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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Aval on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Aval on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Aval on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Algorithmic Expropriation of Knowledge Sovereignty.]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@aval_56415/the-algorithmic-expropriation-of-knowledge-sovereignty-544e8d3550fa?source=rss-6997a4b6d43a------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[algorithmic-trading]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sovereignty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[work]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[knowledge]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[automatization]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Aval]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 01 Jul 2026 12:43:12 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-07-01T12:43:12.157Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/480/1*A4CryJvoIq1BK0qsj95Ftg.jpeg" /></figure><h3>The Algorithmic Expropriation of Knowledge Sovereignty. Toward a Modernization of the Employment Contract</h3><p><strong>Alberto García-Lluis Valencia</strong> <em>Economist · PhD Candidate · Universidad Rey Juan Carlos (URJC)</em> <em>alb.valencia@gmail.com · ORCID 0009–0003–1438–1633 · DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.20424900</em> <em>Working paper — revised version (v2)</em></p><p><strong><em>A note on the status of this document.</em></strong><em> This work is, deliberately, a work in progress. It is offered not as a closed conclusion but as one stage in an ongoing line of reasoning: it reflects a commitment to scientific honesty that places the permanent search for answers above the comfort of premature certainty. Its claims are published to be discussed, tested and, where warranted, revised; each version records both what has been learned and what remains open.</em></p><h3>Abstract</h3><p>The employment contract remunerates time and performance, not the transfer of a worker’s knowledge to the firm’s structural — increasingly algorithmic — assets. This article reconceptualizes that transfer. Knowledge is non-rival: when a worker’s judgment is codified, the worker still possesses it; nothing is dispossessed. What the firm takes is therefore not the knowledge — epistemic possession, inalienable and non-rival — but the sovereignty over its exploitation: the deontic right to decide who may exploit it and how, which is rival and alienable. We define algorithmic expropriation as the uncompensated capture of that sovereignty, and we distinguish the event from its two consequences: the firm’s appropriation of value and the dilution of the worker’s exclusivity in the market. We locate the institutional failure in the contract’s silence on this transfer, argue why the worker — not the firm — holds the contested sovereignty (the prior-title question), and derive a remedy at the source: a liability-rule licence, neither restitution nor a Pigouvian tax.</p><h3>1. Introduction: A Contract Designed for Another Century</h3><p>The employment contract we use today was designed between the late nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries. Its logic was clear and, in its context, efficient: the worker surrendered time and effort in exchange for remuneration, and the firm obtained in return observable, repetitive, and readily measurable tasks. Williamson (1985) would later describe this type of contract as an efficient governance arrangement for transactions characterized by low cognitive specificity and a low degree of idiosyncratic assets.</p><p>The problem is that this architecture, still in force, has remained anchored to the kind of work that prevailed in that historical moment: manual labor, performed in person and measured in units of time. The contemporary economy, however, no longer rests primarily on tasks, but on knowledge. It is this mismatch — between the nature of the work performed today and the nature of the contract that governs it — that gives rise to the problem addressed in this article.</p><h3>2. What a Skilled Professional Contributes Today</h3><p>When a physician, an engineer, a consultant, or an analyst works, they do not merely contribute “hours.” They contribute four distinct things that are worth separating: tacit knowledge, in the sense of Polanyi (1966), know-how that is not fully verbalizable and is transmitted chiefly through shared experience; firm-specific human capital (Becker, 1964), skills that attain full value only within that particular organization; the capacity to decide in ambiguous environments, where information is incomplete and explicit rules do not suffice; and an operational logic of one’s own for approaching problems — what the manuals do not capture but the person applies every day.</p><p>The SECI model of Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) describes with precision how, within any organization, this tacit knowledge is externalized (made explicit), combined with other knowledge, and ultimately internalized into organizational routines. Up to that point, the process is virtuous: the firm learns and improves. Crucially, until now the professional contributed these four things while retaining sovereignty over them — the standing right to decide where, for whom, and on what terms that knowledge would be deployed.</p><h3>3. A Transformation Comparable in Magnitude to the Industrial Revolution</h3><p>It is worth attending to the historical parallel. When the mechanical loom, the sewing machine, and the Fordist assembly line arrived in the factories, they radically transformed the organization of work: tasks that had previously occupied twelve operators for a full working day came to be performed by a single mechanical unit and at far lower fixed cost.</p><p>But — and here lies the key — the displaced worker left the factory not only with their capabilities intact but with their sovereignty over them intact too. Their manual skill, their knowledge of the trade, and their judgment traveled with them, and so did the right to redeploy them: they could reintegrate into another productive process, or even compete with their former employer. This is the classic Luddite argument, and it is, in essence, an argument about displacement.</p><p>The present transformation is different. If Fordism converted manual skills into mechanized processes, digitalization converts professional knowledge into systems capable of replicating decisions, judgment, and cognitive workflows. What is being mechanized is no longer muscle, but judgment (Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2019, 2020) — and, with it, something the loom never touched: the worker’s sovereignty over the knowledge itself.</p><h3>4. From Displacement to Expropriation — and What Is Really Taken</h3><p>It is tempting to say that the firm takes the worker’s knowledge. But knowledge is non-rival: when the commercial director’s judgment is codified into a model, she still has it — she can still use it, teach it, refine it. Nothing is dispossessed. “Expropriation,” in its proper sense, presupposes dispossession, and so, applied to knowledge itself, it is the wrong word.</p><p>The confusion dissolves once we separate two senses of “having” a piece of knowledge. Epistemic possession — knowing it — is non-rival and inalienable; it cannot be expropriated. Deontic sovereignty — the right to decide who may exploit that knowledge, and how — is rival and alienable: it can be taken, and when it is taken, the worker loses it. What the firm captures when it trains a model on her work footprint is not the judgment but the sovereignty over its exploitation.</p><p>We therefore redefine the central concept. Algorithmic expropriation is the uncompensated capture of the worker’s sovereignty over the exploitation of her codified knowledge. This is literal expropriation — a right is taken and retained by a taker — whereas the knowledge itself is merely copied and retained by its origin. This also sharpens what is new about the present moment. Nonaka and Takeuchi’s externalization is, in itself, a virtuous process — but it conceals two distinct operations. When a domain is articulated ex novo (implicit → explicit, with no prior holder), the process is pure creation and amplifies the frontier of knowledge. When an incumbent’s tacit judgment is extracted (tacit → explicit, with a prior holder), the same arrow becomes extraction. The novelty is not externalization, which is as old as the manual; it is that the externalized judgment now resides in an asset the firm governs alone — and with it, the sovereignty that used to be the worker’s.</p><h3>5. The Two-Level Architecture: One Event, Two Consequences</h3><p>Locating expropriation in sovereignty lets three notions that were previously fused coexist, each on its level. The event is the expropriation of sovereignty — the right to decide is taken. From it follow two consequences. First, the appropriation of value (Teece, 1986): the firm captures the returns of the codified judgment, building an asset that operates without the worker. Second, the dilution of exclusivity: as the judgment ceases to be scarce, its market value — the worker’s scarcity rent — collapses, not into the firm’s hands but into the market’s, through lower prices and competition. A third, cross-cutting rupture — the loss of traceability — severs the one channel that could have been positive, reputation, by erasing the link back to the worker.</p><p>This re-anchors the three ruptures of the original argument. The rupture in the symmetry of value is the appropriation; the rupture in bargaining power (Lindbeck and Snower, 2001) is the dilution of exclusivity; the rupture in institutional traceability is the severed attribution. They are not three independent harms, but the structured aftermath of a single event.</p><h3>6. Why the Worker Holds the Sovereignty: The Prior-Title Question</h3><p>The argument rests on one premise: that the worker held the sovereignty before the crossing. A critic will object that the doctrine of work-for-hire already vests the product of employed labor in the firm — so there is no sovereignty to expropriate, only a market shift. The objection must be met, not assumed away.</p><p>Three considerations answer it. First, the product of labor and the generative judgment behind it are distinct: a contract may assign the firm the reports the director wrote without thereby assigning the downstream right to train an autonomous replica of her judgment — a use unforeseen and unpriced at signing. Second, tacit knowledge (Polanyi, 1966) was never alienated because it was never articulable enough to be contracted away; what the contract could not name, it could not transfer. Third, the accumulated know-how of an organization is, in Ostrom’s (1990) terms, a cognitive commons co-built by its professionals; its unilateral enclosure by the firm’s algorithmic layer — without governance, compensation, or traceability — is precisely the privatization of a commons, not the exercise of a pre-existing title. Williamson’s (1985) idiosyncratic, relation-specific asset is here the worker’s, not only the firm’s. The prior title, in short, is contestable in the firm’s favor only for the explicit product, not for the sovereignty over its algorithmic exploitation.</p><h3>7. The Invisible Destruction of Bargaining Power</h3><p>As long as a professional’s knowledge resides solely in their head, that professional is a scarce asset: they can negotiate their salary, move to a competitor, take their experience with them. Insider–outsider theory (Lindbeck and Snower, 2001) describes exactly this power: the insider extracts rents precisely because replacing them is costly.</p><p>What happens once that knowledge has been codified and now resides in the firm’s digital brain? Its scarcity value collapses. The professional ceases to be indispensable — not because their capabilities have diminished, but because the firm possesses an operational replica of their judgment. They continue to draw the same base salary, yet across the contract an asset potentially worth millions has been built, on their uncompensated contribution. This is the dilution of exclusivity of Section 5; note that the lost rent does not, in general, accrue to the firm alone — as the capability diffuses, it disperses into the market through competition and lower prices. The distinction matters for the remedy (Section 9): where the firm appropriates the rent there is a payer; where it dilutes into the market there is not.</p><h3>8. An Analogy to Fix the Idea — and Its Limit</h3><p>Imagine a commercial director leading the sales division of an industrial company. Each day she negotiates with key clients, adjusts pricing policies, segments the portfolio, designs incentives, drafts proposals, and decides which client to press and which to hold. She is paid a salary to run the division: that is what her contract reflects. What the contract does not record is that every one of those decisions is logged — in the CRM, in the BPM approval flow, in the monthly reports, in the sales playbooks, in the emails to her team. Year after year, that repository accumulates not only data but the judgment with which she has resolved thousands of ambiguous situations.</p><p>On that corpus an artificial intelligence system is trained. After a time, the company has an algorithmic assistant that segments as she does, prices as she does, drafts proposals in her style, and anticipates client behavior with her judgment. The director continues to draw the same salary. The company, meanwhile, has built — on her uncompensated contribution — an asset that operates continuously, scales without her, and, in due course, can replace her.</p><p>A simpler image fixes the asymmetry. If two people exchange coins, each ends with one coin; if they exchange ideas, each ends with two. Knowledge is like the ideas, not the coins — which is why nothing is dispossessed. But the analogy must be broken at exactly the right place: ideas, unlike coins, carry an attached second good that coins do not — the right to decide on their exploitation. That right behaves like the coin: rival, and lost by one when taken by another. The director keeps her judgment; what she loses is the coin hidden inside the idea.</p><h3>9. Conclusion: A Remedy at the Source</h3><p>If what is taken is sovereignty, the remedy is neither restitution nor a Pigouvian tax. There is nothing to restitute, since the knowledge was never dispossessed; and a Pigouvian tax on machines, levied by a third party after the fact, mistargets the harm — it fits only the case where value dilutes into the market, not the case where the firm appropriates it. What the contract should record, at the source, is a liability-rule licence in the sense of Calabresi and Melamed (1972): the firm may capture the sovereignty — efficiency is preserved — but must compensate for it. That compensation is best understood not as the price of a thing taken but as the price of an option expropriated: the worker’s destroyed right to choose whether to sell her scarcity, trade it for reputation, or withhold it (a real-option logic in the sense of Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). Modernizing the employment contract is, then, neither Luddism nor welfarism, but recognizing — and pricing, at the source — the second layer the industrial contract never had to name: not the labor, but the sovereignty over the knowledge that labor produces. The question is not whether to halt the digitalization of knowledge, which would be neither feasible nor desirable, but who captures the value it generates, and under what rules. That is the fundamental debate about work in the age of artificial intelligence.</p><p><strong>Note on method.</strong> The conceptual development of this article was structured and stress-tested in dialogue with an AI assistant; the research direction, the decisive objections, and all final decisions are the author’s. Documenting this is consistent with the article’s own subject — sovereignty over knowledge under machine intervention.</p><h3>References</h3><ul><li>Acemoglu, D., &amp; Restrepo, P. (2019). Automation and new tasks: How technology displaces and reinstates labor. <em>Journal of Economic Perspectives</em>, 33(2), 3–30.</li><li>Acemoglu, D., &amp; Restrepo, P. (2020). Robots and jobs: Evidence from US labor markets. <em>Journal of Political Economy</em>, 128(6), 2188–2244.</li><li>Arrow, K. J. (1962). Economic welfare and the allocation of resources for invention. In <em>The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity</em>. Princeton University Press.</li><li>Becker, G. S. (1964). <em>Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis</em>. NBER / University of Chicago Press.</li><li>Calabresi, G., &amp; Melamed, A. D. (1972). Property rules, liability rules, and inalienability: One view of the cathedral. <em>Harvard Law Review</em>, 85(6), 1089–1128.</li><li>Dixit, A. K., &amp; Pindyck, R. S. (1994). <em>Investment under Uncertainty</em>. Princeton University Press.</li><li>García-Lluis Valencia, A. (2026). <em>ITEA Framework — Triple Exposure to Automation Index</em>. Zenodo. <a href="https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19578916">https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19578916</a></li><li>Hodgson, G. M. (2006). What are institutions? <em>Journal of Economic Issues</em>, 40(1), 1–25.</li><li>Kukutai, T., &amp; Taylor, J. (Eds.) (2016). <em>Indigenous Data Sovereignty: Toward an Agenda</em>. ANU Press.</li><li>Lindbeck, A., &amp; Snower, D. J. (2001). Insiders versus outsiders. <em>Journal of Economic Perspectives</em>, 15(1), 165–188.</li><li>Nonaka, I., &amp; Takeuchi, H. (1995). <em>The Knowledge-Creating Company</em>. Oxford University Press.</li><li>North, D. C. (1990). <em>Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance</em>. Cambridge University Press.</li><li>Ostrom, E. (1990). <em>Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action</em>. Cambridge University Press.</li><li>Polanyi, M. (1966). <em>The Tacit Dimension</em>. Routledge &amp; Kegan Paul.</li><li>Romer, P. M. (1990). Endogenous technological change. <em>Journal of Political Economy</em>, 98(5), S71–S102.</li><li>Stiglitz, J. E. (1999). Knowledge as a global public good. In <em>Global Public Goods</em>. Oxford University Press / UNDP.</li><li>Teece, D. J. (1986). Profiting from technological innovation. <em>Research Policy</em>, 15(6), 285–305.</li><li>Williamson, O. E. (1985). <em>The Economic Institutions of Capitalism</em>. Free Press.</li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=544e8d3550fa" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[New theory of volatility in crypto markets, reinterpreting the general idea. (EN)]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@aval_56415/new-theory-of-volatility-in-crypto-markets-reinterpreting-the-general-idea-en-42f61ef3c0e9?source=rss-6997a4b6d43a------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[fınance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[liquidity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[market]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[volatility]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[crypto]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Aval]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 10 Apr 2025 09:49:06 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-04-10T09:49:06.975Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The crypto world, especially during the period from 2016 to 2018, marked a turning point for digital assets with the rise of Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs). During that time, over 6.3 billion dollars were raised globally in 2017 (Statista, 2018), figures that in some cases were comparable to the market value of traditional institutions (for example, Fannie Mae was trading at around 1.7 billion in 2017). Notable examples include the EOS ICO, which raised approximately 4 billion dollars (Coindesk, 2018), and the Telegram Open Network ICO, which raised 1.7 billion according to SEC data (2020).</p><p>These magnitudes not only demonstrated the interest and mobilization of capital in the blockchain ecosystem, but also accelerated regulatory discussions. In Spain, pioneering meetings between token issuers and organizations such as the CNMV (2016‑2017) revealed two dominant perceptions:<br> a) Tokens — based on blockchain technology — were interpreted as speculative instruments, often derogatorily referred to as “casino chips.”<br> b) Extreme volatility was seen as a systemic risk inherent to the crypto markets.</p><p>Both interpretations adhered to a negative and simplistic view that considered high volatility as a market distortion without deeper analysis. However, the announcement of projects such as Mark Zuckerberg’s Libra stablecoin (later renamed DIEM) raised alarms among central banks, international organizations like the BIS, IOSCO, and major financial market regulators, evidencing the need to rethink the debate.</p><p>The debate between proponents of classical economics and defenders of decentralized economics coincided in focusing the analysis on volatility and liquidity as two crucial and, at the same time, vulnerable aspects of the blockchain system. To frame the study within a broader context, it is instructive to start with an analysis of traditional financial markets and contrast them with the innovations inherent to the crypto ecosystem.</p><ol><li><strong>In Traditional Markets<br></strong> According to Hull (2018), volatility is defined as a statistical measure of the dispersion of an asset’s returns, reflecting the uncertainty and risk associated with its price.<br> Classic studies show that volatility tends to be higher during trading hours, when activity — and therefore liquidity — increases, allowing new information to be incorporated into prices.<br> For authors like Taleb (2007), the real risk does not lie in moderate daily fluctuations, but in exposure to unpredictable and extreme events that can destabilize the entire system.<br> Meanwhile, Mandelbrot and Hudson (2004) offer a fractal view by demonstrating that markets exhibit properties of self-similarity and fat-tailed distributions, which implies that extreme events are far more likely than predicted by conventional stochastic models.</li><li><strong>In the Crypto and DeFi Markets<br></strong> The same logic transfers to the crypto environment; however, there the volatility is further influenced by the market architecture and the mechanisms of liquidity provision.<br> While in traditional markets liquidity is facilitated by the presence of multiple market makers and transaction regulators, the crypto space has innovated disruptively with the advent of decentralized liquidity provision systems, such as Automated Market Makers (AMMs).<br> These AMMs, implemented on platforms like Uniswap, allow for automated and continuous execution of transactions, reducing the bid‑ask spread (for example, spreads 58% lower are observed in centralized exchanges such as Binance and Coinbase compared to certain DEXs, according to Kaiko Research, 2023) and modulating the perception of volatility by increasing the market’s capacity to absorb large orders without dramatic price swings.<br> Moreover, recent studies show that there is a negative correlation between daily trading volume and the implied volatility in assets like BTC (ρ = –0.72 on Kraken, 2022), reinforcing the notion that greater liquidity acts as a buffer against extreme movements.</li></ol><p>Based on these foundations, six axioms can be identified as points of convergence in the analysis of the relationship between liquidity and volatility:</p><p><strong>Axiom 1: Liquidity as a Buffer for Transactions.</strong><br> In both traditional and crypto markets, greater liquidity allows the absorption of high-volume transactions without provoking drastic price moves. In crypto settings, the depth of the order book and the presence of numerous market makers, even in centralized exchanges, reduce the impact on price elasticity.<br> <em>Note (I):</em> An excess of supply or demand can generate sudden price changes, transferring the idea of (neutral) volatility. This volatility can suffer from a multiplicative effect due to market irritability if liquidity is exhausted or interrupted by market closures.<br> <em>Note (II):</em> The liquidity of an asset trading on a local market such as the Madrid Stock Exchange (BME) has more limited resources than those available to a global market with an asset like BTC. This is one of the characteristics distinguishing local markets from global markets.</p><p><strong>Axiom 2: Trading Activity and the Incorporation of Information.</strong><br> The continuous flow of information through transactions — especially in 24/7 markets like BTC — means that volatility is continuously dynamic. High activity during low liquidity periods (for example, the Asian trading session) can generate rapid price adjustments, highlighting the relationship between activity, liquidity, and information.<br> <em>Note (III):</em> Information can be broadly classified into two categories: a) globally significant information that can simultaneously change the perception of risk at a global level; b) locally significant information that affects the decision-making of local investors. In the latter case, there is the possibility of a compensatory effect: excess supply/demand in one area A might be offset by supply/demand from the rest of the market.<br> <em>Note (IV):</em> The increased importance of the independence and reliability of Oracles is and will be a key factor in avoiding information manipulation.</p><p><strong>Axiom 3: Systemic Factors and Market Structure.</strong><br> Both the distribution of liquidity across inter-markets and the institutional structure (for example, the presence of market makers on regulated platforms) influence price stability. In crypto, it is observed that during regulatory events the volatility correlation between assets like BTC and ETH can be extremely high (ρ = 0.91, according to recent examples).</p><p><strong>Axiom 4: Non-linear Relationship Between Liquidity and Volatility.</strong><br> An apparent paradox arises when it is observed that, under certain conditions, volatility can be high despite a high level of liquidity, as the latter allows for frequent and “smoothed” adjustments in the incorporation of information. In the absence of trading (such as during nighttime or weekends), the lack of liquidity can freeze prices, underestimating the true volatility.</p><p><strong>Axiom 5: The Influence of Transaction Costs.</strong><br> Spreads and other associated costs act as indirect indicators of the market’s liquidity level. Market structures with lower transaction costs — such as those observed on platforms with high competition among market makers — tend to be associated with lower volatility.</p><p><strong>Axiom 6: The Relationship Between Extreme Events and Market Microstructure.</strong><br> The ability of markets to cope with “flash crashes” or abrupt price movements largely depends on their microstructure. In crypto environments, events such as the BTC crash on Binance (05/2021, with drops of up to –87% in seconds) illustrate how limitations in liquidity can amplify systemic risks, as described by Brunnermeier &amp; Pedersen (2009).</p><p>In conclusion, the common denominator is that liquidity acts as a filter — or buffer — between market activity, information, and the observed volatility. Innovation in the crypto markets, especially through decentralized mechanisms such as AMMs, allows for an integration of liquidity that modulates volatility, making extreme fluctuations less frequent or, at least, manifesting in a way that differs from that seen in traditional markets. This underscores the dynamic and multifactorial nature of risk in the crypto world, where measured volatility does not necessarily equate to real economic risk.</p><p><strong>Bibliographical References:</strong></p><p>• Hull, J. C. (2018). <em>Options, Futures and Other Derivatives</em> (10th ed.). Pearson.<br> • Taleb, N. N. (2007). <em>The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable</em>. Random House.<br> • Mandelbrot, B. B., &amp; Hudson, R. L. (2004). <em>The (Mis)Behavior of Markets: A Fractal View of Risk, Ruin, and Reward</em>. Basic Books.<br> • Kaiko Research. (2023). Crypto Liquidity Report Q2. <a href="https://www.kaiko.com/">https://www.kaiko.com</a><br> • Bessembinder, H. (2003). Trade Execution Costs and Market Quality After Decimalization. <em>Journal of Financial Economics.</em><br> • Brunnermeier, M. K., &amp; Pedersen, L. H. (2009). Market Liquidity and Funding Liquidity. <em>The Review of Financial Studies.</em><br> • Chordia, T., Roll, R., &amp; Subrahmanyam, A. (2000). Commonality in Liquidity. <em>Journal of Financial Economics.</em><br> • French, K. R., &amp; Roll, R. (1986). Stock Return Variances: The Arrival of Information and the Reaction of Traders. <em>Journal of Financial Economics.</em><br> • Glosten, L. R., &amp; Milgrom, P. R. (1985). Bid, Ask and Transaction Prices in a Specialist Market with Heterogeneously Informed Traders. <em>Journal of Financial Economics.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=42f61ef3c0e9" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Nueva teoría de la volatilidad en los mercados CRYPTOS, reinterpretando la idea general. (ESP)]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@aval_56415/nueva-teor%C3%ADa-de-la-volatilidad-en-los-mercados-cryptos-reinterpretando-la-idea-general-esp-3dd5396d6261?source=rss-6997a4b6d43a------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[volatility]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[finance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[liquidity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[crypto]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[market]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Aval]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 10 Apr 2025 09:42:03 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-04-10T09:42:03.154Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>El mundo crypto, especialmente en el período 2016‑2018, marcó un punto de inflexión para los activos digitales con el auge de las Ofertas Iniciales de Monedas (ICOs). Durante ese tiempo, se recaudaron más de 6.300 millones de dólares a nivel global en 2017 (Statista, 2018), cifras comparables –en ciertos casos– al valor de mercado de instituciones tradicionales (por ejemplo, Fannie Mae cotizaba alrededor de 1.700 millones en 2017). Casos emblemáticos incluyen la ICO de EOS, que alcanzó una recaudación de aproximadamente 4.000 millones de dólares (Coindesk, 2018), y la ICO de Telegram Open Network, con 1.700 millones según datos de la SEC (2020).<br>Estas magnitudes no solo evidenciaron el interés y la movilización de capital en el ecosistema blockchain, sino que también aceleraron los diálogos regulatorios. En España, las reuniones pioneras entre emisores de tokens y organismos como la CNMV (2016‑2017) revelaron dos percepciones dominantes:<br>a) Los tokens — basados en la tecnología blockchain — eran interpretados como instrumentos especulativos, muchas veces referidos de manera peyorativa como “fichas de casino”.<br>b) La volatilidad extrema se veía como un riesgo sistémico inherente a los mercados crypto.</p><p>Ambas interpretaciones se adhirieron a una visión negativa y simplista, que consideraba la alta volatilidad como una distorsión del mercado sin analizarla en mayor profundidad. Sin embargo, el anuncio de proyectos como la stablecoin Libra (posteriormente renombrada como DIEM) de Mark Zuckerberg impulsó alarmas en Bancos Centrales, organismos internacionales como el BIS, el IOSCO y los principales reguladores de mercados financieros, evidenciando la necesidad de replantear el debate.</p><p>El debate entre teóricos de la economía clásica y defensores de la economía descentralizada coincidió en centrar el análisis en la volatilidad y la liquidez como dos aspectos cruciales y, a la vez, vulnerables del sistema blockchain. Para situar el estudio en un marco más amplio, es instructivo partir del análisis de los mercados financieros tradicionales y contrastarlos con las innovaciones propias del ecosistema crypto.</p><p><strong>1. En los mercados tradicionales</strong></p><ul><li>Según Hull (2018), la volatilidad se define como una medida estadística de la dispersión de los rendimientos de un activo, reflejando la incertidumbre y el riesgo asociado a su precio.</li><li>Estudios clásicos muestran que la volatilidad tiende a ser mayor durante las horas de trading, cuando la actividad –y por ende la liquidez– se incrementa, permitiendo que se incorporen nuevas informaciones a los precios.</li><li>Para autores como Taleb (2007), el verdadero riesgo no reside en las fluctuaciones diarias moderadas, sino en la exposición a eventos impredecibles y extremos que pueden desestabilizar todo el sistema.</li><li>Mientras, Mandelbrot y Hudson (2004) aportan una visión fractal, al evidenciar que los mercados presentan propiedades de auto‑similitud y distribuciones de colas gruesas, lo cual implica que los eventos extremos son mucho más probables de lo que predicen los modelos estocásticos convencionales.</li></ul><p><strong>2. En los mercados crypto y DeFi</strong></p><ul><li>La misma lógica se traslada al entorno crypto; sin embargo, allí la volatilidad se ve influenciada adicionalmente por la arquitectura de los mercados y los mecanismos de provisión de liquidez.</li><li>Mientras que en los mercados tradicionales la liquidez se facilita mediante la presencia de múltiples creadores de mercado y reguladores de operaciones, en crypto se ha innovado de manera disruptiva con la aparición de sistemas descentralizados de provisión de liquidez, como los Automated Market Makers (AMMs).</li><li>Estos AMMs, implementados en plataformas como Uniswap, permiten una ejecución automatizada y constante de operaciones, reduciendo el spread bid‑ask (por ejemplo, se observan spreads 58% menores en exchanges centralizados como Binance y Coinbase, en comparación con ciertos DEXs, según Kaiko Research, 2023) y modulando la percepción de volatilidad al aumentar la capacidad del mercado para absorber grandes órdenes sin sacudidas de precios.</li><li>Además, estudios recientes muestran que existe una correlación negativa entre el volumen de trading diario y la volatilidad implícita en activos como BTC (ρ = –0.72 en Kraken, 2022), lo que refuerza la noción de que una mayor liquidez actúa como amortiguador ante movimientos extremos.</li></ul><p>Partiendo de estos fundamentos, se pueden identificar seis axiomas que emergen como puntos de convergencia en el análisis de la relación entre liquidez y volatilidad:</p><p><strong>Axioma 1: La liquidez como amortiguador de transacciones.</strong></p><p>En mercados tanto tradicionales como crypto, una mayor liquidez permite absorber transacciones de gran volumen sin provocar movimientos drásticos en el precio. En entornos crypto, la profundidad del libro de órdenes y la presencia de numerosos market makers, incluso en exchanges centralizados, reducen el impacto sobre la elasticidad del precio.</p><p>Nota (I): Un exceso de oferta o demanda puede generar cambios bruscos de los precios, trasladando una idea de volatilidad (neutra), esta puede sufrir del efecto multiplicador por la irritabilidad del mercado, si se agota la liquidez o si esta se ve interrupida por cierres del mercado.</p><p>Nota (II): La liquidez de un activo que cotiza en un mercado local como Bolsa de Madrid (BME) dispone de unos recursos más limitados que los que puede tener un mercado global con una activo como BTC. Esta es una de las características de mercados locales vs mercados globales.</p><p><strong>Axioma 2: La actividad de trading y la incorporación de información.</strong></p><p>El flujo constante de información a través de operaciones –especialmente en mercados 24/7 como en el caso de BTC– implica que la volatilidad se dinamiza de forma continua. La alta actividad en horas de baja liquidez (por ejemplo, el horario asiático) puede generar ajustes rápidos en precios, evidenciando la relación entre actividad, liquidez e información.</p><p>Nota (III): La información pasa a clasificarse en dos grandes categorías: a. información de trascendencia global que puede cambiar la percepción del riesgo simultáneamente a nivel global; b. Información de trascendencia local que afecta a la toma de decisiones de inversores locales. Especialmente en esta última, existe la posibilidad de efecto compensación, el exceso de oferta/demanda en una zona A, puede verse compensado con demanda/oferta del resto del mercado.</p><p>Nota (IV): La mayor relevancia de la independencia y fiabilidad de los Oráculos, son y serán un eje esencial para evitar la manipulación de la información.</p><p><strong>Axioma 3: Factores sistémicos y estructura de mercado.</strong></p><p>Tanto la distribución de liquidez a nivel intermercado como la estructura institucional (por ejemplo, presencia de market makers en plataformas reguladas) influyen en la estabilidad del precio. En crypto, se observa que durante eventos regulatorios la correlación de volatilidad entre activos como BTC y ETH puede ser extremadamente alta (ρ = 0.91, según ejemplos recientes).</p><p><strong>Axioma 4: Relación no lineal entre liquidez y volatilidad.<br></strong>Una aparente paradoja surge cuando se observa que, en determinadas condiciones, la volatilidad puede ser alta a pesar de un elevado nivel de liquidez, ya que ésta permite ajustes frecuentes y “suavizados” en la incorporación de la información. En ausencia de trading (como en períodos nocturnos o fines de semana), la falta de liquidez puede congelar los precios, subestimando la verdadera volatilidad.</p><p><strong>Axioma 5: La influencia de los costos de transacción.<br></strong>Los spreads y otros costos asociados actúan como indicadores indirectos del nivel de liquidez del mercado. Estructuras de mercado con menores costos de transacción –como se observa en plataformas con alta competencia entre market makers– tienden a estar asociadas a menor volatilidad.</p><p><strong>Axioma 6: La relación entre eventos extremos y microestructura.</strong><br>La capacidad de los mercados para enfrentar “flash crashes” o movimientos de precios abruptos depende en gran medida de su microestructura. En los entornos crypto, los eventos como el crash del BTC en Binance (05/2021, con caídas de hasta –87% en segundos) ilustran cómo las limitaciones en liquidez pueden amplificar riesgos sistémicos, tal como lo describen Brunnermeier &amp; Pedersen (2009).</p><p>En conclusión, el denominador común es que la liquidez actúa como un filtro –o amortiguador– entre la actividad de mercado, la información y la volatilidad observada. La innovación en los mercados crypto, especialmente a través de mecanismos descentralizados como los AMMs, permite una integración de liquidez que modula la volatilidad, haciendo que las fluctuaciones extremas sean menos frecuentes o, al menos, se manifiesten de forma diferente a la medida en que lo hacen en los mercados tradicionales. Esto subraya la naturaleza dinámica y multifactorial del riesgo en el mundo crypto, donde la volatilidad medida no equivale necesariamente a riesgo económico real.</p><p><strong>Referencias bibliográficas:</strong></p><p>• Hull, J. C. (2018). Options, Futures and Other Derivatives (10th ed.). Pearson.<br>• Taleb, N. N. (2007). The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable. Random House.<br>• Mandelbrot, B. B., &amp; Hudson, R. L. (2004). The (Mis)Behavior of Markets: A Fractal View of Risk, Ruin, and Reward. Basic Books.<br>• Kaiko Research. (2023). Crypto Liquidity Report Q2.<a href="https://www.kaiko.com/"> https://www.kaiko.com<br></a>• Bessembinder, H. (2003). Trade Execution Costs and Market Quality After Decimalization. Journal of Financial Economics.<br>• Brunnermeier, M. K., &amp; Pedersen, L. H. (2009). Market Liquidity and Funding Liquidity. The Review of Financial Studies.<br>• Chordia, T., Roll, R., &amp; Subrahmanyam, A. (2000). Commonality in Liquidity. Journal of Financial Economics.<br>• French, K. R., &amp; Roll, R. (1986). Stock Return Variances: The Arrival of Information and the Reaction of Traders. Journal of Financial Economics.<br>• Glosten, L. R., &amp; Milgrom, P. R. (1985). Bid, Ask and Transaction Prices in a Specialist Market with Heterogeneously Informed Traders. Journal of Financial Economics.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3dd5396d6261" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Money Trilemma]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@aval_56415/the-money-trilemma-bb4ca4b3155f?source=rss-6997a4b6d43a------2</link>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Aval]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 31 Oct 2023 12:07:07 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-10-31T19:58:42.013Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>by Alberto García-Lluis Valencia 2023 ©.</p><p>A trilemma involves a discussion about the value proposition or the perception of value of three elements that are closely related to the state of technology and cultural maturity. In this specific context, cultural maturity refers to how society understands and perceives money and is intrinsically linked to the “perception of individual freedom.”</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*JyGSSXfxGx-9YuWA7qU17A.png" /></figure><p>The concept of the “Money Trilemma” represents an economic theory that analyzes the relationships and tensions that arise among the three key actors and their respective needs:</p><ol><li><strong>Civil Society</strong> (workers and companies): They use it as a medium of exchange because the value of work is defined based on this unit of account, and it is also expected to serve as a store of value to save savings for harder times or needs.</li><li><strong>State </strong>(Central Bank): Initially focused on economic stability and growth in design and control, which allows for increased tax collection and public budget.</li><li><strong>Financial Sector </strong>(Banks &amp; FinTech): Their business revolves around financial services, particularly the distribution of money (payment methods) and other financial services.</li></ol><p>These three essential actors of the financial system have coexisted since the beginning of time, but the relationships between them are subject to changes based on the two variables defined at the outset: the state of technology and cultural maturity. This ongoing process of adjustment between interests and tensions among the parties is the origin of the MONEY TRILEMMA.</p><p>The “Money Trilemma” is based on the theory that explains the origin of the value of money through the content-container principle. According to this theory, the concept of “currency” resembles a container (the container) whose nominal value is backed by its content (underlying). For example, take a €50 banknote: the paper on which it’s printed is worth only a few cents. So, what determines that its value is the mentioned €50?</p><p>The answer lies in the “content” or underlying element. During the era of the gold standard, banknotes and coins were convertible into gold. After the conclusion of Bretton Woods in 1971, money became fiduciary. From that moment on, the value of money depended on society’s trust.</p><p><em>[RAE: Fiduciary: Der. Said of a business or contract: Based primarily on trust between the parties]</em></p><blockquote><em>Note: For this reason, Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT), or Blockchain, speaks this language perfectly.</em></blockquote><p>Trust, in this context, refers to the level of endorsement that society grants to the currency as a tool to value their work, a unit of account. This concept has gained particular importance in Western democracies, where it is considered an “implicit agreement” derived from the concept of the “Social Contract” proposed by thinkers like Rousseau. Under this social contract, it is established that, by living in society, people tacitly accept the recognition of laws, their compliance, and the contribution through taxes aimed at maintaining the sustainability of the State.</p><p>However, it is essential to understand that this social contract does not imply unconditional support (it should never be a blank check). When laws are manipulated to favor minorities at the expense of majorities or when politicians forget their responsibility as public servants, giving rise to a politocracy instead of a democracy, a dangerous path begins. At this point, the independence of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches is jeopardized, constituting a betrayal of the “Social Contract” and eroding society’s trust in the system.</p><h3>The protagonists in this story:</h3><p>As it is a trilemma, we are referring to three protagonists who establish the three reference coordinates of money.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*2eI5HBVYpgwdMSGRn_lnhg.png" /></figure><p>Possibly the most important, as without it, it wouldn’t make sense to discuss this topic, is Civil Society. They are the ones who generate wealth through their work. They are the ones who, with the value of their work, “fill” all the world’s coins and support their use. The primary protagonist in this scenario is CIVIL SOCIETY, comprised of workers and businesses, who bear the responsibility of transforming their effort (work) into value. They are the only engine with the capacity to turn time into value.</p><p>The second principal actor is the State, to which Civil Society has delegated the responsibility of organizing and managing society’s resources to ensure a peaceful, orderly, and legally secure working environment.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/838/1*1B4H5thg0p8O1rN_T2xgZg.png" /></figure><p>The State exercises its capacity to issue (create) a product called “money,” which, in its essence, is nothing more than a container (container) to which a value is assigned. In a 50€ banknote, the paper itself is worth no more than a few cents, and it’s only when it reaches the value of 50€ that this currency takes on the value of the underlying (content). When the gold standard was in place, the commitment was to be able to convert the nominal value of the banknote into gold. After the Bretton Woods agreement ended in 1971, money became solely backed by the trust of society. This type of money is called fiduciary.</p><p>Therefore, fiduciary money (euros, dollars, etc.) is based on the trust that society places in it, based on a “social contract” that is usually defined in each country’s Constitution. This is why, as long as the Constitution establishes the foundations of this social contract and there is a separation of powers that enables balance and independence, this social contract makes perfect sense and is accepted as the unit of account for labor and society’s effort to create value, as well as the commitment of society to pay the taxes necessary for its sustainability. Otherwise, it does not.</p><p>The third actor in this scenario is Banks and FinTech, which play the role of “facilitators.” These institutions play a fundamental role in the relationship between the State and Civil Society. Their function is primarily focused on two objectives: firstly, distributing and marketing money to the entire society, addressing the limitations of central banks in this aspect (the last-mile problem); and secondly, providing financial services to society in a competitive manner.</p><h3>The importance of banks and FinTech.</h3><p>In the Money Trilemma, it’s necessary to understand why this is a problem of three and not two.</p><p>The quickest explanation is to understand the various limitations the State faces in distributing money to the end user. Especially during the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, many European states were not only recovering from World War II, but in 1971, the gold standard was abandoned, and between 1973 and 1979, the oil crisis shook the entire Western economy.</p><p>During this period, the banking sector encountered a very interesting challenge. Cash was becoming increasingly expensive to handle, not only in terms of its issuance, custody, security, and transportation but also in the “last mile” where these processes multiplied by 300, making it very costly to manage a dynamic economy that relied solely on cash.</p><p>Banks successfully faced one of the most complex and significant processes in their history during the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. They managed to centralize the accounting of all their branches, reducing risks and increasing business opportunities. However, this digitization process also allowed them to transform fiduciary money into digital account entries representing an obligation of payment from the bank to its depositors. In this way, fiduciary money became a means of payment based on Digital Debt, which is now commonly referred to as a Stablecoin.</p><p>Banks and FinTech, through technology, managed to solve the problem of handling cash, making payment system management more efficient.</p><h3>Every currency has an A side and a B side.</h3><p>The truth is, thanks to banks and FinTech, economies worldwide have managed to expedite their operations and the creation of value. However, this hasn’t prevented the existence of abuses within this system, and not only have these abuses remained unresolved, but many of the proposed measures have gradually led to an increasingly unstable and fragile system, suggesting that we are dealing with a systemic error.</p><p>To a large extent, this has happened due to excessive political ambitions to spend beyond means, the increase in public spending, and the lack of control and efficiency. This has caused central banks to shift from being independent institutions of the executive branch to becoming practically an office dependent on the presidency, or in the best-case scenario, with their operational capacities amputated, lacking real supervision over the government and being limited to merely controlling society.</p><p>Today, the financial system based on a network of financial institutions and FinTech and its digital payment infrastructure has transitioned from being a solution to becoming a problem. Currently, in Europe, nearly 9,700 banks and FinTech entities manage around 90% of all the money issued by the ECB (European Central Bank), which amounts to approximately 14.6 trillion euros (10¹²). This scenario poses a situation where, if customers decide to withdraw an amount equivalent to 10% to 18% of their deposits from a European bank within a period of about 6 months, the financial institution could find itself in a situation where it is genuinely unable to cope with the cash outflow. It may have to resort to selling assets at unfavorable terms to obtain liquidity, leading it into a precarious state. This would not only affect the bank itself but also the remaining customers in the bank, who may also encounter difficulties in obtaining liquidity and making payments. This can lead to a situation where, if the management team doesn’t handle it correctly, it could result in panic and a mass exodus from the bank. This problem could then spread to another bank, creating a cascading effect. Despite the containment measures defined by regulators, it’s a known fact that this type of scenario is increasingly plausible.</p><p>Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs) are proposed as a solution to these scenarios. Digital money would cease to be a liability and would instead become an asset, which directly eliminates the risk of convertibility. This prompts an uncomfortable consideration. If states, through their central banks, decide to eliminate paper money and with it the risks of convertibility, despite efforts to explain that banks can still maintain their business model based on managing deposits, this option will become increasingly less valuable. In this context, the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) based in Rome, in its proposal made in September 2023 titled “<a href="https://www.unidroit.org/work-in-progress/digital-assets-and-private-law/">UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES ON DIGITAL ASSETS AND PRIVATE LAW</a>,” establishes, among other proposals, the beginning of changing the concept of irregular deposits into regular ones. This means that ownership is not transferred in deposits, but rather there is only a custody service. This means that the custodian cannot use the deposits; they do not belong to them, nor do they have authorization to do so.</p><p>In this scenario, with a state having its technology for digital money, which is not a liability and is 100% guaranteed by the issuer (itself), the role of banks and their technology-based on fiduciary money is diminishing. If irregular deposits disappear, through which financial institutions had the capacity to finance themselves, the concept of a bank as such will no longer make sense. Their business model will need to transform into investment and credit institutions or other types of financial service providers. This transformation will create tensions, as many smaller banks will either be absorbed or will not withstand this process of change.</p><p>But the banking sector has a new and increasingly appealing option: the crypto world. What appeared as the most uncomfortable enemy just a few years ago can now become the most attractive ally. Life can take many turns.</p><p>The State, with CBDCs, must understand that if it loses the trust of society, as long as society has the freedom, it can use its own money to pay taxes. This poses a significant risk to fiat currencies, as a decrease in their use (demand) can impact their value. It is essential to regain the trust of society with independent mechanisms that are resilient to corrupt or populist governments that undermine the foundations of democracies.</p><p>Finally, and possibly the most profound, there are the people. Within this intricate network of actors, they are always the ones who generate value and, with their trust, establish the standard by which effort and work are measured. Their trust plays a crucial role in the viability of any monetary system and the functioning of the State. I earnestly hope that we never lose sight of this fact, as history has left us with very painful lessons on numerous occasions.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=bb4ca4b3155f" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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