<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0" xmlns:cc="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rss/creativeCommonsRssModule.html">
    <channel>
        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Beyond Machines on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Beyond Machines on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@beyondmachines?source=rss-37530f476672------2</link>
        
        <generator>Medium</generator>
        <lastBuildDate>Thu, 19 Nov 2026 04:38:45 GMT</lastBuildDate>
        <atom:link href="https://medium.com/@beyondmachines/feed" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/>
        <webMaster><![CDATA[yourfriends@medium.com]]></webMaster>
        <atom:link href="http://medium.superfeedr.com/" rel="hub"/>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Built to Remain: Why the Disaster Recovery Plan Outlasts Strategies, Reorgs, Excuses]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@beyondmachines/built-to-remain-why-the-disaster-recovery-plan-outlasts-strategies-reorgs-excuses-4d868a60681a?source=rss-37530f476672------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/4d868a60681a</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[business-continuity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[disaster-recovery]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Beyond Machines]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 16 Mar 2026 16:07:51 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-03-16T16:07:51.512Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The Disaster Recovery Plan does not enter a crisis so much as settle into it. Where other processes announce themselves with ambition, vision, or executive formatting, the DR announces itself by remaining exactly where it is supposed to be, long after the situation has degraded past the point of professionalism and nice emails.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1000/1*9s7no7cFAUk3v05EqnzuvA.png" /><figcaption>Our DR looked a lot like this</figcaption></figure><p>It is a set of knowledge, experience and old trusted tools built for the long middle of a disaster, after the strategy decks have burned off and before anyone admits the quarterly revenue is lost.</p><p>Bound by institutional knowledge, people who are willing to cut through the bullshit and a lot of trust between individuals. That combination alone puts it in an awkward philosophical category: It is neither aspirational nor disposable. It is not meant to inspire, but neither is it treated with the contempt afforded to compliance paperwork. This is deliberate. The DR exists to be used under conditions that make cleaner documents and processes fail.</p><p>The restraint is telling. Instead of chasing digital transformation or doctrinal novelty, it shifts from “restore all systems within four hours” to “restore payroll and email within four hours, everything else when we can”.</p><p>It reads like surrender on paper until you see it work in the field. Less ambition, yes, but far more honesty. The DR is not trying to dominate the incident response; it is trying to make sure that every hour inside it is survivable for the organization.</p><p>The saved phones of all colleagues pushes the communications plan over the same threshold. When PagerDuty fails and support channels are overwhelmed, a saved phone number becomes the entire communications plan.</p><p>Institutional knowledge and repeated exercise matters more than most managers appreciate. A DR does not need to be updated to remain relevant. It can be outdated, partially obsolete, even organizationally compromised by two rounds of layoffs, and still give credible guidance. That quality alone explains why operations teams swear by practical efforts, not paperwork. The plan doesn’t surge forward with the crisis team, but it does not abandon them either. It lists vendors. It clarifies authority.</p><p>Corporate processes are supposed to fear irrelevance. The DR treats it as an inconvenience. Redundant contact lists and “i know how we did this last time” stretch survivability not by making the organization invulnerable, but by giving the team time. Time to reroute workflows. Time to jury-rig a manual process. Time to keep operating while everyone else is busy refreshing the status page.</p><p>I learned that lesson sitting on the floor of a server room that smelled like ozone and dust.</p><p>The outage crashed the storage of a BI server. And there was a regulatory deadline in the morning. No spare drives onsite to rebuild. No critical support contract with vendor. Just an image of a database ready to be deployed, but where?</p><p>A decommissioned iSCSI server sat nearby, that we used to experiment a DR scenario with some interns on a month before. It had a RAID array paired with SSDs for caching. We had Linux on it in a purely Windows big-corp ecosystem. In 2010 that almost amounted to heresy.</p><p>That experiment paid off right there on the floor.</p><p>Bring up the iSCSI target service in the Linux. Connect a 10Gbps cross-connect cable from the DB server, skipping all network latency. Install an iSCSI driver on the DB server. Format the entire array as a single drive.</p><p>Just barely sufficient, when desperation gave us patience and an old server with cobbled drives gave us options. Copy DB image, run BI processes.</p><p>It violated all the change management policies, and all platform strategies at once. It worked.</p><p>The deadlines were met. To the team inside the server room, and to the employees pressed in close around their phones waiting for updates, nothing that mattered had changed.</p><p>That plan kept us moving for another week until we rebuilt the drives. We did not prevent the failure. We did not impress the board. We endured. And that endurance changed the incident report in ways no post-mortem summary ever quite captures.</p><p>Startups despise it. Not because it is agile, or innovative, or compelling, but because it refuses to panic. Mid-size firms misjudge it once, confusing thoroughness for bureaucracy. Enterprises rarely fear it, but they respect the way it lingers, the way it keeps contributing long after it should be irrelevant.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4d868a60681a" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[AI summarizer of your Cloud Drive and other terrible ideas]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@beyondmachines/ai-summarizer-of-your-cloud-drive-and-other-terrible-ideas-f37f004919e1?source=rss-37530f476672------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f37f004919e1</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ai]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[privacy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Beyond Machines]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 30 Sep 2024 13:34:33 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-09-30T13:39:26.066Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>A Data Management Disaster Waiting to Happen</h3><p>Imagine being able to get all the knowledge in all your documents on OneDrive, GDrive, Dropbox…</p><p>All you need to do is click once — give access to an AI summarizer service to your Drive.</p><p>Sounds simple, easy, even wonderful? Unfortunately, from a data management perspective, it’s a complete nightmare.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*YSDl8cSkmxQy7XXy" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@winniepix?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Sue Winston</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><h3><strong>A perfect setup?</strong></h3><p>At first glance, the system looks promising. You have RAG (Retrieval-Augmented Generation) working with a collection of external files that you own. The privacy and data processing policies seem solid and you know the vendor. They promise not to train their AI on your data.</p><p>There are issues go beyond the surface-level assurances and not training AI on data — issues that are much simpler and much more scary:</p><ul><li>Which data is accessible?</li><li>What’s in the data?</li><li>Data processor changes?</li><li>Need to know?</li></ul><h3>No, not by a long shot</h3><h4>What’s in the data?</h4><p>A fact of corporate (and private) life is that significant amount of highly sensitive files are stored on our cloud drives.</p><p>We’re not just talking about simple word documents and spreadsheets; we’re using the cloud storage to dump anything:</p><ul><li>backups of emails,</li><li>backups of entire computers,</li><li>sensitive material filled with customer data,</li><li>contracts,</li><li>sensitive internal documents</li><li>personally identifiable information (PII) like photos of ID documents</li><li>backups of passwords (yes this does happen)</li></ul><p>Are you ready to give access to all that to a third party AI summarizer service?</p><h4><strong>Unclear file accessibility</strong></h4><p>Let’s start with file accessibility. The AI service asks for access to the Drive (whatever your cloud is). But is it allowing you to grant access to individual files, or is it accessing an entire drive section? Also, by transitive properties of you having access to other sections of the cloud drive — are you giving access only to files that you ‘own’ or files you are also just given <em>read</em> or <em>edit</em> access?</p><p>Unless you are perfectly clear what the AI service will get it’s digital hands on, it can mean potentially massive volumes of files being accessed by the AI summarizer service.</p><h4><strong>Where does the data go?</strong></h4><p>When you “give access” to an AI summarizer service, you are essentially giving the right for the service to <strong>copy all the data it has access to</strong>.</p><p>The favorite term is “data sync.” This is just a fancier word for copying. In theory, the data should be transformed into a embeddings (numeric vectors for ML model search).</p><p>They conveniently omit whether the human readable data will be kept, but unless there is a clear transparent declaration saying they won’t copy the data, it probably means that they will keep it. <strong>Because data greed is a real thing and every company is infected by it.</strong></p><p>Even if there are formal assurances that your data won’t be copied, kept in cleartext, used to train their AI… the fact remains that the AI summarizer service has access to the data. All the time.</p><p>So they can change their mind, change the ToS and just copy it. Or a malicious actor or employee in their network can access your data. Or a government entity can force them to make a copy.</p><h4><strong>Breach of the ‘need-to-know’ principle</strong></h4><p>Let’s assume, for a moment, that nothing bad happens on the supplier’s side. Even then, by granting access to a huge mass of files — including sensitive and restricted ones — you are inevitably exposing some confidential information to people who don’t need to see it.</p><p>Through RAG, someone who shouldn’t have access to the data of a particular sensitive file could easily stumble upon it.</p><blockquote><strong>Imagine if the list of bonuses is leaked </strong>: Your AI summarizer ‘ingests’ the spreadsheet for bonuses, that only 4 people in the company know about. An innocent query from any employee using the summarizer may reveal a list of people with bonuses, or some ranges and values.</blockquote><h4>Are your customers, partners and employees OK with this?</h4><p>By granting access to the data, you are essentially transferring the data to a new processor. The debate whether they train AI or not is moot.</p><blockquote><strong>They. Have. Your. Data.</strong></blockquote><p>Are you able to vet the AI summarizer service and confirm that they are trustworthy enough not to abuse anything? You probably don’t know what “anything” is (see above sections).</p><p><strong>Even if you are OK with this vendor, now you have the responsibility to report it to your partners, customers, employees.</strong></p><p><strong>Are they OK with it and the AI summarizer use of their data? (which you can’t really define in a specific purpose for processing)</strong></p><h3><strong>The workaround</strong></h3><p>But you feel that it’s very valuable that you have the power of AI to get access to all that knowledge. So, is there ’s a workaround?</p><h4>Sort of, it requires a little less comfort and a little more discipline</h4><p>Create a designated folder for the AI summarizer’s access. Educate your users, even have a written policy on what kind of data is allowed to be placed in the designated folder.</p><blockquote>under no circumstances should PII, customer data, or anything sensitive be placed in this folder unless it’s meant to be shared company-wide.</blockquote><p>Users will need to consciously move data into tge folder, taking responsibility for what they share.</p><p>Be aware that even with this precaution, security will likely lose out to convenience. People will dump anything and everything into the folder just to make things easier for themselves. The only silver lining? At least you’ll know exactly who messed up.</p><h3>Cybersecurity at a human pace</h3><p>Deliver cybersecurity knowledge with brief, relevant and frequent content.</p><p><a href="https://www.beyondmachines.net/">Start using our platform</a></p><p>Follow us on <a href="https://infosec.exchange/@beyondmachines1">Mastodon</a> and <a href="http://www.linkedin.com/company/beyondmachines-net/">LinkedIn</a> and subscribe to our <a href="https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCEMl_1RQuCnJoa8OZNJ_zjQ">YouTube channel</a>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f37f004919e1" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Researching a very dubious crypto trading campaign]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@beyondmachines/researching-a-very-dubious-crypto-trading-campaign-33ab4ad09dac?source=rss-37530f476672------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/33ab4ad09dac</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[awareness]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[scam]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Beyond Machines]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 09 Jul 2024 12:26:57 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-07-11T12:08:29.480Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>An awareness article about a suspicious campaign for a crypto trading platform promising profits. Share and educate your friends, parents and close ones.</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*dyiMTPbCGmD9ObO1" /></figure><h3>Summary</h3><p>This is a brief research to help people be aware of promises of supposed crypto trading platforms via very dubious campaigns.</p><blockquote>While we can’t claim whether the platforms are real or scams, the number of red flags is too high for this not to be shared with the general public.</blockquote><p>The campaign starts with posts on Facebook and Instagram that impersonate well known media but on completely new domains.</p><p>The posts are claiming to be<strong> “deleted interviews because the central bank doesn’t want to you to know this secret”</strong> and mention well known persons, even takes photos from various sources to increase legitimacy of the post.</p><p>The claimed secret is that there are riches to be made from crypto trading, all you have to do is visit this particular link.</p><p>The link leads to a website that seems to be a cryto trading platform, but has no official company registration details, no information about jurisdiction or anything to indicate how to connect to the legal entity to which you will be entrusting your money.</p><p>The registration is trivial, no password needed. You get in immediately and are asked to transfer money (buy cryptocurrency). They are legally covered from because on their site they have a disclaimer that you accept the risk of losing funds in trading.</p><p>There is no way to know whether this is a real trading platform, but all indicators point to a very dubious operation. <strong>Even if it’s a simple cash grab (no trading, just taking your money and claiming you lost in trading), they are legally covered — because you have been notified that there is a risk and you accepted it.</strong></p><blockquote><strong>If you DO want to trade cryptocurrency, check your local regulation whether it’s legal, and check reputable international long-standing media outlets for references to real crypto trading platforms. Even then, be aware that your money is at risk — a lot of the valid crypto trading platforms went bankrupt.</strong></blockquote><p>The campaign is customized per country, all examples are for the Macedonian version of the campaign.</p><p>The specific campaign is pushed through Facebook, and the target audience profile is the following:</p><ul><li>males over 30 years old, with primary location Macedonia</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*-c72IBeUCjoXryooTdmHyA.png" /></figure><h3>Analysis and red flags</h3><p>This analysis is based on only instance of the campaign. <strong>There are hundreds of fake sites, fake posts and links to various interfaces claiming to be trading platforms. The campaign is going to be very persistent, since it’s very cheap to automate the fake posts, generate websites and spread the word on social media, amplified with bots.</strong></p><h4>Initial post leading to a wrong site, claiming a deleted interview</h4><p>The initial post takes the form of impersonating a portal Kajgana (official site <a href="https://kajgana.com/">https://kajgana.com/</a>), on a link leading to a page on the site <a href="http://minishouts.com/">minishouts.com</a>. The post claims a “deleted” interview claiming to know the secret to earning money with crypto trading.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*9jott9VXmSvXAaorvdu_Ug.png" /><figcaption>Image of the impersonated site Kajgana with the fake post</figcaption></figure><p>The page has a bunch of testimonials, what looks like a set of Facebook posts:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*UPmVnZvdDsl2SDdxFawEIA.png" /><figcaption>Faked facebook like posts on the fake page., they are not interactive</figcaption></figure><p>There is even an image of a bank statement to indicate that all this is true and everyone is earning a lot of money. The image of the bank statement is very much fake — the obvious indicator is that it carries the logo of the Central bank. <strong>For clarity, the Central bank DOES NOT issue bank statements to individuals.</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*FQ4UyH-v0jHfGpelADYCvQ.png" /><figcaption>Fake bank statement, apparently from the Central bank</figcaption></figure><h4>Content changing depending on IP address and country</h4><p>It must be noted that this page is targeted to Macedonia. If you open the same page from an IP address in another country (via VPN or TOR) the same page renders a generic profile for a person about a conference GEMBG16 — completely innocuous. No links to trading or anything.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Vn9Sdu8VkRU060AmhxgjQA.png" /><figcaption>Visiting the same minishouts link from another country leads to a conference like page of a speaker.</figcaption></figure><h4>The link to some crypto trading page</h4><p>If you open the links to the crypto trading platform, it leads you to another page on minishouts.com, but this one is branded as Nearest Edge. There is a website nearest edge, which has a different logo.</p><p>This page has a bunch of photos of well known individuals in Macedonia, supposedly earning a lot of money trading. It also invites you to register.</p><p>Below you can see the page on minishouts and the original Nearest Edge site for comparison.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*X0QyV553QAxfCKR0lWXXKg.png" /><figcaption>The second page, supposedly crypto trading welcome page claiming to be Nearest Edge</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*5NkDulWlDQYQKKyf1guFbw.png" /><figcaption>The real page of Nearest Edge and their logo</figcaption></figure><h4>Registering and entering the supposed crypto trading platform</h4><p>The page allows registration with random data, there is no verification of any kind nor password. We entered with completely fake data (screenshot below), and it allowed us to register.</p><p><strong>For clarity, trading platforms are still required to perform a process “Know Your Customer” (KYC) — which is mandated by financial systems so they identify potential money laundering. How will the company do KYC if it doesn’t verify any of the initial contact details?</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*4bqlomQDt4vfPK11yCbW7g.png" /><figcaption>Registering with completely fake data — there is no way to perform KYC on such a ‘ghost’</figcaption></figure><p>After registration, you are redirected to a completely different site — globalconnect24.net (NOT Nearest Edge). All you can do there is deposit funds, which means entering your payment card details.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*KEzSLykDwd2xNt0IvxZ4rQ.png" /><figcaption>The final page of the supposed platform, offering that you give them money</figcaption></figure><h4>The weird globalconnect24 domain and site</h4><p>The globalconnect24.net domain, was created in December of 2023 — so this platform exists on this link for 6 months.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*cyH9X0fSiultWSTk6eQQgQ.png" /><figcaption>The domain registration for globalconnect24.net registered in December 2023</figcaption></figure><p>Opening the website of globalconnect24.net, you are greeted with generic trading promises. Noting sticks out at first. But one needs to look for the details (below)</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*xyQDKqPwlWuSgOm1RvqWpg.png" /><figcaption>Home page of globalconnect24.net</figcaption></figure><p><strong>The bottom of the page has a mention of “our offices”, and a huge risk warning that “washes their hands” if you lose your money — everything is legal because they told you the risk and you accepted it</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*MGxTfwZORWVigzQEllu0YA.png" /></figure><p>Digging into the site, there are very important items which are missing:</p><ul><li><strong>There are no Terms of Service</strong> — the only legal contract between the user and a service is a ToS. There is no Terms of Service page at all so you don’t know what your contract is.</li><li><strong>There is no named legal entity</strong> — The legal company that operates this service is never mentioned, it’s headquarters and jurisdicton under which the company operates. <strong>For any financial service this is crucial and it’s missing.</strong></li><li><strong>The contact address and building are wrong</strong> — the site claims to be located in the <em>Bruntwood SciTech Manchester Technology Centre</em>, at a claimed address “Oxford Road, Manchester M1 7ED”. The <em>Bruntwood SciTech</em> building is on “Union 2, 10 Albert Square, Manchester M2 6LW”, which is about 28 minutes walking distance from the claimed address.</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*_r-1MV4JllZgw3T2sHlVeg.png" /></figure><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>There is too much wrong with this entire campaign and the site it leads you to. We can’t definitively state that it’s a scam, but the number of red flags is massively too high.</p><p>Educate everyone on the mechanics of this scam, and just walk away from it.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=33ab4ad09dac" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Jira Chess: The ultimate corporate sport]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@beyondmachines/jira-chess-the-ultimate-corporate-sport-5919e4b45178?source=rss-37530f476672------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/5919e4b45178</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[corporate-culture]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[jira]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Beyond Machines]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 04 Jun 2024 12:14:40 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-06-04T12:14:40.546Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>In Jira Chess, strategy, creativity, and corporate cunning are your best allies</h3><h3><strong>Objective</strong></h3><p>The main goal of Jira Chess is to move tickets as far away from your team as possible and make them so bogged down that they never return. The winner is the team that successfully offloads the most complexity of tickets.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1000/0*gWu3iGKK4JFQH2_x" /></figure><h3><strong>Rules</strong></h3><h4><strong>Setup</strong></h4><ul><li>Each team starts with 16 number of tickets in their backlog. All tickets are initially of the complexity 2. Complexity can change based on applied special action moves.</li><li>Each team can process tickets with a maximum of 10 complexity points per sprint.</li><li>Creating a new ticket is with default complexity of 2. Creating a ticket expends part of the points that the team can process per sprint.</li></ul><h4><strong>Players</strong></h4><ul><li>Minimum of 2 players representing teams.</li></ul><h4><strong>Ticket Moves</strong></h4><p>Each team has an infinite number of ticket moves. Only one standard move can be applier per ticket</p><ul><li><strong>Pass the Buck:</strong> Move a ticket to another team’s backlog with a vague or complex description. Does not change complexity of ticket.</li><li><strong>Scope Creep:</strong> Add additional, unrelated ticket to a ticket before passing it along. Adds one point of complexity to the ticket. The created ticket remains in the team’s backlog where it’s created for the sprint in which it’s created.</li><li><strong>Requirements Ping-Pong:</strong> Ask clarifying questions that send the ticket back to the originating team. Adds one point of complexity to the ticket.</li></ul><h4><strong>Special Actions Moves</strong></h4><p>Each team has one of each special actions that modify a ticket and make it more complex for the other team. One action can be applied to only one ticket.</p><ul><li><strong>The Blocker:</strong> Declare a ticket as blocked due to dependencies on other ticket, making it harder to progress. Does not change complexity. The blocker ticket must be in the team’s backlog where it’s created for the sprint in which it’s created.</li><li><strong>Technical Debt:</strong> Create a new ticket linked to an old issue that must be resolved before moving forward. Adds complexity to the original ticket. The technical debt ticket can be moved to other team backlog, but the original ticket is remains in the team that adds the technical debt for the sprint in which it’s created.</li><li><strong>Black Hole Reassignment:</strong> Reassign a ticket to a team member who is on vacation or swamped with other work. Cannot be used with any other standard or special action move. Does not change complexity. Black hole tickets cannot be processed in the next sprint after this special action is executed on the ticket.</li><li><strong>Clarification Bomb:</strong> Provide overly detailed explanations to slow down the ticket return. Doubles complexity of the ticket, but reduces the number of points the team can process in the sprint by the new value of the complexity of the ticket to which clarification bomb is applied. Clarification Bomb ticket<strong> </strong>cannot be processed in the next sprint after this special action is executed on the ticket.</li></ul><h3>Power moves</h3><p>Each team has one power moves per game</p><ul><li><strong>Inadequate Specs:</strong> Sending back a ticket because of wrong team assignment. If a team receives a ticket back, the complexity of the returned ticket is subtracted from the number of complexity points to process for their sprint, and they can’t touch the returned ticket in that sprint.</li><li><strong>FUD</strong>: Declaring the other team to be counterproductive to management, which blocks them from executing their turn of the sprint because of meetings to explain to management. Cannot be used to stop the final sprint of the game. The team that used FUD has only half of moves in the subsequent sprint since they need to explain to HR.</li></ul><h3>Winning the Game:</h3><ul><li>The game is played in 5 sprints (rounds), typically lasting one week. Each team works on their moves in parallel and the other team sees the results at the start of the next sprint.</li><li>At the end of each sprint, teams count the total complexity of tickets remaining in their backlog. The team with least complexity wins the sprint.</li><li>The ultimate winner is the team with the most sprint victories in a season.</li><li>A tie is counted as loss.</li></ul><p><strong>Have a good sprint</strong></p><h3>Cybersecurity at a human pace</h3><p>Deliver cybersecurity knowledge with brief, relevant and frequent content.</p><p><a href="https://www.beyondmachines.net/">Start using our platform</a></p><p>Or just follow us on <a href="https://infosec.exchange/@beyondmachines1">Mastodon</a> and <a href="http://www.linkedin.com/company/beyondmachines-net/">LinkedIn</a> and subscribe to our <a href="https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCEMl_1RQuCnJoa8OZNJ_zjQ">YouTube channel</a>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=5919e4b45178" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[One year of BeyondMachines: You will get hacked.]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@beyondmachines/one-year-of-beyondmachines-you-will-get-hacked-19302d6eeece?source=rss-37530f476672------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/19302d6eeece</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[awareness]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Beyond Machines]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 31 May 2024 10:42:20 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-05-31T10:42:20.738Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Everyone still gets hacked — big, small, rich, poor. Because a lot of small poor decisions due to optimism, comfort and fear. All it takes is a little bit of discipline to be better.</strong></p><h3>Too Lazy, Didn’t Read</h3><p>For those that don’t want to read the entire article, here’s a blunt summary:</p><blockquote>NOTHING HAS IMPROVED. WE ARE ALL FAILING, ON THE SAME THINGS. BECAUSE WE LACK A LITTLE BIT OF DISCIPLINE AND WE THINK SOMEONE ELSE SHOULD DO IT.</blockquote><ol><li><strong>Everyone gets hacked:</strong> From the very rich massive corporations with near infinite resources, via public service organizations and major hosting providers claiming to be the best solution to the miniscule one-man-show outfits.</li><li><strong>Everyone fails on the same issues</strong>: Being optimistic, not wanting the hassle or not having the priority is enough to fail to ransomware, weak credentials, errors in configuration, unpatched vulnerabilities.</li><li><strong>There is no magic — it’s about a little less comfort applied constantly</strong>: Stronger discipline and several fundamental controls applied by everyone, puts an organization miles ahead of the pack.</li></ol><h3>Why do we get hacked?</h3><h4>Some obligatory annual numbers</h4><p>All the observations in this article are based on the full year of analysis of events, advisories and attacks through <a href="https://www.beyondmachines.net/">BeyondMachines</a>.</p><p>Because every annual retrospective needs metrics, here are some numbers:</p><ul><li>10263 processed events, advisories and incidents</li><li>2204 published items: 1523 incidents, 501 advisories, 72 active attack warnings, 107 awareness and knowledge.</li></ul><h4>The Usually Hacked Suspects can barely handle the data</h4><p>Through our monitoring, tagging and documenting incidents, we are seeing a clear set of “usual suspects” industries that are most frequently hacked.</p><figure><img alt="The most hacked industries: Healthcare, Government, Education, Finance, IT/Tech" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/667/1*JBEVmhJKmT5m6TVrx1cQTQ.png" /></figure><p>These five industries rotate in the top 5 weekly. Which is to be expected, because:</p><ul><li>Either through their very function (government, health and education) or through their ambition and growth (IT and finance) these industries have amassed too much data — very sensitive and comprehensive data.</li><li>All provide services and even technical access to massive number of users;</li><li>Their users have fairly low individual security discipline;</li><li>Some don’t have the resources to focus on cybersecurity;</li><li>Some see the technology a supporting tool and cost item, which they can’t finance properly because it’s not core business.</li></ul><p><strong><em>None of them have a realistic comprehension of all the piles of data they have. Whether it’s through not having enough resources, or no will to invest, all these industries have huge blind spots of where data is, what data is used for, who can access data, how those people access it, which systems are running or storing the data.</em></strong></p><p><strong><em>The entire system is left mostly to the trust and individual diligence of people ‘on the ground’. Some of which aren’t even aware of cybersecurity risks, others who are doing their level best to fight the windmills and others still that know about the risks but aren’t empowered to do something about it.</em></strong></p><h4>The Usual ways to get hacked: <strong>Optimism, fear, lack of awareness and comfort</strong></h4><p>Most incidents are caused by only five threats, which usually feed off each other. For instance, ransomware is executed either through compromising access, an unpatched vulnerability or social engineering.</p><p>Third parties are commonly compromised through misconfigured databases exposed publicly, or ransomware hurting the customers of third parties.</p><figure><img alt="Usual hacking threats: Ransomware, Unpatched Vulnerabilities, System Misconfiguration, Third Party Compromise, Unauthorized access." src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/960/1*L735WadorSnuEWllpZeWrg.png" /></figure><p>This vicious cycle of flaws doesn’t relent, even with everyone claiming to “have security as their highest priority”, nobody really does much more than putting out fires.</p><p>It’s not because nobody wants to do more. It’s because of a combination of optimism, crippling fear, lack of awareness and resistance to less comfort.</p><p><strong>Consider patching your own PC:</strong> Even though it should be straightforward, it’s a process that frequently breaks drivers, takes more than an hour and one isn’t really certain that the computer will boot up properly after. So people apply <strong>‘if it ain’t broken don’t try to fix it’</strong> to their PC. Now expand this to an organization with hundreds or thousands of PCs. That are remote, used by non-technical persons and whose job may depend on a running PC. The average user says <strong>“I’m not valuable enough to be hacked, why do I bother”</strong>.</p><p>Now expand this same concern onto database servers, complex central enterprise applications, network devices and everything else these organizations run.</p><p>Same goes for the third parties that these organizations are using. Patching and doing security is time consuming, expensive and potentially high risk. So it’s easy to be optimistic and postpone it.</p><p>Even if we decide that we will bite the bullet and push the patching, updates and go through the pain, next month there are more advisories. More things to patch. <a href="https://beyondmachines.net/event_details/google-patches-fourth-actively-exploited-chrome-flaw-in-two-weeks-q-g-y-i-o">Chrome published FOUR critical patches in two weeks</a>. Back to, <strong>“I’m not valuable enough to be hacked, why do I bother”.</strong></p><p>Finally, our passwords. Nobody likes entering passwords, so everyone uses the simplest three-four passwords for years. Which have already leaked from many platforms where you entered the same passwords that got hacked later. Yet people absolutely hate using Multi Factor Authentication. Because it’s less comfortable, and once again, <strong>“I’m not valuable enough to be hacked, why do I bother”.</strong></p><h4>We are feeding the fire</h4><p>Most attacks are executed for profit, by crime gangs. They don’t care who they attack as long as they can profit, either from selling the data or from extorting victims with reputational issues and downtime.</p><p>And the business world indirectly supports this crime. Have you ever considered how so many companies get to spam you and cold call you? They buy your data from the infamous ‘data brokers’ — companies operating on the edge of the law that aren’t really shy to scrape, buy and steal data in order to resell it.</p><p>As long as businesses are happy to buy from data brokers, they are supporting the crime economy. They provide the demand, someone will provide the supply by stealing data — and we are back to cybercrime and hacking.</p><h3>You will get hacked — through a thousand small wrong decisions</h3><p>If one asks “Will I get hacked?”, the answer is “YES”. And if we think it’s someone else’s problem to solve, think again:</p><ul><li>It’s you who has decided not to patch your browser, your mobile phone, your computer because it’s a hassle.</li><li>It’s you who decided not to use MFA and use the same dumb passwords from a decade ago because it’s a hassle.</li><li>It’s you who has decided not to allow your employees to spend the 2 hours a week on security configuration because “deadlines”.</li><li>It’s you who are still buying from the same vendor after they have had a data breach twice last year, because ‘long term contract relationship’.</li><li>It’s you who has clicked the unexpected attachment from an email with a beautiful girl oh the sender photo.</li><li>It’s you who have allowed untrained people to deploy databases they wish on public internet because ‘agile and speed’.</li><li>It’s you who have bought the stolen data from data brokers because ‘sales’.</li></ul><blockquote><strong>It’s you who are falling for optimism, comfort and lack of discipline. While being part of a deluge of the same poor decisions from thousands others. Each one assuming it’s only them making the poor decision and everyone else will protect them.</strong></blockquote><blockquote><strong>You are wrong.</strong></blockquote><blockquote><strong>And you will be hacked.</strong></blockquote><h3>Can we do something about it?</h3><p>Yes. We just all have to do the hard thing about hard things: Be disciplined.</p><p>It takes conscious effort and time to invest in all the small items that move the needle in fundamental cybersecurity:</p><ul><li>regular patching of PCs, browsers and phones;</li><li>extra effort of typing in MFA;</li><li>time for the downtime for updates;</li><li>on continuous educating your team about cybersecurity risks and current mistakes of others;</li><li>managers leading by example in the discipline</li><li>managers not throwing out the discipline on a whim</li><li>on not buying data from criminals in the hope of two more sales this quarter</li></ul><p>You don’t need cybersecurity superheroes. You need to decide to have a little bit less comfortable day. It goes a long way.</p><h3>Cybersecurity at a human pace</h3><p>Deliver cybersecurity knowledge with brief, relevant and frequent content.</p><p><a href="https://www.beyondmachines.net/">Start using our platform</a></p><p>Or just follow us on <a href="https://infosec.exchange/@beyondmachines1">Mastodon</a> and <a href="http://www.linkedin.com/company/beyondmachines-net/">LinkedIn</a> and subscribe to our <a href="https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCEMl_1RQuCnJoa8OZNJ_zjQ">YouTube channel</a>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=19302d6eeece" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Deconstructing a “Crypto Bank”]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@beyondmachines/deconstructing-a-crypto-bank-588903916760?source=rss-37530f476672------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/588903916760</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[scam]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[awareness]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Beyond Machines]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 21 Mar 2024 13:28:06 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-03-21T13:45:31.002Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>When things are too good to be true, they rarely (never) are.</p><h3>Introduction</h3><p>A colleague just got a weird e-mail message, apparently a message sent to the wrong recipient about a Bitcoin wallet that has been funded over 4 million dollars.</p><p>The message had a bunch of red flags, so we went down the rabbit hole, and discovered even more red flags.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/720/1*MNag4qVARIaijpM6IkZHKA.png" /></figure><p>While we can’t definitively claim that the entire scenario is a scam, it’s a valid tutorial in identifying and analyzing suspicious and unexpected messages.</p><h3>Red flags</h3><p>We have grouped the red flags in three sections:</p><ul><li>The email message</li><li>The website</li><li>The registered company mentioned on the website</li></ul><p>There are a bunch of photos as evidence. Have fun.</p><h4>Weird things about the Mail message</h4><p>Even if we assume that the unexpected message that started this entire investigation is just an honest mistake in sending, it has a lot of red flags:</p><ol><li><strong>Weird sender 1: </strong>The message is sent from a service that’s titled “IT Support”, but the signature appears to be from a person named Ardian.</li><li><strong>Weird sender 2: </strong>The sender is <a href="/service/mailto:itsupport@plnbatam.com">itsupport@plnbatam.com</a>, which is Batam National Electricity Service (Indonesia) — nothing to do with finances and cryptocurrency.</li><li><strong>Weird subject: </strong>The message has a weird subject that’s designed to imply reply to a previous conversation. But even in such a context it’s wrong, because nobody puts a full stop after a space at the end of an e-mail subject line.</li><li><strong>Broken up website link:</strong> The URL to the website is intentionally broken up, which is a standard practice when one wants to avoid someone clicking on a link. But since the sender *wants* the recepient to visit the site, the only reason for the broken URL is to avoid automated filters.</li><li><strong>Mail sent from Indonesia</strong> — The sending mail server is confirmed to be located in Indonesia — while the <em>koincrest</em> website claims that their business is located in the United Kingdom (read on for more details).</li></ol><blockquote>Received: from <a href="http://mail.plnbatam.com/">mail.plnbatam.com</a> (<a href="http://mailgateway.plnbatam.com/">mailgateway.plnbatam.com</a> [103.25.108.207]) by <a href="http://ms13p00im-qukt33112101.me.com/">ms13p00im-qukt33112101.me.com</a> (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 1D3A558A0238; Thu, 21 Mar 2024 10:05:00 +0000 (UTC)</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*p6E8ZtZ1XtjEXPjmmhBUiw.png" /></figure><h4>Weird things about the Website</h4><p>The message leads to a website <a href="http://www.koincrest.com/">www.koincrest.com</a>, which is hidden behind a CloudFlare service, so it’s difficult to locate where the server is really hosted. This is not a red flag in itself, a note for everyone that will ask “where’s the server”.</p><p>Now, onto the website red flags:</p><p>1. <strong>Website is too new to be legit:</strong> The website domain is registered 9 days ago. It is beyond fantastic that someone will put up 70 Bitcoin (over 4 million dollars) on a website that’s only 9 days old!</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/601/1*fyV34tyKLGSKB9DDJrDsQA.png" /></figure><p>2. <strong>Website claims to be Crypto Bank, but cryptocurrency is decentralized: </strong>The website represents itself as “№1 Crypto Bank”. The term makes no sense, since cryptocurrency is decentralized by design —<strong> it doesn’t need a bank</strong>. In fact, most people using cryptocurrency try to avoid banks as much as possible.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*SE8CtHGn6muxfyMRB9eHFA.png" /></figure><p>3. <strong>Password reset process doesn’t wor</strong>k: Upon logging in with the user id and password from the email message, the user is forced to reset password. Yet after resetting the password and trying to log in again, the new password doesn’t work — instead it reverts back to the password in the e-mail message above. This *can* be explained away by not completing the OTP step — next red flag, but in standard web application logic the two steps (password and OTP) are completed as separate processes. Unless somebody really doesn’t want to change the password since the same message was sent to a bunch of people that are being scammed.</p><p>4. <strong>OTP verification is designed to force users to give phone number: </strong>After resetting the password (which didn’t reset anything, see above) the user is forced to activate OTP (one-time-password). But the site requests a valid phone number since OTP is only available via VOICE OTP.</p><p>For readers that don’t have a lot of experience with OTP, the best option for OTP is an application on your smartphone that generates the OTP codes.</p><p>A usual alternative is SMS based OTP, where the user will receive an SMS with the code on their mobile. This alternative is offered as a backup if the smartphone is broken/lost and the user can’t access the application.</p><p>VOICE OTP means that an automated machine will ring you up and speak the numbers. This option is used as an accessibility option for blind people. It’s NEVER a default option.</p><p>Unless… the objective of the website is to collect real phone numbers to continue some sales or scam effort. The user can easily avoid providing a real phone number if the OTP is SMS based, by submitting a free anonymizing number for SMS — there are hundreds of such free services. But there aren’t any free services for Voice calls. So a person will have to give a real number (or at least a fake number they are paying for).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*nusJRtNb6x-I40UssLmh5A.png" /></figure><p>5. <strong>No way to contacting Koincrest unless you are logged into the website:</strong> The contact form claims the following:</p><blockquote>For complete privacy and protection of our users, our customer reps are only available to assist from within our internal messaging system found in your account dashboard area.</blockquote><p>This means that there is no real phone number to call — any and all contact is via something inside the application. If the application shuts down, you lose any means of contacting the entity that claims to be a bank!?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*LdbrCaHJOJOYYPGO1Co9nw.png" /></figure><p>6. <strong>Address leads to a residential street in a London suburb: </strong>The address on the website, <strong><em>19 Harlow Road, Rainham, England, RM13 7UJ, </em></strong>leads to a residential street in London. What bank would have a location in a family home?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*G27zL9LgYbb1V4BX8dV9AA.png" /></figure><h4>Weird things about the company registration</h4><p>As a final phase in the research, we looked at the registered company mentioned on the website. And things don’t inspire confidence.</p><blockquote>© 2024 Trading Dawn Ltd. <br> (UK Registration: 14812436)</blockquote><p>1. <strong>The company was founded in 2023 with a capital of 1 GBP, and the capital is never increased:</strong> The information available on Companies House confirms that the company is founded on 18th April 2023, with a capital of 1GBP, with a director being a person named Dawn Engstrom. What kind of a bank is incorporated with 1 GBP, and never increases capital?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/776/1*Mh2q_5Y9tat-XzpuR8jiQQ.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/749/1*TSyrwPtYaQzG4NU4zvvlEA.png" /></figure><p><strong>2. The company requested to be removed from the register of companies 3 months before they registered the website where they claim to operate: </strong>On 4th of January 2024 the company submitted a request to be stricken from the register of companies, and on the 16th of January 2024 the Registrar of Companies confirmed that “Trading Dawn LTD” will be stricken from the register and dissolved. What kind of a bank receiving 4 million dollars is already in the process of being dissolved?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/632/1*u-mE1wWn1RKnvBvCDrncSg.png" /></figure><p>3. <strong>The director of the company is invisible on social media, the closest person to that name is a cook: </strong>A director of financial institution may not be present on social media, but peculiar that the only person called Dawn Engstrom on LinkedIn, <strong>claims to work as a cook</strong> in the London Borough of Havering, only 5 miles away from the 19 Harlow Road — the registered address of the “Bank”.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/823/1*6_c7UclQtZXbp0_G88KqnA.png" /></figure><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>While we can’t claim that the website and the e-mail message is a scam, it has too many red flags for comfort. If it’s a real company, we hope that H. Frank (named in the e-mail) will receive their 70 Bitcoin.</p><p><strong>For everyone else, we hope this review provides questions and perspectives that they can use to look for red flags in the next message that is too good to be true.</strong></p><h3>Cybersecurity at a human pace</h3><p>Deliver cybersecurity knowledge with brief, relevant and frequent content.</p><p><a href="https://www.beyondmachines.net/">Start using our platform</a></p><p>Or just follow us on <a href="https://infosec.exchange/@beyondmachines1">Mastodon</a> and <a href="http://www.linkedin.com/company/beyondmachines-net/">LinkedIn</a> and subscribe to our <a href="https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCEMl_1RQuCnJoa8OZNJ_zjQ">YouTube channel</a>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=588903916760" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[SMS Scam Analysis]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@beyondmachines/sms-scam-analysis-7b699f86c97a?source=rss-37530f476672------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/7b699f86c97a</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[phishing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[scam]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Beyond Machines]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 08 Jan 2024 15:17:55 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-01-08T15:20:15.123Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Analysis of fake parcel delivery SMS messages and website — scam campaign on the 7th and 8th January 2024</p><h3>Summary</h3><p>We have performed an analysis of scam message impersonating parcel delivery services and luring people to website to steal data and money.</p><p>Our analysis focuses on the scam campaign that targeted Macedonia, but based on public reports a variant of the same scam campaign is being executed at least towards France, Germany, and Spain.</p><p>The campaign is trying to:</p><ul><li>Steal Personally Identifiable Information (PII) by asking for a bunch of PII “for delivery”</li><li>Steal payment card data</li><li>Perform a transaction on the card and steal money</li></ul><p>We have performed both a consumer level and technical level analysis to provide full color of the scam. You can use the conclusions to perform your checks in the future.</p><p>Our general advice is the same as for any scam:</p><h4>If it’s unexpected, implies urgency and provides a link for you to follow — it’s very probably a scam. NEVER FOLLOW THE LINK FROM THE SMS.</h4><h4>Instead, google the official website of the parcel service, visit their tracking service and enter the tracking number to check. Or call up the phone numbers of from the official website of the parce service.</h4><h3>Consumer level analysis</h3><p>The scam is initiated via an SMS message. These are the initial indicators of the scam :</p><ul><li><strong>Unexpected message</strong>: An SMS message is sent to many phone numbers in Macedonia, claiming to be sent from Macedonian Post.</li><li><strong>Unexpected sender</strong>: The SMS message is sent from a phone +33617960810 (french number)</li><li><strong>Implies urgency</strong>: The SMS message references a tracking number and claims that there is customs charges to be paid. Provides a link in the message to pay customs dues.</li></ul><figure><img alt="SMS scam message, in Macedonian, claiming to be from the Post and that a parcel has customs dues to be paid." src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/464/1*cqyxsHSAQbEGjfeDHb9LHg.png" /><figcaption>SMS scam message, in Macedonian, claiming to be from the Post and that a parcel has customs dues to be paid.</figcaption></figure><p>Upon visiting the site linked in the message, the visitor isgreeted with a series of screens that claim to track the parcel, that you need to pay customs dues before the 10th of January 2024 or the parcel will be returned and you will be charged.</p><p>Then the site leads the user to a page in which it collects a bunch of PII and finally asks for payment card details.</p><figure><img alt="Four screens of the scam website, leading through tracking claim, implying urgency to pay customs dues, collecting PII and payment card data" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*EUIsL5SVRVvP5cpVE_TIvg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Four screens of the scam website, leading through tracking claim, implying urgency to pay customs dues, collecting PII and payment card data</figcaption></figure><p>We entered a fake card in the field so we can’t confirm how much money the scammers will try to steal.</p><h4>Previous experiences of the similar scam indicate that the scammers will try to pay for an AirBnB type of service in Asia and have a deal with someone else to split the profits. Good luck trying to get the money back from a random bank across the globe.</h4><p>The obvious solution here is not to follow the URL from the SMS message. Instead to visit the official site of Macedonian Post and enter the tracking number there.</p><h3>Technical level analysis</h3><p>For the users that are more advanced, we went deeper and looked into the website domain and provider, we checked the phone number and we researched how the website works.</p><h4>Website domain and location</h4><p>A simple series of <em>whois</em> queries yields another immediate confirmation that this is a scam:</p><ul><li>The <em>mkposta.com</em> domain is first registered only 5 days ago - on the 3rd of January 2024 — established parcel service domains don’t pop up every day, especially not right after New Year when people are just coming back to work.</li><li>The mkposta.com domain is registered via Squarespace domains and is hiding the original owner — not something a large company does.</li></ul><figure><img alt="mkpost.com domain registrar, anonymous owner and creation date/time" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*bOqBL6HxueF0mYQEZ68hdA.png" /><figcaption>mkpost.com domain registrar, anonymous owner and creation date/time</figcaption></figure><ul><li>If this is not enough, the IP address of the website resolves to an IP of 91.212.166.26, operated by Proton66 operator in Russia. There is no way a Macedonian company will host services in Russia.</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Ie3r9kKt6hYwakf-4fNXMQ.png" /></figure><h4>SMS sender phone number</h4><p>The sender phone number is from France, and there have been multiple reports of SMS spam. From the reports we can see that the same phone number is also presenting itself as U.PS and UP.S (to impersonate the UPS parcel service.</p><figure><img alt="SMS Sender phone number is from France, with multiple reports of spam or scams in the past few days." src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*bJnkRfDcW2nPUVHeYOyYqw.png" /><figcaption>SMS Sender phone number is from France, with multiple reports of spam or scams in the past few days.</figcaption></figure><h4>Scam website analysis</h4><p>This is the most interesting part of the technical analysis. We analyzed the <a href="https://mkposta.com/">https://mkposta.com</a> for behavior, errors and implemented masking mechanisms.</p><ul><li><strong>The website tries to hide itself by rendering the page only to visitors from a known IP address pool </strong>— if one visits the site <a href="https://mkposta.com/">https://mkposta.com</a> from an IP outside of the IP pools of the major telco operators in Macedonia, the site renders a blank page. A real parcel service will render the same page regardless of which location you are visiting — simply because a person can be traveling and still may need to access the service. The scammers idea was to prevent scam reports to Google Safe Browsing since nobody can confirm that the page is a scam — it’s just a blank page.</li><li><strong>The website tries to force users to visit from mobile</strong> -if the user visits the page from a desktop browser, there is an “Access denied” message. Just like with the IP address blocks, a real parcel service won’t do this because a user may not have a smartphone handy but may still need to visit the site. The scammers idea was to force users to use a device on which there is a limited set of tools to identify or block their website — like antivirus, script blocker or similar tools. Also, visiting on mobile makes the analysis of the website a lot harder. Naturally, this can easily be bypassed by setting your PC browser to emulate a mobile browser.</li></ul><figure><img alt="mkposta.com website blocking desktop browsers to prevent advanced blockers." src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*sZOsraks2jnUK6iFLHHpyA.png" /><figcaption>mkposta.com website blocking desktop browsers to prevent advanced blockers.</figcaption></figure><ul><li><strong>There is only one tracking number on the entire website, and any entry of tracking number is not validated — </strong>The criminals got lazy and didn’t create a larger pool of tracking numbers across the entire website so a visitor needs to enter a fresh one and the application to validate it. This doesn’t happen. A visitor can enter whatever tracking number they want, and the website will blindly continue to work with the original tracking number that appeared in the SMS message — no check, error or alert of any kind. <strong><em>This is a good technical test for a suspicious visitor — to intentionally enter a wrong tracking number and see if the app reacts. Check the value we entered on the first page versus the rendered one on the second page</em></strong></li></ul><figure><img alt="Entering wrong tracking number doesn’t cause an error — the application blindly pushes on." src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*S71UCK3pcW9JFzwTsvTTww.png" /><figcaption>Entering wrong tracking number doesn’t cause an error — the application blindly pushes on.</figcaption></figure><ul><li><strong>Not fully translated and using weird language </strong>— The criminals were still lazy and didn’t fully translate the website for Macedonian targets. At least one error message is in French (possibly a remnant of the original scam). Additionally, the word “Криптограм” doesn’t mean anything regarding a payment card in Macedonian. The criminals wanted the CVV code, but their auto-translate failed them.</li></ul><figure><img alt="Scam website error messages not fully translated, and some translation is meaningless." src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/788/1*veYSToE0QZbCTTYnUx60Sg.png" /><figcaption>Scam website error messages not fully translated, and some translation is meaningless.</figcaption></figure><p><strong>The scam website is too fast</strong> — this is not an error per se, but still a visible inconsistency. The real website of Macedonian Post is slower — in some spots MUCH slower than the scam site. The speed difference is easily noticeable to a user that has used the original website. Just take a look at the comparison of the performance using Lighthouse.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*tit0nYNuvxuAe7dMmJgMcA.png" /><figcaption>Scam site speed in Lighthouse</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*kggYUkIOfz0G_dbyvQ_sOQ.png" /><figcaption>Original Macedonian Post site speed in Lighthouse</figcaption></figure><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>This SMS parcel scam is going on for more than a year now, with several variations. It seems that it’s very profitable, so it won’t stop.</p><p>The best way to protect yourself is to have a self-check list, like the one below. If the message you receive ticks more than one indicator below, consider it a scam and consult with others.</p><ul><li><strong>Message is unexpected?</strong></li><li><strong>Message implies urgency?</strong></li><li><strong>Message is trigger strong emotions in you (anger, curiosity, jealosy, worry, fear)?</strong></li><li><strong>Message content is too good to be true (won lottery, inheritance, sexual relationship)?</strong></li><li><strong>Message references or implies authority (your boss)?</strong></li><li><strong>Message has generic language (here’s the file, see attached…)?</strong></li><li><strong>Message has weird grammar/language?</strong></li><li><strong>Message has weird sender</strong></li></ul><h3>Cybersecurity at a human pace</h3><p>Deliver cybersecurity knowledge with brief, relevant and frequent content.</p><p><a href="https://www.beyondmachines.net/">Start using our platform</a></p><p>Or just follow us on <a href="https://infosec.exchange/@beyondmachines1">Mastodon</a> and <a href="http://www.linkedin.com/company/beyondmachines-net/">LinkedIn</a> and subscribe to our <a href="https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCEMl_1RQuCnJoa8OZNJ_zjQ">YouTube channel</a>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=7b699f86c97a" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Twitter, we are leaving you]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@beyondmachines/twitter-we-are-leaving-you-b6b183d8a5e8?source=rss-37530f476672------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b6b183d8a5e8</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[twitter]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Beyond Machines]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 05 Oct 2023 08:46:50 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-10-05T08:46:50.059Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>It’s you, it’s not us. We refuse to be in an abusive relationship.</p><p>As of today we have stopped posting events and reports to Twitter. For a year the entire platform has been a dumpster fire after dumpster fire.</p><p>Everyone that likes to follow our content on social media, head over to <a href="https://infosec.exchange/@beyondmachines1">Mastodon</a> or <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/company/beyondmachines-net">Linkedin</a>.</p><p><a href="https://beyondmachines.net/connect/">The best value is to register for the content directly on our platform</a>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1000/0*Hsb93Q7EOqY-6gpi" /></figure><h3>Some reasons and statistics</h3><p>For clarity, we refuse to pay the $8 US/ month blackmail to maintain reach. Even though we are posting consistently (same content) and respond to all engagements, here are a couple of comparisons per platforms (as of 5th October 2023:</p><p><a href="https://twitter.com/beyondmachines1">Twitter (we had an account from December 2020, </a><a href="https://twitter.com/beyondmachines1">with over 2000 followers</a><a href="https://twitter.com/beyondmachines1">):</a></p><ul><li>Content — 1040 tweets from May 2023</li><li>Followers — 114 new followers</li><li>Engagement — around 300 replies, retweets, likes</li></ul><p><a href="https://infosec.exchange/@beyondmachines1">Mastodon</a> (new account created in May 2023):</p><ul><li>Content — 1049 toots from May 2023</li><li>Followers — 251 new followers</li><li>Engagement — around 1700 replies, boosts, favorites</li></ul><p>The straw that broke the camel’s back was the announcement that <a href="https://www.theverge.com/2023/10/4/23903859/x-elon-musk-headlines-links-image-twitter">X will stops showing headlines because Elon Musk thinks it will make posts look better</a></p><p>There is only one consistent element across all our experience with Twitter in the last 12 months: “Give Me!”.</p><p>Whether it’s asking for money, demanding content locked into the platform, blocking outside links or some other inspiration of a single person, it’s a very abusive relationship.</p><p>We refuse to be in such a relationship.</p><h3>What happens now?</h3><p>We are stopping posting to Twitter today (5th October 2023). The current content will remain, and we will pin a tweet linking to this article for all followers.</p><p>Twitter, we are leaving you. We don’t even need to pick up our stuff.</p><h3>Take Control of Your Cybersecurity</h3><p>Stay informed about critical cybersecurity issues and global risks effortlessly. <a href="https://beyondmachines.net/connect/">Receive automated updates and actionable tasks directly in your inbox, ensuring you stay focused on cybersecurity without compromising your time</a>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b6b183d8a5e8" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Wanted: One-Person-Army Security Architect]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@beyondmachines/wanted-one-person-army-security-architect-30927b7d4b1c?source=rss-37530f476672------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/30927b7d4b1c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[jobs]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Beyond Machines]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 08 Sep 2023 12:17:36 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-09-08T12:24:21.078Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Superpowers are required. They just forgot to add “must be under 30yo, single, not planning a family and available 24/7”.</p><p>On reading a job post like this, walk away. There are no superhumans. There are only burned out cybersecurity people.</p><p>Over the past few weeks the following screenshot of a job post for Information Security Architect floated on the internet. Very probably a joke, but we’ve all been there — the security one-person-army job.</p><p>We’ll go the requirements, section by section. We aim to clear the air for every security professional:<strong><em> It’s not you, it’s the complete and utter ignorance of the hiring managers.</em></strong></p><p>Brace yourselves. This is a long post, and you will be ranting more and more as you read it.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/779/1*qQedT0bY26JJS_i68qJ0dQ.jpeg" /></figure><h3>Step aside Halo Master Chief, here comes the one-man-army called Information Security Architect</h3><h4>The sane parts of the job ad</h4><p>The ad starts ambitiously yet makes sense in the first paragraph. Looking for a senior person with client facing experience, a manager that hasn’t lost the technical touch. Focusing on PCI-DSS, so it’s payment industry experience.</p><blockquote>Information Security Architect — I need an all-around CISSP with a minimum of 10 to 15 years of experience coming from a background in client-facing roles such as vCISO or Security Architecture Manager from MS or MSSPs such as Savvis/CenturyLink/Lumen or Verizon Enterprise Business Solutions wearing many hats in leadership and individual contributor roles and can be hands-on technical yet can lead a team and manage projects. <br>Must Must Must have a strong familiarity with PCI-DSS and doesn’t necessarily have to be the newest version of 4.0. But Must Be Familiar with PCI-DSS version 3.2.1.</blockquote><p>Even the next section still sounds OK, if we consider that this is a Security architect. Although the wording “<em>any architecture</em>” raises red flags — no organization uses ANY framework.</p><blockquote>Must have knowledge of any architecture framework from SABSA to TOGAF to any other one or basic ability to put one together. Must be able to carry a conversation with the C-Suite and upper management.</blockquote><h4>The LESS sane parts of the job ad</h4><p>This is where we start to gradually depart any semblance of logic. An architect who is willing to do operations, and “maybe” do the other thing on the side, while talking to management about “Whatever”?</p><blockquote>Must be willing to put ego aside and role up their sleeves and run cable, rack, stack, and then put on a business outfit and attend a meeting to talk about a high level overview about a topic on MA or Al or Whatever. This is job is 100% remote and I was using the hands-on as an analogy of someone that’s willing to do operations and then step into an architecture role and then maybe pickup a web application security testing or API security testing project.</blockquote><h4>The test (because of course)</h4><p>Of course, what kind of a hiring process would it be if we don’t dump a test on you, even if the test has so many options one feels more confused than Nathan Fillion in <em>Castle:</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/332/0*aJN1gZpC0MaPhut7.gif" /></figure><blockquote>If you do reach out and connect with me let me know what you think of JWT in the following sense. Let us say that a home grown application is reaching out to Okta and making hundreds and hundreds of API calls. Someone on the dev team comes up with a solution to use JWT as solution to intercept all the API calls as to not over exhaust the rate limits at Okta. You are not familiar with the technology? What is it that you would do to make a decision whether to say yes go ahead or hold on let me look into it. Or perhaps you do know something about it and then say hey why not just use regular sessions and cookies and why the need to use JWT tokens. Let us say they decide to go with JWT solution, what would you think to do in this situation? These are just some of the use cases. Another use case can be, hey PCI-DSS version 4.0 is mandating a security control to be in place to protect public facing web applications. What comes to mind? Can you put together an answer on the fly, create a quick presentation and present it to management and recommend the infosec decision?</blockquote><h4>Superpowers required</h4><p>Now we come to the required qualifications. It seems they omitted just the kitchen sink.</p><blockquote>BS and/or MS in a Technical Field is preferred.<br>CISSP is required.<br>Kali Linux or equivalent is required.<br>Familiarity with OWASP is required.<br>Excellent verbal and written communication skills is required.<br>Be able to conduct web application penetration testing is required.<br>Be able to conduct API security testing is required.<br>Vulnerability Assessments and Penetration Testing are required whether it is network or application based.<br>Architect Solutions is required.<br>Research and Analyze technology services and solutions is required.<br>Troubleshoot issues is required.<br>Incident Response is required.<br>Must be familiar with PCI-DSS. <br>Must have experience with SIEMs. <br>Must have experience working with MSSPs. <br>Must have experience with Firewalls especially Palo Alto Networks Firewalls. Must have experience with EDR/MDR/XDR. <br>Must have experience working with MAP/Nessus/Qualys/Nexpose.<br>Must have experience with cloud such as Azure and/or AWS and/or CP and/or Oracle and/or Any type of cloud technologies. <br>Must have experience or at least a little of Artificial Intelligence/Al and ChatGPT or Perplexity or Claude2 or any of these ILMs.<br>Must have experience with WAs whether on-premise or cloud-based.<br>Must have experience understanding the 7 layers sometimes 8 layers of the OSI model. I know there are only 7 layers but if you’ve been in the security field for many years you know what his means.</blockquote><h4>And skills and contact to gain superpowers, for free</h4><p>It’s fine if you don’t have the kitchen sink. But if we ask for the kitchen sink you should be able to easily figure it out, on your own dime and time:</p><blockquote>I need an individual that doesn’t necessarily have this all off the top of their head but is resourceful enough to figure it out on their own. Walk into a company and figure out what’s up. What’s their tech stack. A life long learner willing to work across all security domains and can easily juggle and manage multiple tasks activities. <br>Resourceful enough to find the answers. Resourceful enough to have connections and contacts to be able to bounce ideas off of them.</blockquote><h4>Not to forget having the soft skills of a career diplomat</h4><blockquote>Must have experience working with different personalities. Must have a sense of urgency and tolerance for ambiguity. I need someone that’s capable of swimming in the deep end from day 1. Must be a mentor. Must want to share knowledge.</blockquote><h4>And leadership function without the salary</h4><blockquote>I am looking for someone who’s been in an oversight overlay role at an MSSP as a consultant and now wants to work as an individual contributor but still be part of a team and at times leading a project and at times being a contributor to the project and at times both leading and contributing to the project.</blockquote><h4>Finally, this magical one-man-army needs to be in the US</h4><blockquote>Must be a US Citizen or Green Card Holder. It is a huge plus if you’re in California but not necessary but definitely must be in the US.</blockquote><h3>It’s them, it’s not you</h3><p>The job posting above, albeit probably fake is a great indicator of the sad reality of cybersecurity job expectations.</p><p><strong><em>Let’s repeat: Everybody expects perfect security, but nobody is willing to pay for it.</em></strong></p><p>So instead of building a proper information security function with proper roles and scope to support the organization, everyone is still imagining the one-man-army DIY person that they can just get to do “Whatever” of security.</p><h4>To all our cybersecurity colleagues — <strong>Every time you see a role like this, walk away</strong>. Not only does the poster have no idea what they want, they have no idea what it really means to do the job. You are in for a world of hurt.</h4><h3>Take Control of Your Cybersecurity</h3><p>Stay informed about critical cybersecurity issues and global risks effortlessly. <a href="https://beyondmachines.net/connect/">Receive automated updates and actionable tasks directly in your inbox, ensuring you stay focused on cybersecurity without compromising your time</a>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=30927b7d4b1c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Free advice — How to sell to Cybersecurity Professionals?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@beyondmachines/free-advice-how-to-sell-to-cybersecurity-professionals-69290e41386e?source=rss-37530f476672------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/69290e41386e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[business-development]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sales]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Beyond Machines]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 30 Aug 2023 14:16:57 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-06-24T04:09:08.716Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Free advice — How to sell to Cybersecurity Professionals?</h3><p>Tl; Dr — Don’t bother. Provide value, not social engineering. Or be blocked, marked as spam and treated as a scammer.</p><p>Just like every week, this week I got a message from someone that “<em>they have been trying to call us but couldn’t reach me</em>”.</p><p><strong>Since I haven’t provided a contact number nor I know the person, it would have been a miracle if they were able to call me.</strong></p><p>It’s another of the worn out social engineering sales tactics that Cybersecurity people are trained to reject. Simply because we are trained to look for scammers.</p><figure><img alt="Flogging the dead horse of sales" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/584/1*-UowEuJDdZRfQB5ZqHtw2g.jpeg" /><figcaption>Flogging the dead horse of sales</figcaption></figure><p>This article aims to help:</p><ul><li>All cybersecurity persons to recognize the shady tactics of sales that should raise alarms.</li><li>All the sales people out there actually sell to cybersecurity people</li></ul><p>Here&#39;s a list of sales tactics that DON’T work when you apply them to cybersecurity people, with an explanation of WHY they don’t work.</p><p>If you skip to the end of the article, I’ve included one that DOES work.</p><p><em>Updates:</em></p><ul><li><em>as of 4th of September 2023, we added another example of things that don’t work — the hope of success.</em></li><li><em>as of 24th of June 2024, we added the added the most hated of things that don’t work — buying contacts from data brokers and insisting on “calls”.</em></li></ul><h3>Sh*t that DOESN’T work when selling to Cybersecurity people</h3><ol><li><strong>Buying contacts from data brokers</strong> — Cybersecurity persons fight a daily uphill battle against criminals that profit from stolen data. The list of criminals very much includes the data brokers who scrape, steal and scam their way into collecting contacts and profile of people to sell them. <strong>Any salesperson buying contacts from data brokers is supporting cybercrime by providing demand. How can we trust people and companies that are paying to criminals we are struggling to stop?</strong></li><li><strong>Loaded statements </strong>— Statements like <em>“don’t you want to be the leader in *insert whatever you assume is a customer pain point*” </em>don’t fly. Since it’s social engineering 101, a loaded statement is designed to trigger an emotional response. Which is the same trigger as phishing, so we are trained to look for emotional triggers and be very very adversarial towards them.</li><li><strong>Faking interest </strong>—<em> “I am very interested to hear what you are doing at ACME corp”. </em>No you are not. You don’t give a rat’s ass about what we do, but you are trying to appeal to a person’s ego. Which doesn’t work because you are in no way relevant for a Cybersecurity person to tell you about anything they are doing.</li><li><strong>Flattery and Compliments </strong>— <em>“I am impressed by your career/CV/effort (or anything else)”. </em>Nobody is that impressed with anyone else. It’s a simple and very transparent social engineering tactic to trigger positive response. And yes, we see it as phishing and become very adversarial.</li><li><strong>Asking to reveal the security problems of the company</strong> — Sales 101 is to learn the pains of the prospect and explain how your product fixes them. Which may seem logical, <strong>except you are a random unknown avatar on email or on social network that is asking the security person to reveal their cybersecurity concerns and problems. Which can be exploited since they are vulnerabilities and soft spots of the company. </strong>How many security persons worth their salt will spill their vulnerabilities to a random unknown avatar?</li><li><strong>Asking for real contacts </strong>— “You may not be the right person, but tell me who do I call”. Are you seriously asking the cybersecurity person to GIVE you Personally Identifiable Information of another colleague so you can then use it? Or sell it?</li><li><strong>Name dropping</strong> — “I’ve been to fishing school with your CEO” or any similar stupidity. It’s our job to call C level people at bad times with very bad news. We don’t have a problem calling them to confirm whether a shady company is mentioning them. And you are either getting blocked for lying or you are losing trust for heavy handed abuse of a C-level authority.</li><li><strong>Impersonation </strong>— Claiming to be from IT/Sales support/Whatever to be routed to the phone or given a name. Even if you manage to get the contact, the way you got it will come back internally to the cybersecurity person. And then you are marked as a liar, and your company together with you. If you lied to get a phone number, what else are you prepared to lie about: prices? delivery time? product features? everything?</li><li><strong>Fake Survey or Research</strong> — “<em>we need help with a survey or research</em>” but then bait and switch to pitch your wonderful product. You just burned the good will of a person who invested their time in trying to help you. If you have lied about this, what else are you and your company prepared to lie about?</li><li><strong>Fear-Based Tactics</strong> — “We found this terrible problem with your system, you need to speak to us/pay us”. This is usually targeted at decision makers, hoping that they will make a knee-jerk reaction to engage with you. Any cybersecurity person will challenge you on the claim by asking for responsible disclosure. If you are trying to help and have really found a terrible problem, you will provide responsible disclosure report. If you are a cyber criminal, you will provide evidence and ask for ransom. The third option is once again social engineering and you will be marked as a manipulator, together with your company.</li><li><strong>Use of trackers in emails, then being stupid enough to declare that they are surveilling us </strong>— Trackers are one of the roots of the evil we call surveillance economy. And yes sales people follow up with “We saw that you opened our email”. This is the best way for you to be marked as not trusted and have your emails and communication be either heavily scrubbed or outright blacklisted.</li><li><strong>Using fear or intimidation</strong> — “<em>terrible things are happening, you need to buy our product</em>”. It’s our job to lose sleep so other people in our company don’t lose sleep. We know the fear, we know what are the terrible things happening. And we are doing our best to minimize those terrible things. Keep your drama, because it doesn’t help you.</li><li><strong>Urgency and Scarcity</strong> — unless you are selling Unobtanium (tm), everything in the world of software is not scarce because a digital copy of something scales infinitely well. And the never-again-repeated discount (r) is going to happen again at the end of next quarter. So don’t bother.</li><li><strong>High-Pressure Tactics — </strong>Aggressive and relentless persuasion is another method of social engineering. But there is an easier way to manage this tactic — cybersecurity people are going to mark you as a spammer, request that you are blocked on all electronic channels. This is a wonderful way to alleviate the pressure you think is helping you.</li><li><strong>Information Asymmetry</strong> — Vague and buzzword loaded product description, and avoiding to provide pricing. In cybersecurity we live in the world of information asymmetry and unknown unknowns. We have to make a lot of decisions from incomplete data and research. That doesn’t mean that we like it — especially from someone that claims they want to be our partners. Once again — if you are shady about your product and pricing, what else are you shady about? This doesn’t help you in vendor evaluations as well.</li><li><strong>Insisting on calls</strong> — For whatever reason, the sales person demands to “jump on a call”. Arguments for the call vary from “we need to explain our complex portfolio” to the simplest “but it’s only 30 minutes, let’s talk”. <strong>Unlike salespeople, we are not paid to full a quota of meetings and calls. One can do a material amount of work in 30 minutes, or just have unbroken work time.</strong></li><li><strong>Selling the hope of success</strong> —Hinting at the chance for improvement or success is <strong><em>Internet Guru </em></strong>(tm) 101, also known as scammers. Here’s an example that commits to meetings, but sells the hope of reducing incidents:</li></ol><blockquote>Are you researching how to reduce number of incidents in your company? My team works with dozens of companies to help improve security, and we guarantee our clients 20+ meetings in three months to get the knowledge of top cybersecurity leaders or we work for free.</blockquote><p>Don’t be the Internet Guru. The scammer space is crowded and you are not the best.</p><h3>Sh*t that DOES work when selling to Cybersecurity people</h3><p><strong>Transparency and ability to self evaluate — </strong>Nobody in cybersecurity has enough time to do their work, let alone to join and listen to endless pitches and promises. We need to be able to identify a match of your product to our pain point, and to be able to trust the product and vendor as a partner.</p><p>So provide us with the mechanism to self-register, to run our learning process, to evaluate and consider. Offer support, but not overbearing pushing.</p><p>We understand that this is contrary to your targets and job description. But flogging the dead horse of sales doesn’t work. Especially with people that are trained to see your social engineering sales tactics as direct attacks.</p><h3>Take Control of Your Cybersecurity</h3><p>Stay informed about critical cybersecurity issues and global risks effortlessly. <a href="https://beyondmachines.net/connect/">Receive automated updates and actionable tasks directly in your inbox, ensuring you stay focused on cybersecurity without compromising your time</a>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=69290e41386e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
    </channel>
</rss>