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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Matthew Aubert on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Matthew Aubert on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@aubsec?source=rss-8baf09ecfcfc------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Matthew Aubert on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@aubsec?source=rss-8baf09ecfcfc------2</link>
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        <generator>Medium</generator>
        <lastBuildDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 05:22:06 GMT</lastBuildDate>
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            <title><![CDATA[Malware Analysis for the Incident Responder]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@aubsec/malware-analysis-for-the-incident-responder-3092f8605ff6?source=rss-8baf09ecfcfc------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/3092f8605ff6</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[incident-response]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[malware]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[dfir]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Matthew Aubert]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 10 Feb 2017 15:11:48 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-02-10T15:11:48.278Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>The following is a post I wrote for Cisco. </em><a href="https://blogs.cisco.com/security/malware-analysis-for-the-incident-responder"><em>https://blogs.cisco.com/security/malware-analysis-for-the-incident-responder</em></a></p><p>Malware is one of the most prevalent and most insidious forms of cyber attack. Identifying and eliminating them are critical in minimizing the impact of a breach. As a cybersecurity incident responder, I always end up performing some level of malicious file analysis. In this blog, I’ll share some recommended approaches that have worked for our Incident Response team.</p><p>Time is rarely on our side to perform deep analysis of the potentially malicious file. Reverse engineering a file can take weeks or months to complete and takes a level of skill which few individuals maintain. We need to develop indicators of compromise to complete the identification phase of the incident response process with some degree of haste. With an understanding of how to develop those indicators ourselves, we can quickly execute a response plan without needing to wait on full analysis.</p><p><a href="https://twitter.com/lennyzeltser">Lenny Zeltser</a> groups malware analysis into <a href="https://zeltser.com/mastering-4-stages-of-malware-analysis/">four stages</a>. Starting from the easiest to use, fully-automated analysis, we move up into static property analysis, then to interactive behavior analysis, and finally into full manual code reversing. Many of you likely have experience using fully-automated analysis provided by tools such as <a href="https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/solutions/enterprise-networks/amp-threat-grid/index.html">ThreatGrid</a>. These types of tools provide quick answers, but little in the way of interaction by the analyst. They are easy to use and certainly should be part of the incident responder’s tool kit. Sometimes though we need to do a little more analysis on a suspicious file.</p><p>Figure 1. Four Stages of Malware Analysis by Lenny Zeltser</p><p>While performing an incident response engagement, we really have to focus on efficiency and effectiveness. The goal of the incident response process is determining root cause and impact to ultimately succeed in recovery. The goal is not one of research trying to fully understand the intricacies of a new vulnerability in the moment. However, further research can and should be performed after the engagement has been completed. During incident response malware analysis, I channel the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pareto_principle">Pareto principle</a>, which Vilfredo Pareto developed for application in economics. For our incident response purposes, we are stating that by performing 20% of the malware analysis work we can generate 80% of the results necessary for successful incident scoping. We do not need to always perform full manual code reversing to understand what the malicious file is doing and to write good signatures for that sample.</p><p>To help us out with this incident response malware analysis, we need a set of tools. The following is a list of the tools I use regularly and will demonstrate in this blog post and the corresponding <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a8WqO5W43kI">video</a>.</p><p>Tools:</p><p>· <a href="https://www.winitor.com/">pestudio</a></p><p>· <a href="https://technet.microsoft.com/en-US/sysinternals/processmonitor.aspx">Process Monitor</a></p><p>· <a href="https://www.wireshark.org/">Wireshark</a></p><p>· <a href="http://www.inetsim.org/">INetSim</a></p><p>· <a href="http://procdot.com/">ProcDOT</a></p><p>· <a href="https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/software-download/windows7">Windows 7 Service Pack 0 32-bit</a></p><p>· <a href="https://remnux.org/">REMnux</a></p><p><strong>Static Property Analysis:</strong></p><p>My favorite tool for performing property analysis is <a href="https://www.winitor.com/">pestudio</a> developed by <a href="https://www.twitter.com/@ochsenmeier">Marc Ochsenmeier</a>. I wrote a <a href="https://medium.com/@aubsec/pestudio-standard-f2ada4e8564">personal blog post</a> on this tool a few months ago if you would like a full break down of its capabilities. During static property analysis, we will do some tasks such as searching for the hash on our favorite search engine or malware repository. Beyond simply doing searches for the hash, we will also dump a list of all readable strings in the file, as strings can give us a wealth of information about what the file is likely to do. Files which have little in the way of obfuscation might tell us what domain names it is attempting to call out to and IP address could be stored in plain-text or directory locations where data will be written to.</p><p>Identifying the function imports can allow us to predict what we should expect out of the file when we move into interactive behavior analysis. For applications to execute inside a Windows environment, or any operating system for that matter, they must import functions from the <a href="https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/default.aspx">application programming interface</a>, or API. These function imports tell us a lot about what the file wants to do. If a program has in its import table a function to write out to the Windows registry, we can assume that it will be making registry modifications. We may even be able to see what registry key is being modified in the strings we dumped earlier. While looking at function imports, <a href="https://www.winitor.com/">pestudio</a> will highlight those functions which are ‘blacklisted’, as in those which are most often used in malicious software.</p><p>We can also write signatures based on the static properties of a file. Signatures, whether in the form of anti-virus or intrusion detection and prevention rules, are written on the static properties of a file. Sometimes it is simply the hash, though not often as hashes are not a reliable method for detection due to modern malware samples performing self-modifications to avoid hash detection. More often signatures are written base on byte strings and readable strings.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/499/1*bX4Cma9_lKztczKQU6dVWg.png" /><figcaption><em>Figure 2. </em><a href="https://www.winitor.com/"><em>pestudio</em></a><em> 8.54.</em></figcaption></figure><p><strong>Interactive Behavior Analysis:</strong></p><p>Most files have some method of obfuscation making static property analysis difficult, as some are heavily obfuscated using custom routines making it impossible to analyze without a deeper form of analysis. During behavior analysis, we let the file execute in a contained environment and collect detailed information about its execution, similar to automated analysis. The difference is that with this method we can interact with the malware while it executes. Additionally, we can provide the malware with an environment that it should thrive in. For example, if the malware exploits a Java vulnerability, then we make sure our laboratory machines have that vulnerable version installed.</p><p>While the malware is executing on the vulnerable host, we measure changes to the system. Malware must make modifications to a host to remain persistent; it often must communicate for it to complete its objectives. We can measure these changes and communication to identify other hosts which have been impacted by the malware.</p><p>Before we execute the malware, we need to setup of laboratory environment to allow for the execution of malicious files in a controlled manner. Windows 7 Service Pack 0 compiled for 32-bit Intel x86 architecture will likely be able to execute most malicious Windows binaries. We want the system unpatched so that the malware can execute to its fullest extent. If the sample is compiled for a different version of Windows or processor, then change your laboratory to suit the needs for the sample. You will find this information out during property analysis.</p><p>To mimic services that the malicious sample might communicate with, we will use <a href="http://www.inetsim.org/">INetSim</a>. This is a Linux application which comes installed on the <a href="https://www.remnux.org/">REMnux</a> distribution developed by the SANS Institute. But you can install the application on any Linux distribution of your choice.</p><p>Changes are necessary to the configuration of INetSim to enable all of the services required for analysis. By default, most of the available services are disabled, but you can enable them by uncommenting the appropriate line. I recommend reviewing the configuration and making those changes as necessary.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/504/1*JWKBfxSDR2BIKPJc9llsOw.png" /><figcaption>Figure 3. Screenshot of INetSim executing.</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/504/1*fIiXFqMiY1eoZi990-IW-A.png" /><figcaption>Figure 4. Screenshot of INetSim configuration.</figcaption></figure><p>Prior to executing the malicious sample, we need to start our tools to watch for changes. There are two tools which I use for this. SysInternal’s <a href="https://technet.microsoft.com/en-US/sysinternals/processmonitor.aspx">Process Monitor</a> is a tool which monitors the entire system for changes, to include changes to the registry and to the file system via hooks in the Windows API. When a process wants to write the file system, it must make calls to the appropriate Windows API to do so- process monitor identifies these calls and tracks what arguments are made during the call. Details about the processes and their threads are laid out in a table which updates continuously. We can, and ultimately will, output this data into a comma separated value, or CSV, format for ingestion into another product or review in its CSV form. To prepare us for the later use in a tool called ProcDOT, we need to make some minor configuration changes, as seen in Figure 6.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/467/1*c4SYFcgasSwQXS1-wLRcvA.png" /><figcaption>Figure 5. Screenshot of ProcMon</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/229/1*YbjXOa3iO67e_dspggRuGw.png" /><figcaption>Figure 6. Screenshot of ProcMon Configuration</figcaption></figure><p>Samples will likely make some form of network communication. To capture this communication, we use the ever-popular Wireshark running on the Windows 7 machine. INetSim needs to be running and communication between the Linux and Windows host must be available for this to work.</p><p>We do not want the malware sample to speak to its actual command and control, as doing so would tip our hand to the adversary. Our goal is to find other hosts which made this similar communication. We may also use this information to prepare for second rounds of analysis. <a href="https://www.wireshark.org/">Wireshark</a> is our go-to tool to capture this data.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/504/1*qHfLUV2iXOPlvlCp37Q2bA.png" /><figcaption>Figure 7. Screenshot of Wireshark</figcaption></figure><p>Now that Wireshark and Process Monitor are running we can execute our sample. Running the sample with Administrative privileges will give us the greatest impact to the host. Realistically we will want to run this sample multiple times with a couple different levels of privilege to see what happens. Once we have executed the sample, we may monitor its progress using the Task Manger or <a href="https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/processexplorer.aspx">Process Explorer</a>. When we believe that the process has completed is primary objective, we can pause the data capture and export our data.</p><p>The exported data will now be imported into a graphing tool called <a href="http://procdot.com/">ProcDOT</a>. We must make sure that our output is formatted properly from Process Monitor and from Wireshark for use in ProcDOT. ProcDOT produces an interactive graph of the malicious process executing. In the graph, we can see changes made to the registry, files written to the volume, and attempts at resolving domain names for network communication.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/504/1*ziXCMhQeCT2jOikVq4Y-MQ.png" /><figcaption><em>Figure 8. Screenshot of ProcDOT Output</em></figcaption></figure><p><strong>Wrapping Up:</strong></p><p>The whole purpose of analyzing the file is to determine artifacts, called indicators, which can be used to determine if the file successfully executed in the production environment. We can search for these indicators using the enterprise security information and event management (SIEM) system. Or we can package the indicators into rules such as <a href="https://yara.readthedocs.io/en/v3.5.0/">Yara</a>, <a href="https://www.openioc.org/">OpenIOC</a>, and <a href="https://www.snort.org/">Snort</a>.</p><p>Limitations exist in this process of analysis. Malware can identify it is running inside of a virtual machine. We can avoid this problem by identifying malware capabilities during property analysis of the file then making changes to our procedures or to the sample itself such as removing the offending detection mechanisms. If we cannot get the file to execute at all inside a virtualized environment, we may be able to execute the file on a hardware system instead or perform manual code reversing to <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NOP">NOP</a> out the offending subroutines.</p><p>These simple methods for analyzing malicious files can be a force multiplier for the incident responder on the ground during an investigation. Rather than waiting for a full reverse engineering of the sample, we can quickly determine indicators of compromise and properly complete the identification phase of the incident response process. Cisco Security’s <a href="https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/security/sas-threat-management.html">Incident Response Service</a> can also help support analysis of malicious files for our customers on retainer, and when those files require deeper analysis, we can leverage our relationship with <a href="http://www.talosintelligence.com/">Talos Intelligence</a>.</p><p>For a demonstration on how these tools work together to help us analyze a file, visit my <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a8WqO5W43kI">YouTube video</a>.</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="http://blogs.cisco.com/security/malware-analysis-for-the-incident-responder"><em>blogs.cisco.com</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3092f8605ff6" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Summary and Review of “The Personal MBA” by Josh Kaufman]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@aubsec/summary-and-review-of-the-personal-mba-by-josh-kaufman-3ae16053fe27?source=rss-8baf09ecfcfc------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/3ae16053fe27</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[management]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[dfir]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[leadership]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[incident-response]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Matthew Aubert]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 15 Jan 2017 01:02:09 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-01-15T16:30:01.274Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>As incident responders, we are directly responsible for advising business leaders on preparing for and recovering from the inevitable disruptions of critical information systems. An understanding of overall business practices assists us in making sound justifiable recommendations. In order to properly advise the business, we must at some level think like a business person.</p><p>When I am starting to learn a new topic, I try to find a keystone book, one which I can pivot further into a subject from. These books are high level, broad books, which cover a wide breadth of related disciplines. “The Personal MBA” by Josh Kaufman is one such book. It is a book which introduces the field of business administration. For someone with a technical background, this material was easy to understand and relate to my interactions with the business side operations.</p><p>While reading, I broke up the book into three high level areas. First is targeting what we would typically associate with business administration. These are topics such as marketing, value creation and delivery, and finance. Here Mr. Kaufman defines a business as a repeatable process that creates and delivers something of value, that other people want or need, at a price they are willing to pay, in a way that satisfies the customer’s needs and expectations, so that the business brings in enough profit to make it worthwhile for the owners to continue operation. Businesses are divided into five independent business processes; value creation, marketing, sales, value delivery, and finance. Knowing where you fit into these five processes will help in your decision making as an independent contributer.</p><p>The second section deals with humans. It covers the human mind, how to work with yourself, and how to work with and manage others. Gaining a better understanding of how humans work, what their needs are, will make us better leaders and decision makers. Incident responders are in an interesting position where they are providing advice to executives on situations which have significant impacts to the operation of their business. These decisions are not always make purely rational. Humans are emotional and have a hard time disassociating their decision making with their emotional state. We all have influence over the decisions of others. Understanding how those we work with make decisions will help us chose the methods by which we utilize our influence.</p><p>We also need to understand that we individually make emotional decisions and have our own biases. Occasionally we need to take a step back to review our perspective. Taking stock of natural human biases will help us to identify when we are drawing conclusions from our own.</p><p>In the third part of the book, Josh Kaufman covers business systems. Every business is a consolidation of various systems which are used to operate the business. Breaking down the operation into clearly defined systems is necessary to know how we execute the five independent business processes. Through these broken down systems, we can perform measurements to determine if the system is generating the desired outcome and make appropriate adjustments to the system to improve efficiency and effectiveness.</p><p>The book concludes with recommendations for further study on on each of the specific topics covered. Having this list of recommendations will help direct the reader on a path forward in the process of continuous independent study of business administration. Some of the most successful business leaders gained their success not by completing an MBA, but by critical reflection on the facts of business administration coupled with a strong drive for self improvement. Having an MBA is not a requirement for success in business.</p><p>I highly recommend this book for any individual who does not have a background in business, but knows that the lack of knowledge in business administration is having a negative impact on their effectiveness. For those of us who are responsible for value delivery in the form of advise to executives, respecting their perspective on business operation will go a long way to build rational arguments for securing their enterprise following a security incident. While also improving our ability to deliver value, we also improve our knowledge of how the other business functional areas work to generate revenue for our organization.</p><p>You can find out more about this book at <a href="https://personalmba.com/">personalmba.com</a>. For those of us working in digital forensics and incident response, a little knowledge about how the business operates will go a long way to improving our careers.</p><p>If you have your own business book recommendations, feel free to leave a comment.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3ae16053fe27" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Customer-focused Incident Response Service]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@aubsec/customer-focused-incident-response-service-3b63ea60fe84?source=rss-8baf09ecfcfc------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/3b63ea60fe84</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[dfir]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[incident-response]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[digital-forensics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Matthew Aubert]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 31 Dec 2016 15:11:51 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-12-31T15:11:51.165Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>The following is a post I wrote for Cisco. </em><a href="https://blogs.cisco.com/security/customer-focused-incident-response-service">https://blogs.cisco.com/security/customer-focused-incident-response-service</a></p><p>In our highly connected business environments, the need to respond to the inevitable security breach is on the minds of every CISO. An increasing number of organizations rely on the services of a Managed Detection and Response (MDR) provider. According to the <a href="http://www.cisco.com/c/m/en_us/offers/sc04/2016-annual-security-report/index.html">Cisco 2016 Annual Security Report</a>, 42 percent of surveyed companies outsourced incident response, compared with 35% the prior year.</p><p>Contracting with an MDR service is far different then contracting logistic or facility services. Responders will gain intimate knowledge of your business operation. Their recommendations will have far reaching impacts into information services.</p><p>As a senior incident response analyst on the <a href="https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/security/sas-threat-management.html">Cisco Incident Response Service</a> team, I work with customers every day to ensure they have solid incident response readiness and response strategies. A customer-focused approach to incident response means that when we approach a customer to assist them in responding to a potential breach, we go in with an open mind listening to the needs of the customer. We create response plans with the customer’s business obligations at the highest priority.</p><p>Responders are comrades in the battle against the cybersecurity adversary, walking alongside their client through the valley of uncertainty. Incident responders need to be more than a technical asset: they need to be a trusted partner as well. The responder needs to appreciate their client’s business objectives. Recommendations must balance the client’s risk tolerance with their business objectives.</p><p>The trust relationship between the incident responder and the client is a two-way street. Responders’ recommendations will be incomplete at best if the client is not forthcoming with relevant information about business objectives and technical environment, for example. As part of building a new business relationship with a client, the responder will require information about business operations. For example, it is helpful to know the client’s business objectives, hierarchy of their security organization, logging capabilities, and high priority information systems. The client’s responses to these questions will affect the success of the incident response plan.</p><p>Imagine a situation where an incident response service is brought in to perform root cause analysis and provide a recommendation for containment, eradication, and recovery from the incident. The customer requesting the response services is not comfortable with providing a list of high priority assets due to a lack of trust with the responders. During analysis, incident responders identify a number of assets which could have been impacted by the incident. Since high priority assets were not communicated, it is impossible for the responders to prioritize their work flow. As a result, incident responders may inadvertently focus on low priority assets or give inappropriate recommendations such as to take down a service needed for the business to function.</p><p>Risk mitigation and successful recovery from a cybersecurity incident is mutually beneficial. The impacted organization wants to find the source of the incident, determine the extent of the impact, and implement controls to mitigate the incident from reoccurring. The responders’ reputation relies heavily on their ability to deliver on those objectives. Responders also have a genuine personal sense of responsibility to resolve the incident. Most of us entered this field because we enjoy helping others to solve problems. We become emotionally invested in finding the solution.</p><p>Cultivation of a relationship of trust is absolutely necessary for a successful response engagement. It is through this relationship that we can provide a customer-focused service. If you are interested in learning more about Cisco’s approach to helping our customers with incident response support, read “<a href="http://blogs.cisco.com/security/combatting-cybercrime-with-an-incident-response-plan">Combatting Cybercrime with an Incident Response Plan</a>”.</p><p>-aub</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://blogs.cisco.com/security/customer-focused-incident-response-service"><em>blogs.cisco.com</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3b63ea60fe84" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Insourced vs Outsourced SOC/IR: An Argument for Managed Detection and Response]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@aubsec/insourced-vs-outsourced-soc-ir-an-argument-for-managed-detection-and-response-da278959ed8d?source=rss-8baf09ecfcfc------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/da278959ed8d</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[dfir]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[incident-management]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[computer-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Matthew Aubert]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 07 Oct 2016 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-02-11T02:30:24.924Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Should you have your incident response team and security operations center on- premises or off-premises? Should they be contracted out, internal full-time employees, or some combination of the two? These are the types of questions that I would assume medium sized businesses have to deal with. In the highly connected world where even our hospitals are not safe from attack, how do you detect and respond to breaches?</p><p>The prospect of hiring a dedicated incident response team is both costly and difficult. Depending on your location, the salary cost for hiring a 24/7 monitoring team would likely amount to around $60,000 a year plus the cost of benefits. Full-time incident responders who are well trained could be between $80,000 and $100,000 plus benefits. Not accounting for the costs to recruit them which could amount to 10% of the salary per employee. This could be fine if the budget supported the cost, you could find qualified employees, and you could retain them. A shortage of qualified professionals has made those who are qualified highly marketable. Even the happiest of incident response professionals are unlikely to stay at a company for more then a few years.</p><p>Before you commit to hiring internal employees, take an honest assessment of your needs. Most companies do not have the work-load to require a large fully staffed incident response team. If the majority of your security events involve public web applications being scanned and phishing emails, a full-time team of incident responders will likely not feel engaged. Even if you have the budget to hire the team, you may find a high rate of turn over.</p><p>Monitoring realistically can be mostly automated, particularly with regard to commodity malware which will be the majority of your events. Finding people who are willing to work late nights is difficult. Being selective in identifying candidates who are qualified to perform security only adds to the complexity in hiring.</p><p>Instead look at outsourcing security services to a Managed Detection and Response (MDR) service provider. Partnering with an experienced monitoring team who already has the processes, procedures,and tools developed for an effective monitoring practice. Outsourcing the majority of your monitoring and breach response allows your organization I can go to leverage the knowledge of experienced incident responders at a fraction of the cost. Think of it like a time-share in the Bahamas. If you do your homework, you can have access to a beautiful vacation home when you need it. Buying your own land and building your own home is very expensive. While you may need 24/7 monitoring, you likely are not going to need the same level of constant post-breach analysis.</p><p>An MDR service can offer 24/7 monitoring of your network, along with many other networks. If they see a breach occur at one client, they can hunt on their other client’s networks to see if a similar breach also occurred. MDR incident responders can immediately begin investigations into the breach. Depending on the service you are willing to pay for, an incident response team can show up on-site to begin collecting forensic images.</p><p>It truly could be a win-win for all involved. Highly skilled incident response professionals and SOC analysts can keep busy during the week. Clients will have 24/7 effective monitoring at lower costs. Breach analysis is available as needed rather than paying someone $100k+ to sit in a cubicle all day. Clients also have access to a vast wealth of knowledge based on the wider range of experiences of their MDR.</p><p>I would recommend that the majority of business outsource their security operations. You should still have a few individuals internally who can be incident managers. Find a couple of highly skilled systems or network administrators who want to expand their knowledge into incident response. Send them to the <a href="https://www.sans.org/course/hacker-techniques-exploits-incident-handling">SANS 504 course</a>. Their primary duties can remain the same. But allow them 20% of their time to dedicate towards practicing for managing an incident. When the MDR identifies that an incident has occurred and their incident response service kicks in, your internal incident managers can be the point of contact during the entire engagement. This arrangement should minimize costs for employing a dedicated incident handling team.</p><h4>Counter Argument</h4><p>Outsourcing your security operations may just not be realistic. It could be that you are simply a government agency who handles classified information. Even if you hire a contractor, they still need to be on-site. Maybe you have a leadership structure who is not interested or have had bad experiences with Managed Security Service Providers in the past.</p><p>Some companies are large enough to justify having an internal response team. They have the budgets to support the salaries of incident responders and the work-load to keep them busy. If this is the case, then you probably are not reading my blog anyway.</p><p>It is still rational to have a third party incident response team to investigation breaches. Internal teams have an incentives to sugar coat an incident. Leadership may not handle bad news well. Those internally who may bare some blame for the breach may have close relationships with the internal incident response team. Following a major breach, having an independent set of eyes could shed light on larger issues.</p><p>Whether you chose to outsource your entire security shop or not, retaining support from a third-party should be considered.</p><p>If you have differing feelings on the issue, please feel free to hit me up @aubsec on Twitter. There are certainly other opinions.</p><p>-aub</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="http://aubsec.github.io/dfir/2016/10/07/MDR-Argument/"><em>aubsec.github.io</em></a><em> on October 7, 2016.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=da278959ed8d" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[PeStudio Standard]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@aubsec/pestudio-standard-f2ada4e8564?source=rss-8baf09ecfcfc------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f2ada4e8564</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[dfir]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[programming]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Matthew Aubert]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 01 Sep 2016 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-12-31T14:38:09.852Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I meant to write this post a long time ago, but life got crazy and my job got far less technical. I thought it would be a good idea to come back around now that I am transitioning back into a technical role. Also a great opportunity to work with the updated version of PE Studio as there have been some amazing changes to the program in the past 12 months. This tool is a must have in every Incident Reponder’s toolbox.</p><p>Windows binaries are packed in a format called Portable Executable, or PE. I wrote a short blog post about PE files in my first blog post last year [<a href="https://aubsec.github.io/dfir/winpe/2015/05/26/first-post-portable-executables-and-analysis/">1</a>]. Sometime in the future I will go through how I perform some basic surface and runtime analysis of PE files. Incident responders are often brought in to situations where some sort of portable executable was downloaded onto a host and executed.</p><p>Some of the questions asked by the incident responders are “What does it do?”, “Is it malicious?”, and lastly “Did it execute?” [<a href="https://aubsec.github.io/dfir/2016/05/31/did-it-execute/">2</a>]. There are two basic types of analysis an incident responder can do quickly to answer those questions. We can do some basic surface analysis of the file, it can also be called property analysis. This is where we statically identify the properties of a files, such as the hash value, strings, and library imports, to draw some conclusions based on our past experience and research. If a file contains an IP address “1.2.3.4” and contains imports for ws2_32.dll, then we can probably make an assumption that the sample is going to create a Socket to the aforementioned ip address [<a href="https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/ms740506(v=vs.85).aspx">3</a>]. No reverse engineering necessary to identify this. We can also do searches fo the hash on popular malware sites, such as virustotal.com, to see if the sample had been analyzed. Or we can use the library imports to help identify some problems the PE file may give us during runtime analysis. If it imports IsDebuggerPressent(), then we can easily assume that the file is aware if it being debugged. There are a thousand examples of this type of logic which just takes hands-on work and liberal use of msdn.microsoft.com to learn.</p><h4>PeStudio Overview</h4><p>PeStudio is an amazing all-in-one surface analysis tool for Portable Executables [<a href="https://www.winitor.com/">4</a>]. PeStudio is a Windows application, I have never tried to run it in Wine. I typically use it in a Windows Virtual Machine dedicated to malware analysis. But the application does not require installation. It can run on its own from a thumbdrive without impacting the integrity of the host being investigated. After downloading the PK-ZIP from the wintor downloads page, unpack the file into its own directory [<a href="https://www.winitor.com/">4</a>]. Six files and a sub-directory are unpacked into the folder as seen in Figure 1. The “pestudio.exe” is the application.</p><p><em>Figure 1. PeStudio Unpacked.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/593/0*jbGrExSbHDsxglyu.jpg" /></figure><p>Inside the “xml” directory are eleven XML files. These are configuration files which provide input for blacklisted items and to actually configure the application. One useful feature of PeStudio is its ability to lookup a file by hash in VirusTotal. It comes packed with the indicators listed in XML files. You can edit these files to add additional indicators or signatures if you need to. In older versions you could change the VirusTotal API key or disable VirusTotal all together. As of writing this I could not find the option in the configuration files of the newer version. I will keep looking and update this post when I find it.</p><p><em>Figure 2. XML files.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/589/0*Za4EIytFsTxgILKU.jpg" /></figure><p>When you first open PeStudio version 8.54, you are presented with a simple screen asking you to drag and drop a file for analysis. To analyze a file we can simply drag a file to the window or we can go to File &gt; Open File or click on the Open File icon on the task bar. All real simple.</p><p><em>Figure 3. PeStudio 8.54 Initial Window.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/975/0*hR169dKH2S3YlPNB.jpg" /></figure><p>We ask PeStudio to analyze a file then wait a few seconds while it fetches VirusTotal lookup data and parses the strings and imports. If there is no Internet access, the VirusTotal lookup will obviously not be successful. After analysis is complete we are presented with a window that has some basic descriptive attributes of the file. It gives us the MD5 and SHA1 hashes of the file. It also provides a hash of the imports, called imphash. This is interesting because similar pieces of malware will have the same imports, but may have different attributes which cause the MD5 and SHA hashes to change. Since the imports are the same, the imphash will be same even if the full file hashes are different.</p><p>The CPU width is important if we are going to perform runtime analysis of the file. If we see a file that is a 64-bit application, then we will need a 64-bit version of Windows in our sandbox. File size can also be an indicator of similarity between two files. Again the file hashes may change, but if the size of two files is close, it could be used as a piece of evidence that two files are the same. The Date is simply the date that PeStudio analyzed the file. Later we will talk about compile dates which is a far more useful piece of information. Signature is the educated guess by PeStudio to identify the compiler/linker or packer. When you get into reversing an application, knowing the compiler/linker can help to separate user code from compiler code. If the file is packed, knowing the packer can help identify how to unpack the file. Packing is simply a method to compress a file, but in the process it also obfuscates the file.</p><p><em>Figure 4. Analyzed file.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/972/0*UxbEdP6OsxKCtfv1.jpg" /></figure><h4>Indicators</h4><p>Next down on the menu we have the ‘indicators’ window. I mentioned earlier that PeStudio has a list of indicators it uses to identify whether a file is worthy of suspicion beyond simply doing a VirusTotal lookup. This ‘indicators’ page summarizes the indicators found further down in the menu tree. For this example, we can see that the file makes modifications to the registry, has references to the File Transfer Protocol, and has a VirusTotal score of 49/55. There are two items which stand out to me as a malware analyst.</p><p>This file ignores Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR). ASLR is a feature which simply loads an application into memory at a somewhat randomized preventing the ability to successfully perform a buffer overflow attack. It also ignores Data Execution Prevention (DEP) which would allow for code execution from the Data Section in memory.</p><p><em>Figure 5. Indicators.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/973/0*ZQsTqQTn0twx_iI-.jpg" /></figure><h4>VirusTotal</h4><p>The ‘virustotal’ window is simply a summary of the VirusTotal lookup. It lists all of the anti-virus products the sample was tested against. If they were flagged by a product, the signature name will be displayed in the ‘positiv’ column. This is the same information you would get if you did a search of a hash on virustotal.com.</p><p><em>Figure 6. VirusTotal window.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/971/0*Yd1jLLVTMq2PtwVk.jpg" /></figure><p>The ‘dos-stub’ is next. This window displays information about the DOS application header which comes before the PE header information. It is very rare that an application has much in the dos-stub. PeStudio will display the MD5 hash of the dos-stub, the size, and entropy.</p><p>‘file-header’ is interesting if simply because it contains some useful information to accurately describe a sample. This window provides information that would be in the PE header if you were analyzing this in another application. In fact, the ‘signature’ field should say 0x00004550, which when you convert that to ASCII it states ‘EP’ or flipped the other way for the sake of endianness (I will explain that another time) it states ‘PE’ [<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Endianness">5</a>] [<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ASCII">6</a>]. The ‘stamp’ field contains the timestamp of when the application was compiled. Assuming the author of the application did not deliberately modify this timestamp, it can tell you how old the sample is. Reasonably the older the sample, the more likely it will be detected by signature based ant-virus if it is malicious.</p><p>Some compilers can be identified simply by the compile timestamp. Delphi compilers will leave a timestamp of 0x2A425E19 (6/19/1992 10:22:17 PM) no matter when the application was linked. Some malware authors will zero out this timestamp or put in a fake timestamp to throw off analysts.</p><p><em>Figure 7. ‘file-header’.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/970/0*fWzQfNGA7YG-bePk.jpg" /></figure><p>The ‘optional-header’ contains information that was at one time completely optional, but is not mostly required for an application to execute inside a modern Windows environment. Most of this is not immediately useful for the incident responder. At the bottom of the window though we have information about ASLR, DEP, and Structured Exception Handling (SEH).</p><p>SEH is the ability of an application to handle exceptions on its own. Applications crash from time to time. This crash is called an exception. We can write our applications to execute another sub-routine if an exception were to occur during runtime. Malware authors though can use this SEH code as a mechanism to obfuscate their malicious code.</p><p>Imagine you have a program which appears to do nothing special. Just runs through maybe checks some locations on the file-system then exits. This application though has some SEH code. As an analyst, you just ignore the SEH because what do you care about exception handling? The malware author uses this complacency to hide malicious code in the SEH. The application is configured to generate an exception on its own causing the SEH to execute. Point being, that if you get into reversing malware and see an SEH, be sure to analyze that as well.</p><p><em>Figure 8. ‘optional-header’.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/973/0*QYnBwOjFUjCr5R7A.jpg" /></figure><h4>Directories and Sections</h4><p>‘directories’ lists different groups of data in the PE file. The size and address would be important if you needed this information during reversing. Probably not too useful to incident responders.</p><p>‘sections’ is a useful piece of information when trying to determine if a file is malicious. The .text section will contain executable code. We can see that each of the sections has a read, write, and/or execute permission. What permission is applied to the section is denoted by an x in the appropriate field. We should expect the .text section to have Read and Execute permissions. It has code we need to execute and we must read that code in order to execute. The .text section should never have write permissions. If it did, then this means the application can actively modify itself. Equally, we should only see the .text section with execute permissions. We will also see that the .text section has the ‘entry-point’. This is the first line of executable code when the application is loaded into memory.</p><p>The other sections will contain data. Most of this data will relate to function imports, variables, and large data structures. But occasionally they will actually contain another PE file. Malware “drops” another application is called a “dropper”. Simply this malware writes another application to disk and executes the new application. The dropped application will often be stored in one of the other sections, such as the .rsrc. If you see a .rsrc section that is abnormally large, it might be a good idea to analyze that or keep an eye out for disk writes during runtime analysis.</p><p>One more thing before we move on. Section names can be anything. Windows only cares about the entry-point and the permissions on the sections. There is software called ‘packers’ which compress PE files which can decompress themselves during runtime. Packers will often change the section names. For example, the popular UPX packer renames all the sections to .UPX.</p><p><em>Figure 9. ‘sections’.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/974/0*x1Ua3-rdiV24qOQ5.jpg" /></figure><h4>Libraries, Imports, and Exports</h4><p>‘libraries’ and ‘imports’ help us to identify what capabilities this applcation has. During compilation and linking, the compiler/linker will lookup Windows API libraries and functions being used by application and link them into an import table. Imports are stored in Libraries. A library exports functions and other applications can import them. Make sense? I am more concerned with the imports then necessarily the actual libraries the imports come from.</p><p>‘imports’ contain the actual imported function names. You can lookup the function names on MSDN.microsoft.com to identify what they specifically do. Many have somewhat self-explainitory names. PeStudio has a list of ‘blacklisted’ imports. These are all API functions in Windows which are not malicious in their own right, but can be used to perform functions which may be considered malicious. If you do not know what a function does, which there will be plenty you do not at first, right click the function name and selcted ‘Query MSDN’. This will open a browser window and direct you to the MSDN article containing all kinds of great information about the function. You can do the same in the ‘libraries’ window as well.</p><p>Function imports can be referenced by ordinal number as well. Libraries which contain exports assign a number to each export. The author can chose to use the number rather than the name of the import. Often this is done to obfuscate what the application is importing. PeStudio is pretty good at finding the actual name of imports referenced by ordinal. At a minimum we know what the library is and we know the ordinal. We can go to that library and lookup the ordinal ourselves or do some research to find what the import actually does.</p><p>We should also be concerned if there are only a couple of imports. In Windows, all running applications have to use the API calls. It is a security mechanism which forces user-mode code to interact with the API to proxy interactions with kernel-mode APIs. Any time an application needs access to the Operating System, say to create a file or open a socket, it must interact with an API call. If you only see on library being imported ‘kernel32.dll’, then be suspicious that the file you are analyzing is actually packed. The other imports may become visible after the application is unpacked in memory.</p><p><em>Figure 10. ‘libraries’.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/972/0*w2Upq2D_zHHT-aLr.jpg" /></figure><p><em>Figure 11. ‘imports’.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/974/0*HqFpeUVas-haKkQ-.jpg" /></figure><p>‘exports’ is very similar to the ‘imports’ section, but it lists functions that the PE file you are analyzing actually exports for other PE files to use. In the sample I am using, there are no exports. I analyzed ‘kernel32.dll’ just to demonstrate what exports look like.</p><p><em>Figure 12. ‘exports’.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/970/0*B4BQoj0U_O7U4ZXF.jpg" /></figure><h4>TLS-Callback and Resources</h4><p>‘tls-callback’ is an interesting piece of information. In Windows, a software author can use a tool called Thread Local Storage (TLS). TLS is a piece of code which executes before the entry-point. Typically this could be used to setup the environment for the application to execute. At least that is the purpose. Malware authors can use this to their advantage. By placing malicious code in a TLS callback function, this code will execute before Windows actually creates a process. The host process can fail and exit, but the TLS code is still running. My sample did not have any tls-callbacks, so no screenshot. But keep an eye out for application that do. You will have to change up your runtime analysis strategy if the sample does contain a TLS callback.</p><p>‘resources’ are typically stored in the .rsrc section. Unique UI information such as the application icon or custom window elements are stored here. Often drop files will be stored in the .rsrc section as well.</p><p><em>Figure 13. ‘resources’.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/974/0*YcpbI_HRbxDxMhdg.jpg" /></figure><h4>Strings</h4><p>‘strings’ is a great source for writing Yara rules. Not that we are going to get into that now. Any string of bytes which can be read as ASCII characters is parsed and placed in this table. Most of them are going to be code which when encoded into ASCII spell giberish. There are two things we are looking for here. First we want to find readable strings such as URLs or filenames. This type of information can help point to indicators we should see after the application executes. Secondly we would be concerned if there are very few readable strings. Having a minimal number of readable strings would indicate the application is being obfuscated. Similar to the imports where we see a small number of imports.</p><p><em>Figure 14. ‘strings’.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/972/0*3rJQZ8YQ5kZl6qDJ.jpg" /></figure><h4>Version</h4><p>I am going to skip the ‘debug’ and ‘manifest’ windows. ‘version’ though contains some more information that we can use to uniquely identify the file. This contains the information you see when you right-click on an icon and go to properties. Some interesting items in this file is we have a Copyright date of 2014, but when we looked at the compile date we see that it has a year of 2006. We also have a company name, here call Caere Corporation. We may want to lookup if this is a real company and what they do.</p><p><em>Figure 15. ‘version’.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/974/0*YG97Uhw8ICTjm-Mh.jpg" /></figure><h4>Certificate</h4><p>Lastly I will talk about the ‘certificate’ windows, skipping ‘overlay’. If the application is digitally signed, the certificate it is signed with will be here. Most malware is not digitally signed. Or it is digitally signed with an illegitimate certificate, such as one from a certificate authority that has been compromised or a certificate for which a collision was found. Lookup the Flame malware for some interesting reads on digital signature collision [<a href="http://www.forbes.com/sites/richardstiennon/2012/06/14/flames-md5-collision-is-the-most-worrisome-security-discovery-of-2012/#ece423350cf4">8</a>]. If the sample is digitally signed, validate the signature. Nine times out of ten, if the sample is digitally signed and the signature is valid, then the sample is legitimate. Do research and make your own conclusion though.</p><p><em>Figure 16. ‘certificate’.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/969/0*BO_X6mp-v3869a2v.jpg" /></figure><h4>Conclusion</h4><p>Hopefully you enjoyed this overview of PeStudio. I think this is my longest post so far. Next technical post will talk about what you can do during runtime analysis after you find a file that requires further investigation. Remember we are trying to find suspicious files, conclude that it is malicious, and then develop indicators so we can conclude if it had executed. PeStudio is a powerful tool for performing some static surface analysis of a file. One which I think is a must have in every incident responders.</p><p>I also have plans to do a comparison of the standard and pro version of PeStudio once I get my pro license [<a href="https://www.winitor.com/tools/pestudio/current/pestudio_standard_vs_pro_versions.pdf">9</a>]. I will do a follow on post about that later.</p><p>Question everything and keep moving forward!</p><p>-aub</p><h4>References</h4><ol><li><a href="https://aubsec.github.io/dfir/winpe/2015/05/26/first-post-portable-executables-and-analysis/">Portable Executables and Analysis</a></li><li><a href="https://aubsec.github.io/dfir/2016/05/31/did-it-execute/">Did It Execute?</a></li><li><a href="https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/ms740506%28v=vs.85%29.aspx">Microsoft MSDN: Socket()</a></li><li><a href="https://www.winitor.com/">Wintor</a></li><li><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Endianness">Endianness</a></li><li><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ASCII">ASCII</a></li><li><a href="http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/debugging-tls-callbacks/">Debugging TLS Callbacks</a></li><li><a href="http://www.forbes.com/sites/richardstiennon/2012/06/14/flames-md5-collision-is-the-most-worrisome-security-discovery-of-2012/#ece423350cf4">Flame’s MD5 collision is the most worrisome security discovery of 2012</a></li><li><a href="https://www.winitor.com/tools/pestudio/current/pestudio_standard_vs_pro_versions.pdf">PeStudio Standard vs Pro Versions</a></li></ol><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="http://aubsec.github.io/dfir/2016/09/01/pe-studio/"><em>aubsec.github.io</em></a><em> on September 1, 2016.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f2ada4e8564" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Importance of the Scientific Method in Incident Response]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@aubsec/importance-of-the-scientific-method-in-incident-response-17e8fb5fffc?source=rss-8baf09ecfcfc------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/17e8fb5fffc</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[dfir]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[computer-security]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Matthew Aubert]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 23 Aug 2016 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-12-31T15:06:41.151Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Just like any other science, digital forensics requires us to utilize this continuous process of making observations, formulate a hypothesis, test it, and alter our hypothesis as we test it. The scientific method maps perfectly to the six step incident response process. During the Identification phase of the incident response process, we make an observation about an event, develop a hypothesis as to what we believe actually occurred, then we design a method for testing our hypothesis and carry out the test. The test is typically collecting logs from host and reviewing those logs to see if the event should be considered an incident.</p><p>My point is that we should be testing every event that comes through. Only in rare occasions should we take previous investigations as gospel especially when high value assets are concerned. Two events that look similar at face value may not be the same. Equally previous investigations may not have come to correct conclusions, especially if they were performed by myself. I keep a number of items printed out and taped to my desk.</p><p>I would recommend printing out the scientific method and the incident response process, and tape those around your desk. It helps to remind yourself of these steps.</p><p>Question everything and keep moving forward!</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/933/0*0xWTpk9uA6TIU4ed.png" /></figure><p>-aub</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="http://aubsec.github.io/dfir/2016/08/23/scientific-method/"><em>aubsec.github.io</em></a><em> on August 23, 2016.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=17e8fb5fffc" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Incident Response Culture]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@aubsec/incident-response-culture-ee678b1e9ecf?source=rss-8baf09ecfcfc------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ee678b1e9ecf</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[digital-forensics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[incident-response]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[dfir]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Matthew Aubert]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 01 Jul 2016 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-12-31T15:32:26.298Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Anyone who has read some of my previous blog posts will quickly realize that I tend to focus on the non-technical. This is another one of those non-technical posts, but I genuinely believe that topics such as this need to be discussed. For the Marine Corps and the Navy, culture is easily one of the most important aspects that must be instilled in all members. Arguably it is more important then tactical training. As incident responders it is our responsibility to defend the networks we have been charged with defending. Whether our role is that of a sell-sword or that of a true patriot to our respective employers, we must always remember that we are the DFIR Warriors on the wall fighting to keep the adversary at bay. We must own the mission of those we have volunteered to protect. By understanding the goals of the organization and keeping those goals on our minds at all times, we can make decisions that are in support of that mission. If the mission of your organization is to manufacture and sell widgets, then as a DFIR Warrior your missions is to ensure that those widgets are made and that they can be sold. When going through the PICERL Incident Response Process you must always be mindful of the impact to widget production [1].</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/625/0*BarL3l2dEpFJ-YgZ.png" /></figure><h4>We must sharpen our minds</h4><p>Every member of the team should have passion for their chosen profession. That passion is displayed through the active pursuit of continuing education [<a href="https://www.sans.org/">2</a>]. It could be from certifications being pursued, through the research into new tools and techniques, through the reading of new books or the development of a hip-pocket class given to other DFIR professionals. Maybe the attendance of an industry conference. Hopefully all members of the team will demonstrate this passion during the hiring process. The realities of life though show that not all will. As leaders we must lift up our fellow DFIR brethren and ignite the passion in them to continue moving forward.</p><p>We owe it to our junior cyber security professionals to demonstrate what it means to be a consummate professional at all times. This is done by engaging in some of the activities previously mentioned. It is also done by helping the junior professionals in following the same path. Help them to identify their strengths and weaknesses in the field. This field is very complex requiring many different skills [<a href="https://medium.com/@aubsec_96524/skill-diversity-on-incident-response-teams-405b0d0c441f#.ebskp51ak">3</a>]. We cannot be great at all things. By helping them to find where their interests lie, we can help build a better DFIR team. They can focus their efforts on improving their skills in a topic where there is a clear skill gap. We as leaders can then identify skills that need to be hired for.</p><p>Not all organizations have the budget to send their employees to expensive training. We cannot allow the lack of budget though to excuse failing to learn more. Knowledge is free mostly on the Internet. Lookup videos from DEFCON [<a href="https://www.defcon.org/">4</a>]. Encourage your peers to do the same. If you are in a management position, set time aside regularly to review a conference video as a team or discuss process improvements.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*UCcl_QtHl4RqgHRD.png" /></figure><p>There are a lot of great DFIR blogs out there. Keep keyed into what is happening in the industry [<a href="https://www.google.com/search?q=dfir+blogs&amp;sa=G&amp;hl=en&amp;gbv=2&amp;sei=1MhnWLP8CoSPmQGV0pPwCw">5</a>]. On your daily task list, place reviewing blogs as one of the first things you do in the day. I start each morning by first reviewing what events were escalated to incident response overnight that may require immediate attention, then I review blogs, emails and other sources of intelligence.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*YUhqs_7qLuicaNxL.png" /></figure><p>Get on Twitter! There is so much information made available on twitter that ignoring it is silly. Use tweetdeck and setup a search for terms about the organization you are protecting. Often activitsts like to boast about their exploits. If ‘Widget Inc.’ is the target of a denial of service attack by the ‘Gizzard Squad’, they will almost certainly start tweeting about it. Keep a search open on tweetdeck for #DFIR.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*U9G_Un9YTMkhO1OH.png" /></figure><p>Learning is continuous. We must never stop learning new things. Every day you should go to bed comfortable in knowing that you have done your best to improve the knowledge of yourself and peers.</p><h4>We must sharpen our swords</h4><p>Learning about new tools and techniques does us no good if those skills are not leveraged during our incident response investigations. Keeping up with new tools on a DFIR blog or on twitter require us to test those tools and make changes to our procedures as we find better methodologies. Remember the Process Improvement Loop while finding ways to make your job more effective and more efficient. After reviewing all those blogs, plan on what changes could be made and test those plans, do the plan by implementing the changes to processes or tools, check to verify that the plan was executed properly, and act on any shortcomings discovered during the check phase.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/0*_sGBcJNfbdy0Z5jd.png" /></figure><p>Certainly an incident response team is more than the sum of their tools, but we work in a technical field which requires tools. Scripting a solution may only get you so far. Open-source or proprietary software may be necessary to move forward. If you find your organization is not able to respond to some incidents because they lack the appropriate assets to do so, make an argument to get new tools. Build your argument on a basis of logic. Provide strong references to support your request. Identify potential costs and perform some level of cost/benefit analysis. Implementation of a new tool will have to be approved by a business person. Make your argument in the language of business as best as you can.</p><p>Have a real penetration test performed regularly on your network. This serves a number of huge benefits. From the business perspective it helps leaders see that the finances they have budgeted to cyber security are going to good use. Performing the test annually along with a comparison of what project and process improvements have been implemented over the past 12 months will ease the minds of the business when you make an argument for the next tool.</p><h4>Conclusion</h4><p>A culture of continuous process improvement driven by excited passionate cyber security professionals will drive your security operations center towards success. Question everything and keep moving forward!</p><p>-aub</p><h3>References</h3><ol><li><a href="https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/incident/incident-handling-process-small-medium-businesses-1791">An Incident Handling Process for Small and Medium Businesses</a></li><li><a href="https://www.sans.org/">SANS Institute</a></li><li><a href="https://medium.com/@aubsec_96524/skill-diversity-on-incident-response-teams-405b0d0c441f#.ebskp51ak">DFIR Skills</a></li><li><a href="https://www.defcon.org/">DEFCON</a></li><li><a href="https://www.google.com/search?hl=en&amp;source=hp&amp;biw=&amp;bih=&amp;q=dfir+blogs&amp;btnG=Google+Search&amp;gbv=1">DFIR Blog List</a></li><li><a href="https://tweetdeck.twitter.com/">Tweetdeck</a></li><li><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PDCA">Process Improvment loop</a></li></ol><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="http://aubsec.github.io/dfir/2016/07/01/culture/"><em>aubsec.github.io</em></a><em> on July 1, 2016.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ee678b1e9ecf" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Did It Execute?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@aubsec/did-it-execute-19c99c45e973?source=rss-8baf09ecfcfc------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/19c99c45e973</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[dfir]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Matthew Aubert]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 31 May 2016 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-12-31T14:59:03.232Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>One of the most important questions an incident responder will need to answer when performing a malware investigation. Did the file execute? Given a scenario where a host’s anti-virus flagged a file either during a runtime scan or during a full system scan, the new incident responder may trust that the anti-virus successfully quarantined the file without need to further analyze. Unfortunately anti-virus is far from perfect. It is not entirely uncommon the ant-virus to quarantine the file after the damage has already been done. Or reasonably anti-virus could have quarantined the drop file rather than the file that caused the root infection. As incident responders we must be able to quickly assess whether the compromise was actually prevented. Fortunately when it comes to Windows Portable Executables, there are a few sure-fire ways to solve this problem quickly.</p><h4>UserAssist Keys</h4><p>The easiest way to determine if a PE file executed is to check the UserAssist registry keys. Every program executed from explorer.exe will generate a UserAssist key. They are stored in the hives of the user who executed it. I will do a blog post later about the Windows Registry, but for now just remember that each user stores their personalized registry in the root of their user profile in a file named NTUSER.DAT. So for every user, there is a unique user hive in their profile. If we were performing an investigation to determine whether a file executed on a host with three users, we may have to parse three NTUSER.dat files.</p><p>UserAssist values are stored encoded in ROT-13. This encoding simply stands for Rotate 13 and the rotation is applied to the ASCII characters. This is identical to how a Caesar cipher works. For example, an A would become the letter N. Because it is rotating exactly 13 characters and there are 26 letters in the alphabet, if you ROT-13 an N you would get an A back. So a UserAssist value of ‘znyjner.rkr’ can be decoded to mean ‘malware.exe’. If we have an anti-virus signature with the filename, we can encode that file name and search the NTUSER.dat files for the encoded version of the filename. If we find the filename in an NTUSER.dat we can conclude that the file likely executed before anti-virus detected it.</p><p>I have a great example of misunderstanding this artifact. We had a tier 2 responder identify an anti-virus event where a file was detected during an on-access scan in McAfee. The responder took the filename and performed a search of the UserAssist to determine whether it had executed. He did not find any value in the UserAssist which matched the filename. The responder concluded that the file did not execute and did not implement further response actions.</p><p>He was wrong though in his conclusion. While the file he was analyzing did not execute, he failed to notice that the file was in fact the drop file of another piece of malware. The file was dropped to the root of the user profile. User’s on Windows systems do not save files to the root of their user profiles. They save them in the Documents, Downloads, or Desktop folders. It turned out that the dropper had successfully executed. The event was re-categorized as a malware incident.</p><p><a href="http://www.rot13.com/">http://www.rot13.com/</a></p><h4>Prefetch</h4><p>Starting in Windows XP, Microsoft added a feature to allow process data from the first 10 seconds of a process execution to be cached. The purpose of this is to allow the application to load a little faster. It is disabled by default on servers and host’s with solid-state drives. But for our legacy workstations with classic hard disks, the prefetch can provide us with a wealth of information into program execution. Prefetch files are stored in C:\Windows\Prefetch with the extension *.pf. We can see filenames and estimate file execution times based on the creation timestamp of the .pf minus 10 seconds. There are some great tools out there to actually parse the prefetch file for additional data.</p><p>Prefetch files contain data regarding the file name and the execution path. If cmd.exe is executed with some parameters, those will be stored in the Prefetch file. If you need more information beyond the file name and execution time, it would be rational to use a parsing tool to review details about the</p><p><a href="http://www.forensicswiki.org/wiki/Prefetch">http://www.forensicswiki.org/wiki/Prefetch</a></p><h4>OpenSaveMRU</h4><p>This is a fun item. Every item which is saved or opened by another application will generate an entry in the OpenSaveMRU. A great example of this is when a file is saved from Internet Explorer. How does this help determine file execution? Well simply if an application is interacting with files and generates an OpenSaveMRU item, then that application must have executed to have done so. Which brings us to the next item…</p><p><a href="http://www.forensicswiki.org/wiki/OpenSaveMRU">http://www.forensicswiki.org/wiki/OpenSaveMRU</a></p><h4>LastVisitedMRU</h4><p>The LastVisitedMRU tracks all commands which are typed into the Windows Common Dialog. It populates dialog boxes with commands previously input by the user. If a program is executed by typing the name of the application into a dialog, then a LastVisitedMRU will generate.</p><p><a href="http://www.forensicswiki.org/wiki/LastVisitedMRU">http://www.forensicswiki.org/wiki/LastVisitedMRU</a></p><h4>Indicators of Compromise</h4><p>Malware executes for some purpose. Beyond the simple file execution indicators, they also will leave indicators specific to that malicious file’s execution. These will include file hashes, network communication, registry modifications and filesystem interactions. Some level of file analysis will be necessary to perform this. Analysis could include running the file in a sandbox and performing surface/runtime analysis in a controlled environment. If a file when executed makes a DNS request and an HTTP GET to a domain <a href="http://www.malware.com,/">www.malware.com,</a> then regardless of whether there were forensic artifacts left on the host, if we see the network indicators the file likely executed.</p><p>We cannot always take the anti-virus alert at its face value. While there is not enough time in the day for most organizations to fully investigate all malware events, we should take time to spot check the performance of anti-virus, and learn to identify when a file may have been caught by anti-virus after a compromise. My post here is hardly a comprehensive list of items. It is simply an easy go-to list. I strongly recommend that you follow up reading this post with following all the references listed.</p><h3>References</h3><ol><li><a href="https://uk.sans.org/posters/windows_artifact_analysis.pdf">https://uk.sans.org/posters/windows_artifact_analysis.pdf</a></li><li><a href="https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/08/execute.html">https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/08/execute.html</a></li></ol><p>-aub</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="http://aubsec.github.io/dfir/2016/05/31/did-it-execute/"><em>aubsec.github.io</em></a><em> on May 31, 2016.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=19c99c45e973" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Skill Diversity on Incident Response Teams]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@aubsec/skill-diversity-on-incident-response-teams-405b0d0c441f?source=rss-8baf09ecfcfc------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/405b0d0c441f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[incident-response]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[dfir]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[digital-forensics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Matthew Aubert]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 25 Apr 2016 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-12-31T15:16:13.564Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>So earlier this week I reposted a post about developing good interview questions for incident response. I intentionally tried to stay away from highly technical questions simply because I feel that hands-on practical interviews are better for these anyway. Hiring for an incident response team can be very difficult. Individuals need to be highly technical while still having a strategic mindset. There are few people who are able to perform both tasks. In some industries, such as DoD contracting, incident responders may have a moderately high certification requirements due to DoD 8570.01-m. We all know that highly technical people tend to avoid some certifications because they are perceived as being proof of one’s ability to memorize test questions rather then actually knowing the material.</p><p>There is another important aspect of hiring which could get lost in the chaos of trying to find good candidates. Incident response teams need a diverse set of skills to the degree that you cannot expect all members to be subject matter experts on all aspects of incident response team. When hiring outside of an entry-level position, it is important to identify what skill gaps exist inside the team and hire to fill that gap. Simply hiring another incident responder does not suffice. At a minimum, I think the following skills should be represented in every Incident Response team.</p><p>The following is a list of skills which I believe are a must in every incident response team. This does not mean every individual should hold all these skills, but all these skills should be represented on the team.</p><h3>Technical Skills</h3><p><strong><em>Triage:</em></strong></p><p>Being able to quickly triage an event is a must. When interviewing for positions at any level, some amount of technical questions should involve triaging. All members of the Incident Response Team should be able to triage an event quickly.</p><p><strong><em>Host Forensics:</em></strong></p><p>Incident response is essentially Digital Forensics, but performed at break-neck speeds. Whether the event was triggered by a network signature or a host signature, if the traffic was successful we will ultimately be performing host forensics to determine if the server or workstation was compromised, whether the web application was popped. Having individuals with a strong background in the host platforms used in the enterprise is necessary for successful incident response operations.</p><p>If your organization has a dedicated digital forensics team, members of the incident response team must know how to submit requests to that team. Digital forensics professionals will want to know specifically what the incident response team is looking for. When their tools are used to process images from hosts, they can write a list of keywords to automate the search. Incident responders should detail those keywords when submitting the request for analysis.</p><p><strong><em>Network Forensics:</em></strong></p><p>Most often it is the network signatures which begin the incident response process. On the host, mature properly configured anti-virus does a typical good job of preventing known malware from executing. Those which slip through the cracks are almost always detected by network activity. It is a must that the team have several members, if not all members, strong on network forensics. This goes well beyond the port/protocol trivia <em>(which I think is silly anyway)</em>. This is a holistic approach to network forensics involving packet analysis.</p><p><strong><em>IDS/IPS Configuration:</em></strong></p><p>Organizations will typically have a dedicated team for managing the network sensors. Performing tasks such as updates and applying new signatures. Incident responders must know how to interface with the network sensor team. Through the process of incident response, new network artifacts may be discovered not covered by vendor signatures. Individuals on the team need to know how to write and submit signatures for the appropriate appliances. If you are a shop that runs Snort, some members of the team must know how to write Snort signatures.</p><p><strong><em>Network Infrastructure:</em></strong></p><p>Beyond the IPS/IDS, there are firewalls and routers with access control lists interacting with packets as they traverse the network. Members of the team must be capable of understanding where network appliances are being used, how they should be used, and how to utilize them when investigating or responding to an incident. Those of us who have spent time in the Department of Defense will know that they utilize robust access control lists on all of their boundary devices. Understanding how traffic flows through all devices on the network is necessary for investigating incidents.</p><p><strong><em>Systems Administration:</em></strong></p><p>This one can sometimes be overlooked, but if you are an Active Directory shop, it is absolutely a must that there be members with a background in Active Directory administration on the team. Understanding how accounts are created and best practices for the management of these accounts can help with resolving issues with identifying the source of internal AD problems.</p><p>Also, incident responders may have to manage a laboratory environment. Individuals should know how to administer Windows, Mac, Linux environments as necessary.</p><p><strong><em>Malware Analysis:</em></strong></p><p>Once you get beyond the initial triage of a potential malware infection, indicators must be developed from the sample to scope other systems which may have impacted by the malicious code. Malware will have host indicators in the form of registry changes, file system changes, and hash values which can be searched for on workstations. Most malware will also have network indicators related to its command and control functionality which can be searched for through the network appliances. Taking time to develop these can significantly improve an incident response team’s intelligence.</p><p>This does not mean every malware sample needs to be fully reversed. There is heavy reliance on the 80/20 rule here as you can quickly go down the rabbit hole. Develop actionable indicators as quickly as possible and deploy signatures based on those indicators.</p><p><strong><em>Programming:</em></strong></p><p>At a minimum, some individuals should have a good understanding of how the Operating System and hardware interact. Programming is a great way to gain that understanding. Some individuals should have a strong scripting background to help automate incident response tasks. If your organization lacks a true incident response tool, such as Google Rapid Response or FireEye HX, you will have to rely heavily on the scripting abilities of some members.</p><p><strong><em>SIEM Administration/Operation:</em></strong></p><p>The SIEM is the world which the incident response team revolves. Typically there will be a tier 1 group who is responsible for monitoring the SIEM. Individuals at all levels of the team must know how the SIEM works, what logs it receives, how to write correlation rules for the SIEM, and the processes and procedures around which the incident response team uses the SIEM.</p><p><strong><em>Identity and Access Management:</em></strong></p><p>I already mentioned the need to understand the directory services utilized by the enterprise. Some members need to understand the principles behind identity and access management.</p><h4>Soft Skills</h4><p><strong><em>Executive Reporting:</em></strong></p><p>Reporting is just part of the job. Not all members are required to have the skill, but at least a quarter of them should. Some members may be dedicated to formal executive reporting. Having strong writing and speaking skills is necessary for those members.</p><p><strong><em>Calm and Assertive:</em></strong></p><p>Rarely do incident response teams have full reign of a network. They must interact with different business groups to direct response actions against individual assets. Members of the incident response team must be able to direct those actions when those responsible for performing the actions are not direct reports. Having a calm and assertive demeanor will help is driving response actions on an enterprise network.</p><p>Juggling multiple events/incidents at once will be difficult. Members must be able to organize response actions.</p><p><strong><em>Drive for Self-Improvement:</em></strong></p><p>Every single member of the team must have this last skill or they should find another career.</p><p>-aub</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="http://aubsec.github.io/dfir/2016/04/25/skill-diversity-in-incident-response-teams/"><em>aubsec.github.io</em></a><em> on April 25, 2016.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=405b0d0c441f" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[DFIR Interivew Questions]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@aubsec/dfir-interivew-questions-68ec48ea570f?source=rss-8baf09ecfcfc------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/68ec48ea570f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[dfir]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[incident-response]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[digital-forensics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Matthew Aubert]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 17 Apr 2016 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-12-31T15:15:38.773Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The following was a post I wrote for my blogger about a year ago. Not only do I think the concept of the post is very relevant, but I felt it needed an update before reposting.</p><p>Interviewing is a significant part of the life of a DFIR professional, whether you are performing the interview or being interviewed. There is a wide range of thought as to how an interview should be performed. Some teams do one-on-one interviews with the manager and the candidate. Other teams do a panel interview where anyone with some seniority on the team interviews the candidate. Then there are the types of questions. Should interviews be primarily technical or should they be cultural? Should there be a hands-on technical portion of the interview?</p><p>I really think we need to reflect on the purpose of an interview and take into account the whole person. Technical skills can often be learned, many times on the job. The focus should be on the personality of the individual. Determine whether they have the right passion for the topic. Too often I have gotten the Port/Protocol trivia during the interview. Of course someone being hired into an incident response position should know that DNS runs on UDP 53 for normal name resolution and TCP 53 for zone transfers. But moving beyond the common well-known ports will only lead the interview into a zone of confusion.</p><p>We also may have to accept that DFIR is not rocket-science. Certainly it is a lot of fun. It can be very challenging when the puzzle is complex. But mostly DFIR involves validating that our cybersecurity tools are working properly through the user of digital forensic techniques. Did the anti-virus actually stop the ransomeware infection? Are there other hosts that were compromised?</p><p>I was sitting at work thinking about some good interview questions for a person who was trying for a job in incident response, forensics, and malware analysis. This line of thought was motivated by a recent blog post I read about T-Shaped Analysts. <a href="http://www.realcybercrime.com/the-t-shaped-analyst/">http://www.realcybercrime.com/the-t-shaped-analyst/</a> The idea is that every analyst should have a list of basic skills and should specialize in a topic of their choice.</p><p>An interview serves three purposes. First in a technical position we want to see if they have a basic understanding of the field. This is not a certification exam and the questions should not be simple trivia. Reasonably even some experienced candidates cannot memorize obscure facts. Second we want to see if the candidate can solve some scenario based problems, particularly those directly related to the job they are entering. These questions should be framed in a way that there is more then one answer. There will certainly be wrong answers, there is not a single answer that is correct. Thirdly we want to see if they will be a good fit for the work-place culture that exists or that we are trying to cultivate.</p><p>The following questions are just some ideas for good interview questions. It would not be wise to ask a prospective employee all of these questions. You want to be sure that they have some time to ask questions themselves about the company.</p><p>Update 2016–08–23: I added some more general interview questions, which certainly are not Incident Response specific. I really need to update some of the technical questions too. Will update that later.</p><h4>Topic Opener</h4><p>Is a hotdog a sandwich?</p><p>Tell me about your current job. Give me a brief summary of that job — just a few sentences to outline your major duties and responsibilities. What are the standards of successful performance? How well did you meet them?</p><h4>Accomplishment</h4><p>Let’s talk about a major accomplishment you’re proud of in your current job (previous job, education).</p><p>What was the Problem or challenge?</p><p>What Action did you take?</p><p>What was the Result?</p><p>What did you Learn?</p><p>How have you Applied it?</p><p>Self-Appraisal What qualities did you use to accomplish that? Give me examples where you demonstrated those qualities.</p><p>If I called (name of manager, peer, direct report, or client) how would he/she say you were able to . . ?</p><h4>General Cultural:</h4><p>How is your lab configured at home? If you do not have a lab, how would you setup one?</p><p>Are there any blogs you follow?</p><p>What motivates your interest in the cyber security field?</p><p>What is a topic you are currently studying?</p><h4>Networking 101:</h4><p>What port does DNS operate on?</p><p>If connectivity is lost on a workstation, what is the first think you should check?</p><p>You are a network administrator who has been assigned a class C subnet and want to split that subnet in half, how would you configure the subnet mask?</p><p>When a Ethernet frame passes through a router, what happens to the MAC address?</p><p>What is Network Address Translation?</p><p>What happens when you type ‘http://www.google.com’ into your web browser? (Stole this one from @mubix)</p><h4>System Administration 101:</h4><p>How would you tell from the command line what the MAC address is of one of your network interfaces?</p><p>What is the version number of Windows 7?</p><p>Where would you go to view the installed device drivers on a system?</p><p>What tool could you use to remotely administer a Windows host through the command line?</p><p>What log would show login information on a Windows host?</p><p>How would you setup a scheduled job on a GNU/Linux machine?</p><h4>Cyber Security 101:</h4><p>Explain the difference between a firewall, intrusion prevention system, and a intrusion detection system?</p><p>What is a disadvantage of signature based malware detection?</p><p>What is a zero-day vulnerability?</p><p>A user reports that they received a suspicious looking email. How do you proceed?</p><h4>Programming 101:</h4><p>What is a function?</p><p>What is the difference between an interpreted language and a compiled language? What are the advantages and disadvantages between the two?</p><p>What is machine code?</p><p>Do you have a programming language you prefer? Do you have any experience writing software?</p><h4>Digital Forensics:</h4><p>What is timeline analysis? What is the pivot point in timeline analysis?</p><p>What is a registry hive? What registry hive is only found in volatile memory?</p><p>What is the difference between Modified time-stamp and Change time-stamp? What is the Birth time-stamp generated?</p><p>An incident has been reported that an enterprise host was identified communicating with a known malicious external host. The incident responders have already blocked the communication and have requested the disk for forensic investigation. You are the forensic analyst on duty when the disk arrives. How will you begin the investigation?</p><h4>Developing IOCs from Malware Samples (a.k.a. Malware Analysis for IR):</h4><p>What is static analysis?</p><p>What is dynamic analysis?</p><p>What type of items do you look for during static analysis?</p><p>How does static analysis influence how dynamic analysis is performed?</p><p>Why would you disassemble or debug an application?</p><p>What is a Windows Portable Executable?</p><p>How would a piece of malware maintain persistence?</p><p>What is the ESP register used for in the Intel x86–32 architecture?</p><p>During execution of a piece of malware in a segregated virtual lab environment, the sample was observed making an HTTP GET request for a text file. Because the lab is segregated from the Internet, the sample did not receive the text file. What would you do to move the investigation forward?</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="http://aubsec.github.io/dfir/interview/2016/04/17/dfir-interview-questions/"><em>aubsec.github.io</em></a><em> on April 17, 2016.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=68ec48ea570f" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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