<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0" xmlns:cc="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rss/creativeCommonsRssModule.html">
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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Bassemwanies on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Bassemwanies on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@bassemwanies2002?source=rss-5eba6fd287c9------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Bassemwanies on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@bassemwanies2002?source=rss-5eba6fd287c9------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[⌛ Pending Invite Hijack — Takeover via Improper Identity Linking]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@bassemwanies2002/pending-invite-hijack-takeover-via-improper-identity-linking-905619fff772?source=rss-5eba6fd287c9------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/905619fff772</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[red-team]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-tips]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-writeup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Bassemwanies]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 15 Sep 2025 06:46:42 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-09-15T06:46:42.973Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>⌛ Pending Invite Hijack — Takeover via Improper Identity Linking</h3><p>{وَمَا تَوْفِيقِي إِلَّا بِاللَّهِ} [هود: 88]</p><h3>✍️ About Me</h3><p>I’m Bassem (AKA. <strong>satan11</strong>), a bug bounty hunter and aspiring penetration tester. I publish real-world writeups to help others learn from the bugs I find in live programs.</p><h3>📌 Summary</h3><p>A low-privileged <strong>Observer</strong> account on a cloud management platform could manipulate the profile update flow to claim a <strong>pending administrator</strong>’s email/login values. After this change, the attacker could log in with the admin’s email using the attacker’s own password and obtain full administrative access — without needing access to the admin’s inbox or credentials. This is a <strong>full account takeover</strong> via improper identity-linking validation and allows immediate privilege escalation.</p><h3>⚙️ Affected functionality</h3><ul><li>Account profile update endpoint (user profile/edit)</li><li>Invitation workflow for workspace administrators (pending invited admin)</li><li>Authentication/login flow that accepts the updated email/login mapping</li></ul><h3>✅ Steps to Reproduce</h3><ol><li>While trying the update account flow I noticed that:<br>- The user can’t change his email (The UI forbid it and the docs says that user should only contact support to do so)</li><li>So I looked into the request in burp and found that the user email is showing twice in the request:</li></ol><pre>{<br>  &quot;profile&quot;: {<br>    &quot;firstName&quot;: &quot;Attacker&quot;,<br>    &quot;email&quot;: &quot;victimadmin@example.com&quot;,<br>    &quot;login&quot;: &quot;victim.admin@example.com&quot;,<br>    &quot;UserUpdatedGTSAttribute&quot;: &quot;Y&quot;,<br>    &quot;preferredLanguage&quot;: &quot;en&quot;<br>  },<br>  &quot;access_token&quot;: &quot;&lt;valid token&gt;&quot;<br>}</pre><p><strong>email:</strong> Used in internal operations in the organization<br><strong>login:</strong> Is used only for login process</p><p><strong>Notes:</strong></p><ul><li>you can’t change the mail to an registered email, so no account takeover here :(</li><li>changing email changes also the login parameter but not vice versa.</li></ul><p>3. I changed the email to another email and tried to login with the new mail but old password, that logged me in with that email !!<br>but I wasn’t in the same organizations I was in before.</p><p>So that made me think what if there’s a pending invitation for a user with higher privilege? Can I takeover his account before he does?</p><p>Let’s try so!</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/200/1*RKla7xGv6cDzwpaLPlqn-w.gif" /></figure><p>4. I sent an admin invitation to an unregistered email as the admin of the organization.</p><p>5. then I changed the attacker email (a user in the organization who has the lowest privilege in the organization) to that pending invitation email.<br>| and yes he can see the pending invitations!</p><p>6. Yes, as you think! I could login with his email and my password and the state of the invitation in the organization is changed to be verified without email verification!</p><h3>🎯 Impact</h3><ul><li><strong>Full pre-account takeover</strong> of pending/invited administrator accounts.</li><li><strong>Privilege escalation</strong>: Observer → Administrator, enabling access to sensitive controls and data.</li><li><strong>No inbox access required</strong>: Attacker does not rely on email interception or password compromise.</li><li><strong>Persistence &amp; abuse</strong>: If the victim never accepts the invite, the attacker still gains control of that eventual account.</li><li><strong>Business risk</strong>: Data exfiltration, configuration changes, app installation/removal, user lockouts, and overall environment compromise.</li></ul><p>And <strong>Alhamdullilah the second valid bug!</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/372/1*qbSpaOLeSNDv-P7ZKu-o4A.png" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=905619fff772" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[ Healthcheck in the Wild — How an Unauthenticated Endpoint Leaked Internal Server Details]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@bassemwanies2002/healthcheck-in-the-wild-how-an-unauthenticated-endpoint-leaked-internal-server-details-0d4d4a3374ea?source=rss-5eba6fd287c9------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/0d4d4a3374ea</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-tips]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bugbounty-writeup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-writeup]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Bassemwanies]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 15 Sep 2025 06:04:36 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-09-15T06:04:36.358Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>🔎 Healthcheck in the Wild — How an Unauthenticated Endpoint Leaked Internal Server Details</h3><p>{وَمَا تَوْفِيقِي إِلَّا بِاللَّهِ} [هود: 88]</p><h3>✍️ About Me</h3><p>I’m Bassem (AKA. <strong>satan11</strong>), a bug bounty hunter and aspiring penetration tester. I publish real-world writeups to help others learn from the bugs I find in live programs.</p><h3>📌 Summary</h3><p>An unauthenticated healthcheck endpoint exposed on a public host (path: /healthcheck.aspx) returned <strong>internal configuration and operational details</strong>. The page revealed sensitive server information — including physical server name, internal Windows paths, ASP.NET version, and file-existence check logic — which lowers the bar for attackers to plan targeted follow-up attacks.</p><h3>🔎 How I found the exposed /healthcheck.aspx</h3><ol><li><strong>Discover subdomains</strong><br> I enumerate subdomains first to expand my attack surface.<br> tools I use:</li></ol><ul><li>subfinder -d example.com -o subdomains.txt</li><li>gobuster dns -d example.com -w common.txt -o gobuster_subdomains.txt</li><li>(optional) amass enum -d example.com -o amass.txt</li></ul><p><strong>2. Probe for live hosts &amp; basic tech info</strong><br> I pipe discovered subdomains into httpx to check which hosts are alive and collect simple metadata:</p><ul><li>httpx -l subdomains.txt -status-code -title -o live.txt<br> Purpose: narrow the list to responsive hosts and quickly spot pages that reveal technologies in their titles or banners.</li></ul><p><strong>3. Quick directory discovery to identify tech &amp; file types</strong><br> On hosts that look interesting, I run a fast directory enumeration (dir mode) to discover visible files and infer what technologies are in use:</p><ul><li>gobuster dir -u https://interesting.example.com -w /path/to/common.txt <br> Look for file extensions and filenames in results (e.g., .aspx, .php, .env, /healthcheck, /status).<br> Purpose: learn what file types and endpoints are present so I can tune deeper scans.</li></ul><p><strong>4. Targeted directory scan with focused wordlist + file extensions</strong><br> After spotting likely file types (e.g., .aspx) I run a more focused directory scan using a medium-sized wordlist and the -x flag to search for specific extensions:</p><ul><li>gobuster dir -u https://interesting.example.com -w /path/to/raft-medium-directories.txt -x aspx,html,js -o gobuster-raft.txt</li></ul><p><strong>5. Inspect discovered assets manually</strong><br> When gobuster/httpx return candidate paths, I open them in a browser and inspect the raw response for internal paths, server names, or version info — always avoiding any destructive or unauthorized interaction.</p><p>After doing the previuos steps I found a <strong>healthcheck.aspx</strong> page which exposes:</p><ul><li>Physical Server Name</li><li>Internal Physical Path</li><li>Existence of file</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*3-Yel0l0SgUK42gE-7cngQ.png" /><figcaption>healthcheck.aspx</figcaption></figure><p>And yes finally <strong>alhamdullilah</strong> my <strong>First Valid Report</strong> !! 🥳🎉🎊</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/373/1*ndzrdbCtFQIwCIC7gKXYRw.png" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=0d4d4a3374ea" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Secrets in Plain Sight: How I Found a Hardcoded API Key in a Public JS File]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@bassemwanies2002/secrets-in-plain-sight-how-i-found-a-hardcoded-api-key-in-a-public-js-file-51656593bbb9?source=rss-5eba6fd287c9------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/51656593bbb9</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-tips]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-writeup]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Bassemwanies]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 15 Sep 2025 05:14:34 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-09-15T05:14:34.854Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>{وَقُل رَّبِّ زِدْنِي عِلْمًا} [طه: 114]</p><h3>✍️ About Me</h3><p>I’m Bassem (AKA. <strong>satan11</strong>), a bug bounty hunter and aspiring penetration tester. I publish real-world writeups to help others learn from the bugs I find in live programs.</p><h3>📌 Summary</h3><p>This writeup covers discovering <strong>a hardcoded API key</strong> and other secrets inside a publicly exposed JavaScript file. I’ll show how I found the leak (using safe, public techniques), what the impact is, and how developers can prevent this class of mistakes.</p><blockquote><strong><em>Note:</em></strong><em> all sensitive values shown below are </em><strong><em>redacted</em></strong><em>. Never publish live secrets — I replace them with </em><em>[REDACTED] in public writeups.</em></blockquote><h3>✅ Steps I Took</h3><ol><li>I started with basic reconnaissance — building a sitemap and clicking through the application to discover endpoints and public assets (JS bundles, static files, etc.).</li><li>After manual browsing and targeted recon on microservices, I didn’t find anything obvious at first.</li><li>While reading security posts on Twitter I came across a reference to a public GitHub repo for <a href="https://medium.com/u/ddfff40fe2">h4x0r_dz</a> that collects leaked credentials detection regexes and tips. I used that as inspiration (and followed public, ethical processes).</li></ol><blockquote><strong>Repo link: <br></strong><a href="https://github.com/h4x0r-dz/Leaked-Credentials/?tab=readme-ov-file">https://github.com/h4x0r-dz/Leaked-Credentials/?tab=readme-ov-file</a></blockquote><p>4. I searched in my burpsuite and I came across this:</p><pre>JSON.stringify({<br>  client_id: &quot;3&quot;,<br>  grant_type: &quot;client_credentials&quot;,<br>  client_secret: &quot;[REDACTED_CLIENT_SECRET]&quot;,<br>  scope: &quot;view-hotel-listings&quot;<br>});<br><br>var o = function () {<br>  var c;<br>  return (c = e.env.SECRET_KEY) != null ? c : &quot;[REDACTED_FALLBACK_SECRET]&quot;;<br>};</pre><h3>⚡ Impact</h3><p>Hardcoded credentials in client-visible or public server-side files can lead to:</p><ul><li><strong>Immediate credential compromise</strong> — attackers can use leaked API keys to call backend APIs or third-party services.</li><li><strong>Data exfiltration</strong> — depending on the scope of the credentials, this can expose PII, internal records, or system configuration.</li><li><strong>Lateral movement &amp; privilege escalation</strong> — stolen keys sometimes allow onboarding of new resources or modification of configuration.</li><li><strong>Operational and financial risk</strong> — abuse of third-party services (APIs, cloud) can have cost and availability implications.</li></ul><p>Even if a key is scoped (e.g., view-hotel-listings), leaking it publicly undermines the principle of least privilege and is often the first step in larger attacks (recon, phishing, chaining).</p><p>However this ended up to be a duplicate finding:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/375/1*xSIVPr2pfXuOdcIsfA-pvQ.png" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=51656593bbb9" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[From Manage Members to Full Admin: Privilege Escalation in a GraphQL API]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@bassemwanies2002/from-manage-members-to-full-admin-privilege-escalation-in-a-graphql-api-b58699829d6e?source=rss-5eba6fd287c9------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b58699829d6e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-writeup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-hunting]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[real-world-bug-hunting]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Bassemwanies]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 02 Sep 2025 21:32:57 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-09-02T21:32:57.323Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>{وَقُل رَّبِّ زِدْنِي عِلْمًا} [طه: 114]</p><h3>✍️ About Me</h3><p>I’m Bassem (AKA. <strong>satan11</strong>), a bug bounty hunter and aspiring penetration tester. I publish real-world writeups to help others learn from the bugs I find in live programs.</p><h3>📌 Summary</h3><p>This writeup covers a <strong>Privilege Escalation vulnerability</strong> I discovered in a GraphQL API where a user with only <strong>manage_members</strong> permissions could directly <strong>escalate their own privileges</strong> to more powerful roles (e.g., view_financials, manage_apps, or even full admin rights).</p><p>The flaw undermined the <strong>role-based access control (RBAC)</strong> model and could lead to complete compromise of the affected workspace or store.</p><h3>⚙️ Affected Functionality</h3><ul><li>API Endpoint: /api/graphql</li><li>Mutation: UpdateMembership</li><li>Role: User with manage_members permission only</li></ul><h3>🧪 Technical Breakdown</h3><p>The vulnerability occurred because the UpdateMembership mutation allowed users with <strong>basic member-management rights</strong> to not just invite/edit others, but also to <strong>modify their own permission sets</strong>.</p><p>This created a privilege escalation path where a low-privileged user could turn themselves into an administrator.</p><h4>✅ Steps to Reproduce</h4><ol><li><strong>Invite a user with only </strong><strong>manage_members permission.</strong><br> (This user should have very limited scope — just to add/remove/edit members.)</li><li><strong>Log in as that invited user.</strong><br> Confirm in the UI that your permissions are limited.</li><li><strong>Updating the permissions of the invited user (you) triggers this request:</strong></li></ol><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/742/1*M-ke6Y2LxfwIC0kQLjqUSQ.png" /></figure><p><strong>4. Observe the response:</strong><br> The mutation succeeds and the role now includes unauthorized permissions</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/748/1*Z8N-Dva5pT8vLcN58MsnWw.png" /></figure><ul><li><strong>Verify in the UI:</strong><br> Before:</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*59hoZ3tE9phPX-h3gEuicQ.png" /></figure><p>After:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*mnpDX32NGlr6VbFQshxalw.png" /></figure><h3>🎯 Impact</h3><p>This vulnerability results in:</p><ul><li><strong>Confidentiality breach:</strong> Unauthorized access to sensitive financial data and store records.</li><li><strong>Integrity violation:</strong> Ability to change configurations, apps, and user roles.</li><li><strong>Availability impact:</strong> Attacker could remove/lock out legitimate admins, disrupt operations, or manipulate store settings.</li></ul><p>In essence, a <strong>low-privilege user could compromise the entire environment.</strong></p><h3>🧩 Root Cause</h3><ul><li>Over-trust in the manage_members permission.</li><li>Backend API failed to differentiate <strong>“manage others” vs. “manage self.”</strong></li><li>Missing <strong>authorization checks</strong> at the GraphQL resolver level.</li></ul><p>And this one also was reported as Info because it was listed in the known issues, but thanks god it’s not NA:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/373/1*4qZQWpEHU-gvUDU6s8V4lg.png" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b58699829d6e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Insufficient Access Controls in GraphQL Enables Unauthorized User Enumeration]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@bassemwanies2002/insufficient-access-controls-in-graphql-enables-unauthorized-user-enumeration-400d24e40208?source=rss-5eba6fd287c9------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/400d24e40208</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[graphql]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-writeup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-hunting]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-hunting]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Bassemwanies]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 22 Jul 2025 21:32:52 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-07-22T21:32:52.111Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>قَالَ اللَّهُ تَعَالَى: {يَرْفَعِ اللَّهُ الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا مِنكُمْ وَالَّذِينَ أُوتُوا الْعِلْمَ دَرَجَاتٍ ۚ وَاللَّهُ بِمَا تَعْمَلُونَ خَبِيرٌ} (سورة المجادلة، الآية 11).</p><h3>✍️ About Me</h3><p>I’m Bassem (AKA. <strong>satan11</strong>), a bug bounty hunter and aspiring penetration tester. I publish real-world writeups to help others learn from the bugs I find in live programs.</p><h3>📌 Summary</h3><p>In this writeup, I break down a <strong>Broken Access Control vulnerability</strong> I discovered in a GraphQL API used by a major SaaS CRM platform. The bug allowed an authenticated user with <strong>View-Only privileges</strong> to <strong>leak internal employee data</strong> (names, emails, permissions) by abusing a GraphQL query.</p><p>The vulnerability stemmed from insufficient backend permission checks on a sensitive query (contacts_search / ListingLibCrmSearchQuery), leading to <strong>PII exposure</strong> and potential internal mapping of roles and permissions — all without any elevated access.</p><h3>⚙️ Severity:</h3><p><strong>Broken Access Control / Sensitive Data Exposure</strong></p><h3>🧑‍💼 Affected User Role:</h3><p>Low-privilege user (View-Only seat)</p><h3>🧪 Technical Details &amp; Steps to Reproduce</h3><p>The issue was found in a GraphQL endpoint that failed to verify whether a user with minimal privileges should access internal CRM data.</p><h4>✅ Steps to Reproduce</h4><ol><li><strong>Login with a View-Only user account.</strong><br> Navigating to the users page in the browser returns a restricted UI like this:</li></ol><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*nXDUZ_oVwvpnNK5zN7LlYg.png" /></figure><p>2. Send a Crafted Post Request to the GraphQL Endpoint:</p><pre>POST /api/graphql/crm<br>Content-Type: application/json<br>Redacted-Csrf-Token: &lt;ViewOnlyUserCsrfToken&gt;<br>Cookies: sessiontoken=&lt;ViewOnlyUserToken&gt;; Redacted-Csrf-Token: &lt;ViewOnlyUserCsrfToken&gt;</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*TffFJxKwAW0Vp3u7IigWbg.png" /></figure><p>Payload Used (redacted):</p><pre>{<br>  &quot;operationName&quot;: &quot;ListingLibCrmSearchQuery&quot;,<br>  &quot;variables&quot;: {<br>    ...<br>    &quot;objectTypeId&quot;: &quot;0-115&quot;,<br>    ...<br>  },<br>  &quot;query&quot;: &quot;query ListingLibCrmSearchQuery(...) { ... }&quot;<br>}</pre><p>As you have seen in the response (Showed Above) this confirmed that the query bypassed privilege checks and returned sensitive information.</p><h3>🔍 Data Exposed</h3><p>The response revealed:</p><ul><li><strong>First and Last Names</strong></li><li><strong>Email addresses</strong></li><li><strong>Internal role metadata</strong></li><li><strong>User permission flags (view/edit/delete/communicate)</strong></li></ul><h3>🎯 Impact</h3><ul><li><strong>PII Disclosure:</strong> Internal staff emails and names were exposed to low-privileged users.</li><li><strong>Reconnaissance:</strong> The data could help map internal org structure, aiding social engineering.</li><li><strong>Privilege Escalation Path Discovery:</strong> Attackers could analyze which users have elevated roles.</li></ul><p>This violates the principle of <strong>least privilege</strong> and could have cascading effects if used creatively in a multi-stage attack.</p><h3>🧩 Root Cause</h3><p>The backend GraphQL resolver for ListingLibCrmSearchQuery failed to:</p><ul><li>Enforce <strong>object-level authorization checks</strong>.</li><li>Properly restrict sensitive fields based on the <strong>authenticated user’s seat type</strong>.</li><li>Scope queries to the appropriate dataset (e.g., only contacts the user should see).</li></ul><p>Once Again this was triaged as Informative saying that accessing internal organization team data doesn’t have any security impact:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*05h5P6SjjDPBGbp4qdfSJA.png" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=400d24e40208" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Broken Access Control to Gain Unauthorized Role Management in a Public Program]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@bassemwanies2002/broken-access-control-to-gain-unauthorized-role-management-in-a-public-program-6925f83d0dc4?source=rss-5eba6fd287c9------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/6925f83d0dc4</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[real-world-bug-hunting]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-hunting]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-writeup]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Bassemwanies]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 20 Jul 2025 20:54:22 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-07-20T20:54:22.148Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>قَالَ اللَّهُ تَعَالَى: {يَرْفَعِ اللَّهُ الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا مِنكُمْ وَالَّذِينَ أُوتُوا الْعِلْمَ دَرَجَاتٍ ۚ وَاللَّهُ بِمَا تَعْمَلُونَ خَبِيرٌ} (سورة المجادلة، الآية 11).</p><h3>✍️ About Me</h3><p>I’m Bassem (AKA. <strong>satan11</strong>), a bug bounty hunter and aspiring penetration tester. I publish real-world writeups to help others learn from the bugs I find in live programs.</p><h3>📌 Summary</h3><p>In this writeup, I’ll walk you through how I discovered an <strong>improper access control vulnerability</strong> in a public bug bounty program. The vulnerability allowed a low-privileged <strong>Backoffice Editor</strong> to gain access to a restricted roles management endpoint — and not just view it, but also <strong>create, edit, and delete user roles</strong> that should have been off-limits.</p><p>The issue was caused by <strong>over-privileged JWT permissions</strong>, granting access beyond the intended scope.</p><h3>🕵️‍♂️ Target Endpoint (Redacted):</h3><p>/development/entitlements/roles</p><h3>👨‍💻 Affected Role:</h3><p>Backoffice Editor — meant to be limited to basic admin/backoffice operations.</p><h3>🧪 Technical Breakdown &amp; Reproduction Steps</h3><blockquote><em>The vulnerability stemmed from the </em><strong><em>JWT token assigned to the Backoffice Editor</em></strong><em>, which contained elevated permissions:</em></blockquote><pre>&quot;dp.entitlements.plans.read&quot;,<br>&quot;dp.entitlements.plans.write&quot;</pre><p>These were enough to bypass UI-level restrictions and interact directly with sensitive backend APIs.</p><h4>✅ Steps to Reproduce:</h4><ol><li><strong>Login as a Backoffice Editor</strong></li><li><strong>Visit the entitlements section. You’ll see a message like:</strong></li></ol><p><em>| “Roles &amp; permissions module is currently disabled.” |</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*YXfcpDzmg_oGUrHe3lQrhg.png" /></figure><p>3. <strong>Intercept and send a manual POST request</strong> to the role creation endpoint:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*eeBOYJAmMwaFyyWqmMY6Jg.png" /></figure><p>Observe the successful creation of the role:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/773/1*Tmh0ERFDw4fq0FbAZvaB9w.png" /></figure><h3>🎯 Impact</h3><p>This vulnerability allowed:</p><ul><li>Unauthorized access to the <strong>entitlements/roles</strong> module</li><li>Creation of arbitrary roles</li><li>Modification or deletion of existing roles</li></ul><p>Such access <strong>breaks the principle of least privilege</strong> and could lead to privilege escalation or broader security misconfigurations in a real-world deployment.</p><h3>🧩 Root Cause</h3><ul><li>Backend relied <strong>entirely on JWT claims</strong> for access control.</li><li>No <strong>role-based access enforcement</strong> at the endpoint level.</li><li>Frontend “disabled” UI provided a false sense of restriction.</li></ul><p>Eventually it was triaged as duplicate:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/365/1*xeRYeGW4d90I6j2brpeelw.png" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=6925f83d0dc4" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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