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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Blaine Gardner on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Blaine Gardner on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@b.blaine.gardner?source=rss-83e184eaaa7------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Blaine Gardner on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@b.blaine.gardner?source=rss-83e184eaaa7------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[Rook Advisory for Ceph CVE-2025-30156]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/rook-io/rook-advisory-for-ceph-cve-2025-30156-cc1f8dee6da3?source=rss-83e184eaaa7------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/cc1f8dee6da3</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cve]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ceph]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[rook]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[vulnerability]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Blaine Gardner]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 19 Aug 2026 20:00:41 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-08-25T16:43:10.148Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*HqnZUdmQ319YkG8i_qie2A.png" /></figure><p>Ceph today announced security vulnerability <a href="https://ceph.io/en/news/blog/2026/v20-2-4-v19-2-6-combo-released/">CVE-2025–30156</a> impacting all Ceph clusters, including Rook clusters.</p><p>Rook users are advised to follow the <strong>Quick Resolution Guide</strong> below as soon as possible to resolve the vulnerability.</p><p>More background information on the CVE is present after the resolution guide for interested readers.</p><h3>Quick Resolution Guide</h3><p>Follow these instructions to resolve CVE-2025–30156 as quickly as possible with minimal risk.</p><ol><li>Following Rook upgrade docs, upgrade to Rook <a href="https://rook.io/docs/rook/v1.20/Upgrade/rook-upgrade/">v1.20.6</a> or higher (or <a href="https://rook.io/docs/rook/v1.19/Upgrade/rook-upgrade/">v1.19.10</a> or higher)</li><li>Upgrade to Ceph v20.2.4 or higher (or v19.2.6 or higher)</li><li>Initiate key rotation for the keys you wish to rotate</li></ol><p>Steps 2 and 3 can be done at once by applying the patch below to any <strong>CephCluster</strong> that hasn’t already rotated CephX keys. This will rotate the required keys to resolve the CVE. PVCs will remain active throughout this process.</p><pre>spec: <br>  cephVersion:<br>    image: quay.io/ceph/ceph:v20.2.4-20260818<br>  security:<br>    cephx:<br>      daemon:<br>        keyRotationPolicy: KeyGeneration<br>        keyGeneration: 2 # must be greater than the current keyGeneration</pre><p>Update the patch to use Ceph v19.2.6–20260818 if needed for your environment.</p><p>Ceph health <strong>warnings</strong> will be present during rotation and while any key remains using AES. These warnings can be ignored or muted for now.</p><p>Ceph health <strong>errors</strong> will be present after the Ceph version is updated and while key rotation is still unfinished. These errors should resolve after the <strong>CephCluster</strong> is done upgrading. If any of the following errors persist for more than a few minutes after upgrade and rotation, file a <a href="https://github.com/rook/rook/issues/new/choose">GitHub issue</a> or reach out on Rook’s <a href="https://slack.rook.io/">Slack</a> for assistance:</p><ul><li>AUTH_INSECURE_SERVICE_KEY_TYPE</li><li>AUTH_INSECURE_SERVICE_TICKETS</li></ul><p>Following Rook’s <a href="https://rook.io/docs/rook/latest-release/Storage-Configuration/Advanced/cephx-key-rotation/">CephX key rotation documentation</a>, use the <strong>CephCluster</strong> status.cephx to double check that keys are rotated. An example <strong>CephCluster</strong> cephx status is shown below, with some comments to help check at a glance.</p><pre>    # ...<br>    &quot;cephx&quot;: {<br>      &quot;admin&quot;: {<br>        &quot;keyCephVersion&quot;: &quot;20.2.4-0&quot;,  # SHOULD MATCH CEPH VERSION<br>        &quot;keyGeneration&quot;: 2<br>      },<br>      &quot;cephExporter&quot;: {<br>        &quot;keyCephVersion&quot;: &quot;20.2.4-0&quot;,<br>        &quot;keyGeneration&quot;: 2<br>      },<br>      &quot;crashCollector&quot;: {<br>        &quot;keyCephVersion&quot;: &quot;20.2.4-0&quot;,<br>        &quot;keyGeneration&quot;: 2<br>      },<br>      &quot;csi&quot;: {<br>        &quot;keyCephVersion&quot;: &quot;19.2.4-0&quot;,  # EXAMPLE, WILL NOT MATCH CEPH VERSION<br>        &quot;keyGeneration&quot;: 1,  # MAY BE ZERO<br>      },<br>      &quot;mgr&quot;: {<br>        &quot;keyCephVersion&quot;: &quot;20.2.4-0&quot;,  # SHOULD MATCH CEPH VERSION<br>        &quot;keyGeneration&quot;: 2,<br>        &quot;keyType&quot;: &quot;aes256k&quot;<br>      },<br>      &quot;mon&quot;: {<br>        &quot;keyCephVersion&quot;: &quot;20.2.4-0&quot;,  # SHOULD MATCH CEPH VERSION<br>        &quot;keyGeneration&quot;: 2<br>      },<br>      &quot;osd&quot;: {<br>        &quot;keyCephVersion&quot;: &quot;20.2.4-0&quot;,  # SHOULD MATCH CEPH VERSION<br>        &quot;keyGeneration&quot;: 2,<br>        &quot;keyType&quot;: &quot;aes256k&quot;<br>      },<br>      &quot;rbdMirrorPeer&quot;: {<br>        &quot;keyCephVersion&quot;: &quot;19.2.4-0&quot;,  # EXAMPLE, WILL NOT MATCH CEPH VERSION<br>        &quot;keyGeneration&quot;: 1  # MAY BE ZERO<br>      }<br>    },<br>    # ...</pre><p><strong>CephFilesystem</strong> users should check its staus.cephx as well.</p><pre>    # ...<br>    &quot;cephx&quot;: {<br>      &quot;daemon&quot;: {<br>        &quot;keyCephVersion&quot;: &quot;20.2.4-0&quot;,  # SHOULD MATCH CEPH VERSION<br>        &quot;keyGeneration&quot;: 2,<br>        &quot;keyType&quot;: &quot;aes256k&quot;<br>      }<br>    },<br>    # ...</pre><p><strong>After this process is complete and verified, the CVE is resolved. </strong>It will no longer be possible to elevate the permissions of a CephX key. CephX authentication keys for core Ceph daemons, child Ceph daemons (e.g., RGW), and Rook’s admin key will have been rotated to the new AES256K cipher.</p><blockquote><em>Note that the Rook toolbox has an update to support key rotations, taking about 60 seconds to get updated keys. Update it to the latest manifest, or restart the toolbox to continue using it after rotation.</em></blockquote><h4>Non-urgent follow-up tasks</h4><blockquote><strong><em>Do not rush to perform further steps.</em></strong><em> Additional key rotations have prerequisites and caveats that are important to understand before proceeding. As long as the process above is completed, cluster security is not immediately vulnerable. Take your time.</em></blockquote><p>Some Ceph health <strong>warnings </strong>(not errors) are likely to persist after this process. Rook’s <a href="https://rook.io/docs/rook/latest-release/Storage-Configuration/Advanced/cephx-key-rotation/#warnings">CephX key warnings documentation</a> explains how to interpret, manage, and (if desired) mute them.</p><p>Ceph developers recommend that users rotate remaining CephX client authentication keys to the latest and most secure AES256K keys when possible to ensure their clusters have the best security.</p><p>For Rook users, review official <a href="https://rook.io/docs/rook/latest-release/Storage-Configuration/Advanced/cephx-key-rotation/">CephX key rotation documentation</a> to understand how to rotate authentication keys for CSI daemons, <strong>CephClients</strong>, and RBD-Mirror peers.</p><p>An optional, technical overview of the CVE follows, along with recommended <strong>Mitigations</strong> for users who are not able to resolve the CVE immediately.</p><h3>Background</h3><p>Ceph uses a custom implementation of Kerberos for securing communication between Ceph daemons and clients. This security implementation is called <a href="https://docs.ceph.com/en/latest/dev/cephx/">CephX</a>, which (by design) most Rook users are unlikely to be familiar with. Rook keeps CephX details abstracted from most end users to avoid unnecessary complexity.</p><p>In order to understand the vulnerability and its resolution, we can provide a simplified view of how Ceph authentication works. This explanation is sufficient for basic understanding of the vulnerability and resolution but does not dive into technical nuances and caveats.</p><p>There are two sets of CephX keys in a Ceph cluster: authentication keys and service tickets. Authentication keys are used by Ceph entities (daemons and clients) to establish identity when first connecting to the Ceph cluster. Once an entity is authenticated, it is issued a series of encrypted service tickets that define its authorizations for the four core Ceph daemons: monitors, managers, OSDs, and filesystem MDses. Entities do not have keys to decrypt their service tickets, a second layer of security.</p><p>When a component communicates with any Ceph daemon, it includes its relevant service tickets in network packets. This allows core Ceph daemons to validate client entities in a decentralized manner.</p><h3>Vulnerability Overview</h3><p>CVE-2025–30156 affects the previously mentioned service tickets. The existing AES service tickets do not effectively implement integrity checks and can have their permissions modified without detection, even without decrypting the AES-secured ticket.</p><p>An attacker who is able to (through other methods) gain access to a CephX key and masquerade as a Ceph entity would be able to iteratively flip bits in the AES service ticket payload to attempt to gain elevated Ceph permissions. With this workflow, an attacker would be able to obtain admin-privileged permissions over the Ceph cluster in linear time.</p><h3>Resolution Overview</h3><p>To resolve this CVE, Ceph has introduced a new CephX key type for both authentication keys as well as service tickets. The new key type cipher is called AES256K. In order to resolve the CVE, Ceph must be upgraded, and CephX authentication keys for four core Ceph daemons must be migrated to the new key type. In Rook terms, <strong>CephCluster</strong> monitors, managers, and OSDs; and <strong>CephFilesystem</strong> MDSes must migrate.</p><p>Once these critical migrations are complete, all Ceph service tickets will use AES256K encryption. Any other Ceph client entities that continue using older AES authentication keys will receive new AES256K-encrypted service tickets. Thus, it will no longer be possible for any arbitrary CephX key to be elevated to have admin permissions.</p><p>Rook and Ceph anticipate that most users will need to continue using older AES authentication keys for non-core clients during a transition period in order to avoid storage service outages. This transition period may last years for organizations with large or complex environments.</p><blockquote><strong><em>IMPORTANT:</em></strong><em> CSI keys require Linux kernel version 7.0 or higher for AES256K authentication key support. Older kernels can still use AES authentication keys safely after Ceph is upgraded to issue AES256K service tickets.</em></blockquote><h3>Mitigations</h3><p>This vulnerability is a good reminder of how important it is to ensure security at every layer to minimize the ability for any malicious actors to gain access where they shouldn’t. Below are some mitigations to consider in all production environments, especially those where the upgrade outlined above cannot be done immediately:</p><ul><li>Avoid deploying privileged pods whenever possible.</li><li>Drop NET_RAW permissions from pods whenever possible.</li><li>When keys can’t yet be upgraded to AES256K, use Rook’s key rotation API to rotate AES keys regularly. Rotating keys during any Ceph or Rook version update is a good starting point.</li><li>Use Kubernetes <a href="https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/services-networking/network-policies/">Network Policies</a>. Rook’s experimental policies can be found <a href="https://github.com/rook/rook/blob/master/deploy/examples/networkpolicy.yaml">here</a>.</li><li>Consider enabling full over-the-wire Ceph network encryption via <a href="https://docs.ceph.com/en/octopus/rados/configuration/msgr2/#connection-mode-configuration-options">ms_client_mode</a> options. Be advised of <a href="https://ceph.io/en/news/blog/2023/ceph-encryption-performance/">performance effects</a>.</li><li>Ensure networking environments are resilient to ARP spoofing attempts.</li><li>Use an immutable, container-optimized OS on Kubernetes nodes.</li><li>Keep up-to-date on all security updates for applications running in the Kubernetes cluster as well as applications on the same network.</li><li>Review <a href="https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/administer-cluster/securing-a-cluster/">Kubernetes Cluster Security</a> recommendations.</li></ul><p>There are more mitigations than we could possibly cover in one article. If community members have more hardening advice, reach out on <a href="https://slack.rook.io/">Slack</a> or <a href="https://github.com/rook/rook/discussions">GitHub Discussions</a>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=cc1f8dee6da3" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/rook-io/rook-advisory-for-ceph-cve-2025-30156-cc1f8dee6da3">Rook Advisory for Ceph CVE-2025-30156</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/rook-io">Rook Blog</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Prototyping an NFS connection to LDAP using SSSD]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/rook-io/prototyping-an-nfs-connection-to-ldap-using-sssd-7c27f624f1a4?source=rss-83e184eaaa7------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/7c27f624f1a4</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[storage]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ceph]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ldap]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[fn]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[kubernetes]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Blaine Gardner]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 02 Aug 2022 14:51:43 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-09-06T15:07:18.878Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*PMUGofl8iR2qiBWUjZoLKQ.png" /></figure><h3>Intro</h3><p>In the <a href="https://rook.io/">Rook</a> project, we’ve been making it a priority to add more support for <a href="https://ceph.io/">Ceph’s</a> NFS capabilities. At this stage, we have been following the 80/20-rule and looking for the feature additions that provide the most benefit to users.</p><p>User ID management and user access control are some of the most fundamental parts of any real-world NFS installation. ID management lays a foundation for access control, so it’s reasonable to start there. One of the most common ID management services plugged into NFS servers is <a href="https://ldap.com/">LDAP</a> (Lightweight Directory Access Protocol), so we set that as a target.</p><p>We created a prototype design for connecting our NFS-Ganesha server to an LDAP environment that provides user ID information.</p><p>This is our first time writing a deeply technical article about a prototype feature for Rook. In many cases, we would create a design document to be reviewed, but in this case we weren’t even sure whether the idea was feasible. We wanted to prototype first. The exercise was quite a bit of a challenge, and we think there is a lot of benefit to sharing our experience, especially as it relates to the <a href="https://sssd.io/">System Security Services Daemon (SSSD)</a>. Even though we went about this exercise in the Kubernetes context, the context and details should apply to any containerized environment.</p><h3>Let’s dig in</h3><h4>Finding inspiration</h4><p>Another project that uses NFS-Ganesha is <a href="https://www.gluster.org/">Gluster</a>, so we started by looking at Gluster setups as a reference point. Ganesha uses the <a href="https://sssd.io/">System Security Services Daemon</a> to connect to an LDAP service. SSSD can also connect to Active Directory and FreeIPA for ID management as well, and it can additionally use Kerberos for authentication. SSSD provides a lot of flexibility, and it could be a great option for providing a lot of benefit to Rook’s Ceph NFS offering all at once.</p><h4>Investigating process flows</h4><p>We looked at a sample NFS-Ganesha setup with Gluster to understand the process interactions that happen when the server needs to get ID information about connected users.</p><ol><li>NFS-Ganesha uses Linux <a href="https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/nfs/nfs-idmapper.html">NFS ID Mapper</a> <a href="https://linux.die.net/man/3/nfs4_uid_to_name">functions</a> to request user information</li><li>NFS ID Mapper uses <a href="https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man5/nfsidmap.5.html">nfsidmapd</a> to begin the lookup</li><li>To pass the query onto SSSD, nfsidmapd uses Linux’s <a href="https://www.gnu.org/software/libc/manual/html_node/Name-Service-Switch.html">Name Switch Service (NSS)</a></li><li>Finally, SSSD queries the LDAP database for the user info</li></ol><p>We’ll refer back to these steps in later parts of this article.</p><h4>Making a general plan</h4><p>Before SSSD queries the LDAP service (4), the entire process flow uses either kernel calls (1–2) or sockets (3) for communication. At any point in steps 1–3, we could try to mount the right host files into our containers to use what is running on the host system. However, when running in containers (especially in a Kubernetes environment) we can’t rely on the components we need being available or configured.</p><p>To be as flexible as possible, we decided our solution should be self-contained.</p><h4>Refining the plan</h4><p>Steps 1–2 rely on kernel libraries, which we have available in the Ceph container already. For step 3, passing on the query to SSSD, the NFS server Pod needs access to a running SSS Daemon instance. Because the query is passed via socket, the option of using HTTP calls to a centralized daemon is a no-go. SSSD has to run alongside our NFS-Ganesha server.</p><p>In Rook, our NFS-Ganesha pod already uses the sidecar pattern to run DBus (required by Ganesha) alongside the Ganesha server daemon with a shared socket mount for communication. The relevant diagram of our current Kubernetes Pod looks like this:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*JZu7hdishS2a3YES" /><figcaption>Current Ceph NFS pod architecture as of Rook v1.9</figcaption></figure><p>The requirements behind this design are outside of the scope of this article, but for those not as familiar with Kubernetes, we’ll talk about the methods in brief.</p><ul><li>On the right side: Rook mounts the keyring and Ganesha config file that it created for this NFS-Ganesha server into Pod volumes</li><li>In the init container: a minimal Ceph config file is put into a volume</li><li>Arrows between the Containers and Volume mounts show which volumes are mounted into which containers and also give an idea of whether the directories are used for read or read-write communication</li><li>In the primary Ganesha daemon container: Ganesha is configured by files found in volumes for the Ceph config, Ceph keyring, and Ganesha config</li><li>The sidecar DBus application: sets up a socket in a volume which is also shared with the primary Ganesha daemon container</li></ul><h4>Prototyping</h4><p>In practice, Rook’s current NFS server pod design has worked well, and we used similar methods for prototyping SSSD. After setting up a simple LDAP server for testing, we started working.</p><p>The first challenge was that SSSD wasn’t available in the Ceph container image. We also couldn’t find any recently-maintained SSSD images on Docker Hub or Quay. For the prototype, we created our own simple SSSD image to use, creating yet another unmaintained SSSD image in the ecosystem.</p><p>The critical element for getting our prototype working was determining the right sockets to mount between the NFS-Ganesha container and the SSSD sidecar to allow inter-communication. The information wasn’t easy to come by, but an SSSD developer helped us nail down <em>/var/lib/sss/pipes/</em> as the directory where the sockets live. Many thanks to <a href="https://github.com/alexey-tikhonov">Alexey Tikhonov</a> for supporting us.</p><p>A curious detail we found was that although SSSD uses DBus, SSSD’s NSS module was crashing when we allowed it access to the Pod’s shared DBus socket. Alexey clarified for us that SSSD only uses DBus for internal communications unless the DBus module is needed. Since nfsidmap only uses NSS for the lookup, we removed the shared DBus socket, and everything started working smoothly.</p><p>The penultimate hurdle we had to cross was yet again that SSSD wasn’t available in the Ceph container. Critically, the NFS-Ganesha container needs to have an SSSD client. For the prototype, it was simple enough to manually install the SSSD client into the container. Quick and dirty? Yes, but effective enough for proving out the design.</p><pre>yum install -y sssd-client</pre><p>The final challenge was resolving ID lookups that were taking way too long. Testing ID lookups from the SSSD container took well under a second, but lookups from the Ganesha container took many seconds. In the end, configuring NSS (via <a href="https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man5/nss.5.html">nsswitch.conf</a>) to only search SSSD for IDs and to ignore local files for lookup resolved this.</p><p>With all that out of the way, the diagram for the final working prototype looks like this:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*v-f42TNwXaDo_X8g" /><figcaption>Ceph NFS pod architecture highlighting prototype components</figcaption></figure><ul><li>sssd.conf ConfigMap: LDAP servers can be configured in myriad ways, and the SSSD configuration has to be tailored to the LDAP environment, so we planned our prototype to allow this configuration to be flexibly provided by users</li><li>nsswitch.conf ConfigMap: the configuration here eliminates the extra latency for ID lookups</li><li>The init container: this copies the initial content of the SSSD socket directory into the volume used for sharing sockets so SSSD doesn’t start up with expected items missing from the directory</li><li>Again arrows between the Containers and Volume mounts show which volumes are mounted into which containers and also give an idea of whether the directories are used for read or read-write communication</li></ul><p>The whole Pod looks like this:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*r6NBNTJm5vDqk06A" /><figcaption>Full Ceph NFS pod design including current and prototype components</figcaption></figure><p>It’s a lot, but you’ve seen all of this before.</p><h4>Analyzing what we made</h4><p>How does what we made stack up? What is still left dangling?</p><p>For a final design, the NSS config file likely doesn’t need the flexibility of a ConfigMap. At least with our current plans, files located in the Ganesha daemon pod shouldn’t have user information. This file can be generated by an init container easily.</p><p>The problem of what container image to use is a big one. The Ceph container needs to at least have the SSSD-Client added (~500kB). We also need to have an image with full SSSD requirements installed. We could either build an SSSD stand-alone image (annoying) or install the SSSD requirements into the Ceph container. Our napkin calculations suggest the SSSD requirements add 90–150 MB onto a base image, and the Ceph container is already 1.3 GIGAbytes.</p><p>We aren’t sure what SSSD’s resource usage can be expected to be. It’s also not clear from the <a href="https://linux.die.net/man/5/sssd.conf">documentation</a> to us how to control caching by size. For a simple prototype, it is minimal, but for an LDAP environment with a very large number of LDAP entries or many client connections, SSSD may especially consume a large amount of system RAM.</p><p>The biggest thing to chew on when deciding whether to use this prototype’s design for our eventual implementation in Rook. Linux’s NFS ID mapper already has <a href="https://linux.die.net/man/5/idmapd.conf">configuration</a> options for connecting directly to LDAP servers, and NFS-Ganesha has support for Kerberos natively. We must establish a clear enough benefit to using SSSD in order to justify the extra resource usage.</p><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>Obviously, this exercise is only just a prototype. We have proven that it’s possible to use SSSD in a sidecar to connect NFS-Ganesha to an ID management service, but we still have to decide whether the prototype design is the right one. There are still several unknowns and snags, and there may be other designs we want to prototype to make good comparisons between other options.</p><p>For now, we hope this insight into some of the ongoing work in Rook was valuable. As always, we welcome contributions and feedback from the community. You can find documentation on our <a href="https://rook.io/">webpage</a>, check out the code on <a href="https://github.com/rook/rook">GitHub</a>, or engage in discussion on <a href="https://slack.rook.io/">Slack</a>.</p><p>And again, many thanks to <a href="https://github.com/alexey-tikhonov">Alexey</a> who helped us prove out the possibility of this design.</p><h3>Appendix</h3><p>This prototype was done with Rook v1.9.7 and Ceph v17.2.1.</p><p>If you want to try out the prototype for yourself or see the prototype details more closely, you can check out the files used in the gists below.</p><ul><li>LDAP test server: <a href="https://gist.github.com/BlaineEXE/8c5f0ee54bbc00d2a221b0e9cb16c0a0">https://gist.github.com/BlaineEXE/8c5f0ee54bbc00d2a221b0e9cb16c0a0</a></li><li>NFS deployment prototype: <a href="https://gist.github.com/BlaineEXE/cca3ebf046cbc2753f67126e28728d51">https://gist.github.com/BlaineEXE/cca3ebf046cbc2753f67126e28728d51</a></li><li>SSSD Dockerfile: <a href="https://gist.github.com/BlaineEXE/e908904eca287d4f7d66593b14ad0d6e">https://gist.github.com/BlaineEXE/e908904eca287d4f7d66593b14ad0d6e</a></li><li>Pod for testing exports: <a href="https://gist.github.com/BlaineEXE/6c8d4458b224bb94bcd7773bf8a8c0f5">https://gist.github.com/BlaineEXE/6c8d4458b224bb94bcd7773bf8a8c0f5</a></li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=7c27f624f1a4" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/rook-io/prototyping-an-nfs-connection-to-ldap-using-sssd-7c27f624f1a4">Prototyping an NFS connection to LDAP using SSSD</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/rook-io">Rook Blog</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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