitioners, including attorneys, judges, and consultants, to understand and use the CISG in their work.<em> </em>Currently, Indonesian legal practitioners (lawyers and judges) are unfamiliar with the CISG, which frequently causes them to ignore its application or agree to omit it, perhaps against the client’s best interests.</p><p><strong>V. The challenges ahead</strong></p><p>With that being said, joining the CISG is only the beginning of a long and complex process. Once Indonesia fully participates there are several issues that need to be resolved which are as follows:</p><p><em>i. Lack of legal and judicial competence</em></p><p>As mentioned previously, Indonesian legal practitioners have a deep-seated unfamiliarity with the CISG. Most of these practitioners have very little exposure to the CISG because it is rarely included as part of the curriculum during their legal education. Therefore, decision-makers will be faced with the problem of providing the Indonesian legal practice with education and socialization on how to interpret the provisions of the CISG to ensure unified implementation.</p><p><em>ii. Harmonization issues</em></p><p>When the CISG enters into force for Indonesia, the government would need to determine how its provisions will be integrated into domestic law. The most significant uncertainty concerns Book III of the BW which regulates Obligations. The debate concerns whether it would need to be overhauled completely or if there should be a separate and stand-alone law regulating the international sales of goods.</p><p><em>iii. Cultural and procedural barriers</em></p><p>Most of the principles found in the CISG are flexible which may conflict with the commercial practices in Indonesia. For example, Article 11 of the CISG provides that contracts do not need to be in writing for them to be valid, but Indonesian law requires formal writing for transactions over $500. Not only that, Indonesia typically requires written evidence for commercial certainty.</p><p><em>iv. Party autonomy (Article 6 of the CISG)</em></p><p>A unique challenge concerning the CISG’s application is the fact that the CISG is highly reliant on party autonomy where parties can choose to exclude the CISG’s application entirely under Article 6. The concern here is that that if Indonesian businesses and their foreign partners continue to use the “opt-out” clause due to habit or distrust, then it raises the question of the point of ratification in the first place.</p><p><em>v. Aligning with other international standards</em></p><p>To fully maximise the application of the CISG, it requires integration with other standards such as International Commercial Terms (“<strong>INCOTERMS</strong>”) and the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits (“<strong>UCPDC</strong>”). Therefore, Indonesian actors must not only learn about the CISG but also a whole new ecosystem of norms in International Commercial Law.</p><p><strong>VI. Conclusion</strong></p><p>Due to Indonesia’s persistent dependence on the BW and disjointed PIL regulations, its merchants are vulnerable to legal ambiguity and the frequent, occasionally unintentional application of foreign law or the CISG in the absence of local knowledge. As a result, ratifying the CISG will update and standardize Indonesia’s contract system, lower transaction costs, establish consistent guidelines for cross-border transactions, and increase their negotiating leverage abroad. Joining would further Indonesia’s diplomatic and economic obligations while assisting judges, attorneys, and companies in developing the requisite expertise in modern commercial law, as a significant portion of Indonesia’s trading partners are CISG members and regional integration in ASEAN promotes legal harmonization. In order to safeguard local players, advance commerce, and align Indonesia’s legal system with global norms, implementing the CISG is a sensible and practical move.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=cb16314ba230" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[What is The International Seabed Authority?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@arabaman69/what-is-the-international-seabed-authority-c6c963139e91?source=rss-a51133870705------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[law-of-the-sea]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[international-law]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[seabed-mining]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[unclos-1982]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[seabed-authority]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Raiz Bara Aman]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 13 Mar 2026 13:24:05 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-03-13T13:24:05.224Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*5qAiqeqTSS5RAxR_" /></figure><p><strong>PREFACE</strong></p><p>This is my second paper for my Law of the Sea class. This time I discussed regarding the International Seabed Authority! Much like my previous article discussing Archipelagic States, this is specifically for those studying Law of the Sea and law students in general wanting to know more regarding the International Seabed Authority. I hope that those reading this will identify the shortcomings and use this as a reference for future writing.</p><p>Oh yeah, it’s reference! Don’t ask ChatGPT to make it “yours.” Make your own paper! You know the drill, happy studying and reading! hopefully you can gain some insight from this!</p><p><strong>I. INTRODUCTION<br></strong> The level of wealth which exists beneath the high seas is becoming increasingly apparent at present. According to estimates, there exists around 175 billion dry tonnes of mineable manganese nodules dispersed across 15% of the international seabed area, which is significantly more than the metals’ land-based deposits. This source of mineral wealth presents significant challenges for developing countries, especially those that rely on the export revenue of a small number of mineral categories, even though it has enormous potential value for developed countries that currently have or soon will have the technical capacity to mine such nodules. During the early 1990s, companies from Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America were involved in what seemed to be six significant deep sea mining consortia.</p><p>Although some fundamental investments had been made and the technology to undertake mining in the international seabed region was at an advanced stage, it was doubtful that significant mining activity would have occurred in the upcoming years. The United Nations (“<strong>UN</strong>”) General Assembly Resolution 2574 (XXIV), which called for a moratorium on deep seabed activities, and a Declaration of Principles Governing the Seabed and Ocean Floor and the Subsoil Thereof, beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, were two examples of how the international community had already acknowledged the significance of the international seabed area before this. Pursuant to this, the area and its resources are to be considered as the “common heritage of mankind” and could not be claimed, nor could any rights be acquired over them outside of the parameters of an international framework that would be established to regulate their use and exploration. This is then implemented in Part XI of the Law of the Sea Convention (“<strong>LOSC</strong>”) where it governs the International Seabed Area.</p><p>Since the region and its resources are seen as part of the common heritage of mankind, no sovereign state or other rights may be acknowledged. However, minerals extracted from the region are alienable as long as they comply with the LOSC. The International Seabed Authority (“<strong>ISA</strong>”), which was formed pursuant to the LOSC, is responsible for conducting the operations in the International Seabed Area for the benefit of all people. The ISA is the governing body which organise and controls the exploitation of the mineral resources in the International Seabed Area, with all members of the LOSC being <em>ipso facto </em>members of the ISA which is based in Jamaica, pursuant to Article 156 of the LOSC. An important aspect to be noted regarding the ISA and Part XI of the LOSC is the addition of another instrument related to the ISA and the International Seabed Area is the adoption of the 1994 Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the LOSC (“<strong>1994 Implementation Agreement</strong>”).</p><p>For context, the path to widespread adoption of LOSC was challenging. Industrialized governments criticized the LOSC and specifically Part XI, concerning resource sharing and seabed mining. In fact, by 1993 of the sixty governments that ratified or acceded to the LOSC, only one was categorized as an industrialized state while the others were developing nations. Because industrialized nations were the main producers of marine pollution and the biggest users of the oceans, this imbalance raised major concerns as their non participation from the LOSC would have significantly diminished its international validity and effectiveness. Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, the UN Secretary-General at the time, began informal discussions in 1990 after realizing the risks of letting the LOSC enter into force without the support of these industrialized nations.</p><p>The goal was to determine points of agreement on contentious topics within Part XI. Eventually the 1994 Implementation Agreement was accepted by the UN General Assembly in July 1994, marking the culmination of these efforts. By resolving these concerns, industrialized nations were able to participate in the LOSC while maintaining equity and mutual benefit for all states. With this in mind, this article will analyze further into the scope of the international seabed area, the implementation of the principle of the common heritage of mankind, the ISA and how it functions, how exploration and exploitation of the international seabed area is conducted in practice, and a case study of the international seabed area.</p><p><strong>II. SCOPE OF THE INTERNATIONAL SEABED AREA<br></strong> As defined in Article 1(1)(1) of the LOSC, the International Seabed Area is ‘the seabed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.’ Though it should be noted that the precise extent of the International Seabed Area cannot be determined until all coastal States have fixed the outer limits of their continental shelves in accordance with the LOSC considering also that disputes concerning these areas will mean that the determination will prolong even more. Nevertheless this has caused little issue practically as the main mineral resources of interest to the ISA are found beyond areas of the continental shelf and therefore the likelihood of the ISA having an interest in such an area is unlikely. The main provisions which govern the scope of the International Seabed Area can be found in Article 137 which concerns the Legal status of the International Seabed Area and its resources.</p><p>No State may assert sovereignty or sovereign rights over any portion of the International Seabed Area or its resources, nor may any State or natural or legal entity take any portion of it, according to paragraph 1 of the article. Paragraph 2 vests all the rights in the resources of the International Seabed Area in mankind as a whole and provides that these rights are to be exercised through the ISA on behalf of mankind as a whole. Additionally, the next clause forbids alienating the seabed’s resources in any way other than in compliance with the LOSC. The third paragraph then emphasizes that no State or natural or legal person may make a claim, purchase, or exercise of rights over minerals obtained from the seabed unless Part XI of the LOSC is followed. By limiting its application to the “resources” of the international seabed region, Article 137 significantly qualifies the application of the shared heritage of mankind principle. Any “solid, liquid, or gaseous mineral resources” that are found in the international seabed region or beneath the seabed are considered resources. As a result, new biological resources, especially marine genetic resources, will not be considered. As previously indicated, each state sets the borders of the international seabed region. According to Article 134(4) of the LOSC, the ISA is only permitted to receive lists or charts displaying the continental shelf’s outer limit lines under Article 84(2) of the LOSC, and it has no authority to influence the establishment of the continental shelf’s outer limits or the legality of delimitation agreements between States with adjacent or opposite coasts.</p><p><strong>III. COMMON HERITAGE OF MANKIND<br> </strong>The LOSC in Article 136 states that the international seabed region and its resources are to be regarded as the ‘common heritage of mankind.’ It is unclear if this is an international law theory or doctrine. Nonetheless, the concept of a ‘common heritage’ in relation to the deep seabed was established long ago in 1970 with the Declaration of Principles Governing the Sea-bed and Ocean Floor and the Subsoil Thereof, Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, which was adopted by the UN General Assembly, with the majority of these principles outlined in the declaration being repeated in Part XI of the LOSC. ‘Common heritage’ is such a basic idea that Article 311(6) of the LOSC bans any state party from making any revisions related to ‘common heritage’ or becoming a party to any agreement that deviates from this concept. Before the establishment of LOSC III, there were varying views concerning the legal status of natural resources in the deep seabed which were beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.</p><p>Initially there were three different interpretations before LOSC III, the first being that the continental shelf extends as far as a coastal State is able to exploit its resources which meant that the entire ocean floor could eventually fall under the control of coastal States. The second interpretation followed a <em>Res Communis</em> approach where the deep seabed would not be subject to any national appropriation and belongs to all mankind and governed by the freedom of the high seas. The third interpretation followed a <em>Res Nullius </em>approach where it would not be owned by anyone, however states can acquire ownership through occupation or use which include deepsea mining. Despite this, the practical result of all of these interpretations would be the same, namely that the states that are technologically capable would be best placed to explore and exploit the natural resources in the deep ocean floor. In fact, unrestricted seabed mining would negatively impact developing states and would worsen the uneven development between developed and developing countries.</p><p>In response to the legal uncertainty over who could have access and benefit from the deep seabed beyond national jurisdiction, Ambassador Arvid Pardo of Malta proposed in 1967 that these areas as well as its resources be considered as the ‘common heritage of mankind.’ This was later formalized in the UN through the UN Moratorium Resolution in 1969 which called for a halt to all exploitation of the seabed beyond national jurisdiction until a proper international regime was formalized. It was then in 1970 with the Declaration of Principles which proclaimed that the seabed and its resources cannot be appropriated by any State or private actor and formally declared that the international seabed area and its resources are the common heritage of mankind. The emergence of the common heritage of mankind was a result of the traditional doctrines of sovereignty and freedom of the high seas being insufficient to ensure the equitable use and benefit-sharing of seabed resources among all nations, especially developing ones.</p><p>In regulating the use of the international seabed area, there are four elements to be taken into account especially in the context of ‘common heritage of mankind,’ namely (1) The state is not permitted to acquire any region of the international seabed area; (2) activity is restricted to peaceful purposes; (3) earnings must be fairly dispersed to all people; and (4) the international seabed area must be governed jointly. These components are in place to ensure that the international seabed area is used for the benefit of all people and not just one state. Essentially the adoption of the common heritage of mankind was to prevent the monopoly of utilization only by developed states. In principle, although ownership of the international seabed area is in the hands of all mankind, its use is not done freely and the results are not only enjoyed by the party that extracts the resources. Thus, the use of resources which fall under the common heritage of mankind requires the consent of ‘mankind’, which in this case is represented by countries. In the context of the use of the International Seabed Area, this consent is manifested in the need for a contract between the ISA and the contractor.</p><p><strong>IV. INTERNATIONAL SEABED AUTHORITY<br></strong>In his 1967 speech to the UN, Arvid Pardo not only outlined his vision for the international seabed area to become a ‘common heritage of mankind’, but also stated that this status would be given practical effect by an entity with sufficient powers to administer the oceans and ocean floor beyond national jurisdiction. To achieve this goal, an agency was established under the LOSC, which ultimately became the ISA, with jurisdiction over the whole international seabed zone. The ISA became the institutional expression of the international seabed area’s legal status as a shared human heritage. The underlying reason for declaring the international seabed area as a common heritage of mankind was to ensure that all states share the benefits of mineral resources that are beyond national jurisdiction, in order to prevent a small number of technologically advanced states from reaping all of the benefits at the expense of the international community.</p><p>Therefore, Part XI of the LOSC including the 1994 Implementation Agreement provided a framework where the ISA is central to this regime which was created in 1994 and based in Kingston, Jamaica. The ISA is tasked with organizing, carrying out, and controlling activities in the international seabed area, the majority of which are concerned with the exploration and exploitation of minerals. The ISA is responsible for filling in the gaps and drafting specific and binding regulations governing who can access minerals on the international seabed and under what conditions. The ISA’s broad powers set it apart from other international institutions, making it ‘an unparalleled experiment in international law formation.’ It should be noted however that the mining activities are not carried out by the ISA itself but rather are conducted by contractors which may include the enterprise which is an organ of the ISA for direct participation (although it is not yet operational), state parties to the LOSC, state enterprises, and private entities that are nationals of state parties or effectively within the control by those states or their nationals. The system allows for both public and private participation in seabed mining so long as they are sponsored by a state party to the LOSC.</p><p>The ISA’s particular mandate includes three key tasks: The first step is to build the International Seabed Area regime by adopting the Mining Code; the second is to restrict access to minerals in the International Seabed Area through contractors; and the third is to verify compliance with the legal framework. Given the emphasis on minerals, seabed operations unrelated to mineral resources, such as deep sea fishing or the installation of underwater cables and pipelines, lie beyond the ISA’s purview. More specifically, the ISA’s geographical authority is confined to the international seabed, ocean floor, and subsoil, except the seas adjacent to the international seabed. The ISA itself comprises three principal organs, namely the Assembly, the Council, and the Secretariat pursuant to Article 158(1) of the LOSC. The Assembly of the ISA represents all State Parties to the Convention and serves as its primary institution. The Authority’s other organs are accountable to the Assembly under Article 160(1). The Assembly determines policies, finances, and elects 36 council members. The Council monitors the implementation of the Law of the Sea Convention and proposes interim rules and regulations for ratification by the Assembly. The agency accepts contracts with corporate and government companies for seabed exploration and mining in certain regions.</p><p>The Secretariat is an autonomous and neutral entity with no financial interest in exploration and exploitation operations in the Area as provided pursuant to Article 168. In addition to the three major institutions, Article 163 establishes two further subsidiary organs of the Council under the ISA: the Economic Planning Commission (“<strong>EPC</strong>”) and the Legal and Technical Commission (“<strong>LTC</strong>”). The EPC is responsible for the ISA’s financial activities, whilst the LTC is in charge of the legal and technical aspects, which include monitoring exploration and mining activities. Through this, the LTC, Council, and the Assembly collaborate to establish the mining codes. The LTC is responsible for creating and drafting the appropriate rules. The LTC normally accepts its items by consensus, however a majority vote is permissible. The Council reviews the LTC’s drafts and makes decisions based on consensus. Finally, the assembly determines whether or not to adopt the Council’s drafts, returning them to the Council for further scrutiny. The assembly often adopts mining codes by consensus, but if this is not possible, approval may need a two-thirds majority. The accepted drafts are provisionally effective without assembly approval. If rejected, there is no timeline for the Council to reconsider. This means that the provisional version of the rule might be applied forever.</p><p><strong>V. INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA ADVISORY OPINION ON RESPONSIBILITY AND LIABILITY<br></strong> One of the ISA’s most essential tasks is to preserve marine habitats and human lives from harm caused by the activities it permits. The ISA must consider the need for protection from harmful impacts such as drilling, dredging, excavation, waste disposal, the construction and operation or maintenance of installations, pipelines, and other devices associated with such activities, as well as the prevention of damage to the marine environment’s flora and fauna. In 2011, the advisory opinion of the Seabed Disputes Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (“<strong>ITLOS</strong>”) increased the ISA’s commitment to safeguard and maintain marine habitats. Though ITLOS advisory opinions are not legally binding, the Seabed Dispute Chamber’s opinions on operations in the region are considered authoritative due to its jurisdiction over the dispute at hand. The advisory opinion in question is referred to as <em>Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect to Activities in the Area </em>and was the first advisory opinion ever delivered by the Seabed Disputes Chamber of the ITLOS on 1 February 2011.</p><p>The ISA Council asked the Chamber’s assistance on the limitations of state responsibility where a contractor sponsored by a state to explore or exploit the seabed in regions outside national jurisdiction causes damage or injury. The Chamber was also asked to submit a view on a sponsoring state’s fundamental international duties under the LOSC, any infringement of which would result in accountability. This advisory opinion was significant as this is the first time the advisory jurisdiction of ITLOS has been used. Tullio Treves, President of the Chamber, is credited with the Tribunal’s first unanimous verdict without different opinions or conflicting rationales. Non-governmental organizations, Stichting Greenpeace Council (Greenpeace International) and the World Wide Fund for Nature, submitted a written submission on the ITLOS website for the first time. However, the submission was not included in the case file due to a lack of a treaty rule or internal Tribunal ruling allowing for such a procedure. This is the first time ITLOS’s oral sessions have been televised live. The Advisory Opinion arose as a result of the LOSC and the 1994 Implementation Agreement’s mechanism for equal opportunity in deep seabed mining, specifically the “parallel system” that allows both the ISA and sponsored contractors to conduct exploration and exploitation.</p><p>This requires all contractors and operators to submit a “plan of work” to the ISA for approval. As a result, in 2008–2009, two companies from Nauru and Tonga submitted a plan of work to the ISA for exploration in reserved areas, which are areas of the International Seabed Area reserved for exploration and exploitation in collaboration with developing countries to assist them in participating despite limited resources. Due to concerns about potential accountability for environmental harm during exploration, Nauru recommended that the ISA seek an advisory opinion from the ITLOS’s Seabed Disputes Chamber. The ISA requested three legal questions from the ITLOS. First, what legal obligations do States Parties have when they support activities in the Area under LOSC (particularly Part XI) and the 1994 Implementation Agreement? Second, how much legal responsibility does a State Party have if an entity it sponsors (such as a private firm or state enterprise) breaches LOSC or the 1994 Implementation Agreement? Third, what specific activities or precautions must a sponsoring State take to meet its legal duties, particularly those under Article 139 (responsibility and accountability), Annex III (exploration/exploitation processes), and the 1994 Implementation Agreement? Regarding the first question, the Chamber highlighted that States are responsible for ensuring that operations in the Area carried out by sponsored enterprises comply with LOSC, the 1994 Implementation Agreement, and the ISA rules. As for the second question, a sponsoring State is not solely responsible for environmental damage produced by its sponsored organization. Liability arises only when the State fails to carry out its due diligence requirements.</p><p>Finally regarding the third question it opined that sponsoring States must go beyond formal legislation to develop and aggressively enforce environmental safeguards and compliance measures. The Chamber made no distinction in responsibilities based on whether the sponsoring State is developed or developing. All must adhere to the same due diligence norms (with only limited exceptions under the precautionary principle). Nonetheless, the Advisory Opinion clarified and enhanced States’ environmental duties under LOSC, tying them closely to growing standards in international environmental law.</p><p><strong>VI. CONCLUSION<br></strong>The International Seabed Area, as a common heritage of mankind, demonstrates a worldwide commitment to fairness, sustainability, and mutual benefit. The ISA and the legal framework created by LOSC and its 1994 Implementation Agreement guide States in the appropriate exploration and exploitation of seabed resources. The 2011 ITLOS Advisory Opinion underlined sponsoring States’ due diligence requirements, which strengthened environmental protection in the Area. As interest in seabed mining grows, preserving the balance between growth and conservation becomes increasingly important.</p><p><strong>VII. REFERENCES<br></strong>Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law 9th Ed., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021), pg. 1447.</p><p>Anthony Aust, Handbook of International Law 2nd Ed., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pg. 290.</p><p>United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“LOSC”) (adopted 10 December 1982, effective 16 November 1994), 1833 UNTS 397</p><p>Donald R Rothwell, et al., The Oxford Handbook of The Law of The Sea, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015)</p><p>Yoshifumi Tanaka, The International Law of the Sea, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012)</p><p>R.R. Churchill and A. V. Lowe, The Law of the Sea, 2nd Ed., (Manchester: Manchester University Press)</p><p>Edward Guntrip, “The Common Heritage of Mankind: An Adequate Regime for Managing the Deep Seabed?,” Melbourne Journal of International Law, Vol. 4 №2 (2003)</p><p>Chuanliang Wang and Yen-Chiang Chang, “A New Interpretation of the Common Heritage of Mankind in the Context of the International Law of the Sea”, Ocean &amp; Coastal Management, Vol. 191 №1 (2020)</p><p>Agustina Merdekawati, et al., “ARTI PENTING COMMON HERITAGE OF MANKIND DALAM REZIM PENGATURAN AREA DAN PERKEMBANGANNYA,” Fakultas Hukum Universitas Pelita Harapan Law Review, Vol. 21 №3 (2022)</p><p>Virginie Tassin Campanella, Routledge Handbook of Seabed Mining and the Law of the Sea, (New York: Routledge, 2024)</p><p>Aline L. Jaeckel, The International Seabed Authority and the Precautionary Principle Balancing Deep Seabed Mineral Mining and Marine Environmental Protection, (Leiden: Brill Nijhoff, 2017)</p><p>Enow Godwill Baiye and Fongwa Kesten Ngum, “THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL SEABED AUTHORITY IN THE MANAGEMENT OF THE AREA: A LEGAL APPRAISAL,” International Journal of Law in Changing World, Vol. 1 №2 (2023)</p><p>Makoto Seta, “The Legitimacy of the international Seabed Authority and the way it accepts the involvement of non-state actors in governing the area,” article disseminated by HAL Open Science, 2019</p><p>Donald K. Anton, et al. “Seabed Mining — Advisory Opinion on Responsibility and Liability –,” Environmental Policy and Law, Vol. 41 №2 (2011)</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c6c963139e91" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The International Legal Aspects of the United Nations Security Council]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@arabaman69/the-international-legal-aspects-of-the-united-nations-security-council-a7c043c6c693?source=rss-a51133870705------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a7c043c6c693</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[un-security-council]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[international-law]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[united-nations]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[peacekeeping]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Raiz Bara Aman]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 20 Feb 2026 10:15:57 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-02-20T10:15:57.176Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*c2ICGlWIvmAzbV19" /></figure><p><strong>PREFACE</strong></p><p>This assignment was written for my Law of International and Regional Organizations class, and it was co-written by my classmate, but most importantly best friend Verrel! We were instructed to analyze and explain what were the international law aspects of the United Nations Security Council. Well… more accurately me and Verrel ̶f̶o̶u̶g̶h̶t̶ chose for the topic of United Nations Security Council and thankfully we got it! We both felt that this topic has so much nuance and controversy not just in international law but geopolitics and diplomacy in general, therefore it was worth discussing during our class!</p><p>I hope that we both managed to capture and present that nuance in this assignment, noting that it is not perfect and can be subject for further improvement. With that being said, improving does not mean claiming it to be yours when you submit this to class or write this anywhere else! Side note: at <strong>5578 words </strong>this is probably one of the longest, if not the longest assignment that I (along with Verrel for that matter) have ever made, I think its because of the assignment requirements at the time making it super long, so I would suggest skimming this paper, unless you want to read it fully to fix your attention span then be my guest!</p><p>Regardless of that, happy reading and studying! Hope you can take something of use from this paper!</p><p>Please check out and support Verrel as well through his Linkedin too! → <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/verrel-rafiano-492a98309">https://www.linkedin.com/in/verrel-rafiano-492a98309</a></p><p><strong>A. BACKGROUND<br></strong>War is hell, a common saying nowadays with the devastation and destruction war causes known by all in a civilized and modern society. However, such was not the case back then where war was routine, an inevitability, and a policy. That was until the First World War, the first global war stretching horizons and continents so states from different continents were also roped into the same quagmire. Such universal suffering was not lost on the survivors of the First World War as once the war ended, states ensured that such devastating conflict would never happen again which led to the creation of the League of Nations (“<strong>LoN</strong>”). Its main purpose was to prevent another great war by encouraging states to settle their disputes without first resorting to war which was stipulated within the LoN Charter. Nevertheless, it lacked the legal power to enforce the LoN charter as it does not prohibit war but merely urged states to refrain from it and pursue diplomatic options before resorting to war. Because of this, the LoN failed to prevent another world war when Germany invaded Poland and started the Second World War. The Second World War was even more destructive than the Great War that preceded it, where one of the most outrageous aspects was the deliberate targeting of civilians and non-combatants at a mass scale. Whether it was the aerial bombings of cities, or the gas chambers of concentration camps, civilians have become unwilling participants of war. The blatant disregard for human lives was not lost on those who lived through the war where the message of “never again” was uttered more clearly and loudly than ever. The world now knows the inherent nature of war and sought to prevent it from happening again but this time, states strive to avoid the failures of the LoN. Though the league was not an inherently bad idea, it was structurally flawed from its inception.</p><p>The LoN’s fatal flaw was that it lacked the legal means to enforce its agenda on member states. Although mechanisms do exist, it required unanimous decision from every member state of the LoN. This makes it so that decision making and enforcement of the agenda is difficult to be conducted. Additionally, member states that do not wish to be limited by the LoN can simply withdraw, which is exactly what Germany, Italy, and Japan did as the Axis powers of the Second World War. It was due to their failure to prevent another world war that the LoN dissolved itself and was replaced by the United Nations (“<strong>UN</strong>”) and succeeded the LoN in its functions and purpose.</p><p>Even though the UN is far from a perfect organization, nevertheless, the world is a better place with the UN than without it, a statement mirrored by the Second Secretary-General of the UN (“<strong>UNSG</strong>”), Dag Hammarskjöld, who said “<em>The UN was not created to take humanity to heaven but to save it from hell</em>.” The UN is also not a world government, but acts as the single authoritative forum of world opinion where the failures of the LoN will not be repeated. Nowhere is this more relevant and prevalent than with the United Nations Security Council (“<strong>UNSC</strong>”), one of the organs of the UN whose main purpose is to maintain international peace and security. The UNSC is the most powerful organ of the UN as it is mandated the legal authority to enact sanctions to enforce international peace and security as well as to authorize the use of force against states. Given its role within the UN and the broader international community, the UNSC has been the topic of controversy for many decades. Every time a new armed conflict arises, the question on the effectiveness of the UNSC in maintaining international peace and security. Such criticism and the international legal aspects will be discussed in this paper.</p><p><strong>B. MEMBERSHIP<br></strong>Membership of the UNSC is divided into two types of membership namely permanent membership and non-permanent membership which comprises the full fifteen members of the UNSC. The first five members of the UNSC are permanent members which consist of the United States of America (“<strong>USA</strong>”), the United Kingdom (“<strong>UK</strong>”), the French Republic, the Russian Federation, and the People’s Republic of China (“<strong>PRC</strong>”). These five permanent members of the UNSC have special rights only afforded to permanent members namely the special voting rights among which, more commonly known as veto powers. The special voting rights is the most controversial aspect of the UNSC as any of the permanent UNSC members can use their special voting rights to torpedo any UNSC resolution.</p><p>The foundation of the permanent five’s privilege dates back to the San Francisco Conference in 1945, where the victorious nations of the Second World War made it clear that obtaining this privilege was a requirement for their admission to the new UN. Officials from the USA and the UK took the resounding stance that the veto power would help bring the major nations together and that only then could world peace be preserved. Supporters said that the UN would lose its validity and effectiveness if the big nations did not agree, while others worried that this would erode the concept of sovereign equality. However, the fundamental clash between power politics and the concepts of collective security was brought to light by the start of the Cold War shortly after the UN Charter was adopted, as well as the UNSC’s subsequent stagnation due to the veto. Therefore, despite the UN’s assertion that it is a community of equals, the organization of the UNSC demonstrates a hierarchical reality in which five states hold disproportionate influence over maintaining international peace and security.</p><p>Since the UNSC was established in response to the shortcomings of the LoN, it too has a historical foundation for its permanent members. As previously said, the LoN’s fatal flaw is that it requires a unanimous consensus from all of its members in order to make a decision. Because each member has their own agenda and interests, it would be very hard to make decisions on important subjects. The Second World War winners were aware of this decentralized approach to decision-making. USA President Franklin D. Roosevelt envisioned a centralized form of collective security in which the USA, the UK, the Soviet Union, and the Republic of China (“<strong>RoC</strong>”) and later expanded to include France would maintain peace. Nevertheless, when the Cold War broke out, the permanent members’ unity was shattered when they exercised their veto power to block a UNSC resolution that did not support their state’s and their ideology. The Soviet Union frequently exercised its veto power during the Cold War to block governments’ bids to join the UN that it believed did not serve its interests. The USA then regularly exercised its veto power to block any action that denounced or sanctioned governments that supported USA interests following the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Most notably, the USA has exercised the bulk of its veto power to prevent penalties or censure of Israeli acts in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Originally established with noble intentions, the UNSC permanent members hierarchy was tainted by Cold War ideological conflicts. The permanent members will continue to exercise their particular voting privileges without hesitation in order to guarantee that their interests are not obstructed.</p><p>States and individuals have proposed a number of changes to the UNSC, particularly with regard to the expansion of the number of permanent members and the special voting privileges of its members. Since the global north nations make up the permanent five members (with the PRC being the exception), the global south states are the ones who make these attempts the most. The permanent five veto authority is being reformed in a number of ways. In its initial suggestion, Australia suggested that the veto power be removed from all processes pertaining to the peaceful resolution of disputes under Chapter VI of the UN Charter. Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter on the Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression, members of the Non-Aligned Movement proposed limiting veto rights to UNSC activities. The African Union and other nations, where the passage of a UNSC resolution can only be stopped by the simultaneous vetoes of two or more members, put out the third proposal. The UNSC must make a decision that allows the permanent fives to continue to exercise their veto power in order for the change to be implemented. These permanent members of one of the most powerful international bodies are unlikely to restrain their own authority. More people agree with the idea of expanding the number of permanent and non-permanent members of the UNSC than with the reform plan for the veto rights. In 1965, the UNSC’s sole reform was implemented, increasing the number of non-permanent representatives from four to ten. The permanent five mostly agreed with the plan to expand the number of seats held by permanent members without granting the new members any special voting privileges. The permanent fives, however, struggle to decide which state will join as a permanent member. For one reason or another, a permanent member always vetoed the proposal for a new permanent member. For instance, India has a long history of pursuing the permanent position, but every time a proposal was presented, one of the permanent five opposed it.</p><p>Ten non-permanent members also make up the UNSC’s membership. In the UN General Assembly, non-permanent members are chosen by a two-thirds majority vote to serve two-year terms. States have the obligation and right, as non-permanent members, to uphold global peace and security, vote on UNSC resolutions, and take part in UNSC debates. There is a set number of non-permanent members from each area, and their composition is likewise intentional. There are five seats in Afro-Asia, one in Eastern Europe, two in Latin America and the Caribbean, and two in Western Europe. Since the primary goal of this structure was to address the historically underrepresented regions in international affairs, the diverse makeup of the non-permanent members is not a coincidence. In this manner, the areas’ non-permanent members can address the UNSC about their interests and position. Members of the UNSC cannot quit since the UN Charter does not provide a mechanism for governments to do so. Members, however, have the option to simply decline to attend UNSC sessions until their non-permanent membership period is up. This is more difficult for permanent members, although it has happened previously. One such instance occurred in 1950, when the Soviet Union boycotted the Security Council because the Council had refused to award permanent membership to the PRC, which at the time still had a seat reserved for the Taiwan-based Kuomintang. The UNSC authorized a peacekeeping force to protect South Korea from North Korean invasion during the Korean War as a result of the Soviet Union’s boycott, which prevented them from attending any UNSC sessions. A resolution in favor of South Korea will surely be vetoed by the Soviet Union if it attends the summit. The UNSC’s structure is exemplified by the fact that one of its most noteworthy decisions was only made possible by the Soviet boycott.</p><p><strong>C. FUNCTIONS AND POWERS OF THE UNSC<br></strong>According to Article 24 of the UN Charter, the UNSC is tasked with carrying out the primary duty of preserving world peace and security. In other words, all UN members consent to give the UNSC that power and acknowledge that it will make decisions on behalf of all member nations. Stated differently, the UNSC’s actions are equivalent to those of the entire UN. As a result, everyone in the UN is accountable for the decisions made by the UNSC, and all members are required to abide by the duties imposed by its resolutions. Such resolutions even apply towards members that voted against the decision, those that were not members of the UNSC at the time the resolution was made, and members who did not have the opportunity to vote at all.</p><p>Since the UN’s founders believed that the UNSC was the best body capable of acting quickly and effectively given its size and makeup, the UNSC was given the primary duty for preserving world peace and security. This idea of linking accountability to actual authority was viewed as a significant advancement over the LoN’s prior framework, in which the UNGA and UNSC had nearly similar powers. By granting the UNGA and regional groups additional authority, several governments sought to lessen the UNSC’s hegemony during the San Francisco Conference. However, throughout the finalization of the UN Charter, the UNSC continued to play a key role in enforcement activities. It can maintain its primary function of international peace and security in two ways: first, by resolving international disputes that are likely to jeopardize international peace and security in a peaceful manner; second, by taking enforcement action if the first approach is ineffective or unsuitable.</p><p>Regarding the first approach, the UNSC is equipped with a number of powers under Chapter VI of the UN Charter to assist governments in resolving conflicts amicably, particularly where those disputes pose a danger to global peace and security. Even while the Charter gives a number of actors, including member states, the UNGA, and the UNSG, the ability to bring problems before the UNSC, the UNSC ultimately makes the decision on whether or not to take action. Although the UNSC may suggest certain approaches or parameters for a settlement, its authority under Chapter VI is just advisory and not legally obligatory, in contrast to the authority granted under Chapter VII. However, they play a vital role in resolving conflicts, which may involve actions like sending peacekeeping forces, conducting investigations, or submitting cases to other UN organizations and agencies like the UNGA or the International Court of Justice. The conflict between Indonesia and the Netherlands is an illustration of how the UNSC has used its authority to resolve international conflicts. The Dutch began their second military invasion of the Republic of Indonesia on December 19, 1948, when they invaded Yogyakarta, which was then the capital. Many high-ranking Indonesian politicians, including President Sukarno, Vice President Mohammad Hatta, and Sutan Sjahrir, were detained as a result of the incident. Sjafruddin Prawiranegara established an emergency administration in Sumatra in response to the capital’s loss in order to guarantee the Republic’s survival. After landing at Maguwo Air Base, Dutch troops promptly relocated to Yogyakarta. About 300 soldiers and 53 police officers were killed in the attack, while it’s unclear how many people were killed. The slaughter and imperial aggression of the Dutch drew international criticism. The issue was taken before the UN Security Council by nations including Australia and India. In order to address the situation, the Council established a committee with members from the USA, Belgium, and Australia. An agreement reached during negotiations in The Hague in July 1949 made it possible for Indonesia to be recognized as an independent republic.</p><p>The UNSC has the authority to employ enforcement measures as well. Article 39 of the UN Charter gives the UNSC centralized authority to decide whether there is an act of aggression, a violation of peace, or a threat to peace. The UNSC can choose enforcement actions after reaching a decision. The UNSC has two categories of enforcement powers: Article 41 permits non-military measures, while Article 42 permits military action by air, sea, or land troops. The UNSC must first issue a formal proclamation in accordance with Article 39, which calls for the permanent five’s consent or, at the very least, the absence of a UNSC veto. This implies that the action cannot proceed if one of the permanent five exercises its veto authority. Since the USA and the Soviet Union were involved in significant battles throughout this time and both would veto any proposed action against their allies or themselves, the enforcement procedures under Chapter VII have traditionally been seldom employed. This was particularly true during the Cold War. After deciding that a situation calls for UNSC enforcement, the UNSC can use three different non-military coercive actions. First, a state or non-state actor may be ordered by the UNSC to stop engaging in aberrant behavior. Additionally, it could impose additional duties on the target State or non-State actor. Second, the UNSC has the authority to impose temporary measures, which are typically directed at particular States, such as conflict parties in order to stop the situation from getting worse. Third, in order to force the State or non-State actor in question to stop its abnormal behavior, the UNSC may also decide on measures directed at third states or non-State actors, requesting that they take specific steps.</p><p>The UNSC can also employ force to allow states to conduct things that are normally forbidden, even though the word “force” has never been mentioned in its resolutions. When the UNSC determines that additional measures would be or have been insufficient to maintain peace and security, it has the authority to authorize states to use force in accordance with Article 42. This implies that the UNSC does not actually need to apply economic sanctions or wait for them to fail before approving the use of force, even though in reality it has always done so. The acts in Article 42 are only illustrative; force has been authorized for a variety of reasons. The UNSC has the authority to authorize its members to employ force, but it does not compel such governments to do so. Since the early 1990s, the UNSC has approved the use of force in a variety of international situations, usually delegating this responsibility to coalitions or individual countries. These authorizations have included the United States and its allies in Iraq (1990–91), Somalia, and Haiti; France in Rwanda (Operation Turquoise); Italy in Albania (Operation Alba); and Australia in East Timor. In the Libyan issue, the Council authorized States that had notified the UNSG to act independently or through regional accords. Additional authorizations permit French military deployments in Mali and the Central African Republic (“<strong>CAR</strong>”), as well as the operation of European Union soldiers in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (“<strong>DRC</strong>”) and CAR. The UNSC’s approval of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s first use of force in the Bosnian conflict in the middle of the 1990s stands out among all of these authorizations. The UNSC has only recently begun to consider civil conflicts and internal crises as risks to international peace and security. In the 1995 Tadić verdict, from the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (“<strong>ICTY</strong>”) acknowledged that civil war and internal unrest were now considered “threats to the peace” under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. This change is one important and well studied facet of the Council’s post-Cold War operational practice.</p><p><strong>D. SUBSIDIARY ORGANS OF THE UNSC<br> </strong>The UNSC currently has three permanent committees: a Committee of Experts on Rules of Procedure, a Committee on Admission of New Members, and a Committee on Council meetings away from Headquarters. The UNSC also has the authority to create subsidiary organs or subsidiary bodies under Article 29 of the UN Charter. Because these subsidiary organs involve more flexible agendas and participation, it is important to note that a large portion of the actual work is not carried out through the UNSC as a whole. This allows the members to respond to global issues in novel ways and manage the UNSC’s workload. The subsidiary institutions often take the shape of committees or working groups that are intended to handle both substantive and procedural concerns, such as tribunals, peacekeeping operations, sanctions, or theme topics like disarmament. Furthermore, depending on their structure and jurisdiction, the organs depend on the UN’s administrative staff and funding. For instance, a UNSC committee oversees peacekeeping missions and gives direction to the Department of Peace Operations and Political and Peacebuilding Affairs. Meanwhile, the UN Office for Counter-Terrorism and other subsidiary organs are guided by the Counter-Terrorism Committee, which has its own Executive Directorate headed by an Assistant Secretary-General.</p><p>The UNSC’s approach to creating subsidiary organizations has evolved significantly over time. In its first three years, the UNSC established up to 24 satellite organizations. But between 1949 and 1962, just six of these organs were manufactured. Following the conclusion of the Cold War, there was a notable growth in the number of subsidiary organizations, particularly in the form of peacekeeping missions and sanctions committees. In 2006, the Council issued a resolution calling on the heads of its subsidiary organizations to provide interested Member States with periodic, informal updates on their activities as needed in an effort to promote transparency. The Military Staff Committee, Standing Committees or “Permanent Committees,” Ad Hoc Committees and General Committees, Commissions and Investigative Bodies, Working Groups, Sanctions Committees, Peacekeeping Operations, Political, Peace-Building, and other missions, Groups and panels, International Criminal Tribunals, Security Council and Secretary General missions, Representatives, Mediators, Coordinators, and Good Offices are also generally considered to be member of the UNSC. However, it should be mentioned that the UN has not formally classified the following.</p><p>The first is the Military Staff Committee, which advises and assists the UNSC on issues pertaining to the command and employment of forces at its disposal, armaments regulation, possible disarmament, and the military needs of the UNSC for preserving world peace and security. The majority of the committee is composed of the chief of staff of the permanent members of the UNSC or their deputies. Second, there are four members of the Standing Committee, also referred to as the permanent committee, although three of them are essentially inactive. The Committee on Council Meetings Away from Headquarters met intermittently in 1972 and 1973, the Committee of Experts on Rules and Procedures met just once since 1953, and the Committee of Experts on Associate Membership met only a few times between 1969 and 1970. Given that the great majority of governments are already members of the UN, the Committee on the Admission of New Members is the sole committee still in operation, but with rather restricted duties. These committees are attended by all members of the Security Council, and their sessions are presided over by the Council President. Third, there are the Ad Hoc and General Committees, which are set up to deal with certain problems and specific global issues. For example, the Committee of Good Offices on the Indonesian Question was formed in 1947 with the goal of assisting the Netherlands and Indonesia in reaching a peaceful agreement regarding Indonesia’s independence. Fourth, the UNSC created commissions and investigative organizations to help facilitate and restore global peace and security. The fifth category consists of working groups, some of which were founded in the late 1990s and early 2000s and are either no longer in operation or have fulfilled their objectives. The Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations, the Ad Hoc Working Group on African conflict prevention and resolution, the Working Group created in accordance with Resolution 1566 in 2004, the Working Group on Armed Conflict and Children, the Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions, and the Informal Working Group on International Tribunals are among the ones that are presently in operation. The Sanctions Committees rank sixth, with 13 sanction regimes in effect, including those for Somalia and Eritrea, Iraq, Yemen, the Central African Republic, the DRC, Sudan, North Korea, South Sudan, Libya, and Guinea-Bissau. Former sanctions committees for countries including Iran, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and others have been abolished. Committees seeking sanctions against Al-Qaida, the Taliban, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, and those connected to the murder of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri are also still in operation. The seventh category is Peacekeeping Operations, which includes 16 peacekeeping missions, such as the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon. The UNSC and UNGA jointly formed the Political, Peace-Building, and other missions, which rank eighth. These missions coordinate peacebuilding initiatives and mobilize resources to help post-conflict recovery. These missions, which collaborate closely with national actors and other UN organizations, concentrate on political transitions, conflict resolution, and preventive diplomacy. Among the current missions are the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia. The UNSC has established groups and panels to support the UNSG’s efforts to maintain international peace and security, and it has asked the UNSG to designate groups or panels to help the UNSC examine specific circumstances. These organizations and panels rank ninth. The Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (2000), the Group established under Resolution 309 concerning Namibia (1972), and the Group of Experts on South Africa (1963) are a few examples of expert bodies that the Security Council has established. Tenth are the International Criminal Tribunals, namely the ICTY and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, which were created as auxiliary institutions of the UNSC in 1993 and 1994, respectively. The UNSC and UNSG missions, which have been set up by the Security Council over the years and are made up of UNSC members or those chosen by the UNSG, come in at number eleven. Missions to Cambodia and Vietnam, Guinea, Senegal, Jerusalem, Namibia, Zambia, Western Sahara, Benin, Botswana, and Lesotho are among the examples included in the Repertoire. Another example is a fact-finding expedition that looked into the use of chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq conflict. Last but not least, are the Good Offices, Coordinators, Mediators, and Representatives. In order to confront risks to global peace and security, the UNSC has repeatedly asked the UNSG to designate special representatives or deploy his Good Offices. The Repertoire lists these appointments, which include positions like the Mediator in Cyprus, the UN Representative for India and Pakistan, and several Special Representatives in conflict areas including the Middle East, Namibia, East Timor, and Western Sahara. Others were sent on diplomatic or investigative missions, including the Falkland Islands dispute, the Dominican Republic, Southern Rhodesia, and the Iran-Iraq conflict, as well as organizing the repatriation of Kuwaiti property from Iraq.</p><p><strong>E. CASES OF ENFORCEMENT OF UNSC RESOLUTIONS<br></strong>As provided for beforehand, the UNSC can enforce its resolutions in a variety of methods based on its severity so long as it is based on Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The UNSC can impose anything from deeming certain acts legal or illegal, collective non-recognition, arms embargoes, selective and quasi-comprehensive financial, diplomatic, and economic measures, use of military force, imposing disarmament, and establishing an international criminal tribunal. One of the most frequent methods of enforcement is through the use of sanctions against states and individuals. There are several types of sanctions the UNSC can impose namely; individual, financial, and sectoral sanctions. The most frequent sanctions used are sectoral sanctions as it targets specific sectors related to the objective of the resolution imposed. Sectoral sanctions oftentimes took the form of arms embargoes which are imposed for cases of armed conflict and human rights violations. Individual sanctions target certain individuals actually responsible for certain acts with travel bans and asset freeze. Financial sanctions target governments in regards to their income and economy and are the least imposed sanctions statistically. To ensure the effectiveness of sanctions imposed, sanctions committees are established to administer and oversee the implementation of sanctions and acts as a subsidiary body of the UNSC. A notable case of sanctions imposed by the UNSC are the UNSC Resolutions on North Korea. The UNSC has imposed various sanctions resolutions against North Korea for its nuclear weapons programs. Each time North Korea continues its nuclear weapons programs, a new UNSC resolution is imposed with different targets. Any violation of sanctions imposed by the UNSC constitutes a violation of a state’s international obligation as UNSC resolutions under Chapter VII of the Charter are legally binding.</p><p>Other than sanctions, UNSC resolutions can also be enforced through the use of force. The use of force by the UNSC is often seen with its peacekeeping operations. The United Nations Peacekeeping is a method used by the UNSC to control and resolve conflicts. However, the use of its Peacekeeping Force has drawn criticism over its failure to prevent or stop conflict from occurring. This is because the mandate given to the peacekeeping mission is not one of a military capacity with military objectives. In fact, the Peacekeeping Forces are only permitted the use of force under extreme circumstances to defend themselves. This was due to the fact that none of the permanent members of the UNSC wants the United Nations to have an army and therefore, its peacekeepers are not acting in the capacity of a soldier within an army. The peacekeepers are tasked with maintaining peace by conducting various actions from observing peace accords, stabilizing conflict areas after a ceasefire, helping with elections, protection and promotion of human rights just to name a few.</p><p>The objectives of UN Peacekeeping Missions are often mistaken to that of peace enforcement operations. Peace enforcement operations are the highest measures of enforcement of a UNSC resolution as it permits the use of military force. Peace enforcement operations differ from peacekeeping in many ways. The first is that enforcement operations are not conducted by UN Peacekeeping Forces but are composed of military personnel from UN member states that participate in the peace enforcement operations. The mandate for peace enforcement operations is also to achieve the objective set by the UNSC resolution while the mandate for peacemaking is that of maintaining peace once a conflict has ended. The most notable difference is regarding the use of force as peacekeepers are limited to self-defence as they are not acting as soldiers while peace enforcement operations authorized the use of force and other coercive measures. This is seen with the composition of peace enforcement units as they are equipped with armored vehicles, combat jets, and combat ships, and other amenities deemed essential to fulfill the objective. A notable case of peace enforcement operations is the Gulf War where Coalition forces sent troops to Iraq occupied Kuwait to enforce UNSC Resolution 678. UNSC Resolution 678 authorizes member states cooperating with Kuwait to “use all necessary means” to enforce previous UNSC resolutions and to restore international peace and security to the area. With the authorization given by the resolution, Coalition forces liberated Kuwait from Iraqi occupation and led to a ceasefire agreement between both sides.</p><p>The measures imposed within a UNSC resolution must be explicit and well-defined. This is seen in the aforementioned UNSC Resolution 678 where the measures are defined as “use all necessary means.” The phrasing of this measure is ambiguous and unclear as it leaves a lot to interpretation by member states. UNSC Resolution 678 and other UNSC resolutions used prior against Iraq, were used again as justification for the 2003 USA’s Invasion of Iraq. The USA claimed that by not complying with disarmament and dismissal of its weapons of mass destruction program as required by relevant resolutions, Iraq has committed a material breach of the resolutions. UNSC Resolution 1441 instructed that relevant UNSC resolutions are applicable to ensure compliance to the resolution and to restore international peace and security. The US interpreted this by claiming that UNSC Resolution 1441 gave implicit authorization to use Resolution 678 as legal grounds for its invasion of Iraq. Many member states argued against the use of Resolution 678 as legal grounds since the context for that resolution which is to force Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait had expired. The 2003 US Invasion of Iraq was done under a different context and therefore, Resolution 678 would not be applicable. However, the US refuted this argument by claiming that the resolution contained no time limit and no clause on when it should or should not be used in regards to Iraq. The US further stated that unless the UNSC explicitly says otherwise, Resolution 678 can still be used for the context of the US Invasion of Iraq. Resolution 1441 is also vague in wording as it warned Iraq of “ serious consequences” should Iraq ignore its international obligations. The use of “serious consequences” does not automatically mean that use of military force against Iraq is once again authorized. However, by also stipulating that the previous resolutions on Iraq are applicable, the resolution opens the gate for member states to interpret an already broad and loosely defined measure to do as they see fit to respond against Iraq.</p><p><strong>F. CONCLUSION<br></strong>The UNSC’s existence is one of contradictions. For some, the UNSC is seen as the keeper of international peace and security. To others, the UNSC is the personification of a flawed western-based international order. Regardless of the praise or condemnations towards it, the UNSC remains as one of the most influential and important international organizations. Its mandate to maintain international peace and security afforded it certain rights and obligations that are scarcely present at other international organizations. However, the UNSC dependence on the political willingness of its permanent members to enforce resolutions is criticized by many. Despite it all, the flaws of the UNSC does not mean that it should be dissolved as its functions and mandate is a noble one, to achieve international peace and to prevent another world war. Structural reform is needed for the UNSC to maximize its role as the maintainer of international peace and security. However, unless the permanent members are willing to give up its powers, the world has to make peace with a flawed but still necessary UNSC.</p><p><strong>G. BIBLIOGRAPHY<br>Books<br></strong>Philippe Sands Q.C. and Pierre Klein, <em>Bowett’s Law of International Institutions</em>. London: Thomson Reuters, 2009.</p><p>Jakab, Andras and Dimitry Kochenov. <em>The Enforcement of EU Law and Values: Ensuring Member States’ Compliance</em>. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017.</p><p>Aust, Anthony. <em>Handbook of International Law 2nd Ed</em>. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.</p><p>Wood, Michael and Eran Sthoeger, <em>The UN Security Council and International Law. </em>Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022.</p><p>Shaw, Malcolm N. <em>International Law 9th Ed</em>. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021.</p><p>Haggard, Stephan, and Marcus Noland. “North Korea’s External Economic Relations, 1990–2016.” In <em>Hard Target: Sanctions, Inducements, and the Case of North Korea</em>, 1st ed. California, Stanford University Press, 2017.</p><p>Marquis, Jefferson P., Walter L. Perry, Andrea Mejia, Jerry M. Sollinger, and Vipin Narang. “Genesis of the War.” In Walter L. Perry, Jerry M. Sollinger, Richard E. Darilek, and Laurinda L. Rohn, ed., <em>Operation IRAQI FREEDOM: Decisive War, Elusive Peace</em>, California, RAND Corporation, 2015.</p><p>Higgins, Dame Rosalyn. <em>Oppenheim’s International Law: United Nations</em>. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.</p><p>Findlay, Trevor. <em>The Use of Force in Peace Operations</em>. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.</p><p>Trent, John and Laura Schnurr. “Peace and Security: Fixing the Security Council.” In <em>A United Nations Renaissance: What the UN Is, and What It Could Be</em>, 1st ed. (Leverkusen: Verlag Barbara Budrich, 2018). pg. 57.</p><p><strong>International Documents<br></strong>United Nations Security Council, Resolution 678 (1990), 29 November 1990.</p><p>United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1441 (2002), 8 November 2002.</p><p><strong>Journals<br></strong>Alger Hiss, “The Development Of International Organizations — With Special Emphasis On The Contribution Of The United States To This Development Since 1942.” <em>Proceedings of the American Society of International Law at Its Annual Meeting</em>, Vol. 41 (1947)</p><p>Leland M Goodrich, “From League of Nations to United Nations.” <em>International Organization</em>, Vol. 1 (1947)</p><p>Shashi Tharoor, “Why America Still Needs the United Nations.” <em>Foreign Affairs</em>, Vol. 82, №5 (2003).</p><p>Wolfgang Friedmann. “The United Nations and the Development of International Law.” <em>International Journal</em>, Vol. 25, №2 (1970)</p><p>Ian Hurd. “The UN Security Council and the International Rule of Law.” <em>The Chinese Journal of International Politics</em>, Vol. 7, №3 (2014)</p><p>Michal Hatuel-Radoshitzky, “Israel and the UN Security Council Elections.” Institute for National Security Studies, №834 (2016)</p><p>Dilip Sinha. “Veto Provision in UN Charter: Issues and Dimensions.” <em>Indian Foreign Affairs Journal</em>, Vol. 14, №4 (2019)</p><p>Richard Butler AC, “Reform of the United Nations Security Council,” <em>Penn State Journal of Law &amp; International Affairs, </em>Vol. 1 №1 (2012)</p><p>Colum Gavan Duffy. “The League of Nations.” <em>The Irish Monthly</em>, Vol. 78 №922 (1950)</p><p>Shestack, Jerome J., Oscar Schachter, and Paul Kennedy. “The Charter’s Origins in Today’s Perspective.” <em>Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law)</em>, Vol. 89 (1995)</p><p>Wouters, Jan, and Tom Ruys. “Use and Abuse of the Veto Power.” <em>Security Council Reform: A New Veto For A New Century?</em> Egmont Institute (2005)</p><p>Albert Venter, “Reform of the United Nations Security Council: A Comment on the South African Position.” <em>International Journal on World Peace</em>, Vol. 20, №4 (2003)</p><p>Wouters, Jan, and Tom Ruys. “Veto Reform Proposals.”Security Council Reform: A New Veto For A New Century<em>?”</em> Egmont Institute (2005)</p><p>Royeppen, Andrea, ed., “United Nations Security Council Reform.” <em>United Nations</em>, Vol. <em>70</em>. Institute for Global Dialogue (2016</p><p>Afoaku, Osita G., and Okechukwu Ukaga, “United Nations Security Council Reform: A Critical Analysis Of Enlargement Options,” <em>Journal of Third World Studies</em>, Vol. 18 №2 (2001)</p><p>Manoj Kumar Mishra, “India’s Permanent Membership Of The U.N. Security Council: Changing Power Realities And Notions Of Security.” <em>The Indian Journal of Political Science</em>, Vol. 67 №2 (2006)</p><p>Sydney D Bailey, “The UN Security Council : Evolving Practice.” <em>The World Today</em>, Vol. 34, №3 (1978)</p><p>Mohammad Rasikh Wasiq, “United Nations Security Council Powers, Practice, and Effectiveness Of Security Council,” Indian Journal of Law and Legal Research, Vol. 5 №1 (2023)</p><p>Pasar Abdulkareem Fendi <em>et al</em>., “Role of the United Nation Security Council in Resolving International Disputes,” Turkish Journal of Computer and Mathematics Education, Vol. 12 №2 (2021), pg. 273</p><p>Vera Gowlland-Debbas, “Security Council Enforcement Action and Issues of State Responsibility.” <em>The International and Comparative Law Quarterly</em>, Vol. 43 №1 (1994)</p><p>Fransesco Giumelli. “Understanding United Nations Targeted Sanctions: An Empirical Analysis.” <em>International Affairs </em>(<em>Royal Institute of International Affairs</em>) Vol. 91 №6 (2015)</p><p>Astrid Forberg Ryan. “Sanctions Implementation and the UN Security Council: The Case for Greater Transparency.” International Peace Institute (2014)</p><p>Kristen E Boon, “The Legal Framework of Security Council Sanctions.” <em>Terminating Security Council Sanctions</em>. International Peace Institute (2014)</p><p>Marrack Goulding, “The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping.” <em>International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs) </em>Vol. 69 №3 (1993)</p><p>Howard, Lise Morjé, and Anjali Kaushlesh Dayal. “The Use of Force in UN Peacekeeping.” <em>International Organization</em>, Vol. 72 №1 (2018)</p><p>Lise Morjé Howard, “Peacekeeping, Peace Enforcement, and UN Reform.” <em>Georgetown Journal of International Affairs</em> Vol. 16 №2 (2015)</p><p>Rajeesh Kumar, “Iraq War 2003 and the Issue of Pre-Emptive and Preventive Self-Defence: Implications for the United Nations.” <em>India Quarterly</em>, Vol. 70 №2 (2014)</p><p>John Yoo, “International Law and the War in Iraq,” <em>The American Journal of International Law</em>, Vol 97 №3 (2003)</p><p>Tomasz Iwanek. “The 2003 Invasion of Iraq: How the System Failed.” <em>Journal of Conflict &amp; Security Law</em>, Vol. 15 №1 (2010)</p><p>Shannon Carcelli et al., “The Politics of International Peace and Security: Introducing A New Dataset on the Creation of the United Nations Security Council Subsidiary Bodies.” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 68, №2, (2024)</p><p><strong>Internet<br></strong>United Nations Peacekeeping, “Mandates and the Legal Basis for Peacekeeping,” available at <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mandates-and-legal-basis-peacekeeping,">https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mandates-and-legal-basis-peacekeeping,</a> accessed on 18 April 2025</p><p>Lily Zanjani, “Illegitimate Alliances: Invasion Tales Within the United Nations Security Council,” OpinioJuris, published on 6 June 2022, available at <a href="https://opiniojuris.org/2022/06/06/illegitimate-alliances-invasion-tales-within-the-united-nations-security-council/,">https://opiniojuris.org/2022/06/06/illegitimate-alliances-invasion-tales-within-the-united-nations-security-council/,</a> accessed on 18 April 2025</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a7c043c6c693" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea’s role in maintaining International Peace and…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@arabaman69/the-international-tribunal-for-the-law-of-the-seas-role-in-maintaining-international-peace-and-35c4dabdf917?source=rss-a51133870705------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/35c4dabdf917</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[unclos-1982]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[itlos]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[peace-and-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[law-of-the-sea]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Raiz Bara Aman]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 20 Feb 2026 10:14:36 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-02-20T10:14:36.360Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><strong>The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea’s role in maintaining International Peace and Security</strong></h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*roP9sBihreQVdQDv.jpeg" /></figure><p><strong>PREFACE</strong></p><p>Believe it or not, this is THE VERY FIRST article in an “Op-Ed” kind of format rather than for class that I have ever written where the intention was for this to be posted… somewhere… way before I had the idea of writing on Medium where I wanted to have the freedom in writing whatever that I wanted. Therefore, you might be able to <em>see, read, </em>and <em>identify </em>that this was indeed my very first article and I decided that I would be posting this under the “Bara’s Gazette!” project, despite it being the second article posted under here, but also the first I have EVER WRITTEN? Kinda strange, but honestly I liked the idea how the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea can have a role in maintaining International Peace and Security and I wanted to write it out there! I hope you can enjoy this article and take some insights from it!</p><p><strong>I. INTRODUCTION<br></strong>The United Nations (“<strong>UN</strong>”) Charter (“<strong>UNC</strong>”) in Article 1(1) shows that the UN has three main functions in maintaining international peace and security. First, the UN should ensure that member states do not threaten peace or start conflicts, a primary function held by the UN General Assembly (“<strong>UNGA</strong>”). Second, is to take action when a member state actually starts conflict or breaks the peace, the primary function of the UN Security Council (“<strong>UNSC</strong>”) vested with authority to take strong collective action. Finally, the UN should aid in resolving disputes peacefully, a role given to both the UNGA through Article 14 and the UNSC through Chapter VI of the UNC. This is further elaborated in the UNC in Article 2(3), providing that all states must solve their disagreements peacefully, in a way that would not compromise world peace, security, or justice. Peaceful conflict resolution is a cornerstone of today’s international order and is considered a legal obligation for all UN member states as ruled in the International Court of Justice’s (“<strong>ICJ</strong>”) <em>Fisheries Jurisdiction </em>case and the <em>Aerial Incident of 10 August 1999 </em>case that peaceful dispute resolution could not be concluded as a recommendation that member states can choose to ignore. This obligation of peaceful dispute resolution, also extends to the Law of the Sea.</p><p>The laws concerning the usage of the seas are consolidated into a single treaty, the Law of the Sea Convention of 1982 (“<strong>LOSC</strong>”). The LOSC codified rules concerning the oceans bringing an order to a regime fraught with potential conflict covering all of the ocean space, taking into consideration its diverse applications and physical domains. These include preserving law and order, conserving the marine environment, and navigating, overflying, and exploiting both living and non-living resources across maritime boundaries. As Damos Dumoli Agusman and Citra Yuda Nur Fatihah declared, the LOSC can be considered as the “<em>constitution of the sea</em>” due to its vast scope of regulating the rights and obligation of states in the seas. The LOSC also translates the obligation to settle disputes peacefully as enshrined in the UNC into a comprehensive dispute settlement system found in Part XV of the LOSC. More specifically Article 279 obligates state parties to settle any dispute between them concerning the LOSC by peaceful means in accordance with Article 2(3) of the UNC. In relation to this, Article 287 provides that state parties can decide how they would settle disputes concerning the LOSC with one of the options being to settle through the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (“<strong>ITLOS</strong>”).</p><p>ITLOS, based in Hamburg, Germany is open to state parties of the LOSC and other entities such as the International Seabed Authority, state-owned companies, and even private persons or corporations in certain cases. ITLOS’ jurisdiction comprises all disputes and applications brought to it under the LOSC and any matters covered by other agreements that give ITLOS jurisdiction. ITLOS applies the provisions of the LOSC together with other rules of international law, so long it does not contradict the LOSC. In circumstances when an international agreement linked with the purposes of the LOSC allows, ITLOS may also render Advisory Opinions (“<strong>AO</strong>”) on legal matters in accordance with article 138 of the Rules of the Tribunal 2009. Conclusively, ITLOS is one of the methods state parties to the LOSC can select to peacefully settle disputes concerning its application and by large maintaining international peace and security pursuant to Article 1(1) of the UNC. This article will further explore how ITLOS contributes to maintaining international peace and security in practice as an international court with the power of settling disputes between states.</p><p><strong>II. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK<br>A. LOSC Part XV: Settlement of Disputes<br></strong>The LOSC, is unique in the sense that it contains a detailed regime concerning dispute settlement, with the possibility of mandatory jurisdiction over disputes concerning interpretation and application of the LOSC. Article 279 of Part XV of the LOSC affirms that states have an obligation to settle disputes peacefully in accordance with the UNC to prevent jeopardizing international peace, security, and justice. This integrates the LOSC’s dispute resolution system into the larger UN legal framework and gives courts and tribunals the authority to ensure compliance, promote uniform interpretation, and support the law of the sea’s progressive development. Further, Article 287 of the LOSC provides ITLOS as the adjudicating body entitled to exercise compulsory jurisdiction concerning disputes relating to interpreting and applying the LOSC, though the LOSC nonetheless gives flexibility for disputing parties in choosing their forum. Therefore, the LOSC prioritizes securing compulsory settlement rather than a uniform set of jurisprudence. Under Article 287, a dispute can be brought unilaterally by one party and also by the mutual consent of the parties.</p><p><strong>B. LOSC Article 290: Provisional Measures<br></strong> Article 290(1) of the LOSC provides that in the event that a dispute has been properly brought before a court or tribunal that believes it has jurisdiction, the court or tribunal may, while awaiting a final ruling, order interim measures deemed necessary to protect the parties’ respective rights or to avoid grave harm to the marine environment. Despite the frequently drawn-out nature of international litigation, these are intended to protect the parties’ rights, stop disputes from getting worse, and guarantee that final rulings are upheld. Rather than focusing on the merits, tribunals evaluate whether the absence of measures would result in irreversible prejudice by considering the parties’ actions and the surrounding circumstances.</p><p><strong>C. LOSC Article 292: Prompt Release<br></strong> Article 292(1) of the LOSC provides that if a vessel from one state is detained by another and the detaining state is accused of not following the rules of the LOSC concerning the release of the ship or crew once a fair bond or financial guarantee is paid, the matter can be taken into a court of the parties choice. Nevertheless, if the parties are unable to decide within 10 days, the matter can go to ITLOS pursuant to Article 287, unless the other state agrees otherwise. Because it strikes a compromise between the interests of the flag State and the detaining State, Article 292 is a novel provision in the law of the sea. The flag State wants its ships and personnel released as soon as possible, while the holding State wants to ensure the master appears and pays fines. When a ship is detained on suspicion of violating the LOSC, prompt release may be used. Because a coastal state has the authority to hold a ship that is suspected of violating Article 292, its detention of a ship must be legal. This is due to the fact that Article 292 must be applied in situations where detention is unlawful under international law in addition to situations where it is lawful.</p><p><strong>D. Advisory Jurisdiction<br></strong>International tribunals have both advisory and contentious authority. AOs provide clarification on how international law should be interpreted, as opposed to rulings that resolve conflicts. Although they are not legally obligatory, the tribunal’s status gives them authority, and by outlining states’ responsibilities, they frequently influence the evolution of international law. AOs offer broad legal interpretations that, unless there are compelling grounds to deviate, tribunals often adhere to in subsequent instances. Whether the LOSC adequately tackles new issues or calls for further regulations is a crucial question in the contemporary era of the law of the sea. Thus, without changing the LOSC, AOs assist in elucidating its meaning and relevance to current concerns. ITLOS’ advisory jurisdiction is derived from Article 21 of its Statute, which grants jurisdiction over disputes and “<em>all other matters</em>,” and Article 138 of its Rules of Procedure. The Tribunal affirms that its advisory function is valid when authorized by relevant agreements and not prohibited by the LOSC, even though the LOSC does not specifically mention it.</p><p><strong>III. APPLICATION IN PRACTICE<br>A. Provisional Measures<br></strong> Provisional actions imposed under Article 290 of the LOSC include the <em>M/V Saiga</em> case, which was first referred to the ITLOS under Article 290(5) awaiting the formation of an Annex VII arbitral tribunal. Although the merits were to be resolved by arbitration, the request was eventually deemed to come under Article 290(1) after the parties agreed to submit the matter to ITLOS. Similarly, in the <em>Southern Bluefin Tuna</em> case, temporary measures were requested from ITLOS under Article 290(5) because the arbitral tribunal had not yet been established. In <em>M/V Saiga </em>involved the oil tanker <em>Saiga</em> flying the flag of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines supplying fuel to ships near Guinea, when on 27 October 1997 it crossed into Guinea’s EEZ and supplied fuel, allegedly violating Guinea’s customs laws. Consequently, Guinea’s patrol boats arrested the vessel outside its EEZ after pursuit resulting in two crew members being injured, the ship detained, and the cargo discharged with no bond or financial guarantee being requested or offered. On 13 November 1997, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines brought proceedings against Guinea under Article 292 of the LOSC asking for the immediate release of the <em>Saiga</em>, its cargo, and crew. ITLOS approved Saint Vincent and the Grenadines’ request and ordered provisional measures on March 11, 1998, which compelled Guinea to refrain from pursuing legal or administrative action against the ship and her crew, encouraged both sides to avoid escalating the disagreement, and required them to produce reports on their adherence to ITLOS’ instructions.</p><p>Another example would be the <em>Southern Bluefin Tuna Case </em>between Australia &amp; New Zealand against Japan. The dispute concerned the matter of conservation of the population of Southern Bluefin Tuna (“<strong>SBT</strong>”) which is significantly over-fished and is below the commonly accepted thresholds for biologically safe parental biomass. Because of this, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan established the 1993 Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (“<strong>CSBT</strong>”) agreeing on the total allowable catch for the three states. However, in 1998, Japan unilaterally conducted a so-called experimental fishing of 1,400 tonnes of SBT in the Indian Ocean. Australia and Japan claimed that Japan’s unilateral experimental fishing failed to take into consideration the conservation and management of SBT in the high seas, in breach of Articles 64, 116–119, and 300 of the LOSC. Japan argued that an Annex VII Arbitration Tribunal pursuant to Article 290(5) of the LOSC would lack <em>prima facie </em>jurisdiction over the dispute. Japan further argued that the dispute was concerning the CSBT rather than the LOSC. The Arbitral Tribunal concluded that Australia and New Zealand’s application met the requirements under Article 290(5) of the LOSC, implying that it had <em>prima facie</em> jurisdiction over the matter. Both Australia and New Zealand appealed to ITLOS to seek provisional awards before an award could be made however. On 27 August 1999, ITLOS ordered provisional measures for Australia, Japan, and New Zealand to limit their tuna catches to pre-agreed quotas, refrain from actions that could harm the arbitral tribunal’s final decision, avoid aggravating the dispute, resume conservation and management negotiations, and work with other fishing states to protect the critically endangered SBT population on August 27, 1999.</p><p>The provisional measures in <em>M/V Saiga</em> and the <em>Southern Bluefin Tuna</em> Cases show ITLOS’ role in stability by directing parties to refrain from escalating disputes, maintain the efficacy of final judgments, continue cooperation and negotiations, and exercise caution in uncertain situations. This includes protecting crew rights in <em>M/V Saiga</em> and preserving a depleted marine species in the <em>Southern Bluefin Tuna</em> amidst scientific uncertainty.</p><p><strong>B. Prompt Release<br></strong> The <em>M/V Saiga </em>case also concerned prompt release considering it involved the detaining and seizing of the <em>Saiga </em>by Guinea. ITLOS mandated that the ship be released once a bond or security was posted, which included a certain amount of gasoil that was released from the ship and a certain amount of money in the form of a bank guarantee or letter of credit. The <em>Volga</em> Case is another noteworthy example. In February 2002, Australia detained the Russian-flagged vessel Volga and its crew for allegedly engaging in illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing in its EEZ. After domestic proceedings and the issuance of a bond by Australian courts, Russia filed a request for the immediate release of the vessel and crew as well as compensation before ITLOS in December 2002. Russia filed the case with ITLOS under Article 292 of the LOSC, asking for the prompt release of the Volga and its three crew members. On 23 December 2003, ITLOS delivered its decision stating that Australia must release Volga immediately upon the posting of a security deposit or other guarantee to be determined by ITLOS. ITLOS determined that by imposing an unreasonable bond, Australia had violated the LOSC’s prompt release requirement. It ordered the vessel and crew to be released, stating that its jurisdiction under Article 292 was limited to evaluating the bond’s reasonableness rather than the legality of the detention and that the bond amount could not be determined by the value of the catch.</p><p>Here, international peace and security is maintained because it prevents the dispute from escalating as prompt release ensures that disputes are handled through legal measures. Both the <em>Saiga </em>and <em>Volga</em> cases provided a solution which prevented disputes from escalating, because if a coastal state detains a foreign vessel for too long, it can cause diplomatic tensions and further conflicts. This also balances the interests between two disputing parties where coastal states can enforce their sovereignty while at the same time flag states have their rights protected under the LOSC. Finally, it protects the security of the people, as prompt release also covers the crew of the vessel. Timely release would reduce humanitarian concerns and prioritizing their human rights.</p><p><strong>C. Advisory Jurisdiction<br></strong> So far, there are three AOs which has been issued by ITLOS, namely the Responsibilities and obligations of States sponsoring persons and entities with respect to activities in the Area by the Seabed Disputes Chamber, the Request for an AO submitted by the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission, and the Request for AO submitted by the Commission of Small Island States (“<strong>COSIS</strong>”) on Climate Change and International Law. This article will focus primarily on the most recent AO submitted by the COSIS on Climate Change and International Law. Since the ocean absorbs more than 90% of excess heat and experiences effects like acidification and sea level rise, courts have rarely addressed the connection between climate law and the LOSC. In light of this, the COSIS on Climate Change and International Law in December 2022 requested an AO from ITLOS on states’ obligations to prevent, reduce, and control marine pollution and protect the marine environment from the effects of climate change caused by greenhouse gases (“<strong>GHG</strong>”) emissions, as stipulated in Article 2(2) of its agreement.</p><p>Although Part XII of the LOSC establishes broad obligations to protect and preserve the marine environment, it does not expressly mention GHG emissions, climate change, or ocean acidification which were issues not of central concern during its negotiation in 1982. However, contemporary scientific consensus confirms that anthropogenic GHG emissions alter ocean chemistry, causing acidification, warming, deoxygenation, coral bleaching, ecosystem disruption, and sea-level rise, posing existential threats to low-lying island states. In its advisory proceedings, the COSIS on Climate Change and International Law sought clarification of states’ obligations under the LOSC to address climate change impacts, rather than a determination of responsibility for past wrongdoing. Over 50 states and organizations presented arguments before ITLOS, emphasizing that Part XII should be interpreted in light of contemporary scientific knowledge and present-day environmental threats, rather than being confined to the understanding of 1982.</p><p>Most argued that human-caused GHG counted as “<em>pollution of the marine environment</em>” under Article 1(1)(4) of the LOSC, which would allow ITLOS to address its impacts on the seas. Nearly all states focused on Articles 192 and 194 which required states to protect and preserve the marine environment and take all necessary measures to prevent, reduce, and control pollution using the best means available respectively. Some also debated whether the LOSC includes an obligation to cooperate and how the principle of “<em>common but differentiated responsibilities</em>” applies. Three primary positions emerged from this. First, the COSIS on Climate Change and International Law contended that states are clearly required by Articles 192 and 194 of the LOSC to address climate change, including cutting GHG emissions in accordance with the Paris Agreement and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s 1.5°C goal, if not more. Second, is a middle approach which acknowledged that the LOSC may call for more robust environmental protection, maintaining that the LOSC duties should be construed in accordance with the Paris Agreement and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (“<strong>UNFCCC</strong>”). Third, a hard-line stance maintained that governments’ LOSC responsibilities could be satisfied by just adhering to the Paris Agreement and the UNFCCC, which constitute a specialized framework controlling emissions.</p><p>ITLOS confirmed jurisdiction and restricted its review to the LOSC’s principal environmental requirements in its AO, which was delivered on May 21, 2024. It concluded that preventing, minimizing, and managing marine pollution is part of the larger obligation to safeguard and preserve the maritime environment under Article 192. According to ITLOS, GHG emissions are covered under Part XII, which includes Articles 194, 207–212, 213, 222, and 197–201, and are considered “<em>pollution of the marine environment</em>” under LOSC. Therefore, states must take all necessary steps to address harm caused by GHGs. Some courts disagreed, claiming that some articles, especially Article 194(2), also contain result-oriented features that call for tangible outcomes, even though ITLOS primarily described these requirements as due diligence.</p><p>Despite not having legal force behind them, AOs have a lot of authority and persuasive power and maintain international peace and security. In order to minimize legal uncertainty, ITLOS first made it clear that manmade GHG emissions are considered marine pollution and that governments are required to take all necessary steps to avoid, limit, and regulate such harm. Second, by reinforcing cooperation and assistance commitments, the opinion decreased the likelihood of conflicts and benefited small island governments and climate-vulnerable nations in particular. Third, it helps avert future disputes over fisheries, migration, and depleting resources by connecting GHG emissions to tangible consequences like ocean warming, acidification, and resource loss. Finally, the AO establishes a significant persuasive precedent that affects other organizations like the ICJ and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. All things considered, the AO lessens the possibility of conflict connected to climate change by elucidating legal duties, encouraging collaboration, and assisting in the peaceful settlement of disputes.</p><p><strong>IV. CONCLUSION<br></strong> The aim of this paper is to ascertain the role ITLOS has in maintaining international peace and security. It was found that ITLOS contribution to maintaining international peace and security can be found in the LOSC Part XV regarding its obligations to settle disputes peacefully, Article 290 concerning Prompt Release, Article 292 concerning Provisional Measures. This has been applied in cases such as the <em>M/V Saiga</em>, the <em>Southern Bluefin Tuna</em>, the <em>Volga</em>, and the AO on Climate Change. Therefore, it clearly shows that ITLOS has become one of the most influential international bodies for states to use in order to fulfill their obligations pursuant to LOSC Part XV and Article 1(1) of the UNC.</p><p><strong>V. REFERENCES<br></strong>Simma, Bruno. <em>Et al.</em> <em>The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, Volume I</em>. 3rd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.</p><p>Charter of the United Nations (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 892 UNTS 119.</p><p><em>Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada)</em> (Judgment) [1998] ICJ Rep 432, p. 432.</p><p><em>Aerial Incident of 10 August 1999 (Pakistan v. India)</em> (Judgment) [2000] ICJ Rep 12, p. 12.</p><p>Aust, Anthony. <em>Handbook of International Law</em>. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.</p><p>Agusman, Damos Dumoli and Citra Yuda Nur Fatihah. “Celebrating the 25th Anniversary of UNCLOS Legal Perspective: The Natuna Case.” <em>Indonesian Journal of International Law</em>. Vol. 17. №4. (2020). pg. 539–564.</p><p>United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea [“<strong>LOSC</strong>”], (adopted December 10, 1982, entered into force November 16, 1994) 1833 UNTS 397.</p><p>Shaw, Malcolm. <em>International Law</em>. 9th ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021.</p><p>Klein, Natalie. “The Limitations of UNCLOS Part XV Dispute Settlement in Resolving South China Sea Disputes: The South China Sea — An International Law Perspective Conference.” <em>International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law</em>. (2016).</p><p>Proelss, Alexander. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: A Commentary. Munchen: C.H. Beck/Hart/Nomos, 2017.</p><p>Tomka, Peter, and Gleider I. Hernández. “Provisional Measures in the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea.” In <em>Coexistence, Cooperation and Solidarity</em>. Leiden: Brill | Nijhoff, 2012. doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004214828_086">https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004214828_086</a>.</p><p>Haridus, Haridus, Sudardi Sudardi, and Kresno Buntoro, “TINJAUAN YURIDIS PROMPT RELEASE PROCEDURE DALAM MENANGANI TINDAK PIDANA PERIKANAN DI ZONA EKONOMI EKSKLUSIF INDONESIA.” <em>Jurnal Hukum &amp; Pembangunan</em>. Vol. 50. №2. pg. 492–518.</p><p>Columbia Climate School Sabin Center for Climate Change Law, “The Advisory Jurisdiction of ITLOS in the Request Submitted by the Commission of Small Island States,” blogs.law.columbia.edu, available at <a href="https://blogs.law.columbia.edu/climatechange/2023/04/12/the-advisory-jurisdiction-of-the-itlos-in-the-request-submitted-by-the-commission-of-small-island-states/">https://blogs.law.columbia.edu/climatechange/2023/04/12/the-advisory-jurisdiction-of-the-itlos-in-the-request-submitted-by-the-commission-of-small-island-states/</a>, accessed 01 September 2025.</p><p>Carrillo, Carlos A. Cruz. “The Advisory Jurisdiction of ITLOS: From Uncertainties to Opportunities for Ocean Governance.” Chapter, <em>In The Environmental Rule of Law for Oceans: Designing Legal Solutions</em>, edited by Froukje Maria Platjouw and Alla Pozdnakova. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023.</p><p>Brown, E.D. “The M/V ‘Saiga’ case on prompt release of detained vessels: the first Judgment of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea.” <em>Marine Policy</em>, Vol. 22. №4–5. pg. 307–326.</p><p>International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, “ITLOS/Press 15: 21 Judges decide unanimously on Order for provisional measures,” <a href="http://www.itlos.org/">www.itlos.org</a> available at <a href="https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/press_releases_english/press_release_15_en.pdf">https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/press_releases_english/press_release_15_en.pdf</a>accessed 03 September 2025.</p><p>Marr, Simon. “The Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases: The Precautionary Approach and Conservation and Management of Fish Resources.” <em>European Journal of International Law</em>. Vol. 11. №4. pg. 815–831.</p><p>Carotti, Bruno &amp; Conticelli, Martina &amp; Background,. (2012). Settling Global Disputes: The Southern Bluefin Tuna Case. pg. 60.</p><p>International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, “ITLOS/Press 28: Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases/Tribunal prescribes provisional measures,” <a href="http://www.itlos.org/">www.itlos.org</a> available at <a href="https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/press_releases_english/press_release_28_en.pdf">https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/press_releases_english/press_release_28_en.pdf</a>, accessed 04 September 2025.</p><p>Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, “Prompt Release of Vessels and Crews,” opil.ouplaw.com, available at <a href="https://opil.ouplaw.com/display/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e74">https://opil.ouplaw.com/display/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e74</a>, accessed 04 September 2025</p><p>Vilio Parasian, Kevin, Tri Setyawanto, and Nanik Trihastuti. “PEMBAYARAN UANG JAMINAN DALAM UPAYA PENEGAKAN HUKUM TERHADAP IUU FISHING DALAM PERSPEKTIF HUKUM INTERNASIONAL (STUDI TERHADAP KASUS VOLGA, PROMPT RELEASE).” <em>Diponegoro Law Journal</em>. Vol. 6. №1. (2017). pg. 1–19.</p><p>International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, “ITLOS/Press 75: Judgment delivered in the “Volga” Case,” <a href="http://www.itlos.org/">www.itlos.org</a> available at <a href="https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/press_releases_english/PR_No.75.pdf">https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/press_releases_english/PR_No.75.pdf</a>, accessed 06 September 2025.</p><p>International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, “Advisory Proceedings,” <a href="http://www.itlos.org/">www.itlos.org</a> available at <a href="https://www.itlos.org/en/main/cases/advisory-proceedings/">https://www.itlos.org/en/main/cases/advisory-proceedings/</a>, accessed 06 September 2025.</p><p>Columbia Climate School Sabin Center for Climate Change Law, “ITLOS Advisory Opinion on Climate Change: An introduction into the joint blog symposium,” blogs.law.columbia.edu available at <a href="https://blogs.law.columbia.edu/climatechange/2024/05/22/the-itlos-advisory-opinion-on-climate-change-an-introduction-into-the-joint-blog-symposium/">https://blogs.law.columbia.edu/climatechange/2024/05/22/the-itlos-advisory-opinion-on-climate-change-an-introduction-into-the-joint-blog-symposium/</a>, accessed 13 September 2025.</p><p>Constantinos Yiallourides and Surya Deva, “A Commentary on ITLOS’ Advisory Opinion on Climate Change,” biicl.org available at <a href="https://www.biicl.org/blog/77/a-commentary-on-itlos-advisory-opinion-on-climate-change">https://www.biicl.org/blog/77/a-commentary-on-itlos-advisory-opinion-on-climate-change</a>, accessed 13 September 2025.</p><p>Stephen Webb et al., “Climate Action: Key Insights from ITLOS Climate Change Advisory Opinion,” dlapiper.com available at <a href="https://www.dlapiper.com/en/insights/publications/2024/06/climate-action-key-insights-from-the-itlos-climate-change-advisory-opinion">https://www.dlapiper.com/en/insights/publications/2024/06/climate-action-key-insights-from-the-itlos-climate-change-advisory-opinion</a>, accessed 13 September 2025.</p><p>Dimitrios Dimitrakos, “ITLOS Advisory Opinion on Climate Change: A Brief Review,” asil.org available at <a href="https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/29/issue/5">https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/29/issue/5</a>, accessed 14 September 2025.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=35c4dabdf917" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Cited everywhere, adopted nowhere: what role did Advisory Opinions concerning Climate Change play…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@arabaman69/cited-everywhere-adopted-nowhere-what-role-did-advisory-opinions-concerning-climate-change-play-4139604b08ae?source=rss-a51133870705------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/4139604b08ae</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[international-law]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[advisory-opinion]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[climate-change-law]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[climate-change]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Raiz Bara Aman]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 30 Jan 2026 12:59:38 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-01-30T12:59:38.179Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><strong>Cited everywhere, adopted nowhere: what role did Advisory Opinions concerning Climate Change play at the </strong>Belém<strong> COP30?</strong></h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*RdhDd1YACiO7zXTr.jpg" /></figure><p><strong>PREFACE</strong></p><p>I wrote this case article originally for my Climate Law class, but when it came time for me to actually publish this on my Medium, I decided to publish this separately from my “Bara’s Law University Assignments!” project. I feel like since I actually wrote this without any strict criteria or requirements from an academic context and the only instruction was to create an actual Op-Ed article, I decided that I would be posting this under my new “Bara’s Gazette!” project. I hope that my first article under this project will be insightful and contribute to the future of Climate Change Law! Happy Reading!</p><p><strong>I. INTRODUCTION<br></strong>The unprecedented problem of climate change was discussed by international tribunals at the beginning of the 2020s, which may clarify the obligations states have to one another and to their inhabitants under international law. For instance, in May 2024, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (“<strong>ITLOS</strong>”) issued an Advisory Opinion (“<strong>AO</strong>”), making it the first international tribunal to address climate change. This AO explains governments’ responsibilities under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“<strong>UNCLOS</strong>”) to safeguard seas from the effects of climate change brought on by greenhouse gas (“<strong>GHG</strong>”) emissions generated by human activity.</p><p>The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (“<strong>IACTHR</strong>”) issued an AO on July 3, 2025, reiterating that human rights legislation must be taken into consideration while reacting to climate change and framing the severity of climate change as a common concern both regionally and internationally. The IACTHR emphasized that the majority of climate-related duties are behavioral requirements that call on countries to act in good faith, grounded in equity, sound science, and respect for human rights, thereby integrating justice-oriented concepts into their legal justification.</p><p>Twenty days later, on July 23, 2025, the International Court of Justice (“<strong>ICJ</strong>”) issued a ruling about governments’ responsibilities regarding climate change that is frequently referred to as a landmark ruling. The ICJ affirmed that the Paris Agreement’s 1.5° Celsius target is legally binding and that, in light of the best known science, all state parties must take significant action to attain this goal. In other words, the ICJ ruled that countries must take action to prevent predictable climate damage or risk international legal repercussions.</p><p>The AOs are projected to play important local and international roles, advising stakeholders on mitigation and adaptation strategies. AOs are already influencing both new and current climate lawsuits, and judges have started mentioning them. It is anticipated that the AOs would be used as diplomatic instruments in climate talks. However, the practical implementation of the AOs was constrained by heated negotiations at the Belém Conference of Parties 30 (“<strong>Belém</strong> <strong>COP30</strong>”). With respect to this, it is the aim of this author to analyze and determine the role the ITLOS, IACTHR, and the ICJ AOs concerning climate change had during the Belém COP30.</p><p><strong>II. WHAT IS AN ADVISORY OPINION?<br></strong>Before talking about how they were used, or lack of usage, at the Belém COP30, it is crucial to define what an AO is. An AO, as the name implies, is a judicial opinion rendered by an international tribunal on a legal matter that is often, but not always, connected to an ongoing international conflict. As the name suggests, a fundamental feature of AOs is that they are advisory in nature and do not legally require the seeking organization or any other body or state to take any particular action in accordance with the opinion. While AOs are not legally binding, the requesting body is generally expected to hear the legal reasonings when managing its affairs or shaping its conduct.</p><p>AOs by the ICJ are regulated under Article 65(1) of the Statute of the ICJ provides that “<em>The Court may give an advisory opinion on any legal question at the request of whatever body may be authorized by or in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations to make such a request.</em>” AOs by the ITLOS are regulated under Article 138(1) of the Rules of the ITLOS which states that “<em>The Tribunal may give an advisory opinion on a legal question if an international agreement related to the purposes of the Convention specifically provides for the submission to the Tribunal of a request for such an opinion.</em>” Finally, AOs by the IACTHR can be found under Article 2(2) of the IACTHR Statute which provides that “<em>The Court shall exercise adjudicatory and advisory jurisdiction: its advisory jurisdiction shall be governed by the provisions of Article 64 of the Convention</em>” and in Article 64(1) American Convention on Human Rights which states that “<em>The member states of the Organization may consult the Court regarding the interpretation of this Convention or of other treaties concerning the protection of human rights in the American states. Within their spheres of competence, the organs listed in Chapter X of the Charter of the Organization of American States, as amended by the Protocol of Buenos Aires, may in like manner consult the Court.</em>”</p><p><strong>III. ROLE IN THE BELÉM COP30</strong><br>Despite the tremendous efforts of the Alliance of Small Island States (“<strong>AOSIS</strong>”), the group of Least Developed Countries (“<strong>LDCs</strong>”), the Alliance of Latin American and Caribbean Nations (“<strong>AILAC</strong>”), countless of United Nations (“<strong>UN</strong>”) experts, and the co-facilitators of the Ocean and Climate Change Dialogue 2025 held by the UN, for all three AOs to be recognized at the Belém COP30 the AO did not have much effect during the Belém COP30 because of significant resistance from Saudi Arabia and Arab Group governments, as well as disinterest from the European Union (“<strong>EU</strong>”), despite regular attempts to insert the AOs into important texts.</p><p>The Arab Group went on to say that their rejection was done so they could advocate for more private briefings instead of advancing the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage (“<strong>WIM</strong>”), which would enable states to be held legally accountable for emissions and possibly grant reparations to climate victims. To make matters worse, the three AOs were not included in the Global Mutirão that was approved at the conclusion of the Belém COP30.<strong> </strong>Sadly, it appears that attempts to have the AOs included in the Belém COP30 were eventually failed, even though it is quite clear that the obligation to mitigate climate change is firmly founded in treaty and customary international law.</p><p>Why, therefore, was this the case? There are a number of possible reasons. First, in general, it is a lengthy game to execute climate change commitments, and nobody could have anticipated complete compliance with all requirements at the Belém COP30. Second, it was noted that the Belém COP30 positioned itself as a political body, making political trade-offs and deliberately separating itself from issues of legal duty and responsibility, and that oil-producing states want to be unrestricted by the duties established in the AOs. As a result, trade-offs are determined by political and economic interests that conflict with the values acknowledged in the AO.</p><p>Third, it is possible to interpret the lack of interaction with the ICJ’s AO in Belém as an implicit rejection of the court’s aggressiveness. Fourth, it can be linked to climate governance’s instability. The Belém COP30 is more focused on the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (“<strong>UNFCCC</strong>”) and the Paris Agreement, which means that obligations related to the Belém COP30 are limited to these two agreements. In contrast, the AOs are based on a wide range of interconnected international obligations. It is on this final point that the author would like to emphasize for the next section.</p><p><strong>IV. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS</strong><br>To recap, the ITLOS AO on climate change determined that human-induced GHG emissions absorbed by the oceans constituted marine pollution. As a result, state parties are required by UNCLOS to take all necessary steps to reduce their GHG emissions. The IACTHR climate AO determined that nations must safeguard the climate system as part of their human rights commitments under the American Convention on Human Rights and other human rights laws. Lastly, the ICJ AO affirms that states are legally required to regulate private actors in order to avoid, mitigate, and correct climate harm, including a due-diligence responsibility. These commitments stem from both treaty requirements like the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement and customary international law, that being law founded on continuous state behavior and the assumption that they are behaving in conformity with a binding standard. It is crystal clear that the AO confirms that states must take action in mitigating the impacts of climate change, but the action itself is not properly coordinated.</p><p>Harj Narulla, the counsel for the Solomon Islands, said that the Belém COP30 ruling had directly weakened the ICJ’s AO and emphasized that the inability to execute the AO was due to a lack of coordination and capability rather than a philosophical hostility to its use. Governments were not well advised on how the AO may be utilized successfully during talks because they remained too distant from their legal advice. Even climate-vulnerable states that had really supported the AO appear to have been missing, which exacerbates the situation. According to the Climate Diplomacy Brief, despite being a titan of international climate discussions, the AOSIS performed poorly in the Belém COP30. Conclusively, the problem here is that states during the Belém COP30 lacked a united push to effectively apply all three AOs.</p><p>Therefore, the author suggests that pressure be applied to governments and states to address climate change in a coordinated manner. Consider the fact that despite the lack of debate and acceptance, the AOs are beginning to have an impact on the broader narrative surrounding accountability and culpability, and this was undoubtedly the underlying theme of the discussions. According to Nikki Reisch of the Center for International Environmental Law, the AO is in favor of reforming the UNFCCC, which includes stopping the fossil fuel sector from interfering. Reisch continued by saying that the AOs will continue to be discussed beyond the Belém COP30, emphasizing their enormous future potential. The AO could become even more important in the future. In accordance with the AOs, Colombia and the Netherlands will co-host an international conference on a fair transition away from fossil fuels in 2026. It is anticipated that the AOs’ conclusions would lead to an increase in domestic lawsuits.</p><p><strong>V. CONCLUSION<br></strong>The practical impact at the Belém COP30 was little, despite the fact that the ITLOS, IACTHR, and ICJ AOs represent a significant turning point in defining states’ obligations for climate impacts under maritime, human rights, and general international law. However, by bolstering domestic and international litigation, bolstering arguments about state accountability, and providing authoritative legal underpinnings that may be mobilized in future talks and reform initiatives, it has changed the legal and normative environment. By organizing legal briefings among delegations, advocating for explicit AO references in future talks, shielding negotiations from the fossil-fuel sector, and assisting climate-vulnerable actors, states, civil society, and friendly alliances must bridge the gap between law and diplomacy. Only then, the AOs can become a driving force for turning the tides in the <em>status quo</em> of climate change law.</p><p><strong>VI. REFERENCES</strong><br><em>Internet<br></em>Andrew Cannon et al., “Climate change before international courts — Explaining advisory opinions and why they matter,” hsfkramer.com, 18 September 2024, available at <a href="https://www.hsfkramer.com/insights/reports/inside-arbitration-issue-18/climate-change-before-international-courts-explaining-advisory-opinions-and-why-they-matter">https://www.hsfkramer.com/insights/reports/inside-arbitration-issue-18/climate-change-before-international-courts-explaining-advisory-opinions-and-why-they-matter</a>, accessed on 17 December 2025.</p><p>André Nollkaemper, “The ICJ Set the Bar, COP30 Walked Around It,” seven.uva.nl, 24 November 2025, available at <a href="https://seven.uva.nl/en/content/news/2025/november/cop-30-belem.html?cb&amp;cb">https://seven.uva.nl/en/content/news/2025/november/cop-30-belem.html?cb&amp;cb</a>, accessed on 20 December 2025.</p><p>Climate Diplomacy Brief, “Climate Diplomacy Briefing — December 2025: Bad maths, big impacts, big oil: What’s next post COP30?” climatediplobrief.substack.com, 2 December 2025, available at <a href="https://climatediplobrief.substack.com/p/climate-diplomacy-briefing-december">https://climatediplobrief.substack.com/p/climate-diplomacy-briefing-december</a>, accessed on 21 December 2025.</p><p>Dr Constantinos Yiallourides and Professor Surya Deva, “A Commentary on ITLOS’ Advisory Opinion on Climate Change,” biicl.org, 24 May 2024, available at <a href="https://www.biicl.org/blog/77/a-commentary-on-itlos-advisory-opinion-on-climate-change?cookiesset=1&amp;ts=1766289694">https://www.biicl.org/blog/77/a-commentary-on-itlos-advisory-opinion-on-climate-change?cookiesset=1&amp;ts=1766289694</a>, accessed on 21 December 2025.</p><p>European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights, “Customary International Law,” ecchr.eu, available at <a href="https://www.ecchr.eu/en/glossary/customary-international-law/">https://www.ecchr.eu/en/glossary/customary-international-law/</a>, accessed on 21 December 2025.</p><p>Hugh Thirlway, “Advisory Opinions,” opil.ouplaw.com, April 2006, available at <a href="https://opil.ouplaw.com/display/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e4">https://opil.ouplaw.com/display/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e4</a>, accessed on 20 December 2025.</p><p>International Institute for Sustainable Development: Earth Negotiations Bulletin, “Daily Report for 14 November 2025,” enb.iisd.org, 14 November 2025, available at <a href="https://enb.iisd.org/belem-un-climate-change-conference-cop30-daily-report-14nov2025?ref=the-wave.net">https://enb.iisd.org/belem-un-climate-change-conference-cop30-daily-report-14nov2025?ref=the-wave.net</a>, accessed on 20 December 2025.</p><p>Isabel Kaminski, “Why the ICJ’s advisory opinion on climate change took a backseat at COP30,” climatechangenews.com, 4 December 2025, available at <a href="https://www.climatechangenews.com/2025/12/04/why-the-icjs-advisory-opinion-on-climate-change-took-a-backseat-at-cop30/">https://www.climatechangenews.com/2025/12/04/why-the-icjs-advisory-opinion-on-climate-change-took-a-backseat-at-cop30/</a>, accessed on 21 December 2025.</p><p>Isabella Kaminski, “Did the ICJ advisory opinion shift the dial at COP30?,” the-wave.net, 3 December 2025, available at <a href="https://www.the-wave.net/icj-advisory-opinion-shift-climate-dial-cop30/">https://www.the-wave.net/icj-advisory-opinion-shift-climate-dial-cop30/</a>, accessed on 17 December 2025.</p><p>Juan Auz, “The Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ Advisory Opinion on the Climate Emergency: A Global South Contribution to Climate Governance,” ejiltalk.org, 18 July 2025, available at <a href="https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-inter-american-court-of-human-rights-advisory-opinion-on-the-climate-emergency-a-global-south-contribution-to-climate-governance/">https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-inter-american-court-of-human-rights-advisory-opinion-on-the-climate-emergency-a-global-south-contribution-to-climate-governance/</a>, accessed on 17 December 2025.</p><p>José Daniel Rodríguez Orúe, “Inter-American Court Says Countries Must Prevent Climate Harms: Decision Confirms Protection from Climate Change a Rights Duty,” hrw.org, 7 July 2025, available at <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/07/07/inter-american-court-says-countries-must-prevent-climate-harms">https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/07/07/inter-american-court-says-countries-must-prevent-climate-harms</a>, accessed on 21 December 2025.</p><p>Lukas Schaugg, “Historic International Court of Justice Opinion Confirms States’ Climate Obligations,” iisd.org, 28 July 2025, available at <a href="https://www.iisd.org/articles/deep-dive/icj-advisory-opinion-climate-change">https://www.iisd.org/articles/deep-dive/icj-advisory-opinion-climate-change</a>, accessed on 17 December 2025.</p><p>Manleen Dugal, “ICJ Advisory Opinion: The World’s Top Court Has Spoken Unequivocally on States’ Climate Change Obligations,” earth.org, 25 July 2025, available at <a href="https://earth.org/icj-advisory-opinion-the-worlds-top-court-has-spoken-unequivocally-on-states-climate-change-obligations/">https://earth.org/icj-advisory-opinion-the-worlds-top-court-has-spoken-unequivocally-on-states-climate-change-obligations/</a>, accessed on 21 December 2025.</p><p>Multiple Authors, “COP30: Key outcomes agreed at the UN climate talks in Belém,” carbonbrief.org, 23 November 2025, available at <a href="https://www.carbonbrief.org/cop30-key-outcomes-agreed-at-the-un-climate-talks-in-belem/">https://www.carbonbrief.org/cop30-key-outcomes-agreed-at-the-un-climate-talks-in-belem/</a>, accessed on 20 December 2025.</p><p>United Nations Office of the High Commissioner, “COP30 must advance human rights-based climate action in accordance with International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion: UN experts,” ohchr.org, 10 November 2025, available at <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/11/cop30-must-advance-human-rights-based-climate-action-accordance">https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/11/cop30-must-advance-human-rights-based-climate-action-accordance</a>, accessed on 20 December 2025.</p><p><em>International Documents</em><br>Ocean and Climate Change Dialogue 2025, “Informal summary report by the co-facilitators of the Ocean and Climate Change Dialogue 2025,” (New York: United Nations Headquarters, 2025).</p><p>Wolfgang Obergassel et al., “The Bitter (COP of) Truth,” (Wuppertal: Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Environment and Energy, 2025).</p><p><em>Youtube<br></em>Britmonkey, “Stop Being a Climate Doomer” published on April 15, 2021, video: 09:18–09:45, available at <a href="https://youtu.be/TBYDgJ9Wf0E?si=f_YzFlWmLsTNpAkR">https://youtu.be/TBYDgJ9Wf0E?si=f_YzFlWmLsTNpAkR</a>, accessed on 21 December 2025.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4139604b08ae" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Definition and Application of “Accident,” “Bodily Injury,” and “Punitive Damage” in Air Law]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@arabaman69/definition-and-application-of-accident-bodily-injury-and-punitive-damage-in-air-law-ca29cff50f5b?source=rss-a51133870705------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ca29cff50f5b</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[air-law]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[international-law]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[public-international-law]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[aviation-law]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Raiz Bara Aman]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 30 Jan 2026 12:57:45 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-01-30T12:57:45.189Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*AHpFaV5khlV21QwG" /></figure><p><strong>PREFACE</strong></p><p>This assignment was made for my Air and Space Law class, admittedly my least favorite class in the Public International Law field (but I didn’t hate it by all means!). Much like my Diplomatic Law assignment regarding immunity and inviolability my lecturer randomly and suddenly gave us all an assignment to compare the difference between “Accident,” “Bodily Injury,” and “Punitive damage” under Air Law.</p><p>Please note, that this assignment is not perfect and can be subject for further improvement, therefore I hope that those reading this will identify the shortcomings and use this as a reference for future writing.</p><p>PLEASE use it as REFERENCE ONLY, don’t claim it to be yours when you submit this to class or write this anywhere else! It ain’t yours if an AI (or me as a whole) made it bro!</p><p>Once again, happy reading and studying!</p><p><strong>I. OVERVIEW<br></strong>Aviation carrier liability for damage to people, luggage, commodities, and damage resulting from delays is one of the main principles of aviation law. Air Carrier Liability was necessary to provide legal protection for aviation since it serves the public interest. The Warsaw Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air of 1929 (“<strong>WC29</strong>”), one of the most ratified conventions with 152 States that are party to it, established the basic international legal framework for airline liability. In order to stay current with some of the noteworthy conventions, such as the Chicago Convention of 1944 (“<strong>CC44</strong>”) and the Montreal Convention of 1999 (“<strong>MC99</strong>”), the Warsaw Convention would then be added to or altered throughout time as international law developed. The reason the latter is significant is that the WC29 system did not operate effectively. To ensure the universality of the global framework, the International Civil Aviation Organization (“<strong>ICAO</strong>”) made the decision to update the Air Carrier Liability scheme. MC99 covers international air transport undertakings’ carrying of passengers, luggage, or freight for compensation. It does not, however, cover aircraft carried out by non-commercial operators. However, as stated in Article 1 of the Convention, which requires that the places of departure and destination be found within a State or in States party to the Convention, WC29 also applies to international transportation. It would apply as though there was an agreed-upon halting place in a foreign state, even if that state is not a member of the convention, providing the places of departure and destination are inside one State party to WC29.</p><p><strong>II. ACCIDENT</strong><br>The phrase is included in Article 17 of the Montreal Convention of 1999 (“MC99”), which addresses passenger death and injury as well as damage to luggage. According to paragraph 1, “The carrier is liable for damage sustained in case of death or bodily injury of a passenger, provided that the accident causing the death or injury occurred within the aircraft or during any of the embarkation or disembarkation operations.” Essentially Article 17(1) provides that the damage itself must be a result of an accident meaning that the facts of the case must establish that the facts of the case establishes that there was an accident and that there is a causal link between the damage and the accident. In essence, Article 17(1) states that the harm itself must be the consequence of an accident, which means that the case’s facts must demonstrate both the existence of an accident and a causal connection between the damage and the accident. The rules outlined in MC99 are nearly exact replicas of those found in the WC29, where an accident is required in accordance with Article 17 of the Hague Protocol’s amendments, which does not define “accident.” An example of a case under WC29 is <em>Husserl v. Swissair, 1972</em>. It demonstrated how hijacking can be considered an accident. The plaintiff filed a lawsuit against Swiss Air Transport Company, Ltd., the defendant, seeking $75,000 in damages for physical harm and psychological distress that she had endured as a result of her incarceration on the defendant’s aircraft and other incidents stemming from the aircraft’s hijacking into the Jordanian desert in September 1970. The case raises the question of whether the claimed injuries were identical to those listed in WC29 in order for it to qualify as an accident. The district court decided that the definition of “accident” under Article 17 of the WC29 would include the hijacking. On the other hand, an example of a case under the MC99 was <em>David v. United Airlines, 2016</em>. Leo David, the plaintiff in this case, contends that United Airlines, Inc., the defendant, violated its contract of carriage and behaved carelessly when it demoted him from First Class to Economy Class on an international flight. The plaintiff claimed to have sustained physical harm as a result of the demotion and United Airlines, Inc.’s failure to accommodate the plaintiff’s pre-existing medical condition. Nevertheless, it was decided that because the circumstances did not qualify as an accident, the plaintiff could not make a claim under Article 17 of MC99. If a passenger needs a specific seat because of a disability, they must notify the carrier at least 24 hours prior to the trip, in accordance with the terms of the carrier and applicable laws. Additionally, the defendant had feigned to have sore knees as a result of the downgrade.</p><p><strong>III. BODILY INJURY<br></strong>Bodily Injury is also regulated in the same Article on both WC29 and MC99. That being Article 17 of WC29 stipulating that “…wounding of a passenger or any other <em>bodily injury</em> suffered by a passenger…” MC99 stipulates it in Article 17(1) “The carrier is liable for damage sustained in case of death or <em>bodily injury</em> of a passenger upon condition…” Though there are case instances where the courts adjudicating the issue established what the phrase meant, it should be emphasized that neither convention goes into additional detail about what is meant by “bodily injury.” In the case of <em>Bobian v. Czech Airlines</em>, for instance, the plaintiffs made claims under WC29 for injuries they sustained as a result of their travels on a Czech Airlines flight. According to the plaintiffs’ complaint, on September 16, 1999, while flying through intense turbulence related to Hurricane Floyd, Czech Airlines caused the plaintiffs to suffer “emotional injuries, physical manifestations of emotional trauma, and other damages and injuries to plaintiffs.” Although the Court presiding over the case notes that the injuries belong to multiple categories, none of them meet the convention’s definition of a bodily injury. Even though their responses are described as bodily, plaintiffs assert that they have only suffered emotional harm, such as “anguish,” According to Article 17, these emotional harms are not compensable. In addition, the plaintiffs claim that motion sickness brought on by turbulence may constitute physical damage; nevertheless, they do not provide any concrete evidence or claims to substantiate their claim that the turbulence was the actual cause of their nausea. Nor is there a date on the record indicating when they experienced nausea. Also, the plaintiffs claim that being subjected to g-forces constitutes physical harm, yet there is evidence to refute this. According to WC29, “bodily injury” refers to negative consequences of an accident rather than psychological or social harm brought on by physical contact. Plaintiffs contend that because PTSD affects the brain, it is covered under the WC29 as a physical injury. But in a different instance, the Court of Appeals dismissed this reasoning, ruling that PTSD does not qualify as bodily harm under the Convention.</p><p><strong>IV. PUNITIVE DAMAGE<br></strong>A defendant found guilty of wrongdoing or violation may also be required to pay punitive damages. When compensatory damages that are the amount of money granted to the aggrieved party are judged to be insufficient, Punitive Damages may also be awarded. Punitive damages are not just about making amends for the wronged party. They are intended primarily to penalize offenders whose actions are either willful or extremely negligent. It should be noted that MC99 has specifically outlawed punitive damages. This also includes WC29 though it is depending on the interpretation of the court adjudicating the specific case. An example of a case would be <em>Booker v. BWIA West Indies Airways Limited, 2007</em>. In this case, on December 17, 2004, the plaintiff bought round-trip tickets for BWIA Flight 425 from John F. Kennedy Airport to Georgetown, Guyana. She boarded the flight with her daughter, age three. The plaintiff was given two baggage claim checks for her belongings and was forced, against her will, to give up her two pieces of carry-on luggage as the aircraft was ready to take off. The complainant did not unpack her belongings or get off the aircraft at any point. The plaintiff’s two pieces of luggage were gone when she got to Guyana. Plaintiff filed a Baggage Claim Report and listed the contents as cash, jewelry and Christmas cards. The plaintiff stated in her deposition that there was medication in the luggage as well. The plaintiff’s belongings reached Guyana around four days after her arrival. Upon receiving her luggage, she found that three items totaling $11,790 — $3,90 worth of Christmas cards, $5,000 in cash, and jewelry valued at $6,400 — were missing. The plaintiff stated in her evidence that the delay in the baggage caused her to experience “great emotional stress”. The plaintiff was not allowed to obtain punitive damages, as stated in Article 29 of MC99, and the court dismissed the plaintiff’s claims.</p><p><strong>V. REFERENCES<br></strong>Case Text Inc, “David v. United Airlines, Inc,” 18 April, 2016 available at <a href="https://casetext.com/case/david-v-united-airlines-inc">https://casetext.com/case/david-v-united-airlines-inc</a>, accessed on 17 September 2024</p><p>Case Text Inc, “BOOKER v. BWIA WEST INDIES AIRWAYS LIMITED,” 8 May, 2007 available at <a href="https://casetext.com/case/booker-v-bwia-west-indies-airways-limited">https://casetext.com/case/booker-v-bwia-west-indies-airways-limited</a>, accessed on 20 September 2024</p><p>Daniel Liberto, “What Are Punitive Damages? Purpose, Cap, Calculation, and Example,” 30 April 2024 available at <a href="https://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/punitive-damages.asp">https://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/punitive-damages.asp</a>, accessed on 19 September 2024</p><p>E. Evans, Alona. “Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Company, 338 F.Supp. 1238,” <em>American Journal of International Law</em>. Vol. 70. №1 (1976). pp. 132–135.</p><p>Justia, “Bobian v. CSA Czech Airlines, 232 F. Supp. 2d 319 (D.N.J. 2002)” available at <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/FSupp2/232/319/2521071/">https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/FSupp2/232/319/2521071/</a>, accessed on 19 September 2024</p><p>Pablo Mendes de Leon, <em>Introduction to Air Law,</em> (Alphen Aan den Rijn: Wolters Kluwer, 2017).</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ca29cff50f5b" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Immunity and Inviolability in Diplomatic Law]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@arabaman69/immunity-and-inviolability-in-diplomatic-law-b50c31d0cc4d?source=rss-a51133870705------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b50c31d0cc4d</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[international-law]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[diplomatic-immunity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[diplomatic-law]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[vcdr]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[diplomatic-inviolability]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Raiz Bara Aman]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 23 Jan 2026 10:19:21 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-01-23T10:19:21.624Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*4YmUaUo1rnw3nnlv" /></figure><p><strong>PREFACE</strong></p><p>This assignment was made for my Diplomatic Law class, perhaps my favorite class of all time during my time as a student. One day my lecturer suddenly gave us all an assignment to compare the difference between Immunity and Inviolability seemingly out of nowhere. Nevertheless, it was quite a straightforward assignment.</p><p>Please note, that this assignment is not perfect and can be subject for further improvement, therefore I hope that those reading this will identify the shortcomings and use this as a reference for future writing.</p><p>And yes, it is a REFERENCE, don’t claim it to be yours when you submit this to class or write this anywhere else! It ain’t yours if an AI (or me as a whole) made it bro!</p><p>You know the drill, happy reading and studying!</p><p><strong>I. INTRODUCTION<br></strong>One of the first manifestations of international law is the set of rules governing the several facets of diplomatic relations. Special norms have evolved regarding the treatment of ambassadors and other special representatives of foreign states wherever a number of sovereign states have coexisted throughout history. Centuries of state practice have resulted in international legal regulations controlling diplomacy as a means of communication between various parties, including negotiations between approved agents. The unique privileges and immunities associated with diplomatic staff of various types developed as a result of sovereign immunity and the independence and equality of states. States require diplomatic staff in order to communicate and confer with international organizations as well as with one other. These individuals profit from the legal idea of state sovereignty since they represent their states in a variety of ways. This is a practical convenience concern as well. Maintaining an even tone of diplomatic relations is ultimately in the best interests of all states, making the topic of diplomatic immunity one of the most widely accepted and uncontroversial areas of international law. The rules of diplomatic law constitute a self-contained regime that, on the one hand, lays out the receiving state’s obligations regarding the facilities, privileges, and immunities to be granted to diplomatic missions and, on the other hand, anticipates their potential abuse by mission members and specifies the means at the receiving state’s disposal to counter any such abuse, as the International Court of Justice (“<strong>ICJ</strong>”) noted in the US Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran case. In Diplomatic Law one of, if not the most important piece of legislation which will be mentioned frequently would be the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations in 1961 (“<strong>VCDR</strong>”), which came into force in 1964 highlights how diplomatic privileges and immunities are functionally necessary for the effective management of international relations and highlights how the diplomatic mission represents its state. It created new laws and codified those that already existed. The principles of customary international law nevertheless apply to questions that are not specifically covered by the Convention. With that in mind this paper will be analyzing two key aspects of Diplomatic Law as stipulated in the VCDR, namely the immunities of diplomats and their premises as mentioned previously and also their inviolability.</p><p><strong>II. IMMUNITY<br></strong>As a general rule in Diplomatic Law, a diplomatic agent is completely exempt from the receiving state’s criminal jurisdiction under Article 31(1) of the VCDR. Inviolability and this immunity are related; the latter will be covered in the following section. Regarding administrative and civil jurisdiction, the stance is marginally different. While what is considered criminal will differ from nation to nation, that jurisdiction essentially encompasses all jurisdiction that is not criminal. Parking violations and other minor traffic infractions are frequently not considered crimes. The diplomatic agent is protected from civil and administrative issues that affect them, such as child custody and divorce. According to Article 31(1) however, there are a few outliers. These pertain to private real estate within the receiving state’s borders; diplomatic immunity will not be provided for private professional or commercial endeavors if the diplomatic representative is acting as an individual and not on behalf of the sending state. It is also worth mentioning that the stipulations under Articles 29–36 means that the members of the family of a diplomatic agent also enjoy the immunities and privileges as diplomatic agents. In other words, immunity refers to the exemption of diplomatic agents of the sending state from the jurisdiction of the receiving state.</p><p><strong>III. INVIOLABILITY<br></strong>In contemporary international law, properties, people, or establishments that are physically located on a sovereign state’s territory but are not normally under its jurisdiction are granted inviolability. The receiving State is required by the VCDR to refrain from exercising any sovereign powers, particularly those related to law enforcement, with regard to inviolable property, people, or places. Additionally, the receiving State has a positive obligation to safeguard inviolable individuals, places, or property from physical intrusion, interference with their ability to function, and degradation of their dignity. A variety of locations, individuals, and property are granted inviolability under the VCLT. However, certain types of property are granted certain immunities that do not extend to inviolability. Under the VCDR inviolability is stipulated in Article 22, Article 24, Article 27(2), Article 29, and Article 30. Article 22 stipulates that the premises of the mission is inviolable and consent of the head of the mission is required to have it be waived even in urgent cases. Article 24 stipulates that the mission’s records and archives will always remain untouchable, no matter where they are. The inviolability of the mission’s grounds led to the inviolability of diplomatic archives on those grounds, while the more restricted inviolability of the diplomatic bag and courier safeguarded those in regular transit. Article 27(2) stipulates that installing electronic listening devices at diplomatic posts constitutes a breach of inviolability as regulated in accordance with Article 22. Article 29 stipulates that a diplomatic agent’s person is inviolable and shall not be subjected to custody or arrest. The receiving state must respect and take all necessary precautions to keep their freedom, dignity, or person safe. Article 30 stipulates that a diplomatic agent’s private residence is entitled to the same level of inviolability and protection as the mission’s facilities. His documents, letters, and property will also be inviolable, with the exception of what is stated in Article 31 paragraph 3. In other words, inviolability refers to the prohibition of the receiving state from exercising any law enforcement procedures towards diplomats, missions premises, and the diplomat’s residences.</p><p><strong>IV. CONCLUSION<br></strong>In conclusion, Diplomatic Law and the VCDR has provided two important aspects in order for Diplomacy to work efficiently, namely immunity and inviolability. Immunity would allow for diplomats to have exemption from the laws and regulations that the receiving state applies in its own sovereignty. On the other hand, Inviolability would prevent the receiving state from conducting any coercive measures especially in law enforcement towards diplomatic agents, their mission premises, and the private residences of the diplomats.</p><p><strong>V. REFERENCES<br></strong><em>BOOKS</em> <br>Shaw, Malcolm. International Law, 9th ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021.</p><p>Aust, Anthony. Handbook of International Law, 2nd Ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.</p><p>Denza, Eileen. Diplomatic Law Commentary on the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 4th Ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016.</p><p><em>JOURNALS</em> <br>Hamid, Haezreena Begum Binti Abdul. “The Principle of Inviolability of Diplomatic Agents in Diplomatic Law.” Malayan Law Journal. Vol. 1, №1 (2023).</p><p><em>INTERNET</em> <br>The Crown Prosecution Service. “Diplomatic Immunity and Diplomatic Premises,” cps.gov.uk, 09 September 2019, Available at <a href="https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/diplomatic-immunity-and-diplomatic-premises#:~">https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/diplomatic-immunity-and-diplomatic-premises#:~</a> :text=Article%2029%20of%20the%20VCDR,person%2C%20freedom%20or%20dignity. %22, accessed on 02 November 2024</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b50c31d0cc4d" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[International Court of Justice Case Brief: Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@arabaman69/international-court-of-justice-case-brief-reparation-for-injuries-suffered-in-the-service-of-the-46ec6c6039b5?source=rss-a51133870705------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/46ec6c6039b5</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[reparation-for-injuries]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[united-nations]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[international-law]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[icj]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[advisory-opinion]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Raiz Bara Aman]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 23 Jan 2026 09:39:37 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-01-23T09:39:37.739Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>International Court of Justice Case Brief: Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of 11 April 1949</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*0oeG6M3yw1iIYqXi.jpg" /></figure><p><strong>PREFACE</strong></p><p>I wrote this case brief for my Public International Law class. For this assignment, I was instructed to analyze the International Court of Justices’ (“<strong>ICJ</strong>”) Advisory Opinion concerning Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, which in my humble opinion, is the most important Advisory Opinion rendered by the ICJ as it gave the United Nations (“<strong>UN</strong>”) (and international organizations on a broader scale) legal personality. After looking back at what I submitted, I felt that I was not satisfied with how it turned out, therefore I decided to remaster it here.</p><p>Despite that please note, that this assignment is not perfect and can be subject for further improvement, therefore I hope that those reading this will identify the shortcomings and use this as a reference for future writing.</p><p>And yes, it is a REFERENCE, don’t claim it to be yours when you submit this to class or write this anywhere else! It ain’t yours if an AI (or me as a whole) made it bro!</p><p>You know the drill, happy reading and studying!</p><p><strong>I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND<br></strong>The Advisory Opinion on the Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations was due to a series of tragic events involving agents of the UN. More specifically it took place when the UN agents were performing their official duties in the State of Palestine. Count Folke Bernadotte of Sweden, a mediator from the UN and Colonel André Sérot of France, a UN Observer were murdered by the Stern Group, a group of Israeli extremists on September 17th 1948. The Israeli authorities at the time did not bring charges against the Stern Group members for the killings of Bernadotte and Lérot. As a result, there was an urgent need for the UN to ensure that its people would be fully protected for upcoming missions and that any injuries previously sustained could be compensated.</p><p>On December 3rd, 1948, the UN General Assembly (“<strong>UNGA</strong>”) adopted UNGA Resolution 258 to submit specific legal questions to the ICJ concerning these tragic events which took place. The UNGA concluded that it would be ideal for the UN Secretary-General to be able to take effective action without facing legal challenges in order to secure any compensation for such injuries. The resolution was sent to the ICJ by the UN Secretary-General the following day, and all States required to appear before the ICJ were informed by the ICJ Registrar. In March 1949, public sessions were convened to hear oral arguments from UN Secretary-General representatives, and written statements from China, France, India, Ireland, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America were presented. On April 11th, 1949, the ICJ released its Advisory Opinion on the subject.</p><p><strong>II. THE LEGAL ISSUES<br></strong>In light of the factual background above, the UNGA submitted two specific legal questions to the ICJ, primarily centering on the international legal capacity of the UN to protect its agents and seek compensation for damages:</p><p><em>(1) Whether the UN, as an international organization, possessed the legal capacity to bring an international claim against a responsible de jure or de facto government</em></p><p>The first question was further divided into two distinct parts which concerned the nature of the damage:</p><ul><li>First, concerning damage to the UN, focusing on whether the UN could claim reparation for damage caused specifically to its own interests, including its administrative machine, property, assets, and the interests of which it is the guardian.</li><li>Second, concerns damage to the Victim, focusing on the UN’s capacity to extend to claiming reparation for damage caused to the victim (or the agent) or to persons that are entitled through the victim.</li></ul><p><em>(2) Reconciliation of Competing Rights between the UN and a victim’s national state</em></p><p>This relates to possible conflicts between the UN and the victim’s home country. The ICJ had to decide how to strike a balance between the rights of the victim’s home state and the UN’s ability to file a claim for damages.</p><p><strong>III. THE DELIBERATIONS OF THE ICJ</strong></p><p><em>(1) Deliberations on International Legal Personality</em></p><p>To determine whether the UN had the authority to file an international claim, the ICJ first considered whether the UN possessed international personality. It was emphasized that, while the UN Charter does not clearly state the UN as a “person,” under international law, the UN’s operations and missions require such a status. It contended that the subjects of law in any legal system are not always same in nature, and that the evolution of international law was impacted by the requirements of international life. The ICJ also considered the UN’s purpose, and because the UN has organs and special mandates such as maintaining international peace and security and harmonizing the acts of its member states, the ICJ concluded that the attribution of international personality is required to achieve these objectives. Nonetheless, the ICJ affirmed that the UN’s standing as a “international person” differs from that of a State. Rather, the UN is regarded as a subject of international law, with international rights and duties that must be upheld through the pursuit of international claims.</p><p><em>(2) Deliberations on the Capacity to Bring Claims</em></p><p>The ICJ concluded that the UN has the competence to pursue a claim against its Members for harm caused by a breach of its duties. This includes harm to the UN’s interests, administrative machinery, property, and resources. Furthermore, the measure of restitution should be assessed based on the amount of harm sustained, such as reimbursing an agent for the costs of replacing a handicapped official.</p><p><em>(3) Damage to the Victim</em></p><p>Regarding the issue of claiming damages for the victim, the ICJ implemented the doctrine of implied powers, which stated that under international law, an international organization must be deemed to have powers conferred upon it by necessary implication as being essential to the performance of its duties, even if they are not explicitly stated in its Charter or founding instrument. The ICJ also reasoned that for an agent to fulfill their tasks independently and efficiently, they must believe that their safety is guaranteed by the UN. If UN agents had to rely on their national state for safety, their independence may be jeopardized, especially if their mission did not align with their home state’s objectives. This is a major issue, particularly for agents who are stateless. Overall, the ICJ ruled that when the UN seeks remedy for its agents, it is not “representing” the agent in the classic sense of diplomatic protection; rather, it is using its own responsibility to enforce respect for the undertakings given to the Organization.</p><p><em>(4) Claims against Non-Member States</em></p><p>The issue of whether the UN might make claims against non-member states was also deliberated. It ruled that because the UN was founded by fifty states at the time, representing the great majority of the international community, it had objective international legal personality and hence the ability to pursue claims for restitution. As a result, a non-member state cannot use its lack of UN membership to deny that capacity.</p><p><em>(5) Reconciliation of Claims by the UN with the rights of the victim’s national State.</em></p><p>Finally, the ICJ decided that there was no legal norm prioritizing one over the other with respect to claims by the UN and the victim’s national state. Though both the State and the UN may have claims, the defendant State cannot be forced to pay reparations twice. Instead, the ICJ recommended that goodwill and common sense be applied through conventions or case-by-case basis.</p><p><strong>IV. THE ADVISORY OPINION RENDERED<br></strong>On April 11th, 1949, the ICJ issued its Advisory Opinion which unanimously decided that the UN has the power to file an international claim against a Member State and a Non-Member State for damages caused to the UN. By a vote of 11 to 4, it was also determined that the UN has the authority to file an international claim against a Member State and a Non-Member State for harm caused to the victim or people entitled through them. As for the issue concerning the reconciliation of claims, it was decided by a vote of 10 to 5 that if the UN files a claim for harm to its agent, it must base its claim on a breach of commitments owed to itself. This will preclude competing claims with the national state, even if reconciliation is subject to special conditions and agreements between the UN and individual states.</p><p><strong>V. AFTERMATH AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ADVISORY OPINION <br></strong>Following the ICJ’s opinion, the UN Secretary-General authorized the UNGA to press for a claim under UNGA Resolution 365. As a result, in April 1950, Israel was ordered to issue a public apology, arrest the offenders, and pay an indemnity of $54,624 based on the losses sustained by the UN, as the families of the deceased agents did not file any claims. Israel repaid the requested sum in June 1950 as compensation for the monetary loss inflicted by the UN in connection with Count Bernadotte’s death. Israel also expressed regret for the murders and underlined that, despite their efforts, the culprits remained undetected, and that re-examining the case was unlikely to be successful unless new evidence was discovered. The UN found this to be sufficient as compliance.</p><p>This Advisory Opinion can be regarded as justification for developing agreements concerning the protection of UN agents, including the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, and the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel.</p><p>Crucially, the Advisory Opinion became the primary source for addressing international organizations’ legal personality, capacity, and competency, as well as dealing with international organizations in general rather than only the UN. For example, in the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, which was requested by the World Health Organization (“<strong>WHO</strong>”), the ICJ cited the Advisory Opinion on the Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, specifically the implied powers doctrine. Aside from the WHO, this Advisory Opinion was also useful in discussing the legal personality of the European Union (“<strong>EU</strong>”).</p><p><strong>VI. REFERENCES<br></strong><em>Reparation for injuries suffered in the service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion: I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 174.</em></p><p><em>Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations (Advisory Opinion)</em>, Pierre d’Argent, Max Planck Encyclopedias of International Law, Oxford Public International Law, December 2006, <a href="https://opil.ouplaw.com/display/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e200?prd=EPIL#">https://opil.ouplaw.com/display/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e200?prd=EPIL#</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=46ec6c6039b5" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Archipelagic States and the Law of the Sea]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@arabaman69/archipelagic-states-and-the-law-of-the-sea-474d3b171107?source=rss-a51133870705------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/474d3b171107</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[unclos]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[archipelago]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[international-law]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[indonesia]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Raiz Bara Aman]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 14 Jan 2026 06:41:12 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-01-14T06:41:56.308Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*r33USYakE0D4GqaA-8KpiA.jpeg" /></figure><p><strong>PREFACE</strong></p><p>I wrote this paper for my Law of the Sea class. For this assignment, I was instructed to write a paper regarding the topic of Archipelagic States and how they are regulated under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and how they are applied in practice through a case study (albeit an international incident rather than a court decision).</p><p>Similar to my publications of assignments, I hope that it will help students studying Law of the Sea and law students in general regarding the unique nuances of Archipelagic States and its recognition under international law. Again this assignment is not perfect and can be subject for further improvement, therefore I hope that those reading this will identify the shortcomings and use this as a reference for future writing.</p><p>Oh did I say reference? Because it’s supposed to be just that! Don’t ask ChatGPT to make it “yours.” It ain’t yours if an AI (or me) made it buddy!</p><p>Archipelagic States are quite interesting and I am proud to say that my country of Indonesia helped to pioneer this concept to be recognized under international law. Originally, the international community called out Indonesia for breaking international law for developing this concept, until eventually it was recognized under UNCLOS and Indonesia was recognized as creating international law instead. I think that is something to be proud of about our island nation!</p><p><strong>I. INTRODUCTION</strong></p><p><em>A. Definition and Legal Background</em></p><p>Pursuant to Article 46(b) of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“<strong>UNCLOS</strong>”), a collection of islands, with connected oceans, and other naturally occurring features that form a unique geographical, economic, and political entity is what can be referred to as an Archipelago. Further in Article 46(a) an Archipelagic state is a state composed exclusively of one or more archipelagos, which may also include other islands as a part of their state. Examples of states who have declared to be Archipelagic states include but are not limited to Indonesia, The Bahamas, Cape Verde, Fiji, Maldives, Philippines, Seychelles, and Tuvalu. Archipelagic States are provided under a special provision under the UNCLOS namely pursuant to Articles 46–54 of UNCLOS.</p><p>Article 46 of UNCLOS was created as a result of a protracted and significant debate within the regime of the law of the sea on whether or not states with an archipelagic feature should be subject to a distinct regime. If the law of the sea allows it, how would such a system be established and whose governments should be given the privileges? States asserted special privileges to support their maritime claims during the UNCLOS III negotiations, citing their distinct historical, political, and geographic circumstances. Despite significant variations, the majority of archipelagic claims sought to establish state sovereignty over vast marine areas that satisfied the requirements for high seas under the then current regime of the law of the sea. The Djuanda Declaration, made by the Republic of Indonesia in 1957, was seen as a watershed moment in the evolution of the law of the sea regime for archipelagic nations. The proclamation said that Indonesia’s territorial borders, which include the islands and the seas, shall be defined by straight baselines connecting to the archipelago’s farthest seaward extremities. The Republic of Indonesia announced that the waters surrounding and connecting Indonesian islands, regardless of size, are considered natural extensions of the country’s land area and are under Indonesian sovereignty. According to the statement, the territorial sea is to be measured from the baselines linking the archipelago’s islands; the intervening seas, regardless of their breadth, shall be recognized as a unified unit because Indonesia is an archipelago; and the right of innocent passage is protected. Other governments, including Australia, Japan, the Netherlands, the United States, and the United Kingdom, have opposed Indonesia’s proclamation. Nevertheless, starting in the late 1960s, the Indonesian government began negotiating maritime boundary agreements with Singapore, Malaysia, and Australia in an effort to formally recognize Indonesia as an archipelagic state. Additionally, Indonesian diplomats started to present their case at academic conferences that addressed the law of the sea, arguing that the Indonesian government was taking action to protect the nation’s security and territorial integrity in the same way that any other nation would, through forums like the Asian African Legal Consultative Committee.</p><p>Finally, in 1969 during the planning of the third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (“<strong>UNCLOS III</strong>”), Promoting the interests of archipelagic states was spearheaded by Indonesian diplomats. The majority of Indonesia’s 1960s maritime regulations were maintained during the UNCLOS III archipelago discussions. Major maritime states, including the United States, have shown their willingness to adopt the archipelagic notion by 1977. The majority of countries had already reached an agreement in 1981, despite the Reagan administration’s attempts to thwart talks. The most important outcome of the negotiations was the UNCLOS, which became operative in 1994 with Part IV of UNCLOS, formally acknowledging the rights of archipelagic nations and strengthening Indonesia’s legal foundation for marine sovereignty.</p><p>In terms of the law of the sea, the recognition of archipelagic nations under Part IV of UNCLOS was essentially revolutionary. It allowed countries to establish straight archipelagic baselines around the furthest points of their archipelagic islands and recognized a unique legal regime of archipelagic waterways. Therefore, nations that engage in specialized activities like navigation in marine zones regulated by archipelagic states, or maritime user states, gain from the way these seas are confined. As a result, the UNCLOS was able to acknowledge the importance of the islands being one cohesive one.</p><p><em>B. Archipelagic Baselines</em></p><p>According to UNCLOS Article 47(1), an archipelagic state may create straight baselines that link the outermost points of islands and dry reefs within the archipelago. According to Article 48 of UNCLOS, the lines serve as a benchmark for determining the archipelagic state’s territorial sea, continental shelf, contiguous zone, and exclusive economic zone. Archipelagic baselines must meet a number of requirements, including two precise and quantitative requirements. The other conditions, which are similar to those for straight baselines, are more broad and less explicit. Firstly, it is necessary to create the archipelagic baselines such that the land-to-water ratio within the lines is neither greater than 1:1 nor less than 1:9. According to Article 47(7), land can encompass seas that are located within the reefs that border islands and atolls. It can also comprise a portion of a steep-sided maritime plateau that is surrounded or almost surrounded by a chain of limestone islands and drying reefs that surround the plateau. Archipelagic baselines cannot be drawn by nations with a maximum ratio, such as New Zealand, which are made up of one huge island or a small number of large islands that are near to one another. However, the minimal ratio will make it impossible to construct archipelagic baselines around widely scattered archipelagos made up of tiny islands, like Tuvalu, or around very far-flung islands within an archipelago. In essence, UNCLOS’ ratio criteria makes sure that the total area of the ocean is equal to the area of the land when an archipelagic state uses baselines to enclose its islands. New Zealand cannot be categorized as an archipelagic nation since it has more land than water.</p><p>The Archipelagic baselines cannot be longer than 100 nautical miles in accordance with Article 47(2). However, up to 3% of the baselines that surround an archipelago may be longer than that, with a maximum length of 125 nautical miles. The total number of baseline segments that a state can adopt is unlimited, despite the fact that this may be limiting. A state would have to raise the overall number of baseline segments if it wanted to add longer parts. This can be accomplished by adding more segments utilizing low-tide heights or drying reefs, even if they are not technically required, while still closely adhering to the archipelago’s natural structure.</p><p>The drafting of archipelagic baselines shall not significantly deviate from the overall arrangement of the archipelago in accordance with Article 47(3). This clause aims to establish a connection between the idea of the unit or entity and the method used to create Archipelagic Baselines. Fourth, in accordance with Article 47(4), the Archipelagic baselines cannot be drawn to and from low-tide elevations unless there are installations, like lighthouses, that are permanently above sea level or where a low-tide elevation is located entirely or partially at a distance from the closest island that does not exceed the territorial sea’s width. Fifth, an archipelagic state is prohibited from using archipelagic baselines in a way that would shut off another state’s territorial sea from the high seas or the EEZ, as stated in Article 47(5). Lastly, on nautical charts that are sufficiently accurate to indicate their precise location, an archipelagic state must prominently designate its archipelagic baselines. In order to guarantee accuracy in mapping, the state may additionally offer a list of exact geographic coordinates that establishes the baselines, including the particular geodetic system. For these maps or lists to be formally recorded, the state must make them publicly accessible and provide copies to the UN Secretary General.</p><p><em>C. Archipelagic Waters and Navigational Rights</em></p><p>The Archipelagic waters are to be within the territorial sovereignty of the Archipelagic state, as stated clearly in Article 49(1) and (2) of UNCLOS. However, paragraph (3) stipulates that the exercise of this sovereignty is subject to Part IV of UNCLOS. The rights of third states in four areas qualify the territorial sovereignty of the archipelagic state under this section of UNCLOS. First, in accordance with UNCLOS Article 51(1), the Archipelagic state is required to respect third states’ customary fishing rights. This was mainly to address concerns between Malaysia and Indonesia in regards with their maritime zones. Both Malaysia and Indonesia signed the 1982 Jakarta Treaty in recognition of these rights, which addresses traditional fishing rights, search and rescue operations, undersea cable and pipeline laying and repair, and maritime scientific research. Second, under Article 51(2) of UNCLOS, the Archipelagic State is under the obligation to respect existing submarine cables, though the provision does not mention pipelines. The maintenance and repair of existing undersea cables that span their oceans without touching down must be approved by archipelagic governments. When a state’s archipelagic position is recognized by UNCLOS Part IV, “existing” refers to cables that are already in place. States cannot prohibit access, although they can require advance notification of repairs or replacements. While some countries do not address this in their legislation, others, such as Indonesia, seek to regulate these rights through bilateral agreements or prior authorization. Third, pursuant to Article 47(6), if part of an archipelagic state’s waters is located between two parts of a nearby neighboring country, that neighboring country can continue to use those waters as it always has. Any traditional rights or agreed-upon rights between the two countries must still be honored and respected. Finally, when a country claims archipelagic waters, key sea routes, like the Sunda and Lombok Straits, fall under its control. However, international shipping would be disrupted if these routes were blocked. International law protects foreign ships’ rights to pass through, either through archipelagic sea lanes or innocent passage, in order to stop this. This guarantees a balance between the necessity for unrestricted travel and the nation’s sovereignty.</p><p>It should be mentioned that the UNCLOS recognizes two different kinds of passage for archipelagic waters. The right of innocent passage in archipelagic seas is equivalent to the right of innocent passage in the territorial sea, according to Article 52(1) of the UNCLOS. In addition, the archipelagic state may temporarily suspend such a right in archipelagic seas under Article 52(2) if doing so is necessary to ensure its security. The second recognized type of navigational right is the archipelagic sea lanes passage, which refers to the exercise of overflight and navigation rights exclusively for the purpose of uninterrupted, fast, and unhindered transit between two areas of the high seas or exclusive economic zones. To control navigation, an archipelagic state might establish air routes, sea lanes, and traffic separation plans in its seas. But it can’t accomplish this on its own. Before being finished, these routes need to be authorized by an international agency, adhere to global marine regulations, and follow standard international navigation routes. Importantly, archipelagic sea ways transit does not have to be defined by an archipelagic state. The right to transit archipelagic sea lanes can be used through regular international navigation channels if the archipelagic state does not designate sea lanes or air routes. It should be mentioned that UNCLOS simply stipulates that an archipelagic state must submit a request to the International Maritime body in order to construct archipelagic sea lanes, as the body was tasked with regulating matters under UNCLOS. Relations with other nations often lead to disputes that hurt other governments, which might result in liabilities if international agreements are broken. One important channel for global trade that connects several locations is the Indonesian Archipelagic Sea Lane, or ALKI. However, some contend that by requiring Indonesia to guarantee the security of passing ships, ALKI diminishes Indonesia’s sovereignty. Foreign vessels must, however, abide by certain regulations, such as not stealing Indonesia’s seafood resources. Island states must maintain safe and orderly waterways to prevent disputes since breaking international agreements might result in responsibility. Foreign ships must not jeopardize a country’s political independence, security, or sovereignty by exploiting archipelagic maritime routes. They are not allowed to pollute, conduct research, disrupt communications, or engage in any other activity unrelated to transportation. Breaks or anchorages are only permitted for emergencies, navigation, or rescue operations; uninterrupted, direct, and quick passage is necessary. To enter the territorial seas of another country, foreign vessels must comply with all national maritime legislation. The archipelagic state has complete authority over the seas and the travel conditions. To ensure safe and orderly flow while protecting the coastal state and passing vessels, archipelagic sea routes must adhere to clear norms.</p><p>The Republic of Indonesia is the only state that has officially designated Archipelagic Sea Lanes. Since Indonesia is the largest archipelagic state in the world, all of its maritime traffic eventually passes through South East Asia and enters Indonesian waters. The International Maritime Organization (“<strong>IMO</strong>”) received suggestions from Indonesia in May 1996 for the identification of three Archipelagic Sea Lanes. Despite considerable concerns from other major maritime countries including Australia and the United States of America, the IMO declared Indonesia’s submission a partial designation of these archipelagic sea lanes. The objections from Australia and the United States of America were based on the requirement that any submission include all common passage routes used for international navigation. Indonesia’s submission does not meet this requirement because it omits any sea-lanes that run through the southern part of the archipelago from east to west. In its submission, Indonesia suggested drastically reducing the archipelago’s historic marine commerce access. In the end, the IMO only allowed partial designation towards Indonesia’s sea lanes despite it being obviously against the provisions provided pursuant to Article 53(4) of UNCLOS. The maritime states’ major victory verified Indonesia’s worries about the United States of America’s supremacy in the IMO. Because of the IMO’s “partial designation,” which allowed unrestricted access to archipelagic seas, archipelagic governments, including Indonesia, were unable to require that vessels use archipelagic sea lanes until the IMO deemed the submission complete.</p><p><em>D. The Rights and Obligations in relation to Archipelagic States</em></p><p>According to Etty R. Agoes, a country’s designation as an archipelagic state has three legal implications: the state’s jurisdiction over the waters encircled by archipelagic waters, irrespective of their depth or distance from the coast. Its sovereignty encompasses the air space above it, the land and seabed beneath it, and the natural resources found there. The three archipelagic nations have distinct regimes because, in addition to being archipelagic waters, they are also renowned for their innocent passage. In addition to its natural advantages, the archipelagic state also has legal obligations. The 1982 UNCLOS requires archipelagic nations to abide by applicable international treaties, recognize the customary fishing rights of neighboring nations, respect marine cables installed in other countries and permit their replacement and maintenance, respect the right of any nation’s ship to travel incident-free, and respect the lane passage rights of all foreign ships and aircraft in the archipelagic waters. In addition to other obligations, the Archipelagic state must recognize the right of innocent passage and permit foreign vessels to navigate its waters. Additionally, it recognizes the interests of the next neighboring country as well as the right to communicate.</p><p>By implementing applicable international regulations regarding the discharge of oil, oily wastes, and other noxious substances; the prohibition of fishing, including the stowage of fishing gear; and the loading or unloading of any commodity, currency, or person in violation of the archipelagic state’s customs, fiscal, immigration, or sanitary laws and regulations, the archipelagic state may adopt laws and regulations pertaining to archipelagic sea lanes that address maritime traffic safety, pollution prevention, reduction, and control. Such laws and regulations cannot restrict, hinder, or degrade the right to archipelagic sea lanes, nor may they discriminate in any way, in form or in practice, against foreign vessels. Meanwhile, it should be highlighted that warships and other government non-commercial boats are exempt from all of the UNCLOS’ environmental obligations. Regarding their responsibilities, ships and aircraft must move forward immediately, refrain from threatening or using force against the political independence, territorial integrity, or sovereignty of the archipelagic state, and refrain from engaging in any activities that are not related to their regular, continuous, and quick transit. Civil aircraft operating in archipelagic sea lanes are required to follow the International Civil Aviation Organization’s (“<strong>ICAO</strong>”) Rules of the Air and continuously check the radio frequency assigned by the relevant international distress radio frequency or the relevant internationally designated air traffic control authority. Military and other state aircraft typically adhere to the ICAO Rules of the Air and operate with due consideration for navigation safety.</p><p><strong>II. CASE STUDY: BAWEAN INCIDENT</strong></p><p>The United States of America’s F-18 Hornet plane’s passage over Indonesian territory during the Bawean Island incident acted as a reminder of Indonesia’s air and sea sovereignty. Indonesia and the United States of America had different interpretations of UNCLOS 1982, which was the main cause of the issue. The United States of America’s Freedom of Navigation Operations (“FONOPS”) would apply to Indonesia’s archipelagic waters because the US had previously voiced concerns about the country’s archipelagic sea lanes. The sovereignty of Indonesia’s archipelagic seas and its status as an archipelagic state are uncontested by the United States of America. Only ensuring that foreign vessels can exercise their UNCLOS-guaranteed navigational rights is a concern for the United States of America. In a diplomatic note to the government of the Republic of Indonesia, the United States of America protested Government Regulation Number 37 concerning the Rights and Obligations of Foreign Ships and Aircraft in the Archipelagic Sea Lanes, which Indonesia had enacted a year earlier. The U.S. stated that Indonesia’s submission to the IMO was only partially designated, and that all states’ ships and aircraft were still able to exercise their right to pass through the archipelagic sea lanes on all regular routes used for international navigation through other parts of the archipelago.</p><p>The incident culminated in July 2003 when the USS Carl Vinson and five F-18 Hornet planes maneuvered outside of the permitted sea lanes in the Java Sea, close to Bawean Island. The F-18 Hornet plane from the United States of America locked its missiles onto the two Indonesian F-16 fighters that were colliding. According to the Indonesian government, US aircraft were protecting an aircraft carrier, a tanker, and two frigates. After seeing the US planes’ approach, two Indonesian F-16 fighter jets intercepted them and warned the US military that they were invading Indonesian sovereign territory. Following prolonged communication between the two forces, the matter was resolved, and the US F-18 agreed to leave Indonesian territory. However, the US Navy has previously challenged Indonesia’s maritime claims over its archipelago, notably the Bawean incident. According to the US Department of Defense, navy ships and planes sailed through Indonesia 73 times in 1997, 20 times in 1998, and 22 times in 1999. In a number of diplomatic correspondence referring to Indonesia’s archipelagic seas between 2005 and 2010, the US Navy also objected to Indonesia’s claim that their partial designation of archipelagic sea lanes was equal to a complete designation.</p><p><strong>III. CONCLUSIONS</strong></p><p>UNCLOS recognizes archipelagic nations, which was a key milestone in the Law of the Sea. While it guaranteed these governments autonomy over their waterways, it also imposed conditions to maintain open and equitable access to global marine trade. The legal framework is constantly evolving, especially since disputes over maritime lanes and territorial claims continue to dominate international relations. As the largest archipelagic state, Indonesia would need to strike a difficult balance between asserting sovereignty and sustaining international collaboration. The Bawean Incident illustrates a difficult problem that Indonesia, as an archipelagic state, will need to address in the future.</p><p><strong>IV. REFERENCES</strong></p><p>Coalter G. Lathrop, et al., Baselines under the International Law of the Sea., (Leiden: Brill, 2019)</p><p>Raul (Pete) Pedrozo, “Archipelagic States,” International Law Studies, Vol. 97, №12 (2021)</p><p>Anthony Aust, Handbook of International Law 2nd Ed., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010)</p><p>Alexander Proelss, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea A Commentary., (Munchen: Verlag C.H. Beck oHG, 2017)</p><p>Charlotte Ku, “The Archipelagic States Concept and Regional Stability in Southeast Asia,” Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, Vol. 23 №3 (1991)</p><p>Mohammad Munavvar, Ocean States Archipelagic Regimes in the Law of the Sea., (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995)</p><p>Robert Cribb and Michele Ford, Indonesia beyond the Water’s Edge Managing an Archipelagic State., (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009)</p><p>Dhiana Puspitawati, “Indonesia’s Archipelagic State Status: Current Development,” Indonesian Journal of International Law, Vol. 8 №4 (2011)</p><p>R.R. Churchill and A. V. Lowe, The Law of the Sea, 2nd Ed., (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988)</p><p>Victor Prescott and Clive Schofield, The Maritime Boundaries of the World, 2nd Ed., (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2005)</p><p>United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“<strong>UNCLOS</strong>”) (adopted 10 December 1982, effective 16 November 1994), 1833 UNTS 397</p><p>Yoshifumi Tanaka, The International Law of the Sea, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012)</p><p>Donald R Rothwell, et al., The Oxford Handbook of The Law of The Sea, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015)</p><p>Yulia Hasan and Baso Madiong, “The Position of the Archipelagic Sea Lanes in the Makassar strait interregional zoning plan policy,” Journal of Law and Sustainable Development, Vol. 11 №12 (2023)</p><p>St Fatmawati L, Rifkah Anniza Rahman, and Nadya Khaeriyah Yusran, “Rights and Duties of Foreign Ships to Indonesian Archipelagic Sea Lanes Passage,” Diponegoro Law Review, Vol. 08 №01 (2023)</p><p>Chris Forward, “Archipelagic Sea-Lanes in Indonesia — Their Legality in International Law,” Australia and New Zealand Maritime Law Journal, Vol 23 (2009)</p><p>Muhammad Risnain, “The Concept of the Archipelagi Province and Archipelagic State in the Perspective of National and International Law,” Lampung Journal of International Law, Vol 3, №2 (2021)</p><p>Nanda Virdia Kumala, Violation by American F-18 Hornet and USS Carl Vinson on Bawean Island, International Moot Court Department, 5 October 2019</p><p>Aristyo Rizka Darmawan, “CHALLENGING THE FREEDOM OF THE OCEAN: THE U.S. FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION PROGRAM IN INDONESIAN ARCHIPELAGIC WATERS,” Moscow Journal of International Law, Vol 4, (2022)</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=474d3b171107" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[International Criminal Court Case Study: The Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@arabaman69/international-criminal-court-case-study-the-prosecutor-v-ahmad-al-faqi-al-mahdi-67f488b074c7?source=rss-a51133870705------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[icl]]></category>
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            <category><![CDATA[icc]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[international-law]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[case-study]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Raiz Bara Aman]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 12 Jan 2026 16:03:26 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-01-12T16:03:26.780Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*dadU4vyMC6J1BTWynwUaug.jpeg" /></figure><p><strong>PREFACE</strong></p><p>I wrote this case study for my International Humanitarian Law class. Since in my University, International Criminal Law is not a separate course, it is considered as part of the topics discussed in the syllabus for International Humanitarian Law. For this assignment, I was instructed to write a case study on a case ruled by the International Criminal Court with the primary focus being on the application of International Humanitarian Law, the legal issues, and how the International Criminal Court exercised jurisdiction.</p><p>Like my other publications of assignments, I hope that it will help students studying International Humanitarian Law, International Criminal Law, and law students in general regarding this specific case and the application of both fields of international law. I also recognize that this assignment is not perfect and can be subject for further improvement. So I hope that those reading this will identify the shortcomings identified.</p><p>It goes without saying too… Do not complete this assignment by copy pasting this entire thing and submitting it as your own, or even ask ChatGPT to rephrase the whole thing! There are no shortcuts, do it yourself! Use this as reference only!</p><p>Needless to say, International Criminal Law is my favourite branch of International Law and I am happy to be sharing this assignment! Thank you very much and enjoy!</p><p><strong>I. INTRODUCTION</strong></p><p>International Criminal Law (“<strong>ICL</strong>”) is a branch of public international law which aims to prohibit the committing of serious crimes under international law and prosecuting those legally responsible. ICL was born after World War II where ad hoc tribunals, such as the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals were established, as one of the first steps to enforce ICL and later on the United Nations (“<strong>UN</strong>”) establishing tribunals for Rwanda and Yugoslavia. Nevertheless it was still hampered by issues concerning limited geographical jurisdiction, high costs, limited state participation, and the fact that the establishment of these tribunals depended on the political will of the international community. Consequently, some situations had the international community take action, while others did not.2 To overcome these limitations, in 1998 the UN General Assembly convened the Rome Conference to address the need for a permanent tribunal which resulted in the Rome Statute (“<strong>RS</strong>”) as the International Criminal Court’s (“<strong>ICC</strong>”) statute. On April 1, 2002, the RS acquired more than the requisite ratifications and went into effect on July 1, 2022, activating the ICC.</p><p>The ICC, formed to empower the international community to prosecute individuals violating ICL, International Humanitarian Law (“<strong>IHL</strong>”) and international human rights law (“<strong>IHRL</strong>”). It respects the principles of fair trial and holds all criminals accountable, regardless of their position, status, or whether the crimes were committed during war or peace, by intervening when governments are unable or unwilling to act. Articles 5, 6, 7, and 8 of the RS contains the four major crimes under the ICC’s jurisdiction namely genocide, war crimes, crimes of aggression, and crimes against humanity. Furthermore, the RS confers the ICC jurisdiction over crimes impacting cultural heritage, supplementing international law governing the protection of cultural heritage and property. The international community has long been concerned with the protection of cultural property, as evidenced by the Nuremberg Tribunal, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“<strong>ICTY</strong>”), and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, all of which had specific provisions for crimes involving cultural property.</p><p>Since deliberate attacks towards cultural property have been a constant practice for centuries, continuing to contemporary conflicts, the ICC’s office of the prosecutor (“<strong>OTP</strong>”) acknowledged protection of cultural heritage as a crucial issue in accordance with international law. Modern international law confirms that a general consensus of purposefully destroying cultural heritage is wrong and can be considered a war crime entailing individual criminal responsibility unless there exists absolute military necessity. This is made clear in the ICC’s case of <em>the Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi </em>(“<strong>Al Mahdi Case</strong>”) which concerns deliberate attacks on cultural sites in the World Heritage city of Timbuktu Mali where the ICC found Al Madhi guilty of war crimes for the deliberate destruction of cultural property in Timbuktu Mali, during the city’s 2012 military takeover as the first person to be found guilty of the destruction of cultural property. Thus, this essay will analyse further the Al Madhi Case covering the IHL enforcement, the legal issues raised, the ICC’s use of its power, and the author’s own viewpoint.</p><p><strong>II. THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW</strong></p><p>Under IHL, the International Committee of the Red Cross provides that the protection of cultural property is enforced through the 1954 Hague Convention for the protection of cultural property during armed conflict, complemented by the 1977 Additional Protocols, and has crystallized as a part of customary international law. The 1954 Hague Convention provides that states are obligated to take conducts to ensure protection of cultural property against armed attacks by moving the property away from military action or by avoiding placing military objectives nearby, with the exception being when said property has become a military objective and such attack is needed due to military necessity. What falls under the scope of cultural property under IHL can be found in Article 1 a to c of the 1954 Hague Convention which is defined as the following. First, important cultural heritage items, whether movable or immovable, monuments, archaeological sites, historic buildings, artworks, manuscripts, books, and scientific or archival collections. Second, museums, major libraries, archives, and cultural property shelters during armed conflict fall under buildings with the function of preserving or displaying cultural items. Finally, centers with a high concentration of such cultural property are included too. Under ICL, the ICTY was the first to criminalize the destruction of cultural property, with prosecution falling under Article 3(d) of their statute, granting jurisdiction over violations of the laws of war such as the seizure, destruction, or willful damage to institutions dedicated to religion, charity, and education, the arts and sciences, historic monuments, and works of art and science. Pursuant to Article 8(2)(e)(iv) of the RS, unless they are military targets, intentional attacks on historical sites, hospitals, gathering places for the sick and injured, buildings devoted to religion, education, art, science, or charity, or other buildings are considered serious violations and is considered a war crime. This provision under the RS is exactly what Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi (“<strong>Al Mahdi</strong>”) was being prosecuted for before the ICC.</p><p><strong>III. THE LEGAL ISSUES RAISED IN THE CASE</strong></p><p>In 2012, Mali was facing an armed conflict against the armed organization Ansar Dine which controlled a strong influence in the northwest region and managed to capture the city of Timbuktu in May 2012, where between June and July 2012 the organization carried out the destruction of Timbuktu’s historical sites with at least 10 historical religious buildings targeted. In 2015, after preliminary investigations by the ICC and the OTP, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I issued an arrest warrant for Al Mahdi charging him with war crimes for destroying historical and religious monuments in Timbuktu. The ICC assigned Trial Chamber VIII to adjudicate the case.</p><p>The chamber needed to prove that (1) Al Mahdi directed the attack; (2) with the object being one or more buildings dedicated to religious, educational, artistic, scientific, or charitable institutions, historic monuments, hospitals, and hospitals provided they are not military targets; (3) intended it to be the object of the attack; (4) the attack took place in an armed conflict not of an international character; and (5) the perpetrator was aware of the facts establishing the existence of an armed conflict. The chamber evaluated the crime and its elements for Article 8(2)(e)(iv) of the RS considering this was the ICC’s first case involving the destruction of cultural property. The chamber also relied on the Geneva Conventions including Additional Protocols I and II as well as the 1954 Hague Convention which acknowledged protection of cultural property and jurisprudence from the ICC and ICTY. Al Mahdi in Ansar Dine was appointed to enforce morality in Timbuktu with the aim of suppressing “visible vices” and prohibiting “unlawful” religious practices. The mausoleums and mosques were significant for Timbuktu’s Population and protected under the 1972 UNESCO Convention. Nevertheless Al Mahdi between June 30 — July 11 2012 agreed to participate in the destruction by personally organizing the sequence of destruction and gave media interviews justifying the destruction. In the end, the ICC convicted Al Mahdi which included three prosecution witnesses and hundreds of documentary evidence items, eight victims participating in the trial, and Al Mahdi himself admitted guilt to the charge of intentionally directing attacks on religious and historical buildings.</p><p><strong>IV. HOW THE ICC EXERCISED ITS JURISDICTION</strong></p><p>By ratifying the RS, a state confirms the ICC’s authority over the crimes contained in their jurisdiction. If the accused is a citizen of a State Party or the conduct occurred on State Party property, the Court may take action. Non-state parties may also recognize the ICC’s jurisdiction. These standards, however, do not apply when a case is reported by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The government of Mali referred the situation in Timbuktu to the ICC and after preliminary examination the OTP opened an investigation in 2013 and in 2015, Al Mahdi’s arrest warrant was issued charging him with war crimes for destroying cultural property and eventually Al Mahdi was arrested in Niger by French troops where he was sent to The Hague to face trial before the ICC.</p><p><strong>V. PERSONAL COMMENTARY</strong></p><p><em>The Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi </em>is the first case of the ICC to prosecute crimes of destroying cultural property. This writer believes that cultural property and culture is an important aspect of humanity and its destruction <em>ipso facto </em>destroys humanity itself. Culture represents the diversity of humanity and its beauty, even Al Mahdi regretted his decision highlighting the importance of culture. The fact that Al Mahdi was prosecuted and was sentenced is a testament to the willpower of the international community in their respect for cultural identity. Future cases involving cultural property should continue to be prosecuted and the international community should make a commitment to protecting one of the most important parts of humanity.</p><p><strong>VI. REFERENCES</strong></p><p>Fajri Matahati Muhammadin and Kay Jessica, Recent Developments in International Criminal Law, (Yogyakarta: Fakultas Hukum, Universitas Gadjah Mada, 2022) pg. 1</p><p>Philippe Kirsch, “The Role of the International Criminal Court in Enforcing International Criminal Law,” American University International Law Review, Vol. 22, №4 (2007) pg. 540</p><p>Christiane E. Phillip, “The International Criminal Court — A Brief Introduction,” Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, Vol. 7, №1 (2003) pg. 331</p><p>Charles B.A. Ubah and Osy E. Nwebo, “The International Criminal Court: Antecedents, History, and Prospects,” International Journal for Innovation Education and Research, Vol. 3, №9 (2015) pg. 42</p><p>The Office of the Prosecutor, Policy on Cultural Heritage, (The Hague: The International Criminal Court, 2021), pg. 4</p><p>Amy Stricker and Joseph Powderly, Heritage Destruction, Human Rights and International Law, (Leiden: Brill, 2023) pg. 1</p><p>International Committee of the Red Cross, “Cultural Property,” available at <a href="https://www.icrc.org/en/law-and-policy/cultural-property">https://www.icrc.org/en/law-and-policy/cultural-property</a>, accessed on 25 May 2025.</p><p>Ayesha Jawad and Maira Bokhari, “Measuring the Protection of Cultural Property Under International Humanitarian Laws; Analysis of Russia-Ukraine Conflict,” Journal of Law &amp; Social Studies, Vol. 4 №3 pg. 471</p><p>Simona Pinton, “The ICC Judgement in Al Mahdi: Heritage Communities and The ICC Judgement in Al Mahdi: Heritage Communities and Restorative Justice in the International Criminal Protection of Restorative Justice in the International Criminal Protection of Cultural Heritage,” Vol. 19 №1 (2020) pg. 384.</p><p>Mark. S Ellis, “The ICC’s Role in Combatting The Destruction of Cultural Heritage,” Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, Vol. 49 №1 (2017) pg. 39–40.</p><p>Nugih Wahyudi, et al. “The Role of the International Court in Cases of Attacks on Historical Objects during Armed Conflicts (Al-Mahdi Case),” Jurmayustisi: Jurnal Mahasiswa Yustisi Vol. 1, №1 (2022) pg. 48</p><p>Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, Judgment and Sentence, Trial Chamber VIII, 27 September 2016, ICC-01/12–01/15, para. 13</p><p>The International Criminal Court, Helping build a more just world: Understanding the International Criminal Court, (The Hague: The International Criminal Court, 2020), pg. 11</p><p>Nugih Wahyudi, et al. “The Role of the International Court in Cases of Attacks on Historical Objects during Armed Conflicts (Al-Mahdi Case)…, pg. 48</p><p>Mark A. Drumbl, “From Timbuktu to The Hague and Beyond: The War Crime of Intentionally Attacking Cultural Property,” Journal of International Criminal Justice</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=67f488b074c7" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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