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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Ayoub Mohamed on Medium]]></title>
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            <title>Stories by Ayoub Mohamed on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Post-Quantum Cryptography: Risks, Responses, and Security Challenges]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@ayoubsmohamed07/post-quantum-cryptography-risks-responses-and-security-challenges-da4f66a9711b?source=rss-f66a3f1b0a52------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[post-quantum-cryptography]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[technology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[quantum-computing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ayoub Mohamed]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 04 Oct 2026 11:57:39 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-04T11:57:39.872Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*0EubVG5cWnTQPoqaQOg0aw.jpeg" /><figcaption><a href="https://www.pexels.com/photo/bright-microchip-with-red-light-6432056/">https://www.pexels.com/photo/bright-microchip-with-red-light-6432056/</a></figcaption></figure><p>An architectural deep dive into lattice-based cryptography, QKD networks, and the reality of the transition.</p><h3><strong>Introduction</strong></h3><p>Quantum computing is a quickly evolving field that poses a major threat to the cyber world and its security. In today’s world many major encryption systems rely on the existence of a select few mathematical problems that classical computers cannot solve efficiently. However, with the rise of quantum algorithms like Shor’s, these math problems could be broken in minutes. This paper explores the vulnerabilities quantum computing creates for classical cryptography, the development of post-quantum cryptography (PQC), and the potential role of Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) in building a secure digital future. Beyond just cybersecurity, the rise of quantum computing could reshape finance, healthcare, and even scientific research by making certain simulations and optimizations possible for the first time. This makes the balance between innovation and security even more urgent as while the technology can save lives or accelerate drug discovery, it also threatens the privacy and security of every connected device if protections are not in place.</p><p>The central thesis of this paper is that a coordinated transition to post-quantum cryptography, combined with targeted specific solutions such as QKD, is necessary to manage the extremely complex web that is between the world of pre and post quantum computing. This transition must be driven by clearly set international standards, readiness and coordination of governments and businesses, and prioritized migration plans for sectors holding long-lived secrets. The paper argues that the longer it takes for us to implement PQC standards, the greater the risk of current issues such as “harvest-now, decrypt-later” become, and that technical readiness alone is insufficient unless matched by legal harmonization and standardization on an international level. Evidence for these claims is drawn from standards bodies, implementation surveys, and security research. The remainder of the paper collects technical facts, deployment realities, policy implications, and recommended security measures to operationalize a global PQC migration.</p><h3>Technology Overview</h3><p>Quantum computers are very different from the ones you see today. They use something called qubits that exploit superposition and entanglement. In simpler terms a qubit is a coin that can be heads or tails or both, or all at once, until you look. This is called superposition, superposition lets qubits represent many possibilities simultaneously and something called entanglement links qubits so that measuring one affects the other right away, even at a distance. Those effects let quantum machines try many possible candidate answers at the same time for some problems. Shor’s algorithm exploits that power to break the math behind RSA and ECC much faster than any classical method. There is also Grover’s algorithm, which speeds up brute-force search and means symmetric keys must be much much longer than their already absurd sizes just to stay safe. The practical point is this: some cryptography will be broken outright, and other parts will need different parameters, longer keys, or outright new algorithms. All this allows quantum computers to perform certain computations exponentially faster. For example, Shor’s algorithm, which was mentioned before, can factor large numbers in polynomial time, threatening the foundation of RSA and ECC. So then the question is what can, or rather what are we doing in response? While in response researchers and institutions such as NIST are developing something called PQC algorithms, these are math problems that are resistant to quantum attacks. These new formats offer a potential solution. Furthermore, PQC categories currently being studied include lattice-based cryptography, multivariate polynomial cryptography, code-based cryptography, and hash-based signatures. Each one has its trade-offs in terms of speed, key size, and memory usage, which is why NIST is carefully running multiple rounds of evaluation before recommending standards. At the same time, Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is being tested in countries like China, where quantum satellites have successfully transmitted keys across thousands of kilometers. This shows that both classical PQC and physics-based QKD may need to coexist depending on the scenario.</p><p>First off, Lattice-based schemes, such as Kyber, for key encapsulation, and Dilithium, for signatures, rely on very hard math problems like learning with errors, and Module-LWE. These algorithms work with math related to geometric lattices, which are infinite grid-like structures of points. To picture why these lattice problems are hard, imagine this. A vastly dense 3D grid of points and someone gives you a point that is almost on the grid but shifted slightly. Recovering the original grid coordinates is computationally messy, especially when small errors are intentionally added. That noise of errors is what gives LWE its toughness. It’s a different kind of difficulty than factoring, and current quantum algorithms simply just don’t have a fast way to crack or solve it. These are leading candidates because they provide strong worst case reductions and reasonable performance on modern hardware, and lattices are considered hard for quantum computers to crack, making lattice-based cryptography a promising defense against quantum attacks. (NIST, 2025).</p><p>Furthermore, Code-based schemes, for example McEliece, have historically offered strong security but large key sizes that complicate embedded use. The tradeoff here is blunt, one one hand excellent security but on the other much much much bigger public keys and fingerprints, which makes them awkward for tiny devices or bandwidth-sensitive systems.</p><p>Next, Hash-based signature schemes trade signature size and signing cost for a more conservative style of security assumptions and are attractive for use-cases where verification speed matters and key sizes are a lot smaller and manageable. Another topic is Multivariate polynomial cryptography, it relies on solving multivariate quadratic equations and provides fast operations but has had mixed success due to cryptanalytic challenges. Naturally with all the topics stated above, and their respective upsides and downsides we are starting to see the rise of hybrid deployment strategies. Many implementers plan to use PQC algorithms in hybrid mode alongside classical algorithms to provide defense in depth during the transition (Scrivano, 2025). NISTs multi-round evaluation has emphasized not only raw security but side-channel resistance, implementation risk, and interoperability. Real-world adoption also depends on software and hardware library support; surveys show uneven readiness across major cryptographic libraries and toolchains (Ahmed et al., 2025).So far, in real deployments, people are already planning hybrid modes that pair a PQC primitive with a classical one so you don’t lose everything if one fails.</p><p>Moving on, Quantum Key Distribution offers information-theoretic key exchange guaranteed by quantum mechanics rather than computational hardness. However, normal QKD systems are limited by transmission loss, trusted-node architectures, and infrastructure costs, though it should be noted that satellite QKD experiments have demonstrated long-distance QKD is possible. However, QKDs limits are real and practical. Things like fiber optic cables can bleed signal over distance so you either accept shorter links or insert “trusted nodes” that regenerate keys along the route, which in turn is a whole other issue as it reintroduces points that must be physically secured. Satellite QKD does indeed avoid long fiber spans, but it of course brings its own costs such as ground stations, precise pointing, and limited windows for links. Operationally, QKD systems need specialised hardware, routine maintenance, and secure sites, so the price and logistics put them in a niche. In short, QKD is powerful for a few high-assurance links where you can control the whole chain. For the rest of the internet, swapping algorithms in software and firmware (PQC) is the lower-friction, scalable path. For now QKD can really only complement PQC in very high-security settings such as diplomatic links and select infrastructure where physical channels can be secured and managed (PDF, 2024). In most commercial settings, PQC will be the most straightforward and easiest path as it leverages existing network infrastructure and stacks and public-key infrastructures with algorithm swaps rather than new physical networks. Therefore, a blended model where PQC serves general use and QKD is reserved for specialized high-assurance links is the most feasible near-term strategy. Though the world will have to, sooner or later, adopt a more rock solid cyber security standard that can truly be secure with widespread mainstream quantum computers</p><h3>Legal, Ethical, and Social Issues</h3><p>The transition to PQC is going to be a very tricky one, it requires compliance with new standards, international cooperation, and a vast sum of money. And it is critical to avoid a fragmented adoption of PQC. Furthermore, ethically, there is concern that powerful actors, whether that be governments or corporations, could misuse quantum breakthroughs to gain disproportionate control. Because of these reasons the transition to PQC will be long, complex, and very very expensive. Smaller organizations and developing nations risk being left behind, potentially creating a global “quantum divide.” In addition, on the social side, a lack of awareness among the general public could lead to low pressure on policymakers, delaying critical action until after breaches occur. Legal frameworks like GDPR and HIPAA may also need updates to explicitly account for quantum-era threats. In more specific words, this means that governments and industry will have to agree on things such as shared timelines, how to fund transition assistance, and prioritize protecting data with long confidentiality requirements. Smaller organizations will need clear technical guidance and financial help so they are not left behind.</p><p>Legally, PQC migration also has implications concerning data protection laws. Data retention laws that require long-term confidentiality create particular urgency because encrypted data that is harvested today may be decrypted years later. Thus this brings up a question, should Regulators clarify whether organizations must proactively encrypt stored sensitive records with PQC-compliant algorithms? Furthermore, data that flows across borders will complicate the migration because different jurisdictions could approve different PQC choices or timelines, creating fragmentation that undermines security greatly(Vermeer, 2023). Export controls and national security reviews may also limit the transfer of PQC technologies and expertise, which could slow adoption in multinational deployments. Ethically, the concentration of quantum computing capability raises questions of equitable access and dual-use. If leading states or companies achieve early quantum advantage, they may wield disproportionate power over encrypted communications, financial markets, and intellectual property. Policies should prioritize transparent standards and capacity-building assistance to reduce a quantum divide. Socially, the public lacks a clear understanding of the threat model. Effective risk communication and public-private coordination are required to build political will and fund necessary upgrades across the public sector, small businesses, and critical infrastructure operators (Kumar et al., 2025).</p><h3>Security Aspects and Challenges</h3><p>The primary security risk, of course, is the vulnerability of the encryption we use today to quantum attacks. If bad actors obtain quantum capabilities before PQC is fully implemented then critical infrastructure will almost definitely be compromised. Even so, PQC adoption faces many hurdles, such as performance trade-offs and integration with legacy systems. And solutions such as QKD, while theoretically unbreakable, struggle with real-world deployment. Another challenge is the “harvest now, decrypt later” strategy, where adversaries collect encrypted traffic today with the intent of unlocking it once quantum computers are available. This makes it urgent to transition to PQC even before large-scale quantum computers exist. Furthermore, industries like banking, defense, and healthcare must coordinate their upgrades across entire ecosystems, since one weak link could undermine the whole system.</p><p>The “harvest-now, decrypt-later” problem means attackers can grab encrypted data now and wait until they have a quantum computer to open or decrypt it. Because of that organizations will now need to treat long lived secrets differently. For example, if something needs to stay private for a long time, like many years, for example medical records, corporations will have to treat it as a high priority in terms of transition over to PQC. In order to do that they will have to either implement some form of PQC right now, or, a more easy approach is to simply run a hybrid setup that keeps the old data in place while adding a PQC layer alongside it. The hybrid setups give them protection without a sudden risky change in policy. Also it should be expected to have some practical issues such as keys and signatures may be bigger, transfers might use more bandwidth and take longer, and small devices might struggle without updates. So we must watch out for implementation bugs, however that can be said for almost any major tech transition. (NIST, 2025; Ahmed et al., 2025).</p><p>Another issue is the fact that big systems can’t upgrade alone, alone as in not at the same time as other companies or parts of the world, instead it needs to be an internationally mandated switch. Things like banks, hospitals, and governments, all around the world will need a shared plan and standardization so one group’s change does not break another’s systems. One way to get this done is to start by moving non critical internal tools and data first so you can learn without hurting customers. Think of it as a sort of testing group that still gets a portion of the work done. Using things such as testbeds to try PQC in TLS, VPNs, and SSH and measure real effects on speed and storage. Sectors like Healthcare however, must be conservative because of privacy laws like HIPAA. Then sectors such as defense will want layers of protection and special links like QKD for the most sensitive paths. And then governments should help by funding training, grants, and setting up clear rules so small businesses and poorer countries are not left behind. That support reduces the chance of a messy, fragmented rollout that weakens everyone’s security (Kumar et al., 2025).</p><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>Overall, Quantum computing is a massive opportunity, and a massive security threat. While QKD and PQC offer potential solutions, the time, cost, and complexity of doing so globally are real. The world we now live in poses one of the most pressing technological challenges of all time. Balancing technical innovation with legal, ethical, and social responsibility will determine whether society can maintain trust and security in the quantum era.</p><p>The challenge is not just in replacing algorithms. It is not that simple, PQC requires a overhaul of the whole digital infrastructure, protocols, libraries, devices, and standards which have been built over years and years. It will take a very long time to finish that process, and in the meantime, attackers would already be collecting sensitive data in advance to be decrypted later. Furthermore, QKD, while theoretically powerful, is bound by hardware cost and practical implementation issues, so it will never be a perfect solution.</p><p>Besides that, there is also uncertainty on when we need to prepare. No one can say for certain when quantum computers that can break the cryptography we use now will arrive. Maybe it will be ten years later, or maybe next year. That unpredictability makes preparation important but also difficult. If the governments and institutions wait until the quantum computers arrive, then it would already be too late. So instead of that they need to start the process now, even with incomplete steps like hybrid encryption, because then there will be less chance of being caught off guard.</p><p>And finally, this is simply a technical matter, but rather it’s more about us creating trust for digital life in a world that is dependent on strong, trustworthy security in the future. It will require many entities such as nations, businesses, and developers working all together and making standards and support for those who don’t have resources. The quantum world doesn’t have to be a world of insecurity. If we act early, plan ahead, and act responsibly together, it can be defined in terms of innovation that strengthens society as a whole.</p><p><strong>References</strong></p><p>Vermeer, M. J. D. (2023). The evolution of the post-quantum cyber environment. <em>Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, 24</em>(2), 137–145.<a href="https://doi.org/10.1353/gia.2023.a913639"> https://doi.org/10.1353/gia.2023.a913639</a></p><p>Kumar, S., Klappenecker, A., Brown, G., &amp; Saravanan, S. (2025). Quantum apocalypse: Fortifying critical infrastructure in the age of cyber warfare. In <em>Proceedings of the European Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security</em> (pp. 293–301).</p><p>Quantum cryptology in the big data security era. (2024). <em>International Journal of Advanced Computer Science and Applications, 15</em>(7).<a href="https://doi.org/10.14569/IJACSA.2024.0150761"> https://doi.org/10.14569/IJACSA.2024.0150761</a></p><p>Ahmed, N., Zhang, L., &amp; Gangopadhyay, A. (2025). A survey of post-quantum cryptography support in cryptographic libraries. <em>arXiv Preprint arXiv:2508.16078</em>.<a href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2508.16078"> https://arxiv.org/abs/2508.16078</a></p><p>National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2025). <em>Status report on the fourth round of the NIST post-quantum cryptography standardization process (NIST IR 8545).</em> U.S. Department of Commerce.<a href="https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.8545"> https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.8545</a></p><p>Scrivano, A. (2025). A comparative study of classical and post-quantum cryptographic algorithms in the era of quantum computing. <em>arXiv Preprint arXiv:2508.00832</em>.<a href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2508.00832"> https://arxiv.org/abs/2508.00832</a></p><p>OpenAI. (2025). <em>ChatGPT</em> (September 29th 2025 version) [Large language model].<a href="https://chat.openai.com/"> https://chat.openai.com/</a></p><p><em>Note: This article was originally written as a research paper for my IT coursework at George Mason University.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=da4f66a9711b" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Python linear regression]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@ayoubsmohamed07/python-linear-regression-5f91b7bf1e56?source=rss-f66a3f1b0a52------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[ai]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[artificial-intelligence]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[python]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[math]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[programming]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ayoub Mohamed]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 03 Jan 2024 02:46:33 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-01-03T02:47:49.503Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*LAPwjUJPuSpF_K_d" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@melynavv?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Melyna Valle</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><h4>“revealing the hidden symphony within scattered points”</h4><p>Hey, guys! Today, I’m going to showcase a Python script related to math! If you want to follow along, I’ll link my GitHub repo with the code. I might also be creating a how-to on this project soon. So, if you want to see that, leave a comment down below and let me know what you think. And with that, let’s get into it!</p><h3>What did I make?</h3><p>So if you don’t already know what linear regression is then you are probably wondering, what is linear regression? Don’t worry I&#39;ll spare you the mathematical but if you want to check that out you can find countless tutorials on it online. But for now, I&#39;ll just explain it at its basic level (as best I can). The Google definition for linear regression is “In statistics, linear regression is a linear approach to modeling the relationship between a scalar response and one or more explanatory variables (also known as dependent and independent variables)” In other words, linear regression helps to find the best fit line in a linear data set. This line would be relatively in the middle of the data and be as close to all of the data points as possible. If this sounds cool to you and you want to learn more you can check out this <a href="https://towardsdatascience.com/simple-and-multiple-linear-regression-in-python-c928425168f9">article</a> by <a href="https://medium.com/u/c82c464daf80">Adi Bronshtein</a> or this other <a href="https://towardsdev.com/a-gentle-introduction-to-linear-regression-machine-learning-fe95e7c6c439">article</a> by <a href="https://medium.com/u/cc0dd6c5c762">Sourav Saha</a></p><h3>Show off!</h3><p>Ok enough talk now, let’s get into the fun part! the show-off.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/441/0*bBPUm7PXji2C5wlQ.png" /></figure><p>Pretty cool, right? Just as I explained in the last section, the code took some data points and found the best-fit line (the blue line) using linear regression! You may notice that it has an accuracy at the top. Again, I’ll save you from having to read all about the math, so I’ll explain the basics. The accuracy is calculated using something called squared error. It is how far away this best-fit line is from the rest of the data. The more points that are far away, the lower the accuracy.</p><h3>Final thoughts</h3><p>And that’s all for today’s blog and my first one here! It’s been great fun, and I hope you gained some knowledge or entertainment from this one. A comment, follow, or share would mean the world to me, especially now as I’m just staring into the world of blogging, It helps, and I do notice you! Thank you. And, per routine, if you have any thoughts or questions, I’d be happy to answer them.</p><h3>Git and socials</h3><p>git: <a href="https://github.com/powplowdevs/BlogPostsRepo/blob/main/linear%20regression/linear_regression_code.py">https://github.com/powplowdevs/BlogPostsRepo/blob/main/linear%20regression/linear_regression_code.py</a></p><p>Linkedin: <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/ayoub-mohamed-3179112a2/">https://www.linkedin.com/in/ayoub-mohamed-3179112a2/</a></p><p>buy me a coffee: <a href="https://www.buymeacoffee.com/ayoubmohamed">https://www.buymeacoffee.com/ayoubmohamed</a></p><p>thank you.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=5f91b7bf1e56" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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