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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Vijaysimha Reddy Bathini on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Vijaysimha Reddy Bathini on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@bathinivijaysimhareddy?source=rss-e92cf259385c------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Vijaysimha Reddy Bathini on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@bathinivijaysimhareddy?source=rss-e92cf259385c------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[Tale of Account Takeovers (Part-2)]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@bathinivijaysimhareddy/tale-of-account-takeovers-part-2-9abf62de4ca3?source=rss-e92cf259385c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/9abf62de4ca3</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[infosec]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Vijaysimha Reddy Bathini]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 17 May 2020 18:36:39 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-06-21T05:56:46.486Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Hello guys, It’s my birthday today and on the occasion of my birthday, I’m here with the next part of <strong>Tale of Account Takeovers</strong>. It’s been a long time since I have released my part 1 of Tale of Account Takeovers so I thought of giving some time from my busy schedule and start working on this part. I got a good response from the community and compliments for the first part which I haven’t expected and I have got quite a few messages about when the second part will be released. I’d like to contribute little more for the community which will help them learn something new from a different perspective. Thanks to all who are constantly supporting me in my journey as a Bug Bounty Hunter.</p><p>In the last part, I have described two of my account takeover scenarios and in this blog post, I wanted to describe three account takeover scenarios which I thought were interesting than the others.</p><p>So without wasting time will get straight to the point. Account takeover scenarios 1 and 2 were present in the previous blog post if you haven’t read my first part of Tale of Account Takeovers go <a href="https://medium.com/@bathinivijaysimhareddy/tale-of-account-takeovers-part-1-b24e1f3c3187">check it out</a>.</p><p><strong>Account Takeover Scenario 3:</strong></p><p>There was a signup feature in this target so as usual, I created an account with fatrat@gmail.com and I logged in. As soon as I have created an account there was no verification email functionality. I have taken note of this in my notes and I have started checking for other functionalities. I have opened another browser and I tried to create an account with the same email as above. I was shocked that it created my account without any error. Then I created an account with testing@gmail.com and added info like credit card details, shipping address and I went to another browser and created an account with testing@gmail.com and to my surprise, the details which I kept were reflected in the new account and BOOM I got Account takeover.</p><p><strong>Exploit Scenario:</strong></p><ol><li>An attacker gets the victim’s email.</li><li>He creates an account with victim email and as the server is accepting to create an account with already existing email without any error.</li><li>We have successfully overridden the victim’s password.</li><li>This leads to ACCOUNT TAKEOVER</li></ol><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/498/1*NtT6DpI12w3vew6vohHYrg.gif" /></figure><p><strong>Account Takeover Scenario #4:</strong></p><p>I have created a new account and start playing with the requests. After logged in I have found a parameter(ZXlKMWMyVnlibUZ0WlNJNkltWmhkSEpoZERFME15SXNJbkJoYzNOM2IzSmtJam9pZG1scVlYbHliMk5yZWlKOT09) value in the cookies.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/525/1*QpHSurWV-GsFkqtauFDxbg.png" /><figcaption>Request</figcaption></figure><p>Whenever I see such values I always sent them to burp decoder and check whether they have used any encryption. As usual, I have tested for base64 decoding I got the output starting with ey… (If a value is starting with ey I assume it to be base64 encoded value). So I again decoded it.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*myTYUTOLX0YqlOt5p0fFDQ.png" /><figcaption>Burp decoder output</figcaption></figure><p>You can see that they are storing usernames and passwords in cookies which is a bad implementation. To grab the cookies we need an XSS vulnerability. I have already reported an XSS vulnerability two days ago on the same domain and the same I have chained it now which leads to ACCOUNT TAKEOVER.</p><p><strong>Exploit Scenario:</strong></p><ol><li>The attacker sends the XSS payload link to the victim and grabs the cookies of the victim.</li><li>The attacker double decodes the cookie parameter value and gets the username and password.</li></ol><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/480/1*d_iHOFJD2vXmTlPQHFGO9A.gif" /></figure><p><strong>Account Takeover Scenario #5:</strong></p><p>In this scenario, I will explain how I chained 2 low hanging bugs to Account takeover. There was a forgotten password functionality that sends a 5 digit code to your email. When we enter OTP I found that there is no rate limit protection on that endpoint so I have reported it to the company about this. This program was an external program not on Bugcrowd and HackerOne or any other platforms. After two days I got a reply from them stating that we know about this and you need to fire actually 1,00,000 to brute force the OTP from 00000 to 99999. So I started hunting for other bugs and I found that when we issue 10 forgot password requests only the last OTP code should be valid but I found that previous codes are not expiring even after issuing a new OTP. So I combined two rate limit bugs to chain it to P1 without any user interaction. I have made an assumption that the probability of OTP starting with 50XXX will be more than others. So the scenario we will be using no rate limit bug on forgot password endpoint and issue 1000 password reset emails. I have received 1000 emails and I have made an assumption like there might be a possibility that in all 1000 OTP codes there might be an OTP code starting with 50XXX. I didn’t check the OTP codes but I went on to enter the OTP and captured the request and started to brute-force the OTP from 50000 to 50999. After completion of the attack, I was able to get the correct code and login to the account. Previously we need to brute force it 1Lakh times to crack the code but now we just need to issue 1000 password reset codes and 1000 payloads to brute force the OTP. I have decreased the attack from 100000 to 2000. Reported it to the company and they triaged it by saying this was a clever finding😍😍.</p><p><strong>Exploitation Scenario:</strong></p><ol><li>An attacker sends 1000 password reset codes to the victim’s email.</li><li>After that, the attacker starts to brute force from 50000 to 50999 he gets logged in.</li></ol><p>There were more scenarios but I thought these scenarios were best among remaining so even though they are in triage state I have just made a writeup to let all know about it and the remaining will be writing in the next part.</p><p>Stay tuned…</p><p>If you have liked this article do click on the clap button and do follow me on <a href="https://twitter.com/fatratfatrat">Twitter </a>and <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/vijaysimha-reddy/">Linkedin</a>.</p><p>LinkedIn==&gt;<a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/vijaysimha-reddy/">https://www.linkedin.com/in/vijaysimha-reddy/</a></p><p>Twitter ==&gt; <a href="https://twitter.com/fatrat_v2">https://twitter.com/fatrat_v2</a></p><p>~Vijaysimha Reddy (a.k.a fatrat)</p><p>Buy me a coffee here=&gt;&gt;<a href="https://www.buymeacoffee.com/fatrat">https://www.buymeacoffee.com/fatrat</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9abf62de4ca3" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Tale of Account Takeovers (Part-1)]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@bathinivijaysimhareddy/tale-of-account-takeovers-part-1-b24e1f3c3187?source=rss-e92cf259385c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b24e1f3c3187</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bugcrowd]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hackerone]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[infosec]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Vijaysimha Reddy Bathini]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 22 Feb 2020 11:25:45 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-06-21T05:58:27.072Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Hello guys, I’m here with a new blog post on account takeover vulnerabilities that have been reported by me. I’ve started bug bounty in the month of Jan-2019 where I have reported quite of few low hanging fruits which ended up in duplicates. After getting released from my college I got a lot of time to spend on bug hunting and learning recon process and building my own recon methodology and understanding the functionality and application flow. I would like to thank Nahamsec and Jhaddix for their recon streams. November has been the best month for me till now with a few account takeovers reported and got paid high. In this blog post, I would like to explain all the ACCOUNT TAKEOVER scenarios which I have reported. So Let’s get started…</p><p><strong>What is Account Takeover Vulnerability?</strong></p><p>This is a type of vulnerability that allows hackers to take full control of the user&#39;s account without any need for a password by finding the flaws in the application.</p><p><strong>How it can be done?</strong></p><p>There can be many ways to find the account takeover bugs like brute-forcing the OTP, account takeover through csrf, etc. I have found 6 account takeover bugs till now and still counting. In this blog post, I will explain how I achieved account takeover through HTTP Parameter pollution and account takeover through improper server-side validation of mobile numbers. I’ll be making a few more account takeovers in the next blogs as content might get heavy.</p><p><strong>Account Takeover Scenario 1:</strong></p><p>There was a forgot password implementation that will send an email with a password reset link to the provided email. First thing I have done is capture the request when clicked on forgot password there was a JSON data passing like this:</p><p>{“email”:”victim@gmail.com”,“token”:”some random token”}</p><p>When I forward this request reset link will be sent to this mail.</p><p>I have added a one more email address like this:</p><p>{“email”:[“victim@gmail.com”,”attacker@gmail.com”],”token”:”some random token”}</p><p>When I click on forward mail with the same password reset link was sent to both emails leading to account takeover.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fgiphy.com%2Fembed%2Fd0NnEG1WnnXqg%2Ftwitter%2Fiframe&amp;display_name=Giphy&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fgiphy.com%2Fgifs%2Fmic-d0NnEG1WnnXqg&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fmedia2.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2Fd0NnEG1WnnXqg%2Fgiphy.gif&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=giphy" width="435" height="290" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/92a1cbcf025d177311728150b9307c60/href">https://medium.com/media/92a1cbcf025d177311728150b9307c60/href</a></iframe><p><strong>Exploit Scenario:</strong></p><ol><li>Attacker issues a forgot password request of the victim account and capture the request.</li><li>The attacker then adds his email account along with the victim’s email in the request and forwards the request.</li><li>A mail will be sent to both victim and attacker email and attacker resets the account password with the link he got which leads to account takeover.</li></ol><p><strong>Timeline:<br>Bug Reported: </strong>3rd November 2019<strong><br>Bug Triaged: </strong>4th November 2019<strong><br>Bounty Awarded: </strong>3000$ 🤑🤑</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/765/1*7D4xxWOKH2Y3qJoWf-8TWg.jpeg" /></figure><p><strong>Account Takeover Scenario #2:</strong></p><p>So this was my second account takeover reported immediately after the first one got awarded with a bounty. This bug category became my favorite and i started to look for account takeovers hereafter.</p><p>So this scenario was like this,<br>The website had a forgot password functionality. So, whenever the user tries to reset his password. The user is asked to input the email address for the reset function. After giving the valid email id it gives us two options:</p><p>Reset via OTP sent on email and Reset via OTP sent on mobile.<br>So I tried with the first option and it was secure. I didn&#39;t find anything suspicious.<br>So next I tried with the second option i.e Reset via OTP sent on the mobile. I fired up my burp suite and captured the request, and there i found the data has been sent to the server in JSON format with two parameters mobile and token.</p><p>To my surprise, the token value was unique to the account. I tried changing the token parameter but I have been given an error. So I tried tampering the mobile number. As there was only token validation at the back-end. Then, I changed the mobile number from victim to attacker mobile number. To my surprise, the OTP got delivered to the attacker’s mobile number and the victim’s password got successfully changed thus leading to account takeover.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fgiphy.com%2Fembed%2FAbYxDs20DECQw%2Ftwitter%2Fiframe&amp;display_name=Giphy&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fgiphy.com%2Fgifs%2Frobert-downey-jr-iron-man-tony-stark-AbYxDs20DECQw&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fmedia2.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2FAbYxDs20DECQw%2Fgiphy.gif&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=giphy" width="435" height="179" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/0a649e2cb89831f97e2966696f57fb30/href">https://medium.com/media/0a649e2cb89831f97e2966696f57fb30/href</a></iframe><p><strong>Exploit Scenario:</strong></p><ol><li>Attacker issues a forgot password request on the victim’s email and he has been given the two options whether to reset via email or mobile number.</li><li>The attacker selects the reset via the mobile option and captures the request.</li><li>The attacker changes the mobile number from victims to his mobile number and forwards the request.</li><li>The attacker will get the OTP of the victim and use that to reset the password of the victim leading to account takeover.</li></ol><p><strong>Timeline:<br>Bug Reported: </strong>7th November 2019<strong><br>Bug Triaged: </strong>7th November 2019<strong><br>Bounty Awarded: </strong>2000$</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/766/1*ALxfq5JWxbXTI8lapZO22g.jpeg" /></figure><p>I have submitted quite a few account takeover write-ups. As the content might get large I will be writing in the next blog.</p><p>I hope you like it. I request you to like this which encourages me to write more and more write-ups like this.</p><p><strong>Bug Bounty Tip:</strong></p><p>Thanks to Bhavesh Thakur for sharing the below scenario:</p><p>Intercept the request and put email:victim mail%0d%0acc:hacker mail id. The server sends an email with CC attacker email.</p><p>LinkedIn URL: <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/bhavesh-thakur-73b62723">https://www.linkedin.com/in/bhavesh-thakur-73b62723</a></p><p>Thank You!<br>~Vijaysimha(a.k.a FATRAT)</p><p>Follow me on Twitter and LinkedIn:</p><p><a href="https://twitter.com/fatrat_v2">https://twitter.com/fatrat_v2</a></p><p>Buy me a Coffee: <a href="https://www.buymeacoffee.com/fatrat">https://www.buymeacoffee.com/fatrat</a></p><p><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/vijaysimha-reddy/">vijaysimha reddy - Engineer - Vasavi College of Engg | LinkedIn</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b24e1f3c3187" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[How I takeover the company’s LinkedIn Page]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@bathinivijaysimhareddy/how-i-takeover-the-companys-linkedin-page-790c9ed2b04d?source=rss-e92cf259385c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/790c9ed2b04d</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[hackerone]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bugcrowd]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[infosec]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Vijaysimha Reddy Bathini]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 29 Jan 2020 16:55:18 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-06-21T05:59:08.609Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>How I was able to takeover the company’s LinkedIn Page</h3><p>Hi guys, this is my second blog post related to bug bounty. This vulnerability I have found recently and thought of sharing with the community. The vulnerability I have found is in a private bug bounty program from Bugcrowd. As I cannot disclose the company name will take it as company.com.</p><p>When I got the invitation I quickly ran to gather all subdomains. There was one subdomain and will call it as subdomain.company.com.</p><p>The vulnerability which I found to takeover Linkedin page of the company is Broken Link Hijacking. Almost everyone has heard of subdomain hijacking but what about broken link hijacking. These two vulnerabilities are very similar the major difference is that one involves a subdomain while the other involves an expired link on a page. Shout out to <strong>edoverflow, </strong>for explaining this technique in his blog post.</p><p>Link: <a href="https://edoverflow.com/2017/broken-link-hijacking/">https://edoverflow.com/2017/broken-link-hijacking/</a></p><p>Tools to find broken links: Broken Link Checker</p><p><a href="https://github.com/stevenvachon/broken-link-checker">GitHub - stevenvachon/broken-link-checker: Find broken links, missing images, etc within your HTML.</a></p><p>This tool will give you all the links present in the source code of the website which gives 404 status when clicked on that link. After installing the tool just run the below command. Below command will check for the expired links up to the third level.</p><p>Command: blc -rof --filter-level 3 <a href="https://example.com/">https://example.com/</a></p><p>When I ran the above command on the above subdomain I got one result which shows me the LinkedIn page of the company which has 404 Status code page not found. To confirm this I opened that link and it showed me page not found.</p><p>URL:</p><p>https://www.linkedin.com/company/&lt;company_name&gt;=&gt;404 Not found</p><p>Next step is to create a company page with the above company-name in the above URL and takeover that.</p><p>Impact: A Hacker can post all bad stuff in the name of the company. As there is a LinkedIn page link of the company when I user clicks on that link he will be taken to Hacker controlled LinkedIn page.</p><p>Reported the vulnerability and got a reward of 500$🤑🤑</p><p>Takeaway: Always check for links and endpoints in the source code and javascript files there may be expired links and you can buy that and host malicious files.</p><p>Thank you.</p><p>Twitter: <a href="https://twitter.com/fatrat_v2">https://twitter.com/fatrat_v2</a></p><p>LinkedIn: <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/vijaysimha-reddy/">https://www.linkedin.com/in/vijaysimha-reddy/</a></p><p>Buy me a Coffee=&gt; <a href="https://www.buymeacoffee.com/fatrat">https://www.buymeacoffee.com/fatrat</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=790c9ed2b04d" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Shodan is your friend!!! If you lose him you will lose many…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@bathinivijaysimhareddy/shodan-is-your-friend-if-you-lose-him-you-will-lose-many-657d07472f75?source=rss-e92cf259385c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/657d07472f75</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bugcrowd]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-hunting]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[infosec]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Vijaysimha Reddy Bathini]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 28 Aug 2019 19:03:21 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-09-04T19:14:46.036Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/300/1*OXgE8-V-l2jZukG9DMLl0w.png" /></figure><h3>Shodan is your friend!!! If you ignore him you will lose many…</h3><p>In this blog post, I would like to tell you about my recent finding and it will also show you how effective can be. As it is my first writeup please ignore all my grammatical errors. I have been focusing on my recon procedure from the last couple of months because I just got fed up with monkey testing. I stopped all my hunting for a period and just concentrated on recon. If you don&#39;t concentrate on recon you will end up in getting duplicates every time.</p><p><strong>Coming to the point</strong> on how I discovered a critical bug on a known public program. I love Zseano words “A bigger scope program has the high probability of finding a bug rather than low scope”. I don’t want to mention the program name so I will be mentioning it as redacted.com. As the program consists of wide scope and many got vulnerabilities rewarded almost 600 I thought I cannot find vulnerabilities in those in-scope domains. Then I thought maybe I can find on the IP’s which the company owns. Quickly went to the shodan.io did a query org:” redacted”. It nearly gave me 400 results. Shit, I’m not a robot to check all 400 IP’s. But I tried to find vulnerabilities in 14 results ended up finding nothing. I gave up over there. After a couple of hours, one thing got hit my mind “Does this redacted hosts any services on cloud providers like Amazon cloud, Google Cloud, etc.. I again did a shodan dork against every cloud service provider and I got many results.</p><p>When we query using <strong>org:”organization name”</strong> in shodan it just gives all the IP’s which belong to the organization. So to get all the IP’s which belong to the organization plus all the IP’s which the organization hosts on cloud service provider we use the SSL filter. To get this we use this shodan query <strong>ssl:”organization name”</strong>.</p><p>I found one IP belongs to redacted because I found that the certificate belongs to redacted. To confirm this I quickly opened that IP it has redacted logo on it. It was a basic authentication page. The first thing that strikes me when I see the login page is authentication bypass using SQLi. Quickly I kept username: admin and password:’OR 1=1 — +. I got logged in as admin. I found some developer&#39;s profiles and their project files in that domain. I didn’t confirm that those developers belong to redacted blindly. Searched for them on Github and Linkedin and I confirmed that they belong to the redacted company. I thought its enough actually and better to report.</p><p>Bug reported to redacted and they triaged it in 30 mins and they rewarded me in less than 3 hrs with $$$$🤑🤑🤑.</p><p>Connect to me on twitter</p><p>Twitter: <a href="https://twitter.com/fatrat_v2">https://twitter.com/fatrat_v2</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=657d07472f75" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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