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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Brandon Butler on Medium]]></title>
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            <title>Stories by Brandon Butler on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Busting a Copyright Myth-buster]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@bc_butler/busting-a-copyright-myth-buster-7bdf20f040a6?source=rss-6cff0bd778f1------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[copyright]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[myths]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Brandon Butler]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 27 Apr 2015 21:00:21 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-04-27T21:00:21.545Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In a recent <a href="https://medium.com/@jkdegen/5-seriously-dumb-myths-about-copyright-the-media-should-stop-repeating-a92e934f12a4">listicle</a> on Medium, the Canadian writer John Degen, executive director of the Writers’ Union of Canada, described what he characterized as “5 Seriously Dumb Myths About Copyright the Media Should Stop Repeating.” Of course, Degen’s post takes aim at the usual straw man, a mythical “free culture” movement that hates all copyrights and wants them abolished. As a result, he ignores the complexity of the debate over copyright’s genuine costs and the real contributions of scholars who have shown the harm that unrestrained copyright can do. In fact, two of Degen’s “myths” have been shown empirically to be facts, and two are ambiguous statements with at least one interpretation that is reasonable and uncontroversially true. Only the #1 myth, “Copyright only helps corporations,” is clearly false, but that’s only because it is cast in such artificially stark terms.</p><h3>Two Proven Facts</h3><h4>Artists feel restricted by copyright.</h4><p>Degen’s first “myth” is that “artists feel restricted by copyright.” One way to know how artists feel about copyright is to ask them, and several researchers have done so. For example, Patricia Aufderheide and Peter Jaszi <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/journals/cinema_journal/v046/46.2jaszi.html">found</a> in 2004 that documentary filmmakers felt constrained by their fear of copyright liability and the cost of rights clearance. In a more recent <a href="http://www.collegeart.org/pdf/FairUseIssuesReport.pdf">study</a>, Jaszi and Aufderheide found that visual arts professionals “pay a high price for copyright confusion and misunderstanding. Their work is constrained and censored, most powerfully by themselves, because of that confusion and the resulting fear and anxiety.”</p><p>More proof of some artists’ feeling restricted by copyright can be found in the Copyright Office’s <a href="http://www.copyright.gov/1201">triennial rule making</a> on the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, which invites artists and others who ‘feel restricted’ by the digital locks that help enforce copyright to petition for permission to break those locks for otherwise lawful uses. Every three years <a href="http://copyright.gov/1201/2014/petitions/EFF_and_OTW_1201_Initial_Submission_2014.pdf">artists</a> <a href="http://copyright.gov/1201/2014/petitions/International_Documentary_Association_et_al_1201_Initial_Submission_2014.pdf">report</a> being chilled from lawful expressive activity by the DMCA’s digital locks provisions.</p><p>Now, I actually agree with Degen that professionals (and other considerate communities) who work with copyrighted content (artists and non-artists) can have very good instincts for which uses require permission and which are fair or otherwise allowed. And, outside of the DMCA, I think that the copyright system, through fair use, can be fairly reasonable in terms of balancing the rights of past creators with those of the current generation of users and creators. That’s why I’ve done a decent amount of work with Jaszi, Aufderheide, and many others on the <a href="http://www.cmsimpact.org/fair-use/best-practices">fair use best practices</a>: they document these considered opinions in an effort to help lawful users overcome their (empirically proven to exist) feelings of constraint regarding copyright. Hardcore property rights maximalism like Degen’s, however, chills artists’ speech. The idea of copyright as a sacrosanct property right is exactly what makes follow-on artists wary to make new art that may be seen as “trespassing,” even though their instincts as artists tell them their uses are legitimate.</p><h4>Copyright shrinks the public domain</h4><p>Degen’s next “myth” is that “copyright harms the public domain.” Here I’ll let copyright scholar Paul Heald’s <a href="http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2290181">research</a> speak for itself:</p><blockquote>A random sample of new books for sale on Amazon.com shows more books for sale from the 1880’s than the 1980’s. Why? This paper presents new data on how copyright stifles the reappearance of works. First, a random sample of more than 2000 new books for sale on Amazon.com is analyzed along with a random sample of almost 2000 songs available on new DVD’s. Copyright status correlates highly with absence from the Amazon shelf. Together with publishing business models, copyright law seems to deter distribution and diminish access. Further analysis of eBook markets, used books on Abebooks.com, and the Chicago Public library collection suggests that no alternative marketplace for out-of-print books has yet developed.</blockquote><p>This <a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/07/the-hole-in-our-collective-memory-how-copyright-made-mid-century-books-vanish/278209/">magazine article</a> gives the <em>Reader’s Digest</em> version of Heald’s research, and includes a striking bar graph showing how availability of works plummets once copyright kicks in.</p><p>Degen says that “there is no ‘public domain’ without copyright,” because the public domain is defined as the absence of copyright protection. He suggests that works in the public domain “have for one reason or another fallen out of copyright protection.” This account privileges in-copyright as the default status of all creative works, with public domain as a kind of leftover bucket of odds and ends. The public domain on this view is like the dark matter of the world of creative works; more a theoretical necessity than a lived reality.</p><p>In fact, the leading theoretical and historical accounts of the purpose of copyright have long been that it is subordinate to the public domain; a “limited term” of copyright is granted only to provide incentives so that works will be created and published, and eventually <em>rise</em> into the public domain. Copyright terms were historically quite short, with a view to enabling works to become public property in time to ensure wide distribution unconstrained by the law. Heald’s research shows that copyright is not serving this goal.</p><h3>Two ambiguous statements with reasonable interpretations that are plainly true.</h3><p>Degen’s next two “myths” are ambiguous, but have reasonable readings that are simply true on their face, despite his heroic efforts to muddy the waters.</p><p>“Myth” #3 is that “copyright is an attack on artistic freedom.” Of course, copyright doesn’t constrain the freedom of the copyright holder, so that’s the point of view Degen assumes in finding this statement to be false. It is, however, clearly true insofar as it applies to artists who do not own the copyrights in works they are using in their art. Even if you think, as I do, that fair use should allow 99.99% of legitimate artistic uses of copyrighted works, there is no doubt that copyright chills some non-trivial amount of artistic creation and self-expression. This is especially true if you reject Degen’s view that the only people with a human rights interest in copyrighted works are their authors. Rebecca Tushnet has <a href="http://www.yalelawjournal.org/essay/copy-this-essay-how-fair-use-doctrine-harms-free-speech-and-how-copying-serves-it">written eloquently</a> about why this is a mistake.</p><p>Degen highlights Article 27(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which deals with the moral and economic rights of authors, but he ignores Article 27(1) (whose numeric primacy was not an accident):</p><blockquote>“Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits.”</blockquote><p>The <a href="http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/Copyright.aspx">recent report</a> from the UN High Commission on Human Rights’ Special Rapporteur in the Field of Cultural Rights highlights the importance of the right of access and cultural participation, and the danger of making that right subordinate to property rights in trade agreements and other legal contexts.</p><p>“Myth” #2 (he’s counting down, I suppose, which is confusing) is that “copyright costs consumers.” Degen actually acknowledges that this is true. The real question, of course, is whether it costs consumers <em>too much,</em> and he doesn’t engage it. He also ignores the cost in terms of lost access as documented by Heald’s research.</p><h3>One loaded myth</h3><p>Finally, Degen’s #1 “myth” is that “Copyright only helps corporations.” Well, sure, this is false, but it’s not terribly interesting. Of course copyright can be useful to artists and small businesses. The <a href="http://www.ipclinic.org/">clinic</a> where I work routinely counsels artists, authors, and others to secure and enforce their copyrights in a variety of contexts. But here’s a tougher one: do some of the recent, extreme expansions of copyright’s scope and duration benefit individual artists and the general public as much as they benefit large copyright-holding corporations? Some of the revenues from the last 20 years of the term of protection for a given work may trickle down to its authors, but the vast, vast majority of that wealth is allocated to the corporate owners. In the meantime, for every blockbuster work that’s still commercially viable 70 years after the author’s death, there are thousands of works disappeared from the public domain and unavailable to a public who might make better use of the work than its nominal owner.</p><p>Degen would like to live in a world where absolute copyrights for him have no costs for others, especially other writers and artists. Unfortunately, in the real world his rights come at some public cost. Acknowledging the tradeoff between one artist’s copyright and the interests of other artists, and of the public, opens the door to a conversation about the proper balance, however, and that seems to be a conversation Degen is anxious to avoid.</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="http://brandonbutler.info/post/117544547420/busting-a-copyright-myth-buster"><em>brandonbutler.info</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=7bdf20f040a6" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Transformative Teaching after GSU]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@bc_butler/transformative-teaching-after-gsu-ae9d7cf88875?source=rss-6cff0bd778f1------2</link>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Brandon Butler]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 22 Oct 2014 15:58:16 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2014-10-22T15:58:16.552Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>When can teachers share copyrighted works (or excerpts therefrom) with students without payment or permission?</h4><p>While other parts of the law come into play in narrow contexts, this is primarily a question about the scope of the doctrine of fair use. Educators have struggled with the dimensions of fair use for decades, and we are now at a pivotal point in that struggle. Friday’s <a href="http://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201214676.pdf">decision</a> from the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals in the Georgia State e-reserves case may be the last word on this issue for a long time. What does it say?</p><p>The battle for educational fair use has two fronts: the escape from the past, and the fight for the future. The GSU opinion secures victory on one front while leaving those of us focused on the second front free to fight another day. In that regard it is good news. However, while many are rightly <a href="http://blogs.library.duke.edu/scholcomm/2014/10/19/gsu-appeal-ruling-read-better-seems/">celebrating</a> this partial victory, it is crucial to recognize that the fight continues.</p><p>The first front is the struggle to shake off bad practices grounded in toxic and outdated visions of fair use. The primary sources of this decrepit fair use mode are the old 1976 Classroom Guidelines and the series of lawsuits and threats of lawsuits brought by publishers in the ensuing decades, aka the coursepack cases. Together, the Guidelines and the coursepack cases create a domain of educational fair use that is tightly constrained and highly deferential to the publishers’ profit motives. In the Guidelines-coursepack paradigm, a teacher can share materials with students only if the excerpt is so small, and the timing so tight, that it would be virtually impossible to pay a license fee to the relevant publisher. It is thanks to this paradigm that many teachers and librarians still think that they cannot use the same excerpt two semesters in a row (they can), or that no excerpt from a written work can exceed 1000 words (it can).</p><h4>Friday’s decision from the 11th Circuit marks the end of the Guidelines-coursepack era.</h4><p>The publishers argued vociferously that the court should adopt this mode of analysis, and, like the district court before it, the appellate court refused. Judge Tjoflat’s opinion says of the Guidelines (on p. 23, at the end of the lengthy fn. 12):</p><blockquote>Whatever persuasive value the Classroom Guidelines may possess, we must keep in mind that they</blockquote><blockquote>(1) were drafted by partisan groups,</blockquote><blockquote>(2) “state the minimum and not the maximum standards of educational fair use under Section 107”, and</blockquote><blockquote>(3) adopt the type of “hard evidentiary presumption[s]” with regard which types of use may be fair that the Supreme Court has since repeatedly warned against.</blockquote><p>Later in the opinion the court describes the Guidelines as suggesting, at best, “Congress’ tentative view of the permissible amount of educational copying in 1976,” before declining to apply those standards to the third factor inquiry on permissible amount. That is virtually the last we hear of the Guidelines. Because they describe an outdated safe harbor, the court treats them as essentially irrelevant to the contemporary question of the outer bounds of fair use.</p><p>The Coursepack cases come in for similarly cool treatment. The court claims that the cases “provide guidance,” but rejects the publishers’ argument that they are determinative. Indeed, the court goes on to find that GSU’s uses, unlike the uses of copy shops who were sued in the coursepack cases, are favored under the first factor because they are non-profit, educational uses. The court also expressly rejects the coursepack cases’ approach to the second and third fair use factors. Where the coursepack cases had held categorically that both factors disfavored the copy shops, Judge Tjoflat calls for a case-by-case evaluation, and describes several considerations that could lead to findings that favor GSU. Finally, on the fourth factor, although the court does not mention the coursepack cases, it diverges from their outdated insistence that market harm is the most important issue in the fair use inquiry. In other words, the coursepack cases were shut out on all four statutory factors. It is hard to see what remains of them as a relevant guide to educational users (as distinct from commercial copy shops).</p><h4>All this is fantastic news, but where does it leave us?</h4><p>We’ve shaken off the past, but the future of educational fair use is up in the air. The court’s opinion is deeply equivocal. As Nancy Sims pithily <a href="https://twitter.com/copyrightlibn/status/523276713514774528">observed</a> about the 11th Circuit’s opinion, “NOTHING HERE WILL HELP EVEN ONE TEACHER MAKE FAIR USE CALLS.”</p><p>The source of the opinion’s ambivalence is the equipoise between GSU’s favored status under the first fair use factor (the purpose and character of the use) and the publishers’ favored status under the fourth (the effect of the use on the market for the work). The court found that GSU’s uses are favored because they are educational and non-profit, but that the potential for cognizable harm to the publishers’ market is substantial because the uses are “non-transformative” (more on that term of art below). The relative weight of those two factors, as applied to the 50-odd particular uses before the court on remand, is impossible to judge at this stage, and even after Judge Evans makes her own judgments about how to weigh them in this case, the weight a court might give those factors in future cases of non-transformative use may be difficult or impossible to predict. One commentator has already reacted to this aspect of the GSU case with a <a href="https://www.insidehighered.com/views/2014/10/20/ruling-copyright-fair-use-will-hurt-professors-students-and-publishers-essay">plea</a> for ‘bright lines.’</p><h4>The deeper origin of this ambivalence and uncertainty, in case you haven’t picked up on it, is the court’s finding that the uses are non-transformative.</h4><p>What does this mean? Transformative use is a powerful concept that courts and users have applied with increasing confidence over the last two decades; academics have <a href="http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1874778">shown</a> that it is now the dominant consideration for courts deciding fair use cases. A transformative use is, very roughly speaking, a use for a new purpose distinct from the author’s original purpose in creating the work. Courts generally ask whether the new purpose adds value, and whether the new use is a “market substitution” for the original work. If a use is found to be transformative, the consequences for the user are dramatic. The question of market harm disappears completely, because, as the Supreme Court has said, transformative uses cannot effect markets in a way that is cognizable under the fourth factor. The only question remaining is whether the user took an amount that is justifiable in light of their transformative purpose.</p><p>Transformative use protects <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bill_Graham_Archives_v._Dorling_Kindersley,_Ltd.">for-profit publishers</a> who reproduce entire creative works in new books sold on the commercial market, <a href="http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11449470169883565960&amp;q=authors+guild+v.+google&amp;hl=en&amp;as_sdt=20006&amp;as_vis=1">technology companies</a> who digitize millions of books to power their search engines (for substantial profit), and <a href="http://whatisfairuse.blogspot.com/2008/02/blanch-v-koons-fair-use-of-copyrighted.html">appropriation</a> <a href="http://www.artinamericamagazine.com/news-features/news/richard-prince-wins-major-victory-in-landmark-copyright-suit/">artists</a> who manipulate and alter other artists’ copyrighted works and sell the results for millions of dollars to wealthy patrons. With a transformative use story in hand, even billion dollar companies can disdain license demands; without one, however, the market reasserts itself and even core fair use beneficiaries (scholars, teachers, non-profit educational institutions) face the same uncertainty as GSU.</p><p>If GSU’s uses had been found transformative, the game would have been over long ago. As long as the professors’ choices about amount were justifiable in light of their pedagogical goals, the uses would be fair. Because they are not transformative, GSU’s laudable purposes and their reasonable choices about amount in light of their teaching goals must be balanced against the alleged harm from lost licensing and the alleged impropriety of the amount given the effect of the taking on the market.</p><p>The future of fair use in a non-transformative mode is necessarily uncertain, as it will track specific facts about the operation of markets for the works used, which, as Nancy Sims has <a href="http://blog.lib.umn.edu/copyrightlibn/2014/10/11th-circuit-gsu-ruling.html">observed</a>, are not necessarily facts that individual teachers have at their fingertips. Uses permitted in this mode may well end up being relatively modest to nonexistent where licenses are available, depending on how Judge Evans decides to implement Tjoflat’s instruction to give “additional weight” to factor four. Faced with this uncertainty, or with an available license, teachers may reasonably fear that if they do not pay, they are at significant risk. Institutions who cannot afford to participate in the byzantine licensing schemes of the CCC and its publishing friends will be chilled from fair use activity. The rich will have rich learning experiences, and the poor will be impoverished.</p><h4>So, the fight for the future of educational fair use, if it is to be much more than an unsteady allowance for uses where licenses are unavailable or unreasonably expensive, has got to be fought on the ground of transformativeness.</h4><p>And, luckily, the court recognizes the continuing validity of transformative use beyond the very specific facts of this case. (Here educators should be thankful for the highly effective amicus briefs submitted by several <a href="http://www.aaup.org/brief/cambridge-university-press-v-becker-2012-us-dist-lexis-123154-nd-ga-2012-appeal-docketed-no-12">higher</a> <a href="http://www.acenet.edu/news-room/Pages/Amicus-Brief-to-the-US-Court-of-Appeals-11th-Circuit-in-Cambridge-University-Press-v-Mark-Becker.aspx">education</a> and <a href="http://www.librarycopyrightalliance.org/bm~doc/gsu-amicus-brief-25apr13.pdf">library</a> <a href="http://www.aserl.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/ASERL_Amicus_Brief_GSU.pdf">associations</a> as well as from a laundry list of <a href="http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2259697">copyright scholars</a>)(full disclosure: I helped with a couple of these briefs).</p><p>In footnote 21, on page 63, Judge Tjoflat expressly disclaims any intent to prejudge future cases dealing with works whose primary purpose or function is not educational. Indeed, he notes that the issue of transformativeness has been decided against GSU in this case as part of a finding of fact made by the trial court that, because it is not clearly erroneous, the appellate court will not revisit. GSU never really tried to litigate the transformative use question, so that finding is certainly not air tight. In any event, Judge Tjoflat acknowledges that future uses not at issue here, such as assignment of historical essays for purposes of comparative analysis, or of scholarship not written for educational purposes, may well constitute transformative use.</p><h4>In fact, the universe of transformative educational uses that Judge Tjoflat and the 11th Circuit have not pre-judged is virtually limitless.</h4><p>In a paper I’m working on right now, I argue for a wide variety of transformative educational uses, including:</p><ul><li>Using popular culture as raw material for cultural analysis (motion pictures as evidence of the portrayal of women and minorities, e.g.)</li><li>Studying creative works as exemplars of success or failure in deploying techniques of persuasion, description, etc.</li><li>Using news reporting as a prompt for historical or political debate or reflection</li><li>Using fine art images to illustrate characteristic elements of a movement or era</li></ul><p>These illustrations are not drawn entirely from my fertile imagination.</p><h4>Many examples of common teaching practice that have a strong claim to transformativeness have been identified and promulgated in a series of <a href="http://www.cmsimpact.org/fair-use/best-practices">best practices statements</a> published by educators, scholars, and librarians over the last decade or so.</h4><p>One such statement, the <a href="http://www.arl.org/fairuse">ARL Code of Best Practices in Fair Use for Academic and Research Libraries</a> (which I helped to develop while I was working at ARL) seems to have anticipated several aspects of Friday’s GSU opinion.</p><p>For example, the ARL Code Principle 1 states that “It is fair use to make appropriately tailored course-related content available to enrolled students via digital networks.” The court recognizes that nonprofit educational uses are a favored purpose and remanded to the court to weigh this legitimate interest against the possible market harm to the rights holders (among other factors), i.e., to ensure that the use is appropriately tailored. Of course, for transformative uses, appropriate tailoring is easy to calculate by reference to the transformative purpose.</p><p>This is why the best practices also counsel that “Materials should be made available only when, and only to the extent that, there is a clear articulable nexus between the instructor’s pedagogical purpose and the kind and amount of content involved.” Judge Tjoflat agreed that purpose is crucial and upheld the district court’s holding that the question of whether the amount taken is appropriate is judged at least partially by reference to the pedagogical purpose of the use. In non-transformative cases, however, the market harm factor creates substantial uncertainty about how to know when uses are well-tailored.</p><p>Finally, in recognition that not every educational use is transformative, the best practices caution that “Closer scrutiny should be applied to uses of content created and marketed primarily for use courses such as the one at issue….” This is the same principle that Judge Tjoflat invokes in finding that, because GSU used the books at issue for substantially the same purpose as they were marketed for, the fourth factor should be given “additional weight.” This extra weight is a consequence of the non-transformative nature of the use — hence “closer scrutiny.” As the best practices recognize, materials not designed for educational use would be free of this constraint.</p><p>So, the GSU opinion from Friday describes one way forward, which the court below must follow, which is a careful and largely unpredictable balancing of the value of educational use against the value of a legitimate market harm to the publishers. This seems to be the new normal for non-transformative uses. However, the court also recognizes that there is another way open to transformative uses, and the difference in how fair use would apply in that context could not be more dramatic.</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="http://brandonbutler.info/post/100609027690/transformative-teaching-after-gsu"><em>brandonbutler.info</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ae9d7cf88875" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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