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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Therapy on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Therapy on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@babayev.murad?source=rss-2ab5035318c6------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Therapy on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@babayev.murad?source=rss-2ab5035318c6------2</link>
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        <lastBuildDate>Sun, 22 Nov 2026 11:09:14 GMT</lastBuildDate>
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        <webMaster><![CDATA[yourfriends@medium.com]]></webMaster>
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            <title><![CDATA[Why Your OTP Isn’t Protecting You?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@babayev.murad/why-your-otp-isnt-protecting-you-80abaf0587b4?source=rss-2ab5035318c6------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/80abaf0587b4</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Therapy]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 18 Apr 2026 17:40:11 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-04-18T17:40:11.716Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Uhg1p8xOK9fW7zFHcqg2oQ.jpeg" /></figure><h3>Prologue: The “Extra Layer of Security”</h3><p>It’s 2026. We’ve moved on from passwords being your only security blanket. Now we have <strong>Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA)</strong>. You know, that thing where after you enter your password, the app sends you a code on your phone, and you have to enter it again?</p><p>It feels secure, right? You’ve got something you know (password) AND something you have (your phone with the OTP code).</p><p>Except… what if I told you that all of that can be bypassed in 3 simple steps? Without your OTP code. Without your phone. Without anything except a laptop and 5 minutes of free time?</p><p>Welcome to the real world of OTP bypass.</p><p>Recently, while doing a penetration test on a food delivery website I found, I discovered an OTP bypass vulnerability. The site’s authentication mechanism was actually quite simple. After registration, it redirects to login, and an OTP code is sent to Gmail accordingly. However, I tested some validations here and checked if the OTP could be bypassed.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*MCy69gLW9-Hi5V6w6c4KzA.png" /></figure><p>This endpoint works for OTP-based login, and you need to send both validation_type and otp to the backend:</p><ul><li>validation_type indicates what type of verification the request is (for example, when you write otp, the system understands that the code sent via SMS should be verified)</li><li>otp is the code entered by the user</li></ul><p>First, the system sends an OTP to the number, then you send that code back with validation_type=otp so the verification is performed. However, in your case, both parameters went empty, so the backend couldn&#39;t perform the correct validation and returned &quot;Incorrect OTP&quot;.</p><p>Now let’s spice things up a bit and make some interesting modifications to it.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*tMGT0OEyZe-0ge85yaBB7w.png" /></figure><p>When a random value is written to validation_type and otp is left empty, the server either completely ignores these parameters, or as a fallback, it switches to another (weaker) validation method and ultimately binds the session to some user. Such cases typically occur for these reasons: the backend&#39;s &quot;if/else&quot; logic is constructed incorrectly (for example, if validation_type doesn&#39;t match, the OTP check is skipped), null/empty values for otp are not properly validated, or the session/cookie-based login occurs with a previous or default user. In short: the server authenticates without enforcing mandatory OTP verification, which results in unauthorized access to random accounts, and from a security standpoint, this is a critical bug (authentication bypass).</p><p>Multi-Factor Authentication is supposed to be your safety net. But if it’s implemented poorly, it’s worse than having nothing — it <strong>gives you false confidence</strong>.</p><p>Users think: <em>“I have MFA, so I’m safe.”</em><br>Attackers know: <em>“If MFA is implemented badly, you’re even easier to hack.”</em></p><p>The irony is that adding MFA might actually make you <em>less</em> secure if developers don’t implement it correctly. Because now users are less paranoid. They’re more trusting. And attackers exploit that trust.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/736/1*3edTbZMvxGei48LxwYT-QQ.jpeg" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=80abaf0587b4" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Undead Vulnerability That Just Won’t Die : My SQLI Discovery at nature.com]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@babayev.murad/the-undead-vulnerability-that-just-wont-die-my-sqli-discovery-at-nation-com-7f48c0d7623d?source=rss-2ab5035318c6------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/7f48c0d7623d</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Therapy]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 18 Apr 2026 16:57:53 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-04-18T17:56:56.041Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/540/1*1H3Nw3nyNmfTZ1JSySW4sA.jpeg" /></figure><p>It’s 2026. We have AI that can write code, blockchain that promises security, and developers who swear they follow OWASP top 10 guidelines. Yet here I am, writing about <strong>SQL Injection</strong> — a vulnerability so old it can legally drink in most countries.</p><p>Yes, you read that right. <strong>SQL Injection</strong> is older than Instagram. Older than the first iPhone. Older than your younger siblings probably. And yet, despite being ancient history in cybersecurity terms, it’s still alive, thriving, and apparently living rent-free in production databases across the internet.</p><h3>My Discovery: nature.com</h3><p>This is where the story gets interesting.</p><p>I was conducting a black-box penetration test on <strong>nature.com</strong> and related subdomains. Black-box testing means I had zero knowledge of the internal architecture — just like a real attacker.</p><p>After subdomain enumeration using VirusTotal and custom scripts, I discovered several live subdomains. One of them was particularly interesting: a reviewer/dashboard endpoint at <strong>preview-</strong><a href="http://www.nature.com/"><strong>www.nature.com</strong></a>.</p><h3>Finding the Vulnerability</h3><p>I logged in with valid credentials and was redirected to the dashboard:</p><pre>https://reviewer.springernature.com/dashboard/certificates?years=2023</pre><p>This endpoint accepts a years parameter. Innocent enough, right?</p><p>I started testing with basic SQL injection payloads:</p><pre>?years=2023&#39; OR &#39;1&#39;=&#39;1<br>?years=2023&#39; AND SLEEP(5)--<br>?years=2023*</pre><p>When I sent these requests, the server returned <strong>HTTP 500 Internal Server Error</strong> responses — a dead giveaway. Normal requests return HTTP 200 or 302 (redirect). An error that varies based on your input? That screams SQL injection.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1002/1*RpUh_jJ1Gy3It9Xjm5S5BQ.png" /></figure><p>The server literally told me: <em>“Your input broke my SQL query.”</em> Thank you for the hint!</p><p>I fired up <strong>SQLMap</strong> (a SQL injection automation tool) and pointed it at the vulnerable parameter. Within minutes, SQLMap confirmed:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*blo3yI_dP6wK1V3Hf0m9lg.jpeg" /></figure><p>As you can see, SQLMap found multiple injection techniques:</p><ul><li><strong>Boolean-based blind SQL injection</strong></li><li><strong>Time-based blind SQL injection</strong></li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1005/1*yatQXDGo914Y-0IaVqxc_w.png" /></figure><p>This screenshot shows SQLMap enumerating the complete database structure. Every table, every schema, every bit of data became accessible.</p><h3>Final Thoughts</h3><p>Until developers treat input validation as seriously as they treat features, vulnerabilities like this will keep appearing. It’s not about being paranoid — it’s about being professional.</p><p>If you’re building web applications, please use prepared statements. It takes 5 minutes to learn and zero additional effort to implement. Your security team will love you. Your users will be grateful (even if they don’t know why).</p><p>And if you find a vulnerability like this? Report it responsibly. Help make the internet slightly less broken.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=7f48c0d7623d" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Whisper to Network Protocols]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@babayev.murad/whisper-to-network-protocols-aae2006aa475?source=rss-2ab5035318c6------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/aae2006aa475</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Therapy]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 04 Feb 2026 19:53:13 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-02-04T20:09:21.779Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In this topic, we will learn how to manually prepare arp packets ourselves, analyze the traffic in this way, discovery of devices on the network and create a kind of man-in-the-middle attack by confusing the switch and sending traffic to all ports.</p><p>We will actively use the <strong>scapy </strong>tool here.</p><p><strong>SCAPY tool link : </strong><a href="https://github.com/secdev/scapy"><strong>https://github.com/secdev/scapy</strong></a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/470/0*kWwJzkqQ2gcgHMs1.png" /></figure><p>Above, we see both the ARP header information and the Ethernet header information. The Ethernet header of an ARP packet contains information about the physical sender MAC address and the destination MAC address to which the packet is being sent.</p><p><strong>Scapy </strong>is a packet manipulation tool for computer networks. It can spoof or decode network packets, send and intercept them, and match requests and responses. It can also perform tasks such as scanning, network path tracing, probing, unit testing, attacks, and network discovery.</p><p>We’re trying to discover other systems on the network we’re a part of. Let’s generate packets from <strong>Scapy</strong>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/916/1*Qfhs9TO51nMuNNtu0sRLHg.png" /></figure><p>Ether Title:</p><ul><li>src: Source MAC address (a fake MAC address).</li><li>dst: The broadcast address (ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff) is being sent to all devices.</li></ul><p>ARP Title:</p><ul><li>hwsrc: A fake MAC address.</li><li>psrc: A fake IP address (10.0.x.x).</li><li>hwdst: The physical address of the target (00:00:00:00:00:00 because it is unknown).</li><li>pdst: Victim IP address(10.0.30.6).</li><li>op=1: This is an ARP Request packet.</li></ul><p>Let’s imagine a Kali machine connected to a switch, and a Windows Server also connected to that switch. In this scenario, they are considered part of the same subnet. Because they are both physically on the same server and on the same subnet, we can discover them via ARP without needing to go through a gateway or router system. We can perform the discovery process directly from the physical connection side. Once we’re connected to the network, we send the data for Layer 2 systems using `sendp`, and for systems beyond Layer 2 using `send`.</p><p>So what did we do? We have classic tools that we use, like arp-scan and netdiscover, which allow us to find other IPs on the network. These tools send many IPs in the background, collect the IPs that are returned in response, and present these IPs live. We have seen how this tool works in the background. We understand the logic of the tool by sequentially writing what to which fields in the ARP packet and Ethernet packet, and how it collects the returned responses.</p><h3>Chapter 2 : Manipulation</h3><p>As you can see below, I have provided a code that automatically performs the operation we just did with a python code and I have slightly changed the mac addresses.</p><blockquote>from scapy.all import *</blockquote><blockquote>ether_header = Ether(src=”00:11:22:33:66:32&quot;, dst=”ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff”) <br>arp_header = ARP(hwsrc=”00:11:22:33:66:68&quot;, psrc=”10.0.30.58&quot;, hwdst=”00:00:00:00:00:00&quot;, pdst=”10.0.40.3&quot;, op=1) <br>packet = ether_header / arp_header <br>ls(packet) <br>sendp(packet)</blockquote><p>Switch and Windows devices interpret different values ​​in headers differently.</p><p><strong>Switch</strong>: Registers the MAC address 00:11:22:33:66:32 in the Ethernet header.<br><strong>Windows:</strong> Records the MAC address 00:11:22:33:66:68 in the ARP header.</p><p>When the windows machine responds to the 10.0.30.58 ip address 00:11:22:33:66:68, but in the switch’s arp table, the mac address assigned to this ip is set as 00:11:22:33:66:32, for this reason it broadcasts to all devices on the network without finding the 00:11:22:33:66:68 mac address. We have confused the Switch.</p><p><strong>Opcode Change :<br></strong>op=2: An ARP Reply packet. Responds directly to the target device, even if it hasn’t been asked before.</p><p><strong>op=1 (Request): We can create a new record.</strong></p><p><strong>op=2 (Reply): We can modify an existing record.</strong></p><p>By manipulating the ARP tables of devices on the network with these methods, we can intervene in the decision-making mechanisms. <strong>Remember: </strong>The attacker didn’t have any physical address or IP address to begin with. However, he was able to manipulate the network with fake information.</p><h3>Can we disable the switch by filling its ram?</h3><p>We can send fake ARP request and reply packets to populate the switch’s ARP table. When the ARP request and response are sent for 1 million fake IPs, the switch’s RAM will be full and it will start working like a hub. In this case, the switch will direct the targeted traffic not only to one port, but to all connected devices, and white listening (sniffing) will become possible.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*FfZ9UsRgXvQedGc9.png" /></figure><p><strong>General Situation :</strong> The attacker plugs a loose cable into the switch. The switch is currently only aware of the presence of an electrical signal; if no MAC or IP address is set. At this point, we will create our own packages with Scapy and interfere with the target systems.</p><p>First, we create an ARP Request packet. The ARP protocol is used to identify physical addresses and is usually denoted by ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff. By broadcasting, the packet is transmitted to all devices in the network. Because the attacker is connected to the switch, this summer affects the entire network. The device with the IP address in the ARP Request responds to the packet. For example, a device with IP=2 is requested.<br>We put a value in the source (src) field, say src=x. The target system adds this x value to its ARP table. The switch updates its MAC table using the resource in the Ethernet header (src) of the packet. However, the target system is only aware of the incoming broadcast packet.</p><p>If the value in the ARP header and the values ​​in the Ethernet header are different, or if a conscious inconsistency is created between these two headers, the operation logic of the switch is broken.<br>Switch can forward the response to everyone instead of the target system. In this case, you can pretend to have the system’s MAC address and direct the replies to you. During the penetration test, you monitor the network through the switch, analyze the IP and MAC addresses. After selecting the destination, you can observe the packet traffic in the IP protocol of the upper layer by mixing the switching process of the switch. This process should not be confused with a <strong>MITM (Man-in-the-Middle)</strong> attack. Instead of getting in the middle of the traffic and interfering, we are manipulating to observe the current traffic flow.</p><p><strong>Real life<br></strong>You should be as quiet as possible on the internal network and generate fake packets. A switch can share the target system’s traffic with you.<br>When you perform this process with automated tools, you leave a permanent mark. Tools form a dense package, usually mac changer with mac changer, let’s say you interfered with <strong>ettercap </strong>and poisoned the arp table. You will notice this whole process when you examine it with Wireshark. However, compared to what we do, you will see a lot more packet traffic, which will open the way for you to be caught. You can do this by writing your own tool.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=aae2006aa475" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Stealth (gizli) network pentest]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@babayev.murad/stealth-gizli-network-pentest-739a94382d35?source=rss-2ab5035318c6------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/739a94382d35</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Therapy]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 02 Feb 2026 17:23:53 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-02-02T17:39:10.313Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Xüsusilə Windows sistemlərində müəyyən protokollar var ki, sistem şəbəkəyə qoşulan kimi avtomatik olaraq işə başlayır. Şəbəkəyə qoşulursunuzsa, sisteminizi elə konfiqurasiya etməlisiniz ki, ARP və IP kimi proseslər həmin şəbəkədə varlığınızı aşkar etməsin. Bizim edəcəyimiz şey TCP/IP protokollarını söndürmək, şəbəkədə ünsiyyət qurmaq üçün öz hardcore paketlərinizi yaratmaq və varlığımızı mümkün qədər üzə çıxarmadan şəbəkəyə qoşulmaq və araşdırmaqdır. Mən bunu Kali istifadə edərək virtual maşında edəcəm.</p><p>Ilk növbədə edəcəyimiz şey windowsumuzda host-u söndürməkdir. Pentest mühitində həmişə iki NİC olması məsləhətlidir. Wi-fi dən internet üçün, Ethernet-dən isə pentest üçün istifadə etmək olar.</p><p>VMware burada necə işləyir?</p><p>Windows NIC disabled olsa belə: Fiziki link var , VMware <strong>raw şəkildə</strong> NIC-i VM-ə ötürür.</p><p><strong>WINDOWS HOSTUNUN SUSDURULMASI :</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/525/1*TDcQIwSNzCEWrY0o6MeW3g.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/966/1*L640IKhNudjyMAseNunZpA.png" /></figure><p>Ilk mərhələ də Wm’ə bağlayacağımız Ethernet’i disable edirik. İpv6-da disable olunmalıdır çünki şəbəkəyə daxil olduğumuz zaman bu səfər də ipv6 ilə danışmağa başlayacaq.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/880/1*vXux-nXT7WFx5Z_HcpbZmQ.png" /><figcaption>ipv6-nı unchecked edirik və ok basırıq.</figcaption></figure><blockquote>Təbii ki bunu powershell üzərindən də edə bilərik.<br>Disable-NetAdapterBinding -Name “Ethernet” -ComponentID ms_tcpip6</blockquote><p>Yoxlamaq üçün:</p><blockquote>Get-NetAdapterBinding -Name “Ethernet”</blockquote><p>Son olaraq <strong>802.1X </strong>çox adamın gözündən qaçır, amma stealth-i ən tez pozan şeylərdən biridir. Onuda disable etmək lazımdir çünki, Windows-un USB-Ethernet üzərindən şəbəkəyə “mən kiməm” deyə authentication etməsinin qarşısını almış oluruq. Əgər NIC “Disabled” vəziyyətdədirsə, 802.1X avtomatik olaraq işləmir amma yenə də biz ehtiyatı əldən verməyək. Böyük ehtimalla siz Etherneti disable etdiyiniz üçün onu properties hissəsində görməyəcəksiniz. Buna görə aşağıdaki powershell kodunu təqdim edirəm.</p><blockquote>sc stop dot3svc<br>sc config dot3svc start= disabled</blockquote><p>Indi isə sıra susdurduğumuz Etherneti Wm-lə əlaqələndirməkdədir.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/651/1*TATgnIBG7zhX6mAJb7DI5A.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/549/1*wY6XFk9YjdqvHznmpB4qvg.png" /></figure><p>Bridged to hissəsindən Ethernet’in adı seçilir ve apply daha sonra okay basırıq. Daha sonra Wm-ə geri qayıdırıq setting / network adapter hissəsindən bridge seçirik ve hazırdır.</p><p>Bu Şəbəkə Pentest Metodologiyası göstərir ki, heç vaxt öz hostumuzu və ya aparatımızı şəbəkəyə daxil etmirik. Ehtiyac duyduğumuz əməliyyat sistemində mümkün qədər gizli qala bilsək də, öz hostumuzda yaratdığımız və tamamilə əlaqəsi olmayan trafik şəbəkə daxilində aşkarlana və izlənilə bilər. Bu, əgər varsa, onun müxtəlif məhdudiyyətlərlə bloklanmasına da səbəb ola bilər.</p><p>İndi isə sıra ikinci mərhələdədir hansı ki Wm-in daxilindəki kalidə bəzi əməliyyatları yerinə yetirəcəyik. Mən bu sistemi (kali) şəbəkəyə əlavə edəndə onun rabitəsini məhdudlaşdırmalıyam və buna imkan verən müxtəlif xidmətlər var. Onlardan biri şəbəkə meneceridir.</p><p>Kali-də sistemi ilk dəfə işə saldığımız andan bir xidmətə avtomatik olaraq əlaqə qurmaq və arxa planda müxtəlif protokolları əlaqələndirmək və konfiqurasiya etmək tapşırılır. Bunu deaktiv etməliyik. Bu, Kali-nin avtomatik olaraq bir IP ünvanı əldə etməyə çalışmasının və şəbəkəyə qoşulduqda özünü digər sistemlərə tanıtmasının qarşısını alır. Bunu aşağıdakı şəkildə göstərilən əmrlə edə bilərik. Onu söndürsək belə, bəzən DHCP müştərisi qala bilər, ona görə də yoxlamaq vacibdir. Eynilə, WPA-nı yoxlamaq yaxşı bir fikirdir. Əgər o işləsəydi, onu “killall” ilə öldürərdik.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/863/1*kfRt6UemvhAknu1Sej2MTQ.png" /></figure><p>Son addım olaraq :</p><p>IP konfiqurasiyasını silirik. Səbəbi odur ki Şəbəkə interfeysində <strong>statik və ya əvvəlki IP</strong> qalırdı. Bu IP: log-larda görünə bilər, routing / firewall qaydalarına düşə bilər və sənin real şəbəkə topologiyanı ifşa edə bilər.</p><blockquote>ip addr del x.x.x.x/24 dev eth0</blockquote><p>Nəticə olaraq : Interfeys IP-siz qalır, sistem öz-özünə şəbəkəyə çıxmır və IP-ni yalnız biz istədikdə (məsələn VPN / Tor / proxy sonrası) alır.</p><p>IPv6 bağlamaq üçün:</p><blockquote>echo 1 &gt; /proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/eth0/disable_ipv6</blockquote><blockquote>ÖZƏT :</blockquote><blockquote>Əsas əməliyyat sistemini hər hansı bir şəbəkəyə qoşduqda əməliyyat sisteminin şəbəkədə avtomatik paketlər yaratmasını istəmirik. Mən əsas hostun Ethernet və ya Wi-Fi kartı vasitəsilə məlumatı birbaşa körpü rejimində istifadə etdiyim virtual maşına köçürürəm. Köçürülən hissə həm də əməliyyat sistemi olduğundan, həmin sistemdə paketləri avtomatik yaradan hissələri də söndürməliyəm. Bütün bunları etməkdə məqsədim qoşulduğum şəbəkədə aşkarlanmamaqdır, çünki korporativ şəbəkədə kompüterinizi bağladığınız an əməliyyat sisteminiz “Mən güc alan kimi ətrafı kəşf edəcəm” deyir və buna bənzər bir şəbəkə tətbiqi var. Əgər həmin təşkilatdakı ARP protokolundakı MAC ünvanlarına uyğun olaraq MAC ünvanınız qoşulduğunuz keçidin 5-ci portundan göndərilirsə, lakin onlar real vaxt rejimində MAC-ları izləyirsə və o, müəyyən edilməmiş və təşkilatın inventar siyahısında olmayan cihazla qarşılaşırsa, yaxalanırsınız və bloklanırsız.</blockquote><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=739a94382d35" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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