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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Gian Balsamo on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Gian Balsamo on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Gian Balsamo on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Radical Markets for Elephants]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/gnosis-pm/radical-markets-for-elephants-a742916812db?source=rss-d48ae2e1f7a8------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a742916812db</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[lmsr]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[prediction-markets]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[market-makers]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[financial-markets]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[gnosis]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Gian Balsamo]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 13 Jul 2018 14:19:05 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-07-13T14:19:05.490Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Robin Hanson’s LMSR for Prediction Markets</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/288/1*HZTyjZGfqnFVedDEZHKvuQ.png" /></figure><h4><strong>Speaking the Truth</strong></h4><p>I owe the pachyderm in my title, “Radical Markets for Elephants,” to Robin Hanson. We are masters at deception, Hanson and Kevin Simler write in their recent book, <em>The Elephant in the Brain</em>. Some of the hidden motives driving our social behavior — hidden, on occasion, to ourselves! — are fraudulent, manipulative, and self-serving. “And they aren’t mere mouse-sized motives… They are <em>elephant-sized motives</em> large enough to leave footprints in national economic data.”</p><p>There you go: the “elephants” in the title are the billowy smoke signals whereby we divert attention, even our own, from our hopes and fears.</p><p>Yet, Robin Hanson tells us also that money incentives may trick us into speaking, or signaling, the truth of our expectations. Hanson’s incentives are a sort of Invisible Hand redux, if you think of it — except that Adam Smith didn’t have the right math at his disposal, nor had he heard of elephants in the brain.</p><p>Logarithmic Market Scoring Rule, LMSR for short, is the name of Hanson’s distinctive solution to the following problem: how to use financial incentives to elicit a bunch of people’s truthful and jealously guarded opinions about a future event. Gnosis uses the LMSR market maker for prediction markets.</p><p>My goal today is to translate that mouthful of an acronym, LMSR, into plain English: how does it work, why does it work better than any alternative in prediction markets, and what are its drawbacks?</p><h4><strong>What’s a Scoring Rule?</strong></h4><p>It’s difficult to make honest predictions. Predictions are based on expectations, but expectations can hardly be disentangled from preferences. If you wish for a tax cut, and presidential candidate A is promising a tax cut, while candidate B is menacing a tax increase, it is difficult for you to objectively forecast the election’s result. Your values impinge on your beliefs.</p><p>Betting on horse racing is different. You can be enamored with the elegance of American Pharaoh, but when it comes to placing your bet on the 2018 Triple Crown winner, it’s with unapologetic relief that you hear yourself utter to the teller: “Win on Justify.” Your disincentive to waste money made you set aside preference and side with expectation. Greed made you honest.</p><p>Indeed, betting markets are quite good at revealing the probability estimates of people playing the ponies. The problem with betting markets is that they are zero-sum games, where my gain is your loss: either the participants are <em>irrational</em>, or they have privileged information about the race. In the latter case, a rational person would not gamble against them.</p><p>Ordinary speculative markets, such as the Stock Market, are excellent at aggregating the dominant relevant opinions and information into market prices, which express, in turn, collective probability estimates. But the moment your market grows <em>thin</em>, as in the case, say, with the market for rotten mushrooms — where most people wouldn’t be caught dead trading — there is a <em>liquidity problem</em>: too few people engage in trading, therefore market prices do not represent significant collective probability estimates.</p><p>Scoring rules are very successful at eliciting individual assessment of event-related probabilities. A scoring rule is based on a mercenary principle: the better I forecast a future event, the higher is my score, and the larger is the monetary compensation I receive for it. A patron is paying my reward in return for the elicited information. However, scoring rules are affected by the <em>thick market</em> problem: aggregating or pooling different people’s estimates into a single consensus is remarkably tricky, and partially unreliable in its results.</p><h4><strong>What Does the Logarithmic Scoring Rule Look Like?</strong></h4><p>I might be in the position of the tax-cut-loving voter mentioned above, unable to disentangle preference from expectation. The scoring rule is <em>proper</em> if it constrains me to maximize my expected score by reporting my probabilistic assessment truthfully, regardless of my unsolved dilemma between values and beliefs.</p><p>The best scoring rule is Hanson’s favorite one, the logarithmic scoring rule, because it can be used both to reward my truthful report and to gauge the statistical likelihood of my prediction. It looks like this:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/360/1*6l4ZNsHW-ymJTU1nOuXbXw.png" /></figure><p>When it comes to rewards, equation (1) works this way: if out of several mutually exclusive events, event<em> i</em> happened, and if I had previously assigned probability <em>ri</em> to event <em>i</em>, my compensation will be <em>si</em>. Math details aside, what matters is that in case I nailed my prediction 100%, my compensation will amount to <em>ai</em>. (We will discuss the factor <em>b</em> in a bit.)</p><p>As regards the likelihood of my prediction: I may be as honest as the next guy, but if the next guy is more likely to make a correct prediction than I, the LMSR will enable the patron to weigh his views more than mine.</p><p>The term “market” appears in LMSR as a signpost, to point out that Hanson designed the Logarithmic Market Scoring Rule as a market maker mechanism. Which brings us to the no-frills question: what’s a market maker?</p><p>A market maker is the institution (or the human, or, in the case of Gnosis’ <em>automated</em> market maker, the application) that sets prices for buy (bid) and sell (ask) orders, bears the risk of each trade — since all transactions occur with the market maker as buyer or seller — and may incur losses from trades. By its very presence, the market maker turns the market into a positive-sum game, incentivizing thereby rational traders to participate. And since any participant can trade with the market maker whenever s/he finds the current price attractive, the thin-market obstacle is overcome.</p><h4><strong>The Nitty-Gritty of How LMSR Works</strong></h4><p>This market trades in assets of the form “pay $1 if event <em>i</em> occurs.” To each asset <em>i</em> corresponds an event <em>i</em>. There are (in our simple descriptive model) <em>n</em> exhaustive and mutually exclusive assets and corresponding events. Final settlements occur after market closure, when a certain event <em>i</em> has occurred, and thereby each share of asset <em>i</em> is worth $1, and each share of the other (n-1) assets is worth $0.</p><p>The market maker provides the initial liquidity in return for a fee on each transaction. Math details aside, the logarithmic scoring rule function (1) entails a maximum loss of <em>b log(n)</em> for the market maker, where n is the number of exhaustive and mutually exclusive events. Thereby, the market maker increases or decreases its maximum loss by changing the factor <em>b</em>.</p><p>The greater the sum risked by the market maker, the deeper the market, i.e. the larger will be the number and size of feasible trades — notice that the initial liquidity sets an implicit upper limit for size orders. We’ll presently see that the deeper is the market, the less relevant becomes the price slippage caused by any robust trade.</p><p>The opposite is true, alas, for markets with small initial liquidity.</p><p>When deciding how much seed funding to put up, the market maker must thereby engage in a two-horned maximization: its goal is a market whose animation will be likely to bring in (more than) sufficient fees to compensate for the money put at risk.</p><p>This market has a continuous, inventory-based internal state; in other words, it is constantly characterized by a “net sales so-far” vector of <em>n</em> elements, where each element counts the number of shares which have been sold of this or that asset. At market closure, the state vector reports the final consensus on the probability estimates — which conveys <strong>the probabilistic prediction of the market vis-à-vis the factual turn of events</strong>.</p><p>For each asset <em>i</em> in the LMSR automated market maker, the price of the pertinent share is an exponential function of factor b from the reward equation (1) and of all outstanding shares’ quantities as well.</p><p>Let’s model, for instance, a market with just two assets, asset 1 and asset 2, and assume that the market maker has sold <em>q1</em> shares of asset 1 and <em>q2</em> shares of asset 2 (with thanks to David Pennock’s math). The price function is as simple as:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/360/1*Z5_9A7exuq77OIw_VsdgTQ.png" /></figure><p>For infinitesimal trades, the bid-ask spread is zero. For any concrete, non-infinitesimal trade, the slippage between expected and paid price will be, roughly speaking, inversely proportional to the market’s depth.</p><p>This price slippage depends on the cost of the trade, which depends, in turn, on the trade size as well as on the price equation (2). In our two-asset-market model, the cost function looks like this:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/360/1*I_VgGPAMK8zGxJa2VhUMkQ.png" /></figure><p>If a trader wants to buy <em>x</em> shares of asset 1, this transaction will cost them:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/360/1*67SOZvtLOqLJuFEy9Sh-eg.png" /></figure><p>After this trade has changed the outstanding quantity of share 1, the price function (2) will compute the latter’s new current price for infinitesimal trades. A price change applies to share 2 as well, of course, since the total cost of a bundle of shares holding one share per asset is equal to $1. For each asset, the price slippage owing to the latest transaction amounts to the difference between the previous and current price.</p><p>Notice that each price in American cents is a punctual indication of a probability estimate. (There is convergence therefore between individual prices and the elements of the internal state vector.)</p><p>Whenever my trade causes a price slippage, it is because I paid the scoring rule payment associated with the prevailing probability estimate of some event <em>i</em> and, at once, implicitly declared myself ready to auction off any of my portfolio’s shares to whoever is willing to offer the scoring rule payments associated with the new probability estimates. In doing so, I affected the current overall consensus on probability estimates.</p><p>After the market is closed and, out of <em>n</em> possible, exhaustive and mutually exclusive events, event <em>i</em> has demonstrably happened, it’s time for the final settlements. All traders whose portfolio holds shares of asset <em>i</em> will get $1 per share from the market maker. All other shares are worth $0. The difference between the number of outstanding shares of asset <em>i</em> and the market maker’s total revenue from transactions and fees determines its final balance.</p><p>We are just left with a tiny yet hugely important detail. In the case of Gnosis’ LMSR <em>automated </em>market marker, <strong>anyone can start their own prediction market</strong> and mint the pertinent set of assets, as long as the latter are collateralized with seed funding in the event contract. Anyone can act as market maker, in sum. Gnosis’ application automates the process of minting and trading.</p><h4><strong>Elephants in a Radical Market</strong></h4><p>Time to wrap things up.</p><p>I neglected to mention that I owe the root of my title, “Radical Markets for Elephants,” to Posner &amp; Weyl’s new book, <em>Radical Markets</em>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/288/1*K47hXCWSWcR5umKYSlvTwQ.png" /></figure><p>Posner and Weyl advocate the auction as the quintessential Radical Market: by having people bid against one another for a given asset, this asset will end up in the hands of the person who is most likely to valorize it to the fullest — which is their favorite instance of <em>optimal allocation</em>. And when it comes to the optimal expression of individual preferences, Posner and Weyl advocate “quadratic voting”: a vote whose cost grows exponentially with respect to its preponderance is a better source of valuations than the one-person, one-vote rule.</p><p>In the context of Robin Hanson’s LMSR market maker, as discussed, the marginal cost of the next share grows proportionally to the number of outstanding shares — which entails that casting one more (long) vote on the future of a certain state of affairs is an exponential expression, moneywise, of my (positive) expectations regarding that state of affairs. This leads to an optimal allocation of shares, or, which is the same, a most reliable expression of expectations.</p><p>The mathematical convergence between Hanson’s and Posner and Weyl‘s respective approaches to the intensity of preference and its optimal expression is striking.</p><p>They both tame the elephant in the brain, I dare say.</p><p>Remember the movie <em>Spartacus</em>?</p><p>I am the Invisible Hand. You are the Invisible Hand. We all are the Invisible Hand!</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/288/1*W7_OYiHmuu3fN0fGA7tcHg.png" /></figure><p><em>With thanks to Friederike Ernst, Alan Lu, and Nadja Beneš.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a742916812db" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/gnosis-pm/radical-markets-for-elephants-a742916812db">Radical Markets for Elephants</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/gnosis-pm">GnosisDAO</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Bancor’s Banking]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@balsamo.gian/bancors-banking-92eb1c811191?source=rss-d48ae2e1f7a8------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/92eb1c811191</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bancor]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bitcoin]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ethereum]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hayek]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Gian Balsamo]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 03 Oct 2017 22:33:24 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-10-03T22:33:24.538Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Between utopia and reality there is the same relationship as that between Marlon Brando’s scream in <em>A Streetcar Named Desire</em> and Brando’s coconut-sized prostate in <em>Last Tango in Paris</em>. In other words, the concretization of our desires must take reality into account. So, even if we blockchainers are all in favor of Hayek’s utopian views on the unfettered competition about all conceivable currencies, we accept the reality principle that monetary change comes gradually. Or at least, those of us who have occasionally, and more often than not unproductively, screamed as ferociously as Brando, come sooner or later to accept that utopia is best left to academics, and monetary progress takes time and patience.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/666/1*lnzEUMoAQYAkUfLrE0QM9Q.jpeg" /><figcaption>A Scream of Brando’s but not THE Scream</figcaption></figure><p>This is to say that I do not disapprove, in principle, of Bancor’s partiality toward Keynes’s homonymous concept. Bancor’s token, called BNT, is a blockchain-tethered version of Keynes’s own Bancor, which had been conceived (but never realized) as the supranational currency to be used as unit of account in a multilateral clearing system. Bancor’s BNT is meant to serve the analogous role of unit of account within a multicrypto clearing system.</p><p>Given this historical ancestry, it can’t be a huge surprise to learn that, in agreement with canonical banking orthodoxy, Bancor emits and withdraws BNTs based on diverging principles. In one word, it sells BNTs high and buys them back low. It’s not a surprise, procedurally speaking, but it deserves the brief reflection of this article.</p><p>It’s just like opening a line of credit at your neighborhood bank. Having relinquished partial control of collaterals of proportional value, you bring home from the bank the promise that you’ll be entitled to cash your credit according to this or that temporal pattern. In some cases, you cash it all at once, in the form of a check, and transfer the promise, i.e., the check, to a creditor of yours. But in sum, you know perfectly well that, when it comes to <em>real money</em> (a theological notion, I know, but I won’t get into it) — as I was saying, when it comes to <em>real money</em> instead of a check, when it comes, say, to the banknotes and coins symbolized by that check, you understand that your credit is only worth a slim portion of its nominal value, namely the portion held on reserve by the bank itself.</p><p>The proof of the cake of what I just said is always the same and, be it real or virtual money, fiat or crypto, it comes down to the run-to-the-bank. Nobody can squeeze out of a bank more than they find inside it.</p><p>That’s the way things are since we stopped using a piece of gold for money. That’s the way things were even earlier, when the Medicis coined their own golden florin and then let its value gradually inflate. To us, money has become that theological, ethereal notion I mentioned above (which I won’t go into, I promise). Money is good till it’s not good anymore, and not a minute longer. But as long as the good lasts, why complain?</p><p>I declared above that Bancor sells BNTs high and buys them back low. This is no secret, this is no discovery of mine. It’s amply and clearly codified in the white paper. All of the contributors to the initial crowdsale (I’m one of them) were told about it, in clear words and clearer equations. Supposedly, when we traded ETHs for BNTs, we all knew what we were doing. (Did I really, I wonder? More about it presently.)</p><p>Let us take a closer look at the manifest evidence. I’ll spare you the math (it’s all in the APPENDIX), and ask you to glance at the plot “Parent-Currency Cost/Revenue Versus BNT”.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/612/1*fQxl2jNJ_vA_K5eK68Y4Nw.png" /><figcaption>Parent-Currency ETH Cost or Revenue versus BNT</figcaption></figure><p>First, the superimposed red and blue curves. They coincide because they tell the same story. If I trade a certain amount of the parent currency, say ETH, for BNT, I obtain a certain amount of BNT (red curve); and if I want to bring home that very amount of BNT, I pay that very same amount of ETH (blue curve). Both curves are convex: the greater the amount of BNT I seek, the more-than-proportionally fast grows my payment in ETH.</p><p>The exact opposite occurs with the green and concave curve, whose first derivative (see APPENDIX) tells me that the greater the amount of BNT I trade back at the token changer, the more-then-proportionally slowly grows the payment I receive in ETH. But don’t even bother to look at the derivatives in the APPENDIX: the growing gap between the red and green curves tells the whole sad story. The top limit of the green curve is equal to the quantity of ETH held on reserve (in the case of BNT, a paltry 10% of total supply).</p><p>The beauty of the Bancor project is that prompt liquidity is always available at the token changer, regardless of whether there is a warm-blooded buyer for you BNTs or a warm-blooded seller for your ETHs. Yet, it’s safe to say that the token changer is an exchange of last resort, to be used only when you are in dire need.</p><p>Even Bancor’s arbitrageurs, whose mission is vital to the Bancor project, ought to tread these waters cautiously. It is the arbitrageurs’ task to bring the token changer’s BNT price and the crypto-exchanges’ BNT price back to market equilibrium. Yet, as I just showed, it’s not that a plain comparison of the token changer’s price and the crypto-exchanges’ price may give the arbitrageurs, price-wise, a reliable cross-section of the current state of things. Their very act of feeding the token changer with the BNT amount they want to buy or sell changes the BNT price they’ll pay or will be paid; and this price changes in different proportions according to whether they are buyers or sellers.</p><p>In sum, nothing new on the crypto front: banking-wise, Banco’s multicrypto clearing system is a sober reminder of the reality principle, of the apologetic murmur that must follow Brando’s shout — its everyday prose clashing against the poetry of the blockchain we are all eager to listen to.</p><p>Full-disclosure time: I still hodl my stash of BNTs. I acquired them in stages, at prices increasingly lower. Every time it looked like a bargain, and every time, soon, the price went even lower. (I’ve lost track of the pattern, I confess.) Yet, I’m reluctant to liquidate my stash. Why? I am not sure, just as I am not sure why I kept squandering my small savings onto this project. Was I succumbing to Galia’s siren’s chant? More likely, it was because I tend to feel deep sympathy for all those who, like Galia, like Eyal, like Guy, undertake original and innovative, blockchain-based projects with evidently well-meaning intentions. So, here I am, hoping against hope.</p><p>And talking of paltry savings… My Polish math tutor at York University is amazing. He must pay his bills too, though. So, Autumn is here, and with the season comes my student fees’ deadline. That’s why, as usual, I give you here that other musical me, the one in keys:</p><p>ETH: 0x61515EA460fa100a901d0Bb435A9d84698BDE74A</p><p>BCH:12ukKi64AwXDeFkhCN1LmWEQRLCs1ddMP1</p><p>BTC: 131t1fX5g2K6qYkg97yLwJJ2HLVqrY3ztP</p><h3>APPENDIX</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*N51HQ5FNbSz6yStf3RPGhg.png" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=92eb1c811191" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Constitutional Rights of a Dumb Contract]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@balsamo.gian/constitutional-rights-of-a-dumb-contract-56c567874d1e?source=rss-d48ae2e1f7a8------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/56c567874d1e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[gnosis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[augur]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tezos]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[prediction-markets]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Gian Balsamo]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 04 Sep 2017 14:21:18 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-09-04T14:21:18.177Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>On Regulation of Prediction Markets</h3><p>It could be the title of a novel by Pirandello: “Constitutional Rights of a Dumb Contract.” And after dusting off my novelist cap, I could be its author. But since I became a student of the blockchain, I have no time any longer for book writing. Today I’ll limit myself to giving you the abstract, hoping my friends Martin Köppelmann (who years ago introduced me to the notion of prediction markets), and Kathleen and Arthur Brietman (who lead the most vibrant crypto-community ever) will ponder it.</p><p>One of the benefits from becoming an American citizen is that in the process one discovers the beauty and power of the Law. For people born in the States it is hard to believe it, but contrary to many Western (and most non-Western) countries, it is an extraordinary fact that the American law is designed and conceived to protect our rights. In my country of origin, one is taught to dodge the law, rather than use it.</p><p>My point being that in the USA even my prediction market contracts, be they smart or dumb, have rights.</p><p>The 2014 Supreme Court’s decision on Citizens United vs. <a href="http://www.latimes.com/topic/politics-government/government/federal-election-commission-ORGOV0000275-topic.html">Federal Election Commission</a> states that corporations are people. The 2014 decision in Burwell vs. Hobby Lobby Stores extends the idea that corporations are people from campaign finance law into the sphere of religious liberty. It is high time we lobby for a further extension of this idea to prediction markets.</p><p>My point being that crypto-anarchism has been a fun trip (I was a blockchainer long before the Department of Justice started paying attention to Mr. Charlie Shrem), yet the time has come to start playing politics — the Washington brand included.</p><p>With its gathering and expression of collective wisdom, the prediction market is no less a speaker than corporations and religious organizations; it advances social and utilitarian goals no less than the latter two, its predictions display to an undeniable extent the truth-seeking function that is promoted and protected by the First Amendment.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*b_SU6OMIVwCHveHYj5uUfg.png" /><figcaption>The Fortune Teller — Caravaggio, 1594</figcaption></figure><p>Robin Hanson is right, it goes more or less this way: we vote on value and act on belief. I voted for Hilary but knew that Trump would win. Had I been a builder, you’d have caught me, while still in the voting booth, either designing Trump’s Big Wall or strategizing on the best ways to take over the markets left unguarded by competitors distracted by the Big Wall. Values still count, Hanson’s futarchy doesn’t make us value-agnostic.</p><p>Hanson’s futarchy is informed by a dramatically broader application (from securities to ideas) of the mathematical apparatus of option trading (to which, incidentally, Einstein gave a fundamental contribution in 1905). The future of virtually everything matters; everything has a market value, if I can predict its future state. If I predict the future state of an election and help either wall builders or undocumented workers make a winning strategy (the latter would be hedging against the outcome), of course I deserve a reward.</p><p>What do the forthcoming blockchain-hinged prediction markets look like? How are they going to work? If I look closer to Martin’s Gnosis (but there is Augur too, and at some moment in the future, as we heard from Kathleen “breitwoman”, Tezos), it works more or less like this.</p><p>I can invest 10 GNO on the USA presidential elections. In return for freezing those tokens (let’s use this neutral term, tokens), I am given 10 contracts saying that Trump will win and 10 contracts saying that Hilary will win. In my book, the former are smart contracts (even if, based on values, I’ll vote for Hilary), the later are dumb contracts. I sell the dumb contracts (to buyers who see smart contracts in them) and keep the smart one.</p><p>In doing this, I am exercising a twofold form of free speech. I contribute to gathering the collective wisdom that Trump will win by refusing to be financially damaged by the opposite opinion, the one promoted by my ten dumb contracts. The way I shuffle my twenty contracts affects the present state of the prediction. I will vote for Hilary, but it is in my financial interest, and therefore one of my citizen’s rights, to act according to what I think will really happen. By doing this, I enhance my fellow citizens’ right and need to foresee the future and prepare for [hedge against] it).</p><p>And even if I lie and hodl the dumb contracts in the attempt to affect the final result (it is my right too), the market will correct my lie by arbitrage: I’ll lose both the election and my tokens.</p><p>The most aggressive agency seeking to regulate prediction markets is the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). But in this case, aggression doesn’t necessarily bespeak ill intention or bad outcome. In fact, according to Miriam Cherry and Robert Rogers, inspirers of this piece of mine (See their “Prediction Markets and the First Amendment”), it’s to be hoped that full jurisdiction on prediction markets will go to the CFTC. The alternative would consist in prediction market being regulated via the 2006 Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act. In this latter case, blockchain-based prediction markets might end up being banned from the USA. But in the light of what I wrote above, it seems evident to me that only a deliberately narrow view of prediction markets would justify the identification of prediction with gambling.</p><p>Rather, participation in a prediction market could be more legitimately equated with contribution to the op-ed page of the New York Times (an idea as well of Cherry and Rogers). In both cases, one manifests an opinion, usually based on forecast. In both cases, there is the prospect of a payout; in the NYT case, the payout is sure, whether or not the editorialist is correct in his/her opinion (let’s be crypto-anarchists a moment longer and say it: most of the time s/he is wrong); in the prediction market case, the payout is uncertain, depending mostly on one’s skills at gathering correct predictive information before making one’s move.</p><p>A piece of anecdotal evidence. In a 2005 case, the CFTC asserted jurisdiction over an Irish company, Tradesports, which ran prediction market and sports betting. The case was settled with the payment of a civil monetary penalty and the delisting of markets, such as gold futures and daily crudes, that duplicated, unlicensed, commodity option trading. The other predictive-event markets run by Tradesports, and based on futural knowledge and information, were left alone.</p><p>I find the expression “to put one’s money where one’s mouth is” distasteful. So, I won’t use it. (It’s not just a matter of flavor. Rather, as I wrote somewhere else, I believe that we blockchainers are in it for the social mission first of all, and for desirable personal gain second of all. It’s the taste of freedom from an unfair past we like.) In futarchistic fashion, however, having praised both the American Constitution and prediction markets, having predicted their peaceful coexistence — having in other words declared both my values and my beliefs — I’ll make my move.</p><p>In recent months I acquired a small stash of GNO, REP, and XTZ. To me, there isn’t a single dumb contract among them. I am a hodler. And that’s my long-term move.</p><p>Thanks for reading. As usual, this is me in public keys (to pay for my student fees at the University of York — or to increase my stash, whatever):</p><p>ETH: 0x61515EA460fa100a901d0Bb435A9d84698BDE74A</p><p>BCH:12ukKi64AwXDeFkhCN1LmWEQRLCs1ddMP1</p><p>BTC: 131t1fX5g2K6qYkg97yLwJJ2HLVqrY3ztP</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=56c567874d1e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Prism and the Cost of Money]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@balsamo.gian/prism-and-the-cost-of-money-f4c5e1400f4a?source=rss-d48ae2e1f7a8------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f4c5e1400f4a</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bitcoin]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[prism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ethereum]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Gian Balsamo]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 21 Aug 2017 15:16:20 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-08-21T15:16:20.565Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This is the official definition: “a Prism is a custom-built portfolio of digital assets (aka cryptocurrencies).” It doesn’t give you “access to the actual digital assets,” but to their price movements. It’s decentralized because your invested funds (only expressed in Ethers for now), matched by an equivalent collateral value (in Ethers as well), are held by an escrow contract over which you and the Prism code, written mostly by Prism’s brilliant Lead Architect, Raine Revere, have total control. An oracle tells you how your portfolio is faring, and after a 24-hour waiting period from its creation, you can either sell or (for a fee) rebalance it.</p><p>A Prism is a virtual portfolio at the square power, both in the sense that it is indexed on virtual currencies and in the sense that it does not truly hold them: it is an as-if portfolio, a bet that your chosen aggregate of cryptocurrencies will do well (or bad, if you go short on it) on the market. As such, investing in a Prism is tantamount to betting on a horse.</p><p>In fact, the Prism app (see picture, showing the Leaderboard, which ranks current portfolios by performance) is a sort of personalized wagering window. When you bet on a horse, you don’t own a small piece of the horse, you just make the fate of your wagered money depend on the horse’s performance; the same principle applies to your Prism, it makes your invested money depend on a virtual portfolio’s performance. The major difference between betting at the races and investing in a Prism is that time is irrelevant to the race; your money doesn’t gain or lose value between the moment you place your bet and the end of the race, while it does change value when you invest it in a portfolio bound to exist for longer than a day.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*m4CNG308dtUv9Y_It_SJVw.png" /><figcaption>PRISM: LeaderBoard</figcaption></figure><p>Let me cut to the chase, then.</p><p>I will model my investment in a Prism on the analogy of the horse race. In order to simplify and shorten this exposition, our race will last exactly one year. (This model’s execution may be complicated at whim, of course, stopping-time-wise, diversification-wise, etc., based on your acquaintance with security options.) This one will be a special race, in the sense that our horse (we need just one) is genetically modified to run no-stop for the duration. Let’s call it BTC Horse.</p><p>I bet $10,000 on BTC horse’s win, one year from now. The rival of BTC will be a mechanical horse, let’s call it Numeraire Horse. If at the end of the race, BTC Horse has one meter advantage over its rival, I gain $100; two meters earn me $200; 10,000 meters earn me a 100% profit. However, if my horse outruns its rival of, say, 13,000 meters, I still get only a $10,000 gain. Why?</p><p>The answer is in the nature of the Betting House where I make my bet. It is a decentralized House, it doesn’t claim any control over my wagered money. The moment I place my bet at the Betting House, my money goes into an escrow contract and is matched by the collateral money of whoever is betting against my horse. If no one is, or if their bet is smaller than mine, the difference in the collateral is put down by the House itself. So, this is a horse race where my odds are always 1 to 1. Or almost — there is a small devil in this detail, as we’ll see presently.</p><p>This race is equivalent to my $10,000 Prism contract being worth $10,100 if BTC gains 1% over the course of one year, etc. In the picture of the Prism leaderboard, the “MyInvestmentPrism” portfolio, whose performance is the second highest ranking in the Prism’s Beta version as I write, has gained 24.34% over its original value — the equivalent of 24.34 meters in my model.</p><p>Someone else bets $5,000 on Numeraire Horse; in other words, they go short on BTC Horse. Their money goes into my escrow contract. The House (let’s call it with its name here: Shapeshift) puts down the missing $5,000 to balance the win and lose (long and short) bets. As an incentive to put down this money, I promise to pay 1% monthly interest on this sum to the House. (Remember, this is a race where time affects the value of the wagered money.)</p><p>It falls upon me to pay this interest, and not on the person who went short on BTC Horse, because it is I who created the $5,000 gap by investing more than they; à propos, see Raine <a href="https://blog.prism.exchange/blog/prism-fee-update">Revere</a>. It also makes horse-race sense: in gambling and betting, your odds mirror the inverse ratio between payoff and stake, or in other words, betting with the majority pays more likely yet smaller dividends. In line with Revere’s just-mentioned contribution, I promise a 1% monthly incentive to the House because, at present, this percent “is roughly commensurate with the ETH borrowing rates at exchanges.”</p><p>Let’s take stock of our commitments and run the race. I invest $10,000, which at a 1% compounded interest rate is equivalent to roughly $12,600 in one year, at the end of the race. I pay half of that increase as an incentive to the House (read: Shapeshift) to put down the missing money. (My example models such a situation. Depending on the presence and activity of BTC Horse shorters, it could be a smaller or greater percentage. Raine Revere’s writings are not totally clear about it, but I’m inclined to think I’m not being asked to pay interest also to the shorters of my position.) I pay about $2 to the House (Shapeshift) as a fee for the usage of their betting app. And I pay about $14 in gas to Ethereum to enable the placing of my bet (read: the creation of my Prism). My total investment amounts to $ 13,916 (all my numbers are approximated by defect). To get even, I need for BTC Horse to outrun Numeraire Horse of at least 39.16 meters. In terms of cryptocurrency, I need BTC to increase in value at a solid 39.16% yearly rate. Not an impossible goal, but still…</p><p>This is the end of the chase. Based on this simplified horse race model, you can try out all conceivable alternative scenarios, all sorts of diversifications and stopping-time sequences. I won’t impinge on your financial imagination.</p><p>An alternative investment opportunity might look like this. You go to your Poloniex account (or Kraken, or Bitfinex etc.), invest your $10,000 in the real assets (BTC in my simple example, but it could be such a hugely diversified portfolio that you can’t hold it in a hardware wallet), and, after paying much more modest fees, reap the benefits (or suffer the losses) accordingly. In this case, your $10,000 investment is equivalent to $12,600 one year from now: this is the present value, the cost of your money. The overhead is around $1,300 lighter than the Prism overhead. A further advantage is that the structure of my Poloniex portfolio is known only to me, while, at present, anyone with access to the Prism app can “borrow” from my strategy if it is high ranking on the Leaderboard. To create this sort of real portfolio takes a bit more tech-savviness than operating the Prism app, true — but not that much.</p><p>However, in going this way you run into “regulatory risk,” to use Revere’s words. Indeed, who knows if all currencies in your wallet will survive future Federal regulations? Who knows, moreover, the extent to which Poloniex will be solvent in the future — I mention it as it’s a recurring nightmare of Poloniex’s customers, or so I hear, although this financial institution has always been solvent and quite decent to me.</p><p>One last word on the socio-moral issue. After all, we blockchainers are in it for the social mission first of all, and for desirable personal gain second of all. It is maintained by many people, me included, that one of the benefits of thousands and thousands of traders trading daily on the exchange markets is the achievement of (relative) fair prices and the containment of arbitrage. It is one of the pillars of competitive markets. No such contribution derives to any market, not even the racing horse market, from betting at the races. (No less than betting odds, the price of a thoroughbred depends on wins and reputation, and not the other way around.) Horse betting and Prism portfolio-building are purely speculative and recreational, with no positive social attributes.</p><p>You may ask: isn’t a Prism the equivalent of an option, a derivative on a set of currencies? (Let’s leave aside the currency-versus-security thorny issue.) Is option trading on Wall Street equally sterile from a socio-moral viewpoint? I would put it this way — and here is what I deem, on the long run, the potentially redemptive attribute of Prism. There is a high degree of permeability between derivative trading and stock trading on Wall Street: the information flow goes both ways, both markets affect each other, and both affect the prices. The day a robust ecosystem of digital financial transactions will be in place, the owner of a Prism will be the player in a socially beneficial network. I can easily picture Prim’s future contributions to a prediction-market network orbiting the likes of my friend Martin Koppelmann’s <a href="https://forum.gnosis.pm/">Gnosis</a>.</p><p>I won’t make predictions on the timing of such future state of affairs, because in these euphoric days any prediction is tinged with excessive optimism, and one knows too well, doesn’t one? what comes after a trader’s euphoria.</p><p>That’s all. This is Prism as I understand it.</p><p>I’m ready and more than willing to stand corrected, of course.</p><p>Thanks for reading. This is me in public keys (to pay for my student fees at the University of York):</p><p>ETH: 0x61515EA460fa100a901d0Bb435A9d84698BDE74A</p><p>BCH:12ukKi64AwXDeFkhCN1LmWEQRLCs1ddMP1</p><p>BTC: 131t1fX5g2K6qYkg97yLwJJ2HLVqrY3ztP</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f4c5e1400f4a" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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