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            <pubDate>Mon, 06 Jan 2025 12:44:11 GMT</pubDate>
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            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Our new home</h4><p>Hi Techno-Legal Family!</p><p>Firstly, thank you so much for your ongoing support of our work since we started this blog in 2021!</p><p>We just wanted to let you know that our future pieces will be hosted on <a href="https://atechnolegalupdate.substack.com/">our Substack</a>.</p><p>We’ve moved most of our archive of posts there as well.</p><p>If you enjoy <em>A Techno-Legal Update</em>, do yourselves a favour and head over to <a href="https://atechnolegalupdate.substack.com/">our Substack</a> and give that a subscribe!</p><p>Thanks, legends!</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Gx6zVFpmUFdJE5hVuYyvLg.jpeg" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b017208ab0df" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Definitive Dialogue Diary]]></title>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[A Techno-Legal Update]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 09 Sep 2024 00:59:50 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-09-09T00:59:50.470Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>By Ravi Nayyar</h4><p>I had the good fortune of being invited by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute to attend <em>The Sydney Dialogue</em>, a flagship international forum on all things geopolitics x geoeconomics x technology.</p><p>It was awesome to be among delegates from government, industry, academia and civil society — hailing from the Indo-Pacific and beyond — for a <em>packed</em> two days of debate and discussion.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?type=text%2Fhtml&amp;key=d04bfffea46d4aeda930ec88cc64b87c&amp;schema=twitter&amp;url=https%3A//x.com/ravirockks/status/1830383233722356054&amp;image=" width="500" height="281" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/710db4263ac03f040401734343d019be/href">https://medium.com/media/710db4263ac03f040401734343d019be/href</a></iframe><p>In this piece, I reflect on some of those sessions (all on the record), interrogating the broader policy and strategic issues thrown up by them. There’s a mix of cyber, geopolitics, economics, military capability, innovation, infrastructure (digital and physical), minilateralism v multilateralism, human capital, telecom and, of course, AI.</p><p>This piece was previewed by my earlier meditation on the larger takeaways from the summit.</p><p><a href="https://atechnolegalupdate.medium.com/some-reflections-on-the-sydney-dialogue-baecad600e9e">Some Reflections on The Sydney Dialogue</a></p><p>Now, back to the <em>Dialogue</em> Diary.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*AGSbzqVkE-8VXbm69OyYiQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>(Source: <a href="https://x.com/ravirockks/status/1830744149500535087">Me</a>)</figcaption></figure><p>And let’s get AI out of the way by going through the first two sessions together.</p><p>Strap in.</p><h3><em>A Global Tech Industry Leader’s Outlook to 2030; AI’s Well that Ends Well? Expert Perspectives on What’s Next</em></h3><p>Coming right after the ASPI chief, <a href="https://x.com/BassiJustin">Justin Bassi’s</a>, excellent <a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/technology-can-serve-humanity-if-we-dont-let-it-outpace-our-societies/">opening remarks</a>, these two sessions were bizarrely alarmist. They seemed to focus a lot on the <em>catastrophic</em> (inter)national security risks from AI and other emerging technologies. Indeed, most of us in the audience — certainly when one spoke with delegates afterwards — believed that the discussions would have benefited from nuance on the nature of relevant risks, and our <em>positive</em> responses and partnerships to manage these risks.</p><p>The comments — especially from Connor Leahy and Dr Eric Schmidt — about the likelihood of us creating an artificial general intelligence system, which chooses to get rid of us, seemed fantastical at best, certainly for those of us having to deal with more pressing issues.</p><p>Like a lot of small critical infrastructure (‘CNI’) asset operators <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/06/10/fact-sheet-biden-harris-administration-bolsters-protections-for-americans-access-to-healthcare-through-strengthening-cybersecurity/">not</a> <a href="https://therecord.media/water-industry-wants-to-write-its-own-cyber-rules">having</a> <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/buying-down-risk/cyber-poverty-line/">the</a> <a href="https://ventureinsecurity.net/p/lifting-the-world-out-of-the-cybersecurity">money</a> to do basic cyber resilience. Hostile Chinese activity towards <a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/wong-and-marles-must-speak-up-about-chinese-incursions-into-japan/">Japan</a>, <a href="https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-september-6-2024">Taiwan</a> and <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-09-01/china-philippines-south-china-sea-ship-clash/104296158#">the Philippines</a>. The <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/strengthening-americas-defense-industrial-base/">degradation</a> <a href="https://youtu.be/CqjvTKFufuk">of</a> Western defence industrial bases since the Wall came down (<a href="https://warontherocks.com/2023/10/the-sinking-submarine-industrial-base/">especially</a> <a href="https://gcaptain.com/a-deep-dive-us-navy-shipbuilding-failure/">shipbuilding</a>), or <a href="https://youtu.be/Ga2PA-vEiFk">human capital management issues</a> in our militaries.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?type=text%2Fhtml&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;schema=twitter&amp;url=https%3A//x.com/ASPI_org/status/1830423449489350894&amp;image=" width="500" height="281" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/c433ea5440ca893d4a4ae3a8abaa7c9e/href">https://medium.com/media/c433ea5440ca893d4a4ae3a8abaa7c9e/href</a></iframe><p>The chat about Silicon Valley folk worshipping AI as a proto-deity and being willing to continue <em>aggressive</em> innovation in AI perhaps wasn’t ideal; including the bit about how tech folk believed a 20% chance that this stuff could kill us was worth risking because of the 80% chance that they could live for centuries.</p><p>I note that Connor rightly said that Silicon Valley folk should not be making such calls on behalf of us, but yeah, it just sounded <em>off</em> on a Monday morning in front of people who aren’t AI (governance) experts.</p><p>Sometimes, the remarks just seemed uncritical.</p><p>For instance, the comments from Dr Schmidt about enemies using swarming drones against us should have been caveated by how our offensive cyber operators could pop just the right part of their software supply chain to severely undermine their capability. And that’s on the off-chance they are immune to conventional EW and other C-UAS measures that are themselves getting better — see the <a href="https://youtu.be/iJnuTtUFiWM?si=8El2RTWWsFfFifMZ&amp;t=2385">Ukraine War</a>.</p><p>Dr Schmidt’s points about the paucity in software updates on large platforms like aircraft carriers did not sufficiently acknowledge, if at all, the efforts of <em>his own</em> <em>military</em> on the software front. Such as those to:</p><ul><li><a href="https://media.defense.gov/2022/Feb/03/2002932833/-1/-1/1/DEPARTMENT-OF-DEFENSE-SOFTWARE-MODERNIZATION-STRATEGY.PDF">modernise</a> <a href="https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodi/500087p.PDF?ver=virAfQj4v_LgN1JxpB_dpA==">its</a> <a href="https://www.defenseone.com/defense-systems/2022/08/pentagons-plan-speed-software-buying-weapons-systems/375554/">software acquisition pathway</a>;</li><li>enable organisations to roll out DevSecOps methodologies through resources like <a href="https://p1.dso.mil/">Platform One</a>;</li><li>develop more software <a href="https://www.c4isrnet.com/smr/cybercon/2021/11/10/soldiers-wont-always-be-able-to-rely-on-contractors-for-coders-says-army-software-factory-director/">in-house</a> through <a href="https://breakingdefense.com/2023/03/marines-teaming-with-army-on-three-year-software-factory-pilot/">factories</a> (with CYBERCOM <a href="https://breakingdefense.com/2024/06/cyber-command-wants-to-unify-army-and-air-force-software-factories-under-jcwa-plans-for-new-peo/">moving</a> to consolidate them under the Joint Cyber Warfighting Architecture); and</li><li><em>rapidly field updates</em>: to key platforms (having successfully <a href="https://www.flightglobal.com/defence/usaf-shows-ability-for-rapid-f-22-f-35-software-updates/153647.article">tested</a> this for Fat Amy, F-22 and F-16); to <a href="https://www.airforcetimes.com/news/your-air-force/2024/05/01/air-force-looks-to-boost-electronic-warfare-with-coding-tactics-units/">EW software</a>; and during an exercise (<a href="https://breakingdefense.com/2023/06/this-capability-didnt-exist-30-days-ago-how-military-exercises-can-drive-software-development/">Exercise Digital Falcon Oasis</a>) with devs, military and intelligence folk working together in the one tent.</li></ul><p>Of course, such efforts <a href="https://www.hudson.org/national-security-defense/software-defines-tactics-structuring-military-software-acquisitions">have been</a> <a href="https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-22-105230.pdf">far</a> <a href="https://x.com/ravirockks/status/1622727629156794368">from perfect</a> and <a href="https://www.defenseone.com/defense-systems/2022/08/pentagons-plan-speed-software-buying-weapons-systems/375554/">haven’t yielded</a> a necessary level of progress. But come on, they should have at least been <em>acknowledged</em> as a positive to counter the doomtalk.</p><p>All in all, the tone and tenor of both sessions, unfortunately, reminded me of the alarmist and irresponsible rhetoric about how the baddies can nix all of our critical infrastructure (‘CNI’) in one cyber attack with ‘the cyber weapons’ [pew, pew, pew] and ‘send us back to the Stone Age with a few keystrokes’. (<a href="https://x.com/ciaranmartinoxf">Prof Ciaran Martin</a> <a href="https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/cyber-realism-time-war">wrote</a> an excellent takedown of this rhetoric just after the Russian invasion of Ukraine.)</p><p>As with IT and OT, we have been using AI directly and indirectly (such as through commercial and government services enabled by AI) for <em>years</em> now.</p><p>The language of fear on AI engenders disengagement from productive discussion by a largely non-expert audience who is genuinely interested in practical solutions. I certainly found it a source of derision, if not a turn-off.</p><p>Indeed, I was hoping for more practical discussion from ticketed AI experts on tackling software supply chain and other cyber risks to AI systems, given <a href="https://atlas.mitre.org/">the umpteen threats</a> like:</p><ul><li><a href="https://jfrog.com/blog/data-scientists-targeted-by-malicious-hugging-face-ml-models-with-silent-backdoor/">malicious ML models</a>;</li><li>LLMs ‘<a href="https://www.mend.io/blog/hallucinated-packages-malicious-ai-models-and-insecure-ai-generated-code/">hallucinating</a>’ open source software (‘OSS’) packages that can be subsequently <a href="https://www.theregister.com/2024/03/28/ai_bots_hallucinate_software_packages/">poisoned</a> by baddies;</li><li><a href="https://checkmarx.com/blog/llama-drama-critical-vulnerability-cve-2024-34359-threatening-your-software-supply-chain/">bugs</a> in OSS packages that are dependencies for <em>scores</em> of models;</li><li>GenAI <a href="https://www.scmagazine.com/news/ai-will-create-a-tidal-wave-of-buggy-vulnerable-software">writing and poorly vetting</a> hilariously insecure code, having itself been trained on insecure OSS; and</li><li>major model and data hosting platforms like GitHub and Hugging Face <a href="https://www.lasso.security/blog/1500-huggingface-api-tokens-were-exposed-leaving-millions-of-meta-llama-bloom-and-pythia-users-for-supply-chain-attacks">allowing</a> API tokens to lie exposed in public repositories.</li></ul><p>In that vein, I asked Connor Leahy and Navrina Singh whether massive AI coding or hosting platforms like Hugging Face should be encouraged (by government) to roll out controls equivalent to GitHub’s <a href="https://github.blog/news-insights/product-news/raising-the-bar-for-software-security-next-steps-for-github-com-2fa/">MFA</a> for user accounts and <a href="https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/secret-scanning/introduction/about-secret-scanning">secret scanning</a>, perhaps even drawing inspiration from the CISA-OpenSSF <a href="https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2024/02/08/cisa-partners-openssf-securing-software-repositories-working-group-release-principles-package"><em>Principles for Package Repository Security</em></a>.</p><p>After all, those principles are transferable to platforms like Hugging Face. And the implications of baddies being able to easily commandeer massively popular repositories — and thus poison AI systems reliant on their models — through just stealing or buying creds for user accounts are not pretty as we rely more and more on AI.</p><p>While Navrina, to her credit, spoke to ‘responsible use licences’ being attached to publicly available models, I would have liked more specific chat about how said chokepointy AI platforms are ticking time bombs of software supply chain →(inter)national security risk as more and more AI is built using models hosted on these platforms.</p><p>To reiterate, we would have appreciated more balanced and nuanced remarks from the AI people. As I said at the top, ‘Strap in’.</p><p>Even speakers in subsequent sessions on hard power topics like hybrid threats were relishing that <em>they </em>weren’t the Debby Downers for a change.</p><h3><em>The Future of Cybersecurity: Capabilities, Strategy, Preparedness</em></h3><p>This was the session I was most looking forward to: our National Cyber Security Coordinator, Lieutenant General Michelle McGuinness, CSC, interviewing the Deputy Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor for Cyber and Emerging Technologies for the US, <em>the </em>Anne Neuberger, a legend of our discipline.</p><p>There were some great comments from both speakers on the multi-faceted nature of the ransomware threat and how to impose cost. This included chat on:</p><ul><li>the role of economic sanctions against criminals and other actors involved in the ecosystem;</li><li>threat response work against these actors and their infrastructure, including Deputy NSA Neuberger’s reflection on the momentous LockBit disruption and how police engage in psychological warfare against the crims by seeking to undermine their trust in their operations and each other; and</li><li>the next meeting of the multilateral Counter-Ransomware Initiative (‘CRI’) — which will happen in the coming weeks — including growth in its agenda and forthcoming joint statements from member countries on stuff like cyber insurance.</li></ul><p>It was also good that the interview dealt with the domestic, workaday side of counter-ransomware, including how:</p><ul><li>multifaceted it is with informational regulation (like incident reporting) being a stick versus payouts from cyber insurers (who make coverage conditional on cyber hygiene) as carrots; and</li><li>the overall cyber resilience of firms showing an improvement, which makes it easier for them to recover from an incident and, crucially, refuse to pay a ransom.</li></ul><p>The session also dealt with US and Australian approaches to cyber policy, especially in relation to CNI.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?type=text%2Fhtml&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;schema=twitter&amp;url=https%3A//x.com/ASPI_org/status/1830771307564409181&amp;image=" width="500" height="281" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/a8251b93100567f11da6a3416f57ae1d/href">https://medium.com/media/a8251b93100567f11da6a3416f57ae1d/href</a></iframe><p>As part of this, there was some chat on how both governments responded to the CrowdStrike <a href="https://atechnolegalupdate.medium.com/crowdstrikes-crowning-kerfuffle-af4e226baf4b">incident-non-incident</a> of July 2024.</p><p>Lt Gen McGuinness highlighted how this disruptive event contrasted with the data breaches her office dealt with more often, and its bringing into sharp relief the concentration of technological dependencies — especially when a very tiny portion of machines were directly affected by the bad update.</p><p>Deputy NSA Neuberger referred to her 4 am call from the White House Situation Room, learning what her Australian colleagues were seeing (we were among the first jurisdictions affected by the infamous Channel File 291).</p><p>Apart from highlighting the importance of software end-users testing patches before popping ’em into prod (operators of US National Security Systems were exemplars here), she foreshadowed the second Biden executive order on cyber, coming this fall, to include principles on vendors testing their patches and having rollback procedures for problematic patches. Noice!</p><p>[Clears throat.]</p><p>Taking this opportunity to plug my own series of essays on the CrowdStrike saga.</p><ul><li><a href="https://atechnolegalupdate.medium.com/crowdstrikes-crowning-kerfuffle-af4e226baf4b">CrowdStrike’s Crowning Kerfuffle</a></li><li><a href="https://atechnolegalupdate.medium.com/crowdstrikes-complicating-critical-infrastructure-cyber-resilience-bd1cbf86b786">CrowdStrike’s Complicating Critical Infrastructure Cyber Resilience</a></li><li><a href="https://atechnolegalupdate.medium.com/crowdstrikes-corporate-citizenship-making-mapping-matter-84ae2b555dd2">CrowdStrike’s Corporate Citizenship: Making Mapping Matter</a></li></ul><p>Now, back to the sesh.</p><p>The speakers looked at the US voluntary IoT cybersecurity labelling framework, <a href="https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-adopts-rules-iot-cybersecurity-labeling-program"><em>Cyber Trust Mark</em></a><em> </em>(see <a href="https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-47/chapter-I/subchapter-A/part-8/subpart-B">47 CFR §§ 8.201–8.222</a>). Deputy NSA Neuberger pointed out how this is not just an informational regulation piece to make it easier for consumers to identify what the safest option is for them, but also a national security piece.</p><p>After all, if consumers are informed about the hygiene of wares and vote with their wallets to buy securer wares, there will be less of the usual cheap garbage in circulation that would otherwise represent a resource for bad actors (eg <a href="https://spectrum.ieee.org/mirai-botnet">Mirai</a>, <a href="https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-government-disrupts-botnet-peoples-republic-china-used-conceal-hacking-critical">Volt Typhoon</a>, <a href="https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-conducts-court-authorized-disruption-botnet-controlled-russian">Fancy Bear</a>, <a href="https://www.fbi.gov/news/press-releases/director-christopher-wray-announces-actions-to-disrupt-and-prosecute-russian-criminal-activity-040622">Sandworm</a>) to weaponise as straight-up offensive botnets and/or C2 infrastructure to confuse attribution (when targeting our CNI).</p><p>The positive externalities of this framework’s shaping of demand and supply curves for IoT gear around security, not functionality or price, include substantial national security benefits.</p><p>Obviously, the labelling scheme is voluntary, like the Singaporean <a href="https://www.csa.gov.sg/faqs/cls"><em>Cybersecurity Labelling Scheme</em></a>. Our <a href="https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/cyber-security-subsite/files/2023-cyber-security-strategy.pdf"><em>2023–2030 Cyber Security Strategy</em></a> similarly commits us to creating a voluntary labelling scheme for consumer IoT.</p><p>That said, our cyber strategy <em>also</em> commits us to developing a <em>mandatory</em> consumer IoT <em>security standard</em>. Per Home Affairs’ <a href="https://www.aph.gov.au/api/qon/downloadattachment?attachmentId=072b8e82-40a0-4a7b-9a1b-dad931dad69c">response</a> to a question on notice from Senator James Paterson, development of the mandatory standard had ‘Substantially progressed’ by the end of June 2024 (our voluntary labelling scheme shall be developed after the mandatory product security standard is enacted).</p><p>The Europeans have something <em>very</em> interesting cooking with the proposed <em>Cyber Resilience Act</em> which is <a href="https://oeil.secure.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?reference=2022/0272(COD)&amp;l=en">making</a> its way through their supranational legislative procedure.</p><p>Note also the UK’s mandatory regimes for IoT security under the:</p><ul><li><a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2022/46/contents"><em>Product Security and Telecommunications Infrastructure Act 2022</em></a><em> </em>(UK) ss 8, 13, 14, 21, 79(2) → <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2023/1007/contents/made"><em>The Product Security and Telecommunications Infrastructure (Security Requirements for Relevant Connectable Products) Regulations 2023</em></a> (UK) regs 1(2), 3, 6, schs 1, 3, regs 2–5 + <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2023/109/contents/made"><em>The Product Security and Telecommunications Infrastructure Act 2022 (Commencement №1) Regulations 2023</em></a> (UK) reg 3 — for consumer IoT bar charge points for electric vehicles, medical devices, smart meters, and desktop, laptop and tablet computers; and</li><li><a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2003/21/section/105F"><em>Communications Act 2003</em></a> (UK) s 105F(6) → <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2022/933/contents/made"><em>The Electronic Communications (Security Measures) Regulations 2022</em></a> (UK) regs 1(2), 4(4)© + <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/6384d09ed3bf7f7eba1f286c/E02781980_Telecommunications_Security_CoP_Accessible.pdf"><em>Telecommunications Security Code of Practice</em></a> [0.12], [2.88], [3.37]-[3.39], [M9.01]-[M9.06] — which covers stuff including ‘customer premises equipment’ (like edge devices) supplied by UK telcos to their customers.</li></ul><p>We’re hardly breaking any new ground in acknowledging that voluntary labelling regimes — in the absence of mandatory product security standards — are not even half a solution.</p><p>Consumers do not look at the security of the IoT they buy, be it to replace old stuff like routers (<em>if </em>they do) or as a gift for someone.</p><p>Informational regulation tends to work only when customers of the intelligence <em>act</em> <em>on it.</em></p><p>I suspect waiting for consumers to prioritise security over price, especially in a deteriorating economic climate, is a fool’s errand. Just look at the <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2024/09/05/support-for-a-us-tiktok-ban-continues-to-decline-and-half-of-adults-doubt-it-will-happen/">declining support</a> among US adults for a TikTok ban. It’s also analogous to relying on ‘peer pressure’ and reputational sanction for major software vendors — via CISA’s <a href="https://www.cisa.gov/securebydesign/pledge"><em>Secure by Design Pledge</em></a><em> — </em>to not market insecure wares.</p><p>Now, yes, I understand that the political economy of mandatory public-facing product security regulation, let alone enacting a federal data privacy law, in the US is fraught. So, good on the Yanks, via the <a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/07/30/2024-14148/cybersecurity-labeling-for-internet-of-things">FCC</a>, for having a go.</p><p>It’s like my immense respect for Jen Easterly and her merry band at CISA for pressing on while confined to <a href="https://www.cisa.gov/securebydesign/dir-easterly-remarks-carnegie-mellon-university">jawboning</a>.</p><p>And yes, I recall that the USG is using the procurement lever with the <em>Internet of Things Cybersecurity Improvement Act of 2020</em> (see <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/15/278g-3a">15 USC §§ 278g–3a-278g-3e</a>) in lieu of a mandatory security standard for consumer IoT. <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/15/278g-3e">15 USC § 278g–3e(a)(1)</a> bans federal agencies from procuring IoT which doesn’t meet minimum security standards <a href="https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/search?sortBy-lg=relevance&amp;viewMode-lg=brief&amp;ipp-lg=25&amp;status-lg=Draft,Final&amp;topics-lg=28580%7CInternet+of+Things+Cybersecurity+Improvement+Act&amp;topicsMatch-lg=ANY&amp;controlsMatch-lg=ANY">developed by</a> NIST, subject to a waiver process under subsection 15 USC § 278g–3e(b).</p><p>The procurement lever was given a fillip in December last year by the White House Office of Management and Budget (‘OMB’) devoting a section of its <em>Fiscal Year 2023 Guidance on Federal Information Security and Privacy Management Requirements</em> (<a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/M-24-04-FY24-FISMA-Guidance.pdf"><em>M-24–04</em></a>) to IoT procurement and secure deployment by federal agencies. Signalling which hopefully trickles down to the acquisition pathway.</p><p>That’s the need of the hour, given a 2023 OMB survey of ‘a diverse set of agencies’ <a href="https://www.nextgov.com/media/omb_warner_iot.pdf">finding</a> that ‘relatively few formal agency policies address the selection of cybersecurity requirements specifically for IoT devices’. Having a ban on buying garbage is great but procuring agencies not even having robust policies in place to procure secure IoT and deploy it safely is just not cricket</p><p>That all said, how cool that an <em>IoT labelling regime</em> was being discussed by <em>very </em>senior cyber officials from two FVEY governments at a <em>foreign policy x security</em> summit!</p><p>It would have been even more fun if Lt Gen McGuinness and Deputy NSA Neuberger spoke about software supply chain risks to national security as a general topic. (This stuff’s right in my wheelhouse.)</p><p><a href="https://atechnolegalupdate.medium.com/tangos-in-the-tangled-web-9e7092367222">Tangos in the Tangled Web</a></p><p>Or on OSS, given the <a href="https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/news/lessons-xz-utils-achieving-more-sustainable-open-source-ecosystem">xz utils almost-snafu</a> earlier this year or the <a href="https://atechnolegalupdate.medium.com/crowdstrikes-corporate-citizenship-making-mapping-matter-84ae2b555dd2">generally sorry state</a> of the ecosystem. (Also in my wheelhouse.)</p><p><a href="https://atechnolegalupdate.medium.com/advice-to-apra-dont-gloss-over-oss-8dc5a18734bd">Advice to APRA: Don’t Gloss over OSS</a></p><p>I’d have loved to hear the Deputy NSA talk about how US allies and partners respond to the USG’s fabulous <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/oncd/briefing-room/2024/01/30/fact-sheet-biden-harris-administration-releases-end-of-year-report-on-open-source-software-security-initiative/"><em>Open-Source Software Security Initiative</em></a>.</p><p>Then again, a real privilege to attend this session.</p><h3><em>Back to the Future: Building Resilient Economies in the ‘Era of New Competition’</em></h3><p>This was another cool sesh, save the ASEAN Deputy-SG for Political-Security Community’s really having it in for the Quad (more on that later).</p><p>Admiral Mike Rogers (Ret’d and former DIRNSA), as expected, dropped the hammer when it came to the importance of us baking cybersecurity into everything we do, be it operationally or in the policy process. He also helpfully distinguished between cybersecurity and how states (via proxies) use cyber to project power.</p><p>It was a fanboy moment for me to ask Admiral Rogers a question on how we tackle risks from concentrations in markets for technology services, given the examples of <a href="https://www.finance.senate.gov/hearings/hacking-americas-health-care-assessing-the-change-healthcare-cyber-attack-and-whats-next">Change Healthcare</a> and <a href="https://atechnolegalupdate.medium.com/crowdstrikes-crowning-kerfuffle-af4e226baf4b">CrowdStrike</a>. His response defined the problem in first principles terms, that is, as a function of governments’ tolerance of national security risks (from such concentrations). He referred to the greater regulatory interventions by governments like ours in CNI.</p><p>With the session being on resilience, Admiral Rogers’ answer built on his earlier comments on the need for greater redundancies in our CNI, using the Colonial Pipeline incident as a case study (where the operators proactively <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-05-09/cyber-attack-shuts-down-us-fuel-pipeline-operator-colonial/100126712">shut down</a> around half of the US east coast’s fuel pipeline capacity because their billing system <a href="https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/ideas/economics/38136/ex-security-chief-we-have-privatised-our-cyber-security.-the-winners-are-the-hackers">was bricked</a>).</p><p>In response to a separate question of whether it was the subsistence of the WTO-centric international trading order or our minilateral diplomacy, such as through the Quad, which primarily got us through Chinese economic coercion (that arguably <a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/why-chinas-coercion-of-australia-failed/">hit</a> said trading order for six) in the early 2020s, Admiral Rogers pointed out that it was our friends (including our Quad partners) who enabled us, as sources of demand, to diversify away from the Chinese market.</p><p>The trade data agrees: our Asian friends in the region <a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/why-chinas-coercion-of-australia-failed/">picked up</a> the slack (though, the Americans and British didn’t).</p><p>To speak generally, my two cents is that international law and norms, such as the WTO-centric trading order, are meaningless if you don’t have a coalition of allies and partners working with you to uphold them. Such as by trading with you in a compliant fashion while your largest trading partner thumbs its nose at said law and norms. And thumbing its nose at the international system in more contexts than just trade.</p><p>On the other hand, what I found wanting for novelty and logic was the outright condemnation of the Quad by the ASEAN Deputy-SG. How ASEAN members feel ‘encircled’ by the Quad (sure, cartographically, but come on), that sort of stuff. Her Excellency even stated that the ASEAN membership — apparently seen by the Quad as irrelevant (never mind the umpteen joint statements championing ‘ASEAN centrality’ and the public goods in the agenda) — will have to deal with the ‘fallout’ (yikes) from this example of problematic minilateralism. The Quad is a body which will force ASEANers to ‘choose’ their friends (please workshop some new material, ASEAN).</p><p>Never mind the Chinese ramming Coast Guard ships into Filipino vessels and refusing to abide by the 2016 arbitral tribunal ruling. That leaves Manila with plenty of choice, of course.</p><p>What made Her Excellency’s comments even more curious was how, when pressed to compare the Quad with BRICS, she didn’t provide a concrete answer. The ASEAN position couldn’t possibly be influenced by China being a founding member of the BRICS, right?</p><p>Certainly, an interesting session.</p><h3><em>Defence in the Digital Age: Whole-of-Nation Preparedness</em></h3><p>This was an excellent panel, fielding heavy-hitters from government and SECDEF’s former <a href="https://www.defense.gov/About/Biographies/Biography/Article/3326722/abraham-m-denmark/">point man</a> on AUKUS.</p><p>It was good to hear that NATO not only <a href="https://www.diana.nato.int/">supports</a> a large VC fund/accelerator, ‘DIANA’, for promising DIB/dual-use startups to grow and commercialise their wares, but is also working to establish a rapid acquisition/adoption pathway to ensure that NATO militaries actually leverage innovations (such as those supported by NATO’s accelerator) before they are rendered obsolete by Moore’s Law et al. An end-to-end approach.</p><p>I liked the example from the NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Innovation, Hybrid and Cyber, <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/james-appathurai-99a6904/">James Appathurai</a>, of militaries leveraging innovation: the ‘Artillery Tinder’ application, which drove a circa sixfold decrease in time lag between troops calling in fires and shells flying at the enemy.</p><p>The need for cooperative innovation was underlined by the Australian Department of Defence’s Deputy Secretary Strategy, Policy, and Industry, <a href="https://www.defence.gov.au/about/who-we-are/leaders/deputy-secretary-strategy-policy-industry">Hugh Jeffrey</a>. If I recall correctly, he gave an example of how target detection algorithms co-developed by AUKUS countries for P-8A multi-mission maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft performed better in testing than respective nationally-developed algorithms.</p><p>That all said, as someone who doesn’t follow export controls or military procurement, I found it a bit disheartening that it’s <em>2024</em> and (former) very senior defence bureaucrats are <em>still</em> bemoaning their own governmental labyrinths of provisions and procedures that contradict the imperative of agile procurement of critical and emerging technologies. (Read this <a href="https://www.ussc.edu.au/aukus-assessing-defence-trade-control-reforms-in-australia-and-the-united-states">report</a> from the United States Studies Centre on AUKUS export control reform, by the way.)</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?type=text%2Fhtml&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;schema=twitter&amp;url=https%3A//x.com/ASPI_org/status/1830818491441795219&amp;image=" width="500" height="281" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/dd858043d0fd71cc7c5b12ca2d2542e1/href">https://medium.com/media/dd858043d0fd71cc7c5b12ca2d2542e1/href</a></iframe><p>The metaphor of the ‘hands of dead colonels reach[ing] out from the grave and clutch[ing] the defence planning process to their dead hearts’ to prevent NATO planning targets for all allies being taken out of ‘the Jurassic Park era of innovation’ wasn’t encouraging.</p><p>That NATO had to set up DIANA to be run <em>outside </em>of NATO in order to depoliticise the facility and ensure it is actually agile says it all.</p><p>= NATO seeking to protect NATO from NATO. Yes, Minister.</p><p>On a brighter note, I loved the enthusiasm of the Lithuanian Vice-Minister for National Defence in calling for AUKUS Pillar 2 to serve as a model for governments to work together on innovative military capabilities.</p><p>Tangentially, over lunch, I was asked by some overseas defence officials about whether I saw the membership of Pillar 2 being expanded to include smaller countries. I spoke on the fact that AUKUS countries would be or are already working on high-stakes dual-use technologies with friends like <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/06/17/joint-fact-sheet-the-united-states-and-india-continue-to-chart-an-ambitious-course-for-the-initiative-on-critical-and-emerging-technology/">India</a>, <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/08/18/the-spirit-of-camp-david-joint-statement-of-japan-the-republic-of-korea-and-the-united-states/">Republic of Korea and Japan</a>, such that labelling the latter countries as ‘Pillar 2 peeps’ could be an exercise in semantics.</p><p>And a few days later, the <a href="https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/penny-wong/media-release/eleventh-australia-japan-22-foreign-and-defence-ministerial-consultations">joint statement</a> from the Australia-Japan 2+2 dropped, featuring this bit:</p><blockquote><strong>Continue to consult with AUKUS partners and Japan on opportunities for cooperation on AUKUS Pillar II Projects.</strong></blockquote><p>So, official <em>and</em> unofficial Pillar 2 cooperation on the cards, eh?</p><p>Side note: it would have been nice to see some chat on securing the software supply chains underpinning the fancy capabilities being developed by allies and partners, as well as the tools used to build them.</p><p>After all, what use is the ‘<a href="https://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/2023/12/26/u-s-economic-restrictions-on-china-small-yard-high-fence/">small yard, high fence</a>’ to protect our innovations →capabilities if determined threat actors like China, <a href="https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-347a">Russia</a> or the DPRK can merely pop the right CI/CD box (which doesn’t check if an OSS package’s author has <a href="https://jfrog.com/blog/revival-hijack-pypi-hijack-technique-exploited-22k-packages-at-risk/">changed</a> before pulling another completely different piece of code happening to have the same name) at the right subcontractor, to grossly oversimplify?</p><p>Or take after <a href="https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/backdoor-in-xz-utils-that-almost-happened">Jia Tan</a>?</p><p>Another thought-provoking session, this one.</p><h3><em>Digital Public Infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific: Security, Privacy and Accessibility</em></h3><p>As an aspiring DPI nerd, this was a really insightful session with practical insights and case studies from the region, namely India, Papua New Guinea and the Philippines.</p><p>For folks who don’t know what DPI is, here’s the definition <a href="https://g7g20-documents.org/database/document/2023-g20-india-sherpa-track-digital-economy-ministers-ministers-language-g20-digital-economy-ministers-meeting-outcome-document-and-chair-summary#section-3">agreed</a> by the G20 Digital Ministers in 2023:</p><blockquote>… a set of shared digital systems that should be secure and interoperable, and can be built on open standards and specifications to deliver and provide equitable access to public and / or private services at societal scale and are governed by applicable legal frameworks and enabling rules to drive development, inclusion, innovation, trust, and competition and respect human rights and fundamental freedoms.</blockquote><p>Not only was it cool to hear what PNG and the Philippines are up to with DPI, but it was very refreshing to hear the Secretary for the PNG Department of Information Communication Technology call for greater focus from development partners on supporting the design and implementation of locally-tailored DPI products. If development assistance recipients do not have political will →create demand for DPI projects, DPI won’t become the force for achieving the Sustainable Development Goals which it must in the Global South.</p><p>Referring to his country’s <a href="https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=1943839">MoU</a> with New Delhi on DPI cooperation, the Secretary said PNG looked at India as an example of how to develop and run DPI (especially India’s Aadhaar and DigiLocker solutions), as well as Singapore and Australia for accessing government services online.</p><p>I also appreciated the Secretary explicitly calling for investment screening for DPI projects because DPI comprises, essentially, CNI. If you wouldn’t allow a hostile country into your telecom network, why would you allow them (via their vendors) in as a supplier for or operator of your national digital identity network?</p><p>I asked Kanishk Gaur and the moderator, the awesome <a href="https://x.com/raji143">Dr Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan</a>, about the role of DPI in India’s (new) economic statecraft, especially as a means to counter Chinese influence in the Global South. Their responses spoke to the role of both minilateralism (eg the Quad) and multilateralism (eg UN/G20) in ‘exporting’ the Indian approach to DPI, as well as fora like the CRI in assuring the cyber resilience of DPI solutions around the joint. But, of course, the absence/dysfunction of UN standardisation processes (for DPI) or the UN generally don’t help.</p><p>After the session, it was interesting to learn about how senior Indian diplomats are aggressively promoting DPI as part of Indian economic statecraft, as well as the contrasting approaches to state-centricity in DPI between Europe (as a regulator) and India (as a creator, platform operator, ecosystem facilitator and regulator).</p><h3><em>Countering Hybrid Threats: National Resilience and Collective Action</em></h3><p>Some great, practical points in here from NATO, CEE (Latvian) and Indian perspectives on defining and addressing hybrid threats, including in partnership with industry.</p><p>I absolutely agree with Lt Gen Rajesh Pant (Ret’d) when he said that an Indian perspective is vital in any discussion on irregular warfare. He pointed out that New Delhi has had to tackle the complete spectrum of irregular warfare by China and Pakistan. Stuff like <a href="https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/fake-currency-note-racket-nia-pakistan-d-company-rs-2000-currency-2386002-2023-05-29">currency counterfeiting</a>, <a href="https://www.icct.nl/publication/decade-2008-mumbai-attack-reviewing-question-state-sponsorship">sponsorship</a> <a href="https://www.deccanherald.com/india/jammu-and-kashmir/retired-pakistani-army-men-or-highly-trained-terrorists-likely-involved-in-recent-jammu-attacks-report-3113774">of</a> <a href="https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/pakistan-minister-admits-islamabads-role-in-pulwama-terror-attack/article32973658.ece">terrorism</a>, FIMI (by <a href="https://archive.md/epgK1">China</a> and <a href="https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/blunt-frank/fake-trolling-of-mohammad-shammi-after-indo-pak-cricket-match/">Pakistan</a>), <a href="https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/china-releases-fourth-list-of-names-for-arunachal-pradesh/article68015051.ece">cartographic aggression</a> and <a href="https://carnegieindia.org/research/2023/12/stabilizing-the-border-a-possible-way-ahead-in-the-post-galwan-situation?lang=en">flat-out refusal</a> <a href="https://www.youtube.com/live/1_OgoPo0lBU">to</a> peacefully settle land borders (with <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2021/03/the-road-from-galwan-the-future-of-india-china-relations?lang=en">fatal</a> <a href="https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/the-galwan-valley-face-off-explained-through-17-news-reports/story-UzyJFQdaOEDgJZH2dE1MON.html">consequences</a>).</p><p>(And that’s in addition to the conventional wars started by both countries against India since 1947.)</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?type=text%2Fhtml&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;schema=twitter&amp;url=https%3A//x.com/ASPI_org/status/1830441345472921790&amp;image=" width="500" height="281" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/c4cb5ebc45460d4276f7a1132c649d20/href">https://medium.com/media/c4cb5ebc45460d4276f7a1132c649d20/href</a></iframe><p>The General stressed that, as we seek to counter irregular warfare from the likes of Russia, which has an actual hybrid threats C2 centre, and China, our governments must approach the mission in an holistic way. Like the Russians themselves do in <a href="https://stratcomcoe.org/cuploads/pfiles/Nato-Cyber-Report_11-06-2021-4f4ce.pdf">defining</a> cyber operations (what they call ‘information-technological warfare’) as just a cog in their holistic idea of ‘information confronta­tion’.</p><p>Lt Gen Pant thus called for friendly governments to set up hybrid threats-focused C2 infrastructure at the national, sectoral, etc levels. He nailed it when referring to this as a <em>governance</em> problem: the counter-hybrid threats mission requires us to break down departmental and capability siloes to throw <em>everything </em>at the problem (like our adversaries do).</p><p>Besides, the session featured some pointed, welcome comments from NATO’s James Appathurai about the need for the private sector to lean into partnering with government in order to drive greater national cyber resilience and thus ensure the very markets and societies — that industry needs to operate — actually continue to exist.</p><p>Yes, government <a href="https://archive.md/vKrSR">needs</a> industry because the latter <a href="https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-22-104279">operates</a> most of our CNI and <a href="https://pylos.co/2023/02/16/what-have-we-learned/">has access</a> to tons of telemetry, but industry also needs government (eg convening power, signals intelligence, military and law enforcement powers) to ensure the various contexts that it requires to actually exist are maintained per agreed standards.</p><p>Oh, and the example of a European port being actually targeted by baddies seeking to drop a warship berthed there certainly focused the mind.</p><h3><em>(Sub)sea to Sky: The Future of Digital Connectivity in the Indo-Pacific</em></h3><p>A wide-ranging session on telecoms in the region, ranging from cables to space-based connectivity. It was moderated quite well by our Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs, Tim Watts MP, a former technology lawyer and telecom executive who worked on submarine cable matters back in the day.</p><p>The Speaker of the Tongan Parliament had some sobering remarks about the dependence of Pacific countries on a few submarine cables that have actually been damaged <em>since </em>the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jan/18/tonga-could-be-cut-off-for-weeks-amid-efforts-to-repair-undersea-communications-cable">volcanic eruption</a> of January 2022. Good thing Australia is working with <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/10/25/united-states-australia-joint-leaders-statementbuilding-an-innovation-alliance/">the United States</a>, <a href="https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/penny-wong/media-release/eleventh-australia-japan-22-foreign-and-defence-ministerial-consultations">Japan</a>, and <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/05/20/quad-leaders-summit-fact-sheet/">through the Quad</a> on submarine cable resilience projects in the Indo-Pacific, including with the Pacific countries.</p><p>But I still am not quite sure why some Pacific countries — like Tonga — <a href="https://www.starlink.com/au/map">are</a> <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-07-21/starlink-pacific-tonga-undersea-cable-vanuatu-png-samoa/104107628">holding out</a> on providing SpaceX a licence to provide satellite-based Internet services (though SpaceX <a href="https://www.rnz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/527119/elon-musk-s-starlink-in-final-stages-to-get-licences-to-operate-pacific-wide">has been expanding</a> its coverage in the region). These countries are more likely to face serious connectivity issues from their few submarine cables being <a href="https://atechnolegalupdate.medium.com/threats-to-the-ties-that-bind-66a101daaaed">damaged</a> by negligent mariners, natural disasters or saboteurs than problems with Starlink infrastructure.</p><p>Indeed, Starlink not only provides a cheaper, faster connectivity option relative to submarine cables →terrestrial telecom, but it also provides a more stable one. Customers merely rely on portable terminals pointed at the sky, not, eg, towers that can be toppled by cyclonic winds. Let’s also not forget the value of a space-based solution for people in remote areas whom it is uneconomical or otherwise <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-07-21/starlink-pacific-tonga-undersea-cable-vanuatu-png-samoa/104107628#">difficult</a> to serve with cables and towers.</p><p>Hence, one wonders whether the hold-outs are more concerned about their investments in national cable operators and other telcos dropping in value if their citizens use a more competitive Internet provider.</p><p>[Clears throat.]</p><p>I take this opportunity to plug my series of essays on submarine cables in the Indo-Pacific, focusing on Australia-India cooperation on this front.</p><ul><li><a href="https://atechnolegalupdate.medium.com/threats-to-the-ties-that-bind-66a101daaaed">Threats to the Ties that Bind</a></li><li><a href="https://atechnolegalupdate.medium.com/overseeing-the-ties-that-bind-a7a10fcba5f1">Overseeing the Ties that Bind</a></li><li><a href="https://atechnolegalupdate.medium.com/strengthening-the-ties-that-bind-669fdf262d47">Strengthening the Ties that Bind</a></li></ul><h3><em>Continental Drift: Enabling Tech and Talent Transfer between the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific</em></h3><p>Though this panel was an interesting one, I would have liked it to interrogate the reticence of companies, certainly in Western markets, to hire entry-level cyber people as well as experienced practitioners who may not have the usual list of certifications, based on what I’ve heard from industry and <a href="https://ventureinsecurity.net/p/lets-get-real-there-is-no-such-thing">read</a>.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?type=text%2Fhtml&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;schema=twitter&amp;url=https%3A//x.com/ASPI_org/status/1830875219109752861&amp;image=" width="500" height="281" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/e387510e4279e650ee0b0d81312462c2/href">https://medium.com/media/e387510e4279e650ee0b0d81312462c2/href</a></iframe><p>Now, yes, Cambodia’s Senior Minister in Charge of Special Missions (Multilateral Trade and Economic Affairs), Dr Siphana Sok, pointed out that his country’s ‘ICT Academy’ (the <a href="https://www.cadt.edu.kh/">Cambodia Academy of Digital Technology</a>, I presume) trains a number of people each year in cyber resilience, who can be hired by Cambodian industry. His Excellency highlighted the imperative of building the cyber capacity of youth, regardless of whether they work in industry, government or academia.</p><p>Dr Sok indeed pointed to the primacy of market forces in shaping the cybersecurity jobs market: young people with cyber qualifications just want jobs; while industry, cyber people.</p><p>It would have been good, however, for Dr Sok and his Filipino counterpart to interrogate rebuttals to this market forces argument. To speak on whether the actual business and regulatory incentives are there for firms in ASEAN countries (like advanced economies) to hire or continue hiring cyber-qualified people, be they graduates or experienced professionals.</p><p>And how it is <a href="https://www.insurancebusinessmag.com/asia/news/cyber/survey-exposes-cybersecurity-shortfalls-in-southeast-asias-business-landscape-504074.aspx">long past time</a> for ASEAN governments, including Cambodia, to proactively tackle the corporate cyber resilience problem.</p><p>In general, if a government does not execute a zero tolerance approach to moral hazard with respect to poor corporate cyber hygiene — combined with shareholders not meaningfully punishing control failures — can it be assumed that firms, regardless of geography, will keep hiring cyber-qualified people to assure their cyber resilience?</p><p>Or will they instead regard DFIR costs as merely costs of doing business, condemning their cyber resilience (and product security) teams as <a href="https://kellyshortridge.com/blog/posts/cybersecurity-isnt-special/">handbrakes</a> <a href="https://www.resilientcyber.io/p/cybersecuritys-delusion-problem">for</a> their competitiveness, and thus <a href="https://ventureinsecurity.net/p/lets-get-real-there-is-no-such-thing">failing to provide</a> CISOs the budgets which they need to hire and train new people (like cyber grads)?</p><p>Tangentially, it is dangerous to assume that a worsening cyber threat environment (<a href="https://www.themandarin.com.au/240775-southeast-asias-three-nation-partnership-to-fight-cyber-threats/">for Southeast Asian economies</a>) <em>per se</em> will make companies care about their cyber resilience and having the right people in place. Southeast Asian businesses certainly <a href="https://www.insurancebusinessmag.com/asia/news/cyber/survey-exposes-cybersecurity-shortfalls-in-southeast-asias-business-landscape-504074.aspx">have work to do</a> like all of us.</p><p>Dr Sok should have caveated his remarks on market forces and acknowledged the role of government as a <em>regulator</em>, beyond just an education provider or facilitator, to shift the needle in cyber governance and thus human capital management by industry.</p><p>Especially when there is quite a bit government can do in shaping the aforementioned market forces and incentives through making corporate bigwigs liable for particularly egregious stuff-ups.</p><h3><em>Designing Technology for Democracy</em></h3><p>How cool that the wonderful Brendan Dowling, our Ambassador for Cyber Affairs &amp; Critical Technology, <em>publicly interviewed</em> a very senior Taiwanese national security official on tech and democracy.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?type=text%2Fhtml&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;schema=twitter&amp;url=https%3A//x.com/ASPI_org/status/1830473351724478485&amp;image=" width="500" height="281" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/4d02842657043b59f1d1e5a077c99cb0/href">https://medium.com/media/4d02842657043b59f1d1e5a077c99cb0/href</a></iframe><p>It was great to hear Dr Yuh-Jye Lee, Senior Advisor to the National Security Council of Taiwan, on his country’s experience in how tech can enable democracies to flourish but also undermine them, as well as how Taiwan seeks to tackle the issue of Chinese information warfare (defined broadly) against its polity.</p><p>The larger symbolism of the panel was the cherry on top, even if there is no restriction on our officials meeting their Taiwanese colleagues. Good on ASPI for making this happen.</p><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>A <em>huge</em> thank you to the good folk at ASPI for inviting me to join the fun. Having usually attended industry-/academia-focused conferences on cyber policy, it was <em>marvellous</em> to be a part of one on all things geopolitics x technology where <em>Track 1</em> was very well-represented.</p><p>For my big picture meditation on <em>The Sydney Dialogue</em>, check out my earlier piece.</p><p><a href="https://atechnolegalupdate.medium.com/some-reflections-on-the-sydney-dialogue-baecad600e9e">Some Reflections on The Sydney Dialogue</a></p><p>Do tell me what you make of my takeaways and the summit itself, especially if you were a fellow delegate.</p><p>Folks, as I said in that piece, technology is a fantastic enabler for our collective betterment.</p><p>But it is a two-edged sword, perhaps even a <em>shuriken</em>.</p><p>The ASPI chief, Justin Bassi, <a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/technology-can-serve-humanity-if-we-dont-let-it-outpace-our-societies/">put</a> it quite well to get the ball rolling on Day 1:</p><blockquote><strong>As the power of technology grows — and everyone in this room knows that’s the course we’re on — the stakes are getting higher and the conversations more vital. That’s why we’re all here.</strong></blockquote><p>Fora like <em>The Sydney Dialogue </em>are critical, especially as anything and everything is weaponised against us.</p><p>We have to make sense of our evermore fluid technological →threat and geopolitical landscapes.</p><p><em>Together</em>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*8NxWQVRsS0XtZsV5MJtWVA.jpeg" /><figcaption>[Insert lazy pun about horizons.] (Source: <a href="https://x.com/ravirockks/status/1830937284524622144">Me</a>)</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ch9JLxYe90fpm_sScpDxqQ.png" /><figcaption>(Source: <a href="https://x.com/ASPI_org/status/1830379996575350826">ASPI</a>)</figcaption></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8d90278f613b" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Some Reflections on The Sydney Dialogue]]></title>
            <link>https://atechnolegalupdate.medium.com/some-reflections-on-the-sydney-dialogue-baecad600e9e?source=rss-2c8c011d69de------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/baecad600e9e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[disruptive-innovation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[international-relations]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[reflections]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[national-security]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[A Techno-Legal Update]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 08 Sep 2024 06:05:56 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-09-09T04:03:04.459Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>By Ravi Nayyar</h4><p>A <em>huge</em> thank you to the good folk at ASPI for inviting me to participate in 2024’s edition of <em>The Sydney Dialogue</em>, a flagship international forum on all things geopolitics x geoeconomics x technology.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?type=text%2Fhtml&amp;key=d04bfffea46d4aeda930ec88cc64b87c&amp;schema=twitter&amp;url=https%3A//x.com/ravirockks/status/1830383233722356054&amp;image=" width="500" height="281" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/710db4263ac03f040401734343d019be/href">https://medium.com/media/710db4263ac03f040401734343d019be/href</a></iframe><p>I wrote this short article as a meditation on my larger takeaways from the two days at the International Conventional Centre in, you guessed it, Sydney. And thus why fora like <em>The Sydney Dialogue </em>matter.</p><p>(This piece is separate to my longread diary piece on the summit.)</p><p><a href="https://atechnolegalupdate.medium.com/the-definitive-dialogue-diary-8d90278f613b">The Definitive Dialogue Diary</a></p><p>Having usually attended industry-/academia-focused conferences on cyber policy, it was fantastic to get to go to one on all things geopolitics x technology where <em>government</em> was very well-represented and hear <em>Track 1</em> give their side of the story <em>in person</em>. Especially Track 1 from other parts of the world, including our CEE cousins.</p><p>My head tends to be in the niche of cyber/software security policy and law because of my PhD, so I appreciated the opportunity to broaden my horizons when it comes to national security law, international relations and strategic policy. To see how my research fits into the larger scheme of things, the larger game played by countries and companies, to help ensure my analyses are grounded in the broader realities that they actually exist in.</p><p>To see what other communities of researchers and officials are talking about and where I come in regarding those issues, and vice versa.</p><p>Complexity theory and all that.</p><p>I loved attending <em>The Sydney Dialogue</em>, not just because of the sessions on a range of interesting topics (and getting to ask a few questions therein!), but also the conversations with an eclectic bunch of far wiser and more experienced people over lunch or a cookie. Be they government officials from partner countries, leading academics or industry practitioners, I learned something from each one of them.</p><p>Be it on Indian foreign policy, what should be running in the kernel, the difference between Chinese and Taiwanese cuisines, the role of corporate and markets regulators, first principles cyber and software security regulation, cyber terrorism or Taiwanese cyber-preparedness.</p><p>Pretty much everyone I spoke with had a good story. My highlight was listening to a CEE official passionately narrate the history of their polity’s identity over centuries and how that history underpins their country’s strategic policy, be it in backing Ukraine to the hilt or joining hands with democracies here in the Indo-Pacific, including Taiwan.</p><p>I love speaking to people with that sense of mission, especially one rooted in history and country.</p><p>Now, I was merely a PhD kiddie waddling about, picking the brains of these actual experts and officials for my research. <em>They’re</em> the movers and shakers, having those key conversations in the big meeting rooms at the other end of Level 3 of the International Convention Centre and at the subsequent <a href="https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/about-us/our-portfolios/cyber-security/2024-cyber-champions-summit">Cyber Champions Summit</a> which included a ‘regional side event’ from the CRI (yeah, many cyber-facing officials were in town).</p><p>Indeed, the real action at these conferences is what Track 1(.5) gets up to on the sidelines. Like how at major multilateral summits, it’s the diplomacy on the sidelines (and intelligence collection by certain members of delegations on official cover).</p><p>But sure, whether it’s Tracks 1(.5) or 2, events like <em>The Sydney Dialogue </em>are awesome because of the conversations and connections in the plenary hall, meeting rooms and by the coffee carts. Concerning a whole host of topics. Enriching our shared understanding of the issues that matter, especially issues that can get left behind amid the jargon and buzzwords.</p><p>Building said understanding as a collective group of officials, industry practitioners, academics and civil society folk is vital when it comes to how geopolitics, geoeconomics, foreign policy and technology fit together.</p><p>The ASPI chief, <a href="https://x.com/BassiJustin">Justin Bassi’s</a>, <a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/technology-can-serve-humanity-if-we-dont-let-it-outpace-our-societies/">point</a> about technological change as ‘cumulative and cross-pollinating’ aptly describes the positive externalities of summits like <em>The Sydney Dialogue</em>, these accelerators for foreign, strategic, economic and technology policy ideation<em>.</em></p><p>Such acceleration is vital because technological change <em>itself</em> is accelerating.</p><p>As Justin <a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/technology-can-serve-humanity-if-we-dont-let-it-outpace-our-societies/">highlighted</a>:</p><blockquote>Progress is happening so quickly that governments and societies struggle to understand revolutionary and disruptive technology, much less mobilise effective responses.</blockquote><p>As he said to kick us off on Day 2, the timeframes that societies, economies and governments have to react to the evolution of the state of the art are becoming rather compressed:</p><blockquote>We are building the plane at the same time as we are flying it.</blockquote><p>And that’s before we get to the speed with which hostile foreign powers like China, Russia, Iran and the DPRK, as well as (cyber)criminals, terrorists and hacktivists are leveraging said disruptive innovation against us.</p><p>Yes, technology is a fantastic enabler for our collective betterment.</p><p>But it is a two-edged sword, perhaps even a <em>shuriken</em>.</p><p>Making fora like <em>The Sydney Dialogue </em>all the more important.</p><p>As Mr Bassi <a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/technology-can-serve-humanity-if-we-dont-let-it-outpace-our-societies/">put it</a>:</p><blockquote>As the power of technology grows — and everyone in this room knows that’s the course we’re on — the stakes are getting higher and the conversations more vital. That’s why we’re all here.</blockquote><p>So, there is my larger meditation on <em>The Sydney Dialogue</em>.</p><p>I’ve also written a diary piece where I analyse some of the sessions from the summit, and provide my two cents on the debates and discussions.</p><p><a href="https://atechnolegalupdate.medium.com/the-definitive-dialogue-diary-8d90278f613b">The Definitive Dialogue Diary</a></p><p>Have a read and tell me what you think!</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ch9JLxYe90fpm_sScpDxqQ.png" /><figcaption>(Source: <a href="https://x.com/ASPI_org/status/1830379996575350826">ASPI</a>)</figcaption></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=baecad600e9e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[CrowdStrike’s Corporate Citizenship: Making Mapping Matter]]></title>
            <link>https://atechnolegalupdate.medium.com/crowdstrikes-corporate-citizenship-making-mapping-matter-84ae2b555dd2?source=rss-2c8c011d69de------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/84ae2b555dd2</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[national-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[software]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[policy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[supply-chain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[A Techno-Legal Update]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 09 Aug 2024 08:04:14 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-08-16T02:19:30.560Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>By Ravi Nayyar</h4><p>Welcome to Article 3 in this series on the CrowdStrike incident-non-incident.</p><p>Here’s Article 1.</p><p><a href="https://atechnolegalupdate.medium.com/crowdstrikes-crowning-kerfuffle-af4e226baf4b">CrowdStrike’s Crowning Kerfuffle</a></p><p>Here’s Article 2.</p><p><a href="https://atechnolegalupdate.medium.com/crowdstrikes-complicating-critical-infrastructure-cyber-resilience-bd1cbf86b786">CrowdStrike’s Complicating Critical Infrastructure Cyber Resilience</a></p><p>Now, as I wrote in Article 1, the way I label the event is inspired by the choice of wording from the then-Commonwealth Minister for Home Affairs.</p><p>As I also flagged in that piece, this incident-non-incident is the case study which my thesis was designed for.</p><p>Look at the below graphic, inspired by my 2023 Cybercon <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/posts/stillromancingwithlife_the-tangled-web-critical-software-and-cni-activity-7120893021172207616-gNfH/">preso</a>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*qeLLn6fnzz65XGqFoVJ14w.png" /><figcaption>My PhD in a graphic. (Source: Me)</figcaption></figure><p>3 regulatory circles pertaining to:</p><ol><li>the cyber resilience of critical infrastructure (‘CNI’) assets;</li><li>software supply chain risk management (‘SCRM’) by CNI operators; and</li><li>critical software risk to CNI assets (<strong>my thesis</strong>).</li></ol><p>With this in mind, the CrowdStrike incident-non-incident has the ‘Thesis Trifecta’ for me:</p><ol><li>a critical software vendor messing up; which jeopardises</li><li>the cyber resilience of the operators of critical infrastructure (‘CNI’) assets; and thus captures</li><li>the incredible risks to national security from software supply chains.</li></ol><p>To nut out the Trifecta, I’ve written three pieces: one on each Limb.</p><p><a href="https://atechnolegalupdate.medium.com/crowdstrikes-crowning-kerfuffle-af4e226baf4b">Article 1</a> set the scene with Limb 1 — the anatomy of the stuff-up from a critical software vendor, CrowdStrike.</p><p><a href="https://atechnolegalupdate.medium.com/crowdstrikes-complicating-critical-infrastructure-cyber-resilience-bd1cbf86b786">Article 2</a> continued with Limb 2 — how CNI asset operators were caught up in this saga.</p><p>Article 3 brings it home with Limb 3 — all this illustrates how software supply chain risks are national security risks.</p><p>Once more unto the breach, my friends.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?type=text%2Fhtml&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;schema=twitter&amp;url=https%3A//x.com/ravirockks/status/1806133139544461614&amp;image=" width="500" height="281" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/d74da42206b73a6dea997728610c8f66/href">https://medium.com/media/d74da42206b73a6dea997728610c8f66/href</a></iframe><h3>Should‘ve Woken Up a While Back</h3><p>First things first, the <a href="https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2022-02/ICT%20Supply%20Chain%20Report_2.pdf">definition</a> of a software supply chain (emphasis added):</p><blockquote>A software supply chain is <em>the entire sequence of events that impacts software </em>from the point of origin where it is designed and developed, to the point of end-use. Each sequence and element in this chain affects the software … The supply chain includes the software code itself <em>as well as the systems and tools </em>used by developers, proprietary and open-source software repositories, signing keys, compilers, and download portals. The entities that comprise the software supply chain can include <em>multiples of developers and technology providers</em> … It is also unusual to find a single company responsible for the entirety of a software code base.</blockquote><p>In a word, ‘Sprawling’.</p><p>And that’s just <em>one</em> software supply chain.</p><p>Software supply chain<em>s</em> — especially those for critical software products (here’s the <a href="https://www.nist.gov/itl/executive-order-improving-nations-cybersecurity/critical-software-definition-explanatory">definition</a> of critical software) — have been an increasing source of risk for <em>everyone</em> downstream.</p><p>If you want to understand how much of a source of risk, a <a href="https://19517320.fs1.hubspotusercontent-na1.net/hubfs/19517320/NetRise%20Supply%20Chain%20Visibility%20%26%20Risk%20Study%20-%20Edition%201%20Q3%202024.pdf">study</a> by firmware security company, NetRise, of <em>100</em> networking devices (routers, switches, firewalls, VPN gateways and Wireless Access Points — code running on them <a href="https://www.nist.gov/itl/executive-order-improving-nations-cybersecurity/critical-software-definition-explanatory"><em>includes</em></a><em> critical software</em>) found:</p><ul><li>an average of 1,267 software dependencies/device;</li><li>an average of 1,120 known vulnerabilities/device (1/3 of bugs &gt; 5 years old); and</li><li>45 Linux Kernel versions deployed, 27 EoL ones.</li></ul><p>And, given that these grinning leviathans are growing, they’re domains for a whole host of actors — bad, frustrated or plain incompetent.</p><p>We have seen the movie <em>many</em> times:</p><ul><li><a href="https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2016/03/rage-quit-coder-unpublished-17-lines-of-javascript-and-broke-the-internet/">left-pad</a> — the maintainer for those sweet seventeen lines of Java deleted them due to a trademark tiff, breaking tons and tons of JavaScript and websites;</li><li><a href="https://www.england.nhs.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/lessons-learned-review-wannacry-ransomware-cyber-attack-cio-review.pdf">WannaCry</a> — you know this one;</li><li><a href="https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/six-russian-gru-officers-charged-connection-worldwide-deployment-destructive-malware-and">NotPetya</a> — you know this one;</li><li><a href="https://www.propublica.org/article/cyber-safety-board-never-investigated-solarwinds-breach-microsoft">SolarWinds</a> — you know this one;</li><li><a href="https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-court-authorized-effort-disrupt-exploitation-microsoft-exchange">Microsoft Exchange 2021</a> — the feds had to get a search and seizure warrant to uninstall tons of web shells that Chinese actors (Hafnium) had left on people’s vulnerable Exchange boxes upon their being outed;</li><li><a href="https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/news/kaseya-ransomware-attack-guidance-affected-msps-and-their-customers">Kaseya</a> — you know this one;</li><li><a href="https://www.dhs.gov/news/2022/07/14/cyber-safety-review-board-releases-report-its-review-log4j-vulnerabilities-and">Log4j</a> — you know this one;</li><li><a href="https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/news/lessons-xz-utils-achieving-more-sustainable-open-source-ecosystem">xz utils</a> — you know this one;</li><li><a href="https://therecord.media/citrix-bleed-bug-targeted-cisa">#CitrixBleed</a> — this one got, eg, DP World Australia pwned;</li><li><a href="https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/3cx-software-supply-chain-compromise">3CX</a> — #DoubleCrunch;</li><li><a href="https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-347a">TeamCity</a> — wonder why the SVR targeted CI/CD boxes.</li></ul><p>We have had the <a href="https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2023-04/foreign-affairs_stop-passing-buck-on-cybersecurity_508.pdf">CISA Director</a> and <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/ONCD-Strategic-Intent.pdf">Office of the National Cyber Director</a> (‘<a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/2024-Report-on-the-Cybersecurity-Posture-of-the-United-States.pdf">ONCD</a>’) <a href="https://archive.md/vsrwm">write</a> and/or <a href="https://www.cisa.gov/securebydesign/dir-easterly-remarks-carnegie-mellon-university">give speeches</a> specifically on the risks to our very societies and economies from the technologies that are, as ONCD put it, ‘the foundation on which our future lives — lives we cannot yet imagine — are currently being built’.</p><p>As part of this, the Director and ONCD have highlighted how risks can be transmitted through broader technology supply chains and cascade across sectors to cause tons and tons of disruption and/or damage.</p><p>How there’s that horrible mismatch between:</p><ul><li>vendors prioritising their financial interests in speed-to-market and functionality (because corporate law in the absence of specific regulation — see <a href="https://atechnolegalupdate.medium.com/crowdstrikes-crowning-kerfuffle-af4e226baf4b">Limb 1</a>); versus</li><li>the criticality (for <em>all of us</em>) of their products being secure-by-design and -default.</li></ul><p>A mismatch which jeopardises national (cyber) resilience.</p><p>There’s also the usual criticism about the state not having enough visibility into the problem. About industry needing to be <em>far</em> more transparent regarding, eg, breaches (ASD has certainly <a href="https://www.itnews.com.au/news/asd-sees-frequency-richness-of-cyber-info-sharing-fall-away-605067">noticed</a> that here) and vulnerabilities to enable greater accountability and more effective incident response. (I should note that, eg, the USG has done good work <em>itself</em> to share more data with industry, be it via <a href="https://www.cisa.gov/about/2023YIR#jump_to_2">CISA</a>, NSA’s <a href="https://cyberscoop.com/nsa-threat-sharing-unclassified-ccc/">Cybersecurity Collaboration Center</a> and the Cyber National Mission Force’s <a href="https://therecord.media/cyber-command-virustotal-twitter-malware-alerts-cnmf">Under Advisement program</a>.)</p><p>And yet <em>again and again</em>, here we are.</p><p><em>Scrambling</em> as societies, economies and governments to clean up after a critical software vendor’s mess.</p><p>More recently, an unforced error which bricked <a href="https://blogs.microsoft.com/blog/2024/07/20/helping-our-customers-through-the-crowdstrike-outage/">millions</a> of Windows machines and disrupted the cyber resilience of the operators of CNI assets around the world (see <a href="https://atechnolegalupdate.medium.com/crowdstrikes-complicating-critical-infrastructure-cyber-resilience-bd1cbf86b786">Limb 2</a>).</p><h3>Yawning &gt; ‘Shocked!’</h3><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?type=text%2Fhtml&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;schema=twitter&amp;url=https%3A//x.com/ravirockks/status/1814537533059178891&amp;image=" width="500" height="281" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/27a4ff72ebf84d4f387f6985c92d7015/href">https://medium.com/media/27a4ff72ebf84d4f387f6985c92d7015/href</a></iframe><p>My initial response (like most in Infosec land) to this incident-non-incident was, ‘Ah, here we go again’.</p><p>For the CrowdStrike Falcon Fiasco borders on technological and cyber policy cliché.</p><p>Look again at the outputs from the USG.</p><p>First, ONCD’s <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/ONCD-Strategic-Intent.pdf"><em>Strategic Intent Statement</em></a>:</p><blockquote>Critical services for millions can be imperiled because of a single person’s failure to recognize a phishing attempt.</blockquote><p>Second, an <a href="https://archive.md/vsrwm">op-ed</a> co-authored by then-NCD Chris Inglis (emphasis added):</p><blockquote>… the security challenges in cyberspace are daunting because the scope and scale of any<em> one security incident</em> can be so vast<em>.</em> In a world where clicking the wrong link or neglecting a single software patch can result in a geopolitical incident, responders often focus on an attack’s perpetrator at the expense of addressing the perverse incentives that create these circumstances in the first place.</blockquote><p>Third, the <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/2024-Report-on-the-Cybersecurity-Posture-of-the-United-States.pdf"><em>Cybersecurity Posture of the United States</em></a>, put out in May 2024 by ONCD (emphasis added):</p><blockquote>Adversaries are increasingly taking advantage of complex and interconnected relationships between organizations and their suppliers, customers, vendors, and service providers, compromising<em> single nodes</em> that grant surreptitious access to victims in the United States and around the world.</blockquote><blockquote>[The 3CX hack showed] how <em>a</em> <em>single initial compromise</em> can quickly spread through interlinked technology supply chains and third-party relationships.</blockquote><p>The incident-non-incident is nothing new. The USG said that such a thing — <em>one</em> event or person being the source of <em>a lot </em>of trouble — could happen way back in <em>October 2021.</em></p><p>That the operational resilience of <em>society itself </em>can be disrupted due to <em>one</em> malicious/erroneous thing happening somewhere in the software supply chains making us tick.</p><p>(And I’ve been writing about this sort of thing since 2022.)</p><p><a href="https://atechnolegalupdate.medium.com/tangos-in-the-tangled-web-9e7092367222">Tangos in the Tangled Web</a></p><p>Fast-forward to July 2024 and the CISA Director’s <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/ode-outage-jen-easterly-2dcse">write-up</a> on the incident-non-incident (emphasis added):</p><blockquote>And this is due, in large part, to a <em>fragile software ecosystem</em> that has historically deprioritized security in favor of features and speed to market.</blockquote><blockquote>… our highly digitized, <em>highly interdependent</em>, highly connected, and highly vulnerable critical infrastructure ecosystem.</blockquote><p>Hardly different to the policy statements from 2021 onwards, eh?</p><p>Perhaps that’s why an <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/business-56559073">incident</a> from 2021 provided the template for a great meme on the offending Channel File 291, the immediate trigger for the CrowdStrike Falcon Fiasco.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/964/1*oP14wToqMXAA7-WmXaFWow.png" /><figcaption>Software supply chains are critical supply chains. (Source: <a href="https://x.com/TimMedin/status/1814491923828117732">X</a>)</figcaption></figure><p>The Sonatype CTO was on the money when <a href="https://www.politico.com/newsletters/weekly-cybersecurity/2024/07/29/should-the-csrb-take-on-crowdstrike-00171578">describing</a> the incident-non-incident as ‘the perfect tabletop’ for an actually malicious event.</p><h3>The Elephant Is the <em>Lessor</em> of the Room</h3><p>Folks, to reiterate the bleeding obvious, software supply chains are domains for more and more baddies, and home to (<em>unnoticed</em>) vendors and SaaS providers for major companies/entire economic sectors.</p><p>The malevolence or stupidity of these groups can have terrible downstream consequences, such as:</p><ul><li>a litany of (significant) data breaches — <a href="https://www.wired.com/story/snowflake-breach-advanced-auto-parts-lendingtree/">Snowflake</a>, leading to Ticketek, Santander and <a href="https://techcrunch.com/2024/07/12/att-phone-records-stolen-data-breach/">AT&amp;T</a>; or Progress Software’s 2023 <a href="https://www.theverge.com/23892245/moveit-cyberattacks-clop-ransomware-government-business">MOVEit saga</a>; or</li><li>(threatened) disruptions of commerce — <a href="https://www.reuters.com/technology/ion-starts-bring-clients-back-online-after-ransomware-attack-source-2023-02-07/">ION Trading</a>, <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/07/11/business/cdk-hack-ransom-tweny-five-million-dollars/index.html">CDK</a>, <a href="https://www.finance.senate.gov/hearings/hacking-americas-health-care-assessing-the-change-healthcare-cyber-attack-and-whats-next">Change Healthcare</a>, <a href="https://therecord.media/ransomware-attack-on-maritime-software-impacts-1000-ships">DNV</a>, <a href="https://therecord.media/citrix-bleed-bug-targeted-cisa">#CitrixBleed</a>, <a href="https://www.zdnet.com/article/updated-kaseya-ransomware-attack-faq-what-we-know-now/">Kaseya</a> or <a href="https://x.com/NPCI_NPCI/status/1818635040038793492">C-Edge Technologies</a>.</li></ul><p>(For me, the term, ‘snowflake’, has a rather different meaning since that drama.)</p><p>Prominent insurer, Howden, <a href="https://www.howdengroupholdings.com/sites/default/files/2024-06/howden-2024-cyber-report.pdf">referred</a> to the targeting of software supply chains, through attacks like SolarWinds, Microsoft Exchange, Kaseya, Log4j and MOVEit, as designed ‘to maximise the fallout across multiple organisations’. It used Change Healthcare as an example of the ‘inherent risk of aggregation’ and thus concentration of potential (losses) in sectors ‘due to reliance on industry specific software and payments / administration platforms’.</p><p>The insurer provides some great stats too:</p><blockquote>Recent disclosures show that the MOVEit file transfer breach, which began in June 2023, affected approximately 2,800 organisations and 96 million people.</blockquote><blockquote>The user base for the Change Healthcare payments and claims platform is made up of 900,000 doctors, 33,000 pharmacies and 5,500 hospitals in the United States. The CEO of parent company UnitedHealth has indicated that up to one-third of the U.S. population has had sensitive data leaked.</blockquote><p>In general, note the findings of a 2024 SecurityScorecard <a href="https://securityscorecard.com/resource/redefining-resilience-concentrated-cyber-risk-in-a-global-economy/">study</a> (done using SecurityScorecard Automatic Vendor Detection ‘to identify the most frequently and extensively used companies of approximately 12 million public and private sector organizations’):</p><ul><li>150 companies = 85% x customer relationships, 90% x product detections;</li><li>15 = 62% x products and services;</li><li>41% with at least one compromised device on their networks.</li></ul><p>Folks who aren’t in threatintel shops/relevant economic sectors reliant on such popular vendors/SaaS shops most likely don’t know that these vendors/service providers even exist before something bad happens, monoculture or not. Perhaps that lack of awareness applies to national security officials as well.</p><p>All this makes an incident-non-incident like CrowdStrike’s stuff-up look rather quaint, eh?</p><p>Though, if we momentarily return to the CrowdStrike incident-non-incident (or ‘The CrowdStrike disaster’, as Delta Air Lines’ counsel <a href="https://regmedia.co.uk/2024/08/08/delta_response_to_crowdstrike_letter.pdf">called</a> it), here are some numbers, courtesy of Delta’s counsel (emphasis added):</p><blockquote>At Delta, it shut down <em>more than 37,000</em> computers and disrupted the travel plans of more than 1.3 million Delta customers.</blockquote><blockquote><em>Approximately 60 percent of Delta’s mission-critical applications and their associated data</em> — including Delta’s redundant backup systems — <em>depend </em>on the Microsoft Windows operating system and CrowdStrike.</blockquote><p>But then again, these are all examples of <em>vendors</em> messing up or being compromised.</p><p>They don’t even include OSS.</p><h4><em>Don’t Forget OSS</em></h4><p><a href="https://www.synopsys.com/software-integrity/resources/analyst-reports/open-source-security-risk-analysis.html">Most</a> <a href="https://www.synopsys.com/glossary/what-is-open-source-software.html">estimates</a> <a href="https://www.synopsys.com/blogs/software-security/open-source-trends-ossra-report.html">will</a> tell you that <em>almost all</em> code is OSS.</p><p>And it’s <em>growing</em>. Sonatype observed, on a YoY basis, there <a href="https://www.sonatype.com/state-of-the-software-supply-chain/">to be</a> 32% growth in package requests served by npm in 2023, 25% by Maven, 31% by PyPI and 43% by .NET. Collectively amounting to <em>trillions </em>of package requests;</p><p>This growth encourages gargantuan levels of software supply chain risk for modern computing.</p><p>Some examples:</p><ul><li>A 2023 <a href="https://www.synopsys.com/software-integrity/resources/analyst-reports/open-source-security-risk-analysis.html">analysis</a> of 1,067 commercial codebases (from seventeen sectors) by Synopsys found that: the mean of OSS dependencies/codebase was <em>526</em>; around 65% of codebases had OSS bugs that had been actively exploited/had POCs/were RCE bugs; and around 43% had OSS dependencies <em>without</em> development activity within the <em>previous two years</em>.</li><li>ReversingLabs <a href="https://www.reversinglabs.com/blog/the-state-of-software-supply-chain-security-2024-key-takeaways">observed</a> an <em>over 1300%</em> increase in ‘threats circulating via [OSS repositories]’ from 2020–23, including <em>over 7,200</em> malicious Python (PyPI) packages from <em>January-September 2023</em>.</li><li>25% of all OSS projects <a href="https://www.resilientcyber.io/p/open-source-security-landscape-2024">have</a> <em>one </em>maintainer and 94%, &lt; 10 maintainers ‘actively contributing code’.</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/385/1*gerWZuDgPQTc6ejcZNcChA.png" /><figcaption>I couldn’t not include this cartoon. (Source: <a href="https://xkcd.com/2347/">xkcd</a>)</figcaption></figure><ul><li>A 2022 <a href="https://www.endorlabs.com/learn/state-of-dependency-management">analysis</a> of 1,883 OSS packages by Endor Labs found 254 Java (Maven) packages with an average of <em>fourteen</em> dependencies/package (&lt; reported average of <em>77</em> for Java (npm) packages). Six of said 254 packages had <em>over 100</em> dependencies <em>each</em>. Endor Labs’ broader analysis discovered that, for the applications we use, <em>around 95%</em> of their vulnerable dependencies were <em>transitive </em>(definition below).</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*9LMVVm6w-ikLPWlI2XEDbA.png" /><figcaption>Direct (P1) v Transitive (P2, P3) Software Dependencies of an Application. (Source: <a href="https://www.endorlabs.com/learn/state-of-dependency-management">Endor Labs</a>)</figcaption></figure><ul><li>A threat actor <a href="https://medium.com/checkmarx-security/over-170k-users-affected-by-attack-using-fake-python-infrastructure-05a04b7e058a">leveraged</a> fake Python infrastructure to distribute a malicious version of the <em>hugely </em>popular Colorama package in March 2024.</li><li>Hacktivists poisoned OSS with ‘protestware’ to (indiscriminately) disrupt the cyber resilience of entities served by those software supply chains (eg <a href="https://www.itnews.com.au/news/protestware-npm-package-dependency-labelled-supply-chain-attack-577488">1</a>, <a href="https://www.reversinglabs.com/blog/protestware-taps-npm-to-call-out-wars-in-ukraine-gaza">2</a>, <a href="https://discourse.ubuntu.com/t/announcement-ubuntu-desktop-23-10-release-image-is-being-updated-to-resolve-a-malicious-translation-incident/39365">3</a>, <a href="https://www.technologyreview.com/2022/03/21/1047489/activists-are-targeting-russians-with-open-source-protestware/">4</a>, <a href="https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/nullbulge-threat-actor-masquerades-as-hacktivist-group-rebelling-against-ai/">5</a>).</li></ul><h4><strong>TL;DR</strong></h4><p>Looking only at vendors/other for-profit developers when formulating cyber→national security policy is <em>incredibly </em>narrow.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*y7_zbYGqinUeEW5zgmCTzw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Bonus points if you can geolocate this photo. (Source: Me)</figcaption></figure><p>Policy is meant to be a numbers game:</p><ul><li>OSS dependencies of your enterprise code;</li><li><em>those</em> <em>OSS dependencies’ own</em> OSS dependencies;</li><li>most OSS packages having inadequate maintenance; and</li><li>baddies looking to exploit all of the above.</li></ul><p>(Oh, and if you’re interested, Sonatype maintains a <a href="https://www.sonatype.com/resources/vulnerability-timeline">timeline</a> of software supply chain attacks, including those involving OSS, going back to 2017.)</p><p>As ONCD <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/ONCD-Strategic-Intent.pdf">put it</a> (emphasis added):</p><blockquote>Computers, defined by the hardware and the software that runs them, are now so complex that it can be <em>difficult to fully appreciate the sum of their constituent parts</em> — a sum which now extends beyond any given physical location. This problem compounds exponentially as computers have been <em>networked together into the vast and increasingly complex digital systems </em>that define our modern lives, economies, and societies. These <em>sprawling arrays of daunting complexity</em> are easy for malign actors to hide in and exploit, and, to date, too challenging for industry or government alone to defend or protect.</blockquote><p>So, you need to survey <em>everything.</em></p><p>Which was implied by the European Systemic Risk Board (‘ESRB’) in relation to the financial sector when it <a href="https://www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/reports/esrb.SystemiCyberRisk.220127~b6655fa027.en.pdf">decried</a> (emphasis added):</p><blockquote>a lack of comprehensive and timely data on operational linkages, such as common third-party providers, common exposures to hardware and <em>software packages</em>, and common exposures to clients, retail partners and counterparties.</blockquote><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?type=text%2Fhtml&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;schema=twitter&amp;url=https%3A//x.com/ravirockks/status/1675017889756356609&amp;image=" width="500" height="281" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/55799a5c5c4e6f5007bb52a9f4586926/href">https://medium.com/media/55799a5c5c4e6f5007bb52a9f4586926/href</a></iframe><p>Given the scale of the problem, one wonders if it was the futility of the whole thing which played a role in President Biden’s <a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/05/09/2024-10394/continuation-of-the-national-emergency-with-respect-to-securing-the-information-and-communications">extension</a> (by a year) of the ‘National Emergency With Respect to Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain’ on 8 May 2024.</p><p>The original emergency having been declared by President Trump on 15 May <em>2019</em>.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?type=text%2Fhtml&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;schema=twitter&amp;url=https%3A//x.com/ravirockks/status/1697951229303984178&amp;image=" width="500" height="281" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/667cbd827f67fba743f8f804f619b06c/href">https://medium.com/media/667cbd827f67fba743f8f804f619b06c/href</a></iframe><p>But lo, we have a potential solution!</p><h3>The Journey of Self-Discovery</h3><p>You have to understand where your pressure points are, your desires, needs, issues, etc, so that you can mitigate or leverage them, as appropriate, to make yourself stronger than the sum of your parts. (I’ll be doing book signings in the foyer.)</p><p>The same logic must apply to national security risk management.</p><p>We, our allies and our partners need to map our jurisdictions’ software supply chains.</p><p>It’s like mapping, with the <a href="https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/penny-wong/media-release/quad-foreign-ministers-meeting-joint-statement-tokyo">help</a> <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/04/05/u-s-eu-joint-statement-of-the-trade-and-technology-council-3/">of</a> <a href="https://www.state.gov/minerals-security-partnership/">allies and partners</a>, supply chains for critical goods like vaccines, refined oil, semiconductors, critical minerals and clean energy tech.</p><p>But for OSS, enterprise codebases, SaaS/IaaS/PaaS relationships, as well as the flow of data among and from the operators of the plumbing of the Internet like code repositories, ISPs, CDNs, CAs, DNS providers and domain registrars.</p><p>For reference, here’s a highly simplified software supply chain.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*nc92tqN_btt68Jqp4lF8Dg.png" /><figcaption>A simplified software supply chain. (Source: <a href="https://www.ntia.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ntia_sbom_framing_2nd_edition_20211021_0.pdf">NTIA</a>)</figcaption></figure><p>Now, create a series of these for our societies and economies.</p><h4><em>Assumptions</em></h4><p>Of course, I am assuming that, eg:</p><ul><li>firms and OSS developers/maintainers have robust, dynamically-updated asset and software inventories — <em>fundamental</em> to such a mapping exercise;</li></ul><p><strong><em>NOTE: </em></strong><em>This assumption is also crucial because the map is one of technological relationships and thus </em><a href="https://www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/reports/esrb.SystemiCyberRisk.220127~b6655fa027.en.pdf"><em>must mirror</em></a><em> the dynamism of the technology landscape to be useful.</em></p><p><em>That said, this assumption is problematic because of the </em><a href="https://securityconversations.com/episode/ep6-after-crowdstrike-chaos-should-microsoft-kick-edr-agents-out-of-windows-kernel/"><em>horrific</em></a><em> </em><a href="https://youtu.be/d02zUEu7AYU"><em>amount</em></a><em> </em><a href="https://www.veracode.com/sites/default/files/2024-02/SOSS-Report-2024.pdf"><em>of technology debt</em></a><em> floating (unnoticed) within and among organisations, which significantly multiplies our collective attack surface. Especially as that debt is (unknowingly) carried by </em>all<em> stakeholders, it is incredibly difficult for vendors and other developers to even quantify the costs of their code causing massive problems for users, though </em><a href="https://newsletter.pragmaticengineer.com/p/the-biggest-ever-global-outage-lessons"><em>it is a good idea</em></a><em> for vendors and other developers to do such threat models and scenario planning.</em></p><p><em>I also note that SBOMs </em><a href="https://www.csoonline.com/article/2515198/software-supply-chain-still-dangerous-despite-new-protections.html"><em>aren’t regarded</em></a><em> as mature →useful enough at this stage.</em></p><ul><li>bureaucrats are literate in software and other computing terminology, and resourced to collect, process and analyse relevant data to ultimately generate the maps; and</li></ul><p><strong><em>NOTE:</em></strong><em> The mapping exercise could be shepherded by the jurisdiction’s Siginters/cyber security agency/prudential regulator folk to ensure it is governed by those who are literate.</em></p><p><em>Resourcing is a key question, given the ESRB </em><a href="https://www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/reports/esrb.SystemiCyberRisk.220127~b6655fa027.en.pdf"><em>warning</em></a><em> in 2022 that such an exercise for the financial sector alone would be arduous due to ‘current challenges’ in collating data on financial institutions and their vendors.</em></p><ul><li>stakeholders will be willing to: voluntarily share their asset and software inventories, as well as their registers of suppliers and customers, with the state; and be happy to more generally help the state perform said mapping exercise.</li></ul><p><strong><em>NOTE:</em></strong><em> Will officials require new information-gathering powers (available on application to federal judges)?</em></p><p><em>Existing powers include:</em></p><ul><li><em>section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act (codified at </em><a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/50/1862"><em>50 USC § 1862</em></a><em>), especially as the goal is to understand what the entity is running, and who’s in their client and supplier books;</em></li><li><a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2554/oj"><em>European</em></a><em>/</em><a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/1867"><em>American</em></a><em>/</em><a href="https://www.legislation.gov.au/F2016L01436/asmade/text"><em>Australian</em></a><em> financial regulators’ powers of oversight over institutions’ third party service providers and/or institutions’ obligations to maintain a register/notify financial regulators of contracts for (critical) third party arrangements; and</em></li><li><a href="https://www.legislation.gov.au/C2018A00029/latest/text"><em>Security of Critical Infrastructure Act 2018 (Cth)</em></a><em> s 37 (‘SOCI Act’)–the broad, general power of Dep-Sec Home Affairs to, roughly speaking, obtain documents or information from the owner/operator of a CNI asset if said stuff could aid the operation of the SOCI Act in relation to the asset.</em></li></ul><h4>What Should Be Mapped?</h4><p>For the sake of the argument, let’s make the aforementioned assumptions and commission the software supply chain mapping exercise.</p><p>What are the sorts of persons, services and code that we are wanting to identify and track?</p><p>The Reserve Bank of India provides a good rule of thumb through what it <a href="https://www.rbi.org.in/Scripts/NotificationUser.aspx?Id=12715&amp;Mode=0">requires</a> non-bank Payment System Operators to do:</p><blockquote>A complete process flow diagram of network resources, inter-connections and dependencies, and data flows with other information assets, including any other third-party systems, shall be created and maintained.</blockquote><p>Let’s flesh out some of the specifics of what should be mapped by the state in partnership with other stakeholders.</p><p>The sorts of <strong>vendors/service providers</strong> that such a mapping exercise is especially designed to capture would have the characteristics, roughly speaking, of folks like:</p><ul><li>Systemically Important Financial Market Utilities — see <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/5463">12 USC § 5463(2)</a>;</li><li>critical ICT third-party service providers — article 31 of <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2554/oj"><em>DORA</em></a>;<em> </em>or</li><li>gatekeepers — see article 3(8) of the <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2022.265.01.0001.01.ENG&amp;toc=OJ:L:2022:265:TOC"><em>Digital Markets Act</em></a>.</li></ul><p>And they would have these characteristics generally or in relation to the specific economic sector(s) that they serve.</p><p>The sorts of <strong>enterprise software</strong> that such a mapping exercise is especially designed to capture (if the vendors for this software haven’t already been identified) would be what I’ve <a href="https://x.com/ravirockks/status/1740527658805739769">called</a> ‘Systemically Critical Software’ (taking inspiration from the OECD and the EU).</p><p>That concept revolves around two criteria:</p><ul><li><strong>scale</strong> — the size of the user base; and/or</li><li><strong>scope</strong> — dependency factors like: the criticality of the product to certain social/economic functions; whether it’s a dependency for hugely popular stuff; and whether exploitation of bugs in it would cause a massive problem for everyone.</li></ul><p>(One way to understand the scale and scope criteria is by looking at the criteria listed in article 6(2) of the European Commission’s <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/docs_autres_institutions/commission_europeenne/com/2022/0454/COM_COM(2022)0454_EN.pdf">original proposal</a> for the <em>Cyber Resilience Act</em>.)</p><p>The sorts of <strong>OSS packages</strong> that this mapping exercise is especially designed to capture are those identified as critical to ecosystem resilience by major OSS community initiatives like the:</p><ul><li><a href="https://alpha-omega.dev/about/about-alpha-omega/">Alpha-Omega project</a>;</li><li><a href="https://openssf.org/blog/2023/07/28/understanding-and-applying-the-openssf-criticality-score-in-open-source-projects/">OpenSSF Criticality Score</a>; and</li><li><a href="https://openssf.org/blog/2023/09/28/openssf-securing-critical-projects-working-group-identifying-and-helping-improve-top-open-source-projects/">OpenSSF Securing Critical Projects Working Group</a>.</li></ul><p>The USG certainly has the right idea by <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/oncd/briefing-room/2024/08/09/fact-sheet-biden-harris-administration-releases-end-of-year-report-on-open-source-software-security-initiative-2/">launching</a> (and <a href="https://therecord.media/open-source-software-security-white-house-dhs-11million-funding">committing</a> $11 million to) the Open-Source Software Prevalence Initiative, which seeks to map the use of OSS in US CNI assets, ‘allowing the Federal Government and partners in the open-source community to strengthen the security of the open-source software ecosystem’.</p><h4><em>Case Study: Financial Sector</em></h4><p>Helpfully, financial regulators and agencies have been working on the mapping sorta thing more generally, given their increased focus on risks from (critical) third party service providers to prudentially-regulated institutions and systemic stability.</p><p>See, eg, the aforementioned mapping <em>requirement </em>from the Reserve Bank of India.</p><p>The ESRB has even developed a <a href="https://www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/reports/esrb.report200219_systemiccyberrisk~101a09685e.en.pdf">conceptual model</a> for tracking systemic cyber risk to the financial sector and defined a ‘cyber map’ as tracking the:</p><blockquote>identification of systemic nodes in the [financial] system by monitoring and analysing the main technologies, services and connections between financial sector institutions, service providers and in-house or third-party systems.</blockquote><p>Such maps, or those inventories voluntarily created by entities, can then be aggregated by the state, as well as allies and partners in their jurisdictions, to generate nationwide maps of software supply chains.</p><p>An expanded version of what the International Monetary Fund has hypothesised for the financial sector.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*1vZj9geNP4qtRWG_D674Tw.png" /><figcaption>(Source: <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Departmental-Papers-Policy-Papers/Issues/2019/09/23/Cybersecurity-Risk-Supervision-46238">International Monetary Fund</a>)</figcaption></figure><p>Honourable mention to the Cambridge Centre for Risk Studies for their map of the ‘world’s largest commercial companies and their trading relationships, showing the systemic linkages through major software providers’. From <em>2014</em>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*mgjHrgUTh4-Ot0nouzcGSQ.png" /><figcaption>How times have changed since, eh? (Source: <a href="https://www.jbs.cam.ac.uk/faculty-research/centres/risk/publications/technology-and-space/sybil-logic-bomb-cyber-catastrophe-stress-test-scenario/">Cambridge Centre for Risk Studies</a>)</figcaption></figure><p>Obviously, the preceding two graphics are simplifications and only feature (tech) vendors (not, eg, critical OSS packages) but their objective is kinda sorta along the lines of mine.</p><p>That is, understanding the flow of code/data/services and (trusted) relationships among different stakeholders that, <em>taken together</em>, touch on (inter)national security.</p><p>Identifying also those relationships or stakeholders that can <a href="https://www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/occasional/esrb.op16~f80ad1d83a.en.pdf">amplify</a> incidents at any point into something with systemic implications.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*pY9o0joHCmwEUXknjaUrEQ.png" /><figcaption>(Source: <a href="https://www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/occasional/esrb.op16~f80ad1d83a.en.pdf">European Systemic Risk Board</a>)</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*nkds9ZtQ8sJuhuIHG1KvtQ.png" /><figcaption>(Source: <a href="https://www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/occasional/esrb.op16~f80ad1d83a.en.pdf">European Systemic Risk Board</a>)</figcaption></figure><p>Which <a href="https://www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/occasional/esrb.op16~f80ad1d83a.en.pdf">is</a> especially vital when there is no transparency about network topologies (especially concentrations and monocultures), as well as sheer uncertainty if many screens suddenly go blue, eg, thanks to a very popular third party vendor for folks in a CNI sector.</p><p>What is also necessary is to <em>integrate</em> the desired technical software supply chain maps with those of ownership and other <em>non-cyber relationships</em> binding the same stakeholders. This will provide us, including allies and partners, an holistic understanding of how (inter)national security risk flows<em> through and from</em> relevant layers of cyberspace (like software supply chains), as well as other economic and social domains.</p><p>Take the below visualisation of the ‘financial sector as a multi-layered network of complex systems’, courtesy of the ESRB.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*cP4G1cKnM08HkflH9vXSaQ.png" /><figcaption>(Source: <a href="https://www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/occasional/esrb.op16~f80ad1d83a.en.pdf">European Systemic Risk Board</a>)</figcaption></figure><p>And a visualisation of how the different layers fit together.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*k8wbSojO7aAJj-1coFbaMg.png" /><figcaption>(Source: <a href="https://www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/reports/esrb.SystemiCyberRisk.220127~b6655fa027.en.pdf?bd2b11e760cff336f84c983133dd23dc">European Systemic Risk Board</a>)</figcaption></figure><p>As this case study highlights, the state is no stranger to such mapping exercises. Most of the above graphics are from ESRB literature on analysing systemic cyber risk to the European financial system from <em>2020</em> onwards. In it, the ESRB <a href="https://www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/reports/esrb.SystemiCyberRisk.220127~b6655fa027.en.pdf">has referred to</a> mapping efforts by the Dutch and Norwegian central banks. It has also called for prudential regulators to focus on herding the various arms of the state and industry stakeholders to ensure mapping exercises have meaningful outputs.</p><p>By the way, mapping is hardly an alien concept in national security policymaking, right, folks?</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?type=text%2Fhtml&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;schema=twitter&amp;url=https%3A//x.com/aaronbateman22/status/1808123374574383586&amp;image=" width="500" height="281" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/373ac4a1b03293763d41bfa480bbc240/href">https://medium.com/media/373ac4a1b03293763d41bfa480bbc240/href</a></iframe><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?type=text%2Fhtml&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;schema=twitter&amp;url=https%3A//x.com/aaronbateman22/status/1804868083913568348&amp;image=" width="500" height="281" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/a9b426f3e628b98714480d61056a5b51/href">https://medium.com/media/a9b426f3e628b98714480d61056a5b51/href</a></iframe><h3>— &gt; Exercises</h3><p>A comprehensive map of, essentially, a society’s digital economy is a national security enabler. Especially when integrated with maps of non-cyber stuff connecting the same stakeholders (as flagged above), as well as equivalent outputs from allies and partners.</p><p>Software supply chain mapping is an enabler of <em>more realistic</em> scenario planning, tabletop exercises and stress testing by: our national security policymakers and regulators; allied and partner counterparts; and other stakeholders, especially industry (which <a href="https://www.cisa.gov/topics/partnerships-and-collaboration">owns and operates</a> most CNI assets, and markets most software) and <a href="https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/news/lessons-xz-utils-achieving-more-sustainable-open-source-ecosystem">OSS folk</a>.</p><p>This mapping makes (regional and international) crisis response or stress testing frameworks like the EU systemic cyber incident coordination framework (<a href="https://www.esrb.europa.eu/news/pr/date/2022/html/esrb.pr.220127~f1548f677e.en.html">EU-SCICF</a>) or cyber resilience scenario testing (<a href="https://www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/reports/esrb.macroprudentialtoolscyberresilience220214~984a5ab3a7.en.pdf">CyRST</a>), respectively, meaningful.</p><p>For unless we know how our societies and economies’ plumbing is organised, we’re left with the below scenario.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?type=text%2Fhtml&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;schema=twitter&amp;url=https%3A//x.com/ravirockks/status/1697953395552956659&amp;image=" width="500" height="281" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/4900c9b2160d98977c08b35b59aef451/href">https://medium.com/media/4900c9b2160d98977c08b35b59aef451/href</a></iframe><p>Greater realism in planning would particularly stem from our, allies and partners’ newfound awareness of the weakest links in our software supply chains (akin to our knowing whom we are especially dependent on for critical medical inputs like active pharmaceutical ingredients).</p><p>Said awareness translates into a more informed estimation of what adversaries would seek to target to cripple our national/collective cyber/economic resilience (eg <a href="https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa24-038a">the Volt Typhoon scenario</a>) and how that targeting would interact with the non-cyber layers of our societies and economies.</p><p>After all, adversaries would especially seek to terminate the cybery stuff that we/allies/partners rely on <em>but</em> <em>they don’t </em>(to the same degree), as Professor JD Work highlights below.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?type=text%2Fhtml&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;schema=twitter&amp;url=https%3A//x.com/HostileSpectrum/status/1821163477911605608&amp;image=" width="500" height="281" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/bc2010eca8a410c02ce725e0344dab61/href">https://medium.com/media/bc2010eca8a410c02ce725e0344dab61/href</a></iframe><p>Mapping thus enables realistic threat modelling and helps ensure we aren’t caught flat-footed the next time something like the CrowdStrike incident-non-incident happens. Or at least something malicious.</p><p>Tangentially, we better keep said software supply chain maps far away from prying eyes, the infrastructural Rosetta Stones that they are for us, allies and partners.</p><p>By the way, another honourable mention to the Cambridge Centre for Risk Studies. <em>A</em> <em>decade ago,</em> they <a href="https://www.jbs.cam.ac.uk/faculty-research/centres/risk/publications/technology-and-space/sybil-logic-bomb-cyber-catastrophe-stress-test-scenario/">war-gamed</a> the fallout from an insider attack on a hypothetical ‘Systemically Important Technology Enterprise’ (logic bomb in the Sybil Corporation’s ‘database product used throughout the corporate world’; emphasis added):</p><blockquote>The resulting global macro-economic impact portends <em>an economic downturn driven by a reduced trust in IT</em> by business leaders, investors and consumers, which we call an ‘information malaise’.</blockquote><blockquote>The damage caused by the <em>more extreme variants of Sybil Logic Bomb is almost as severe as the Great Financial Crisis</em> of 2007–2012.</blockquote><p>‘Nuff said.</p><h3>Concentrations and Monocultures</h3><p>It is precisely the software supply chain mapping discussed above which enables us to spot concentrations and monocultures of the sorts <a href="https://cybersect.substack.com/p/bad-experts-on-the-crowdstrike-failure">warned</a> about in the aftermath of the CrowdStrike incident-non-incident.</p><p>It helps counter the problem which ONCD <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/2024-Report-on-the-Cybersecurity-Posture-of-the-United-States.pdf">defined</a> as follows (emphasis added):</p><blockquote>Complex and interconnected supply chains for software and other information technology and services, <em>combined with growing reliance on common third-party service providers</em>, create opportunities for sophisticated adversaries to <em>access victims at scale</em> and complicate the efforts of defenders to identify and manage cybersecurity risks.</blockquote><p>To return to the financial sector case study, the ESRB has seen the concentration issue coming. When it <a href="https://www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/reports/esrb.SystemiCyberRisk.220127~b6655fa027.en.pdf">suggested</a> a toolkit in <em>2022</em> for tackling systemic cyber risk, it called for financial regulators to track, eg (emphasis added):</p><blockquote>systemic nodes by size, complexity, <em>substitutability</em> and interconnectedness of institutions and third-party ICT providers, for example through <em>market concentration</em> of external IT service providers (in %), average number of cloud service providers and number of external IT service providers.</blockquote><p>The ESRB <a href="https://www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/reports/esrb.macroprudentialtoolscyberresilience220214~984a5ab3a7.en.pdf">suggested</a> in 2023 that a tabletop scenario for the financial sector could be developed around ‘a severe disruption at a critical third-party ICT service provider’.</p><p>Earlier this year, it <a href="https://www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/reports/esrb.report202404_advancingmacroprudentialtools~ca44cf0c8a.en.pdf">referred to</a> the downstream effects of the ION Trading ransomware attack as (emphasis added):</p><blockquote>a striking example of how an incident at a<em> relatively little-known</em> third-party provider (albeit one of great significance) can cause major disruption, if that institution <em>provides vital central services</em> through the financial industry’s supply chain.</blockquote><p>This is <a href="https://cdn.prod.website-files.com/660ab0cd271a25abeb800453/665a2c34ecb3eb73916dd380_CCPL_ITConventrationRisk.pdf">something</a> even governments <a href="https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2024-04/CSRB_Review_of_the_Summer_2023_MEO_Intrusion_Final_508c.pdf">have to</a> look at for <em>their own</em> cyber resilience.</p><p>Indeed, it is software supply chain mapping which enables the state to zero in on concentrated vendors like CrowdStrike, in relation to which it can task the collection of (further) economic intelligence.</p><p>In CrowdStrike’s case, intelligence on the industry dynamic of ‘platformisation’.</p><p>As Chris Hughes <a href="https://www.resilientcyber.io/p/systemic-concentrated-cyber-risks">pointed out</a>, the push for ‘platformisation’ by cyber resilience vendors — whereby a vendor seeks to offer, on a single platform, the services provided by other firms — encourages this trend. CrowdStrike itself refers to its Falcon platform as ‘Driving Consolidation’.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*2tBKbI1sZVwhDg0q0Hhi9g.png" /><figcaption>(Source: <a href="https://ir.crowdstrike.com/static-files/8ae4af6f-8d70-4c59-822d-c78b2bd43327">CrowdStrike</a>)</figcaption></figure><p>Palo Alto Networks has also dedicated a <a href="https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/why-paloaltonetworks/consolidation">section</a> of its website to the C-Word, publishing literature on why it’s a great idea and why you should task Palo with delivering a consolidated solution for your organisation.</p><p>Again, just look at the above screenshot from CrowdStrike. How doesn’t this industry trend of bringing multiple solutions under the one vendor’s roof engender <em>monocultures</em> if not concentrations, at least by <a href="https://www.resilientcyber.io/p/systemic-concentrated-cyber-risks">heightening</a> switching costs for customers?</p><p>That said, we should be careful when using a word like ‘monoculture’.</p><p>After all, between July 2021 and June 2022, CrowdStrike’s <a href="https://www.crowdstrike.com/resources/reports/idc-worldwide-modern-endpoint-security-market-share-report/">market share</a> for EDR was <em>17.7%</em>.</p><p>Yes, 8.5 million Windows boxes were estimated to have been <a href="https://blogs.microsoft.com/blog/2024/07/20/helping-our-customers-through-the-crowdstrike-outage/">bricked</a> in the incident-non-incident, but that’s <em>&lt;1% of all Windows boxes</em>. As <a href="https://cybersect.substack.com/p/bad-experts-on-the-crowdstrike-failure?utm_source=post-email-title&amp;publication_id=549478&amp;post_id=146833400&amp;utm_campaign=email-post-title&amp;isFreemail=true&amp;r=8snts&amp;triedRedirect=true&amp;utm_medium=email">pointed out</a> by Rob Graham, ‘1% is not a monoculture’.</p><p>Ditto re CrowdStrike’s market share.</p><p>So, to reiterate my earlier word choice, we have a <em>concentration</em> on our hands with CrowdStrike, <em>not a monoculture</em>. The M-word <a href="https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2024-04/CSRB_Review_of_the_Summer_2023_MEO_Intrusion_Final_508c.pdf">is</a> very much a Microsoft skillset.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?type=text%2Fhtml&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;schema=twitter&amp;url=https%3A//x.com/jamie_maguire1/status/1814775309214032341&amp;image=" width="500" height="281" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/77cf56cc0871d394c0ae96e335036db6/href">https://medium.com/media/77cf56cc0871d394c0ae96e335036db6/href</a></iframe><p>(<a href="https://zenaciti.com/software-monoculture/">Andrew Plato</a> and <a href="https://x.com/chrisrohlf/status/1814420619112419367">Chris Rohlf</a> provide some interesting arguments around the software monoculture question, by the way.)</p><p>Nomenclature notwithstanding, the issue at hand is the sheer number of (essential) services disrupted by CrowdStrike’s bad Rapid Response Content update. Indeed, of those <a href="https://www.aon.com/en/insights/articles/building-cyber-resilience-effectively-5-lessons">polled</a> by Aon at a webinar held a week after the incident-non-incident, 32% said they were ‘indirectly impacted’, just more than the 30% who said they were ‘directly impacted’.</p><p>The bad update from CrowdStrike did quite the dipsy-doodle around economies, eh?</p><p>It is precisely the aforementioned software supply chain mapping which enables us to identify the bits (or larger chunks) of our economies and societies that <em>any</em> concentration in software/services actually implicates.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?type=text%2Fhtml&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;schema=twitter&amp;url=https%3A//x.com/jfslowik/status/1814739033953870102&amp;image=" width="500" height="281" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/1e687ae691c102af79c7629c412fb2c6/href">https://medium.com/media/1e687ae691c102af79c7629c412fb2c6/href</a></iframe><p>Even though CrowdStrike’s client book is nowhere near as large as Microsoft’s, it is because (as discussed in <a href="https://atechnolegalupdate.medium.com/crowdstrikes-complicating-critical-infrastructure-cyber-resilience-bd1cbf86b786">Limb 2</a>) a fair deal of it is in <em>CNI</em> that we need to perform said mapping and ensure that, as the ESRB <a href="https://www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/reports/esrb.SystemiCyberRisk.220127~b6655fa027.en.pdf">declared</a> for the financial system:</p><blockquote>Systemic nodes … should operate with elevated levels of cyber resilience.</blockquote><p>As Kevin Beaumont <a href="https://doublepulsar.com/what-i-learned-from-the-microsoft-global-it-outage-d6138c06ebdb">put it</a>:</p><blockquote>… we have a small number of cyber companies effectively operating as God Mode on the world’s economy now.</blockquote><p>Oh, and Dan Geer <a href="https://www.schneier.com/essays/archives/2003/09/cyberinsecurity_the.html">especially</a> <a href="https://securityledger.com/2014/05/dan-geer-keynote-security-of-things-forum/">has</a> <a href="https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/it-is-time-to-act">been</a> <a href="https://www.privacywonk.net/2014/11/cybersecurity-as-realpolitik-by-dan-geer/">warning</a> about this sort of stuff (be it concentrations/monocultures/product security failures) for <em>years</em>.</p><p>As Dan <a href="https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/it-is-time-to-act">put it</a> in the wake of the CrowdStrike Falcon Fiasco, ‘It Is Time to Act’.</p><p>And, in explaining why this incident-non-incident has the ‘Thesis Trifecta’ for mine, I have attempted to provide workable law and policy reform recommendations on that front.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?type=text%2Fhtml&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;schema=twitter&amp;url=https%3A//x.com/ravirockks/status/1645221263399600129&amp;image=" width="500" height="281" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/a4194388ebfbc27fab34593eef65ea54/href">https://medium.com/media/a4194388ebfbc27fab34593eef65ea54/href</a></iframe><h3>Wrapping Up</h3><p>This saga, this incident-non-incident, this ‘CrowdStrike disaster’ (as Delta Air Lines’ counsel <a href="https://regmedia.co.uk/2024/08/08/delta_response_to_crowdstrike_letter.pdf">put it</a>), this great CrowdStrike Falcon Fiasco, was the SolarWinds moment for CrowdStrike — popping into the zeitgeist for all the wrong reasons.</p><p>And that too, not because of the merchandise.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*QLNnQuknYenD2ax0--OZew.png" /><figcaption>The most bizarre stocking stuffers. (Source: <a href="https://www.crowdstrikeswag.com/Accessories-C4.aspx">CrowdStrike</a>)</figcaption></figure><p>Or whatever this is.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?type=text%2Fhtml&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;schema=twitter&amp;url=https%3A//x.com/AJVicens/status/1821317773408288791&amp;image=" width="500" height="281" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/9e0d442f7286025ca4ab186ee7b286ac/href">https://medium.com/media/9e0d442f7286025ca4ab186ee7b286ac/href</a></iframe><p>Indeed, software supply chain-driven events like the incident-non-incident make me furrow my brow.</p><p>We are quite likely to threaten our collective existence because someone at a major vendor — which most ordinary folk haven’t heard of but is vital to key commercial/military supply chains — sends a bad update (malicious or not) to their customers that happen to be CNI asset operators/other systemically important businesses/entities.</p><p>An update which then bricks the boxes that most/all of those customers are using <em>en masse</em> because the boxes are sourced from the <em>one</em> company and are thus prone to being bricked by said bad update.</p><p>A cascading, systemically significant, outage (malicious or not) which traverses software supply chains and jeopardises the continuity of essential services <em>worldwide</em>.</p><p>All because of (a slew of) concentration(s) or monocultures in software supply chains that we have allowed (yes, <em>allowed</em>) to fester.</p><p>An outage like NotPetya (there’s a reason the GRU <a href="https://www.wired.com/story/notpetya-cyberattack-ukraine-russia-code-crashed-the-world/">targeted</a> Linkos Group’s update servers) but on an even larger scale.</p><p>Of course, as seen with the CrowdStrike incident-non-incident, jurisdictions have mitigating controls in place (like grounding planes out of caution or medics switching to pen and paper). And yes, we are resilient as a species.</p><p>But it would be good if we stopped testing that resilience beyond realistic (red team) exercises and coordinated stress tests.</p><p>We should instead be leveraging this golden opportunity to comprehensively recalibrate our policy settings. (And thanking CrowdStrike for bringing this imperative into ever sharper relief.)</p><p>For the solution is far larger than a vendor <a href="https://techcrunch.com/2024/07/24/crowdstrike-offers-a-10-apology-gift-card-to-say-sorry-for-outage/">paying off</a> overworked/burnt out IT staff — at the very customers that that vendor bricked — with minuscule food delivery vouchers. (That’s just grubby as heck, CrowdStrike.)</p><p>To bring this series home, here are two pithy quotes.</p><p>One, from the X user, Pinboard:</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?type=text%2Fhtml&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;schema=twitter&amp;url=https%3A//x.com/Pinboard/status/1814375375817879848&amp;image=" width="500" height="281" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/e4ec82fc23ee599d4691547ab3e338a2/href">https://medium.com/media/e4ec82fc23ee599d4691547ab3e338a2/href</a></iframe><p>Second, from software engineer, <a href="https://www.salon.com/1998/05/12/feature_321/">Ellen Ullman</a>:</p><blockquote>The computer was suddenly revealed as palimpsest. The machine that is everywhere hailed as the very incarnation of the new had revealed itself to be not so new after all, but a series of skins, layer on layer, winding around the messy, evolving idea of the computing machine ... And down under all those piles of stuff, the secret was written: We build our computers the way we build our cities — over time, without a plan, on top of ruins.</blockquote><p>Bah, come on, let’s end on an optimistic, if not wistful, note.</p><p>The vision which ONCD <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/ONCD-Strategic-Intent.pdf">imagined</a> in 2021:</p><blockquote>No single component is a source of catastrophic risk, no one Achilles heel is waiting to unleash cascading, systemic failure, and no minor slip-up is capable of producing a massive breach in privacy.</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*UMfOqD13pcLo18VrhOxCGQ.png" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=84ae2b555dd2" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Tangos in the Tangled Web]]></title>
            <link>https://atechnolegalupdate.medium.com/tangos-in-the-tangled-web-9e7092367222?source=rss-2c8c011d69de------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/9e7092367222</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[supply-chain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[international-relations]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[regulation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[national-security]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[A Techno-Legal Update]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 08 Aug 2024 12:40:46 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-12-10T08:44:31.609Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Curated by Ravi Nayyar</h4><p>Since software supply chain risks to national security especially came to prominence during the great CrowdStrike Falcon Fiasco of 2024, here’s a collection of my work on the subject.</p><p><em>My interview about my research on the sidelines of the Australian Cyber Conference 2024</em></p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2F3XUY368zf4Q%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;display_name=YouTube&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3D3XUY368zf4Q&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2F3XUY368zf4Q%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="854" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/5eabc8330c053e8c6a3ba07f075cbc57/href">https://medium.com/media/5eabc8330c053e8c6a3ba07f075cbc57/href</a></iframe><p><em>My 2024 series on the CrowdStrike Falcon Fiasco</em></p><ul><li><a href="https://atechnolegalupdate.medium.com/crowdstrikes-crowning-kerfuffle-af4e226baf4b">CrowdStrike’s Crowning Kerfuffle</a></li><li><a href="https://atechnolegalupdate.medium.com/crowdstrikes-complicating-critical-infrastructure-cyber-resilience-bd1cbf86b786">CrowdStrike’s Complicating Critical Infrastructure Cyber Resilience</a></li><li><a href="https://atechnolegalupdate.medium.com/crowdstrikes-corporate-citizenship-making-mapping-matter-84ae2b555dd2">CrowdStrike’s Corporate Citizenship: Making Mapping Matter</a></li></ul><p><em>My review of the 2023–2030 Australian Cyber Security Strategy</em></p><p><a href="https://atechnolegalupdate.medium.com/the-cessation-of-strayas-cyber-somnolence-yeah-nah-281d9e64b594">The Cessation of Straya’s Cyber Somnolence? Yeah, Nah</a></p><p><em>My 2023 presentation at CyberCon on my PhD research</em></p><p><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/posts/stillromancingwithlife_the-tangled-web-critical-software-and-cni-activity-7120893021172207616-gNfH">Ravi Nayyar on LinkedIn: The Tangled Web: Critical Software and CNI Law</a></p><p><em>My 2023 papers from my Guest Fellowship at the German Institute for Global and Area Studies on the geopolitics of software supply chain security</em></p><ul><li>Working paper</li></ul><p><a href="https://www.giga-hamburg.de/en/publications/contributions/quad-carved-code-collaborating-deliver-public">The Quad: Carved in Code: Collaborating to Deliver the Greatest Public Good</a></p><ul><li>Policy brief</li></ul><p><a href="https://www.giga-hamburg.de/en/publications/contributions/quad-carved-code-shaping-inter-national-security-reshaping-economic-incentives">The Quad: Carved in Code: Shaping (Inter)national Security through Reshaping Economic Incentives</a></p><ul><li>Op-ed</li></ul><p><a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/quad-tackling-spider-not-cobwebs-cyberspace">The Quad: Tackling the spider, not cobwebs, in cyberspace</a></p><p><em>My 2022 submission to the Australian prudential regulator</em></p><p><a href="https://atechnolegalupdate.medium.com/advice-to-apra-dont-gloss-over-oss-8dc5a18734bd">Advice to APRA: Don’t Gloss over OSS</a></p><p><em>My 2022 piece on the imperative to tame software supply chains</em></p><p><a href="https://atechnolegalupdate.medium.com/the-pursuit-of-lucidity-in-the-labyrinth-df33b6f7e061">The Pursuit of Lucidity in the Labyrinth</a></p><p>Any feedback is most welcome!</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*IC86Qfk_I73aJOpmv3ZsUA.jpeg" /><figcaption>(Source: Me)</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*xzPSCsyOcRtiEdWvpo-LxA.png" /><figcaption>(Source: ‘The Tangled Web’, <em>Yes Prime Minister (British Broadcasting Corporation, 1988) 00:14:37–00:14:40)</em></figcaption></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9e7092367222" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[CrowdStrike’s Complicating Critical Infrastructure Cyber Resilience]]></title>
            <link>https://atechnolegalupdate.medium.com/crowdstrikes-complicating-critical-infrastructure-cyber-resilience-bd1cbf86b786?source=rss-2c8c011d69de------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/bd1cbf86b786</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[infrastructure]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[national-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[governance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[regulation]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[A Techno-Legal Update]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 07 Aug 2024 08:36:45 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-01-06T08:16:41.181Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>By Ravi Nayyar</h4><p>Welcome to Article 2 in this series on the CrowdStrike incident-non-incident.</p><p>(Here’s Article 1, by the way.)</p><p><a href="https://atechnolegalupdate.medium.com/crowdstrikes-crowning-kerfuffle-af4e226baf4b">CrowdStrike’s Crowning Kerfuffle</a></p><p>As I wrote in that one, the way I label the CrowdStrike saga is inspired by the choice of wording from the then-Commonwealth Minister for Home Affairs.</p><p>As I also flagged in that piece, this incident-non-incident, the great CrowdStrike Falcon Fiasco, is the case study which my thesis was designed for.</p><p>Look at the below graphic, inspired by my 2023 Cybercon <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/posts/stillromancingwithlife_the-tangled-web-critical-software-and-cni-activity-7120893021172207616-gNfH/">preso</a>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*qeLLn6fnzz65XGqFoVJ14w.png" /><figcaption>My PhD in a graphic. (Source: Me)</figcaption></figure><p>3 regulatory circles pertaining to:</p><ol><li>the cyber resilience of critical infrastructure (‘CNI’) assets;</li><li>software supply chain risk management (‘SCRM’) by CNI operators; and</li><li>critical software risk to CNI assets (<strong>my thesis</strong>).</li></ol><p>With this in mind, the CrowdStrike incident-non-incident has the ‘Thesis Trifecta’ for me:</p><ol><li>a critical software vendor messing up; which jeopardises</li><li>the cyber resilience of the operators of critical infrastructure (‘CNI’) assets; and thus captures</li><li>the incredible risks to national security from software supply chains.</li></ol><p>To nut out the Trifecta, I’ve written three pieces: one on each Limb.</p><p><a href="https://atechnolegalupdate.medium.com/crowdstrikes-crowning-kerfuffle-af4e226baf4b">Article 1</a> set the scene with Limb 1 — the anatomy of the stuff-up from a critical software vendor, CrowdStrike.</p><p>Article 2 dives into Limb 2 — how CNI asset operators were caught up in this saga.</p><p>Let’s begin, shall we?</p><h3>A <em>Lot </em>Happened</h3><p>Mr Cimpanu <a href="https://news.risky.biz/risky-biz-news-crowdstrike-faulty-update-affects-8-5-million-windows-systems/?ref=risky-business-news-newsletter">provided</a> an excellent summary of how this incident-non-incident disrupted the cyber resilience of the operators of CNI assets around the world:</p><blockquote><a href="https://x.com/arommelaere/status/1814586889560830402?ref=news.risky.biz">Planes were grounded</a> across several countries, <a href="https://www.foxbusiness.com/live-news/tech-outage-hits-911-hospitals-banks-and-exchanges-live-updates?ref=news.risky.biz">911 emergency systems</a> went down, <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/crowdstrike-mass-it-outage-us-hospitals-cancel-some-surgeries-procedures-2024-7?ref=news.risky.biz">hospitals canceled medical procedures</a>, <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/banks-scramble-to-repair-damage-caused-by-crowdstrike-it-outage-2024-7?ref=news.risky.biz">ATMs went offline</a>, <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/company/corporate-trends/microsoft-cloud-outage-from-atms-to-stock-trading-and-flights-epic-it-crash-leaves-trail-of-chaos/articleshow/111875663.cms?from=mdr&amp;ref=news.risky.biz">stock trading stopped</a>, <a href="https://www.security.nl/posting/850471/Bussen+in+Utrecht%2C+Amersfoort+en+Almere+geschrapt+wegens+storing?ref=news.risky.biz">buses</a> and <a href="https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-13654173/crowdstrike-outage-trains-london-stations-ticket-machines-scanners.html?ref=news.risky.biz">trains were delayed</a>, <a href="https://www.tradewindsnews.com/ports/here-are-the-ports-and-shipping-companies-impacted-by-the-global-crowdstrike-software-outage/2-1-1680541?zephr_sso_ott=flXsMD&amp;ref=news.risky.biz">ships got stuck in ports</a>, <a href="https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-13654199/crowdstrike-outage-world-airports-borders-hospitals.html?ref=news.risky.biz">border and customs checks stopped</a>, Windows-based <a href="https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/microsoft/microsoft-windows-365-cloud-pcs-stuck-restarting-after-crowdstrike-update/?ref=news.risky.biz">online services went down</a> (eg. <a href="https://www.icann.org/en/announcements/details/icanns-email-service-restored-20-07-2024-en?ref=news.risky.biz">ICANN</a>), and there’s even an unconfirmed report that one nuclear facility was affected.</blockquote><p>A number of CNI sectors represented right there.</p><p>To drive it home (albeit without Andy and Gazey), here’s how US airspace changed.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?type=text%2Fhtml&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;schema=twitter&amp;url=https%3A//x.com/US_Stormwatch/status/1814268813879206397&amp;image=" width="500" height="281" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/754fbf1464ce1a42b19ba3d352dc5e53/href">https://medium.com/media/754fbf1464ce1a42b19ba3d352dc5e53/href</a></iframe><p>As part of the disruption of flights around the world, a number of travellers (including fellow Australians) <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-07-22/australians-stranded-overseas-due-to-tech-outage/104123768">were left stranded</a>. The refund bills awaiting airlines, especially in <a href="https://infosec.exchange/@ravirockks/112821862199824089">the</a> <a href="https://www.securityweek.com/most-airlines-except-one-are-recovering-from-the-crowdstrike-tech-outage-the-feds-have-noticed/">US</a>, are <em>eyewatering</em>. Delta Air Lines <a href="https://regmedia.co.uk/2024/08/08/delta_response_to_crowdstrike_letter.pdf">says</a> the incident-non-incident (‘the CrowdStrike disaster’ as the airline’s counsel calls it) bricked <em>over</em> <em>37,000</em> computers and affected over <em>1.3 million</em> Delta customers.</p><p>UK general practitioners <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/society/article/2024/jul/21/nhs-warns-of-considerable-backlog-in-gp-services-after-global-it-outage">could not access</a> patient EHRs because the relevant SaaS solution was down, forcing the NHS to revert to manual procedures. As if it (and the <a href="https://www.blood.co.uk/news-and-campaigns/news-and-statements/nhs-calls-national-blood-shortage-amber-alert/">UK’s national blood supply</a>) already wasn’t under enough <a href="https://www.england.nhs.uk/london/2024/07/25/update-on-cyber-incident-clinical-impact-in-south-east-london-thursday-25-july/">stress</a> from the ransomware attack against Synnovis.</p><p>(On the nuclear facility stuff, note that the: US Nuclear Regulatory Commission <a href="https://fedscoop.com/federal-government-agencies-affected-by-worldwide-it-outage/">said</a>, ‘U.S. commercial nuclear facilities reported that they are operating safely’; and US National Nuclear Security Administration <a href="https://fedscoop.com/federal-government-agencies-affected-by-worldwide-it-outage/">said</a> around the time of the event that the Department of Energy ‘is working with CrowdStrike, Microsoft, and federal, state, local, and critical infrastructure partners to fully assess and address system outage’, whatever that means.)</p><p>The following meme also made the rounds.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/776/1*2Sh5ah2o2_as0AkM_oQChA.png" /><figcaption>Asset = Liability. (Source: <a href="https://x.com/TimMedin/status/1814326202334613633">X</a>)</figcaption></figure><p>On top of pretty much everything running on Microsoft products (like Windows), we have CrowdStrike acting as one of the <em>very few</em> critical points of failure. An EDR vendor of choice for quite a few CNI people around the world.</p><p>The Office of the National Cyber Director <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/2024-Report-on-the-Cybersecurity-Posture-of-the-United-States.pdf">called out</a> this sort of risk in <em>May</em>:</p><blockquote>Critical infrastructure owners and operators rely on third-party service providers to manage key aspects of their digital operations.</blockquote><p>Now, while this incident-non-incident was not <em>destructive</em> like NotPetya (thank goodness), the <em>disruption</em> was certainly more widespread, given the <a href="https://blogs.microsoft.com/blog/2024/07/20/helping-our-customers-through-the-crowdstrike-outage/">estimate</a> of 8.5 million Windows machines being affected. And even then, remediation advice was out within hours and CrowdStrike <a href="https://www.crowdstrike.com/falcon-content-update-remediation-and-guidance-hub/">said</a> over 97% of those boxes were back up and running within a week.</p><p>As Rob Graham <a href="https://cybersect.substack.com/p/bad-experts-on-the-crowdstrike-failure">put it</a>, ‘This disruption was broad, but not deep’.</p><p>That said, as Rob highlights, these stats <a href="https://cybersect.substack.com/p/bad-experts-on-the-crowdstrike-failure">do not change</a> the fact that CrowdStrike customers, including CNI operators, were bricked thanks to a catastrophic unforced error <em>from their ‘trusted’ EDR vendor</em>.</p><p>And it is because those <em>CNI operator-customers’</em> Windows boxes were bricked by their vendor that this incident-non-incident is especially unforgivable.</p><p>Brian in Pittsburgh captured it quite well.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?type=text%2Fhtml&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;schema=twitter&amp;url=https%3A//x.com/arekfurt/status/1816060340238492018&amp;image=" width="500" height="281" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/2e0d758a16f3ad63bba94417456b851c/href">https://medium.com/media/2e0d758a16f3ad63bba94417456b851c/href</a></iframe><p>As the CISA Director <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/ode-outage-jen-easterly-2dcse/">explained</a> in her write-up:</p><blockquote>… our nation’s critical infrastructure … is, broadly speaking: highly digitized, highly interdependent, highly connected, and highly vulnerable.</blockquote><p>And this reality is brought into unfortunately sharp relief whenever disruptions of the cyber resilience of CNI asset operators occur, malicious or otherwise. Especially so during the incident-non-incident.</p><p>If the stakes were already high because we’re talking about a critical software vendor messing up (<a href="https://atechnolegalupdate.medium.com/crowdstrikes-crowning-kerfuffle-af4e226baf4b">Limb 1</a>), they’re <em>heightened</em> thanks to the operators of CNI assets having to clean up that mess (Limb 2).</p><p>Just look at the <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/definitions/uscode.php?width=840&amp;height=800&amp;iframe=true&amp;def_id=42-USC-616744004-48891172&amp;term_occur=999&amp;term_src=title:42:chapter:68:subchapter:IV%E2%80%93B:section:5195c">definition</a> of CNI itself under 42 USC § 5195c(e) (emphasis added):</p><blockquote>… systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, <em>so vital</em> to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets <em>would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination</em> of those matters.</blockquote><p>‘Nuff said.</p><h3>Sending in the Cavalry</h3><p>To thankfully reiterate, the CrowdStrike incident-non-incident was <em>not</em> a NotPetya.</p><p>Nonetheless, given the scale of the (potential) disruption here — CrowdStrike’s customer book features CNI operators — governments mobilised their national crisis response mechanisms to coordinate what can be described as, collectively, the largest incident response exercise in history.</p><p>Our National Coordination Mechanism (a public-private crisis response coordination <a href="https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/about-us/our-portfolios/emergency-management/about-emergency-management/national-coordination-mechanism">forum</a>) convened four times and was briefed by CrowdStrike.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?type=text%2Fhtml&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;schema=twitter&amp;url=https%3A//x.com/ClareONeilMP/status/1814235546060829168&amp;image=" width="500" height="281" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/7910dc39d3aeff8458e78894019b458f/href">https://medium.com/media/7910dc39d3aeff8458e78894019b458f/href</a></iframe><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?type=text%2Fhtml&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;schema=twitter&amp;url=https%3A//x.com/ClareONeilMP/status/1814453188944445733&amp;image=" width="500" height="281" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/df78244af8f86016d2cd9b132aebfe60/href">https://medium.com/media/df78244af8f86016d2cd9b132aebfe60/href</a></iframe><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?type=text%2Fhtml&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;schema=twitter&amp;url=https%3A//x.com/ClareONeilMP/status/1814861822824227164&amp;image=" width="500" height="281" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/f26752e93588d7eeeb4cceff786f4dd7/href">https://medium.com/media/f26752e93588d7eeeb4cceff786f4dd7/href</a></iframe><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?type=text%2Fhtml&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;schema=twitter&amp;url=https%3A//x.com/ClareONeilMP/status/1815288634582646984&amp;image=" width="500" height="281" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/ef91bf1c7ba8231571a06af6bac9cb3a/href">https://medium.com/media/ef91bf1c7ba8231571a06af6bac9cb3a/href</a></iframe><p>The Poms triggered COBR.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?type=text%2Fhtml&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;schema=twitter&amp;url=https%3A//x.com/patmcfaddenmp/status/1814234426923991522&amp;image=" width="500" height="281" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/fd2494ff2c8d329243ea3e629a1f7663/href">https://medium.com/media/fd2494ff2c8d329243ea3e629a1f7663/href</a></iframe><p>The Yanks quickly <a href="https://therecord.media/it-teams-scramble-recover-crowdstrike">set up</a> an interagency task force (can’t recall a Cyber Unified Coordination Group being set up for this one as it <a href="https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-22-104746">was</a> for SolarWinds?). Deputy NSA for Cyber and Emerging Technology, Anne Neuberger’s, day started at 4 am ‘with a call from the [White House] Situation Room’.</p><p>Governments weren’t going to leave anything to chance when cleaning up after CrowdStrike with the private sector. And rightly so.</p><p>Which made clear how important this event was in signalling, especially to governments, the risks to CNI cyber resilience from the assets’ software supply chains.</p><p>And hey, the collection of national incident response work <a href="https://therecord.media/it-teams-scramble-recover-crowdstrike">was a great sign</a> in terms of public-private coordination mechanisms becoming more effective.</p><p>Yes, by necessity, given the <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/2024-Report-on-the-Cybersecurity-Posture-of-the-United-States.pdf">realities</a> of CNI being owned and operated largely by the private sector and thus requiring ‘a national cybersecurity posture rooted in public-private action, collaboration, and partnership’.</p><p>But still really good to see, especially compared to, say, ten years ago.</p><h4>Messaging</h4><p>Speaking of the role of government in that public-private partnership, may I point out that the messaging from governments, at least mine, has been a tad weird on this incident-non-incident?</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?type=text%2Fhtml&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;schema=twitter&amp;url=https%3A//x.com/ClareONeilMP/status/1814235548476731485&amp;image=" width="500" height="281" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/1cc854f460641cc096725bf3c66f672d/href">https://medium.com/media/1cc854f460641cc096725bf3c66f672d/href</a></iframe><p>It was presented by the then-<em>Minister</em> merely as a mistake made by the vendor which then ‘issued a fix’.</p><p>While those words were true, come on, this <a href="https://x.com/vxunderground/status/1814267016699576369">was</a> a de facto ransomware attack from a ‘trusted vendor’, triggering national crisis response mechanisms for more than one meeting because of the disruptive effect on CNI assets. And the ‘Our technological dependencies are big sources of risk’ messaging was trotted out.</p><p>Which made these two later posts by the then-Minister contradictory.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?type=text%2Fhtml&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;schema=twitter&amp;url=https%3A//x.com/ClareONeilMP/status/1814861830118121833&amp;image=" width="500" height="281" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/27f99b3110168ea3d81a08de1c6bc7ec/href">https://medium.com/media/27f99b3110168ea3d81a08de1c6bc7ec/href</a></iframe><p>On the one hand, ‘it will take time until all affected sectors are completely back online’. On the other, ‘There is no impact to critical infrastructure’.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?type=text%2Fhtml&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;schema=twitter&amp;url=https%3A//x.com/AlboMP/status/1814220388920078506&amp;image=" width="500" height="281" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/c6c14bb058af72e759c5e3d235765b8e/href">https://medium.com/media/c6c14bb058af72e759c5e3d235765b8e/href</a></iframe><p>The <em>Prime Minister </em>similarly said, ‘There is no impact to critical infrastructure’.</p><p>How so, especially when:</p><ul><li>payments processing <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-07-20/australians-hit-by-global-crowdstrike-it-outage/104120736">was down</a>;</li><li>domestic airports’ operations <a href="https://www.9news.com.au/national/microsoft-crowdstrike-outage-aussies-stranded-as-global-outage-shuts-down-flights-airports/ffec5ca0-3a28-47cf-87e9-dd6020cf6cda">were disrupted</a> (with Jetstar cancelling all its flights in Australia and New Zealand);</li><li>self-checkouts <a href="https://7news.com.au/news/chaos-strikes-coles-woolworths-and-more-australian-retailers-during-global-it-outage-c-15409393">weren’t working</a> at outlets of Coles and Woolworths (both <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.au/F2021L01769/latest/text">designated</a> by the Commonwealth as critical supermarket retailers); and</li><li>the ABC and Sky News were <a href="https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-13650487/Microsoft-crowdstrike-outage-abc-sky-news.html">unable</a> to (normally) broadcast?</li></ul><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?type=text%2Fhtml&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;schema=twitter&amp;url=https%3A//x.com/andy_park/status/1814176879961842157&amp;image=" width="500" height="281" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/75a0c6c6668e37866218e5555bbecf8d/href">https://medium.com/media/75a0c6c6668e37866218e5555bbecf8d/href</a></iframe><p>But then again, I understand that governments like mine didn’t want mass panic from something which was clearly non-malicious. They were rightly saying that this was on CrowdStrike (and not <em>directly</em> on the state — see more on that front in <a href="https://atechnolegalupdate.medium.com/crowdstrikes-corporate-citizenship-making-mapping-matter-84ae2b555dd2">Limb 3</a>).</p><p>Also, there are <a href="https://therecord.media/uk-election-campaigns-ignore-london-attacks">no votes</a> in cyber resilience, so there was little point in governments making themselves the face of responding to a crisis from an unforced error by a company few civilians have even heard of.</p><p>(Separately, there has been some chatter about whether the Australian <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.au/C2018A00029/latest/text"><em>Security of Critical Infrastructure Act 2018</em></a><em> </em>(Cth) (‘<em>SOCI Act</em>’) needs reform because of this incident-non-incident. I <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/posts/stillromancingwithlife_but-the-legislation-doesnt-cover-the-broader-activity-7222099988569284609-Kcjf">say</a>, ‘Nah’.)</p><h3>But Don’t Forget the Core Issue Here</h3><p>We can talk about the state sending in the cavalry to coordinate national incident response all we like, but I return to the issue at the heart of this incident-non-incident:</p><p><strong>The critical software vendor <em>should not have messed up</em> in the first place (as argued in </strong><a href="https://atechnolegalupdate.medium.com/crowdstrikes-crowning-kerfuffle-af4e226baf4b"><strong>Limb 1</strong></a><strong>).</strong></p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?type=text%2Fhtml&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;schema=twitter&amp;url=https%3A//x.com/ravirockks/status/1680081511784267776&amp;image=" width="500" height="281" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/f02191d3422d4fa8c5b163bd928531fa/href">https://medium.com/media/f02191d3422d4fa8c5b163bd928531fa/href</a></iframe><p>Folks, if you follow me <a href="https://x.com/ravirockks">on</a> <a href="https://infosec.exchange/@ravirockks">social</a> <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/stillromancingwithlife/">media</a>, you will see my regularly railing against the quality of software SCRM by CNI asset operators, my calling for better oversight of vendors and all that; especially with the number of SCRM regs out there, such as under the <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.au/F2023L00112/asmade/text">SOCI framework</a> and <em>CPSes </em><a href="https://www.legislation.gov.au/F2016L01436/asmade/text"><em>231</em></a> &amp; <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.au/F2018L01745/asmade/text"><em>234</em></a> over here.</p><p>This is on top of the number of attacks against CNI assets via critical software products running on them (see Appendix), as well as the deteriorating threat environment for software supply chains, especially <a href="https://openssf.org/blog/2024/04/15/open-source-security-openssf-and-openjs-foundations-issue-alert-for-social-engineering-takeovers-of-open-source-projects/">open</a> <a href="https://medium.com/checkmarx-security/over-170k-users-affected-by-attack-using-fake-python-infrastructure-05a04b7e058a">source </a><a href="https://blog.phylum.io/q1-2024-evolution-of-software-supply-chain-security-report/">software</a> (we all know about the luckily-averted xz utils debacle).</p><p>An idealist, I want CNI asset operators to be able to audit the living daylights out of their critical software vendors (that’s kinda my thesis). If they can’t perform that auditing/have it done by an independent third party, well, they might as well be trying to feel their way around in the dark with both hands tied behind their backs.</p><p>To reiterate Kevin Beaumont’s <a href="https://doublepulsar.com/what-i-learned-from-the-microsoft-global-it-outage-d6138c06ebdb">point</a>, there is nowhere near the necessary level of transparency from cyber vendors like CrowdStrike about their code and procedures, and I’d safely assume that that can be extended to <em>all</em> software vendors. Kinda what the European Commission argued in its <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52022SC0282&amp;qid=1722850814202">impact assessment</a> accompanying the proposal for the <em>Cyber Resilience Act </em>(emphasis added):</p><blockquote>While fewer vulnerabilities in products with digital elements and more transparency on the side of manufacturers as regards the security properties and secure use of products would not eliminate such costs altogether, more secure hardware and software and <em>better documentation and instructions</em> could lead to a notable reduction in costs.</blockquote><p>This incident-non-incident is pretty much on CrowdStrike for failing to adequately test what it swings into customers’ kernels, and to allow customers to review the vendor’s update procedures and make patch management decisions accordingly.</p><p>A breach of trust all the more galling, given that EDR customers are on a hiding to nothing — the solution <a href="https://www.theregister.com/2024/07/23/crowdstrike_lessons_to_learn/">cannot be</a>, ‘Do not have cyber resilience controls and do not install updates from your vendor’.</p><h4>Solutions, People!</h4><p>So, it’s clear that more vendor transparency is required.</p><p>But how are we to attain it?</p><p>Well, while we impatiently await governments mandating that transparency from <em>all</em> software vendors — at least to customers that operate CNI assets — through <em>legislative</em> reform, one piece of low-hanging fruit is for antitrust agencies to expressly authorise CNI asset operators to collectively bargain with their vendors to ensure that the latter meet minimum SDLC hygiene and other product security requirements.</p><p>Indeed, the NCSC CTO, Ollie Whitehouse, <a href="https://youtu.be/d02zUEu7AYU?si=iCYb_25u_zjWvmXv&amp;t=915">suggested</a> this measure to leverage market forces.</p><p>Antitrust folk justifiably identify this incident-non-incident as reflective of dangerous concentrations that are allowed to build up and jeopardise national (economic) security (the subject of <a href="https://atechnolegalupdate.medium.com/crowdstrikes-corporate-citizenship-making-mapping-matter-84ae2b555dd2">Limb 3</a>).</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?type=text%2Fhtml&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;schema=twitter&amp;url=https%3A//x.com/linakhanFTC/status/1814395610788929649&amp;image=" width="500" height="281" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/22e46b70013680e09ad6500a9d798b9a/href">https://medium.com/media/22e46b70013680e09ad6500a9d798b9a/href</a></iframe><p>Which is why antitrust folk must specifically say that said collective bargaining is okay to provide certainty to CNI asset operators’ lawyers as they try to make sense of their relationships with large(r) software vendors, especially critical software vendors.</p><p>As I said, it’s low-hanging fruit.</p><p>All the more so, considering the dearth of progress on this front, as Ollie <a href="https://youtu.be/d02zUEu7AYU?si=iCYb_25u_zjWvmXv&amp;t=915">pointed out</a>:</p><blockquote>… how we cohere the voice of what is the accepted minimum now in these systems, I think, we have yet to go.</blockquote><h3>CNI Asset Operators Can’t Fob Off Governance to Vendors</h3><p>That all said, <em>no one</em> has clean hands here.</p><p>CNI people can’t outsource their own cyber governance to their critical software vendors, critical dependence notwithstanding.</p><p>As someone in industry pointed out to me, all software end-users, especially in CNI sectors, ought to create robust test environments. It’s cheaper to test updates from vendors relative to commissioning and/or performing vendor auditing, which costs a lot, takes a while, is fraught and is unlikely to lead to rapid change in vendor practices. On the other hand, customers can swiftly test an update and, if it’s a dud, they can ring up the vendor who can then (fingers crossed) de-dud the update, protecting customer production environments.</p><p><em>The Register </em>has a <a href="https://www.theregister.com/2024/07/23/crowdstrike_lessons_to_learn/">great piece</a> on the lessons that organisations need to learn regarding patch management, especially literacy in their vendors’ update policies.</p><p>Kevin Beaumont also had some good questions for admins preparing for the next (inevitable) incident-non-incident.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*aQoP5Df7pX1exhamVRATCQ.png" /><figcaption>How prepared are orgs to answer these questions? (Source: <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/posts/kevin-beaumont-security_although-the-crowdstrike-incident-isnt-a-activity-7220215309327106048-5kUH">LinkedIn</a>)</figcaption></figure><p>The imperative for customers to wisen up at their ends are reinforced by Brian in Pittsburgh’s <a href="https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1819663059939443015.html">excellent thread</a> on the realities of software SCRM for CNI asset operators. (I’ve popped two posts from the thread below.)</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?type=text%2Fhtml&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;schema=twitter&amp;url=https%3A//x.com/arekfurt/status/1819663080504140181&amp;image=" width="500" height="281" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/e254e7ed0b9844c74ba2b70655523e21/href">https://medium.com/media/e254e7ed0b9844c74ba2b70655523e21/href</a></iframe><p>In terms of CNI people keeping their own noses clean, CrowdStrike has alleged (in a letter dated 4 August from counsel to Delta Air Lines’s legal team) that the airline resides in a glass mansion (<a href="https://atechnolegalupdate.medium.com/crowdstrikes-crowning-kerfuffle-af4e226baf4b">Limb 1</a> went through the two companies’ battle of lawyers’ letters).</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?type=text%2Fhtml&amp;key=d04bfffea46d4aeda930ec88cc64b87c&amp;schema=twitter&amp;url=https%3A//x.com/David_Slotnick/status/1820286332347760672&amp;image=" width="500" height="281" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/5ce9e2488d9e2577d8454b443cfd5ee3/href">https://medium.com/media/5ce9e2488d9e2577d8454b443cfd5ee3/href</a></iframe><p>Even Microsoft has <a href="https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/25033223/2024-08-06-msft-letter-to-delta.pdf">said</a> in a letter (dated 6 August) from counsel, ‘Glass Mansion, mate’ (emphasis added):</p><blockquote>… on Wednesday, July 24, Microsoft CEO Satya Nadella emailed Delta CEO Ed Bastian, who has never replied.</blockquote><blockquote>… to understand why other airlines were able to fully restore business operations so much faster than Delta ... Our preliminary review suggests that <em>Delta, unlike its competitors, apparently has not modernized its IT infrastructure</em>, either for the benefit of its customers or for its pilots and flight attendants.</blockquote><p>In a letter dated 8 August, Delta’s counsel has <a href="https://regmedia.co.uk/2024/08/08/delta_response_to_crowdstrike_letter.pdf">replied</a> tersely to CrowdStrike’s lawyers.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?type=text%2Fhtml&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;schema=twitter&amp;url=https%3A//x.com/David_Slotnick/status/1821639169468219445&amp;image=" width="500" height="281" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/87ca77fadc1a5978d0896049abf6f065/href">https://medium.com/media/87ca77fadc1a5978d0896049abf6f065/href</a></iframe><p>I’ve included this extract from the 8 August letter because it underlines why software SCRM is so important:</p><blockquote>Contrary to your [CrowdStrike’s] misrepresentation of Delta’s technology, the reason for Delta’s disproportionate experience relative to other airlines, was its reliance on CrowdStrike and Microsoft. <em>Approximately 60 percent of Delta’s mission-critical applications and their associated data — including Delta’s redundant backup systems</em> — depend on the Microsoft Windows operating system and CrowdStrike.</blockquote><p>Indeed, to return to the section heading, ‘CNI Asset Operators Can’t Fob Off Governance to Vendors’.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?type=text%2Fhtml&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;schema=twitter&amp;url=https%3A//x.com/HostileSpectrum/status/1821848812396122585&amp;image=" width="500" height="281" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/105742232979a7bebdb27905db8ee3eb/href">https://medium.com/media/105742232979a7bebdb27905db8ee3eb/href</a></iframe><p>To continue interrogating cyber governance by OT operators (like airlines) with respect to critical software products, folks, what does the CrowdStrike Falcon Fiasco mean for the <em>accelerating</em> IT-OT convergence?</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?type=text%2Fhtml&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;schema=twitter&amp;url=https%3A//x.com/Aaron_PE_/status/1814456601983496510&amp;image=" width="500" height="281" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/34519c726d04c1106eeddb9d881eafbd/href">https://medium.com/media/34519c726d04c1106eeddb9d881eafbd/href</a></iframe><h4>KISSing Is Wonderful</h4><p>As part of driving home (albeit without Andy and Gazey) the importance of CNI asset operators taking charge of their own cyber resilience, the incident-non-incident reinforces the criticality for them to <strong>Keep It Simple, Stupid</strong>.</p><p>For starters, having comprehensive asset and credential (okay, at least BitLocker key) inventories.</p><p>Far easier to execute BCPs if you know what and where your endpoints (and BitLocker keys) are.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?type=text%2Fhtml&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;schema=twitter&amp;url=https%3A//x.com/ErrataRob/status/1814574544536932724&amp;image=" width="500" height="281" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/3cd2bfd59cace03d85b1ced3339f4cdd/href">https://medium.com/media/3cd2bfd59cace03d85b1ced3339f4cdd/href</a></iframe><p>Linked with that, this saga has shown the criticality of doing realistic DFIR exercises, including with your material third party vendors, using these to develop robust BCPs and then rehearsing said BCPs regularly.</p><p>Indeed, this incident-non-incident showed what BCPs are meant for.</p><p>Considering how hard IT/cyber staff toiled and how most things were back up and running within a week or so, it could be argued that a lot of organisations did well in executing their playbooks.</p><p>To wit, Aon <a href="https://www.aon.com/en/insights/articles/building-cyber-resilience-effectively-5-lessons">ran</a> a poll during their webinar a week after the incident-non-incident: 83% of respondents said they had an IR plan, 76% said ‘it performed well’.</p><p>To state the obvious, however, there is a <em>lot</em> for CNI people to do in terms of the <em>basics</em>. The Australian Prudential Regulation Authority said just that in July 2023 when releasing an <a href="https://www.apra.gov.au/news-and-publications/cyber-security-stocktake-exposes-gaps">audit</a> of the compliance by around a quarter of Australian prudentially-regulated institutions with sectoral cyber resilience regs.</p><p>The findings were far from encouraging, with the most common control gaps including (emphasis added):</p><blockquote>incomplete identification and classification for critical and sensitive information <em>assets</em>;</blockquote><blockquote>limited assessment of <em>third-party information security capability</em>;</blockquote><blockquote>inadequate definition and execution of control <em>testing</em> programs;</blockquote><blockquote><em>incident response</em> plans not regularly reviewed or tested;</blockquote><blockquote>limited <em>internal audit</em> review of information security controls …</blockquote><p>Sheesh.</p><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>Alrighty, so we’ve done <a href="https://atechnolegalupdate.medium.com/crowdstrikes-crowning-kerfuffle-af4e226baf4b">Limb 1</a>— critical software vendor messing up.</p><p>And now we’ve dissected Limb 2 — the cyber resilience of CNI asset operators being jeopardised.</p><p>Onto <a href="https://atechnolegalupdate.medium.com/crowdstrikes-corporate-citizenship-making-mapping-matter-84ae2b555dd2">Limb 3</a> — given Limbs 1–2, this incident-non-incident captures the national security risks from software supply chain risks.</p><p>Which shall be examined in Limb 3.</p><p><a href="https://atechnolegalupdate.medium.com/crowdstrikes-corporate-citizenship-making-mapping-matter-84ae2b555dd2">CrowdStrike’s Corporate Citizenship: Making Mapping Matter</a></p><p>P.S. There were (alleged) silver linings from this incident-non-incident for CNI asset operators.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?type=text%2Fhtml&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;schema=twitter&amp;url=https%3A//x.com/AlexLuck9/status/1814215706105528806&amp;image=" width="500" height="281" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/76cd8857c5fa8435d51100dbe7516db8/href">https://medium.com/media/76cd8857c5fa8435d51100dbe7516db8/href</a></iframe><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?type=text%2Fhtml&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;schema=twitter&amp;url=https%3A//x.com/Doctrine_Man/status/1814489346294112584&amp;image=" width="500" height="281" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/2f7d4e6fad58735349a86d059f75bac8/href">https://medium.com/media/2f7d4e6fad58735349a86d059f75bac8/href</a></iframe><h3><em>Appendix — Critical Software-Enabled Attacks against CNI Assets</em></h3><p>Here’s a slide from my 2023 Cybercon <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/posts/stillromancingwithlife_the-tangled-web-critical-software-and-cni-activity-7120893021172207616-gNfH/">preso</a>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*0x660_ZeYYE-Xz_Cm5Hwag.png" /><figcaption>Attacks leveraging critical software to compromise/brick CNI assets. (Source: <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/posts/stillromancingwithlife_the-tangled-web-critical-software-and-cni-activity-7120893021172207616-gNfH">Me</a>)</figcaption></figure><p>In there, you’ve got:</p><ul><li><a href="https://spectrum.ieee.org/the-real-story-of-stuxnet"><strong>Stuxnet</strong></a> (likely 2005–2010) — Iranian defence industrial base (we know what those centrifuges were for): bugs in OT software;</li><li><a href="https://www.wired.com/2016/03/inside-cunning-unprecedented-hack-ukraines-power-grid/"><strong>BlackEnergy</strong></a> (2015) — Ukrainian electricity utilities; lack of MFA on operators’ remote access software + using local SCADA deployment to open circuit breakers;</li><li><a href="https://www.england.nhs.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/lessons-learned-review-wannacry-ransomware-cyber-attack-cio-review.pdf"><strong>WannaCry</strong></a> (2017) — UK and/or European healthcare, telecommunications and railway services; Windows bugs.</li><li><a href="https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/acidrain-a-modem-wiper-rains-down-on-europe/"><strong>AcidRain</strong></a> (2022) — satcom/Internet for the Ukrainian military and parts of Europe (eg French emergency services losing primary comms + remote monitoring and control for 5,800 wind turbines); misconfigured VPN.</li></ul><p>Also note attacks like:</p><ul><li><a href="https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/news/attack-colonial-pipeline-what-weve-learned-what-weve-done-over-past-two-years"><strong>Colonial Pipeline</strong></a> (2021) — US liquid fuel; VPN being sans MFA;</li><li>allegedly, <a href="https://www.oaic.gov.au/newsroom/oaic-takes-civil-penalty-action-against-medibank"><strong>Medibank</strong></a> (2022) — Australian insurance; VPN being sans MFA;</li><li><a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-11-28/dp-world-australia-employee-data-stolen-cyber-attack-freight/103161588"><strong>DP World</strong></a> (2023) — Australian stevedoring (with serious flow-on effects for Australian logistics); unpatched Citrix (#CitrixBleed); and</li><li><strong>Several MSPs</strong> (like <a href="https://therecord.media/supermarket-chain-coop-closes-800-stores-following-kaseya-ransomware-attack">Visma EssCom</a>) and <a href="https://www.zdnet.com/article/updated-kaseya-ransomware-attack-faq-what-we-know-now/">hundreds</a> of Coop<strong> supermarkets</strong> in Sweden (2021) — data storage and processing, Swedish food and grocery; malicious Kaseya update.</li></ul><p>The critical software products targeted in these examples reflect the growing cybercriminal preference, as <a href="https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/enisa-threat-landscape-2023/@@download/fullReport">identified</a> in the <em>ENISA</em> <em>Threat Landscape 2023</em>, for remote monitoring and management tools in order to (easily) establish and maintain persistent access to victim environments.</p><p>After all, these are ‘trusted products from trusted vendors’, so customer environments would not be treating traffic coming through/from these boxes/their update channels as inherently suspicious.</p><p>#CriticalSoftwareMatters</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*KRcFAHMc7IR6BppCpamXtQ.png" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=bd1cbf86b786" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[CrowdStrike’s Crowning Kerfuffle]]></title>
            <link>https://atechnolegalupdate.medium.com/crowdstrikes-crowning-kerfuffle-af4e226baf4b?source=rss-2c8c011d69de------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/af4e226baf4b</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[regulation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[crowdstrike]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[software]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[corporate-governance]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[A Techno-Legal Update]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 05 Aug 2024 07:53:02 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-08-18T05:56:26.742Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>By Ravi Nayyar</h4><p>I’ve been thinking about the recent CrowdStrike ‘ain’t a cyber security incident’-incident.</p><p>This saga that was labelled <a href="https://x.com/ClareONeilMP/status/1814235548476731485">merely</a> ‘a technical issue’ by the then-Commonwealth Minister for Home Affairs and Cyber Security.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?type=text%2Fhtml&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;schema=twitter&amp;url=https%3A//x.com/ClareONeilMP/status/1814235548476731485&amp;image=" width="500" height="281" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/1cc854f460641cc096725bf3c66f672d/href">https://medium.com/media/1cc854f460641cc096725bf3c66f672d/href</a></iframe><p>Just an incident-non-incident, after all. (Never mind the A in the CIA triad being well and truly engaged here.)</p><p>The fortnight after the incident-non-incident was certainly a year, eh? Look at the <a href="https://www.theverge.com/24202037/microsoft-crowdstrike-outage-blue-screen-error-photos">photos</a> of blue screens from around the world.</p><p>I’ll leave the introduction at that because, if you are reading my blog, you are most likely following the news in Infosec, especially when Mr Risky Business goes on holiday. Indeed, I’ve been <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/posts/stillromancingwithlife_i-guess-this-is-the-solarwinds-moment-for-activity-7220193207102447616-qpOM">writing</a> about the software supply chain question since 2022.</p><p>The point is, this incident-non-incident is the case study which my thesis was designed for.</p><p>Look at the below graphic, inspired by my 2023 Cybercon <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/posts/stillromancingwithlife_the-tangled-web-critical-software-and-cni-activity-7120893021172207616-gNfH/">preso</a>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*qeLLn6fnzz65XGqFoVJ14w.png" /><figcaption>My PhD in a graphic. (Source: Me)</figcaption></figure><p>3 regulatory circles pertaining to:</p><ol><li>the cyber resilience of critical infrastructure (‘CNI’) assets;</li><li>software supply chain risk management (‘SCRM’) by CNI operators; and</li><li>critical software risk to CNI assets (<strong>my thesis</strong>).</li></ol><p>With this in mind, the CrowdStrike incident-non-incident has the ‘Thesis Trifecta’ for me:</p><ol><li>a critical software vendor messing up; which jeopardises</li><li>the cyber resilience of the operators of critical infrastructure (‘CNI’) assets; and thus captures</li><li>the incredible risks to national security from software supply chains.</li></ol><p>To nut out the Trifecta, I’ve written three pieces: one on each Limb.</p><p>As the USG <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/2024-Report-on-the-Cybersecurity-Posture-of-the-United-States.pdf">put it</a>, ‘Sprawling supply chains, widening access to communications networks, and interdependent global infrastructures have led to an increasingly interconnected world’.</p><p>Let’s dive into that world with Article 1 on Limb 1, shall we?</p><h3>What’s Critical Software?</h3><p>Well, this was an appalling stuff-up from a vendor of critical software (as defined by NIST).</p><p>But <em>what</em> is ‘critical software’?</p><p>Here is the <a href="https://www.nist.gov/itl/executive-order-improving-nations-cybersecurity/critical-software-definition-explanatory">definition</a> of critical software from NIST (issued under Section 4(g) of <a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2021/05/17/2021-10460/improving-the-nations-cybersecurity">Executive Order 14028</a> (‘EO14028’)):</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*1LDausyOXZjqdXTyX9cs8A.png" /><figcaption>(Source: <a href="https://www.nist.gov/itl/executive-order-improving-nations-cybersecurity/critical-software-definition-explanatory">NIST</a>)</figcaption></figure><p>CrowdStrike’s Falcon clearly fits the bill, not least because of the kernel-level access that it, like most EDRs, <a href="https://doublepulsar.com/what-i-learned-from-the-microsoft-global-it-outage-d6138c06ebdb">has</a> to customer Windows boxes.</p><p>NIST <a href="https://www.nist.gov/itl/executive-order-improving-nations-cybersecurity/critical-software-definition-explanatory">recommended</a> that the initial phase of the implementation of EO14028 focus on eleven categories of critical software, given that critical software ‘has security-critical functions or poses similar significant potential for harm if compromised’.</p><p>And among those eleven categories, you have EDR software.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ESwr6NKuMEghMrMaWKuFfg.png" /><figcaption>(Source: <a href="https://www.nist.gov/itl/executive-order-improving-nations-cybersecurity/critical-software-definition-explanatory">NIST</a>)</figcaption></figure><p>To return to the definition of critical software, the criteria scream, ‘The stakes are high’, for:</p><ul><li>critical software vendors to get their ducks in a row from SDLC management and software SCRM perspectives;</li><li>end-users, from safe deployment and software SCRM perspectives;</li><li>the state, as appropriate, to assure that the latter two stakeholder categories — including the state’s regulated populations — get it right; and</li><li>societies and economies, the software-dependent existence of which rests on all of the above stakeholders keeping themselves operationally resilient and overseeing that operational resilience.</li></ul><p>The concept is hardly an esoteric ‘thing’ from some thought bubble someone had inside the White House. Indeed, the definition of critical software has been incorporated into memoranda (<a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/M-23-16-Update-to-M-22-18-Enhancing-Software-Security.pdf">M-23–16</a>, <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/M-22-18.pdf">M-22–18</a>, <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/M-21-30.pdf">M-21–30</a>) that have been issued — also under Section 4 of EO14028 — by the White House’s Office of Management and Budget with respect to how US federal agencies handle (critical) software and how they manage their software supply chains.</p><p>Hence, the significance of critical software is reflected in the regulatory obligations attracted by its security for USG agencies, including for how they procure software (we know procurement is a carrot for the Yanks, per Strategic Objective 3.5 under the <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/National-Cybersecurity-Strategy-2023.pdf"><em>National Cybersecurity Strategy</em></a>, to encourage vendors to mend their ways).</p><p>To reiterate, we’re not talking about advisory stuff, rather actual rules that federal agencies have to comply with.</p><p>If critical software were irrelevant, why did <a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2021/05/17/2021-10460/improving-the-nations-cybersecurity">EO14028</a> s 4(a) say, ‘The security and integrity of “critical software” … is a particular concern’.</p><p>Indeed, this is why my PhD research looks at how the regulation of the security and deployment of <em>critical software </em>fits into the regulation of the cyber resilience of CNI assets.</p><p>Because this stuff ought to attract super-special scrutiny — such as through formal legal regulation (not Smithy’s invisible hand) — from a state already sweating the national security consequences of a breach of CNI cyber resilience. And yes, of course, scrutiny from customers too, given what this stuff involves for their environments (as I will explain in more detail in <a href="https://atechnolegalupdate.medium.com/crowdstrikes-complicating-critical-infrastructure-cyber-resilience-bd1cbf86b786">Limb 2</a>).</p><p>To speak generally, if you’re an attacker who finds a nice bug in/misconfiguration/other unsafe deployment of critical software in your target’s environment, ceteris paribus, ‘That’s gold, baby’ (as Jerry Seinfeld once said).</p><p>Again, look at the criteria for critical software.</p><p>A vendor not getting it right and/or the end-user not deploying it safely could, for all intents and purposes, be the same as rolling out the red carpet for baddies.</p><p>Because of technical realities, these products (like hypervisors) may not support EDR/logging and generally enable stealthy, persistent access to victim environments.</p><p>Logic errors thanks to these products, especially those with kernel access to the operating system, have the potential for causing <em>major</em> problems at the user’s end (ie the CrowdStrike incident-non-incident).</p><p>Look at why the <a href="https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/chinese-espionage-tactics/">Chinese</a>, including <a href="https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa24-038a">Volt Typhoon</a>, <a href="https://www.ncsc.nl/actueel/nieuws/2024/juni/10/aanhoudende-statelijke-cyberspionagecampagne-via-kwetsbare-edge-devices">have shown</a> edge devices like ESGs/VPNs/firewalls/SOHO routers as well as virtualisation software much love of late. Indeed, the Yanks <a href="https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-government-disrupts-botnet-peoples-republic-china-used-conceal-hacking-critical">disrupted</a> a Chinese botnet of hundreds of US-based SOHO routers in January, having been used to conceal Chinese activity. The same day as when the disruption was announced, CISA and the FBI <a href="https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/secure-design-alert-security-design-improvements-soho-device-manufacturers">put out</a> a <em>Secure by Design Alert</em> for SOHO router manufacturers, which referenced Volt Typhoon.</p><p>Note that I have popped other examples of baddies leveraging critical software in the Appendix.</p><p>But anyhoo, back to CrowdStrike and Limb 1 of the Thesis Trifecta: a critical software vendor messing up.</p><p>And gee whiz, did they stuff up.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*M-mvdqVgls_-YjsAMvDwKw.png" /><figcaption>Was this a friendly ransomware attack? (Source: <a href="https://x.com/TimMedin/status/1814376575783051279">X</a>)</figcaption></figure><h3>What Happened: The Quick and Dirty Version</h3><p>From CrowdStrike’s <a href="https://www.crowdstrike.com/falcon-content-update-remediation-and-guidance-hub/">Preliminary Post Incident Review</a> (‘Preliminary PIR’, dated 24 July) for the incident:</p><blockquote>On Friday, July 19, 2024 at 04:09 UTC, as part of regular operations, CrowdStrike released a content configuration update for the Windows sensor to gather telemetry on possible novel threat techniques.</blockquote><blockquote>The problematic Rapid Response Content configuration update [(‘RRC update’)] resulted in a Windows system crash.</blockquote><blockquote>Systems in scope include Windows hosts running sensor version 7.11 and above that were online between Friday, July 19, 2024 04:09 UTC and Friday, July 19, 2024 05:27 UTC and received the update. Mac and Linux hosts were not impacted.</blockquote><p>(The company said on 31 July UTC that around 99% of Windows boxes are back online.)</p><p>Basically, the updated baddy-detection instructions (the RRC update) sent by CrowdStrike to its sensors triggered a logic error which bricked not just the sensors but also the Windows boxes running them, given that the sensors had kernel-level access to them.</p><p>The issue which this bad update triggered was so bad on the Windows machine that it would, on rebooting, get Falcon rolling again, repeating the crash.</p><p>(<a href="https://newsletter.pragmaticengineer.com/p/the-biggest-ever-global-outage-lessons"><em>The Pragmatic Engineer</em></a>, <a href="https://www.theregister.com/2024/07/23/crowdstrike_failure_shows_need_for/"><em>The Register</em></a> and <a href="https://news.risky.biz/risky-biz-news-crowdstrike-faulty-update-affects-8-5-million-windows-systems/"><em>Risky Biz News</em></a><em> </em>have great explanations of what happened.)</p><p>To make matters worse, the process for customers to recover their Windows machines was quite fiddly (eg if boxes had <a href="https://x.com/attilabubby/status/1814216589559861673?s=61&amp;t=r58Z6R0DNa-mmzzhOPT3WA">BitLocker switched on</a>), especially since each machine had to be physically accessed. (To their credit, Microsoft <a href="https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/intune-customer-success/new-recovery-tool-to-help-with-crowdstrike-issue-impacting/ba-p/4196959">put out</a> a tool to make the recovery process easier.)</p><p>This created live case studies for how ordinary cyber resilience work is not what movies/stock photos used by media outlets portray it to be.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?type=text%2Fhtml&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;schema=twitter&amp;url=https%3A//x.com/DunkenKBliths/status/1814817123275055463&amp;image=" width="500" height="281" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/1a21ad43d2062cc973555ec92dbee48e/href">https://medium.com/media/1a21ad43d2062cc973555ec92dbee48e/href</a></iframe><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?type=text%2Fhtml&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;schema=twitter&amp;url=https%3A//x.com/techAU/status/1814919887267242391&amp;image=" width="500" height="281" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/3c3722b55565292cb1647fe29bdb29c4/href">https://medium.com/media/3c3722b55565292cb1647fe29bdb29c4/href</a></iframe><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*81x0KAEVgBtab5df" /><figcaption>(Source: <a href="https://x.com/ravirockks/status/1814530397847625752">Me</a>)</figcaption></figure><p>Indeed, this incident revealed just how many organisations <a href="https://x.com/erratarob/status/1814574544536932724">don’t have</a> an inventory of their BitLocker keys.</p><p>As I <a href="https://x.com/ravirockks/status/1814798746695446867">observed</a>, customers should thank CrowdStrike for forcing them to do an asset inventory. Machine by machine.</p><p>But this update was put out <em>by CrowdStrike</em>, a dozens-of-billions-of-dollars cybersecurity vendor, not a malicious actor who wanted to cause chaos, right?</p><p>We need to understand the finer details here, including the quality of testing of these updates.</p><p>If any.</p><h3>What Happened: The Nitty Gritty</h3><p>For this, I’ll be especially leaning on CrowdStrike’s <a href="https://www.crowdstrike.com/falcon-content-update-remediation-and-guidance-hub/">Preliminary PIR</a> and <a href="https://www.crowdstrike.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/Channel-File-291-Incident-Root-Cause-Analysis-08.06.2024.pdf">technical root cause analysis</a> (dated 6 August).</p><h4>Definitions</h4><p>Let’s first define Template Types v Instances.</p><p>A <strong>Template Type</strong> is sent as part of Sensor Content updates to modify Falcon <em>sensor capability</em> by adding telemetry and detection. It supplies the Content Interpreter on the sensor with what behaviour the sensor should be looking out for to match with a Template Instance.</p><p>A <strong>Template Instance</strong><em> is Rapid Response Content</em> and an ‘instantiation’ of a Template Type <em>while preserving the sensor’s code</em>.</p><p>Each Template Instance ‘maps to specific behaviors for the sensor to observe, detect or prevent’ — it provides ‘behavioral heuristics’ for the sensor to act on. It is ‘used to gather telemetry, identify indicators of adversary behavior, and augment novel detections and preventions on the sensor’.</p><p>Template Instances are sent by Channel Files (RRC updates). Each Channel File carrying (a) Template Instance(s) is matched with a particular Template Type.</p><p>Having made clear who’s who in the zoo, let’s get into the nitty gritty of 19 July 2024.</p><h4>This Case</h4><p>Actually, let’s rewind a few months.</p><p>In February 2024, CrowdStrike created a Template Type for spotting the exploitation of Windows interprocess communication processes (the ‘<strong>IPC Template Type</strong>’).</p><p>They successfully stress-tested it in their staging environment in March.</p><p>As a matter of course, <strong>Channel File 291</strong> was designated as the file carrying <strong>IPC Template Instances</strong> to operationalise the IPC Template Type.</p><p>Now, the<strong><em> definitions file </em></strong>for the IPC Template Type told the Content Interpreter on a sensor to look out for <em>21</em> input sources— this is ‘the activity data and graph context’ — to match against in IPC Template Instances.</p><p><strong>The</strong> <strong>Channel File 291 of 19 July</strong> deployed two new IPC Template Instances that together, for the first time ever, <em>required the sensor to inspect the 21st input field.</em></p><p>CrowdStrike’s Content Validator had previously waved these new IPC Template Instances through testing because it was <em>expecting</em> that the Content Interpreter would be supplied values for <em>21 </em>input sources, as specified by the IPC Template Type.</p><p>Except the <strong><em>sensor code (separate to the definitions file)</em></strong> for the IPC Template Type told the Content Interpreter to expect data on <em>20</em> input sources.</p><p>And, obviously, 21 &gt; 20.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?type=text%2Fhtml&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;schema=twitter&amp;url=https%3A//x.com/arekfurt/status/1821333989195403506&amp;image=" width="500" height="281" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/ab041ee9bda8aea6dc80bd6ec7099910/href">https://medium.com/media/ab041ee9bda8aea6dc80bd6ec7099910/href</a></iframe><p>Having expected 20 values, the Content Interpreter in each sensor got upset when it tried to inspect a value for the <em>21st</em> input field as required by the 19 July version of Channel File 291.</p><p>More specifically, it triggered ‘an out-of-bounds memory read’ and thus a BSOD on the Windows box.</p><p>Tangentially, Brian in Pittsburgh provides a good explanation of why CrowdStrike’s driver, which actually runs the Falcon sensor, being written in a memory-unsafe language was a recipe for disaster.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?type=text%2Fhtml&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;schema=twitter&amp;url=https%3A//x.com/arekfurt/status/1821334003909079390&amp;image=" width="500" height="281" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/7b33f881c6c80ab435855e0bfae15e4c/href">https://medium.com/media/7b33f881c6c80ab435855e0bfae15e4c/href</a></iframe><p>(‘more input than it knew how to handle’ refers to the 21 ≠ 20 mismatch.)</p><p>But what about testing?</p><h3>No, Testing Was Not up to Scratch</h3><p>First things first, according to the Preliminary PIR, prior <a href="https://www.crowdstrike.com/falcon-content-update-remediation-and-guidance-hub/">CrowdStrike procedures</a> meant that new <em>Template Types</em> went through <em>layers</em> of testing:</p><blockquote>The sensor release process begins with automated testing, both prior to and after merging into our code base. This includes unit testing, integration testing, performance testing and stress testing. This culminates in a staged sensor rollout process that starts with dogfooding internally at CrowdStrike, followed by early adopters. It is then made generally available to customers.</blockquote><p>Pretty darn comprehensive, right?</p><p>But <em>Template Instances</em> did <em>not</em> go through the same level of testing.</p><p>Now, regarding the incident-non-incident, note this from the Preliminary PIR:</p><blockquote>Based on the testing performed before the initial deployment of the Template Type (on March 05, 2024), trust in the checks performed in the Content Validator, and previous successful IPC Template Instance deployments, these instances were deployed into production.</blockquote><p>And this from the <a href="https://www.crowdstrike.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/Channel-File-291-Incident-Root-Cause-Analysis-08.06.2024.pdf">root cause analysis</a>:</p><blockquote>This mismatch was not detected during development of the IPC Template Type. The test cases and Rapid Response Content [IPC Template Instances] used to test the IPC Template Type did not trigger a fault during feature development or during testing of the sensor 7.11 release.</blockquote><p>Evidently, CrowdStrike didn’t sufficiently check whether the new Template Instances were problematic.</p><p>Not only was their Content Validator not up to scratch (giving a false negative) but they literally ran with ‘She’ll be right, mate’ because they trusted the validator and prior Template Instances not throwing up issues.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?type=text%2Fhtml&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;schema=twitter&amp;url=https%3A//x.com/arekfurt/status/1821333979917644273&amp;image=" width="500" height="281" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/fec4198b03a24c626da51f1f2dd78101/href">https://medium.com/media/fec4198b03a24c626da51f1f2dd78101/href</a></iframe><p>If the vendor had reasonable testing arrangements in place for IPC Template Instances, it is very hard to argue that this issue would not have been caught by CrowdStrike.</p><p>Because a BSOD isn’t exactly a subtle result of a logic error which your thing induces on a Windows box, especially via the kernel.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?type=text%2Fhtml&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;schema=twitter&amp;url=https%3A//x.com/Grave_Rose/status/1814312963173470711&amp;image=" width="500" height="281" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/4eda038bc1a3c8d8d9f64b6678798174/href">https://medium.com/media/4eda038bc1a3c8d8d9f64b6678798174/href</a></iframe><p>As <a href="https://x.com/GossiTheDog/status/1816086960873824562">pointed out</a> by Kevin Beaumont, while the Preliminary PIR talks up a storm about testing, it appears this was a case of ‘Zero real testing in reality’.</p><h4>Oh, Come on</h4><p>CrowdStrike are a <em>critical software vendor</em> but they didn’t test their own stuff properly before deploying it to <a href="https://blogs.microsoft.com/blog/2024/07/20/helping-our-customers-through-the-crowdstrike-outage/">millions</a> of customer kernels.</p><p>Justin Cappos presciently <a href="https://www.cncf.io/blog/2024/07/19/lessons-from-crowdstrikes-buggy-update-the-critical-importance-of-robust-release-processes/">spoke</a> for all of us <em>on 19 July</em> itself:</p><blockquote>It strains credibility that any organization, much less a security company, would fail to have robust software supply chain validation mechanisms in place. The fact that software could be released without testing demonstrates a level of negligence, I’m shocked to see from a major security company.</blockquote><p>Mr Risky Business <a href="https://risky.biz/RB756/">had</a> similarly strident views on<em> </em>24 July (emphasis added):</p><blockquote>… when you look at this, given that this was a 100% reliable ‘blue screen of death’ against every machine that it [the updated config file] touched, the only conclusion you can draw is: A) it doesn’t matter what the problem is; because B) they obviously didn’t do any testing … you can talk to people who say, “Well, testing is hard and whatever”. Not in this case: <em>100% reliable instant blue screen of death</em>. And you just think, “What the ****?”</blockquote><blockquote>… CrowdStrike absolutely made a terrible mistake and it’s baffling … there’s no version of this in which this looks at all like, “Oh, okay, I can see how that happened”. Like, there’s no version of this where it looks reasonable. Just forget it.</blockquote><p>As <a href="https://risky.biz/RB756/">made</a> clear by Patrick, the sheer uniformity of the BSODs on Windows boxes makes the ‘Oh, complex!’ defence simply untenable.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*-APvqp7kU3PKE_cRkA1cPg.png" /><figcaption>(Source: Me)</figcaption></figure><p>In a 30 July discussion with Patrick and Chris Krebs, SentinelOne’s Alex Stamos <a href="https://risky.biz/WWC4/">pointed out</a> <em>on 30 July</em> that his company have much more comprehensive testing for <em>all</em> updates (ie they don’t pick and choose what types of content gets tested more than others). In that discussion, Patrick <a href="https://risky.biz/WWC4/">summed up</a> CrowdStrike when he said that they dogfood their updates ‘but they’re a Mac shop’.</p><p>To wit, look at Florian Roth’s comment on the <a href="https://www.crowdstrike.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/Channel-File-291-Incident-Root-Cause-Analysis-08.06.2024.pdf">external technical root cause analysis</a>: ‘… a single $400 canary machine could have prevented this disaster’. (I’ve put his full post below.)</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?type=text%2Fhtml&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;schema=twitter&amp;url=https%3A//x.com/cyb3rops/status/1821096079372251203&amp;image=" width="500" height="281" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/060d7686793ae72d8417f25eb9354f36/href">https://medium.com/media/060d7686793ae72d8417f25eb9354f36/href</a></iframe><p>It’s as if CrowdStrike didn’t put in place controls recognising the nature of its actual customer base.</p><p>Now, in vendor liability questions, the notion of a ‘duty of care’ (akin to that in tort for any actor) has come up a regulatory lodestar. The USA’s 2023 <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/National-Cybersecurity-Strategy-2023.pdf"><em>National Cybersecurity Strategy</em></a> declares that software vendors ‘must … be held liable when they fail to live up to the duty of care they owe consumers, businesses, or critical infrastructure providers’.</p><p>I’m not sure how the above would mean that CrowdStrike <em>didn’t</em> fail to take reasonable steps to protect Falcon customers who were running Windows.</p><p>This is absolutely bonkers.</p><p>This is unforgivable, no matter what people say about how ‘we must not assign blame, we need to learn from this and not act in anger, we need to smoke the peace-pipe, stand in solidarity with the hard-working people at [a billion-dollar listed company], yada, yada, yada’.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?type=text%2Fhtml&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;schema=twitter&amp;url=https%3A//x.com/ravirockks/status/1814480600314851454&amp;image=" width="500" height="281" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/ccee733b8ac3996dd1fdaaf4921bd20a/href">https://medium.com/media/ccee733b8ac3996dd1fdaaf4921bd20a/href</a></iframe><p>No matter what people say about how ‘these updated baddy-detection instructions need to be pushed out as quickly as possible because security!’, which Florian Roth satirised really well.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?type=text%2Fhtml&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;schema=twitter&amp;url=https%3A//x.com/cyb3rops/status/1816563753762324554&amp;image=" width="500" height="281" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/c9abe7637646f7ada7336f34352613cc/href">https://medium.com/media/c9abe7637646f7ada7336f34352613cc/href</a></iframe><p>Indeed, the CrowdStrike approach to RRC update testing has whiffs of the attitude behind shipping code to production on a ‘YOLO’ basis.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*S4HVbkJAI9-Gc7BueE5_wA.png" /><figcaption>Two different approaches to shipping code to prod. (Source: <a href="https://newsletter.pragmaticengineer.com/p/shipping-to-production">The Pragmatic Engineer</a>)</figcaption></figure><p>Delta Air Lines, CrowdStrike’s <em>incensed</em> customer, certainly <a href="https://regmedia.co.uk/2024/08/08/delta_response_to_crowdstrike_letter.pdf">agrees</a>, given the terse nature of its reply (though its lawyers) to CrowdStrike’s counsel:</p><blockquote>… CrowdStrike’s Preliminary Post Incident Review (“PIR”) confirms that CrowdStrike engaged in grossly negligent, indeed willful, misconduct with respect to the Faulty Update.</blockquote><blockquote>CrowdStrike’s Root Cause Analysis (“RCA”) of the Faulty Update … admits that had it maintained basic software development, testing, and validation procedures, the July 19 disaster from the Faulty Update would not have occurred.</blockquote><p>Tangential fun fact: AT&amp;T’s nationwide outage in February 2024 was thanks to, eg, its failure to adequately test, and oversee the testing of, a network change, as <a href="https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-404150A1.pdf">found</a> by the Federal Communications Commission (emphasis added):</p><blockquote>… several factors, including a configuration error, <em>a lack of adherence to AT&amp;T Mobility’s internal procedures, a lack of peer review, a failure to adequately test after installation, inadequate laboratory testing, insufficient safeguards and controls to ensure approval of changes affecting the core network</em>, a lack of controls to mitigate the effects of the outage once it began, and a variety of system issues that prolonged the outage once the configuration error had been remedied.</blockquote><h4><em>Promising to Do Better</em></h4><p>One can argue that CrowdStrike have implicitly admitted to following a YOLO approach with respect to writing and shipping Template Instances as part of RRC updates.</p><p>After all, look at what they’ve <a href="https://www.crowdstrike.com/falcon-content-update-remediation-and-guidance-hub/">promised</a> on testing. (See also the detailed external technical root cause analysis which CrowdStrike <a href="https://www.crowdstrike.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/Channel-File-291-Incident-Root-Cause-Analysis-08.06.2024.pdf">released</a> a few days since this article was published.)</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*U1FI-dc4OvvRGFdPUPRFmg.png" /><figcaption>Pledging to do better testing of RRC updates. (Source: <a href="https://www.crowdstrike.com/falcon-content-update-remediation-and-guidance-hub/">CrowdStrike</a>)</figcaption></figure><p>Seems rather comprehensive, doesn’t it?</p><p>They’ve even pledged to improve the functioning of their Content Validator and Content Interpreter. Gee, I wonder why.</p><p>And when it comes to willy nilly tweaking how customer sensors operate by sending them new threat detection, etc instructions, well, CrowdStrike have realised that the status quo is <em>far </em>from, well, <em>safe</em>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*-TrV1tXTWZh_jjNHy3Uynw.png" /><figcaption>Pledging to deploy RRC updates in a non-willy-nilly fashion (Source: <a href="https://www.crowdstrike.com/falcon-content-update-remediation-and-guidance-hub/">CrowdStrike</a>).</figcaption></figure><p>When combined with the pledge to test RRC updates more robustly, this is welcome.</p><p>After all, CrowdStrike showed the world what a single point of failure looks like. It showed a self-portrait, to be precise.</p><p>It’s just basic customer protection by critical software vendors to not modify the behaviour of all customer endpoints/environments in <em>one fell swoop</em>.</p><p>Doing a YOLO as a vendor with <em>kernel</em>-level access to other people’s Windows boxes is hardly ideal.</p><p>Hence, it’s good that, as they already <a href="https://www.crowdstrike.com/falcon-content-update-remediation-and-guidance-hub/">do</a> with Sensor Control updates, CrowdStrike have said that they’re going to do things in a staggered fashion. This is enhanced by the greater agency afforded to customers regarding what, when and where RRC updates are deployed to their sensors, as well as the vendor getting feedback from them.</p><p>Transparency and giving more control to customers always helps.</p><p>Even if doing things like better testing, more cautious deployment of stuff to their boxes and giving them more of a say in how the product runs are <em>basic</em> as heck.</p><p>(Also, good to see that CrowdStrike has <a href="https://www.crowdstrike.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/Channel-File-291-Incident-Root-Cause-Analysis-08.06.2024.pdf">commissioned</a> two independent third party software security vendors ‘to conduct further review of the Falcon sensor code for both security and quality assurance’, in addition to CrowdStrike’s ‘independent review of the end-to-end quality process from development through deployment’.)</p><h3>Culture</h3><p>Such promises to do better in required areas are excellent because what has been the case <a href="https://www.crowdstrike.com/resources/videos/under-the-wing/">‘Under the Wing’</a> has been, checks notes, <em>bad</em>.</p><p>Questions remain about CrowdStrike’s approach to product security and customer welfare. Yes, it’s all well and good to look at things with the benefit of hindsight. Except the failures in control design are <em>so</em> <em>basic</em> that one hopes the snafu can be explained through Hanlon’s Razor alone.</p><p>And it is because CrowdStrike’s failures are so basic that one is reminded of the company which CrowdStrike and its CEO <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/newsletters/2024-07-24/crowdstrike-ceo-kurtz-gets-lesson-in-the-golden-rule">have thrown</a> snarky remarks at and still have a <a href="https://www.crowdstrike.com/compare/crowdstrike-vs-microsoft-defender/">page</a> explaining why they’re a better shout than that company.</p><p>After all, doesn’t the recent incident-non-incident — especially CrowdStrike’s own admissions and promises regarding testing — reflect that CrowdStrike’s security culture is ‘inadequate’, as the Cyber Safety Review Board (‘CSRB’) <a href="https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2024-04/CSRB_Review_of_the_Summer_2023_MEO_Intrusion_Final_508c.pdf">described</a> Microsoft’s?</p><p>Doesn’t the following CSRB commentary on Microsoft apply to CrowdStrike as well:</p><blockquote>… in light of the company’s centrality in the technology ecosystem and the level of trust customers place in the company to protect their data and operations.</blockquote><blockquote>This position brings with it utmost and global responsibilities. It requires a security-focused corporate culture of accountability …</blockquote><blockquote>… point to a corporate culture … that deprioritized both enterprise security investments and rigorous risk management. These decisions resulted in significant costs and harm for Microsoft customers around the world.</blockquote><p>It’s that juxtaposition of the criticality of the software/services provided by the vendor to economic activity at large with the vendor’s below-par security/risk culture. Can’t this capture the situation at CrowdStrike, especially given the sheer number of businesses and government agencies <em>around the world</em> hit by this incident-non-incident?</p><p>CrowdStrike are well aware of their importance to the national security of a number of (advanced) economies (just look at their website and marketing), given the nature of their customer base. And yet, this happened.</p><p>To ask a facile rhetorical question (to further spark debate), shouldn’t CrowdStrike have invested the same amount of attention in ensuring updates pushed to customer instances won’t trigger BSODs as they do in naming and commissioning cartoons + <a href="https://www.crowdstrikeswag.com/The-Future-C157.aspx">merchandise</a> for threat actors?</p><p>And again, the incident-non-incident was not an <em>attack</em>, but an <em>unforced error</em>.</p><p>Making the saga even more alarming, given the fallout for societies and economies.</p><p>Something which David Swan, Technology Editor for the <em>Sydney Morning Herald</em>, <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/technology/how-close-are-we-to-chaos-it-turns-out-just-one-blue-screen-of-death-20240720-p5jv6t.html">reminded</a> us about in relation to the great Optus outage of 2023.</p><p><em>That</em> outage was because of <em>Optus’s own boo-boo — </em>its <a href="https://x.com/ravirockks/status/1725366830376910982?s=61&amp;t=r58Z6R0DNa-mmzzhOPT3WA">retention</a> of factory settings on Provider Edge routers that didn’t like new routing instructions from the parent company’s peering router and thus took the consumer IP network (and dependent services) down with them.</p><p>A major national telco. A global EDR vendor. Both falling down of their own accord. With terrible negative externalities.</p><h3>Heads Must Roll</h3><p>And this is why heads must roll at said vendor (as they should have at said telco, which saw the CEO and networks chief <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-03-09/optus-networks-director-lambo-kanagaratnam-resigns/103568496">resign</a>).</p><p>How should or <em>can</em> any one of the CrowdStrike fat cats’ gigs be safe?</p><p>Just look at the share price since the incident-non-incident.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*3G3QZiQMn5Kk6fTeR1gO2Q.png" /><figcaption>CrowdStrike’s share price over the last month.</figcaption></figure><p>Folks, we can have the debate about what corporate law actually is (shareholder- versus stakeholder-centric), but we’ll do that another day (and my PhD research deals with this point too, so stay tuned for that).</p><p>In any case, I’m not so sure how the company’s share price, (potentially) its client book and definitely its reputation taking a hit <em>like that</em> fits any<em> </em>definition of corporate governance.</p><h4><em>The Law</em></h4><p>Anyhoo, given that CrowdStrike is a US company, let’s have a quick look at the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty (and subsidiary duties) of directors <a href="https://globalinvestigationsreview.com/guide/the-practitioners-guide-global-investigations/2022/article/directors-duties-the-us-perspective">under</a> <a href="https://law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Corporate-Governance-and-Directors-Duties-in-the-United-States-Overview.pdf#page19">US law</a>. To summarise the hyperlinked resources, directors have to, essentially:</p><ul><li>exercise the degree of care which an ‘ordinarily prudent person’ would have done in a similar position and circumstances;</li><li>act in good faith in the best interests of the company; and</li><li>provide adequate oversight of management’s running of the company, including by ensuring the implementation and maintenance of reasonable information and reporting systems so the Board and senior management are informed on how the company is performing in a timely fashion.</li></ul><p>To grossly oversimplify, the caselaw (such as the 1996 <em>Caremark </em>litigation, <em>Stone v Ritter</em> and the 2017 <em>Wells Fargo</em> shareholder derivative action,<em> </em>analysed in the hyperlinked materials) establishes a <em>high</em> bar for directors to be held liable in private civil actions (by shareholders/through derivative suits) for breaching these duties. There’s gotta be stuff like:</p><ul><li>‘intentionally’ acting with an ulterior motive or ‘demonstrating a conscious disregard for [their] duties’;</li><li>knowingly ‘utterly fail[ing] … to implement any reporting or information system or controls’ or ‘consciously fail[ing] … to monitor or oversee its operations’; or</li><li>‘consciously regard[ing]’ the fact that failures have occurred, including after being informed of such issues.</li></ul><p>Of course, if they’re sued through such actions, directors can invoke the business judgment rule (see the 2005 <em>Disney</em> shareholder derivative action; US law is kinda sorta like our <a href="https://www5.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/ca2001172/s180.html"><em>Corporations Act 2001</em></a><em> </em>(Cth) s 180(2) on this front). In such a scenario, the court will presume their decision was legal ‘unless it cannot be attributed to any rational business purpose’, or it featured ‘unintelligent or unadvised judgment[s]’.</p><p>Note that the SEC also has civil jurisdiction (the DOJ, criminal) with respect to US securities laws and regulations.</p><h4><em>Which Means?</em></h4><p>I’ll leave detailed analysis, including on the question of liability, to US legal experts and academics because I’m more familiar with Australian corporate law and this article is not a legal analysis.</p><p>By my back-of-the-envelope application of the above legal tests, the CrowdStrike Board certainly has serious questions to answer, even if a private or regulatory action <em>against them</em> may not be likely to succeed thanks to evidential requirements for the plaintiffs. Shareholders certainly think they have a case: their class action <a href="https://www.cybersecuritydive.com/news/crowdstrike-class-action-suit-investors/723053/">names</a> the <em>CEO and CFO</em> as defendants <em>in addition to the company</em>.</p><p>Note that the legal calculus for corporate governance directly drives the ethical one or even that in the court of public/customer opinion for the Board.</p><p>Even if media coverage dampened after a few days to a week — especially when Biden dropped out of the 2024 race — one could argue that at least CrowdStrike’s major customers would be asking serious questions.</p><p>Certainly, Delta Air Lines and its CEO <a href="https://www.theverge.com/2024/8/1/24210680/crowdstrike-microsoft-outage-delta-lawsuit-class-action-damages">has been</a> <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2024/07/31/delta-ceo-crowdstrike-microsoft-outage-cost-the-airline-500-million.html">jawboning</a> like an absolute champion, though one wonders if Delta merely seeks to win the narrative battle and extract a hefty amount of compensation — without going to/out of court — from a company whose reputation has taken a most frightful battering.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?type=text%2Fhtml&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;schema=twitter&amp;url=https%3A//x.com/arekfurt/status/1818533558790627780&amp;image=" width="500" height="281" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/c746a5600a8daf6abf03933d401aedec/href">https://medium.com/media/c746a5600a8daf6abf03933d401aedec/href</a></iframe><p>CrowdStrike has certainly <a href="https://www.reuters.com/technology/cybersecurity/crowdstrike-says-it-should-not-be-blamed-delta-airlines-cyber-outage-2024-08-05/">jawboned</a> back through its lawyers.</p><p>Having read Delta’s <a href="https://regmedia.co.uk/2024/08/08/delta_response_to_crowdstrike_letter.pdf">reply</a> (though counsel, dated 8 August) to CrowdStrike’s jawboning, I’m wondering if CrowdStrike has thought their PR strategy through.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?type=text%2Fhtml&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;schema=twitter&amp;url=https%3A//x.com/David_Slotnick/status/1821639169468219445&amp;image=" width="500" height="281" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/87ca77fadc1a5978d0896049abf6f065/href">https://medium.com/media/87ca77fadc1a5978d0896049abf6f065/href</a></iframe><p>While there are <a href="https://x.com/arekfurt/status/1821822512050622801">doubts</a> about Delta’s chances of extracting damages from CrowdStrike at trial (but see also <a href="https://x.com/ebailey1367/status/1821902468504293504">this view</a>), its 8 August letter alone would send chills down the spine of a partnerships/customer relations manager at <em>any</em> supplier.</p><p>In addition to Delta’s arguing that CrowdStrike has confirmed it engaged in tortious conduct, here are some juicy extracts (emphasis added):</p><blockquote>We were even more surprised and disappointed by CrowdStrike’s decision to try a “blame the victim” defense.</blockquote><blockquote>CrowdStrike’s offers of assistance during the first 65 hours of the outage simply referred Delta to CrowdStrike’s publicly available remediation website …</blockquote><blockquote>CrowdStrike CEO George Kurtz’ single offer of support to Ed Bastian on the evening of Monday, July 22, was unhelpful and untimely.</blockquote><blockquote>Delta’s reliance on CrowdStrike and Microsoft actually exacerbated its experience in the CrowdStrike-caused disaster.</blockquote><blockquote>Rather than continuing to try to evade responsibility, I would hope that CrowdStrike would immediately share everything it knows. <em>It will all come out in litigation anyway.</em></blockquote><p>On top of everything CrowdStrike has put itself through since 19 July, the reputational damage from that one letter, on top of what I’ve been hearing from folks in industry about CrowdStrike’s increasingly uncertain client book, is most likely to be <em>significant</em>.</p><p>Delta’s counsel have even provided a label for the event: ‘The CrowdStrike disaster’.</p><p>In light of all the above, customers, governments and shareholders must ask the CrowdStrike Board if it <em>ever</em> sought:</p><ul><li>a briefing on how their company updates the functionality of customer sensors and who writes these updates (ie kernel engineers versus threat analysts?);</li><li>an independent opinion on the safety of these update mechanisms (for customers especially), including the quality of testing of updates;</li><li>an explanation of why RRC updates were not previously tested with the same rigour as Sensor Content updates when both species of updates are affecting/flung into the kernel;</li><li>an explanation of why RRC updates were simply delivered to customer sensors <em>en masse</em>, as opposed to in a staggered fashion;</li><li>to create robust feedback loops with senior management on updates to CrowdStrike’s core product lines, especially given how a bad CrowdStrike update <a href="https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=41005936">bricked</a> a lot of Linux boxes in April; and</li><li>to war-game the reputational, regulatory, operational and financial impacts of any updates to their core product lines.</li></ul><p>If the answer to any of these questions is ‘No’, the Board needs to take a good, hard look at itself.</p><p>For these questions directly touch on the ability of the company to operate in a manner which merely <em>does not harm</em> its own reputation, customer book and thus its finances (see the crash in the stock price).</p><p>These questions not only touch on the directors’ fiduciary duty of care but also on that of loyalty, given that said questions go directly to whether they are discharging their oversight role. Namely, whether they are preventing management from driving the company’s share price and reputation into the ground.</p><p>After all, which ‘ordinarily prudent’ person sitting on a Board of a global EDR vendor somehow doesn’t inquire about the vendor’s steps to solidly mitigate the risk of their brand entering the zeitgeist, SolarWinds-style, due to their failing to have robust controls?</p><p>In the present case, steps with respect to deploying those updates to customer instances only when sure that respective updates will not cause a rude shock for customers?</p><p>After all, CrowdStrike is paid to minimise the risk of stuff which throws customer operations into disarray.</p><p>Not inflict a de facto ransomware attack on customers.</p><p>Were CrowdStrike directors acting in good faith in the best interests of the company when they allowed the company to do something so unmistakably stupid?</p><p>This incident-non-incident is perhaps arguable as symptomatic of serious corporate governance failures at the vendor.</p><p>How <em>else</em> does this happen?</p><p>In fact, if one looks at the experience of CrowdStrike, one can’t but help to be reminded of what happens in militaries when units experience similarly serious failures or lack of effective governance.</p><p>Like (widespread) failures to perform adequate risk assessments and understand basic operational practice, a disregard for safety procedures, leadership vacua, ineffective culture and discipline. Just have a read of the USAF’s Aircraft AIB <a href="https://www.airandspaceforces.com/app/uploads/2024/07/4JAN24-AFGSC-Ellsworth-AFB-AIB-Report-1-1.pdf">report</a> on the crash-landing of a B-1B bomber at Ellsworth AFB in January: wowee, were the 28th Operations Group found wanting in the oversight department (my <a href="https://infosec.exchange/@ravirockks/112855834414547054">summary</a>).</p><p>To return to the immediate incident-non-incident, if we look at the fallout, there have been whispers about whether CrowdStrike can even retain (let alone grow) its customer book and how long the vendor’s directors even retain their positions. Its shareholders are <a href="https://www.reuters.com/legal/crowdstrike-is-sued-by-shareholders-over-huge-software-outage-2024-07-31">suing</a> CrowdStrike because it (including through the CEO) was allegedly fibbing about its software being safe and tested prior to the saga. And, to reiterate, that suit <a href="https://www.cybersecuritydive.com/news/crowdstrike-class-action-suit-investors/723053/">names</a> the CEO and CFO as defendants <em>in addition to the company</em>.</p><p>Folks, any corporation’s Board, as its stewards appointed by the shareholders in general meeting, <em>is</em> its break-glass check.</p><p>You can argue that shareholders in general meeting are that check but I disagree. It’s too late by that stage anyway whether we’re discussing an attack or a non-malicious outage, given how quickly circumstances change (for and due to any stakeholder) in the cyber context.</p><p>Whether a company is mitigating the risk of an attack or self-inflicted stupidity, the buck stops with the Board — the company acts through them.</p><p>If they can’t do their jobs, especially oversight of management and acting in a reasonably informed fashion to promote CrowdStrike’s interests, they should step aside.</p><h4>Don’t Distract from the Governance Vacuum</h4><p>It is imperative that we not distract from the critical fact here: this incident-non-incident has its roots in below-par corporate governance, perhaps even a governance <em>vacuum</em>, at CrowdStrike.</p><p>While Infosec folk have kept stressing this since the beginning (even before the vendor came out and said they didn’t test the RRC update properly), the media has <a href="https://doublepulsar.com/what-i-learned-from-the-microsoft-global-it-outage-d6138c06ebdb">failed</a> to adequately prosecute the stupidity of this incident-non-incident, having initially blamed it on Microsoft and then shifted the news cycle to the US election.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?type=text%2Fhtml&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;schema=twitter&amp;url=https%3A//x.com/ciaranmartinoxf/status/1815094680503394351&amp;image=" width="500" height="281" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/28f9979cebea15ea06eceb17c9c2b162/href">https://medium.com/media/28f9979cebea15ea06eceb17c9c2b162/href</a></iframe><p>The non-cyber commentariat generally has also been found wanting.</p><p><a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/crowdstrike-glitch-sounds-a-cybersecurity-alarm-we-cannot-ignore/">Talk</a> of the need to have multiple vendors is futile without inquiring if these vendors have suboptimal corporate governance like CrowdStrike. It’s little point having multiple baskets to place our cyber resilience equities in if each basket is flimsy.</p><p><a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/cyber-security-means-sticking-with-trusted-not-any-providers/">Talk</a> of how CrowdStrike ought to be recognised for the speed with which it identified the issue and came up with a fix, for its ‘transparency’ and for the CEO’s swift ‘apology’ is necessarily incomplete without interrogating how the Board allowed CrowdStrike to bring this saga upon its brand and its customers (including those in CNI and the public sector) in the first place.</p><p>Oh, and CrowdStrike wasn’t acting swiftly to ‘fix this’ because it’s a charity: it was desperately seeking to preserve its business, especially with the public sector, given the aftermath (more in <a href="https://atechnolegalupdate.medium.com/crowdstrikes-complicating-critical-infrastructure-cyber-resilience-bd1cbf86b786">Limb 2</a>).</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?type=text%2Fhtml&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;schema=twitter&amp;url=https%3A//x.com/arekfurt/status/1814457054465274344&amp;image=" width="500" height="281" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/4fedf1e4c6db8bbfeeb8a85f7ab5a860/href">https://medium.com/media/4fedf1e4c6db8bbfeeb8a85f7ab5a860/href</a></iframe><p>Also, on that ‘transparency’, ‘apology’ and comms, well, that’s debatable. Juan Andrés Guerrero-Saade of SentinelOne <a href="https://securityconversations.com/episode/ep6-after-crowdstrike-chaos-should-microsoft-kick-edr-agents-out-of-windows-kernel/">regarded</a> the firm’s Preliminary PIR as so carefully-worded that he had a ‘hard time parsing it’. Patrick Gray and Adam Boileau <a href="https://risky.biz/RB756/">were in agreement</a> that the company’s PR has ‘been absolutely appalling’. Rob Graham <a href="https://x.com/erratarob/status/1815597144281096618">had</a> <em>far</em> less charitable words for the attempted <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/posts/shawn-henry-372bb74b_on-friday-we-failed-you-and-for-that-im-activity-7220983915421806592-VhPP">apology</a>/ad from the CrowdStrike CSO.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?type=text%2Fhtml&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;schema=twitter&amp;url=https%3A//x.com/vxunderground/status/1815469839747600576&amp;image=" width="500" height="281" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/77c354478d03d45170759c592b515e52/href">https://medium.com/media/77c354478d03d45170759c592b515e52/href</a></iframe><p>The ‘But they’re not Chinese’ argument (which has also been <a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/cyber-security-means-sticking-with-trusted-not-any-providers/">thrown up</a>) misses the point entirely. It is, quite frankly, immaterial. Once customers pay CrowdStrike for EDR after doing relevant foreign influence screening of vendors, they expect to be protected regardless.</p><p>The ‘But they’re not a Chinese vendor’ line doesn’t help their recovery and diverts attention from the overworked IT workers trying to clean the mess left by CrowdStrike at their organisations over a good couple of days (and during subsequent ‘teething issues across the economy’, as <a href="https://x.com/clareoneilmp/status/1815288634582646984">put</a> by the then-Commonwealth Minister for Home Affairs).</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?type=text%2Fhtml&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;schema=twitter&amp;url=https%3A//x.com/UK_Daniel_Card/status/1816860535431807323&amp;image=" width="500" height="281" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/d21f9725ffc43c517cfa942d9499f721/href">https://medium.com/media/d21f9725ffc43c517cfa942d9499f721/href</a></iframe><p>Comparing CrowdStrike’s response and ‘transparency’ to China’s attempts to do espionage/disruptive hacking via software supply chains à la xz-utils/‘national champion’ vendors is unsound.</p><p>If anything, it makes CrowdStrike look <em>worse </em>than it already does, given that it committed the world’s largest friendly ransomware attack actually from its exalted position as a ‘trusted vendor’, indeed one of <em>the</em> pre-eminent<em> </em>trusted cyber resilience vendors.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?type=text%2Fhtml&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;schema=twitter&amp;url=https%3A//x.com/vxunderground/status/1814267016699576369&amp;image=" width="500" height="281" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/2c0ee3fcc7972d4b771dcc363a599018/href">https://medium.com/media/2c0ee3fcc7972d4b771dcc363a599018/href</a></iframe><p>It <a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/cyber-security-means-sticking-with-trusted-not-any-providers/">has also been argued</a> that the incident-non-incident is a reminder of the need for greater investment in sovereign cyber resilience capability (as per what countries like <a href="https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/cyber-security-subsite/files/2023-cyber-security-strategy.pdf">mine</a> and the <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/National-Cybersecurity-Strategy-2023.pdf">USA</a> have committed to do under national cyber security strategies).</p><p>The reality is, however, that all of your investment (promotion), your workforce development initiatives and work fostering domestic industry clusters will be ultimately for nothing if your sovereign vendors don’t have good enough corporate governance to prevent (yes, prevent) such a basic stuff-up like CrowdStrike’s.</p><p>And this is before we get to how complex SDLC management for <em>any</em> software product is.</p><p>Be it CrowdStrike, SolarWinds or Microsoft, everything is downstream of (a lack of) corporate governance. Especially impacts on national security.</p><p>If you ignore the corporate governance question here — the central animating question — in your commentary, then, like the CrowdStrike Board, you have serious questions to answer.</p><p>Speaking of corporate governance, the CrowdStrike CEO <a href="https://finance.yahoo.com/news/crowdstrike-ceo-involved-another-global-200015346.html">was</a> the McAfee CTO in 2010 when the latter firm also put out an infamous update which bricked millions of machines.</p><p>Well, it’s not as if that dented his/his Board’s careers, so I guess no directorial/senior executive heads will roll, as per usual in this business.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*SLVE9gmRzKC3HQdBfq8EyQ.png" /><figcaption>Well, well, well. (Source: <a href="https://x.com/TimMedin/status/1814721917225480273">X</a>)</figcaption></figure><p>(Separately, I note that the commanding officer of the USAF’s 28th Operations Group <a href="https://www.8af.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/3858705/b-1b-commander-relieved-of-command/">was sacked</a> ‘due to a loss of trust and confidence in his ability to command, based on the findings of [the aforementioned AIB report on the B-1B crash]’.)</p><p>By the way, I heard that CrowdStrike sponsored the <a href="https://publicsectornetwork.com/event/victorian-cyber-security-showcase/">Victorian Cyber Security Showcase</a> (held on 23 July 2024), but they were so embarrassed that they didn’t turn up (including to a lunch they were meant to co-host). And (relevant bits on) event banners were taped over.</p><p>Making the below quite amusing.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?type=text%2Fhtml&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;schema=twitter&amp;url=https%3A//x.com/vxunderground/status/1820121939773411658&amp;image=" width="500" height="281" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/5771ac10ca75d6e40c3b2e11675cc36b/href">https://medium.com/media/5771ac10ca75d6e40c3b2e11675cc36b/href</a></iframe><h3>Privilege of EDR Products</h3><p>Given that Falcon (like most EDR products) requires kernel access to function on Windows boxes, a key debate surrounding this incident-non-incident is the future of the kernel-access model itself for third party software. I’m not at all technically knowledgeable in this highly specialised department, so I will leave the field to <a href="https://doublepulsar.com/what-i-learned-from-the-microsoft-global-it-outage-d6138c06ebdb">those</a> <a href="https://securityconversations.com/episode/ep6-after-crowdstrike-chaos-should-microsoft-kick-edr-agents-out-of-windows-kernel/">who</a> <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/place-kernel-mode-driver-edr-anymore-greg-hoglund-ig1zc/">actually</a> <a href="https://newsletter.pragmaticengineer.com/p/the-biggest-ever-global-outage-lessons">know</a> <a href="https://stratechery.com/2024/crashes-and-competition/">what</a> <a href="https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2024/07/27/windows-security-best-practices-for-integrating-and-managing-security-tools/">they’re</a> talking about and flag some of their key talking points:</p><ul><li>The stability-security trade-off for users of EDR products operating in the kernel;</li><li>EDR products being far from perfect in their operation, calling into question whether they deserve kernel access;</li><li>Whether EDR products actually require kernel access to do their jobs (on top of their having a hard time due to anti-tampering controls in operating systems and baddies trying to disable/bypass them);</li><li>The antitrust v security question raised by Microsoft/EU in terms of giving kernel access to third party EDR products;</li><li>The merits (or not) of the <a href="https://eclecticlight.co/2021/07/07/extensions-are-moving-away-from-the-kernel/">Apple</a> <a href="https://news.risky.biz/how-chinese-illegal-gambling-infiltrates-european-football/">approach</a> whereby no third party has direct kernel access, rather the operating system vendor creates an API to replicate that access but third party stuff still runs only in user mode;</li></ul><p>While we wait for this debate to be resolved by vendors, experts and regulators, the question remains of what happens in the immediate future.</p><p>First things first, EDR vendors (or cyber resilience vendors more generally) enjoy the ‘confidence’ of customers and indeed non-specialist policymakers.</p><p>To the contrary of the ideal scenario.</p><p>As Kevin Beaumont put it in his <a href="https://doublepulsar.com/what-i-learned-from-the-microsoft-global-it-outage-d6138c06ebdb">write-up</a>:</p><blockquote>We should have zero trust in cybersecurity vendors’, given that ‘the cybersecurity industry has failed upwards to the point of having administrator access to almost every PC on earth, out of apparent necessity.</blockquote><p>Policymakers and regulators have failed to check this (or at least receive sufficiently independent advice on this front) while requiring organisations to have these tools to meet operational resilience regs, which Kevin stressed.</p><p>The extraordinary privileges at which these products operate (as critical software products) create extraordinary risks for organisations running them: what happens if the (SaaS) vendors get pwned/bugs in these products get exploited by baddies? This problem is especially real if security products enforce zero trust methodologies, given that they are the source of truth when it comes to identity within a customer environment, as <a href="https://x.com/swagitda_/status/1814336688933748790/photo/1">pointed out</a> by Kelly Shortridge.</p><p>Like with critical software vendors generally, the problem is a dearth of <em>direct</em> regulatory oversight.</p><p>Where are the transparency requirements for vendors so prospective customers can review their SDLCs, source code as well as their own cyber governance?</p><p>Where are the industry standards and metrics — bar marketing gimmicks and snark from vendors — to judge the products against?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/632/1*pZsEu9zMDl_CWPqcOO5-2g.png" /><figcaption>This is still up, by the way. (Source: <a href="https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/">CrowdStrike</a>)</figcaption></figure><p>Indeed, when critical software vendors like CrowdStrike are referred to by the commentariat as ‘trusted vendors’ (because they’re not Chinese and came clean so quickly about their bricking millions of Windows computers worldwide), there is a larger question on the degree to which that trust is even <em>informed</em> because of vendor marketing or the customer lacking the bargaining power/the <a href="https://securityconversations.com/episode/ep6-after-crowdstrike-chaos-should-microsoft-kick-edr-agents-out-of-windows-kernel/">awareness</a> to ask the vendor to be transparent about their controls or submit to independent audits as part of the procurement process.</p><p>Folks, recall that vendors are not special, entitled to protected species status because ‘Ooo, fancy software’: they’re companies selling a product/service like anyone else. It’s amusing to see folks go after the big banks as part of some crusade against capitalism, but then ignore the sheer volume of <em>financial</em> (not broader operational resilience) regulations — especially after the GFC — that are designed to keep said banks and the broader financial system healthy.</p><p>Critical software vendors don’t have such <em>direct</em> regulation. They may be regulated <em>indirectly</em> because they’re part of the supply chains of CNI asset operators (eg as ‘Bank Service Providers’ under the <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/chapter-18"><em>Bank Service Company Act</em></a>, codified at 12 USC §§ 1861–7) or they are ‘incentivised’ to do better through government (procurement) regs pertaining to software security (eg <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/M-23-16-Update-to-M-22-18-Enhancing-Software-Security.pdf">M-23–16</a>, <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/M-22-18.pdf">M-22–18</a>, <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/M-21-30.pdf">M-21–30</a>, flagged above; I’ve <a href="https://www.giga-hamburg.de/en/publications/contributions/quad-carved-code-collaborating-deliver-public">written</a> <a href="https://www.giga-hamburg.de/en/publications/contributions/quad-carved-code-shaping-inter-national-security-reshaping-economic-incentives">about</a> the benefits of the carrot-based approach).</p><p>But they do not face mandatory standards for the quality and reliability of their wares (perhaps beyond consumer law) or mandatory auditing requirements <em>of their own</em> like normal regulated sectors. (I note that the EU is amending its <a href="https://oeil.secure.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?reference=2022/0302(COD)&amp;l=en">product liability directive</a> to include software and enacting a <a href="https://oeil.secure.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?reference=2022/0272(COD)&amp;l=en">specific regulation</a> for the security of software generally.)</p><p>As Kevin <a href="https://doublepulsar.com/what-i-learned-from-the-microsoft-global-it-outage-d6138c06ebdb">put it</a>:</p><blockquote>I think the cybersecurity industry is still very immature compared to its journey to come, and we’re just a bunch of dorks with far too much power currently.</blockquote><p>It could be argued that the CrowdStrike incident-non-incident, given the externalities, <a href="https://x.com/arekfurt/status/1816453552060989552">provides</a> the trigger for shifting the conversation on creating bespoke regulation of (critical) software vendors. Or at least <a href="https://x.com/arekfurt/status/1816453552060989552">laying the foundations</a> for consensus on the need for that reform because what happened is such a significant case study for the consequences of vendors being allowed to run their own show.</p><p>Like how the investment banks gave us the GFC because the Yanks, eg, de-regulated derivatives.</p><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>The incident-non-incident is negative externalities writ large.</p><p>Including for CrowdStrike’s own reputation, as flagged above.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?type=text%2Fhtml&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;schema=twitter&amp;url=https%3A//x.com/fchollet/status/1814387536019763378&amp;image=" width="500" height="281" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/9a991c7f1c82f4b30b050e53a85c274d/href">https://medium.com/media/9a991c7f1c82f4b30b050e53a85c274d/href</a></iframe><p>And we’ll be dealing more with the negative externalities at play when we talk about Limb 2 — the cyber resilience of the operators of CNI assets being jeopardised by a critical software vendor stuffing up.</p><p>Which shall be dealt with by Article 2 in this series.</p><p><a href="https://atechnolegalupdate.medium.com/crowdstrikes-complicating-critical-infrastructure-cyber-resilience-bd1cbf86b786">CrowdStrike’s Complicating Critical Infrastructure Cyber Resilience</a></p><h3><em>Appendix — Critical Software-Enabled Attacks against CNI Assets</em></h3><p>Here’s a slide from my 2023 Cybercon <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/posts/stillromancingwithlife_the-tangled-web-critical-software-and-cni-activity-7120893021172207616-gNfH/">preso</a>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*0x660_ZeYYE-Xz_Cm5Hwag.png" /><figcaption>Attacks leveraging critical software to compromise/brick CNI assets (Source: <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/posts/stillromancingwithlife_the-tangled-web-critical-software-and-cni-activity-7120893021172207616-gNfH">Me</a>)</figcaption></figure><p>In there, you’ve got:</p><ul><li><a href="https://spectrum.ieee.org/the-real-story-of-stuxnet"><strong>Stuxnet</strong></a> (likely 2005–2010) — Iranian defence industrial base (we know what those centrifuges were for); bugs in OT software;</li><li><a href="https://www.wired.com/2016/03/inside-cunning-unprecedented-hack-ukraines-power-grid/"><strong>BlackEnergy</strong></a> (2015) — Ukrainian electricity utilities; lack of MFA on operators’ remote access software + using local SCADA deployment to open circuit breakers;</li><li><a href="https://www.england.nhs.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/lessons-learned-review-wannacry-ransomware-cyber-attack-cio-review.pdf"><strong>WannaCry</strong></a> (2017) — UK and/or European healthcare, telecommunications and railway services; Windows bugs.</li><li><a href="https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/acidrain-a-modem-wiper-rains-down-on-europe/"><strong>AcidRain</strong></a> (2022) — satcom/Internet for the Ukrainian military and parts of Europe (eg primary comms for French emergency services + remote monitoring and control for 5,800 wind turbines); misconfigured VPN.</li></ul><p>Also note attacks like:</p><ul><li><a href="https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/news/attack-colonial-pipeline-what-weve-learned-what-weve-done-over-past-two-years"><strong>Colonial Pipeline</strong></a> (2021) — US liquid fuel; VPN being sans MFA;</li><li>allegedly, <a href="https://www.oaic.gov.au/newsroom/oaic-takes-civil-penalty-action-against-medibank"><strong>Medibank</strong></a> (2022) — Australian insurance; VPN being sans MFA;</li><li><a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-11-28/dp-world-australia-employee-data-stolen-cyber-attack-freight/103161588"><strong>DP World</strong></a> (2023) — Australian stevedoring (with serious flow-on effects for Australian logistics); unpatched Citrix (#CitrixBleed); and</li><li><strong>Several MSPs</strong> (like <a href="https://therecord.media/supermarket-chain-coop-closes-800-stores-following-kaseya-ransomware-attack">Visma EssCom</a>) and <a href="https://www.zdnet.com/article/updated-kaseya-ransomware-attack-faq-what-we-know-now/">hundreds</a> of Coop<strong> supermarkets</strong> in Sweden (2021) — data storage and processing, Swedish food and grocery; malicious Kaseya update.</li></ul><p>The critical software products targeted in these examples reflect the growing cybercriminal preference, as <a href="https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/enisa-threat-landscape-2023/@@download/fullReport">identified</a> in the <em>ENISA</em> <em>Threat Landscape 2023</em>, for remote monitoring and management tools in order to (easily) establish and maintain persistent access to victim environments.</p><p>After all, these are ‘trusted products from trusted vendors’, so customer environments would not be treating traffic coming through/from these boxes/their update channels as inherently suspicious.</p><p><em>#CriticalSoftwareMatters</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*GX6ABSuOLVcJogIPMLnIRw.png" /><figcaption>My research in a graphic.</figcaption></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=af4e226baf4b" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Musings on the Management of Machinery]]></title>
            <link>https://atechnolegalupdate.medium.com/musings-on-the-management-of-machinery-f5b0ac85379a?source=rss-2c8c011d69de------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f5b0ac85379a</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[government]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[industrial-control-system]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[education]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ot-security]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[A Techno-Legal Update]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 12 Jul 2024 14:10:25 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-07-13T13:00:02.996Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>By Ravi Nayyar</h4><p>In early June, I attended the fabulous <a href="https://infosec.exchange/@hacks4pancakes">Lesley Carhart</a>’s talk on all things OT security, hosted by Dragos in Sydney. As a fan of Lesley and as an aspiring OT security nerd, I loved it. Great explainers, points and stories from the field (including the ‘peaker plant which turned itself on’).</p><p>Always great to listen to folks who have actually been in the trenches. Or on oil platforms, with Lesley telling us about mandatory drown-prevention training which OT security folk have to do before they are allowed to take an helicopter ride to a rig.</p><p>As someone whose knowledge of OT security is largely from literature, it is a pleasure to learn from folks who have been there, done that.</p><p>Well, folks, this piece is about just that. Lesley’s talk and conversations on OT security over drinks after her preso. This is about how the sausage is well and truly made.</p><p>And gee whiz, for someone as green as I, were the insights really something.</p><h3><em>1. The Basics Matter Most</em></h3><p>First things first, operators continue to be found wanting in terms of basic security controls. Of course, no industry veteran will be surprised, but yeah, I mean <em>basic</em>. This was reflected in how Lesley’s talk was about said basic controls.</p><p>I found this quite surprising at the time, given that the audience were experienced OT operations/OT security folk. Lesley is a veteran (both of the US Air Force and this discipline) and the talk was run by her employer, one of <em>the</em> specialist OT security vendors.</p><p>Hence, I went into the small theatre expecting the content to be quite advanced in terms of emerging fancy threat vectors, the nitty gritty of ICS protocols and gear, even war-gaming of future threats. I thought that last one would be especially relevant as the landscape hots up and the barriers to entry for OT hacking lower with, eg, <a href="https://www.dragos.com/blog/industry-news/chernovite-pipedream-malware-targeting-industrial-control-systems/">modular hacking kits</a>. In fact, I thought we would hear Lesley’s thoughts on the implications of stuff like <a href="https://therecord.media/final-ot-icefall-vulnerability-disclosed-schneider">ICEFALL</a>, what the Russian state’s OT hackers have been <a href="https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/sandworm-disrupts-power-ukraine-operational-technology/">doing</a> in Ukraine, as well as the finer details of defending against <a href="https://www.cyber.gov.au/about-us/view-all-content/alerts-and-advisories/prc-state-sponsored-actors-compromise-and-maintain-persistent-access-us-critical-infrastructure">Volt Typhoon</a>-y threat actors.</p><p>Or even talk about secure-by-design (‘SbD’) being rolled out (if at all) by OT OEMs, certainly given what I’ve heard at conferences from folks in the sector about product security (especially vulnerability response) from OT vendors.</p><p>Instead, Lesley brought it all down to earth.</p><p>Her excellent talk was more an explainer of, as above, OT security <em>basics</em>. Stuff like MFA, training personnel and prioritising vendors who are responsive and have bug bounties when making procurement decisions. Run-of-the-mill matters.</p><p>Indeed, Lesley pointed out that most of her work in OT incident response stems from operators just not doing the actual basics right. Whether it is securing edge devices or safely managing IT-OT connectivity (eg just having <em>DMZs</em>).</p><p>Little wonder that the presentation was focused on the simple things being done wrongly, time and time again, by operators. Not fancy hacking techniques.</p><p>Focusing on defenders who fail to exercise their agency to defeat the lion’s share of threats by getting their houses in order, rather than the ‘winged ninja cyber monkeys’ (to quote <a href="https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/blog-post/so-long-thanks-for-all-the-bits">Dr Ian Levy</a>).</p><p>This makes one wonder why labels like ‘cyber-attack’, ‘sophisticated’ and needless jargon are used in the mainstream press and from non-cyber executives on panels at cyber summits/in interviews.</p><p>If one looks at IT, we know the story: shadow IT, poor vulnerability management, phishing, stolen creds and a lack of MFA, misconfigurations, poor network segmentation, etc. And the state of OT security appears to be little different, at least in terms of that laxity in security culture.</p><p>Indeed, is it ‘sophisticated’ if a baddy simply uses creds for a company VPN — stolen from an employee’s personal device as they use the same browser on their managed work device — bereft of MFA in order to <em>log into </em>an OT facility and subsequently move laterally to fiddle with the HMI?</p><p>Or if the baddy is a malicious insider who gets sacked by an OT operator but poor ICAM means that the baddy’s accounts aren’t terminated as soon as they are removed from their position, such that they can run riot in their ex-employer’s OT environments out of spite?</p><p>It would be great if the diplomats, (international) bureaucrats, corporate officers and civil society members (like think tankers talking about norms for state conduct in cyberspace and regional capacity-building) addressed this sort of issue (‘defenders stuffing up’) a bit more relative to their speaking on the threat from exploit shops (sorry, ‘<a href="https://press.un.org/en/2024/sgsm22280.doc.htm">cyber mercenaries</a>’) or state actors doing normal signals intelligence.</p><p>And yes, I am aware of the UNGA <a href="https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=A/70/174&amp;Language=E&amp;DeviceType=Desktop&amp;LangRequested=False">approving</a> the norm of responsible state conduct in cyberspace that ‘[s]tates should take reasonable steps to ensure the integrity of the supply chain so that end users can have confidence in the security of ICT products’ in <em>2015</em>. And the <em>G20</em> countries <a href="https://g7g20-documents.org/database/document/2023-g20-india-sherpa-track-digital-economy-ministers-ministers-language-g20-digital-economy-ministers-meeting-outcome-document-and-chair-summary">calling</a> for the promotion of SbD as part of baking security and trust into the digital economy in 2023, which is &gt; FVEY(+) doing joint advisories/guidance on <a href="https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2023/04/13/shifting-balance-cybersecurity-risk-security-design-and-default-principles">SbD</a> or <a href="https://www.cyber.gov.au/resources-business-and-government/maintaining-devices-and-systems/outsourcing-and-procurement/cyber-supply-chains/choosing-secure-and-verifiable-technologies">procurement</a>. And thus the need to hold vendors to account for marketing nonsensical stuff. (And to define software supply chain risk management as a pillar of (inter)national security — you can read my take on that <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/quad-tackling-spider-not-cobwebs-cyberspace">here</a>, <a href="https://www.giga-hamburg.de/de/publikationen/beitraege/quad-carved-code-collaborating-deliver-public">here</a> and <a href="https://atechnolegalupdate.medium.com/the-pursuit-of-lucidity-in-the-labyrinth-df33b6f7e061">here</a>.)</p><p>But that does not mean we create a smokescreen of ten-foot tall threat actors and focus our indignation entirely on vendors in order to let reckless/negligent OT operators get away with poor controls.</p><p>Indeed, this is why my thesis concerns the regulation of the security <em>and deployment </em>of critical software as part of the regulation of CNI cyber resilience. It’s not just about the vendors dropping the ball with their SDLCs. It’s about the defenders neither deploying the product safely nor mitigating risks sufficiently from that product.</p><p>As Ukraine has well and truly <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/02/russias-countervalue-cyber-approach-utility-or-futility?lang=en">shown</a> us, defenders get a vote.</p><p>Reinforcing another UNGA-approved cyber norm which <a href="https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=A/70/174&amp;Language=E&amp;DeviceType=Desktop&amp;LangRequested=False">begins</a> like so: ‘States should take appropriate measures to protect their critical infrastructure from ICT threats …’</p><p>‘Nuff said.</p><h3><em>2. A Major Skills Gap?</em></h3><p>Another key takeaway from the evening for me, especially from conversations over drinks after Lesley’s talk, was the serious skills shortage in the OT security discipline. What shocked me in my naivety wasn’t talk about the shortfall in folk who are technically trained in cyber resilience, but talk about the dearth of folk who understand <em>how computers actually work</em>, even after doing the average cyber resilience degree/vocational training program.</p><p>Of course, I’m a regulatory guy, so I don’t track the skilling aspect of cyber policy or what a good cyber education program requires. Yes, I understand the incredible diversity of the cyber resilience and computing disciplines such that folks will have to specialise within either of the two to gain a deep, technical understanding of a particular technology or paradigm.</p><p>And yes, I am not positioned at all to comment on the details of cyber resilience/computing curricula. So, I am only relaying to you what I heard from veterans I spoke with that evening. If you want to push back on this section of the piece, please do. I want to get the other side of the argument, especially because I am very green in cyber and OT security.</p><p>I assume a basic <em>degree</em> in how to <em>protect computers</em> from baddies in cyberspace would teach candidates <em>how computers work</em>. Certainly, one at my university <a href="https://cusp.sydney.edu.au/students/view-degree-page/degree_id/1154">seems</a> to do so. But one veteran said the top universities in Australia drop the ball in their instruction, which puzzled me.</p><p>If we want to fill the oft-mentioned ‘skills gap’ in cyber, we need to ensure that our programs for cyber resilience education are actually fit-for-purpose. To speak generally, training providers like universities must ensure that the education they provide to our future incident responders, vulnerability researchers, pentesters, red-teamers, CISOs and cyber policymakers is actually preparing them for what they will be working on: computers.</p><p>After all, we are talking about something as vital as cyber resilience, which keeps modern societies and economies alive, not an 18th Century English contract law case of little relevance today (no offence, contract law people).</p><p>Broadening out the talent pipeline issue, one thing which also made my ears prick up was how OT security firms can’t find enough folks, <em>even those trained in cyber resilience</em>, who are <em>worth recruiting</em> for OT incident response roles.</p><p>Why, you ask?</p><p>Well, per the industry veterans I spoke to, it’s because most of today’s school leavers/university grads can’t think critically or laterally. Which isn’t ideal, given the complexity of OT environments, the increased amount of software and connectivity with IT assets making them hum along, and the quite bizarre ways OT assets can be operated ‘by themselves’.</p><p>For instance, to borrow from one of Lesley’s stories (my memory’s spotty here, so bear with me), how does a trainee incident responder think their way through the problem of ‘phantom inputs’ to deduce that it’s actually moths flapping about or drops of condensation hitting an HMI touchscreen because the setup is in a shed with a door which wasn’t shut properly and thus exposed to the elements?</p><p>If people wanting to work in OT incident response (or cyber more broadly) can’t problem-solve and/or think creatively when faced with a seemingly intractable problem (like how an OT asset is switching itself on without verifiable human input), OT security vendors face a dilemma.</p><p>In this particular case, the jobs are there, rather there aren’t enough folks worth recruiting for them.</p><p>And the clincher was, someone said to me that they are happy to show a cyber grad the ropes when it comes to OT incident response but if the grad is unable to go off the beaten track when it comes to ideas, the exercise is one of futility.</p><p>Not merely a cyber skills shortage, but a structural problem with the degree to which our primary, secondary and/or tertiary education systems actually teach kids <em>how to think.</em> If they aren’t taught how to push boundaries or be critical of their own approaches to problems, having too few capable cyber resilience people is the least of our problems.</p><p>Relative to the wider issue of a workforce not quite up to thinking creatively and rationally.</p><p>Not an OT or cyber resilience workforce. But a workforce generally.</p><p>You can’t generate a cyber/OT security talent pipeline from that, at least to the magnitude you need even in the shorter-term as: IT and OT threat landscapes worsen; and attack surfaces multiply with software dependencies and increasing(ly unsafe) IT-OT connectivity.</p><p>The solution is a more complex, whole-of-government one than the Commonwealth Minister for Cyber Security sharing the <a href="https://x.com/ClareONeilMP/status/1728590005134843996">odd</a> <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/posts/clare-o-neil_meet-lucy-shes-studying-a-bachelor-of-computer-activity-7214181220232962048-gf9y">photo</a> with a computing or cyber resilience student to highlight how the government is working to fill the skills gap.</p><p>This is in addition to an existing issue where, as one attendee told me, OT operators don’t have enough people to spare for them to take time off to get trained in OT/general cyber security.</p><p>That one really is a dilemma: how do you upskill a vital employee in how to better look after a vital bespoke and/or legacy asset when you don’t have a decent stand-in to look after that asset in the meantime?</p><h3><em>3. State Capacity?</em></h3><p>The third key takeaway from the evening for mine was state capacity, especially in Australia. My conversations were obviously focused on <em>Australian</em> cyber defence &gt; offence, given the crowd and the overarching theme of the evening.</p><p>Now, of course, as a general matter, state capacity in cyber can never be perfect. Guns v butter and all that stuff. Especially in Western countries where there is a whole host of non-cyber stuff (like social services and healthcare) which requires taxpayer funding equally, if not more urgently, relative to cyber. Especially during present cost-of-living crises.</p><p>That all said, when it comes to assuring national cyber resilience, agencies aren’t exactly starved of resources.</p><p>If we look at Australia, one need only look at the roughly $10 billion being invested in ASD under <a href="https://www.asd.gov.au/sites/default/files/2022-05/ASD-REDSPICE-Blueprint.pdf">Project REDSPICE</a> — note the dot points on CNI cyber resilience and improving ‘nationwide cyber-incident response’.</p><p>I note also the Commonwealth’s commitment under the <a href="https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/cyber-security-subsite/files/2023-cyber-security-strategy.pdf"><em>2023–2030 Australian Cyber Security Strategy</em></a> to make us a ‘world leader in cyber security’ by 2030. For example, through investments in capabilities and mechanisms to drive more robust incident response, such as a last resort ‘all-hazards consequence management power’ for the state, as well as uplifting CNI cyber resilience more generally. These aren’t small fry. (I <a href="https://atechnolegalupdate.medium.com/some-takes-on-the-ministers-takes-on-risky-cni-business-1417ed81300c">expressed</a> my reservations about such a power months before our strategy came out, but that’s not the topic today.)</p><p>Indeed, the point is, there is a lot of spending happening and more on the cards, as well as political will. This is on top of how the reputation of ASD (of which ACSC <a href="https://www.asd.gov.au/about/what-we-do/cyber-security">is</a> a part) precedes it: FVEY and right up there.</p><p>Robustly well-resourced when it comes to defending the oodles of OT around the country.</p><p>Or so I thought.</p><p>I was quite surprised to learn from someone in the electricity sector that ACSC just don’t have enough OT security specialists.</p><p>Which throws into jeopardy their ability to actually execute intervention requests issued by Dep-Sec Home Affairs to DG ASD under <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.au/C2018A00029/latest/text"><em>Security of Critical Infrastructure Act 2018</em></a> (Cth) s 35AX (‘<em>SOCI Act</em>’).</p><p>But wait, what are intervention requests?</p><p>I have analysed the intervention request regime <a href="https://atechnolegalupdate.medium.com/explainer-intervention-requests-and-australian-critical-infrastructure-2b3330754c6">here</a> and <a href="https://atechnolegalupdate.medium.com/some-takes-on-the-ministers-takes-on-risky-cni-business-1417ed81300c">here</a>, but the TL;DR is:</p><ul><li>these are break-glass powers that allow ASD to be sent in to, essentially, operate a CNI asset which has been/is imminently going to be bricked that national security is (likely to be) threatened; and</li><li>among other triggers being met, the Minister’s satisfied that no other regulatory system will ‘fix it’, the operators are no good/unwilling to resolve the incident, and the triumvirate (PM, Defence Minister and Minister for Home Affairs) are on board.</li></ul><p>Point is, these powers are at the extreme end of the spectrum of ASD’s advisory function under the <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.au/C2004A00928/latest/text"><em>Intelligence Services Act 2001</em></a><em> </em>(Cth) s 7(1)(ca).</p><p>Makes sense, though, given the context of national security being directly threatened. ASD is an intelligence agency, after all.</p><p>Oh, and let me point out that intervention requests cannot be authorised by the Minister unless they are satisfied that compliance is technically feasible: <em>SOCI Act </em>s 35AB(10)(f). When the powers were being debated in the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, ASD pointed out that they would, as a matter of course, consult with the operator of the affected CNI asset when figuring out what would be technically feasible (there are consultation requirements under section 35AD(2)).</p><p>So, at least when I wrote that earlier piece on these powers, I assumed that ASD has plenty of in-house OT security expertise. How else would they be able to consult appropriately and swiftly with the operator during a crisis?</p><p>Except the electricity sector person I spoke to that evening said the dice were not exactly present on this front.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/733/1*QwihaeJey3jYS63MZP7wug@2x.jpeg" /></figure><p>Now, I’ve had the pleasure of meeting a few of the OT specialists at ACSC, including at <a href="https://www.cyber.gov.au/resources-business-and-government/assessment-and-evaluation-programs/critical-infrastructure-uplift-program">CI-UP</a>. They’re lovely folks and absolute guns.</p><p>But are there enough of them? I don’t know.</p><p>So, as with the earlier section of this piece on the quality of education, I want you readers to tell me if you agree with my interlocutor’s position.</p><p>Is the OT expertise/resourcing situation <em>that</em> bad at ACSC?</p><p>And yes, to speak generally, we know the journeys of <em>many</em> folks in cyber: getting world-class training in cyber resilience and operations while working in the military/Sigint agencies (if not in the military), then checking out (after required service periods) for better pay and conditions in the private sector. I’m not at all dissing folks who follow that route, rather wondering out loud if FVEY agencies like ASD do enough to retain their talent, especially their OT talent.</p><p>A vital question, given that a true OT specialist is priceless in a national security sense.</p><p>The skills are built over <em>years</em> of tinkering/responding to incidents in a whole variety of OT environments or even a niche of OT environments, given that you can have people who spend most/all of their careers becoming specialists in, say, pipeline security.</p><p>It is such specialists who are pillars of the (regulatory) capacity and literacy of the state. For example, they help cyber resilience agencies identify, with respect to their CNI cyber resilience missions, what:</p><ul><li>threat types and responses need to be planned for;</li><li>legal and policy reforms, and OT security metrics, are necessary;</li><li>resources (including training and funding) are required for whole-of-government efforts to assure OT cyber resilience; and</li><li>institutional structures and mechanisms are necessary for agencies to be credible and trusted partners for industry, including for CTI sharing, co-development of law and policy, and incident response.</li></ul><p>I make these points while thinking of the shortcomings identified in the (past) approaches of <a href="https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-106221">the</a> <a href="https://oig.federalreserve.gov/reports/board-cybersecurity-supervision-apr2017.htm">Fed</a>, <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2022/03/17/tsa-has-screwed-this-up-pipeline-cyber-rules-hitting-major-hurdles-00017893">TSA</a>, <a href="https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-22-104279">CISA</a> <a href="https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-21-236">and</a> <a href="https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-22-105103">other</a> <a href="https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-20-299">US Sector Risk Management Agencies</a> <a href="https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-22-105973">to</a> discharging their (regulatory) missions.</p><p>Oh, and our CNI is largely OT. Our agencies need OT-literate folk to be able to protect it and enable smooth collaboration with operators.</p><p>I’ve heard that ACSC needs to spend a few meetings convincing OT operators that they’re not a regulator when trying to literally <em>help</em> them through CI-UP. This suggests that there is a trust deficit between the state and industry. Which is such a shame, given how amazing the CI-UP people are.</p><p>And, to reiterate an earlier point, such OT specialists can make much more money in industry, be it for an OT operator or even a specialist firm like a Dragos, Fortinet or Nozomi. Our agencies, backed by our governments, need to do what they must to retain that talent.</p><p>Indeed, the CISA Director <a href="https://www.youtube.com/live/hMUFT-KQcfg?si=pD9l1AnSYMuStZ0o&amp;t=1139">acknowledged</a> the pull factors at play for cyber folk generally (using herself as an example) before trying to rebut them by saying that ‘nobody joins the federal government to make any money … [rather] they come for a mission’. Make of that what you will.</p><p>(Tangentially, we know the <a href="https://infosec.exchange/@ravirockks/109579019857575976">reports</a>/<a href="https://fedscoop.com/insiders-worry-cisa-is-too-distracted-from-critical-cyber-mission/">leaks</a> on issues with CISA’s resourcing/structuring/approach. My heart goes out to the agency: no real teeth, yet condemned to jawbone, at least until <em>CIRCIA</em>, <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/6/chapter-1/subchapter-XVIII/part-D">6 USC §§ 681–681g</a>,<em> </em>is operationalised through the agency’s rules. CISA <a href="https://www.regulations.gov/docket/CISA-2022-0010">was consulting</a> on them earlier this year).</p><h3><em>All Up, a Fun Evening</em></h3><p>It was a really cool evening (not just because it was at the start of winter). Lesley gave a great talk, told some great stories and provided some great lessons. I have been following Lesley for around a year or so on X/Mastodon and been a fan of hers since, especially as an aspiring OT security nerd. Therefore, it was so cool that I could finally meet and talk shop with her. Cheers to Dragos for putting on this event.</p><p>In terms of my three key takeaways from the evening, well, those made it even more memorable. I’m always looking to learn from folks who actually do this stuff for a living since my knowledge is almost entirely book-knowledge. I relished the chats ’n reality checks over drinks. Be it with regard to the dearth of implementation of basic controls by OT operators, whether our cyber workforce is being given the <em>right</em> skills or whether our agencies are appropriately resourced to perform their OT security mission.</p><p>Of course, as I said especially with regard to takeaways 2 and 3, I want you to provide your responses. Are those takes from the other attendees accurate? Something missing? What’s your take on the solution?</p><p>P.S. Someone I spoke to made an interesting definitional point. They said that the IT-OT convergence had already happened, namely in the 1990s with the introduction of SCADA solutions. That ‘convergence’ was still confined to OT segments of operators’ networks, though.</p><p>Hence, they distinguished that ’90s convergence from the contemporary IT-OT convergence by highlighting how the latter involves a fusion of the OT operator’s <em>business processes</em> with their OT processes. This is because of, eg:</p><ul><li>IT running processes that govern or enable the operation and maintenance of OT (eg workforce planning and rostering, operator callout systems, vulnerability management and asset inventories);</li><li>the wider ‘cloudification’ of OT; and</li><li>the (subsequent) phenomenon of OT and IT data flying around each other’s segments of operators’ networks more and more.</li></ul><p>What do you make of their assessment of the IT-OT convergence?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ZlbQgnJxc6OAwry0P4Ld7Q.png" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f5b0ac85379a" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Cessation of Straya’s Cyber Somnolence? Yeah, Nah]]></title>
            <link>https://atechnolegalupdate.medium.com/the-cessation-of-strayas-cyber-somnolence-yeah-nah-281d9e64b594?source=rss-2c8c011d69de------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/281d9e64b594</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[policy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hacking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[infrastructure]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[corporate-governance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[A Techno-Legal Update]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 04 Dec 2023 00:24:29 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-12-25T12:48:02.489Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>By Ravi Nayyar</h4><p>So, like a lot of folks, I have thoughts about the <a href="https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/about-us/our-portfolios/cyber-security/strategy/2023-2030-australian-cyber-security-strategy"><em>2023–2030 Australian Cyber Security Strategy</em></a><em> </em>(‘<em>2023 Strategy</em>’).</p><p>The thing hyped up as the remedy for our erstwhile ‘cyber slumber’, to <a href="https://minister.homeaffairs.gov.au/ClareONeil/Pages/cyber-strategy-signals-generational-shift-response-growing-threat.aspx">quote</a> our fearless Minister for Home Affairs and Cyber Security, Clare O’Neil MP. (Though, did Rhonda from <em>Utopia</em> come up with that term?)</p><p>Well, TL;DR = I didn’t expect much and my response is, ‘Barring a few things, sigh’.</p><p>I’ll provide brief thoughts on the <em>2023 Strategy </em>as a whole, dive into a few of the shields and will leave my specific thoughts on bits and pieces in an appendix. (And all the memes were created by moi.)</p><p>Let’s dive in.</p><h3>General</h3><p>There’s not really much new in the <em>2023</em> <em>Strategy</em> versus its predecessor, <a href="https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/about-us/our-portfolios/cyber-security/strategy/australias-cyber-security-strategy-2020"><em>Australia’s Cyber Security Strategy 2020</em></a> (‘<em>2020 Strategy</em>’). For a strategy which has been <a href="https://archive.md/nfLFj">in the works</a> since August 2022.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*WJ3Vw5OAoZrye60-uL-zGA.png" /></figure><p>I won’t do an action-by-action comparison of the two strategies, but if you do, you’ll understand my point, especially if you have been following the Australian cyber resilience scene far longer than I have.</p><p>Makes one wonder what all the millions of dollars <a href="https://www.innovationaus.com/mckinseys-1m-cyber-strategy-contract-has-no-core-policy-work/">spent on</a> <a href="https://www.itnews.com.au/news/cyber-strategy-has-cost-home-affairs-28-million-so-far-598207">consultants</a> to do administrative-sounding work to support the development of the new strategy was for. Either way, happy days for the firms when Home Affairs could have hired Masters/PhD students as research assistants/interns to do the same for much less. Nonetheless, our fearless Minister <a href="https://minister.homeaffairs.gov.au/ClareONeil/Pages/interview-patrick-gray-01082023.aspx">has been</a> clear in avoiding questions about the merits of these disbursements of taxpayer dollars:</p><blockquote>Yeah, I mean, I actually — the Department decides about contracting and that sort of thing. It’s actually not something that I have power and control over. All I can say is that this is a problem that is worth… [throwing] Literally tens of billions of dollars [at solving]. I’m not kidding… I think you will find whatever the cost of this strategy is going to be is going to pay for itself hundreds of times over.</blockquote><p>Yes, Minister.</p><p>Alrighty, to the Shields.</p><h3>The Most Noble Order of the Shields</h3><p>Now, the ‘six cyber shields’ (um, that s-word suggests defence, not a more holistic goal of resilience, but anyhoo). Figure 1 summarises them.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*tz_nJtlQxwgvdbb3fQNnfg.png" /><figcaption>Figure 1: The six Shields from the <a href="https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/cyber-security-subsite/files/2023-cyber-security-strategy.pdf"><em>2023 Strategy</em></a><em>.</em></figcaption></figure><p>I find the ordering baffling. Why put CNI as far back as 4?</p><p>Why not an order like the following:</p><ol><li>Safe technology</li><li>Protected critical infrastructure</li><li>World-class threat sharing and blocking</li><li>Strong businesses and citizens</li><li>Sovereign capabilities</li><li>Resilient region and global leadership</li></ol><p>Safe technology (never mind the cop-out from the government, as I argue below) is vital to everything in our society and economy functioning — like CNI — let alone the <em>2023 Strategy</em> being implemented.</p><p>And then, you can’t do any of the stuff in the other four Shields without your CNI running (with the aid of safe technology), given the definition of CNI. See the criteria under the <em>Security of Critical Infrastructure Act 2018</em> (Cth) ss 51(1)(c)-(d) (‘<em>SOCI Act</em>’). For example, you can’t share CTI per Shield 3 if your data centres are starved of electricity.</p><p>But ah well, that’s ‘semantics’.</p><p>Now, my thoughts on Shield 1.</p><h3>Shield 1</h3><p>A mixed bag.</p><h4><strong>The Good Bits</strong></h4><p>Firstly, the proposed ‘Cyber Incident Review Board’ (‘CIRB’), modelled on the likes of the American Cyber Safety Review Board (‘CSRB’) and the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (Action 5.2), is a great thing.</p><p>A specialised, most likely multi-stakeholder (if it’s modelled on the CSRB), body tasked with investigating major breaches and identifying how we can collectively improve how we tackle cyber risk.</p><p>Secondly, the proposal to co-design a legislated limited use obligation which will closely regulate the intra-governmental sharing of data reported by industry to the Australian Signals Directorate (‘ASD’) and the National Cyber Security Coordinator, with the Commonwealth planning to get the ball rolling ‘by developing an interim approach for ASD’ (Action 6.2).</p><p>The Commonwealth can use the following bit of clause 21 of the <a href="https://ico.org.uk/media/about-the-ico/mou/4027247/ncsc-mou-20230912.pdf"><em>Memorandum of Understanding between the National Cyber Security Centre and the Information Commissioner</em></a> (‘<em>NCSC-ICO MoU</em>’) as a template:</p><blockquote>For the avoidance of doubt, the NCSC will not share information from an organisation it is engaged with due to a cyber incident with the Commissioner unless it has the consent of the organisation to do so.</blockquote><p>In the foreshadowed Australian limited use obligation, the Commonwealth can also make reference to section 40 of the <em>Intelligence Services Act 2001 </em>(Cth), which strictly limits what information can be shared by ASD staff, contractors and their employees.</p><p>I reckon Action 6.2 is among the most consequential elements of the <em>2023 Strategy</em>, given the criticality of transparency and information-sharing by the private sector — especially CNI owners and operators — with government (during a crisis). The quicker industry can share more, richer CTI and telemetry with legislated limits on what that data can be used for by government, the greater the trust will be between the public and private sectors.</p><p>Which will enable ASD to move much more quickly in a national security crisis stemming from a serious breach of cyber resilience in, say, CNI. Not least because the situational awareness of the victim organisation will be more rapidly super-charged (yes, I said that) by <a href="https://x.com/ravirockks/status/1509840204428824577">the state’s own</a> ’Marvel superpower’ (no, I didn’t say that) — their situational awareness and technical expertise through ASD, a Sigint agency — in order to swiftly resolve the breach and crisis.</p><p>Action 6.2 makes clear that this limited use obligation ‘would not impact regulatory or law enforcement actions, or provide an immunity from legal liability’. Sure, in principle, this prevents moral hazards that would be caused by organisations otherwise being confident that they can avoid scrutiny for unreasonable control failures and thus breaches of their regulatory obligations. It thus promotes the rule of law.</p><p>But in practice, if the Commonwealth is looking to incentivise transparency by organisations, there are questions about what this limited use obligation will achieve in terms of shifting industry mindsets in favour of engagement with ASD and/or the National Cyber Security Coordinator in the absence of further carrots or reductions in the size of relevant sticks.</p><p>In this regard, the Commonwealth should consider instituting a mechanism for organisations constructively engaging with it to be looked upon favourably by their regulators, especially in the context of enforcement action. Such a mechanism could echo clause 37 of the <em>NCSC-ICO MoU</em>:</p><blockquote>The Commissioner will on an increasing basis, continue to recognise and incentivise appropriate engagement with the NCSC on cyber security matters in its approach to regulation. Specifically, the Commissioner will publicise (on its website, in guidance, and in relevant press releases) that it looks favourably on victims of nationally significant cyber incidents who report to and engage with the NCSC and will consider whether it can be more specific on how such engagement might factor into its calculation of regulatory fines.</blockquote><h4><strong>The Suboptimal Bits</strong></h4><p>Firstly, on the proposed CIRB, I am unsure what is meant by how it ‘will not make findings of fault’. How do you conduct a ‘lessons-learned review’ without figuring out whose conduct contributed to what happened? (Of course, I understand the need to keep industry onside in all this.)</p><p>The value of such a CIRB is also limited by its ability to access information from industry and government in order to generate rich recommendations. Will it have information-gathering powers akin to those of a royal commission?</p><p>This is relevant especially if the pwned organisation claims legal professional privilege (‘LPP’) over relevant data because it fears getting sued — as Optus unsuccessfully <a href="https://www.judgments.fedcourt.gov.au/judgments/Judgments/fca/single/2023/2023fca1392">did</a> with the Deloitte post-breach report — thereby delaying the work of the CIRB with litigation over LPP. Perhaps the Commonwealth can legislate powers for the CIRB similar to that under the <em>Royal Commissions Act 1902 </em>(Cth) s 6AA in this regard?</p><p>When it comes to dealing with a Medibankesque scenario where the organisation subject of a CIRB review simply <a href="http://archive.today/8NBXd">refuses</a> to publish the DFIR review, the Commonwealth can look at the coercive powers of a royal commission to summon witnesses and take evidence under the <em>Royal Commissions Act 1902 </em>(Cth) s 2 as a model.</p><p>Devil’s advocate: Why do we need a CIRB when you can expand the purview of the Inspector-General for Intelligence and Security (‘IGIS’) to review how ASD (regulated by IGIS) and all stakeholders acted in resolving a breach? IGIS has pretty hefty powers.</p><p>Secondly, the <em>2023 Strategy </em>is a damp squib, a <em>complete</em> let-down when it comes to cyber governance.</p><p>Our country appears reticent when it comes to taking even basic action against poor cyber governance <em>as poor corporate </em>governance; as opposed to a breach of sectoral law a la <a href="https://www.judgments.fedcourt.gov.au/judgments/Judgments/fca/single/2022/2022fca0496"><em>ASIC v RI Advice</em></a>.</p><p>Or reticent in terms of imposing <em>personal</em> liability on corporate <em>officers</em>, as defined by the <em>Corporations Act 2001 </em>(Cth) s 9 (‘<em>Corps Act</em>’), for breaches of their statutory duties to their companies arising out of said poor cyber governance.</p><p>Why else haven’t any of the people, who were Medibank’s or Optus’s officers just before and during the relevant breaches, been even the subject of <em>Corps Act</em> s 1317E proceedings that merely involve a court, on application from the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (‘ASIC’), declaring that they have breached their officers’ duties under sections 180–1 of the <em>Corps Act</em> (those are civil penalty provisions under section 1317E(3))?</p><p>Seriously, Medibank (<a href="https://x.com/ravirockks/status/1583241178551844864">a CNI operator</a>) was <a href="https://x.com/ravirockks/status/1628604668468404224">done</a> through its supply chain (valid Medibank creds stolen from a third-party service provider) and a misconfigured firewall letting the attacker straight in. The consensus is that Optus was <a href="https://www.protocol.com/bulletins/optus-data-breach-api-security">done</a> in 2022 through an unauthenticated API. The Minister rightly <a href="https://x.com/clareoneilmp/status/1574361824102711296?s=61&amp;t=r58Z6R0DNa-mmzzhOPT3WA">shot down</a> the then-CEO’s narrative about it being a ‘sophisticated’ attack.</p><p>Fast-forward just over a year and the <em>massive </em>outage of Optus’s consumer IP network <a href="https://www.aph.gov.au/DocumentStore.ashx?id=2ed95079-023d-49d5-87fd-d9029740629b&amp;subId=750333">being thanks to</a> Optus failing to configure its Provider Edge Routers appropriately, such that around 90 ended up ‘automatically self-isolating in order to protect themselves from an overload of IP routing information’ — as per the <em>default</em> settings — received after a software update (which Optus knew about) at a Singtel internet exchange (run by the parent company, whom Optus <a href="http://archive.today/iEMic">unsuccessfully</a> tried to blame).</p><p>So an outage which <a href="https://x.com/ravirockks/status/1722489249696821627">had</a> such <em>massive</em> cross-sectoral impacts, including by preventing <em>000 access</em> for many customers, was thanks to Optus not <em>configuring</em> its own gear properly.</p><p>No threat actors.</p><p>Just its own stuff-up.</p><p>Oh, and it gets worse — one of our country’s most critical of CNI operators had <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2023/nov/17/optus-ceo-kelly-bayer-rosmarin-telstra-vodafone-sim-cards-network-outage"><em>not</em></a> exercised a complete cold restart of its network. (And its then-CEO <a href="http://archive.md/K58UN">felt</a> it was perfectly professional to leak her resignation to the <em>Australian Financial Review</em> the week before she officially resigned.)</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*M209RfWcW8Q9xlsm1i0N_w.png" /></figure><p>But wait, there’s more, possums!</p><p>It’s not like the DP World Australia hack was because of a ‘military-grade cyber weapon’.</p><p>Rather, it was most likely because they <a href="https://cyberplace.social/@GossiTheDog/111391471194676506">didn’t patch</a> their Citrix NetScaler instance prior to their compromise with, <a href="https://x.com/ravirockks/status/1724223428859744632">let’s face it</a>, LockBit. The Minister certainly seemed to imply CitrixBleed was the initial access vector by publicly <a href="https://archive.md/EOT55">railing against</a> the <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/posts/stillromancingwithlife_dp-world-executive-vice-president-oceania-activity-7129740666644926465--jLp">port facility operator</a> for failing to patch their Citrix.</p><p>The CNI operator <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/business-67400164">handling</a> 40% of our maritime trade failing to do basic patch management (which would include, one would assume in this case, failing to put in place mitigating controls for the intervening period prior to their ultimately patching their Citrix).</p><p>When we are already an island continent fundamentally dependent on sea lines of communication to continue, well, existing. And <a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/lets-get-behind-an-australian-merchant-navy/">exacerbating</a> the systemic problems brought on by lacking a merchant navy.</p><p>To sum up, we have a few instances of terrible cyber governance with terrible negative externalities for our national security in just the last year or so. Among the 143 incidents that ASD <a href="https://www.cyber.gov.au/about-us/reports-and-statistics/asd-cyber-threat-report-july-2022-june-2023">responded to</a> in FY 2022–23 at organisations self-identifying as CNI people, an increase from the 95 incidents reported in 2021–22.</p><p>And yet, here’s what Shield 1 has to offer on cyber governance.</p><blockquote><em>Industry feedback has flagged that more could be done to help businesses understand what good cyber security looks like.</em></blockquote><p>What an indictment. It’s 2023, for crying out loud.</p><blockquote><em>As a first step, the Government will publish an overview of corporate obligations for critical infrastructure owners and operators.</em></blockquote><p>ASIC already did in 2015 with <a href="https://asic.gov.au/regulatory-resources/find-a-document/reports/rep-429-cyber-resilience-health-check/"><em>Report No 429</em></a><em>. </em>See Appendix 2 thereof. No mention, of course, of ASIC’s role in enforcing officers’ duties in the cyber governance context.</p><p>To add insult, ASIC isn’t even the lead agency for Action 5.1, per the <a href="https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/cyber-security-subsite/files/2023-cyber-security-strategy-action-plan.pdf">Action Plan</a> for the <em>2023 Strategy </em>(‘<em>2023 Action Plan</em>’), rather Home Affairs and Treasury are. I didn’t realise they were the corporate regulators.</p><p>Never mind that this is not a law reform initiative (which would require Treasury and Home Affairs to be <em>among</em> the lead agencies), rather one recycling existing literature on cyber governance.</p><p>Including that put out by the actual corporate regulator.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*PclvPZqxt4L1drc-V6-5Cg.png" /></figure><blockquote><em>Next, the Government will consider how best to collaborate with industry to design best-practice principles to guide good cyber governance.</em></blockquote><p>Excuse me!?</p><p>No wonder there is no mention of ASIC’s role as an enforcer: the Commonwealth seems to have forgotten the underlying philosophy of Recommendation 6.2 from the <a href="https://www.royalcommission.gov.au/system/files/2020-09/fsrc-volume-1-final-report.pdf"><em>Financial Services Royal Commission</em></a>, which called for ASIC to, ‘as its starting point, [take] the question of whether a court should determine the consequences of a contravention’.</p><p>Yes, that recommendation was about enforcing financial services law, not corporations law, but you get my point — ASIC needs to actually and aggressively enforce the <em>Corps Act</em> officers duties, rather than the government sitting down to sing kumbaya with industry.</p><p>That is what will truly ‘guide good cyber governance’.</p><p>‘Why not litigate?’, to quote Commissioner Hayne.</p><p>Oh, and note that we already have ‘best-practice principles’. They’re called <em>rationes decidendi</em> from courts interpreting the officers duties under the <em>Corps Act</em>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*d7aVwdhNBbjEYCG7f30N4A.png" /></figure><blockquote><em>To help industry navigate mandatory cyber incident reporting obligations, the Government has developed a single reporting portal on cyber.gov.au that brings key reporting links together in one place.</em></blockquote><p>So it’s basically something undergrad law students can put together and pitch in a day’s work at a hackathon? A <a href="https://www.cyber.gov.au/report-and-recover/single-reporting-portal">collection</a> of hyperlinks based on whom you tell the webpage you’re regulated by?</p><p>Sigh.</p><p>All up, folks, it is obvious that said breaches of cyber resilience in our CNI are merely continuing a trend of below-par cyber governance in Oz generally.</p><p>Look at the findings of ASIC’s cyber pulse survey 2023 (<a href="https://download.asic.gov.au/media/yiqjhv0p/rep776-published-13-november-2023.pdf">Report 776</a>), based on responses from 697 organisations, including companies of a range of shapes and sizes. Across the board, the weighted average cyber maturity score was <em>1.66</em> out of 4.</p><p>When we break things down by category of the NIST framework, things are far from rosy — see Figure 2 (hint: look at the ‘Govern’ function).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ah6HVbRZVUO-T3-x9yyF5A.png" /><figcaption>Figure 2: Weighted average cyber maturity score by function for small vs medium and large organisations, per ASIC’s <a href="https://download.asic.gov.au/media/yiqjhv0p/rep776-published-13-november-2023.pdf">cyber pulse survey 2023</a>.</figcaption></figure><p>The overall score for governance and risk management is <em>1.62</em> out of 4, with ASIC saying organisations can do better in:</p><ul><li>‘defining cyber security roles and responsibilities’;</li><li>‘complying with regulatory obligations’; and</li><li>‘identifying and prioritising vulnerabilities to information assets’.</li></ul><p>Furthermore:</p><ul><li>‘44% [of respondents] do not manage third-party or supply chain risk’;</li><li>‘58% have limited or no capability to protect confidential information adequately’;</li><li>‘33% do not have a cyber incident response plan’; and</li><li>‘20% have not adopted a cyber security standard’.</li></ul><p>ASIC’s survey is in addition to the cyber security stocktake <a href="https://www.apra.gov.au/news-and-publications/cyber-security-stocktake-exposes-gaps">being done</a> by the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (‘APRA’) in 2023 to assess compliance by over 300 banks, insurers and superannuation trustees with APRA’s prudential standard for information security, <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/F2018L01745"><em>CPS 234</em></a>.</p><p>The findings, released in July 2023, from the assessment of 24% of APRA’s regulated population thus far are as damning as those from ASIC’s survey.</p><p>Never mind that the respondents would include CNI operators, given the categories of CNI assets under the <em>SOCI Act </em>s 9.</p><p>Oh, and let’s go back even further to a <a href="https://www.aicd.com.au/content/dam/aicd/pdf/news-media/research/2022/08299-3-5-Cyber-Security-Report-30pp-v3B.pdf">survey</a> by the Australian Institute of Company Directors and the Australian Information Security Association in May 2022 of 856 directors on how their organisations did the cyber dance. The findings from which are also damning.</p><p>Of the directors surveyed:</p><ul><li>22% have an ‘inadequate’ understanding of their companies’ regulatory obligations with respect to cyber;</li><li>25% of those sitting on the Boards of listed companies did not consider that cyber security is a ‘high priority issue for [their Boards]’;</li><li>less than half of listed company directors said their Boards ‘[m]ake cyber a specific focus of a board committee’;</li><li>31% said their Boards are <em>never</em> briefed on the cyber resilience of ‘key third-party suppliers’, while merely 37% received briefings ‘Occasionally/Ad-hoc’ on ‘execution of [a] cyber strategy or framework’;</li><li><em>half</em> said their organisations did not apply cyber resilience frameworks like NIST/ISO 27001/Essential Eight; and</li><li>merely 14% of those sitting on listed company Boards and 20% of those sitting on unlisted company Boards said their organisations recruited directors with expertise in cyber.</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/956/1*n1h9MKrykEtzsoq6XLxOcw.png" /></figure><p>And yet, our cyber security strategy, our Rosetta Stone for cyber policy, has not shed the voluntary self-regulation/warm, fuzzy/baby steps, etc approach when it comes to cyber governance. This is not a new problem. This is not a ‘winged cyber ninjas’ problem. This is a ‘dearth of intent’ problem.</p><p>A dearth of intent to enforce existing laws.</p><p>Not jawbone, as the ASIC Chair <a href="https://asic.gov.au/about-asic/news-centre/speeches/marconi-s-illusion-what-a-120-year-old-magician-s-trick-can-teach-us-about-cyber-preparedness/">has</a> <a href="https://asic.gov.au/about-asic/news-centre/speeches/asic-s-corporate-governance-priorities-and-the-year-ahead/">done</a> over the last two years, about officers needing to provide good cyber governance and comply with their <em>Corps Act </em>duties.</p><p>But enforce.</p><p>If the sword of Damocles does a wee bit more than just hanging over officers who drop the ball, well, that would really set the cat among the pigeons.</p><p>Like the SEC is <a href="https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2023-227">doing</a> in the case of SolarWinds and its CISO (here’s my <a href="https://infosec.exchange/@ravirockks/111329820010852382">take</a> on that action.).</p><p>Especially as the threat environment <a href="https://www.cyber.gov.au/about-us/reports-and-statistics/asd-cyber-threat-report-july-2022-june-2023">gets</a> even worse generally, not just CNI.</p><p>Otherwise, we make Sisyphus look like he’s on holiday.</p><p>Actually, don’t we already do that?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*-ODUnNpBvNgmd0o9ckNyrw.png" /></figure><p>Now, Shield 2.</p><h3><em>Shield 2</em></h3><p>Another mixed bag.</p><h4><strong>The Disappointing Bits</strong></h4><p>This is the one I was especially looking forward to as an aspiring software security nerd, but knew not to expect much from, given the Minister’s publicly <a href="http://archive.today/kYNFn">disclaiming</a> the creation of a European <em>Cyber Resilience Act</em>-style vendor liability regime. And good thing I hadn’t gotten me hopes up.</p><p>Yes, there are commitments to: co-design a mandatory IoT cyber security standard with industry (Action 8.1); implement year-old Quad commitments to harmonise procurement regulations with respect to software security (Action 8.2); and create a national security-focused SCRM framework to help industry do their C-SCRM on top of figuring out how to boot insecure gear from the Australian market (Action 8.3).</p><p>That said, will the mandatory IoT standard merely codify the <a href="https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/reports-and-pubs/files/code-of-practice.pdf"><em>Voluntary Code of Practice: Securing the Internet of Things for Consumers</em></a> from 2020, flagged by the <em>2020 Strategy</em>? If yes, how’s that a radical rethink of policy taking us out of the ‘cyber slumber’ under the Morrison Government? That said, the bar is subterranean for IoT/software security regulation in Australia.</p><p>Also, why go for a mandatory IoT security standard but then go for a voluntary labelling regime for IoT? If both a security standard and labelling regime would be in synch with international standards, then I’m not quite sure how the former would require compliance with criteria irrelevant to the latter.</p><p>If you’re going to require IoT vendors to do x, y and z in terms of product hygiene, which they have agreed on via the co-design process and thus would see as making their products more attractive, then how is it a compliance headache for them to be <em>required</em> to merely disclose that they have done x, y and z on their products and/or packaging in a manner which they have agreed to via the co-design process?</p><p>Why not make <em>both</em> mandatory? And enforceable co-regulatory frameworks analogous to industry codes under <em>Competition and Consumer Act 2010</em> (Cth) pt IVB?</p><p>The problem is not that small enough to justify voluntary self-regulation (because that is what is foreshadowed here) ‘as a first step’, by the way.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*I9WLNvXM7lm5UvgiUAZZBQ.png" /></figure><p>On implementing commitments as a Quad country (from the <a href="https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/100347801.pdf">May 2022</a> and <a href="https://www.pmc.gov.au/resources/quad-cybersecurity-partnership-joint-principles-secure-software">May 2023</a> Quad Leaders’ Summits), excellent. I’ve written on the Quad’s initiative (<a href="https://www.giga-hamburg.de/en/publications/contributions/quad-carved-code-collaborating-deliver-public">here</a>, <a href="https://www.giga-hamburg.de/en/publications/contributions/quad-carved-code-shaping-inter-national-security-reshaping-economic-incentives">here</a> and <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/quad-tackling-spider-not-cobwebs-cyberspace">here</a>) and think it’s a great idea.</p><p>But I am incredibly disappointed the government is not going down the liability route in re software vendors not investing in the hygiene of their software development life cycles (‘SDLCs’). As I’ve argued in said pieces on the Quad’s initiative, existing incentive structures, if any depending on the jurisdiction, are utterly inadequate in motivating vendors to invest in and continue to assure the resilience of their SDLCs (just like how they are in Australia for companies generally to assure their cyber resilience).</p><p>You cannot possibly rely on economic incentives (like government contracts) alone to get vendors (or indeed any regulated entity) to lift their game. You need to go for smart regulation a la Gunningham, using a range of approaches, <em>including black-letter law</em>. If economic incentives (the wallets of educated buyers) were enough, then the invisible hand alone would have done it.</p><p>Except it didn’t.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*f_AjulXN9jdYJX5sJUaCqA.png" /></figure><p>It’s long past time the government realised that this is a software and national security problem, and thus a <a href="https://www.giga-hamburg.de/assets/pure/44369008/GIGA_DigitalDiplomacyStatecraft_PB_02_Nayyar.pdf">public goods</a> problem.</p><p>Alas, the market <a href="https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/cyber-resilience-act-impact-assessment">has not</a> prioritised SDLC hygiene, but it appears the Albanese government has reposed a lot of faith in the market and ignored the signal. By rejecting the idea of an explicit liability framework to recalibrate the invisible hand to favour vendors with robust SDLCs.</p><p>Meanwhile, the Council of Europe and European Parliament <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/11/30/cyber-resilience-act-council-and-parliament-strike-a-deal-on-security-requirements-for-digital-products/">have reached</a> provisional agreement on the EU’s proposed <em>Cyber Resilience Act </em>— what would be the world’s first bespoke liability regime for the security of hardware <em>and software</em> products — a major milestone in the EU supranational legislative <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/olp/en/interinstitutional-negotiations">process</a>. #whycantwehavenicethings</p><p>Meanwhile, we’re committed to coming up with a ‘voluntary code of practice for app stores and app developers’ in Action 8.2 of the <em>2023 Strategy</em>. Look at the sheer amount of malware in the Android ecosystem, <a href="https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/android-malware-infiltrates-60-google-play-apps-with-100m-installs/">finding</a> its way into popular apps, for instance. How can we forget the Pinduoduo <a href="https://www.theregister.com/2023/03/21/google_suspends_pinduoduo/">imbroglio</a> of 2023? A case study into negative externalities of decision making by developers and app store gatekeepers.</p><p>And yes, both <a href="https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2023/05/app-store-stopped-more-than-2-billion-in-fraudulent-transactions-in-2022/">Apple</a> and <a href="https://security.googleblog.com/2023/04/how-we-fought-bad-apps-and-bad-actors.html">Google</a> take <em>tons</em> of action to prevent fraud and flush out malicious apps, but then again, it is purely motivated by corporate governance on their part — failure to do their basic gatekeeper roles as app store arbiters will not exactly do their reputation among users any good.</p><p>They are not <em>specifically</em> required by <em>legislation</em>, at least in Australia, to take that action and held accountable per standards for the security of apps that they allow to be downloaded from their storefronts.</p><p>Of course, if the likes of Apple and Google rail against being regulated as gatekeepers, well, the Commonwealth can merely tell them, ‘We’ll enshrine your existing policies in law <em>as a start</em>’.</p><h4>The Great Bit</h4><p>I <em>love</em> Action 8.3 because I <a href="https://atechnolegalupdate.medium.com/the-pursuit-of-lucidity-in-the-labyrinth-df33b6f7e061">believe</a> C-SCRM, especially <a href="https://atechnolegalupdate.medium.com/with-vendors-like-these-ea897024e6ed">software SCRM</a>, is national security risk management (which is why regulating the hygiene of SDLCs is vital).</p><p>As the Indian External Affairs Minister <a href="https://atechnolegalupdate.medium.com/the-geopolitics-of-technology-indias-approach-ea9b49f109a">put it</a> just a year ago:</p><blockquote>Today, technology is very much at the heart of geopolitics…</blockquote><blockquote>We live in an era where, in many ways, the Westphalian model of international relations is over for us in this era of technological interpenetration… I think in the digital side, we are going to hear, more and more, the concept of trusted geographies, so the moment you start talking trusted geographies, the geopolitical connotation of that is very, very clear.</blockquote><p>C-SCRM matters, folks. Geopolitics, and thus cyber risk and foreign interference risk, pervade the lot of it.</p><p>Anything the state can do to share its situational awareness on hardware and software supply chains with industry to enable the latter to make much more informed decisions (and give CISOs/procurement officers some actionable intelligence to take to their Boards/seniors, respectively) is vital.</p><p>This will especially enable industry’s compliance with their obligations to manage supply chain risk, such as: CNI operators covered by the risk management program regime obligations under <em>SOCI Act </em>pt 2A, specifically required to take care of supply chain hazards under the <em>Security of Critical Infrastructure (Critical infrastructure risk management program) Rules (LIN 23/006) 2023</em> (Cth) r 10 (‘<em>SOCI RMP Rules</em>’); or prudentially-regulated institutions under <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/F2018L01745"><em>CPS 234</em></a> having to manage risks from third party service providers (note <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/F2023L01242"><em>CPS 230</em></a><em> </em>coming online in 2025, requiring them to do so regarding material service providers).</p><p>A framework of the sort contemplated by Action 8.3 could also contain criteria that regulated entities or organisations can plug into their procurement contracts and vendor screening procedures. Beauty.</p><p>If we are to go down the black-letter route to implement Action 8.3, we can use, as templates, the:</p><ul><li><a href="https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-15/subtitle-A/part-7">Supply Chain Rule</a> (see 15 CFR § 7), a national security-focused screening regime under which the Secretary of Commerce can ban ‘any acquisition, importation, transfer, installation, dealing in, or use of any information and communications technology or service, including but not limited to connected software applications’ on the basis, essentially, of foreign interference risk;</li><li><em>Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019 </em>(<a href="https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?path=%2Fprelim%40title47%2Fchapter15&amp;edition=prelim">codified</a> at 47 USC §§ 1601–9), under which the FCC designated <a href="https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-affirms-designation-huawei-national-security-threat-0">Huawei</a> and <a href="https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-designates-huawei-and-zte-national-security-threats">ZTE</a> as national security threats and thus producers of covered equipment per 47 USC § 1601. Which led to the Federal Communications Commission: banning the use of Universal Service Fund (‘USF’) money to purchase said companies’ gear, per 15 USC § 1602 and 47 CFR § 54.9(a); requiring the removal of their gear by US telcos receiving Universal Service Fund money, per 47 CFR § 54.11(a); and making said removal, where the telco has at most ten million customers, eligible for federal funding under the <a href="https://www.fcc.gov/supplychain">Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Reimbursement Program</a>, per 47 USC § 1603 and 47 CFR §§ 1.5000, 54.9(d); and</li><li><em>Secure Equipment Act of 2021</em> (<a href="https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?path=%2Fprelim%40title47%2Fchapter15&amp;edition=prelim">codified</a> as a statutory note to 47 USC § 1601), under which the FCC <a href="https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-bans-authorizations-devices-pose-national-security-threat">updated</a> its equipment authorisation program (<a href="https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-47/chapter-I/subchapter-A/part-2/subpart-J">contained</a> in 47 CFR §§ 2.901–2.1093) in November 2022 to ban the authorisation, import and marketing of covered equipment (including comms gear produced by Huawei, ZTE, Hytera, Hikvision and Dahua) in the US.</li></ul><p>Or maybe the Commonwealth won’t go for the creation of a generalist framework — be it under statute or legislative/regulatory instrument (eg Ministerial rule-making to amend the <em>SOCI RMP Rules</em> under <em>SOCI Act </em>s 30AH(1)(c)) — modelled on the above, which allows the state to coercively require the exclusion of designated vendors?</p><p>Maybe it will be left to sectoral regulators to implement? (Though none are mentioned in the <em>2023 Action Plan</em> list of accountable agencies for Action 8.3.)</p><p>Or maybe the SCRM framework, as contemplated by Action 8.3, won’t be legally enforceable?</p><p>More ‘guidance’ incoming from Home Affairs — via the Cyber and Infrastructure Security Centre/Australian Cyber Security Centre (‘ACSC’)/Australian Security Intelligence Organisation — on which vendors to avoid? Guidance which CNI responsible entities can ‘consider’ when complying with their SCRM obligations under the <em>SOCI RMP Rules </em>r 10 as well as sectoral obligations, if any?</p><p>After all, Action 8.3 contemplates ‘further options to limit the availability of non-secure products in the domestic market’, which is broader than black-letter law bans on vendors or service providers that have been designated by the Minister for Home Affairs/Secretary for the Department of Home Affairs/delegate of the latter.</p><p>Wouldn’t want to antagonise industry through more pesky black-letter regulation, now, would we?</p><p>On the whole with Shield 2, I can’t help but see it as a missed opportunity. We could have really driven real change at home in terms of incentivising the production and support of truly secure technology, had we gone for liability frameworks for software vendors, mandatory IoT labelling and mandatory security standards for app stores and developers. The things enabling all the other Shields.</p><p>Gee, what a surprise that we can’t have nice things.</p><p>I guess we can hang on to how we <a href="http://archive.today/zS4dM">led</a> the world in excluding Huawei from our NBN and 5G build, but not really progress much beyond that.</p><p>Now, Shield 4.</p><h3>Shield 4</h3><p>As Shakespeare wrote, ‘What’s in a name?’</p><p>Well, in policymaking and law reform (as we were taught in statutory interpretation in law school), a lot. Intent, for one.</p><p>Why does Shield 4 say ‘protected’, but not ‘resilient’, CNI?</p><p>‘Protected’ suggests that the CNI assets’ perimeter defences, in the cyber context, are good enough, not that the assets and their operators are ‘resilient’ in the face of successful targeting by the baddies.</p><p>Words matter.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*TK0MPGMMsIYe-ZlHWjeLBQ.png" /></figure><p>Especially when, right before the diagram that is Figure 1 (listing the Shields) appears in the <em>2023 Strategy</em>, is the following sentence:</p><blockquote>Throughout the period covered by the 2023–2030 Australian Cyber Security Strategy (the Strategy), the Australian Government will work with industry to reinforce these shields and build our national cyber resilience.</blockquote><p>R-word, Baby!</p><p>By the way, on the proposal in Action 14.3 for a ‘last resort all-hazards consequence management power’, note that the all-encompassing directions-issuing power of the Minister already exists under <em>SOCI Act</em> pt 3.</p><p>And if this is talk about extending the Commonwealth’s part 3A powers to operate after the relevant cyber security incident has been resolved, I am firmly against that — see my <a href="https://atechnolegalupdate.medium.com/some-takes-on-the-ministers-takes-on-risky-cni-business-1417ed81300c">analysis</a> from earlier this year.</p><p>Onto the final Shield.</p><h3>Shield 6</h3><p>I am especially disappointed by how Shield 6, ‘Resilient region and global leadership’ (five pages worth with 7 Actions), is nowhere as comprehensive as our <a href="https://www.internationalcybertech.gov.au/strategy"><em>2021 International Cyber and Critical Technology Engagement Strategy</em></a> (‘<em>2021 CCTE Strategy</em>’; the operative bits are close to 80 pages long with 37 Actions).</p><p>The <em>2023 Strategy’s</em> Action 19 is titled ‘Support a cyber resilient region as the partner of choice’, especially for our Pacific family. And we appointed Tim Watts MP — someone more than literate in cyber policy — as Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs.</p><p>So why wasn’t Assistant Minister Watts tapped to draft a new cyber and critical technology diplomacy strategy? After all, if we were <a href="https://archive.md/nfLFj">wanting to</a> tear back the curtains, open the windows and let in some fresh air by replacing the <em>2020 Strategy</em>, why not do the same with the <em>2021 CCTE Strategy</em>?</p><p>In the interests of bringing our diplomacy and domestic policy on cyber under one strategy (the <em>2023 Strategy</em>, as <a href="https://open.spotify.com/episode/5CiUJDU3efY1WpLVV978tz?si=m_IQniykTAqtd_QVP3kxyQ">argued</a> by our Ambassador for Cyber Affairs and Critical Technology), why seemingly water down great Actions (eg one on confidence-building measures) from the <em>2021 CCTE Strategy </em>to a few sentences or words?</p><p>Also, what happened to the ‘critical technology’ component of Shield 6, especially when the <em>2023 Strategy </em>refers to Ambassador Brendan Dowling as ‘Australia’s Ambassador for Cyber Affairs <em>and Critical Technology</em>’ (emphasis added)?</p><p>Or is all of that critical technology stuff subsumed by the ‘emerging technology’ Actions 10.1 (‘Support safe and responsible AI’) and 10.2 (‘Prepare for a post-quantum world’)? Never mind all the other technologies, such as ‘protective cyber security technologies’, that the current government itself has <a href="https://www.industry.gov.au/publications/list-critical-technologies-national-interest/advanced-information-and-communication-technologies">designated</a> as critical technologies in the national interest.</p><p>Will we see a specialised critical technology diplomacy strategy; in another payday for the consultants? Is the <em>2021 CCTE Strategy </em>still alive? The hyperlink for ‘Cyber affairs’ on the ‘<a href="https://www.dfat.gov.au/international-relations/themes/global-themes">Global themes</a>’ section of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade’s (‘DFAT’s’) website is for the <em>2021 CCTE Strategy</em>, so there is that<em>.</em></p><p>By the way, is there a reason neither the <em>2023 Strategy </em>nor the <em>2023 Action Plan</em> announce extra funding for DFAT’s Cyber Affairs &amp; Critical Technology Branch (‘CYB’)? The CYB is a small branch as it is (see Figure 3). With DFAT <a href="https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/cyber-security-subsite/files/2023-cyber-security-strategy-action-plan.pdf">responsible</a> for leading the implementation of five of the seven sub-Actions under Shield 6 (see Figure 4).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/466/1*FIIhOIHVqcTfUpFLqbCSJQ.png" /><figcaption>Figure 3: Excerpt from the DFAT <a href="https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/dfat-org-chart-executive.pdf">organisational chart</a> (effective from 6 November 2023).</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*L_KbmQsCayGCBtsu6UCf2Q.png" /><figcaption>Figure 4: Excerpts from the <a href="https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/cyber-security-subsite/files/2023-cyber-security-strategy-action-plan.pdf"><em>2023 Action Plan</em></a>.</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*KPeQKbgEM8QA7Ldws4eKAA.png" /><figcaption>Figure 5: Excerpt from the Budget Measures <a href="https://budget.gov.au/content/bp2/download/bp2_2023-24.pdf">document</a> from the 2023–24 Commonwealth Budget.</figcaption></figure><p>Note that the 2023–24 federal budget does not even mention our cyber and critical technology diplomacy, let alone provide additional funding (see, eg, Figure 5).</p><p>So, is the CYB already funded to, for instance:</p><ul><li>revamp our Cyber and Critical Technology Cooperation Program and develop a new strategy for gender equality, disability and social inclusion (under Action 19 of the <em>2023 Action Plan</em>, though see Actions 12–14 under the <em>2021 CCTE Strategy</em>);</li><li>‘develop a framework to identify when and how to deploy our limited resources [for incident response] across the region’ (under Action 19 of the <em>2023 Action Plan</em>);</li><li>‘support the establishment of a permanent UN Programme of Action to advance peace and security in cyberspace’ (under Action 20 of the <em>2023 Action Plan</em>), with us all knowing how expensive UN diplomacy can be; and</li><li>review our attribution framework for cyber to ‘ensure it continues to be fit for purpose’ (under Action 20 of the <em>2023 Action Plan</em>)?</li></ul><p>It already has, presumably, led from the Australian side the <a href="https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/dfat-annual-report-2022-23.pdf">delivery</a> of 64 projects across Southeast Asia and the Pacific, with a total value of $45.75 million, via the pre-existing Cyber and Critical Tech Cooperation Program (2016–2025).</p><p>Like ASIC, the CYB needs to be funded appropriately to pull off what the <em>2023 Strategy </em>requires it to do and/or lead.</p><p>By the way, just on the regional cyber crisis response team to be established in DFAT (per Action 19.1), why not leave the crisis response to be led by the ACSC, perhaps with DFAT and ACSC having a liaison officer parked with each other so ACSC can swing into action, supported by DFAT? Not sure about the logic (bar turf gains for DFAT) of Action 19.1.</p><h3>Summing Up</h3><p>As I said up top, TL;DR = I didn’t expect much and my response is, ‘Barring a few things, sigh’.</p><p>There isn’t much new in here, but there are a few things to write home about for the government, such as the: CIRB; limited use obligation for ASD and the National Cyber Security Coordinator; SCRM framework; and mandatory standard for IoT security.</p><p>But I am especially disappointed about the: ordering of the Shields; lack of any intent to enforce corporate law to uplift cyber governance; absence of a proposal for a bespoke regulatory framework for software security; and Shield 6 being nowhere near as comprehensive as our <em>2021 CCTE Strategy</em>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*-wLPWumVlt8kcRamhnzdrw.png" /></figure><p>Anyhoo, see the Appendix for my specific takes on bits here and there, eg, on CTI sharing, CNI policy and cyber diplomacy.</p><p>And tell me what you think of the <em>2023 Strategy </em>and my take on it.</p><h3>Appendix</h3><h4><strong>From the Minister’s Foreword</strong></h4><blockquote><em>We are rallying our international network of cyber guns to help break the business model of ransomware and cybercrime.</em></blockquote><p>Excuse me? And I really want to hear someone with a Yorkshire accent say that.</p><h4><strong>From the Strategic Context</strong></h4><blockquote><em>Australia is not starting from scratch.</em></blockquote><p>But the <a href="https://ministers.dss.gov.au/transcripts/9261">Minister</a> <a href="https://minister.homeaffairs.gov.au/ClareONeil/Pages/cyber-security-coordinator-27022022.aspx">has</a> <a href="https://twitter.com/ClareONeilMP/status/1575274159663357953">repeatedly</a> <a href="https://minister.homeaffairs.gov.au/ClareONeil/Pages/interview-patrick-gray-01082023.aspx">said</a> the Morrison government left us (about) ‘five years behind’ on cyber law and policy.</p><blockquote><em>One of Australia’s core strengths is our robust legislative system… From regulation of critical infrastructure under the Security of Critical Infrastructure Act 2018 (the SOCI Act)…</em></blockquote><p>Which the Minister <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/bloody-useless-companies-could-be-forced-to-report-data-breaches-after-hacks-20221001-p5bmg8.html">described</a> as ‘bloody useless’ just last year.</p><h4><strong>Shield 1</strong></h4><blockquote><em>Disrupt and deter cyber threat actors from attacking Australia</em></blockquote><p>Yes, we will deter cyber threat actors. Whatever that means.</p><blockquote><em>As a next step, the Government will build a ransomware playbook. This playbook will provide clear guidance to businesses and citizens on how to prepare for, deal with, and bounce back from ransom demands.</em></blockquote><blockquote>2. <em>Build playbooks for incident response</em></blockquote><p>What are the ACSC’s <a href="https://www.cyber.gov.au/resources-business-and-government/essential-cyber-security/publications/cyber-incident-response-plan"><em>Cyber Incident Response Plan</em></a> and <a href="https://www.cyber.gov.au/smallbusiness/business-continuity-in-a-box"><em>Business Continuity in a Box</em></a> resources, then?</p><h4><strong>Shield 3</strong></h4><blockquote><em>The Government will also support industry-industry threat sharing by investing in a Threat Sharing Acceleration Fund to support the development of sector-specific ISAC in Australia.</em></blockquote><p>So the government is preferring a sectoral ISACs approach? Siloes for CTI?</p><p>Why not empower a centralised ISAC for all CNI folk like <a href="https://ci-isac.com.au/index.html">CI-ISAC Australia</a>? (Full disclosure: I <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/feed/update/urn:li:ugcPost:7128492243946008578?commentUrn=urn%3Ali%3Acomment%3A%28ugcPost%3A7128492243946008578%2C7128510769809264640%29&amp;dashCommentUrn=urn%3Ali%3Afsd_comment%3A%287128510769809264640%2Curn%3Ali%3AugcPost%3A7128492243946008578%29">played</a> a small role in the genesis of CI-ISAC Australia and one of its co-founders is a mentor of mine.)</p><p>Also, was the ‘Threat Sharing Acceleration Fund’ coined by Jim and Rhonda from <em>Utopia</em>?</p><blockquote><em>To promote uptake of threat sharing, the Government will encourage and incentivise industry to participate in threat sharing — with a particular focus on organisations most capable of collecting and sharing threat information at scale, such as critical infrastructure.</em></blockquote><p>What does this mean?</p><p>And again, why go for sectoral ISACs and not empowering CI-ISAC Australia to bring everyone in CNI under one roof?</p><blockquote><em>Drawing on the work of the Steering Group, the Government will also seek to encourage and incentivise threat blocking across the economy by those most capable of doing so — including telecommunication providers and ISPs.</em></blockquote><p>Love Clean(er) Pipes, but see para [62] (page 31) of the <em>2020 Strategy</em>.</p><h4><strong>Shield 4</strong></h4><blockquote><em>The Government will work with industry to move the security regulation of the telecommunications sector from the Telecommunications Sector Security Reforms (TSSR) in the Telecommunications Act 1997 to the SOCI Act.</em></blockquote><p>If it’s relatively painless for telcos and the obligations are (amended to be) almost identical across both regimes, fair enough.</p><blockquote><em>The Government will explore options to incorporate cyber security regulation into “all hazards” requirements for the aviation and maritime sectors.</em></blockquote><p>Well, the government could cancel their sectoral regs and the Minister designate them to fall under the <em>SOCI Act</em> pt 2A?</p><blockquote><em>To protect our Systems of National Significance, the Government will expedite implementation of the Systems of National Significance framework.</em></blockquote><p>What was the government doing re <em>SoNSes</em> before now?!</p><p>These are the <em>super-duper subset</em> of Australian CNI assets, per the criteria for a Ministerial declaration under <em>SOCI Act </em>s 52B.</p><p>The Minister has, to date, <a href="https://minister.homeaffairs.gov.au/ClareONeil/Pages/afr-cyber-summit-18092023.aspx">declared</a> 168 CNI assets to be SoNSes.</p><p>Note the <a href="https://budget.gov.au/content/bp2/download/bp2_2023-24.pdf">$19.5 million</a> for 2023–24 under the last Commonwealth Budget ‘to continue work to improve the security of critical infrastructure assets and assist owners and operators to respond to significant cyber-attacks’.</p><blockquote><em>The Government will also scale up ASD’s Critical Infrastructure Uplift program.</em></blockquote><p>This is wonderful. I’ve met the folks running CI-UP and they’re <a href="https://www.cyber.gov.au/about-us/reports-and-statistics/asd-cyber-threat-report-july-2022-june-2023">doing</a> excellent work.</p><p>If only all CNI operators here stopped being apprehensive about ASD/ACSC being regulators (they’re not) and thus stopped hindering the agencies’ ability to help them under CI-UP, per conversations I’ve had.</p><blockquote><em>As part of this framework, the Government will consult with industry on developing enhanced review and remedy powers, including the power to direct entities to uplift risk management plans if they are seriously deficient.</em></blockquote><p>Adding a bit more teeth to the thrust of <em>SOCI Act</em> ss 30AE-30AF, to mix metaphors?</p><h4><strong>Shield 6</strong></h4><blockquote><em>Australia will continue to drive development and implementation of high-quality digital trade rules…</em></blockquote><p>Awkward — the Yanks <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-drops-digital-trade-demands-wto-allow-room-stronger-tech-regulation-2023-10-25/">pulled</a> support for such rules at the WTO, <a href="https://archive.md/MiaTR">cancelled</a> digital trade negotiations under the IPEF and <a href="https://archive.md/U1kbD">are loath</a> to doing new bilateral FTAs.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*HJ6Wbvxyd17J_2mb6ByfjQ.png" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=281d9e64b594" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Some Takes on the Minister’s Takes on Risky CNI Business]]></title>
            <link>https://atechnolegalupdate.medium.com/some-takes-on-the-ministers-takes-on-risky-cni-business-1417ed81300c?source=rss-2c8c011d69de------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/1417ed81300c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cyber]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[national-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[policy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[critical-infrastructure]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[government]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[A Techno-Legal Update]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 28 Jul 2023 11:03:35 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-08-07T00:27:43.775Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>By Ravi Nayyar</h4><p>Last week, the wonderful Mr Patrick Gray (aka Mr Risky Business) <a href="https://risky.biz/clareoneil/">interviewed</a> the Commonwealth Minister for Home Affairs and Minister for Cyber Security, Clare O’Neil MP, and the founding CEO of the UK National Cyber Security Centre, Professor Ciaran Martin. It was a wide-ranging discussion, covering matters like CNI incident response, ransomware (including ransom payments), counter-cybercrime operations by the state, Australia’s forthcoming cyber security strategy and potential reforms to the <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2022C00160"><em>Security of Critical Infrastructure Act 2018</em></a> (Cth) (‘<em>SOCI Act</em>’). All in all, Patrick asked some great questions and Prof Martin provided some great insights, as per usual.</p><p>Many of the Minister’s responses, however, made me furrow my brow. (Full credit to Patrick for pushing back on some of the Minister’s more curious assertions.)</p><p>Given the subject of my PhD research, I will predominantly review the Minister’s comments on the incident response powers of the Commonwealth under the <em>SOCI Act</em> pt 3A. These powers are those of the Minister to give Ministerial authorisations for the Secretary of the Commonwealth Department of Home Affairs (‘Secretary’) to give the: relevant entity for a CNI asset (‘relevant entity’ is defined by <em>SOCI Act </em>s 5) an information gathering or action direction (divisions 3 and 4 of part 3A, respectively); and Director-General of the Australian Signals Directorate (‘ASD’) an intervention request (division 5).</p><p>After reviewing Minister O’Neil’s comments on these powers, I will provide brief takes on some of the other comments the Minister made in the interview.</p><p>Let’s get cracking.</p><h3><strong>The Minister’s Takes on SOCI pt 3A</strong></h3><p>The Minister argued that the <em>SOCI Act</em> pt 3A powers are hamstrung by ‘a very technical’ definition of a cyber security incident, such that ‘once the technical event is over, basically, those powers pretty much evaporate’. Having closely examined the intervention request regime under <em>SOCI Act</em> pt 3A div 5 in a <a href="https://atechnolegalupdate.medium.com/explainer-intervention-requests-and-australian-critical-infrastructure-2b3330754c6">piece</a> last year, I found the Minister’s comments rather fascinating.</p><p>From the off, this is because:</p><ul><li><em>SOCI Act</em> s 35AB(1) allows the Minister to give a Ministerial authorisation for an intervention request (or indeed an action direction or information gathering direction) even if the incident <em>has had</em> a ‘relevant impact’ on a CNI asset, provided there remains a ‘material risk’ that the incident ‘is likely to seriously prejudice’ national security. So, the powers do not ‘evaporate’ once the breach is resolved, rather once national security isn’t likely to be seriously prejudiced;</li><li><em>SOCI Act </em>s 12M (see Figure 1) defines ‘cyber security incident’ <em>extremely </em>broadly and sections 8G(2)-(3) (see Figure 2) define ‘relevant impact’ for such an incident on a CNI asset or system of national significance <em>extremely </em>broadly. This helps cast a generous regulatory perimeter for the powers in the first place; and</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*TcbrDs5G63V-9CkT6f6OOg.png" /><figcaption>Figure 1: Section 12M (Source: <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2022C00160">Federal Register of Legislation</a>)</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*dh8_WejGDuBk7HkOvMITBg.png" /><figcaption>Figure 2: Section 8G (Source: <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2022C00160">Federal Register of Legislation</a>)</figcaption></figure><ul><li>though, per <em>SOCI Act</em> s 35AG, a Ministerial authorisation (and thus an intervention request, per SOCI Act 35AX(3)) can only be in force for up to 20 days, the Minister is allowed to issue a fresh authorisation (for a fresh intervention request) which comes into force immediately after the previous one expires, per <em>SOCI Act</em> s 35AG(3). The Minister need only revoke either authorisation once she is satisfied that it is ‘no longer required to respond to the incident’, per <em>SOCI Act</em> 35AH(3). The Secretary need only revoke either request once they are satisfied that it is ‘no longer required to respond to the cyber security incident’, per <em>SOCI Act</em> s 35BA(3). So the powers do not ‘evaporate’ after 20 days, especially when read with the above criterion of material risk of serious prejudice to national security.</li></ul><p>In her commentary on <em>SOCI Act </em>pt 3A, the Minister pointed to how, in her incident response role for Medibank and Optus, ‘the technical bit’ of that response is the ‘first 10%’. The ‘90% beyond it’ is ‘logistics, government systems and how we are going to continue service provision for our citizens while systems are down’. She suggested that the legislation was ‘sort of, written very technically’, flagging potential law reform to add powers necessary for ‘deal[ing] with cyber incidents beyond the technical event’.</p><p>I find these comments curious because, if we hone in on the intervention request regime, the intent of the Commonwealth Parliament in enacting it, as I highlighted in <a href="https://atechnolegalupdate.medium.com/explainer-intervention-requests-and-australian-critical-infrastructure-2b3330754c6">my earlier piece</a>, was that such powers were of <em>last resort </em>(see also <em>SOCI Act </em>s 35AB(10)(b)), <em>technical </em>(see also section 35AC) and to be used in <em>targeted</em> scenarios, that is, constrained to a specific cyber security incident and a specific asset (see also sections 35AB(2)(e)-(f)). While we’re here, note also the wording of sections 35AB(6), (7): the information gathering and action directions regimes, respectively, are similarly those of last resort.</p><p>These particular powers, when used in relation to a specific asset, are not meant to deal with what’s going on <em>outside</em> the asset thanks to the event, such as ‘logistics, [and] government systems’, to quote the Minister. Once the serious risk to national security which is posed by the <em>incident</em> is resolved, the powers are not applicable.</p><p>Given the extraordinary and coercive nature of the regime, mission creep for part 3A (especially division 5) of the <em>SOCI Act</em> is not a good idea.</p><h4><em>Amendments to SOCI on the Cards?</em></h4><p>If the law is amended to allow, for instance, the <em>intervention request</em> regime to be used even after material risks of serious prejudice to national security <em>from the</em> <em>incident</em> <em>in question</em> have been mitigated and have a broader regulatory purview (‘Extended Regime’), then we need to have a conversation about oversight.</p><p>The thing is, as I pointed out in <a href="https://atechnolegalupdate.medium.com/explainer-intervention-requests-and-australian-critical-infrastructure-2b3330754c6">my previous piece</a>, part of the Commonwealth’s justification for the absence of oversight of the giving of Ministerial authorisations for intervention requests and actual intervention requests by an independent third party, such as a federal judge or the President/a Deputy-President of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, was the rather compressed timescale under which these authorisations and requests would be given, as well as the need for the third party to quickly understand the nuances of the network of the CNI asset hit by the incident to assess if the authorisation and request met required criteria under what is now <em>SOCI Act </em>s 35AB(10).</p><p>For the Extended Regime, it is hard to plead the same justification. The timescales for decision makers to act are much longer, allowing for deliberation by an independent third party on whether the proposed exercise of the powers is necessary and proportionate for tackling ongoing threats to national security. Which is key when such powers, I’d imagine, will be <em>coercive </em>(why else enact them?), enabling the state (through ASD) to continue <em>directly</em> intervening in the running of what are most likely private sector assets.</p><p>Of course, if the Minister was foreshadowing the development of powers other than the Extended Regime, such as powers requiring the provision of real-time telemetry to ASD to improve transparency of our CNI’s operating environments for government, then that’s less controversial. But then again, the Commonwealth ought to be careful to avoid regulatory duplication.</p><p>There are a few powers already for the Secretary to direct the relevant entity for a system of national significance (‘SoNS’, a class of CNI assets declared by the Minister to be such because they are of ‘national significance’, per <em>SOCI Act </em>s 52B(1)(b)) to provide ASD with information on the functioning of their networks (and which is not PII), such as basic telemetry, and which ‘may assist with determining whether a power under this [SOCI] Act should be exercised in relation to the [SoNS]’, per <em>SOCI Act </em>ss 30DB(1)(b), 30DC(1)(b). If the Secretary reasonably believes the relevant entity to be technically capable of providing this information, the Secretary can direct they do so periodically (via a ‘system information periodic reporting notice’, per section 30DB) or ‘each time a particular kind of event occurs’ (via a ‘system information event-based reporting notice’, per section 30DC). If the Secretary reasonably believes they are not technically capable of providing this data themselves, the Secretary can direct them to install a specific piece of software on their networks to transmit it to ASD (via a ‘system information software notice’, per section 30DJ).</p><p>Each of said notices can be in force for up to twelve months, but the Secretary can (like the Minister with Ministerial authorisations) give a new one which comes into force immediately after the previous one expires (per <em>SOCI Act </em>ss 30DE, 30DL, depending on the notice given). This gives the state plenty of time to play with when it comes to collecting and leveraging said data to better preserve the cyber resilience of the SoNS in question, particularly during the ‘90%’ of the time after the ‘technical incident’ (ie the breach) has occurred when we need to do a whole-of-government/CNI response, which the Minister spoke about. All the Minister would have to do is check that she has lawfully declared the CNI asset in question, from which the government needs ongoing telemetry, to be a SoNS (as at March 2023, the Minister already has <a href="https://minister.homeaffairs.gov.au/ClareONeil/Pages/australia-number-1-cyber-progress.aspx">declared</a> 82 assets to be SoNSes).</p><p>Perhaps the Minister was foreshadowing that these notice-issuing powers of the Secretary would be amended to be available in relation to all CNI assets, not merely SoNSes?</p><p>In terms of additional powers, if the government is looking at enacting coercive, last-resort powers for directing the activity of a reporting entity or operator for <em>any</em> CNI asset (‘reporting entity’ is defined by <em>SOCI Act </em>s 5), including assets beyond those suffering a relevant impact from a cyber security incident and especially in the absence of an ongoing national security crisis where <em>SOCI Act </em>pt 3A would be otherwise available, well, it already has them.</p><p>Enter <em>SOCI Act </em>pt 3: ‘Directions by the Minister’ (see Figure 3).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*0u4IpuonkASOxJO_x8cqgg.png" /><figcaption>Figure 3: Section 31 (Source: <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2022C00160">Federal Register of Legislation</a>)</figcaption></figure><p>These should be useful during the ‘90%’ phase which the Minister flagged in her comments and for dealing with the broader fallout of a ‘technical incident’ on our CNI; such as the lingering effects of the operator of a critical freight services asset (like Toll Group, given <em>SOCI Act </em>s 12C and <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/F2023C00097"><em>Security of Critical Infrastructure (Definitions) Rules (LIN 21/039) 2021</em></a> (Cth) r 9 (‘<em>SOCI Definitions Rules</em>’)) being bricked on the ability of the operator of critical food and grocery assets (like Coles, given <em>SOCI Act </em>s 12K and <em>SOCI Definitions Rules </em>r 15) to manage their inventories. Again, the government needs to do legislative inventory management the law before proposing amendments.</p><p>In any case, that the Minister was flagging potential amendment of the <em>SOCI Act</em> to bring in broader, coercive powers to enable better, seemingly more holistic incident response was interesting. Because these powers — especially the Extended Regime — would not be required if the relevant entities for CNI assets were willing to work with ASD to clean up the relevant mess of and after an incident, as opposed to, say, stonewalling the agency with lawyers when it wants <em>telemetry</em> to be able to help out, like Toll Group <a href="https://www.zdnet.com/article/toll-unsure-if-it-lawyered-up-to-avoid-asd-assistance-following-ransomware-attack/">apparently did</a> in the aftermath of the first of its two major incidents in 2020.</p><p>I can understand the current intervention request regime providing coercive tools for the state <em>when the chips are (likely) down</em> and the relevant entity stonewalls. But to suggest that, when the immediate cyber security incident has been resolved and where timescales for decision makers in relevant entities and the state are a bit more relaxed, there are still relevant entities for CNI assets that need more than a nudge to cooperate casts a long shadow on the government’s, and indeed the Minister’s, efforts towards their <a href="https://minister.homeaffairs.gov.au/ClareONeil/Pages/next-phase-2023-2030-australian-cyber-security-strategy-motion.aspx">goal</a> to make us ‘the world’s most cyber secure nation by 2030’.</p><p>After all the singing of kumbaya at industry conferences, talks, briefings, the rhetoric, the ‘lessons learned’ from Optus and Medibank, that the state is flagging the introduction of coercive powers to <em>help</em> those operating CNI assets recover from an incident <em>after the actual incident has been resolved</em> is, well, far from ideal.</p><p>But anyhoo, let’s see what Home Affairs comes up with.</p><h3><em>The Minister’s Other Takes</em></h3><p>Having gone through the Minister’s comments on the <em>SOCI Act </em>pt 3A framework, let’s turn to her takes on other matters of cyber policy.</p><h4>On Transparency about Incidents</h4><p>The Minister said she wanted more transparency about breaches, but did not talk about the performance of the <em>SOCI Act</em> pt 2B incident reporting regime for CNI assets since she switched it on in July 2022 with the <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/F2022L00562"><em>Security of Critical Infrastructure (Application) Rules (LIN 22/026) 2022</em></a><em> </em>(Cth) r 5<em> </em>for specified categories of CNI responsible entities (‘responsible entity’ is defined by <em>SOCI Act </em>s 12L). A regime which <a href="https://www.cisc.gov.au/resources-contact-information-subsite/Documents/cisc-newsflash-10.pdf">saw</a> 334 incident reports being given to Home Affairs until June 2023.</p><h4>On Australia’s Incident Response Capability</h4><p>The Minister asserted that Australia was ‘about five years behind’ in terms of incident response capability when the Albanese government was sworn in. Patrick rightly rebutted this with reference to the Turnbull government enacting the <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2018A00025"><em>Intelligence Services Amendment (Establishment of the Australian Signals Directorate) Act 2018</em></a> (Cth), which specifically authorised ASD ‘to prevent and disrupt, by electronic or similar means, cybercrime undertaken by people or organisations outside Australia’.</p><p>Additionally, the Minister’s assertions were curious because the intervention request and incident reporting regimes under the <em>SOCI Act </em>were <a href="https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Bills_Legislation/Bills_Search_Results/Result?bId=r6657">enacted</a> in <em>2021</em> by the Morrison Government following the <a href="https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Intelligence_and_Security/SOCI/Report">recommendation</a> of the bipartisan Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security (on which the present Commonwealth Attorney-General, Mark Dreyfus KC MP, sat). The <em>SOCI Act</em> was far from a <em>tabula rasa</em> prior to the Albanese Government.</p><h4>On What the ASD-Australian Federal Police Counter-Cybercrime Operation Has Done</h4><p>The Minister’s response to Patrick’s question on the absence of transparency on the fruits of ASD and the Australian Federal Police’s ‘ongoing, joint standing operation to investigate, target and disrupt cyber criminal syndicates with a priority on ransomware threat groups’ left a fair bit to be desired.</p><p>As Patrick pointed out, the Yanks release a good deal of information about the disruption operations they do, versus the Commonwealth being tight-lipped on what the operation has actually achieved following its <a href="https://minister.homeaffairs.gov.au/ClareONeil/Pages/standing-operation-against-cyber-criminal-syndicates.aspx">commencement</a> last year.</p><h4>On Collectively Learning from Incidents</h4><p>The Minister flagged that, as part of the forthcoming cyber strategy, the government is considering how to create a framework for us, as a country, to ‘actually learn’ from breaches like those at Optus, Medibank, Latitude Financial and HWL Ebsworth, and thus bolster our collective cyber security. The Minister stated that ‘bringing some more transparency to those conversations is something that is really important to [her]’.</p><p>Which makes me wonder why the Minister did not criticise Medibank (having just pointed to its holding a quantum of Australian PII which is of national significance) for <a href="https://archive.md/8NBXd">choosing</a> to <em>not</em> publicly release the Deloitte review of its catastrophic data breach last year (looking at the ‘incident itself, control effectiveness and the response of Medibank’). A review which the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority <a href="https://www.apra.gov.au/news-and-publications/apra%E2%80%99s-interim-response-to-medibank-cyber-breach">planned to factor</a> into its <a href="https://www.apra.gov.au/news-and-publications/apra-takes-action-against-medibank-private-relation-to-cyber-incident">action</a> against Medibank.</p><p>Surely, and to reiterate an earlier point, in the interests of transparency and us as a country learning from the utterly catastrophic stuff-up by that company (including misconfiguration of a firewall and substandard C-SCRM which <a href="https://twitter.com/ravirockks/status/1628604668468404224?s=20">allowed</a> the threat actors to enter Medibank’s network), that report ought to be made public?</p><h4>On the Development of Our Forthcoming National Cyber Security Strategy</h4><p>The Minister said that we can expect a draft of our new national cyber security strategy ‘over the next few months’. Note that the development of the strategy <a href="https://minister.homeaffairs.gov.au/ClareONeil/Pages/expert-advisory-board-appointed-as-development.aspx">began</a> in December 2022 and submissions to the government’s discussion paper <a href="https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/about-us/our-portfolios/cyber-security/strategy/2023-2030-australian-cyber-security-strategy">closed</a> in April 2023. So I don’t know if the government is seeking to write the next <em>War and Peace</em> and not a 60-page high-level strategy which will be very similar (I guess) to the <a href="https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/cyber-security-subsite/files/cyber-security-strategy-2020.pdf">2020 one</a> and indeed <em>any</em> FVEY country cyber strategy.</p><p>When asked about a multinational consulting firm being paid $2.4 million for work (<a href="https://www.itnews.com.au/news/cyber-strategy-has-cost-home-affairs-28-million-so-far-598207">ie</a> ‘developing briefings and background content, stakeholder engagement and minutes for industry meetings, as well as project management…’) on the strategy, the Minister responded that her Department is responsible for contracting, not her. Well, as the phrase goes, ‘Yes, Minister’.</p><p>The Minister also suggested that such a quantum of spending on the development of the strategy is justified by the high stakes context of the strategy. I found this all quite strange because it suggests that her own Department has not invested in recruiting enough experts in-house for so crucial a policy area and contradicts the Commonwealth’s otherwise admirable <a href="http://archive.today/wHXLB">moves</a> to cut outsourcing to external consultants and lawyers.</p><p>Furthermore, there already are senior bureaucrats within Home Affairs whose roles can easily accommodate what the consultants are being paid to do above, for crying out loud (see Figure 4). Or is the empty position of ‘First Assistant Secretary Cyber Security Strategy’ to be given to whichever consulting firm the Department has retained?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/522/1*EOdj_ZnMUZAeYhorytglXQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Figure 4: Annotated Extract of the July 2023 Organisational Chart of the Commonwealth Department of Home Affairs (Source: <a href="https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/about-us-subsite/files/home-affairs-org-structure.pdf">Department of Home Affairs</a>)</figcaption></figure><p>Note that <em>iTnews</em> erroneously reported the consulting firm as KPMG at first but <a href="https://www.itnews.com.au/news/cyber-strategy-has-cost-home-affairs-28-million-so-far-598207">corrected</a> it after Patrick’s interview to say it was McKinsey, where the Minister <a href="https://www.aph.gov.au/Senators_and_Members/Parliamentarian?MPID=140590">worked</a> from 2009–13. Nonetheless, the Minister did not herself clarify in her response that McKinsey got $2.4 million in taxpayer funds, not KPMG.</p><p>Just on what that $2.4 million is getting us, why couldn’t the Department of Home Affairs hire Masters/PhD students as research assistants/interns to do the same for much less? As an OECD intern helping run a multi-stakeholder policy consultation for distributed ledger technology, this was the lion’s share of <em>my</em> day job.</p><h4>On Banning Ransom Payments</h4><p>The Minister said a conditional ban on ransom payments ‘is something we should keep an open mind to’ but stated that the government’s ‘first port-of-call’ is gaining a better idea of payments (noting the absence of payment reporting obligations for firms) and providing as much support as the Commonwealth can to ransomware victims so that they do not feel compelled to pay.</p><p>In principle, the Minister’s comments make sense, but we were denied an explanation as to why the government has not already passed legislation which mandates the reporting of ransom payments or why federal regulators have not used applicable authorities to specifically mandate the reporting of ransom payments. Why hasn’t the government resurrected now-Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs, Tim Watts’, fairly decent <a href="https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Bills_Legislation/Bills_Search_Results/Result?bId=r6730">Ransomware Payments Bill 2021</a> (Cth), which he brought as a private member’s bill while Labor was in opposition (which I had a look at in <a href="https://anujolt.org/post/1103-ransomware-gotta-report-em-all">another piece</a>)? The government obviously has the numbers in the Lower House and I doubt the politics of enacting such obligations are fraught.</p><p>Given the Minister’s comments on ransom payments, I hereby plug my <a href="https://anujolt.org/post/1104-ransomware-spider-not-cobwebs">essay</a> calling for officers, who are involved in the decisions of their companies to pay ransoms, to be prosecuted for money laundering (the stick) and for the state to provide comprehensive support to all businesses, particularly SMEs, to strengthen their cyber resilience to minimise the chance they pay in the first place (the carrot).</p><h4>On Negative Externalities of Breaches at CNI Assets</h4><p>The Minister made a good point about how breaches like those at Optus and Medibank (both CNI asset operators, given the wordings of <em>SOCI Act </em>ss 5, 12H(1)(e), respectively, and <em>SOCI Definitions Rules </em>r 13(5) for Medibank) are not merely ‘private events that affect private companies’.</p><p>Hence, I would have loved to hear her thoughts on the operation of the <em>SOCI Act</em> pt 2A critical infrastructure risk management program regime, which the Minister switched on for the responsible entities for certain categories of CNI assets early this year via the <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/F2023L00112"><em>Security of Critical Infrastructure (Critical infrastructure risk management program) Rules (LIN 23/006) 2023</em></a> (Cth).</p><p>Linked with that, it would be have been marvellous if Minister provided her thoughts on how cyber <em>governance</em> at companies generally should be regulated in Australia (the interview was focused on ‘technical’ matters of cyber policy, to borrow the Minister’s word).</p><h3>All in All</h3><p>Mr Business did a fabulous job and Prof Martin was his usual wise self, but I felt many of the Minister’s comments were rather (you guessed it) curious.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*JYVFeE4qjd0kpmfXTUVOiQ.png" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1417ed81300c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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