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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Ben Everett on Medium]]></title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Switch 5 (Part 4): How Have Front Offices Adapted?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@beneverett/switch-5-part-4-how-have-front-offices-adapted-f4635d6b5cf2?source=rss-1f1f62d6872------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[analytics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sports-analytics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[basketball]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[nba]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ben Everett]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 12 May 2023 18:54:35 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-05-12T18:54:35.170Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*_5Pr4YlETxTa8U1YKj1KYQ.jpeg" /></figure><p><em>Part 4 of a 4 part series.</em></p><p>Takeaways from <a href="https://medium.com/@beneverett/switch-5-part-1-what-tracking-era-numbers-reveal-about-the-nbas-hottest-trend-53dea6df3e09">Part 1</a>:</p><blockquote>We’ve established that switching has become significantly more popular, it happens much more often in the playoffs, teams likely started switching more to mitigate the advantages that ball screens created, and while switching may result in giving up better shots, teams are having a hard time playing any defense successfully in the NBA.</blockquote><p>Takeaways from <a href="https://medium.com/@beneverett/switch-5-part-2-why-is-switching-better-or-is-it-7e69fe00dadc">Part 2</a>:</p><blockquote>Switch 5 lineups are: Maybe better at guarding mid-range and above-the-break 3’s (but shooting percentages can be so fluky it&#39;s hard to draw conclusions), not as good at rebounding (but the difference on the defensive glass is pretty small), and better at forcing turnovers.</blockquote><blockquote>NBA teams have concluded there are more efficient play types than the post-up, and while small lineups are not as good at guarding the post-up as ones with traditional bigs, the advantage gained isn’t enough to “expose” these types of lineups.</blockquote><p>Takeaways from <a href="https://medium.com/@beneverett/switch-5-part-3-does-this-stuff-matter-in-the-regular-season-7a241f77b4ae">Part 3</a>:</p><blockquote>We established two potential reasons that switching occurs significantly more in the playoffs: (1) Switching is physically more taxing and (2) Switching doesn’t necessarily give you leg up in the regular season because a larger sample typically means shotmaking regresses to the mean.</blockquote><p>The final part of this series is going to focus on how these defensive trends have influenced NBA front offices decision making. We’ll take a look at the 3 possible ways to acquire players: free agency, trades, and the draft.</p><h4>Free Agency</h4><p>Evaluation of free agency year-by-year can be tricky for the following reasons:</p><ul><li>The salary cap (usually) rises each year</li><li>The teams that have salary cap space or available exceptions (and their motivations) change year-to-year</li><li>The players who are free agents in that specific year largely dictate the distribution of money for the rest of the market</li></ul><p>Using Basketball Reference’s classification of the center position, here’s the average annual value of contracts given to centers every year since 2016 (excluding minimum contracts):</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*tjb5II0eiTBDxoD8lJRnyg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Data courtesy of Basketball Reference</figcaption></figure><p>Keep in mind that the salary cap in 2016 was $94M, compared to $124M in 2022, so in a perfect world for people playing the center position, the chart above would show a steady increase.</p><p>We can zoom in on 2016 and 2022 to see how NBA ideologies have changed. In 2016, the salary cap spiked and teams had a bunch of extra cash to spend and man did the centers benefit. Here’s all the centers who got 3+ year, $40M+ contracts in the summer of 2016:</p><ul><li>Al Horford — 4 years, $113M</li><li>Andre Drummond — 5 years, $130M</li><li>Hassan Whiteside — 4 years, $98M</li><li>Dwight Howard — 3 years, $70.5M</li><li>Joakim Noah — 4 years, $72M</li><li>Bismack Biyombo — 4 years, $72M</li><li>Timofey Mozgov — 4 years, $64M</li><li>Ian Mahinmi — 4 years, $64M</li><li>Miles Plumlee — 4 years, $52M</li><li>Meyers Leonard — 4 years, $41M</li></ul><p>Now here’s 2022:</p><ul><li>DeAndre Ayton — 4 years, $133M</li><li>Jusuf Nurkic — 4 years, $70M</li><li>Mitchell Robinson — 4 years, $60M</li></ul><p>Mitchell Robinson, a starting center for a playoff team this year, would’ve gotten more money in 2016 when the cap was $30M lower than it is now. (Side note: That Ayton contract… oof)</p><p>However, much of this has nothing to do with how much a player makes, but rather how in-demand they are, especially for contenders. PJ Tucker makes roughly $11M a year but has been one of the more sought after free agents for contenders who only have their mid-level exception available. Oh yeah, and he’s 38 years old and <a href="https://twitter.com/statmuse/status/1598064691364122625?s=20">basically never touches the ball</a>.</p><p>As discussed in Part 3, having a good traditional center in the regular season is not inherently a bad thing. It becomes a bad thing when the financial commitment to them makes it hard to pay players who would help more in the playoffs.</p><h4>Trade Value</h4><p>The trade aspect of this is probably the hardest to discern. The trade market is even weirder than free agency sometimes. Plus, a specific trade in the past year involving a 3x Defensive Player of the Year is a direct contradiction to this whole series of articles.</p><p>The trades that have become more common, especially at the deadline, are the ones for 3-and-D players where a contending team typically gives up a first-round pick or some sort of package of picks. This includes:</p><ul><li>Robert Covington to Houston in 2019 for a first round pick</li><li>Marcus Morris to the LA Clippers in 2020 for a first round pick, a first round pick swap and a second round pick</li><li>PJ Tucker to Milwaukee in 2021 for a first round pick</li><li>Jae Crowder to Milwaukee in 2023 for 5 second round picks</li></ul><p>These guys don’t necessarily play small-ball 5. All have at some point, to varying levels of success. But each of them enables a team to slide a typical PF to C in a switching system. Houston traded for Covington and moved Tucker to C. Morris played the 5 alongside Nicolas Batum for the Clippers. Acquiring Tucker allowed Milwaukee to move Giannis to the 5 in their switching lineups, and the same theory applied to the Jae Crowder move.</p><p>That’s the other difficult part about the switch everything system: Not only do you need a guy who can hold up as a center, you need enough wing/forward types to make it work. So those are the guys that are sought after by contenders.</p><h4>Draft Implications</h4><p>From a pure counting perspective, the number of centers drafted in the past 20 or so years has decreased:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*HkSeAahQ2L3e8lg7ZTpEOw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Data courtesy of Basketball Reference</figcaption></figure><p>Not a perfect measurement, but once again there’s an outline here that shows NBA teams have begun to distance themselves from pure center types.</p><p>Part of that has to do with offense. Jahlil Okafor, for example, was the last post-up center that was drafted in the lottery simply for his offense. His offense turned out to be less effective than hoped, for sure, but one would think that if he could be average defensively he might have found his footing in the league. That was not the case.</p><p>Offensively talented centers simply don’t matter as much unless they are the best of the best (Jokic, Embiid). Teams would rather put the ball in a guard or wings hands and leave the defense and dirty work to the bigs. And if you’re a center who struggles on defense — might as well play another forward instead.</p><p>Looking at the last few years of the draft, there have been some intriguing big prospects that reflect the impact of NBA defensive concepts on decision making:</p><ul><li>Alperen Sengun — many a mock had him in the Top 10. Did he fall to #16 for the explanation laid out above? He’s great on offense, sure, but the ball needs to be in his hands and defensively there’s concerns. Why not replace him with a Switch 5?</li><li>Evan Mobley — raw offensively, and two years in he’s still raw offensively. But this is the type of player that has defensive hybrid potential like Anthony Davis and Giannis Antetokounmpo, who have proven to be the most valuable defenders in the playoffs. That’s why he went #3.</li><li>Onyeka Okongwu — I think it&#39;s a sign of the times that he went #6 overall in 2020. In the past, he would have been billed as a power forward with a lack of offensive skill. But with the success of smaller versatile centers like Bam Adebayo, Okongwu is seen as a 5, and he has shown that he is more than capable of holding up there.</li></ul><h4>Wrap-Up</h4><p>This series of articles isn’t ground-breaking, and it’s really part of a larger narrative that includes more nuanced discussions of basketball strategy. But I thought it was worth it to take a snapshot of where we are right now compared to just 6 or 7 years ago. Especially since we are now firmly in the era of “More Than 1 or 2 Teams Can Win the Title”. It seems that intricacies of strategy are more important than ever because there’s no dominant team.</p><p>I’m interested to continue seeing the evolution of the Switch 5, along with whatever the next defensive revolution will be.</p><p>Thanks for reading along.</p><h4>P.S. Things to Keep an Eye On Moving Forward</h4><p>Teams bucking the trend and going with 2 bigs — seemed to work for the Cavs in the regular season (but not the playoffs)</p><p>The rise in importance of elite shot-blocking bigs (i.e. can shutting off the rim stifle the best offenses?)</p><p>Can a team with a center as its best offensive player win the title? Or does a center’s energy need to be focused on defense to compete with the best?</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f4635d6b5cf2" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Switch 5 (Part 3): Does This Stuff Matter in the Regular Season?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@beneverett/switch-5-part-3-does-this-stuff-matter-in-the-regular-season-7a241f77b4ae?source=rss-1f1f62d6872------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/7a241f77b4ae</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[basketball]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[nba]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[analytics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sports-analytics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[basketball-analytics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ben Everett]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 28 Apr 2023 21:51:27 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-05-11T14:48:17.158Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/865/0*mcFRQ06_IjTIBeGs.jpg" /></figure><p><em>Part 3 of a 4 part series. Read Part 1 </em><a href="https://medium.com/@beneverett/switch-5-part-1-what-tracking-era-numbers-reveal-about-the-nbas-hottest-trend-53dea6df3e09"><em>here</em></a><em> and Part 2 </em><a href="https://medium.com/@beneverett/switch-5-part-2-why-is-switching-better-or-is-it-7e69fe00dadc"><em>here</em></a><em>.</em></p><p>Takeaways so far:</p><blockquote>We’ve established that switching has become significantly more popular, it happens much more often in the playoffs, teams likely started switching more to mitigate the advantages that ball screens created, and while switching may result in giving up better shots, teams are having a hard time playing any defense successfully in the NBA.</blockquote><p>And:</p><blockquote>Switch 5 lineups are: Maybe better at guarding mid-range and above-the-break 3’s (but shooting percentages can be so fluky its hard to draw conclusions), not as good at rebounding (but the difference on the defensive glass is pretty small), and better at forcing turnovers.</blockquote><blockquote>NBA teams have concluded there are more efficient play types than the post-up, and while small lineups are not as good at guarding the post-up as ones with traditional bigs, the advantage gained isn’t enough to “expose” these types of lineups.</blockquote><h4>Why Don’t Teams Switch More in the Regular Season?</h4><p>In Part 1, we saw that the gap between switching frequency in the regular season and playoffs was massive:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*7bTly07Y2R13TIjP-NVMxw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Data from Second Spectrum</figcaption></figure><p>If teams have concluded that switching is the better defensive strategy, why do teams not switch nearly as much in the regular season? Let’s examine a couple of potential reasons:</p><h4>Switching is Hard</h4><p>Second Spectrum provides a handful of fitness stats, including speed and load for each player, along with distance traveled during games. Per the Second Spectrum Definitions Handbook:</p><blockquote>Speed: Magnitude of the two dimensional velocity of the player in feet per second</blockquote><blockquote>Total Load: The total acceleration in feet/s² integrated over the chance incorporating changes in speed and changes in direction</blockquote><blockquote>Speed Zones: Fast = greater than 14 ft/s, Medium = between 8 ft/s and 14 ft/s, Slow = less than 8 ft/s</blockquote><p>I don’t know anything about biomechanics, but wanted to visualize some of this data in case anything popped out. First I gathered the data of all the centers who played in the playoffs since the beginning of the tracking era. Next, I divided them into two groups based on switch frequency. Here’s how their fitness stats compared:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*L8SCS7hKQLyXZeekJQk1tQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>Second Spectrum fitness stats show a slight increase in distance traveled per 36 minutes for players with high switch rates. Additionally, players with low switch rates spend much more time in the “Slow Load” category as opposed to the medium or fast ones.</p><p>Not a massive difference here, but keep in mind that the players in the “High Switch Frequency” category still only switch *at most* 50% of the time.</p><p>This is not surprising — especially in the era of load management. Coaches don’t want their bigs flying around the court every possession and putting more stress on their bodies if not all possessions are created equal.</p><h4>Law of Averages</h4><p>Statistically, we can conclude that switching in the regular season does not lead to a better defensive rating:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Q0-8bksVi0e5auwBRMmb5A.jpeg" /></figure><p>Not much of a correlation here. In the regular season, great defenses are not necessarily built on switching — they can be — but they don’t need to be.</p><p>Let’s take a look at the top 10 defenses by defensive rating since 2017:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*AmQtOnQMgVlkFSNAox7szA.jpeg" /></figure><p>A lot of teams here with traditional centers and a conservative, rim-protecting scheme. The 2020–21 Milwaukee Bucks, who went on to win the title, are further down on this list because they <a href="https://theathletic.com/2385475/2021/02/16/bucks-starting-to-switch-it-up-on-defense-i-like-that-were-open-minded-now/">“experimented” with different defensive styles during the regular season</a> (shoutout Eric Nehm), rather than sticking to their drop-back-and-shut-off-the-rim style that was so successful in regular seasons of yore.</p><p>Why does the traditional rim protection/drop/less aggressive strategy work in the regular season? One potential answer is the competition. The best shotmakers in the NBA make the playoffs (typically) and actually play in those games (typically). In the playoffs, you won’t find load management or a game against a team that is tanking.</p><p>Another reason is sample size. If you give up shots that are typically harder to make, it has a greater chance of evening out over 82 games than over a 7 game or less playoff series.</p><p>Some great analytical work has been done to increase our knowledge in the”Quality of Shot” space— check out Cleaning the Glass’s Location eFG%, Second Spectrum’s Shot Quality metric, or <a href="https://shotquality.com/">ShotQuality.com</a>.</p><p>The correlation between defensive rating and Second Spectrum’s Shot Quality surrendered in the regular season is just over 60%.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*lhgye3kDC6wlK2-E5-qygQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>82 games is a lot. This isn’t March Madness. In the playoffs, not only are you going up against the better shot makers, but there’s also less of a sample for it to even out. There is more of a reason for coaches to feel uneasy about giving up a pull-up jumper to a really good player even if it’s statistically a tough shot to make.</p><h4>Where we go from here</h4><p>The difference between the regular season and playoffs is as stark as it has ever been. We see teams build rosters specifically for playoff basketball, while teams that put up great numbers in the regular season may fizzle out in the postseason. A portion of that difference is defensive strategy.</p><p>We established two potential reasons that switching occurs significantly more in the playoffs: (1) Switching is physically more taxing and (2) Switching doesn’t necessarily give you leg up in the regular season because a larger sample typically means shotmaking regresses to the mean.</p><p>Next up, let’s see how the switching trend has impacted roster building — stay tuned for Part 4.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=7a241f77b4ae" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Switch 5 (Part 2): Why is Switching Better? Or is it?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@beneverett/switch-5-part-2-why-is-switching-better-or-is-it-7e69fe00dadc?source=rss-1f1f62d6872------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/7e69fe00dadc</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[sports]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sports-analytics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[basketball]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[nba]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ben Everett]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 21 Apr 2023 18:44:11 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-04-21T18:44:11.183Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*bweW6UonxRcRdFg_.jpg" /><figcaption>POV: You’re a post-up center and you want to punish the Warriors small-ball lineups</figcaption></figure><p><em>Part 2 of a 4 part series. Read Part 1 </em><a href="https://medium.com/@beneverett/switch-5-part-1-what-tracking-era-numbers-reveal-about-the-nbas-hottest-trend-53dea6df3e09"><em>here</em></a><em>.</em></p><p>Takeaways from Part 1, in short:</p><blockquote>We’ve established that switching has become significantly more popular, it happens much more often in the playoffs, teams likely started switching more to mitigate the advantages that ball screens created, and while switching may result in giving up better shots, teams are having a hard time playing any defense successfully in the NBA.</blockquote><h4>How do we define a Switch 5?</h4><p>In my opinion, the most difficult aspect of studying the switching trend is classifying who qualifies as a switch 5. Looking at how often a player switches doesn’t necessarily indicate they are good at it. There’s no metric I’m aware of (at least publicly) that tracks how often a ball-handler gains an advantage on his defender.</p><p>So for the sake of analysis, I made some subjective delineations. An important consideration here is that I want as much playoff data as possible, so these selections are largely from teams who have played multiple playoff series since 2017 or so.</p><p><em>Traditional: Joel Embiid, Nikola Jokic, Rudy Gobert, Jusuf Nurkic</em></p><p><em>Hybrid: Anthony Davis, Giannis Antetokounmpo, Jaren Jackson Jr., Bam Adebayo</em></p><p><em>Switch 5: Draymond Green, PJ Tucker (mainly in Houston), Marcus Morris/Nic Batum (whoever you consider the center in those Clipper lineups), Maxi Kleber</em></p><p>In short, the classifications are as follows:</p><p><em>Traditional = Undoubtedly a center — mainly plays some form of drop coverage</em></p><p><em>Hybrid = Plays PF &amp; C — can take on either the traditional center defense role or the Switch 5 role</em></p><p><em>Switch 5 = A PF masquerading as a center in switch-everything lineups</em></p><h4>The Data</h4><p>Given these delineations, I pulled data from pbpstats.com to determine the statistical shot profile difference between lineups with “Traditional” centers and lineups with a “Switch 5” or “Hybrid” playing center.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/763/1*uSil2yGsQAoKhofrfmHoaQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Data from pbpstats.com</figcaption></figure><p>Based on these stratifications, Switch 5/Hybrid lineups give up slightly more 3’s and slightly less mid-range shots than traditional lineups — this is usually not good, but…</p><ul><li>The issue here is that teams hit those long mid range shots pretty well against traditional centers</li><li>Additionally, traditional centers give up four percentage points better shooting on above the break 3’s</li><li>This is the conundrum with drop centers vs. switching: from a frequency perspective, the shot profile looks good, but NBA players have gotten so good at making pull-up jumpers that drop coverage gets attacked ruthlessly</li></ul><p>Let’s look at a couple more stats:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/763/1*pzEHdSbTzXtPqJtEqUMLcQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Data from pbpstats.com</figcaption></figure><p>As expected, Switch 5 lineups are not as good at rebounding, but the difference on the defensive glass is pretty small — which is encouraging. Offensively, it would make sense that having a big traditional center would allow you to take advantage of the offensive glass.</p><p>On the other hand, with less conservative defense and more ball pressure, Switch 5 lineups make a real difference in the turnover department, which are much more valuable than a missed shot from a statistical perspective.</p><p>Important to note we also get selection bias from a couple different aspects here:</p><ul><li>The hybrid/switch players I’ve selected are generally pretty good at their jobs — that’s why their coaches played them at center in the playoffs (again, I wanted a decent sample size). This represents the tippy top of NBA small-ball efficiency. As you move down the spectrum, you’ll see more PF types playing small-ball center to pick up offensive slack rather than for defensive reasons. These players (and frankly, teams) aren’t usually good enough to be playing in May or June.</li><li>Since these stats are playoff-only, the competition these centers are going up against is better than league average, which is probably going to manifest itself in the shooting efficiency numbers the most. Averaging this out over the course of an 82-game regular season… more on that in Part 3.</li></ul><h4>Can True Bigs Take Advantage?</h4><p>Typically, discussion around punishing small lineups involves using size and strength to power through a smaller player and score inside, sometimes as a result of an offensive rebound.</p><p>We’ve already covered rebounding, where the difference mainly shows up on the offensive end, but let’s talk about post-ups. Since the start of the tracking era, post-ups in the playoffs have plummeted:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Zgn9mpWUWMSecIEL-JV_FQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Data from Second Spectrum</figcaption></figure><p>In the 2013–14 playoffs, there were 1,347 direct post-ups compared to 754 in last year’s postseason. I tend to assume NBA coaches and teams are smart, so the decline in post-ups speaks for itself, but we can also back it up with stats, first using the traditional/hybrid/switch delineations defined earlier:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*f4_i5ZJqD4EHWdeQK1wBMA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Data from Second Spectrum</figcaption></figure><p>As we see here, the traditional centers I singled out faired better defending post-ups, but not by much. To hedge against my imperfect stratification of these players, here’s those same numbers, but instead using Second Spectrum’s “# of centers in lineup” filter:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*LBtLG4vD-8bd4ZjPce_DHQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Data from Second Spectrum</figcaption></figure><p>The two big/small delineations track pretty similarly, with a clear advantage given to the traditional centers in guarding post-ups, but a pretty small one across the board.</p><p>When you take into account that small-ball 5’s often add an offensive element like spreading the floor (<strong>per Dunc’d On, the positional average of 3P% for centers is 23% compared to 33% for power forwards</strong>), the offense/defense trade-off of playing a big guy becomes an increasingly difficult choice for coaches, especially in the playoffs.</p><p>Per NBA.com/stats:</p><ul><li>Only 23 players in the league this year posted up more than twice per game, and only 10 of those players scored better than 1 point per possession on those post-ups</li><li>Combining P&amp;R Ball-Handler and P&amp;R Roll Man possessions, teams utilized these play-types roughly 30 times per game, on average, compared to 4 post-ups per game</li></ul><p>Given these stats, coaches would want to formulate their lineups to be able to defend the most used and most efficient offensive strategies, neither of which is the post-up. More frequently, teams are forcing the opposing center to figure out how to guard a ball screen.</p><h4>Where we go from here</h4><p>Ok, so Switch 5 lineups are…</p><ul><li><em>Maybe</em> better at guarding mid-range and above-the-break 3’s, but shooting percentages can be so fluky its hard to draw conclusions</li><li>Not as good at rebounding, but the difference on the defensive glass is pretty small</li><li>Better at forcing turnovers</li></ul><p>In regards to post defense, NBA teams have concluded there are more efficient play types than the post-up, and while small lineups are not as good at guarding the post-up as ones with traditional bigs, the advantage gained isn’t enough to “expose” these types of lineups.</p><p>Another takeaway? This data is exceedingly difficult to aggregate. While the increase in data available through tracking stats have given us more to look at, much of this is still subjective, which is why this type of analysis is often better researched through watching film and on a case-to-case basis. I’ll leave that to the coaches.</p><p>Next, we want to study the gap between regular season and playoff switching frequency — stay tuned for Part 3.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=7e69fe00dadc" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Switch 5 (Part 1): What Tracking-Era Numbers Reveal about the NBA’s Hottest Trend]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@beneverett/switch-5-part-1-what-tracking-era-numbers-reveal-about-the-nbas-hottest-trend-53dea6df3e09?source=rss-1f1f62d6872------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/53dea6df3e09</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[sports-analytics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sports]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[basketball]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[nba]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ben Everett]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 14 Apr 2023 21:02:24 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-04-21T18:24:11.785Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/933/0*kzRS8Gt_2Gr4OJtF.jpg" /></figure><p>A seemingly offensively-motivated free agent signing by an NBA contender during the 2021 offseason developed into a storyline that only a handful of years ago would’ve sounded ludicrous.</p><p>When Utah signed veteran forward Rudy Gay to a two-year deal in August 2021, one of the more prevalent takes on the situation was <a href="https://thejnotes.com/2021/08/04/utah-jazz-grading-rudy-gay-signing/">Gay’s potential ability to play “small-ball 5” for the Jazz</a> in order to give them more defensive versatility, especially in the playoffs.</p><p>The merits of this storyline can be debated, of course. After all, the Jazz did have arguably the best defensive player in the NBA playing the center position. But the reality is the massive changes in NBA offense over the past decade have forced teams to adjust by trading height for quickness.</p><p>Hence, the “Switch 5” was born.</p><h4>A Note about Tracking Data</h4><p>We can denote the 2013–14 season as the official beginning of the tracking era. That’s the first NBA season in which league-wide tracking data became available through Second Spectrum.</p><p>The addition of tracking stats was a welcome one. Box scores can only tell us so much, and given how complex the game of basketball is, there is plenty of room for additional data to be compiled.</p><p>One of the more useful subsets of tracking data that Second Spectrum introduced is ball screen data. Instead of having to manually track how successful a ball-handler is against hedges, or how awful a center is at guarding high pick-and-roll, it has been automated for us (to a degree).</p><p>Before I dive into the analysis, I want to reiterate the main component of my analysis: players who are playing the “5” position switching a ball screen. I understand that switching happens at other positions and that defining a “5” can be an inexact science. For the purposes of this research, I am generally relying on Second Spectrum’s filter titled “Screener Position (by Matchups).” That being said, there are some instances where I manually select players, but I will mention that when necessary.</p><h4>Okay, let’s see some graphs</h4><p>Utilizing ball screen data, the first question I was interested in was simply how much more switching is occurring today compared to the beginning of the tracking era.</p><p>I calculated the percentage of screens that a center switched onto the ball-handler after a ball screen (aptly named “Switch Rate”) for each of the last eight seasons:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*2VVTW8HjdYF5HhAhyj99yQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Data from Second Spectrum</figcaption></figure><p>For the first couple years of the tracking era, the league was looking at a 4% Switch Rate. The past four years the average has hovered between 8 and 10%.</p><p>I also threw in a potential cause of the switching craze: the rise of ball screen 3’s. Ball screen 3’s was one of the first things I thought of because, in addition to switching, it is something that has become more routine for NBA teams and players over the last decade or so. Hypothetically, one of the counters to pull-up 3’s is for the defense to switch. While the numbers track somewhat, <strong>there definitely seems to be more to the story</strong>.</p><p>But first, let’s split up the data between regular season and playoffs:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*7bTly07Y2R13TIjP-NVMxw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Data from Second Spectrum</figcaption></figure><p>Oh baby. One thing is clear: teams switch much more in the playoffs than they do in the regular season, even going back to the beginning of the tracking era. Another thing to note, though, is that the growth of switching hasn’t been linear. For instance, 2017–18 is the highest on record because the switch-addicted Rockets made it to the conference finals and played a 7-game series.</p><p>Now that we’ve established that switching has seen a significant rise in popularity as a defensive strategy, let’s figure out why.</p><p>Back to the Second Spectrum well, where we can filter by ball screen defense and find out what happened during those plays when a switch occurred.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*_XG-jtXUBo_MdAmlnJcT6g.jpeg" /><figcaption>Data from Second Spectrum</figcaption></figure><p>Since 2013, NBA teams have seen the following trends when playing any P&amp;R defense <strong>other than switch</strong>:</p><ul><li>Ball-handlers shooting MORE</li><li>Ball-handlers passing LESS</li><li>On-ball defenders dying on the screen MORE</li></ul><p>Since 2013, NBA teams have seen the following trends when <strong>switching</strong> P&amp;R:</p><ul><li>Ball-handlers shooting LESS</li><li>Ball-handlers passing MORE</li><li>On-ball defenders dying on the screen LESS</li></ul><p>The only trend that didn’t reverse? How effectively ball screens are guarded.</p><p>This past season, teams had roughly the same DER when switching ball screens as opposed to utilizing a more traditional P&amp;R coverage.</p><p>Conclusion: Teams started switching more because ball-handlers became more adept at exploiting ball screen coverages. Screeners were giving their ball-handler a serious advantage by setting a screen and the other team not switching.</p><h4>Shot Quality</h4><p>To drive the point home, I wanted to take a look at shot quality, which has become an increasingly popular topic in the analytics community.</p><p>For the purposes of this analysis, I defined big and small lineups as follows:</p><p><strong>Big Lineups</strong> = Lineups that feature 1 or more center(s)</p><p><strong>Small Lineups</strong> = Lineups that feature 0 centers</p><p>Again, I should note that Second Spectrum’s “Center” label isn’t always perfect. For instance, it considers Bobby Portis a “Forward”, although many would argue Portis is more of a center and one that would likely be a perfect example of the type of center that would be played off the floor in the playoffs due to an inability to switch.</p><p>Nevertheless, we march on.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*9pZ2WYvDUScIaOBHtTb6HA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Data from Second Spectrum</figcaption></figure><p>Though the data fluctuates a bit due to small playoff sample sizes, teams have consistently been getting better shots in the playoffs since 2013 regardless of lineup type.</p><p>More notably, we can see that prior to the 2015–16 season, big lineups were really holding down the fort in terms of shot quality defense. With these numbers in mind, think about the basketball discourse 10 years ago — why would you ever play small?</p><p>One thing to note about that outrageous 2017–18 number is that the Cavaliers made the Finals using a lineup with Love at center, which, uh…. did not go well:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/694/1*olBXfAjhZVnmg2T3lukrtg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Data from Cleaning the Glass (Note: Yes I would currently consider Anthony Davis a center, but not in 2017–18)</figcaption></figure><p>Taking out Love lineups, that shot quality number drops to around the same number as what the big lineups surrendered. As for 2021–22, Draymond at center was surprisingly rough on defense, as was the Maxi Kleber small-ball groups for Dallas.</p><h4>Where we go from here</h4><p>The purpose of this introduction was to lay down some basic facts about the switching era. We’ve established that switching has become significantly more popular, it happens much more often in the playoffs, teams likely started switching more to mitigate the advantages that ball screens created, and while switching may result in giving up better shots, teams are having a hard time playing any defense successfully in the NBA.</p><p>Next, we want to see how switch 5 lineups differentiate from traditional lineups from a statistical standpoint — stay tuned for Part 2.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=53dea6df3e09" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Her Last Day]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@beneverett/her-last-day-3ab8cfacaf1b?source=rss-1f1f62d6872------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/3ab8cfacaf1b</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ben Everett]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 29 Nov 2022 05:20:15 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-11-29T05:20:15.482Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*GlmFfxtRNBD0JqCnyywayw@2x.jpeg" /></figure><p>My mom had never been to New York before. Largely because she was afraid of flying. She finally caved when the opportunity arose for the whole family to be in New York over Thanksgiving week. There’s nothing more that my mom loved than her kids.</p><p>Only a 4-hour train ride from New York, my mom’s last day on Earth was spent with my brother and I at the Naismith Basketball Hall of Fame.</p><p>My brother and I inherited a love of basketball from our mom. Loyal to her home state Jayhawks, but willing to switch allegiances for her kids, who went to Baylor, my mom was endlessly proud of the fact that she danced with Danny Manning after the 1988 National Championship.</p><p>When we moved from Kansas City to Louisiana, my brother and I bonded over basketball in a part of the country that overlooked it. The culture shock allowed us to grow closer as a family, and the love of basketball that my mom and brother shared, I began to partake in. In visits back to Kansas, my mom and I waited in line outside Allen Fieldhouse to experience the best atmosphere in college basketball.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*pa4uNInxjkSa2-UpFUrMGg@2x.jpeg" /></figure><p>After getting a job with the Baylor Basketball team, I convinced her to start using the term “we” when discussing the Bears — something she only would’ve done for her son.</p><p>In the last two years of her life, we got to experience both Baylor and Kansas winning national championships together, which I don’t find to be a coincidence.</p><p>I had been having a pretty stressful month or so. But that Tuesday felt peaceful. My mom had some anxieties about visiting New York. But she was very content that day with my brother and I in Springfield.</p><p>I love you so much, mom. I’ll always be proud to be your son.</p><p>— Your Little Man</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3ab8cfacaf1b" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[We ‘Moneyballed’ an NBA2K Simulation]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/analytics-vidhya/we-moneyballed-an-nba2k-simulation-32acb51ac2e6?source=rss-1f1f62d6872------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/32acb51ac2e6</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[statistics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[basketball]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[atlanta-hawks]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[nba]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[nba-2k]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ben Everett]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 08 Jul 2020 19:53:03 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-07-14T15:58:23.854Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Because we had nothing better to do.</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*jEiqYrgPYflFPO8Sq_0OFw.jpeg" /><figcaption>NBA Champion John Collins</figcaption></figure><h4>Preface</h4><p>In the midst of the global pandemic, I’ve been feeding my basketball addiction by participating in an NBA 2K MyLeague with some friends. Basically what happens is we all draft a team in 2K, simulate through the season and the playoffs and see who wins. Sometimes we jump into the actual games and watch them because we’re so starved for live sports. Nevertheless, it’s been a ton of fun, and I found myself getting very competitive about my team.</p><p>I teamed up with two friends to create a “front office” feel throughout this whole process. We chose the Atlanta Hawks. This is our story.</p><h4>Part I: Right Place, Right Time</h4><p>Going into the first draft, we didn’t have much of a strategy. We were randomly given the 23rd pick in the draft, not a great spot. We listed out the best players in the NBA by 2K rating and decided we would likely be selecting one of Chris Paul, Kemba Walker or Jayson Tatum to build our team around based on draft position. Our pick came around and we ended up going CP3. He’s a veteran leader, he can create for others, and he can make shots off the dribble.</p><p>Since it was a snake draft, we immediately shifted our attention to pairing CP with a capable running mate. We knew this was probably the most important pick to nail. We listed out a few bigs that would fit well: Kristaps Porzingis, Zion Williamson, John Collins. Two very capable P&amp;R partners, one deadly P&amp;P partner. Porzingis and Willamson were scooped off the board by one team who was eyeing a versatile front court. We were lucky to nab Collins a few picks later. We breathed a sigh of relief knowing we had our building blocks.</p><p>We decided to surround this P&amp;R combo with <em>a lot of shooting — </em>nay, <strong><em>as much shooting as possible</em></strong>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/498/1*vkiQxS6DzCUTf9Hi6E_Z7Q.gif" /><figcaption>The Swanson strategy</figcaption></figure><p>We got Seth Curry and Bojan Bogdanovic to fill out our wing, before taking Tristan Thompson (basically our only non-shooter) to start alongside Collins down low. For our bench, we went shooting as well, taking Reggie Jackson, Doug McDermott, and Ersan Ilyasova.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*b8ZfeD4NkEbEy8rmUNgLaQ.png" /><figcaption>Final roster for season 1</figcaption></figure><p>We were happy with our team, but didn’t expect much. We started out 26th in the initial power rankings, so we just wanted to make the playoffs. In a weak Eastern Conference, we ended up with the 3-seed.</p><p>The playoffs were wildly entertaining. After taking care of Philly in round one, we faced off against a stacked Bucks roster that featured Kawhi Leonard, Kevin Love and Derrick Rose. John Collins made play after play, scooping up offensive rebounds and seemingly always being in the right position to make a play. Hawks in 7.</p><p>In the ECF, we somehow managed to have home-court advantage since the Kevin Durant-led, 8th-seeded Orlando Magic had bested its first two playoff opponents. Hawks in 6.</p><p>Finals up next. MVP Luka Doncic and the Dallas Mavericks. Series tied 3–3. Dallas has home-court. Doesn’t matter. Reggie Jackson comes up huge in the final game of the season and the Hawks hoist Larry O’B.</p><h4>Part II: Lesson Learned</h4><p>Coming off the high of improbably winning the championship with Chris Paul as our best player, we now faced a new challenge: an All-Time league. Through extensive prep work (read: none at all) we concluded that our strategy worked and we should do something similar. So we did.</p><p>We took Hakeem Olajuwon with our first pick, and surrounded him with an ass-ton of shooting. CP returned as our point guard, flanked by Pete Maravich, Carmelo Anthony as a small-ball four, with sharpshooting Hawks legend Lou Hudson rounding out our starting five.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*MuAHbgV0swmoqdZl-kPeGQ.png" /><figcaption>Final roster for season 2</figcaption></figure><p>We sucked.</p><p>Worst record in the league by far. Considering this league only had 16 user-led teams (the last one had 30), we still made the playoffs. We decided to make a last-minute rotational adjustment prior to our first-round matchup with the Michael Jordan-Luka Doncic-Anthony Davis led Orlando Magic. We hypothesized that maybe playing small in an All-Time league was a bad choice. With so many great bigs in the history of the league, poor Carmelo Anthony was probably getting roasted on the block, and 6&#39;5 Lou Hudson was likely too small to guard the game’s greatest small forwards.</p><p>We moved Chris Bosh to the starting lineup and slid Melo to the 3. The result: <strong>we took the eventual champion Magic to seven games</strong>.</p><p>What if we had Bosh starting the entire season? Would we not have been so bad? Maybe we would’ve been a top 4 seed.</p><h4>Part III: Billy Beane Time</h4><p>Motivated by our absolutely horrid showing in the All-Time league, and knowing that another All-Time league was just around the corner, we dove into some numbers.</p><p>Our thinking was that NBA2K is purely numbers, so if we can find out which numbers are most important, we can exploit them and win.</p><p>Data collection: I asked my friend that was running the league to send me the entire rosters of each of the MyLeague teams, along with the final standings and playoff results. I wrote an R script to scrape 2KRatings.com and get a list of attributes for each player on each roster.</p><p>Exploratory data analysis: I wanted to see what each team was good at, attributes-wise. So I computed the average rating for the entire list of attributes. These include general ones like Outside Scoring, Inside Scoring, Rebounding, Perimeter Defense, Interior Defense and more specific ones like Close Shot, Three Point Shot, Pass IQ, and Speed With Ball.</p><p>Correlations: Through a series of linear regressions, I determined that <strong>the two most statistically significant predictors of wins in this particular iteration of the league were rebounding and close shot</strong>.</p><p>Data visualization:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/533/1*xOplpS8kDVqWc3vB1ptkZw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Rebounding is clearly an important part of winning in an all-time 2K league</figcaption></figure><p>The circled teams are the four teams that made the conference finals. Coincidence? I think not. (Note the sorry Atlanta Hawks in the bottom left)</p><p>If rebounding was so important, how would we draft to capitalize on that?</p><p>I divided the player pool into two groups: 90th percentile players (based on overall rating) and everyone else. I explored the attributes of these two groups, and determined the biggest drop-offs between the best players in the All-Time pool and everyone else.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*7CiMprCCznyY5WQwslyP5w.png" /><figcaption>The best players All-Time are great rebounders</figcaption></figure><p>We concluded that the best players were significantly better at rebounding than everyone else. Our strategy was clear: prioritize rebounding both early and often.</p><h4>Part IV: Can He Get on Base?</h4><p>Alright so now we have our big board: a ranking of the players in the All-Time player pool sorted by a combination of overall rating and rebounding while also throwing in close shot for fun. But we decided don’t have to follow it religiously. For instance, if we have a top 3 pick, we have to take either Jordan, LeBron, or Magic.</p><p>It’s draft time.</p><p>We get the 5th pick. The first four picks go chalk: the big 3 plus the other 99 overall, Kareem. That means we are guaranteed one of the two best rebounders in the game. We go Wilt over Bill Russell because of his offense.</p><p>In the second round, we know we want to go power forward. Ideally, we get Tim Duncan, but he gets taken. We end up with Kevin Garnett. Not a bad start.</p><p>Now we deviate a little bit. We really need a primary initiator. Someone who can create some offense for us. Through the previous two leagues we learned something through simple observation: Luka is an absolute cheat code. The dude made the Finals both times. We snag him in round 3.</p><p>Picks four and five. We need a point guard and a small forward. There are a lot of good options, but my front office reminds me of an important question to consider: C̶a̶n̶ ̶h̶e̶ ̶g̶e̶t̶ ̶o̶n̶ ̶b̶a̶s̶e̶?̶ Can he rebound? We pick up Bob Cousy and Rick Barry — two great rebounders for their position.</p><p>Now time to fill out our bench. You better believe we went big first. We took elite rebounder Elvin Hayes in the sixth round before rounding out our front court rotation with Dominique Wilkins and Bob Lanier.</p><p>We deviate with our final two picks because we figured we could use some ball-handling and shooting off the bench: Baron Davis and Drazen Petrovic are the final two picks for your Atlanta Hawks.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*5iDHgNJGiCkoic1QNRE6PQ.png" /><figcaption>Final roster for season 3</figcaption></figure><p>Draft felt good, but did we achieve our goal? Let’s consult the chart:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*MA4EVQuuv9zW20W2CDm8gA.png" /><figcaption>The Hawks can rebound the damn ball</figcaption></figure><h4>Part V: Redemption SZN</h4><p>Moment of truth time.</p><p>We simulate through November: 19–0.</p><p>We simulate through December: 33–1.</p><p>Is this real? Did our strategy really work? Is it that simple?</p><p>We fall back to earth a little bit and lose a couple more games before the All-Star break, but our <em>entire starting lineup</em> made the All-Star team.</p><p>We finish the regular season 72–10. Best record in the league, but only one game ahead of the Boston Celtics for 1st place in the East. Luka won MVP (told you he was a cheat code).</p><p>We go 8–1 in the first two rounds to set up a showdown between two 70-win teams in the ECF. Hawks in 5.</p><p>But now comes the real test. OKC made it out of the West, and they are the second best rebounding team in the league. Additionally, their GM decides to start Scottie Pippen at the 2 and guard Luka, which turns out to be our death knell.</p><p>We drop game one at home and never recover. OKC wins in 6, and we fall short of winning 2 rings in 3 seasons. Pippen smothered our main source of offense, and they had the rebounding (Karl Malone and Alonzo Mourning, plus Big O at the point) to match up with ours.</p><p>In the end, basketball strategy won out over statistics. And the worst part is, we ended up with the most total wins, so if I ran the numbers again, I would likely get the same answer.</p><p>Such is life.</p><p>#LetsGoHawks</p><p>P.S. If you’re interested in joining one of these leagues, follow Kaan Erel @iKaanic on Twitter.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=32acb51ac2e6" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/analytics-vidhya/we-moneyballed-an-nba2k-simulation-32acb51ac2e6">We ‘Moneyballed’ an NBA2K Simulation</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/analytics-vidhya">Analytics Vidhya</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[My mental health]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@beneverett/my-mental-health-d94e0dc3955c?source=rss-1f1f62d6872------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d94e0dc3955c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[mental-health]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ben Everett]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 13 Aug 2019 22:16:18 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-08-13T22:16:18.839Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*CZ8XxWeu8rolduSjriywRA.jpeg" /></figure><p>I got a 62 on my first test in tax class in the fall of 2016. When I saw that number on my computer screen, I stepped outside of the apartment so my roommates wouldn’t see me cry. I called my parents and had a full blown panic attack.</p><p>I had always been a good student, but the semester was already getting to me. In the accounting core classes, you have to study a lot, and I clearly wasn’t up for the challenge. I didn’t even want to do accounting, I wanted to work in basketball. It was a serious internal battle. In addition, I was taking calculus III (with a graduate student teacher who didn’t explain things very well), intro to corporate finance (a class meant to scare people away from the finance major) and editing (the hardest class I took for my journalism minor).</p><p>It was the most difficult time academically, and in turn mentally, of my entire life. And the following semester didn’t get much easier. I did what I always do when I’m anxious or depressed — I shut down. I didn’t study for classes. I played video games and watched basketball and tried to stay in a good mood while pushing my problems further down the road until I had to face them. I had numerous anxiety attacks and secret crying sessions. But I told no one.</p><p>To multiple mental health professionals I have described it as the worst year of my life.</p><p>Senior year of high school, I was diagnosed with depression and anxiety. Ever since then, I’ve been on medication. Unfortunately, I’ve been described as treatment resistant. Many traditional mental health medications don’t work on me like they work on other people.</p><p>You need both hands to count the number of depression medications I’ve tried over the last five years. One worked for a while, but made me feel like I wasn’t myself. One never really worked. One made my heart race to the point of almost passing out in class one morning. One, I would argue, made my symptoms worse.</p><p>I’ve been on a combination of two meds now for almost a year, and they work well enough so that I can function as a normal human being. There are weird side effects, as there are with many depression medications. I don’t dream anymore, which sometimes bothers me. When I wake up in the morning, I’m unbelievably groggy, but I’ve grown to deal with it (coffee helps).</p><p>I found meds that work, but that doesn’t mean I’m great all the time. That’s part of being human. I’ve learned that life isn’t about being happy 24/7. That’s unachievable. I’m still learning how to live a purpose-driven life and fight through my negative thoughts. There are tools at my disposal to help with that — counseling, prayer, meditation.</p><p>According to my mom, I was a very outgoing child. I remember when my personality changed. Something traumatic happened — we moved. My young mind couldn’t handle the stress of making new friends in Louisiana and leaving everyone I knew behind in Kansas City, so I shut down.</p><p>I don’t think I really had a personality for the first couple years we were in Monroe. I was so scared of everyone and so lonely. I just wanted to fit in. I became known at school as someone who was quiet, though I always hated that label. I became enamored with what people thought of me and how I presented myself, and I carry that social anxiety with me to this day (it’s still very heavy).</p><p>By the time junior year of high school rolled around, my life was great. I had an awesome youth group that I hung out with all the time. I was on the varsity basketball team. My life was structured. I had purpose and I felt like a part of my community. I had a bright future ahead of me.</p><p>The first half of senior year was much of the same. The stress of classes, basketball and my future eventually caused me to break, however, and led me to a psychiatrist. Then my longtime girlfriend and I broke up and I was fully ready for the next stage of life — moving away for college.</p><p>Freshman year brought challenges that I had experienced before in meeting new people and making new friends. This time I felt more confident in my ability to do that. I settled in with a solid friend group within a few months. Classes were easy. Life was a breeze.</p><p>I get choked up whenever I think about my sophomore year of college. I’m not sure if it’s because I think I could have done so much better than B’s and C’s on my transcript, or if my mind re-experiences those thoughts and feelings I had throughout that year. Some day I’d like to look back on that year and cry tears of joy, realizing how much progress I’ve made as a person since being a fragile 19-year-old.</p><p>Miraculously, I didn’t cry when I explained how awful that year was to multiple psychiatrists and therapists, though I definitely could have if I wanted to. That’s always something I’ve been so good at — hiding my emotions from other people. But it’s something I want to change, which is why I’m sharing.</p><p>In writing this, I realize how ridiculous this could sound. I truly am blessed in a lot of ways. But mental health is about reality, not appearance. And the reality is I often feel like less than a person. The reality is I often feel left out, isolated and lonely. The reality is I desperately want to connect with people, but am deathly afraid of doing so.</p><p>I chose the picture from my brother’s wedding as the featured image because I loved everything about that day, and that picture encapsulates it. I’ve been told, “You seem happy,” when in reality I’m not. In this picture I look happy, and I definitely was.</p><p>Here’s to more of those days.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d94e0dc3955c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Quick and dirty thoughts on the 2019 NBA Draft class]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@beneverett/quick-and-dirty-thoughts-on-the-2019-nba-draft-class-2963b2c2adaa?source=rss-1f1f62d6872------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2963b2c2adaa</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[nba]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sports]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[zion-williamson]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ja-morant]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[nba-draft]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ben Everett]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 20 Jun 2019 14:36:48 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-06-20T14:36:48.543Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*QL1PUhnaU7n2N5gYIrBd8w.jpeg" /></figure><p><strong>Preface</strong>: Last year, I made my first-ever <a href="https://medium.com/@beneverett/nba-draft-2018-big-board-391e05911e7b">Big Board</a>. This year, I did not have nearly enough time to watch the same amount of film, comb through the stats, etc. However, I still wanted to get my thoughts written down about this year’s draft class so I can look back and laugh at how wrong I was (and hopefully learn a little bit in the process).</p><h4>Tier 1: Easy Money</h4><ol><li><strong>Zion Williamson — Forward, Duke</strong></li></ol><p>Don’t overthink it. He’s Shaq for modern basketball. The man shot 75% (!!) on 2-pointers as a freshman in college with one shooter on his team.</p><h4>Tier 2: Next Best Thing</h4><p>2. <strong>Ja Morant — Guard, Murray State</strong></p><p>Ja has elite PG tools. He’s a pretty darn good bet to be an above average NBA point guard. Combination of athleticism/advanced handle/potential pull up game make me thing he’ll be more than that.</p><h4>The rest of ‘em</h4><p>I’m going to refrain from ranking prospects from this point on, but here’s a conglomeration of thoughts I have about specific prospects in this year’s class:</p><h4>Projected first rounders I like and don’t like</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/1*ZuLqL4vgZVBBK3zdN0Uutg.jpeg" /></figure><p><strong>RJ Barrett — Wing, Duke</strong></p><p>I like Barrett as a prospect, and I’d feel really good about drafting him in the middle of the lottery. The problem with this draft is that teams are going to have to be comfortable “reaching” for guys they like because of the lack of high-end talent. Barrett should go № 3.</p><p><strong>Jarrett Culver — Wing, Texas Tech</strong></p><p><strong>De’Andre Hunter — Forward, Virginia</strong></p><p>I don’t see the hype as much with these two. Both have pretty good defensive potential, but I’m lower than most on their offense. I’ve seen the phrase “NBA ready prospect” written about these two quite a bit. When that’s the best thing you can say about a prospect, it’s not a great sign. In this draft, it’s hard to peg where I would take them, but late Top 10/late lottery seems reasonable.</p><p><strong>Brandon Clarke — Forward, Gonzaga</strong></p><p>One of the most unique athletes we’ve seen in the draft process. Absolutely dominant at Gonzaga. 6&#39;8 and moves like a guard. He better be gone early.</p><p><strong>PJ Washington — Forward, Kentucky</strong></p><p>Strong af. Good passer. Potential to be a versatile defender. If he fills out his perimeter game he’s gonna be awesome.</p><p><strong>Grant Williams — Forward, Tennessee</strong></p><p>See above.</p><p><strong>Jaxson Hayes — Big, Texas</strong></p><p>So raw but so much to work with. 19 years old, almost 7-foot tall high school wide receiver. Easily projectable role.</p><p><strong>Darius Garland — Guard, Vanderbilt</strong></p><p><strong>Coby White — Guard, North Carolina</strong></p><p>To me, these guys are relatively similar in what they can do at the NBA level. They both lack defensive upside and neither are great playmakers, but their shooting is what makes them interesting. Garland is tougher to evaluate given his short college career, but both seem like they could have defined roles in the NBA.</p><p><strong>Bol Bol — Big, Oregon</strong></p><p>Gut reaction is he’s two big and slow. But a closer look and this guy has real scoring touch. Why not take a flier late in the lottery?</p><p><strong>Rui Hachimura — Forward, Gonzaga</strong></p><p>Hachimura is a great college level scorer and nothing more.</p><p><strong>Cam Reddish — Wing, Duke</strong></p><p>6&#39;8. 7&#39;0 wingspan. Shooter who made clutch shots. Disappearing act is very concerning.</p><p><strong>Nassir Little — Wing, North Carolina</strong></p><p>He’s got some tools, but I can’t help but feel like he’s just Stanley Johnson.</p><p><strong>Sekou Doumbouya — Forward, France</strong></p><p>18 year old Pascal Siakam clone. Take him in the lottery.</p><h4>Projected second rounders who shouldn’t be projected second rounders</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*0rroBWuw2hvVuadVJoC2UQ.jpeg" /></figure><p><strong>Jontay Porter — Big, Missouri</strong></p><p>Huge, smart, skilled — take him in the lottery.</p><p><strong>Talen Horton-Tucker — Wing, Iowa State</strong></p><p><strong>Chuma Okeke — Wing/Forward, Auburn</strong></p><p><strong>Cody Martin — Wing, Nevada</strong></p><p>These guys have good physical measurements and can shoot the ball.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2963b2c2adaa" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[NBA Offseason Notebook: How the Warriors leveraged Boogie’s broken market]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@beneverett/nba-offseason-notebook-how-the-warriors-leveraged-boogies-broken-market-9665359d86cb?source=rss-1f1f62d6872------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/9665359d86cb</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[nba]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[demarcus-cousins]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[new-orleans-pelicans]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[golden-state-warriors]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sports]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ben Everett]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 03 Jul 2018 21:53:30 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-07-03T22:01:13.614Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*PS4pWd98BMzeJ_Yshe05lA.jpeg" /></figure><p>Leverage is a term that’s tossed around in NBA fan circles frequently. It often comes up when discussing trades.</p><p>When conversing about Kawhi Leonard’s trade request, some might say:</p><p><em>“The Spurs have no leverage against the Lakers now that LeBron signed there.”</em></p><p><em>“The Spurs should use the Celtics and 76ers as leverage against the Lakers in trade talks.”</em></p><p>Leverage, in general, is maximizing a position to achieve an advantage, so these remarks make sense.</p><p>In the finance world, the term is slightly more specific:</p><blockquote>Any technique involving the use of borrowed funds in the purchase of an asset, with the expectation that the after tax income from the asset and asset price appreciation will exceed the borrowing cost</blockquote><blockquote>-Wikipedia-</blockquote><p>Financial leverage arises from taking on debt. This magnifies both gains and losses, but the expectation when a company takes this route is that <strong>gains will cover any potential cost.</strong></p><p>This is exactly the risk the Warriors took when agreeing to sign DeMarcus Cousins to a 1-year, $5.3m deal on Monday.</p><p>The Warriors have a behemoth payroll. Their death lineup alone commands $119 million in salary for 2018–19. That’s $18m over the salary cap with only $4m in wiggle room below the luxury tax threshold.</p><p>When you throw in the guaranteed contracts of Shaun Livingston, Jacob Evans, Damian Jones, Quinn Cook and Jordan Bell, the Dubs find themselves at $134m with a tax payment of $28.3m.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*A6SxGr1pLK3oBHGEVgtg5g.png" /></figure><p>For reaching the top shelf and eclipsing the $129m tax apron, the Warriors are permitted to use the $5.3m Taxpayer MLE, but not without significant cost.</p><p>This tool is costly due to luxury tax payments, so in this sense you are taking on more debt than face value in order to gain an asset.</p><p>When you do the math, Golden State’s tax bill rises to $47.7m. That’s a $19m increase for adding a little over $5m in salary. <strong>All-in-all, DeMarcus Cousins is going to cost the Warriors $24m in salary and taxes.</strong></p><p>Yet the question remains: Golden State is only giving Cousins a fifth of that, so how did they get him that cheap? Let’s take a look:</p><h4>An imperfect market due to lack of cap smoothing</h4><p>The NBA has seen a major influx of cash due to a lucrative TV deal signed in 2015 that caused a salary cap spike in 2016. Teams had stupid amounts of money to throw at whatever players were lucky enough to be free agents that summer.</p><p>The reason the teams had all this money is because the NBPA (Player’s Association) rejected the league’s offer to “smooth the cap” or gradually step up the cap number year by year instead of having it spike. The players wanted their money as soon as possible and refused.</p><p>The summer of 2016 caused many teams to handicap their cap sheets for years to come, and this summer we are seeing the ramifications of that. Six teams entered free agency with any amount of cap space. Yep, 24 teams were already capped out ENTERING free agency. For a high-caliber center like DeMarcus Cousins who would seemingly command a max deal, the market was not there. Signing a small one-year deal allows him to get back out on the market next year when much more cap space is available.</p><h4>The soft cap</h4><p>The league has always had a “soft cap,” meaning that teams are constrained by a cap, but can use a plethora of exceptions to sign players over the cap.</p><p>The soft cap is in place so that teams can retain their players. The NBA wants to reward teams for drafting well and wants those players to be able to re-sign with their team whether the team has space or not.</p><p>There is a legitimate argument to be made about whether the soft cap is actually doing the opposite. Kevin Durant did not re-sign with the team that drafted him even though he could have gotten more money. The team that he is on now just used the soft cap to sign another All-Star even though they are well over the salary cap.</p><p>A hard cap is likely not the answer, but stricter restraints could be on the way. We could see luxury tax multipliers drastically increase. We could see the Taxpayer Mid-Level disappear. (This is all purely speculation)</p><p>The NBA isn’t short on cash or viewership, but there are competitive concerns given the Warrior’s dominance. Then again, there have always been great teams. My guess? Adam Silver waits out the Warriors dynasty and we all forget about this argument.</p><h4>Contenders have the upper hand in a cash-strapped market</h4><p>We’ve seen players choose winning over money before. That’s not new. So when the market is as dried-up as it is this summer, contenders like Golden State are the big winners.</p><p>Sure, other teams (Atlanta, Brooklyn, Chicago) could’ve offered Cousins more than what he ended up taking, but what’s the pivoting number where he decides it’s worth being on a bad team? $10m? $20m? The max?</p><p>Moreover, which of those teams takes a chance on the ailing Cousins while they’re in re-building mode? After all…</p><h4>There is a small chance Boogie isn’t even worth $5.3m</h4><p>Cousins suffered an Achilles injury in January, and there is a long list of NBA players <a href="https://www.sbnation.com/nba/2018/1/27/16940178/demarcus-cousins-achilles-injury-golden-state-warriors-this-is-the-worst">who weren’t the same after suffering the same injury</a>. Even healthy, Cousins isn’t necessarily a great fit in Golden State given his defensive deficiencies and incredibly high usage.</p><p>The Dubs could have gone after younger, more certain options on the free agent market, but they took a chance on Boogie because there is no risk. They’re already the best team of all-time, why not try to become laughably better? If he doesn’t work out, well, they’re still the Warriors.</p><p>Golden State successfully used their championship leverage without even reaching out to Cousins. <a href="https://twitter.com/jasonrmcintyre/status/1014000472452038656">He called them because he got no offers</a>, according to Marc Spears. When you’re the best of the best, taking advantage of market imperfections is a bit easier.</p><p>At the end of the day the Warriors just have to hope Cousins’ wealth of talent can outweigh his tax costs and injury concerns. Because in leveraged situations like this, gains and losses are equally magnified.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9665359d86cb" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[NBA Offseason Notebook: Elie Okobo, the ‘Hinkie Special’ and working the margins]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@beneverett/nba-offseason-notebook-elie-okobo-the-hinkie-special-and-working-the-margins-a308a6509db4?source=rss-1f1f62d6872------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a308a6509db4</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[phoenix-suns]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sports]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[nba-draft]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[nba]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[philadelphia-76ers]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ben Everett]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 27 Jun 2018 20:07:17 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-06-27T20:07:17.758Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*B9OS5pwwcHn3y4LQONpEVg.jpeg" /></figure><p>Margin (noun) has two definitions per Dictionary.com:</p><p><em>(1) The edge or border of something</em></p><p><em>(2) An amount by which a thing is won or falls short</em></p><p>The first definition invokes a sense of insignificance. An immaterial action. The crust of the bread.</p><p>The second definition, however, gives us a contrasting viewpoint. The smaller, seemingly insignificant decisions are the ones that separate wins and the losses.</p><p>In <a href="https://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/margin.asp">accounting</a>, margin is the difference between revenues and expenses. Profit margin is an important component in valuing companies, rather than looking at a misleading number such as revenue. Companies working with greater margin can invest cash flows more freely and have greater liquidity.</p><p>The word margin is a phenomenal depiction of how important “the small stuff” can be.</p><p>During his tenure as general manager of the Philadelphia 76ers, Sam Hinkie became known for working the margins to a T.</p><p>He stripped down the entire roster and made every decision a small one by signing 2nd round, un-drafted and un-proven players to team-friendly deals. It became impossible to screw up a big free agent signing because he didn’t make any. His infamous contract choice became known as the “Hinkie Special.”</p><p>Three examples of successful players who signed the “Hinkie Special” are Robert Covington, Jerami Grant and TJ McConnell.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*MF7ewbwbp11xs9LHAHjYpw.png" /><figcaption>(Red=Non/Partial Guarantee, Purple=Team Option)</figcaption></figure><p>Each got four years at or slightly above the minimum salary with the final year being a team option after being selected in the second round or going un-drafted.</p><p>For un-drafted players, this deal is a win-win. They get a spot on an NBA roster and the ball is in their court to prove themselves and get their deals guaranteed. Covington ended up playing his way into a major extension and now makes eight figures. McConnell is getting solid minutes as a backup point guard on a playoff team.</p><p>It’s the ultimate team-friendly deal, too. If the players flame out, the team can cut their non-guaranteed deal. If they turn out to be legitimate role players, the team is getting good minutes on bargain deals.</p><p>This seems fair for un-drafted players who have a lot to prove. For second rounders like Jerami Grant, however, the “Hinkie Special” is somewhat insulting. If Grant (who was picked 39th) had been taken just a few picks earlier, he’d be getting a fully guaranteed two years above the minimum.</p><p>The Athletic’s Danny Leroux touched on this <a href="https://theathletic.com/257933/2018/03/01/one-player-signed-a-hinkie-special-contract-the-other-turned-it-down-the-lasting-impact-of-those-choices-on-two-second-round-picks-drafted-by-the-sixers-in-2014/">back in March</a>, saying that Grant missed out on making more money earlier in his career if he had taken a shorter term deal and bet on himself to attract suitors after becoming a free agent as a third year player.</p><p>Often times teams will sign second-round picks to minimum (or slightly above minimum) deals, but for just two to three years.</p><p>Let’s take a look at last year’s early second-round picks and the contracts they signed.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*-TtbfdjgtDwMgE1ukRMqZQ.png" /><figcaption>(Red=Non/Partial Guarantee, Purple=Team Option)</figcaption></figure><p>These are the spillovers from round one in 2017. Each of them got at least three years, partially guaranteed. Notice that Davon Reed got a four year deal from Phoenix.</p><p>This year’s draft, considered by many to be incredibly deep, had a different feel to it. When Phoenix snagged French point guard Elie Okobo with the 31st pick in the draft, it felt like a <a href="https://www.brightsideofthesun.com/2018/6/25/17499286/center-of-the-sun-deandre-ayton-mikal-bridges-elie-okobo-and-george-king-all-now-phoenix-suns-nba">first round selection</a>.</p><p>On Sunday, Shams Charania of Yahoo! Sports broke some news.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*V1_K_G-INN1MS4t8tCKALw.png" /></figure><p>While this is partially incorrect (options can only be on the last year of a contract unless the player is selected in the first round), the amount and number of years is shockingly good for Phoenix.</p><p>As shown below, Okobo is making about $300k more than a four year minimum deal but roughly $900k less guaranteed than the 30th pick, and potentially $3m less in earnings than the 30th pick.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*dQ0U8_yHL2HT4QurvHIOzg.png" /><figcaption>(Red=Non/Partial Guarantee, Purple=Team Option)</figcaption></figure><p>The bottom line: Okobo signed a deal more player friendly than the “Hinkie Special,” but still pretty team friendly considering he was the 31st pick in a strong draft.</p><p>With the potential to be its starting point guard, Elie Okobo is on a bargain deal for the Phoenix Suns.</p><p>We haven’t seen much from 2017 second-rounder Davon Reed, but signing back-to-back high second-rounders to extremely team-friendly deals is a win for Phoenix. It’s what separates perennial lottery teams from playoff contenders. It’s the <em>margin</em>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a308a6509db4" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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