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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Benedetta Di Matteo on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Benedetta Di Matteo on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@benedettadimatteo?source=rss-960cbd98fbf8------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Benedetta Di Matteo on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@benedettadimatteo?source=rss-960cbd98fbf8------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Rise Of Green Politics In Europe: A New Wave Or Washing Strategy?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@benedettadimatteo/the-rise-of-green-politics-in-europe-a-new-wave-or-washing-strategy-34e2fa8de74f?source=rss-960cbd98fbf8------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[europe]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[environment]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[green]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[european-union]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Benedetta Di Matteo]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 18 Oct 2019 09:43:26 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-10-18T18:26:08.449Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The unexpected success of the Green parties in this year’s European Parliament elections triggered a discussion about a Green wave that swept over the continent, while some even referred to this emerging political movement as “ <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/jun/02/european-parliament-election-green-parties-success">a quiet revolution</a> “. However, proponents of a Green agenda will encounter a mix of enthusiasm and resistance, both within EU institutions and at the national level.</p><p>At first glance, the Green victory signals a wider change in European politics, both from the perspective of voters and policymakers. Climate change seems to be one of the most important election issues of 2019, and Green parties are reaping the benefits of the widespread climate activism and global social-media phenomena such as the student protest movement popularised by Greta Thunberg. This caused a loss of support for mainstream centre-left and right parties in favour of green and left-leaning liberal counterparts in several European countries. This was especially the case in Germany, Ireland and the <a href="https://globalriskinsights.com/2019/06/green-liberal-european-business/">UK</a>, where the Greens gained from 25 to 75 seats and the Liberal Democrats went from having 40 to 139 seats in the European Parliament.</p><p>Voters demographics and mobilisation are among the main factors that led to this victory. <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/davekeating/2019/05/27/the-eu-elections-green-wave-is-set-to-transform-energy-policy/">Young voters</a> have been especially active in this election and voter turnout has been the highest in <a href="http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/headlines/eu-affairs/20190523STO52402/elections-2019-highest-turnout-in-20-years">twenty years</a>. This suggests that many voters that previously felt apathetic to the EU electoral process or no longer identified with the classical Christian democratic- socialist political divide finally may have found a party that represents their views. As a result, climate policy seems to have entered the mainstream political debate like never before.</p><p>However, a closer look at the Green movement in Europe reveals a more complex reality, which raises the question of whether these parties will be able to enforce effective climate policies at the European level. Firstly, the surge in popularity of Green parties and the subsequent loss of support for mainstream ones is in part a response to widespread discontent over specific domestic policies, rather than a sudden rise in environmental consciousness among voters. This is especially clear in the UK, wherein the context of a particularly controversial Brexit process, the Green Party and the Liberal Democrats experienced a surge in popularity largely because of their pro-remain stance.</p><p>Another challenge for the Greens is to win enough support across the European Parliament’s spectrum. One of the more obvious disparities is that while Green parties performed very well in EU’s core countries such as the UK, Germany, France and the Benelux, they enjoyed a much more modest success among the Union’s newer members. In Hungary and Austria, for example, Green parties <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/jun/02/european-parliament-election-green-parties-success">lost seats</a> in the European election. This gap is exacerbated by the size and power that green MEPs enjoy in their respective countries<a href="https://www.panorama.it/news/politica/italia-verdi-elezioni-europee-voto/">; in Italy</a>, the Green party did not even reach the minimum threshold to win seats in the European Parliament.</p><p>This discrepancy is significant for two reasons; firstly, a Green agenda must enjoy widespread support among European voters to gain legitimacy and, as a result, bargaining power at the European Parliament. Secondly, it shows that voters’ priorities have the potential of being volatile, and support for the Green parties may decline once seemingly more pressing, material issues come to the forefront. <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-green-wave-struggles-in-east/">Lower minimum wages</a> and dependency on fossil fuels for energy immediately come to mind as obstacles in less affluent European countries and Central Europe, while in Western European countries such as <a href="https://www.panorama.it/news/politica/italia-verdi-elezioni-europee-voto/">Italy</a>, unemployment and weak economic growth trump environmental concerns.</p><p>Moreover, mainstream centre-left and -right parties still have a strong grip on the European Commission, although centrist camps have begun to rely on Green parties to form alliances in the European Parliament to have a working majority. Potentially, this could give the Greens the power to demand significant policy concessions, for instance by bringing to the table stricter emissions reduction proposals and targets.</p><p>While this is an important step forward for the Green agenda, there is some justified scepticism about the extent to which centrist parties will be willing and able to adopt stricter climate policies. The growing support of climate policies by both the <a href="https://www.eppgroup.eu/what-we-stand-for/our-priorities/affordable-energy-and-the-fight-against-climate-change">European Peoples Party</a> (EPP) and the <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/davekeating/2019/05/22/after-climate-protests-europes-conservatives-change-policies-for-eu-elections/#2f2eecc46d06">European Alliance of Economic Liberals</a> (ALDE) raises legitimate doubts on these parties’ willingness to commit to policies that favour climate action.</p><p>On the other hand, the widespread popularity of environmental activism and a growing sense of urgency about the possibly catastrophic effects of climate change makes sustainability a difficult issue to ignore, even among the most conservative parties. In the UK, Labour committed to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/sep/24/labour-set-to-commit-to-net-zero-emissions-by-2030">net zero emissions by 2030</a>, and other European parties are quickly following suit.</p><p>These contrasting realities are mirrored inside the European Union institutions, too. The <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy-environment/news/green-deal-branded-as-hallmark-of-new-european-commission/">European Green Deal </a>promoted by European Commission President-elect Ursula von der Leyenincludes goals that are in line with the Green agenda, such as higher emission reduction targets and climate neutrality by 2050. Former Dutch foreign minister <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20190910-new-european-commission-timmermans-climate-change-hogan-trade-goulard-leyen">Frans Timmermans</a>, who was appointed as the EU’s Executive Vice-President for the European Green Deal, will have decision-making power over crucial policy areas such as investment, taxes and food standards, as well as Europe’s transition to clean energy.</p><p>It will be <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/timmermans-climate-commission-european-green-deal/">Timmermans’ job</a> to coincide these goals with the realities of coordinating with other commissioners that might be less enthusiastic about swift change, such as Economy Commissioners Paolo Gentiloni and Trade Commissioner Phil Hogan. His ability to promote the Green Deal goals while facing significant resistance within the EU policymaking apparatus will be representative of the challenges faced by Green parties across Europe.</p><p>It is clear that the European Union and its Member States have long neglected pressing sustainability and environment issues, and an increasingly climate-sensitive public is starting to realise it. However, time will tell whether the Green wave constitutes a real change in the EU or is merely a green-washing attempt by established political parties, which are struggling with declining support, a changing political landscape and the consolidation of nationalist parties across the continent.</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://www.insideover.com/politics/the-rise-of-green-politics-in-europe.html"><em>https://www.insideover.com</em></a><em> on October 18, 2019.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=34e2fa8de74f" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Role of the Private Sector in Combating Trafficking in Human Beings: A Way Forward?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@benedettadimatteo/the-role-of-the-private-sector-in-combating-trafficking-in-human-beings-a-way-forward-6d1f595cd47f?source=rss-960cbd98fbf8------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[human-trafficking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[modern-slavery]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[private-sector]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Benedetta Di Matteo]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 31 Jul 2019 19:59:33 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-07-31T19:59:33.128Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Modern slavery and trafficking in human beings are global phenomena that affect a growing number of victims. While it is difficult to provide an exact figure, the International Labour Organization (ILO) estimates that <a href="https://www.stopthetraffik.org/about-human-trafficking/the-scale-of-human-trafficking/">40.3 million people</a> are victims of modern slavery (including human trafficking) around the world, of which over half (24.9 million) are exploited for their labour. The ILO estimates that <a href="https://www.ilo.org/global/topics/forced-labour/lang--en/index.htm">16 million</a> people are exploited in the private sector, especially in sectors like domestic work, construction and agriculture. The most recent estimate of the profits of modern slavery, based on 2012 data, is that it generates <a href="https://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/newsroom/news/WCMS_243201/lang--en/index.htm">$150 billion annually in illegal profits</a>.</p><p>As global supply chains continue to grow and often become less transparent, it has become increasingly difficult to achieve the oversight required to identify, combat and prevent modern slavery and trafficking in human beings worldwide. Out of 51 companies surveyed by the <a href="http://www.respect.international/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Corporate-approaches-to-addressing-modern-slavery-in-supply-chains-A-snapshot-of-current-practice.pdf">Ashridge Centre for Business and Sustainability</a> in 2015, <a href="http://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Battling-Human-Trafficking-A-Scrutiny-of-Private-Sector-Obligations-under-the-Modern-Slavery-Act-Global-Initiative-RESPECT-2018.pdf">71%</a> believed modern slavery was likely to be occurring in their supply chains. Indeed, the need for private sector actors to become involved in the fight against this form of organised crime is becoming more widely accepted. In recent years, a number of companies and private sector actors have taken steps to improve transparency and accountability in their supply chains. These companies have adopted new regulations to raise minimum standards, they have strengthened corporate due diligence, and sought remediation for victims.</p><blockquote><em>The UK’s 2015 Modern Slavery Act is one the most ambitious examples of anti-human trafficking legislation</em></blockquote><p>The UK’s 2015 Modern Slavery Act (MSA) is one the most ambitious examples of anti-human trafficking legislation. In particular, its Transparency in Supply Chains clause places obligations on a wide range of private sector actors to mitigate the risk of trafficking in human beings in their supply chains, requiring companies to publish an annual statement describing the steps they have taken to mitigate such risk. This clause is an improvement to previous legal instruments in two important ways: it extends the statement obligations to all companies who supply goods or services and whose total turnover exceeds £36 million; and it also bases its requirements on companies’ global revenues, giving the MSA a potentially global reach.</p><p>Other governments have also passed laws that outlined specific obligations for the private sector to prevent and combat trafficking in human beings. In March 2018, <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2018/03/21/politics/sex-trafficking-bill/index.html">The Stop Enabling Sex Traffickers Act</a> (SESTA) was introduced in the US, amending Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act. Although the Act has so far shielded tech companies such as Facebook, Amazon and Google from liability for content shared by their users, including advertisements that may facilitate and promote trafficking in human beings, such as escorting services. In theory, however, legal instruments such as the Stop Enabling Sex Traffickers Act will make it easier for authorities to take action against websites that are perceived to facilitate trafficking in human beings and for victims to seek justice against perpetrators.</p><blockquote><em>Legislation alone is useless if it is not enforced</em></blockquote><p>Nevertheless, combating trafficking in human beings through legislation alone has been <a href="http://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Battling-Human-Trafficking-A-Scrutiny-of-Private-Sector-Obligations-under-the-Modern-Slavery-Act-Global-Initiative-RESPECT-2018.pdf">shown to be ineffective in the past</a>. Notably, companies’ compliance with anti-trafficking obligations such as those outlined in the MSA’s Transparency in Supply Chains clause has been limited, and there has been little improvement in most companies’ due diligence reporting and risk assessment processes. Legislation alone is useless if it is not enforced, yet injunctions remain a rare occurrence and there is a lack of specific sanctions for companies who breach the rules.</p><p>Anti-trafficking legislation, although necessary, therefore remains insufficient. Moreover, key players in the private sector, such as the tech industry, have traditionally been largely uncooperative and opposed to the passage of laws such as the SESTA. For months, companies such as Google, Facebook and Amazon <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/law/2017/sep/07/online-sex-trafficking-backpage-bill-communications-decency-act">fought the bill</a> in its original form, only reaching a compromise with lawmakers when <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/nov/03/us-internet-companies-back-online-sex-trafficking-bill">key changes</a> were approved. One of these changes was to only hold liable websites that knowingly facilitate sex trafficking. The fact that <a href="http://fortune.com/2017/09/06/oracle-online-human-trafficking-bill/">Oracle</a> backed the bill last year marked a sharp departure from most of the technology industry’s traditional opposition to the law — they argued that it would hinder digital innovation and lead to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/law/2017/sep/07/online-sex-trafficking-backpage-bill-communications-decency-act">unsustainable liability</a>.</p><p>However, in recent years there have been several interesting developments and initiatives aimed at involving the private sector in combating trafficking in human beings, especially within the tech industry. For instance, IBM have been at the forefront of several cooperation efforts involving multiple actors, in particular financial institutions. This concept is best illustrated by IBM’s partnership with Europol, the NGO Stop the Traffik, Western Union, Barclays, Lloyd’s Banking Group, Liberty Global and UCL to launch the <a href="https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/ibm-stop-the-traffik-western-union-barclays-lloyds-banking-group-liberty-global-europol-and-university-college-london-unveil-international-data-hub-to-combat-human-trafficking-300733485.html">Traffik Analysis Hub </a>(TAHub) on 18 October 2018. The TAHub is a cloud-hosted data hub that enables relevant institutions to identify trafficking networks by analysing the movement of money.</p><p>Furthermore, by using <a href="https://www.ibm.com/blogs/citizen-ibm/2017/04/laird_stop_the_traffik/">IBM i2 software</a>, the TAHub is trained to recognise and detect specific human trafficking terms and incidents, processing open-source data such as news feeds in order to help analysts to identify the characteristics of human trafficking incidents such as recruitment and transportation methods, and potentially predict them. In a nutshell, authenticated partners upload the data, which is then aggregated and interpreted by the tool, transforming it into actionable information for law enforcement, governments, NGOs and financial institutions. The hub’s <a href="https://www.ibm.com/blogs/citizen-ibm/2018/10/bill-peace-stop-the-traffik/">shared governance model</a> also means that all partners own an equal stake and retain control over the data, while sharing it with everyone in the global anti-trafficking community.</p><blockquote><em>The idea of involving the private sector in preventing and eradicating trafficking in human beings is slowly but surely gaining momentum</em></blockquote><p>The idea of involving the private sector in preventing and eradicating trafficking in human beings is slowly but surely gaining momentum, especially with the help of technology companies. Initiatives similar to the TAHub include the <a href="http://www.respect.international/about-us/who-we-are/">RESPECT Initiative</a>, <a href="https://www.bsr.org/en/our-insights/blog-view/announcing-a-new-collaboration-using-tech-to-combat-human-trafficking">Tech Against Trafficking</a> (TAT), <a href="https://www.gbcat.org/">The Global Business Coalition Against Trafficking</a> (GBCAT), <a href="https://www.unglobalcompact.org/take-action/action-platforms/decent-work-supply-chains">The Action Platform on Decent Work in Global Supply Chains</a> and <a href="http://www.modernslaverymap.org/">The Interactive Map for Business of Anti-Human Trafficking Organizations</a>, all of which are multi-stakeholder resources that are attempting to join forces in order to analyse and share relevant data, raise awareness, reach vulnerable communities individuals more efficiently and improve supply chain standards.</p><p>A particularly direct approach was adopted by the NGO <a href="https://www.stopthetraffik.org/">Stop The Traffik</a>, which works with clients across industries and sectors to help them understand the phenomenon of human trafficking. Instead of imposing obligations, Stop The Traffik recognises the importance of directly involving and guiding companies in understanding the economic risks trafficking poses to their business, such as damages to reputation and unfair competition, as well as helping them to spot the red flags, understand the specific ways that they might be vulnerable to human trafficking, and provide guidance on best practice to mitigate the risks — by providing awareness courses and business risk analysis services.</p><p>Moreover, <a href="https://www.stopthetraffik.org/intelligence-led-prevention/">Stop the Traffik’s Centre for Intelligence-Led Prevention</a> collects and analyses vast quantities of data and builds intelligence on human trafficking and modern slavery hotspots and trends on a global scale, which is then shared directly with vulnerable communities and individuals in order to generate action on the ground and to build resilience to these crimes. It collects data from numerous sources, including their STOP APP, data provided by partners, Open Source and community intelligence. This data is then analysed by professionals in law enforcement, human intelligence and anti-money laundering.</p><blockquote><em>In the US and Canada, public-private partnerships and cooperation projects have yielded some positive results</em></blockquote><p>While it is still too early to assess the effectiveness of such initiatives, it is already clear that their impact in combating and preventing human trafficking will depend on how authorities and other actors involved use the new tools at their disposal. Early results appear to be encouraging: in the US and Canada, <a href="http://fortune.com/2018/07/17/banks-human-sex-trafficking-exploitation-slavery/">public-private partnerships</a> and cooperation projects, such as the Blue Campaign and Project Protect, have yielded some positive results, with reports of suspicious transactions related to human trafficking increasing from 400 in 2015 to 2000 in each of 2016 and 2017. Nevertheless, much like legislation, these tools will be useless if they are not properly and regularly used.</p><p>As evident in the case of Stop the Traffik’s Centre for Intelligence-Led Prevention, the more material is collected, the better and more accurate the insights will be. For instance, community-oriented tools such as the STOP APP could encourage victims and witnesses of human trafficking to provide analysts with useful data. After all, the added value of the shared governance model is highly dependent on the number and quality of its users. For sure, educating the public and the private sector on the risks posed by trafficking in human beings while at the same time encouraging businesses to take preventive measures in their supply chains continue to be daunting tasks, especially given companies’ business interests and reputational concerns. Nevertheless, public pressure on private actors to take action, and the introduction of new methods and tools to address trafficking in human beings, are promising developments, especially as a way to complement legislation to protect victims and to discourage modern slavery.</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://shoc.rusi.org/informer/role-private-sector-combating-trafficking-human-beings-way-forward"><em>https://shoc.rusi.org</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=6d1f595cd47f" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Defence for Children: agreement on kinderpardon is good news but NL accepting less refugees is not…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@benedettadimatteo/defence-for-children-agreement-on-kinderpardon-is-good-news-but-nl-accepting-less-refugees-is-not-16eba1215809?source=rss-960cbd98fbf8------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/16eba1215809</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[refugees]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[netherlands]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Benedetta Di Matteo]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 02 Apr 2019 12:06:03 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-09-29T21:43:17.175Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Defence for Children: agreement on kinderpardon is good news but NL accepting less refugees is not | +31mag</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/696/0*U0VjETIj62bG8K7J.jpg" /></figure><p><strong>Mr. Vegter, last month the Dutch government reached an agreement, according to which several refugee children will be given the right to stay in the Netherlands. How many children and families will this affect?</strong></p><p>That is not yet known. According to governmental sources, about 700 cases will be reassessed, however, it is not explained where this figure comes from, so we need to wait for official figures. So far, we also do not know for sure how many legal cases will be reopened exactly and how many children will be impacted by the decision. However, the Dutch government’s plan is to reassess all cases before the end of 2019, with the exception of appeal procedures.</p><p><strong>Regarding the government’s decision to abolish the controversial kinderpardon (child amnesty), can you explain to us what this means in practice?</strong></p><p>In 2013, the Dutch government passed two kinderpardon regulations: a preliminary one and a permanent one; the latter required refugee children under the age of 18 to reside in the Netherlands for at least five years before February 2013. One of the criteria contained in the regulations was that the childrens’ parents or legal guardian were sufficiently collaborating with the Dutch authorities towards their expulsion, otherwise known as the meewerkcriterium (collaboration criterion). With time, this criterion became very strict, and only extreme situations became tolerated as exceptions, such as life-threatening conditions in origin countries or statelessness. As a result, only a small fraction of refugee children was granted their stay in the Netherlands. What made the kinderpardon<br>so controversial was that in assessing these childrens’ cases, all other factors were irrelevant: the permanent regulation did not take in consideration the well-being of the children or their level of integration into Dutch society at all. We at Defence for Children are striving for a stronger position for children well-being in Dutch immigration law, and we are hopeful that the new directive, expected to replace the 2013 regulation in the next weeks or months, will do just that.</p><p><strong>Is the agreement a step forward with regards to children’s rights, legally speaking?</strong></p><p>Generally speaking, the abolishment of previous regulation and the adoption of the new directive is good news for children rights and for the affected families; it is indeed very important that children rights are finally included in Dutch immigration law.</p><p><strong>According to the agreement, the Netherlands will reduce the number of refugees it accepts under UN rules. What is your opinion on this decision?</strong></p><p>We think that is a horrible part of the compromise. The refugees that will be affected by the negotiation are extremely vulnerable, so we are disgusted by the way in which this issue was even part of the negotiation. This is also the view of many other organisations in the Netherlands that deal with human and refugee rights. This is really not the way human rights should be dealt with; there should not be any bargaining involved when it comes to human lives, regardless of the political gains.</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://www.31mag.nl/defence-for-children-agreement-on-kinderpardon-is-good-news-but-nl-accepting-less-refugees-is-not/"><em>https://www.31mag.nl</em></a><em> on April 2, 2019.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=16eba1215809" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[India, France, and their new security agreements | Global Risk Insights]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@benedettadimatteo/india-france-and-their-new-security-agreements-global-risk-insights-ecb0533f8314?source=rss-960cbd98fbf8------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ecb0533f8314</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[france]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[foreign-policy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[maritime-security-market]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[india]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Benedetta Di Matteo]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 20 Apr 2018 01:10:27 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-07-31T19:18:24.576Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/0*Tg6ji5Dy1zLVvZnB.jpg" /></figure><p><em>Regional power struggles and maritime security are at the heart of new security agreements between France and India. India is especially worried about being geopolitically isolated by China, and is seeking to expand its presence in the Indian Ocean.</em></p><p>Between 10 and 14 March, India and France signed a series of agreements to strengthen their strategic and commercial relations. The deals aim at deepening cooperation on a wide range of issues, especially defense, space technology, climate change, nuclear energy, urbanization and counterterrorism. The underlying concerns, however, are ensuring maritime security in the Indian Ocean and containing China’s sphere of influence in the region.</p><h3>Maritime security and India’s Indian Ocean influence</h3><p>Last November, India joined discussions on the revival of a <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Viewpoints/Sreeram-Chaulia/India-belatedly-boosts-naval-competition-with-China?page=2">quadrilateral defence cooperation</a> with Japan, Australia and the United States, during which the four members confirmed their commitments to establish a free and open Indo-Pacific region, promote cooperation in line with a rules-based order, respect international law, and ensure freedom of navigation, overflight, maritime security and connectivity. The agreements with France are India’s latest effort to create a multilateral network with the common aim to maintain stability and security in the Indian Ocean and the broader Asia-Pacific.</p><p>The deals have important practical implications for the regional security landscape. Specifically, India is seeking to strengthen its military presence in the Indian Ocean and to gain access to ports and naval bases in the region, which is precisely what the latest agreements with France allow. Considering France’s military presence in the Ocean through the island of La Reunion, Mayotte and the French Antarctic Lands, as well as Djibouti and Abu Dhabi, the partnership could greatly facilitate India’s desire for influence in the Western Indian Ocean.</p><p>Modi has already <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/indian-ocean-base-race-india-responds">signed similar agreements</a> with other partners such as Seychelles, Singapore and Oman, granting India’s access to these countries’ ports and naval facilities. Also noteworthy is the partnership with the United States, with which Modi signed a logistics agreement in 2017 to facilitate the use of US naval and air force bases in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf.</p><h3>Countering China’s ambitions</h3><p>China’s growing presence in the region is one of the main factors behind India’s recent efforts to boost its strategic cooperation with third parties. The stakes are particularly high for India because China has repeatedly shown its growing willingness to expand its influence in South Asia and in the Indian Ocean region, threatening India’s status of provider of security and stability. Beijing showed strategic ambitions in Djibouti, where it established its first and for the moment only military base, as well as in <a href="https://globalriskinsights.com/2018/03/chinas-strengthening-relationship-pakistan/">Pakistan</a>, Sri Lanka and the Maldives, especially through <a href="https://globalriskinsights.com/2015/12/india-and-china-vie-for-the-maldives/">increased investment</a> and free trade agreements.</p><p>From India’s perspective, Chinese efforts to strengthen economic ties in South Asia might culminate in the establishment of its <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/chinas-new-network-indian-ocean-bases">naval bases</a> in these key countries. The Maldives’ recent tilt towards China is especially worrisome for Modi, as he fears the possibility that Beijing will increase its economic and military presence in the island nation, thereby disrupting the current regional equilibrium.</p><p>A stronger response by India as a result of growing Sino-Indian competition would increase the risk of collision between the two regional powers over the Indian Ocean. Most importantly, the risk of military and strategic confrontation between China and India over South Asia and the Indian Ocean will increase, as India attempts to enhance its influence and power. The likely outcome is a struggle to secure bases in smaller and micro-states in the region, bringing significant political risks. Recent instances of instability in the <a href="https://globalriskinsights.com/2018/03/china-india-relations-maldives/">Maldives</a> and the consequent competition for influence between the two powers illustrate this trend, and smaller states will increasingly find themselves in a position to choose between Chinese economic incentives and maintaining their tradition of supporting India’s strategic interests.</p><h3>Shared concerns, mutual benefits</h3><p>Currently, Modi faces two main challenges in containing China’s influence in the Indian Ocean. These are the inability to compete with the economic benefits and foreign investment opportunities that Beijing is able to offer to less developed nations in the region, and a limited defense budget and capabilities.</p><p>As a response, India sees increased security cooperation with strategic partners such as France and the Quad as a means to establish a rules-based regional security architecture, in an attempt to attract smaller states in the region and prevent them from gravitating towards China’s sphere of influence. Moreover, France is an important partner in developing Indian military capabilities, and the purchase of <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2018/03/macron-and-modi-what-france-can-do-for-india-and-what-india-can-do-for-france/">French-produced</a> Scorpene submarines and Rafale fighter jets is among the most significant contributions to India’s limited defence and naval capacity. As France is willing to cooperate with Modi and his security ambitions, similar deals will likely follow soon.</p><p>For France, India’s growing economic role on the global stage can provide important support, as Macron also seeks to build stronger bilateral relationships as a response to China and Russia’s increased assertiveness and internal changes in the European Union and in the US. In Macron’s view, India is an important partner in providing <a href="http://www.dw.com/en/frances-macron-seeks-closer-india-ties-amid-global-uncertainty/a-42893357">greater stability</a> and balance in Asia, and will boost the role of France and the European Union in world affairs.</p><p>Chinese expansionism is not the only shared concern for the two leaders. Stronger <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2018/03/from-sea-to-space-india-and-france-deepen-security-cooperation/">maritime surveillance</a> and space cooperation were also key component in the agreements, which included areas such high resolution earth observation, spaces situational awareness and satellite navigation. Maritime traffic security is an especially important issue for the two parties, who expressed concerns over freedom of navigation and overflight, organized crime, trafficking of weapons, smuggling and illegal fishing in the Indian Ocean and the Horn of Africa. As both India and France seek to play a stronger role in the region’s changing security landscape, cooperation between the two countries over the Indian Ocean will surely grow in the near future.</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://globalriskinsights.com/2018/04/india-france-new-security-agreements/"><em>https://globalriskinsights.com</em></a><em> on April 20, 2018.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ecb0533f8314" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Spike in protests a symptom of deeper issues in Honduras | Global Risk Insights]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@benedettadimatteo/spike-in-protests-a-symptom-of-deeper-issues-in-honduras-global-risk-insights-9a047a9ef489?source=rss-960cbd98fbf8------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/9a047a9ef489</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[elections]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[honduras]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Benedetta Di Matteo]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 28 Dec 2017 16:31:47 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-07-31T19:57:42.476Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/0*IxRQHwpyMrhnu0bt.jpg" /></figure><p><em>On 17 December, Honduras’ electoral tribunal declared incumbent President Juan Orlando Hernandez the winner of the presidential elections. Resulting allegations of electoral fraud and public protests are however signs of deepening political instability.</em></p><p>In Honduras, a country already affected by widespread corruption, crime and poverty, this means increased risks for investors and businesses, while prolonged instability will fuel deep-seated issues such as migration and drug-related crime.</p><h3>Civil unrest likely to persist</h3><p>Controversy and unrest resulting from Honduras’ latest presidential elections are the symptoms of a climate of political instability affecting the Central American country. Initial counts on 26 November — the day of the election — suggested a victory for Hernandez’ main opponent Salvador Nasralla, from the centre-left coalition Opposition Alliance against the Dictatorship. However, on 10 December, the electoral tribunal stated that a partial recount of the votes showed current President Juan Orlando Hernandez as the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-honduras-election/honduras-tribunal-says-partial-vote-recount-shows-same-result-idUSKBN1E40SZ">winner</a>, while Nasralla supposedly won 31.5 percent of the votes. Country-wide protests and civil unrest followed these results.</p><p>The situation is likely to deteriorate in the immediate term. Salvador Nasralla already expressed his intention to hold mass protests against the election results, suggesting that frequent instances of political violence will take place during the upcoming months. So far, key transit roads and assets have been affected by protesters, who put roadblocks in place and <a href="https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/honduras-elections-end-brings-more-uncertainty#/entry/jsconnect?client_id=644347316&amp;target=%2Fdiscussion%2Fembed%3Fp%3D%252Fdiscussion%252Fembed%252F%26vanilla_identifier%3D285880%26vanilla_url%3Dhttps%253A%252F%252Fworldview.stratfor.com%252Farticle%252Fhonduras-elections-end-brings-more-uncertainty%26vanilla_category_id%3D1%26title%3DIn%2BHonduras%252C%2Ban%2BElection%2527s%2BEnd%2BBrings%2BMore%2BUncertainty">attacked</a> local businesses.</p><p>Since last Sunday, the Organization of American States (OAS) already called for <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/18/honduras-election-president-juan-orlando-hernandez-declared-winner-amid-unrest">new elections</a>, after Nasralla met US State Department officials and the head of OAS to denounce electoral fraud. Moreover, the results were met with anti-government demonstrations across the country, especially affecting urban areas such as the capital Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula. At least 17 people lost their lives as a result of these <a href="http://www.dw.com/en/honduras-clashes-as-official-rejects-calls-for-new-election/a-41852500">clashes</a>.</p><p>Similar instances of violence could turn into a trend: the opposition may in fact use street protests as leverage in order to obtain <a href="https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/honduras-elections-end-brings-more-uncertainty#/entry/jsconnect?client_id=644347316&amp;target=%2Fdiscussion%2Fembed%3Fp%3D%252Fdiscussion%252Fembed%252F%26vanilla_identifier%3D285880%26vanilla_url%3Dhttps%253A%252F%252Fworldview.stratfor.com%252Farticle%252Fhonduras-elections-end-brings-more-uncertainty%26vanilla_category_id%3D1%26title%3DIn%2BHonduras%252C%2Ban%2BElection%2527s%2BEnd%2BBrings%2BMore%2BUncertainty">political concessions</a>. Such compromises may include new elections or Cabinet appointments that are favourable to the opposition. The frequency and violence of such protests, however, will depend on whether the opposition and the incumbent government can successfully engage in negotiations.</p><h3>Failure to address endemic challenges</h3><p>Honduras’ political stability also has regional repercussions. The Central American country is in fact among the largest sources of illegal immigrants to the United States, fueling the ongoing migration and humanitarian crisis. While the election results are unlikely to be a major cause of migration, an unstable government will once again fail to address Honduras’ endemic challenges such as the lack of economic opportunity, poverty and drug trafficking.</p><p>In this regard, Hernandez’ achievements as a President are controversial. On the one hand, his tough-on-crime stance made him popular amongst many Hondurans, who give him credit for the reduction in the country’s crime rate since 2014, when he came to power. Specifically, he passed effective measures such as dismantling criminal structures, reforming the national police force, increasing anti-crime resources, reforming the national penal code and allowing extradition from Honduras to the United States, which reduced drug trafficking to the country. The <a href="https://www.economist.com/news/americas/21731691-his-tough-crime-policies-are-paying-political-dividend-juan-orlando-hern-ndez-looks-headed">positive effects</a> of such initiatives are already showing: Honduras’ crime rates have halved compared to last year’s.</p><p>On the other hand, crime rates in the country are still among the highest in Latin America and plans to address the <a href="https://www.economist.com/news/americas/21731691-his-tough-crime-policies-are-paying-political-dividend-juan-orlando-hern-ndez-looks-headed">root causes</a> of the crisis such as poverty and unemployment, and to attract foreign investment and diversification of the Honduran economy, are yet to come to fruition. Furthermore, rather than stopping drug trafficking, Hernandez’ policies have led to the creation of new routes, now affecting other countries in the region, such as Mexico, El Salvador and Jamaica.</p><h3>Honduras and the United States: a lasting partnership</h3><p>Nevertheless, the recent political developments will not change the fact that Honduras is an important ally in the United States’ fight against drug trafficking and illegal immigration. Indeed, the country is a significant transit point for the smuggling of cocaine to North America as well a source of mass migration. The current government has shown a zero-tolerance approach against drug trafficking and considerably strengthened border control capabilities and budget. This trend will most likely continue under Hernandez.</p><p>Since 2009, the Central American country received nearly <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/07/crisis-of-honduras-democracy-has-roots-in-us-tacit-support-for-2009-coup">$114m</a> in US aid to strengthen law enforcement capabilities, enforce border security and anti-drugs operations. Given such strategic interests, therefore, very limited intervention is to be expected from Washington. So far, the current administration has indeed been cautious to comment on electoral fraud allegations, suggesting that little will change in their relationship.</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://globalriskinsights.com/2017/12/honduras-rising-political-instability/"><em>https://globalriskinsights.com</em></a><em> on December 28, 2017.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9a047a9ef489" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Why “Military First” is the wrong approach in the G5 Sahel | Global Risk Insights]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@benedettadimatteo/why-military-first-is-the-wrong-approach-in-the-g5-sahel-global-risk-insights-7a67f9f3704f?source=rss-960cbd98fbf8------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/7a67f9f3704f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[terrorism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[military]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sahel]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[radicalisation]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Benedetta Di Matteo]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 19 Nov 2017 21:13:58 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-07-31T19:22:52.156Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/0*YVCMZe0oD4rREHFm.jpg" /></figure><p><em>In the past week the United States, France and Russia pledged to increase their financial and military support to the G5 Sahel Joint Force, which consists of Niger, Burkina Faso, Mali, Chad and Mauritania, to fight terrorism and organized crime in the region. However, military efforts without a wider development strategy could just aggravate the security risks.</em></p><p>On 30 October, the United States <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/11/g5-sahel-counterterrorism-force-explained-171102071159524.html">pledged</a> $60 million to the Force, while the G5 Sahel countries and the EU also committed to contribute $57 million each. Similarly, France, the main supporter of this initiative, announced its intention to provide the taskforce with further financial, military and intelligence resources; with a view to combat terrorism and drug trafficking, restore state authority and implement development. Given the ongoing threat of <a href="http://globalriskinsights.com/2017/02/ongoing-terrorism-frances-new-normal/">terrorism</a> in France, the country’s major involvement in the initiative is unsurprising. However, the plan suffers from significant obstacles and overall short-sightedness that will likely result in a slow, long-lasting rise of security risks in the region and abroad.</p><p>It remains unclear whether an enhanced G5 Sahel taskforce will be able to address the issues that the United Nations, US and France have not managed to solve in spite of their substantial financial contributions to the region. Indeed, France has had a military presence in Mali since 2013 through Operation Barkhane, and in the same year the UN launched its Multidimensional Integrated Stabilizations Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) with seemingly <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/11/western-armies-face-uphill-battle-africa-sahel-171108125319178.html">limited results</a> in decreasing terrorism.</p><h3>The structural challenges of fighting terrorism and crime</h3><p>The central issue that the G5 Sahel will face is that it will likely carry out asymmetric attacks on drug traffickers and armed fighters with very little consideration for the wider, socio-economic implications of terrorism and organized crime on the local population. Its plans to address <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/11/western-armies-face-uphill-battle-africa-sahel-171108125319178.html">structural issues</a> such as unemployment, poverty, porous borders and political instability in the Sahel region are also extremely limited.</p><p>Targeting groups engaged in criminal activities without proper planning is likely to <a href="http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_the_risks_of_deeper_engagement_in_mali_7089">aggravate</a> the security crisis rather than offering solutions. Indeed, a more suitable approach would consider the delicate balance between illicit activity and its contribution to the informal economy, which provides livelihood for several local communities. Simply targeting such networks without providing viable alternatives will likely push the affected groups towards other illicit activities and armed organizations.</p><p>The ongoing security crisis in Mali could offer a <a href="http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_serious_questions_remain_over_g5_sahel_military_force_7300">glimpse</a> into the risks involved in adopting a “military first” approach to regional issues. Not only does it highlight the link between criminal activity and impoverished communities, but it also demonstrates that some armed groups have been involved in funding the peace process. It would be very difficult, therefore, for the parties involved to address organized crime without involuntarily causing more violence and political instability. Moreover, while creators of the G5 Sahel recognize the need to implement an integral <a href="http://institut-thomas-more.fr/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/NoteActu-ITM-40-Eng-2.pdf">development strategy</a>, security concerns firmly remain at the forefront, resulting in a problematic lack of development projects.</p><h3>A Joint Force plagued by divisions</h3><p>The group also seems to be suffering from serious logistical flaws which, if unaddressed, may drastically undermine its effectiveness. Firstly, there are severe internal divisions. For instance, the group’s composition remains as <a href="http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_serious_questions_remain_over_g5_sahel_military_force_7300">unclear</a> as its exact targets. Part of the issue is that the G5 Sahel is a relatively novel military initiative, in which foreign strategic and financial aid directly backs existing African armed forces. As such, the exact role of the United States and France is still undefined, potentially causing leadership disputes.</p><p>Secondly, the G5 Sahel suffers from reduced capacity, especially in comparison to similar regional initiatives, as well as from limited staffing and funding. Once again, the problem seems to lie in the group’s inception: right now, it is merely a tool of military regional cooperation, designed to <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/g5-sahel-joint-military-task-force-to-tackle-terrorism/4099673.html">complement</a> existing regional efforts such as MINUMSMA and Operation Barkhane rather than a more comprehensive regional solution.</p><p>Lastly, the current lack of cooperation with other regional actors will significantly complicate the group’s mandate. Such actors include <a href="https://www.thecairoreview.com/tahrir-forum/the-forgotten-maghreb-sahel-nexus/">Algeria and Morocco</a>, whose intelligence forces have deep knowledge on regional armed groups and could be included in long-term stabilization and development efforts in the Sahel. This kind of local assistance would be especially significant as G5 Sahel’s foreign troops operate in <a href="http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_serious_questions_remain_over_g5_sahel_military_force_7300">unfamiliar areas</a> and with limited knowledge of the complex regional dynamics.</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://globalriskinsights.com/2017/11/military-first-approach-g5-sahel-not-likely-yield-significant-results/"><em>https://globalriskinsights.com</em></a><em> on November 19, 2017.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=7a67f9f3704f" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[New French anti-terror law will only be partially effective | GRI]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@benedettadimatteo/new-french-anti-terror-law-will-only-be-partially-effective-gri-42fc9640e7e4?source=rss-960cbd98fbf8------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/42fc9640e7e4</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[law-enforcement]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[france]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[terrorism]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Benedetta Di Matteo]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 02 Nov 2017 20:04:30 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-07-31T19:24:30.281Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/0*dMM7GdsUSRebe3kH.png" /></figure><p><em>On 30 October, the French signed a new anti-terror law that grants enhanced power to law enforcement authorities, while limiting oversight from the judiciary branch. Supporters of the bill claim that it will create necessary conditions to curb </em><a href="http://globalriskinsights.com/2017/10/shrinking-islamic-state-europes-heightened-terrorist-threat/"><em>terrorism and extremism in France</em></a><em>. However, civil rights defenders strongly oppose its measures, harshly criticizing its arbitrary aspects.</em></p><p>Important elements of the state of emergency enforced by France as a result of the terror attacks occurred in November 2015 have been enshrined into law, <a href="https://www.thelocal.fr/20171004/french-anti-terror-bill-explained-how-emergency-powers-are-now-law">making several of its measures permanent</a>. The bill that was signed into law on 30 October allows the Ministry of Interior and police forces to carry out anti-terrorism operations without seeking prior permission from the judiciary, potentially resulting in a decrease in planned attacks.</p><p>Law enforcement authorities will be allowed to establish security zones around places of events that they consider to be vulnerable to attack. The law also grants the police the power to place suspects of extremist tendencies under the constraints of their town or city’s boundaries for up to one year. Furthermore, authorities will be able to close down places of worship for a period of six months in case of incitement to violence. Increased discretion will be given with regards to private property raids if given judicial permission and greater restrictions on free movement of persons if deemed as a threat to national security. Such limitations aim at deterring and preventing radicalization and deliberate attacks, while contradicting, to some extent, the principle of individual liberty.</p><h3>Part of Macron’s broader strategy</h3><p>The bill was adopted by a margin of 415 to 127 and was deemed necessary given <a href="http://globalriskinsights.com/2017/02/ongoing-terrorism-frances-new-normal/">France’s “state of war” against extremism</a> and radicalization, as over 240 people were killed since 2015 in the country due to Islamic State-inspired attacks.</p><p>While few disagree on the need to curb IS-related ideology and violence in France, controversies have arisen with regards to effectiveness and necessity of this new law. However, according to government sources, measures taken as a result of the emergency status had prevented the execution of several attacks, hence the necessity of keeping the status intact.</p><p>In order to better appreciate the implications of the new law, it should be understood as part of a broader strategy adopted by President Macron to enhance the nation’s counter-terrorism efforts. In June, the French President created the National Centre for Counter-terrorism, with a view to strengthening coordination between the intelligence services to respond and prevent terror attacks.</p><p>The improvement and strengthening of national counter-terrorism measures are necessary in order to lower the risk of terror-related violence and uncertainty. Such enhanced power can be especially effective in identifying and preventing planned attacks. At least <a href="http://www.france24.com/en/20170706-seven-terror-plots-foiled-2017-france-state-emergency-macron">seven terror plots were foiled this year</a>, while <a href="http://www.france24.com/en/20170418-france-police-arrest-two-suspects-over-imminent-attack-elections">last April two suspects were arrested</a> for intending to commit a violent act elections in Marseille.</p><p>Police and intelligence forces were able to effectively track the suspects’ activities and to conduct the property search that leads to their arrest, as multiple weapons and explosives were found in one of the suspects’ apartments. Nevertheless, it remains unclear whether such measures would be able to prevent attacks which do not involve a high degree of planning, such as the <a href="http://globalriskinsights.com/2016/07/nice/">Nice attack</a>, conducted by a single assailant and requiring a low level of preparation.</p><p>Overall, the most difficult task remains to balance prevention, swift response to existing threats, and protection of civil liberties, while limiting arbitrary police action to a minimum.</p><h3>Will the new anti-terrorism law curb civil rights?</h3><p>Human rights groups have been the harshest critics of the new law, arguing that it would <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/28/macrons-counter-terror-bill-risks-frances-human-rights-record-says-un">result in the infringement of multiple civil liberties</a>, such as the right to security, freedom of assembly and freedom of religion. One of the main concerns is that enforcement authorities will not be required to provide much proof of radicalization. Religious venues can be closed down on the basis of preachers and devotees holding <a href="https://www.thelocal.fr/20171004/french-anti-terror-bill-explained-how-emergency-powers-are-now-law">“radical ideas and theories”, rather than concrete evidence</a>.</p><p>In addition, police forces will be able to carry out stop-and-search-operations, which could see Muslim minorities targeted on an arbitrary basis. This would risk having the unwanted effect of further alienation and radicalization.</p><p>Lastly, the bill will allow security services to access the travel data of airline passengers, and intelligence agencies to tap into phone and email communications in order to detect suspicious behaviour, raising the issue of data privacy.</p><p>The public reaction has not yet been strongly critical, given the series of Islamist-related attacks that have affected the country in recent years. Nevertheless, a <a href="https://www.thelocal.fr/20171003/french-mps-to-vote-on-tough-anti-terror-law">recent poll</a> showed that while 57 percent of the respondents claimed to be in favour of the law and 89 percent consider the measure to improve security, 62 percent also expected that it would undermine their freedoms.</p><h3>Unlikely to prevent unsophisticated attacks</h3><p>The consequences of this new anti-terrorism law on France’s security and stability will only be determined in the long-term. So far, judging from the existing measures’ effectiveness in preventing attacks, the most likely short-term impact will be the decline of complex terrorist attacks, at least with regards to their frequency. While the relatively wide margin of discretion given to the police will undoubtedly result in false alarms and the breach of civil rights in some cases, enhanced intelligence operations and swifter action by the police will result in the neutralization of suspects before attacks are perpetrated. The high profile of the law will also no doubt discourage terrorist planning in the short term, as cells seek to avoid activity that would result in detection. However, single-assailant unsophisticated attacks will remain extremely difficult to intercept, and with Islamic State being squeezed in Iraq and Syria, it will <a href="http://globalriskinsights.com/2017/10/shrinking-islamic-state-europes-heightened-terrorist-threat/">continue to seek to inflict damage in Europe</a>.</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://globalriskinsights.com/2017/11/new-french-anti-terrorism-law-partial/"><em>https://globalriskinsights.com</em></a><em> on November 2, 2017.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=42fc9640e7e4" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Venezuela’s uncertain future | Global Risk Insights]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@benedettadimatteo/venezuelas-uncertain-future-global-risk-insights-b39f41d45d95?source=rss-960cbd98fbf8------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b39f41d45d95</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[maduro]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[venezuela]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Benedetta Di Matteo]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 31 Oct 2017 18:36:34 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-07-31T19:56:19.438Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/0*RDXKxtPGvPA1ppq-.jpg" /></figure><p><em>Nicolas Maduro’s victory in this month’s regional elections has strengthened his leadership position and drastically reduced the opposition’s hope for a victory in Venezuela’s 2018 presidential elections. If he retains his presidency next year, will he be able to count on the support of his Latin American allies?</em></p><p>Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro’s victory in the regional elections on 15 October was met with harsh criticisms from the opposition, which reacted to its unexpected defeat by accusing the Socialist party of <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/venezuela-election-nicolas-maduro-socialists-chavez-result-a8003221.html">electoral irregularities. </a>Whether the victory was fraudulent or not, it suggests that the opposition is less likely to succeed in the 2018 Presidential Election. It is still unclear whether Maduro will run as a presidential candidate or whether the party will nominate a substitute, but there is a strong possibility that the PSUV will remain in power.</p><p>While the United States and the European Union already expressed their intention to impose further on Venezuela as a measure against Maduro, his regional alliances are as important to his regime’s endurance as they are unstable. This is largely because the region is undergoing a period of political change and instability. A series of crucial elections in 2017 and 2018 hold potentially serious implications for Maduro’s regime.</p><h3>The decline of Latin America’s socialist parties</h3><p>Nicolas Maduro and his predecessor, Hugo Chavez, have historically enjoyed strong support by several other countries in Latin America, most notably Argentina, Bolivia, Cuba and Ecuador. The regime has received <a href="https://qz.com/178799/venezuelas-protests-are-dividing-south-america-and-not-just-along-the-usual-ideological-lines/">strong backing </a>from both traditionally leftist governments and other economic allies of Venezuela. Nevertheless, recent political shifts and the fall of leftist governments in the region may reinforce the Maduro’s regional isolation.</p><p>The clearest example of such changes is the recent election of Ecuador’s new President <a href="http://www.el-nacional.com/noticias/mundo/nuevo-presidente-ecuador-busca-distanciarse-del-gobierno-maduro_200003">Lenin Moreno </a>, who expressed his wish to build stronger ties with Washington rather than continuing Correa’s ideological and strategic support to Socialist Venezuela and Maduro’s legitimacy as a leader. Moreno, elected in April of this year, has already publicly accused Maduro’s party of violence and the imprisonment of political opponents and discontinued Ecuador’s ambassadors to Venezuela and Cuba.</p><p>These actions are indicative of the weakening of the left-leaning alliance that Maduro and his party have historically relied on for support. Similarly, Argentina’s President Macri — elected in 2015 and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-argentina-election/macris-coalition-sweeps-argentinas-mid-term-vote-idUSKBN1CR04Q">widely supported </a>in mid-term elections this past October — recently committed to strengthen his alliance with President Trump in order to Maduro’s recent measures and to restore a democratic regime in the country.</p><p>Other regional actors, such as the relatively conservative governments of Chile, Peru, Colombia, Brazil and Mexico, are even more unlikely to support Maduro. of the Maduro regime has been especially evident with regards to the <a href="http://globalriskinsights.com/2017/05/developments-venezuela-crisis/">violent protests</a> that occurred throughout 2017, mainly rooted in humanitarian concerns, severe economic shortages and a perceived deterioration of democratic institutions in the country.</p><p>On the other hand, Maduro can still count on the support of Bolivian president <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/aug/10/venezuela-crisis-left-divided-maduro-hugo-chavez">Evo Morales </a>, who defended the creation of the new Venezuelan assembly and condemned acts of foreign aggression towards the country. Similarly, Maduro has recently reiterated the importance of his party’s alliance with Cuba for both economic and military cooperation. However, even Cuba’s future support is in question, as Venezuela’s dire economic situation and anti-Maduro pressure from Washington have <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/4f04a4c0-a946-11e7-ab55-27219df83c97">cast doubts </a>on Cuba’s future support of the PSUV and its leader.</p><h3>The rise of populism in Latin America</h3><p>In recent years, centrist governments have flourished in Latin America, isolating President Maduro. However, it is unclear if this centrist trend will continue in the long term, as a <a href="http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/news-columns-blogs/andres-oppenheimer/article175975561.html">climate of discontent </a>with democracy and with the inability of traditional political candidates to curb crime and corruption may give way to a tide of leftist populism and help Maduro’s Venezuela.</p><p>In , for instance, leftist candidate Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador is leading in the polls for the July 2018 presidential elections. Some members of his party, Morena, have been <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/aug/10/venezuela-crisis-left-divided-maduro-hugo-chavez">openly supportive </a>of the Maduro regime. Similarly, in Colombia, the left-wing politician Gustavo Petro is supported by a significant part of the Colombian electorate, which will vote for President in May 2018. Importantly, Petro’s take on Maduro is muddled. He has been criticized for <a href="https://www.colombiafocus.com/colombias-gustavo-petro-and-the-farc-celebrate-maduros-constituent-assembly">supporting </a>Venezuela’s Constituent Assembly; however, the candidate has taken care to <a href="https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/el-mundo/petro-se-distancia-de-maduro-y-califica-de-pesima-su-politica-economica-articulo-707108">distance himself </a>from Maduro’s economic and social policies.</p><p>It is still too early to predict with confidence the effect that such candidates would have on Maduro’s leadership. However, they would certainly have a strongly divisive effect on the so-called , which consists of 12 countries that openly oppose Venezuela’s new constituent assembly.</p><p>To what extent, then, is President Maduro suffering from regional isolation? At the moment, his regime does not enjoy widespread support from other Latin American governments, as the number of historical allies have decreased and the threat of further US-backed sanctions becomes a real possibility. Nevertheless, victory by populist candidates in the near future may turn things around for the Venezuelan President, at least with regards to the opposition he faces by the Lima Group countries. Whether Maduro will earn the support or the ire of the the future leaders of Latin America remains to be seen.</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://globalriskinsights.com/2017/10/isolation-venezuela-maduro-uncertain-future/"><em>https://globalriskinsights.com</em></a><em> on October 31, 2017.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b39f41d45d95" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[ASEAN’s anti-terror coordination problem | GRI]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@benedettadimatteo/aseans-anti-terror-coordination-problem-gri-dc8e4166308d?source=rss-960cbd98fbf8------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/dc8e4166308d</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[asean]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[terrorism]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Benedetta Di Matteo]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 16 Oct 2017 14:56:48 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-07-31T19:48:42.826Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/0*cq1HqFPOihHflKeS.jpg" /></figure><p><em>ASEAN member states gathered last month to define and strengthen the bloc’s position on counter-terrorism. However, differences between members and the principle of non-interference are among the biggest obstacles to a coordinated strategy.</em></p><h3>Rising number of attacks</h3><p>Southeast Asia has seen several attacks by IS-affiliated groups this year, highlighting its vulnerability to terrorism. New trends are emerging, such as transnational collaboration among militants: in the Philippines last May, local groups joined forces with foreign fighters from Malaysia, Indonesia and other ASEAN countries, in an attempt to attack and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/29/explainer-how-and-why-islamic-state-took-over-part-of-a-philippine-city">claim Marawi as the “first IS province”</a> in the region.</p><p>Attacks are expected to affect the region at an increasing rate, especially as the Islamic State seeks to <a href="http://globalriskinsights.com/2017/10/shrinking-islamic-state-europes-heightened-terrorist-threat/">attract support beyond the Middle East</a>. Southeast Asia is particularly vulnerable to the transnational nature of contemporary terrorism, as fighters are likely return to the region to continue their campaign, fueling violence and diminishing stability.</p><p>Furthermore, existing conflicts, racial and religious tensions and pockets of instability in ASEAN countries provide the <a href="http://www.philstar.com/letters-editor/2017/02/16/1672703/aseans-rising-terrorism-threat-calls-urgent-actions">ideal conditions</a> for the expansion of IS-inspired ideology.</p><h3>A step in the right direction</h3><p>On 20 September, Ministers from the respective member states <a href="http://asean.org/joint-statement-the-eleventh-asean-ministerial-meeting-on-transnational-crime-11th-ammtc/">gathered</a> in Manila, The Philippines, for the Eleventh ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (11 thAMMTC) to consolidate and further strengthen regional cooperation in combating transnational crimes, including terrorism. In addition, one day prior to AMMTC, the Second Special ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on the Rise of Radicalization and Violent Extremism (2 ndSAMMRRVE) took place in order to exchange views and best practices in combating the rise of radicalization and extremism.</p><p>These two meetings are a step in the right direction to strengthening cooperation on counter-terrorism issues among ASEAN members as well as between the bloc and relevant third parties such as China, Japan and South Korea. Members highlighted the need for mutual information sharing, exchange of best practices, resource sharing and improving states’ capabilities to combat terrorism.</p><h3>Challenges to co-ordination</h3><p><a href="http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asiapacific/time-for-asean-to-unite-against-the-threat-of-homegrown-9089272">Effective cooperation amongst ASEAN members</a> has been extremely challenging. One of the main difficulties in designing a common counterterrorism strategy has been attributed to the member states’ significant developmental, economic, political and social discrepancies, which result in different approaches to combat terrorism at the national level.</p><p><em>Malaysian UNGERIN anti-terror police.</em></p><p>Diversity among ASEAN members is likely to generate unequal results from the adoption of a more comprehensive regional counter-terrorism strategy. Members such as Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines share strong geographical bonds and are affected by extremism to a similar degree; thus, increasing cooperation in order to tackle the transnational movement of terrorists between them is an obvious priority.</p><p>However, it is unclear whether other member states would benefit to the same extent. For example, countries such as Laos or Cambodia may face economic difficulties in complying with stricter counter-terrorism rules dictated by ASEAN, both due to budget constraints and to the likely extensive legislative changes that such a strategy would entail.</p><p>Secondly, ASEAN is based on the principle of non-interference. Ensuring that coordination between its members can be carried out without foreign intervention in the internal affairs of each country has been a pillar of the ASEAN project since its inception.</p><h3>Individual frameworks</h3><p>As a result of ASEAN’s emphasis on non-interference, each country has been encouraged to develop its own framework to combat terror and militant groups. However, in practice this has hindered the creation of strongly needed joint operations, such as troop sharing and implementation of other regional counter-terrorism programs.</p><p>The principle of non-interference also resulted in the creation of a “ <a href="https://kyotoreview.org/issue-11/a-long-row-to-hoe-a-critical-assessment-of-asean-cooperation-on-counter-terrorism/">comprehensive security approach</a> “, which is widely adopted by the bloc. It highlights the role of the nation-state in providing security and focuses on non-military dimensions of terrorism and crime, while encouraging cooperation built on shared norms and trust between its members. While such an approach can be effective in addressing the root causes of insurgency, its critics point out that its state-centrism and focus on trust-building are inadequate to fighting transnational terrorism.</p><p>Furthermore, ASEAN still lacks the enforcement mechanisms that would be necessary to translate the bloc’s legal commitments into concrete measures. For instance, in 2007 the ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism (ACCT) was signed by all Member States, and was ratified as late as 2013. While the ACCT is a significant achievement for the bloc’s counterterrorism efforts and deepened regional cooperation, it does not specify mechanisms for enforcement. The implementation of earlier instruments, such as the 2002 ASEAN Declaration on Terrorism faced very similar obstacles, reducing the effectiveness of these regional efforts.</p><h3>Cautious optimism</h3><p>The latest bloc meetings leave some room for cautious optimism. For instance, on 13 September, an <a href="http://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/better-information-sharing-database-for-asean-police-agencies-dpm-teo-chee-hean">Improved Database System</a> was launched for ASEAN National Police (ASEANAPOL) in order to improve connectivity and information exchange regarding terrorism and organized crime. While the web-based system was launched in 2006, the new version contains new features such as a discussion forum, which would allow law enforcement officials to share best practices, intelligence information and trends in crime and terrorism in an efficient and secure manner.</p><p>Enhanced information sharing on counter-terrorism issues is particularly necessary due to weak border security: ASEAN’s porous borders facilitate smuggling networks and <a href="http://www.philstar.com/letters-editor/2017/02/16/1672703/aseans-rising-terrorism-threat-calls-urgent-actions">unchecked regional movement</a> of people and weapons.</p><p>Indeed, members have been adopting <a href="http://globalriskinsights.com/2017/06/new-indonesia-counter-terrorism-measures-deserve-scrutiny/">more multifaceted approaches to counter-terrorism</a> that seek to address terrorism as well as human trafficking, migrant smuggling and money laundering. These approaches could be emulated by other Member States in the bloc. <a href="http://www.thesundaily.my/news/2017/09/20/asean-accepts-malaysias-proposals-address-transnational-crime">Malaysia successfully developed four proposals</a> to tackle transnational crime and terrorism.</p><p>Finally, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines are considering creating a trilateral task force aiming to counter IS-affiliated terrorist groups, focusing on stricter border controls in the Sulu-Sulawesi Sea, as well as sharing intelligence and curbing terrorism financing. Other regional initiatives such as the Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter Terrorism (SEARCCT) are expected to gain importance by becoming a regional centre in counter-terrorism training and research. All of the above initiatives and proposals will do much to foster regional integration and create a comprehensive ASEAN counterterrorism strategy.</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://globalriskinsights.com/2017/10/asean-anti-terror-coordination-problem/"><em>https://globalriskinsights.com</em></a><em> on October 16, 2017.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=dc8e4166308d" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[New EU cyber strategy leaves key security gaps | Global Risk Insights]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@benedettadimatteo/new-eu-cyber-strategy-leaves-key-security-gaps-global-risk-insights-44aaacfe6570?source=rss-960cbd98fbf8------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/44aaacfe6570</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[european-union]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Benedetta Di Matteo]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 15 Oct 2017 12:49:46 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-07-31T19:49:44.478Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/0*tBuI5qfuy05D3kQu.jpg" /></figure><p><em>Last month, the European Commission released a report on “Resilience, Deterrence and Defence: Building strong cybersecurity for the EU”. GRI examines the strengths and weaknesses of this proposed strategy.</em></p><p>The strategy is based on <a href="https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=d18fd66b-bbdc-4ff5-aebf-7cde2ae0a8fb">three principles:</a> building greater resistance against cyber vulnerabilities, deterring cyber attacks against member states and increasing cooperation at the European and international level. In order to meet these goals, the first reform proposed by the Commission is to transform the European Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) into a permanent, independent structure which would assist EU institutions and Member States in developing and implementing cybersecurity policies and cooperation.</p><h4>New certification scheme</h4><p>A strengthened ENISA would enable improved intelligence sharing and facilitate the organization of cybersecurity exercises on a European level, as well as providing member states with operational assistance in the event of cyber attacks. The Commission is also planning to double the Agency’s annual budget to 23 million euro, and increase its workforce.</p><p>The revision of ENISA is however not the only component of the Commission’s cybersecurity strategy. Further plans for a new <a href="http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-3193_en.htm">European certification scheme</a> are underway to ensure the safety of several ICT products and services. Other proposed measures include the creation of a Cybersecurity Emergency Fund to support member states that have fallen victim to cyber attacks, and a European Cybersecurity Research and Competence Center aimed at training and recruiting experts in the field to complement efforts at the national level.</p><p>Finally, the European Commission aims to develop more effective law enforcement responses to cybercrime by focusing on detection and prosecution of offences such as fraud and counterfeiting of non-cash means of payment. It is now up to the European Parliament and Council to approve these initiatives, and determine their implementation.</p><h4>Incentives for enhanced cybersecurity and a digital single market</h4><p>There is a compelling economic incentive to put in place stronger mechanisms to combat cyber-related threats, as the European Commission estimates that approximately 80 percent of companies in the EU have been subject to cybersecurity attacks, for an estimated cost of <a href="http://www.dw.com/en/new-eu-cyber-strategy-aims-to-cut-crime-and-raise-resilience/a-40590601">265 billion euro</a> worth of damages every year, and that value is estimated to quadruple by 2019. In 2016 alone, more than <a href="http://marketrealist.com/2017/09/why-europes-increased-focus-on-cybersecurity-is-good-news-for-fireeye/">4,000 ransomware attacks</a> occurred on a daily basis across the EU, and the economic and financial impacts of such incidents have been increasing dramatically.</p><p>Moreover, the European Commission’s chief of security claims that a stronger EU cyber agency would help member states to protect themselves against <a href="https://euobserver.com/justice/139072">election hacking</a>, as well as other attacks targeting crypto-currencies and economic institutions. The increased focus on cybersecurity in the EU is creating significant growth for the cybersecurity market in the region, and the industry is expected to grow by as much as <a href="http://marketrealist.com/2017/09/why-europes-increased-focus-on-cybersecurity-is-good-news-for-fireeye/">7.2 percent</a> by 2020 to a worth of $16 billion.</p><p>The creation of this new EU cybersecurity strategy can also be understood as a stepping stone in the Commission’s goal to create a so-called <a href="http://www.financialexpress.com/industry/technology/eu-to-launch-cybersecurity-safety-labels/862318/">digital single market</a>, in which the free flow of non-personal data is ensured, as opposed to the current system within which such information is stored and processed inside national borders. According to the European Commission, the free movement of such non-personal data could generate as much as <a href="https://euobserver.com/justice/139072">370 billion euro</a> per year for the single market.</p><h4>Limited coordination and information sharing</h4><p>The EU’s new program to strengthen cyber security is undoubtedly a positive development for the creation of a unified strategy against cyber-related threats. Nevertheless, it does not entirely eliminate fragmentation between the Member States, and coordination and exchange of best practices at the EU level are still needed. The creation of a digital single market is yet to be actualized, and internal divisions with regards to cybersecurity amongst member states pose a limitation the strategy’s effectiveness.</p><p>For instance, it is still unclear whether the new strategy will actually result in enhanced information sharing between the member states. While the Commission has listed the sharing of cybersecurity information and best practices as one of its main goals, it remains an especially sensitive and difficult issue, given the existence of considerable constraints to the free flow of data and the relative lack of willingness on behalf of member states to adhere to such a scheme.</p><p>However, this needs to change if the European Union wants to transform its current efforts on cybersecurity into a truly effective, consolidated strategy. Indeed, as argued by Software Alliance’s Policy Director General, it is necessary for Europe to develop a <a href="http://www.dw.com/en/new-eu-cyber-strategy-aims-to-cut-crime-and-raise-resilience/a-40590601">united front</a> against cyber-related threats by harmonizing its approach, as well as by cooperating and sharing information to the greatest extent possible.</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://globalriskinsights.com/2017/10/new-eu-cyber-strategy-leaves-key-security-gaps/"><em>https://globalriskinsights.com</em></a><em> on October 15, 2017.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=44aaacfe6570" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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