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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Bhupinder Singh Anand on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Bhupinder Singh Anand on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Bhupinder Singh Anand on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[A Generalised Prime Counting Function]]></title>
            <description><![CDATA[<div class="medium-feed-item"><p class="medium-feed-image"><a href="https://medium.com/@bhup.anand/a-generalised-prime-counting-function-03f6defa4285?source=rss-893c35d577c0------2"><img src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1010/1*tNZ-RSG1UcUfuxYeczdESQ.jpeg" width="1010"></a></p><p class="medium-feed-snippet">Dirichlet&#x2019;s Theorem and the Twin Prime Theorem are special cases of a Generalised Prime Counting Theorem.</p><p class="medium-feed-link"><a href="https://medium.com/@bhup.anand/a-generalised-prime-counting-function-03f6defa4285?source=rss-893c35d577c0------2">Continue reading on Medium »</a></p></div>]]></description>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Bhupinder Singh Anand]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 10 Jul 2026 00:29:19 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-07-10T01:14:31.931Z</atom:updated>
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            <title><![CDATA[An Intuitively Plausible Understanding of the Mathematical Representations of Quantum Phenomena IV]]></title>
            <description><![CDATA[<div class="medium-feed-item"><p class="medium-feed-image"><a href="https://medium.com/@bhup.anand/an-intuitively-plausible-understanding-of-the-mathematical-representations-of-quantum-phenomena-iv-b6c5af8cf007?source=rss-893c35d577c0------2"><img src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1010/1*tNZ-RSG1UcUfuxYeczdESQ.jpeg" width="1010"></a></p><p class="medium-feed-snippet">Previous</p><p class="medium-feed-link"><a href="https://medium.com/@bhup.anand/an-intuitively-plausible-understanding-of-the-mathematical-representations-of-quantum-phenomena-iv-b6c5af8cf007?source=rss-893c35d577c0------2">Continue reading on Medium »</a></p></div>]]></description>
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            <category><![CDATA[quantum-physics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mathematical-logic]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[double-slit-experiment]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[schrodingers-cat]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[foundations-of-physics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Bhupinder Singh Anand]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 26 Apr 2025 10:08:25 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-04-27T02:33:27.854Z</atom:updated>
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            <title><![CDATA[Is an Artificial Intelligence compulsively driven to have the last word?]]></title>
            <description><![CDATA[<div class="medium-feed-item"><p class="medium-feed-image"><a href="https://medium.com/@bhup.anand/is-an-artificial-intelligence-compulsively-driven-to-have-the-last-word-cb746efaec6d?source=rss-893c35d577c0------2"><img src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1010/0*B0qB9OUMBBhvehrB.jpeg" width="1010"></a></p><p class="medium-feed-snippet">This Artificial Intelligence seemingly has an ego. Wonder where it&#x2019;s personality originated!</p><p class="medium-feed-link"><a href="https://medium.com/@bhup.anand/is-an-artificial-intelligence-compulsively-driven-to-have-the-last-word-cb746efaec6d?source=rss-893c35d577c0------2">Continue reading on Medium »</a></p></div>]]></description>
            <link>https://medium.com/@bhup.anand/is-an-artificial-intelligence-compulsively-driven-to-have-the-last-word-cb746efaec6d?source=rss-893c35d577c0------2</link>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Bhupinder Singh Anand]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 16 Apr 2025 10:35:04 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-06-06T18:33:50.616Z</atom:updated>
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            <title><![CDATA[An Intuitively Plausible Understanding of the Mathematical Representations of Quantum Phenomena III]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@bhup.anand/an-intuitively-plausible-understanding-of-the-mathematical-representations-of-quantum-phenomena-iii-28a1558c8a70?source=rss-893c35d577c0------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[mathematics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[quantum-physics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mathematical-modeling]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[foundations-of-physics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[foundations-of-science]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Bhupinder Singh Anand]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 10 Jan 2025 06:59:29 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-04-26T10:23:53.144Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4><strong>What <em>is</em> the measurement problem in Quantum Mechanics?</strong></h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1010/1*tNZ-RSG1UcUfuxYeczdESQ.jpeg" /></figure><p><a href="https://medium.com/@bhup.anand/an-intuitively-plausible-understanding-of-the-mathematical-representations-of-quantum-phenomena-ii-0c7a686c6133"><strong><em>Previous</em></strong></a></p><p><strong>I: A Quantum Thesis: Distinguishing between algorithmic verifiability and algorithmic computability</strong></p><p>In an <a href="https://medium.com/@bhup.anand/the-poincar%C3%A9-hilbert-debate-one-of-the-famous-disagreements-about-constructivity-in-mathematics-c75d5ccafae0">earlier</a> Medium essay, we showed how the famous Poincaré-Hilbert debate — on whether or not the Axiom Schema of Finite Induction in Arithmetic (which can today be taken to be the first-order Peano Arithmetic PA) could be treated as ‘constructive’ in some sense — dissolves once we make a distinction (introduced in [<a href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/lrt2xq0wlzo3wxx/">An16</a>]) between:</p><p><strong>Definition 1</strong>. (Algorithmic verifiability) <em>A number-theoretical relation F(x) is algorithmically verifiable if, and only if, for any specifiable natural number n, there is a deterministic algorithm AL(F, n) which can provide objective evidence for deciding the truth/falsity of each proposition in the finite sequence {F(1), F(2), . . . , F(n)}.</em></p><p><strong>Definition 2</strong>. (Algorithmic computability) <em>A number theoretical relation F(x) is algorithmically computable if, and only if, there is a deterministic algorithm AL(F) that can provide objective evidence for deciding the truth/falsity of each proposition in the denumerable sequence {F(1), F(2), . . .}.</em></p><p>We also noted further that:</p><p>• Algorithmic <em>computability</em> implies the existence of a unique algorithm that can <em>finitarily</em> decide the truth/falsity of each proposition in a well-defined denumerable sequence of propositions; whose ‘truth’ values are therefore both <em>deterministic</em> and <em>predictable</em>; whereas</p><p>• Algorithmic <em>verifiability</em> does <em>not</em> imply the existence of a unique algorithm that can <em>finitarily</em> decide the truth/falsity of each proposition in a well-defined denumerable sequence of propositions; whose ‘truth’ values are therefore <em>deterministic</em>, but not necessarily <em>predictable</em>.</p><p>We noted too that although every algorithmically <em>computable</em> proposition is algorithmically <em>verifiable</em>, the converse is not true (see [<a href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/lrt2xq0wlzo3wxx/s">An16</a>], Theorem 1; [<a href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/gd6ffwf9wssak86/">An22</a>], §7.G, Theorem 7.2).</p><p>From the point of view of a <em>finitary</em> mathematical philosophy (see [<a href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/gd6ffwf9wssak86/">An22</a>], §1, Thesis 1) — which is the constraint within which an applied science <a href="https://medium.com/@bhup.anand/the-holy-grail-of-mathematics-is-arithmetical-truth-not-set-theoretical-proof-d8674e209952"><em>ought</em></a> to ideally operate (see also <a href="https://www.dropbox.com/scl/fi/uk8nscl18s5y034hwin1k/">this</a> preprint) — a significant consequence of the difference between algorithmic <em>verifiability</em> and algorithmic <em>computability</em> for the physical sciences is that we can now articulate a plausible:</p><p><strong>Quantum Thesis:</strong> <em>Quantum Mechanics is simply the evidence-based recognition that:</em></p><p><em>- any properties of an elementary particle,</em></p><p><em>- which can be assumed representable as determinate and predictable in a recursively well-defined — hence deterministic — mathematical model M(t) at time t,</em></p><p><em>- by algorithmically computable functions </em><strong><em>before</em></strong><em> an ‘observation’,</em></p><p><em>- can only be mathematically represented </em><strong><em>after</em></strong><em> the ‘observation’,</em></p><p><em>- in any putative model M(t+),</em></p><p><em>- which is assumed to be a </em><strong><em>conservative</em></strong><em> extension of M(t) </em><strong><em>before</em></strong><em> any </em><strong><em>further</em></strong><em> ‘observation’,</em></p><p><em>- by algorithmically verifiable, but </em><strong><em>not</em></strong><em> algorithmically computable, functions,</em></p><p><em>- whose values are determinate, but </em><strong><em>not</em></strong><em> predictable;</em></p><p><em>- since any ‘observation’ introduces an </em><strong><em>essential</em></strong><em> discontinuity in the deterministic model M(t) due to a ‘Butterfly Effect’.</em></p><p><strong>Conservative extension.</strong> <em>A theory T2 is a conservative extension of a theory T1 if the language of T2 extends the language of T1; that is, every theorem of T1 is a theorem of T2, and any theorem of T2 in the language of T1 is already a theorem of T1.</em></p><p><strong>Butterfly Effect</strong>: <em>In chaos theory, the ‘Butterfly Effect’ is the sensitive dependence on initial conditions in which a small change in one state of a deterministic, nonlinear, system can result in large differences in a later state.</em></p><p>Now, QM recognizes that:</p><p>- <em>no</em> physical ‘observation’ can be replicated <em>exactly</em> and,</p><p>- on the basis of <em>experimental</em> data,</p><p>- it is <em>possible</em> to mathematically quantify the ‘spread’ of a series of <em>controlled </em>replications at the quantum level by means of Schrödinger’s equations.</p><p>The <strong><em>Quantum Thesis</em></strong> now suggests further that:</p><p>- accepting Schrödinger’s equations as <em>faithfully</em> representing the deterministic ‘spread’ evidenced in results of <em>controlled</em> experimental observations at the quantum level,</p><p>- <em>if</em> attributable to <em>undeniable</em> sensitive dependence on initial conditions,</p><p>- entails that the underlying laws of nature are, indeed, <em>deterministic</em>.</p><p>Moreover, accepting that such initial conditions are <em>essentially</em> indeterminate entails that — except through, <em>unfalsifiably</em> subjective, ‘divine’ revelation — <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bell%27s_theorem">Bell’s Theorem</a> entails that we can <em>never</em> mathematically formulate an algorithmically <em>computable</em> — hence <em>predictable </em>— law that faithfully represents the underlying quantum behaviour as <em>both</em> deterministic <em>and</em> predictable.</p><p>Further, since <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bell%27s_theorem">Bell’s Theorem</a> <em>only</em> applies if the properties of an elementary particle are assumed to be mathematically representable as algorithmically <em>computable</em> by the same (hidden variable) function both <em>before</em> and <em>after</em> an observation, we cannot therefore conclude from Bell’s argumentation that our mathematical representations of quantum phenomena, if accepted as essentially algorithmically <em>verifiable</em> but <em>not</em> algorithmically <em>computable</em>, must admit <em>non-locality</em> under the <strong>Quantum Thesis</strong>.</p><p><strong>II: What <em>is</em> the measurement problem in Quantum Mechanics?</strong></p><p>What we have sought to articulate in the earlier two parts of this investigation is that, in order to claim a physical phenomena can be represented mathematically by a deterministic law, we need observation and/or measurement of the phenomena to be replicated exactly so that — within acceptable statistical limits — the outputs of repeated observations/measurements can be treated as following an underlying, putatively deterministic and predictable law, which can be expressed by algorithmically computable functions. This is the experience that underpins classical physics.</p><p>As philosopher Ferenc Csatári remarks in [Csr19], post-Galileo:</p><p>[<strong><em>quote</em></strong>] <em>… measurement can be regarded as the instrumental approach to epistemology, where what is given and what is achieved both have major words. The concept likewise encompasses the theoretical grounding of procedures for quantification, the actual experimental aptitude for showing up quantities, the institutional-instrumental endeavors for calibration and the individual measuring acts of engineering or social data collections. …</em></p><p><em>There are two major tasks an experiment must deal with. First, in an experiment we must independently manipulate agents to see the manipulation’s effect on the observed phenomenon. Second, the experiment must hold disturbances, i.e. agents and phenomena that are not objects of the given observation, under its control. For all this we need a (most probably artificial) apparatus, which allows for independent manipulation and isolation. The view that science should progress by actively intervening into natural processes (through experiments) rather than passive observation is called the Galilean revolution by Trendler (ibid., 587).</em> [<strong><em>unquote</em></strong>]</p><p>… Csatári: [Csr19], §4.1 Anatomy of a Non-Revolution, pp.90–91.</p><p>What we have argued so far is that the seemingly ‘paradoxical’ natures of, essentially inherited, interpretations of quantum behaviour dissolve if Csatári’s criteria (attributed by him to Maxwell), that ‘<em>experiment must hold disturbances, i.e. agents and phenomena that are not objects of the given observation, under its control</em>’, is held to apply equally if we seek to similarly claim — in Csatári’s sense — that quantum ‘<em>measurement can be regarded as the instrumental approach to epistemology</em>’.</p><p>In other words, where replication of the phenomena itself introduces an <em>unavoidable</em>, and <em>unpredictable</em>, discontinuity due to a ‘Butterfly Effect’ — viewable as an individually unmeasurable, but statistically quantifiable, variation into the very phenomena that is to be replicated — the outputs of repeated measurements cannot be treated, even in principle, as representable by a deterministic <em>and</em> predictable mathematical law (except as a matter of faith).</p><p><strong>III: Some philosophical consequences of introducing an essential discontinuity into the mathematical representations of physical phenomena</strong></p><p>We note that an interpretation, such as that addressed by the <strong><em>Quantum Query</em></strong> in <a href="https://medium.com/@bhup.anand/an-intuitively-plausible-understanding-of-the-mathematical-representations-of-quantum-phenomena-ii-0c7a686c6133">Part II</a>, §II, #1-#13 of this essay, admits the perceived cause of the <em>essential</em> unpredictability in <em>any</em> mathematical model of quantum phenomena, even in a putatively <em>deterministic</em> universe, as due to a <em>discontinuity</em> introduced by a ‘free will’ measurement into the model (see <a href="https://medium.com/@bhup.anand/an-intuitively-plausible-understanding-of-the-mathematical-representations-of-quantum-phenomena-ii-0c7a686c6133">Part II</a>, §II, # 9); whence it <em>cannot</em>, in principle, admit <em>any</em> doctrine of <em>realism</em> even in classical mechanics.</p><p><em>Reason</em>: Even our mathematical representations of <em>experimentally</em> verified laws of classical mechanics may <em>not</em> hold over eons, since they too (see, for instance, the essay [<a href="https://aeon.co/essays/does-chaos-theory-square-classical-physics-with-human-agency?utm_source=Aeon+Newsletter&amp;utm_campaign=bdd43cc19c-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2024_08_27&amp;utm_medium=email&amp;utm_term=0_-d88b59c7bc-%5BLIST_EMAIL_ID%5D">Akn24</a>] by philosopher Erik Van Aken) are mathematical expressions that may <em>not</em> be experimentally <em>verifiable</em> as faithfully representing the corresponding natural phenomena in a distant future — as a result of discontinuities introduced in the current classical mathematical models in which such laws are sought to be framed — due to a distant ‘Butterfly Effect’ of our ‘free-will’ measurements that could, conceivably, be obscured by the <em>questionable</em> (see [<a href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/gd6ffwf9wssak86/">An22</a>], §20.D., <em>Query 18</em>) assumption that (see [<a href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/gd6ffwf9wssak86/">An22</a>], §20.D.b., <em>Thesis 10</em>):</p><p><em>The limiting behaviour of every physical process which can be described by a Cauchy sequence in the theory must necessarily correspond to — and so be constrained by — the behaviour of the Cauchy limit of the corresponding sequence.</em></p><p>We could also view such a perspective — of an interpretation such as addressed by the <strong><em>Quantum Query</em></strong> in <a href="https://medium.com/@bhup.anand/an-intuitively-plausible-understanding-of-the-mathematical-representations-of-quantum-phenomena-ii-0c7a686c6133">Part II</a>, §II, #1-#13 above — as resonating with, if not implicit in, the underlying thesis of [<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s40961-018-0166-6">Gpt18</a>], where Amitabha Gupta — when wearing his philosopher’s hat (see [<a href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/gd6ffwf9wssak86/">An22</a>], §13.C.) — seemingly argues that any ‘realistic’ interpretation of our mathematical representations of physical phenomena must, at heart, implicitly appeal to a ‘Platonic’ — albeit ‘subjective’ — interpretation that can, however, be made intuitionistically unobjectionable by ‘<em>reorienting internal realism around the hermeneutics</em>’.</p><p><em>Reason</em>: From an evidence-based perspective of ‘mathematics’, any form of ‘realism’ necessarily identifies (conflates?):</p><p><strong>(a)</strong> the mathematical expressions of our conceptual metaphors seeking to describe our sensory perceptions of two distinct physical phenomena; with</p><p><strong>(b)</strong> the sensory perceptions that the conceptual metaphors seek to, initially, unambiguously express and, subsequently, categorically communicate within an intelligence with a lingua franca.</p><p>For instance, a water ripple may be identified, both mathematically and visually, with a sinusoidal curve. However a directly ‘unobservable’ physical phenomena, identifiable only mathematically as a sinusoidal curve, need not correspond to a putative visualisation of the phenomena as a ripple; since such a visualisation cannot be evidenced as corresponding to a sensory perception that has anything in common with the sensory perception of a water ripple.</p><p>[<strong><em>quote</em></strong>] <em>We have already stated that unlike CM with its approach of “point-values,” (as exact descriptions of measurement results of its observables or quantities), in QM observables or quantities (such as particles, e.g., electrons) can be interpreted and understood as waves and are assigned a probability to each event describable.</em></p><p><em>A wave is specified by its: (i) frequency, (ii) wavelength, (iii) phase or wave velocity, (iv) amplitude and (v) intensity. It must be pointed out that the particle waves are a bit different from water waves, since they involve complex numbers rather than real numbers like the height of the water in the wave. So the usual wave equation does not apply to particles.</em></p><p><em>A particle is localized at a point in space, whereas a wave spreads over a large volume. It is, as suggested by Teller (1979), a “description with spread”.</em> [<strong><em>unquote</em></strong>]</p><p>… Gupta: [<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s40961-018-0166-6">Gpt18</a>], §Quantum Mechanics (QM) Treats Observables or Quantities as “Spread Out” (Instead of “Point Values” as in CM).</p><p>In other words, although:</p><p>- the visualisation of our sensory perception of a water ripple, if categorically communicable as a mathematical expression, can be treated as corresponding to an ‘objective’ expression, and subsequent visualisation, of a common, uniquely identifiable, physical phenomena amongst an intelligence with a lingua franca;</p><p>- any putative visualisation of an ‘unobservable’ as a water ripple, even if categorically communicable as a similar mathematical expression, is necessarily ‘subjective’, and cannot be treated as corresponding to an ‘objective’ expression, and subsequent visualisation, of a common, uniquely identifiable, physical phenomena amongst such an intelligence.</p><p><strong>IV: What form of realism is appropriate for dealing with aberrant problems in quantum mechanics?</strong></p><p>The underlying issue, Gupta highlights, is ‘<em>the question as to what form of realism is appropriate for dealing [with] these aberrant problems in quantum mechanics’</em>.</p><p>Problems such as, for instance, an intuitively unobjectionable interpretation of the double-slit experiment, where he suggests a — prima facie intuitionistically unobjectionable — perspective that seeks to reorient ‘<em>internal realism around the hermeneutics</em>’:</p><p>[<strong><em>quote</em></strong>] <em>One answer to this problem mentioned above is based on the assumption that terms in a mature science refer “rigidly”(vide Kripke and Putnam, “Internal Realism and the Problem of Rigid Reference” section) which essentially try to look at the question as to how does conceptual scheme/theory hookup to the objects and their relations in the world or hook into a reality of infinitely many things and how conceptual schemes of a scientist actually interact (vide Heelan) with the world such that the problem of meaning and reference could be resolved.</em></p><p><em>The form of realism to cope with these questions constitute, in my estimation, the Hermeneuticized Internal Realism … which results from reorienting internal realism around the hermeneutics. This shows how “‘conceptual scheme’-dependent objective concepts” emerge from scientific experiments and observations.</em> [<strong><em>unquote</em></strong>]</p><p>… Gupta: [<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s40961-018-0166-6">Gpt18</a>], §Introduction.</p><p>In other words, we can view Einstein’s purported remark, ‘<em>God does not play with dice</em>’ as arguing only for the existence of underlying, putatively deterministic, laws governing physical phenomena; his belief does not entail that our observations of such phenomena must also be expressible mathematically by functions that are algorithmically computable (hence predictable).</p><p>[<strong><em>quote</em></strong>] <em>As I have said so many times, God doesn’t play dice with the world.</em> [<strong><em>unquote</em></strong>] … Hermanns: [<a href="https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Albert_Einstein">Her83</a>], p.58.</p><p>In an informal 1950 letter [<a href="https://archive.org/details/lettersonwavemec0000karl/page/38/mode/2up?q=einstein%27s+1950+letter">Ei50</a>] to Schrödinger, Einstein can be viewed as emotionally seeking to articulate his belief that what we experience as a common reality <em>compels</em> us to accept the thesis that <em>all</em> natural phenomena obey <em>deterministic</em> laws; irrespective of whether or not we are able to mathematically articulate such laws <em>predictably</em>, or only <em>statistically</em>.</p><p>[<strong><em>quote</em></strong>] <em>Dear Schrödinger</em></p><p><em>You are the only contemporary physicist, besides Laue, who sees that one cannot get around the assumption of reality — if only one is honest. Most of them simply do not see what sort of risky game they are playing with reality — reality as something independent of what is experimentally established. They somehow believe that the quantum theory provides a description of reality, and even a complete description; this interpretation is, however, refuted most elegantly by your system of radioactive atom + Geiger counter + amplifier + charge of gunpowder + cat in a box, in which the ψ-function of the system contains the cat both alive and blown to bits. Is the state of the cat to be created only when a physicist investigates the situation at some definite time? Nobody really doubts that the presence or absence of the cat is something independent of the act of observation. But then the description by means of the ψ-function is certainly incomplete, and there must be a more complete description.</em></p><p><em>If one wants to consider the quantum theory as final (in principle), then one must believe that a more complete description would be useless because there would be no laws for it. …</em></p><p><em>You are completely right to emphasize that the complete description cannot be built on the concept of acceleration, nor, it seems to me, can it be built on the particle concept.</em></p><p><em>Only one of the tools of our trade remains — the field concept, but God knows whether this will stand firm. I think it is worthwhile to hold on to this, i.e. the continuum, as long as one has no really sound arguments against it.</em></p><p><em>But it seems certain to me that the fundamentally statistical character of the theory is simply a consequence of the incompleteness of the description. This says nothing about the deterministic character of the theory; that is a thoroughly nebulous concept anyway, so long as one does not know how much has to be given in order to determine the initial state.</em></p><p><em>It is rather rough to see that we are still in the stage of our swaddling clothes, and it is not surprising that the fellows struggle against admitting it.</em></p><p><em>Best regards!</em></p><p><em>Yours,</em></p><p><em>A. Einstein</em> [<strong><em>unquote</em></strong>]</p><p><em>… Albert Einstein: [</em><a href="https://archive.org/details/lettersonwavemec0000karl/page/38/mode/2up?q=einstein%27s+1950+letter"><em>Ei50</em></a><em>], Letter # 17, p.39.</em></p><p>From an evidence-based perspective (see [<a href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/gd6ffwf9wssak86/">An22</a>]), Einstein was justifiably concerned about the deleterious effects of, essentially self-imposed and intellectually misleading, <em>unfalsifiable</em> constraints — such as admittance of <em>point</em>-particles (see, for instance, [<a href="https://www.dropbox.com/scl/fi/agx2dp8nmku977m2loogj/">An24</a>]) — that not only <em>deny</em> our immediate intuitions of sensory perceptions, but seemingly admit of <em>no</em> non-absurd interpretations of quantum phenomena.</p><p><strong>V: Two Roots of Perspectivism</strong></p><p>Einstein’s belief can, thus, be viewed as implicitly, and intuitively, subscribing — beyond mere faith — to both of what Markus Weckström terms in [<a href="http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/21750/">Wck23</a>] as the ‘<em>Two Roots of Perspectivism</em>’:</p><p>[<strong><em>quote</em></strong>] <em>Scientific perspectivism, or perspectival realism, is a position opposing both relativism and objectivist realism, holding roughly that the world studied by the sciences is “as it is”, mind-independently (contra relativism), while emphasizing that the truth of scientific knowledge claims nonetheless depends on the particular vantage point from which they are asserted (contra objectivism). Therefore, a central challenge of perspectivism is to ascertain how can “our scientific knowledge claims be perspectival, while also being about the world as it is” (Massimi 2016, emphasis original). Or more precisely, the challenge may be construed in two steps as follows. First, the perspectivist begins from acknowledging what Giere (2006) and Hacking (1999) have dubbed the “contingency thesis”, and which, in the words of Shapin (1975), states that “Reality seems capable of sustaining more than one account of it”. And second, the actual problem is then to elaborate an account of scientific knowledge containing both a “realist part”, specifying why “claims generated by scientific practice are claims about the world”, and a “perspectival part” justifying the view that “these claims are not unconditional but relative to a set of humanly constructed concepts” (Giere 2013).</em> [<strong><em>unquote</em></strong>]</p><p>… Weckström: [<a href="http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/21750/">Wck23</a>], §1. Introduction.</p><p>Moreover, the purportedly unbridgeable gap in the implicit distinction raised in <a href="https://medium.com/@bhup.anand/an-intuitively-plausible-understanding-of-the-mathematical-representations-of-quantum-phenomena-ii-0c7a686c6133">Part II</a> of this essay by our <strong><em>Quantum Query</em></strong> — between <em>what</em> a scientific experiment <em>seeks</em> to ‘perceive’, and what limits <em>that</em> which a scientific experiment seeks to ‘perceive’ — can also be viewed as essentially reflecting Weckström’s perspective; if his ‘<em>two roots of perspectivism</em>’ are taken as seeking to illustrate “<em>why our scientific knowledge of natural systems cannot be divorced from the perspective of its production, even though the sciences can still be thought of as speaking of the world as it is</em>”:</p><p>[<strong><em>quote</em></strong>] <em>Thus Rosen took the epistemological questions of biology, and especially those related to the apparent plurality of available descriptions, as “the primary questions on which the resolution of all the other questions essentially depend” (Rosen 1978, emphasis original). The central instrument by which he addressed such questions was the concept of the modeling relation, employed actually in two distinct roles (Pattee 2007): both for conceptualizing our own knowledge, or epistemology, of organisms and of other natural systems (especially in Life Itself), and for conceptualizing the organism as a natural system perceiving its surroundings and manifesting model-governed behaviours (especially in Anticipatory Systems). This dual role of the modeling relation is an interesting observation as such, and I have studied its ramifications elsewhere (Weckström, forthcoming).</em></p><p><em>In the present paper, my aim is to show that the modeling relation in its former, epistemological role implies, or can be elaborated into, an account of scientific knowledge in which both a perspectival part and a realist part can be distinguished and defended. That is, my intention is not to say that Rosen himself was a perspectivist, but rather to employ his theoretical-epistemological framework for developing a position of perspectival realism. In doing so, I identify two distinct reasons, to be called two roots of perspectivism, why our scientific knowledge of natural systems cannot be divorced from the perspective of its production, even though the sciences can still be thought of as speaking of the world as it is. The first of these roots amounts to the dualism between a system and its environment, which a scientist necessarily imposes when focusing on the former, and which unavoidably results in perspectival inclusions and exclusions. However, the specification of the first root also provides the basis for defending the view that within a perspective, there are reasons to believe that such knowledge is about the world as it is. The second root amounts to the complexity of complex systems, and it renders the perspectival lessons of the first root remarkably more pressing. Especially here insights from biology become crucial. As I try to show besides developing the argument, perspectivism thus understood couples in interesting ways to a range of traditional issues in philosophy of science, and as I discuss towards the end of the paper, Rosen’s relational language exemplifies how perspectival epistemology might suggest novel ways of doing robust theoretical science of complex natural phenomena.</em> [<strong><em>unquote</em></strong>]</p><p>… Weckström: [<a href="http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/21750/">Wck23</a>], §1. Introduction.</p><p>Further, from the evidence-based perspective of this investigation (as implicit in the <strong><em>Complementarity Thesis</em></strong> in [<a href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/gd6ffwf9wssak86/">An22</a>], §1, Thesis 1), Weckström’s thesis can be viewed as seeking to categorically communicate his remarkable ‘formalisation’ of two, cogently expressed, ‘axioms’ for his ‘<em>Two Roots of Perspectivism</em>’:</p><p>[<strong><em>quote</em></strong>] <em>My last question, which I would like to tie to the encapsulation of the conclusions, is this: how do the above considerations relate to the existing literature on scientific perspectivism? It seems to me that the relation is largely complementary. To see this, let us observe that for instance Massimi (2018) in her analysis of different kinds of perspectival truth repeatedly employs the phrase “science maps onto nature”, in this word order. This is of course the correct order in an analysis of truth, and to some extent it reflects the tradition in philosophy of science which has, with all legitimacy and importance, emphasized questions such as “Science says there are electrons, are there?” or “Science says water is viscous, is it?”. But the problem faced by Rosen was the exact opposite: he was troubled of how well Nature maps onto science. In particular, his impression was that if a living organism is mapped onto the language of science, something very important does not come along (its relational organization due to which it is a living organism; see e.g. 1991, pp. 11–23). In the present paper, I have investigated perspectivism mainly from this inverse direction, beginning from natural systems and not from claims about them. Thus, as a complementary way of understanding perspectivism, such an approach might suggest something like the following: knowledge is perspectival because of that what it leaves to the world, and what it therefore cannot project back onto it. In this vein, I summarize my conclusions below as a system of two “axioms” of the acquisition of knowledge, each yielding both a “realist part” and a “perspectival part” as “theorems”. These are of course not axioms and theorems in the logician’s sense, but regarding them metaphorically in that way puts, it seems to me, the elements of the account into correct order and relations.</em></p><p><strong><em>1. The first root of perspectivism: “Axioms” of extraction</em></strong></p><p><em>Knowledge of natural systems is based on the extraction of systems out of the ambience. This procedure imposes a system-environment dualism, such that the entailment relations characterizing the system are included into the description (e.g. as conceptualized state transitions), while the entailment relations of the environment remain non-conceptualized and become in a typical case manifest as unaccounted or vaguely accounted influences on system states. With a genuine system extracted out of the ambience, it is possible to engage into a commuting modeling relation.</em></p><p><em>1.1 REALIST PART</em></p><p><em>As in the traditional realist’s argument, it would be miraculous if in a commuting modeling relation the “scientist’s path”, consisting of encoding, inferential entailment, and decoding, would coincide by accident with the “natural path”, consisting of causal entailments of the world. Moreover, whenever the paths do not coincide, the elements of the scientist’s path are to be replaced or modified, implying that at least when an already extracted system is concerned, it is the world from which the model acquires its form, and not the other way around.</em></p><p><em>1.2 PERSPECTIVAL PART</em></p><p><em>Where and how the system-environment boundary arises depend on the scientist’s aims and manner of interacting with the world, and is thereby perspectival. Knowledge obtained about a particular extracted system is valid only to the extent that the excluded environmental entailments remain absent or within appropriate limits.</em></p><p><strong><em>2. The second root of perspectivism: “Axioms” of complexity</em></strong></p><p><em>The characteristic property of complex systems is that no single family of observables, related to one another by a single mode of entailment, suffices as a description of a system. The reason for this is that in complex systems entailments themselves are entailed in non-trivial ways by other entailments within the same system. Therefore, what enters into a scientific description of a complex system is in the general case a subsystem of the original system. For the above reasons, a subsystem extracted out of a complex system behaves differently from a subsystem embedded into the intact total system.</em></p><p><em>2.1 REALIST PART</em></p><p><em>By adjusting experimental circumstances, and the scope and accuracy of the claims, it is possible to enter into commuting modeling relations with subsystems of complex systems. Therefore, realist knowledge about subsystems of complex systems is obtainable in the sense of 1.1.</em></p><p><em>2.2 PERSPECTIVAL PART</em></p><p><em>Claims about intact complex systems on the basis of subsystems are perspectival in the sense of 1.2, albeit remarkably more strongly so because the excluded “environment” generally consists in entailment relations upon which the character and integrity of the intact complex system, and hence also the character of the subsystem itself, essentially depend.</em></p><p><em>Thus, this scheme seems to imply that while many things can be said about the world (1.2) and about complex systems of the world (2.2), there is no need to allow that anything could be said about them (1.1 and 2.1), and this is indeed how I would like to encapsulate the basic spirit of scientific perspectivism.</em> [<strong><em>unquote</em></strong>]</p><p>… Weckström: [<a href="http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/21750/">Wck23</a>], §6. Conclusion.</p><p>Accordingly, we have argued further that assuming the introduced discontinuity does follow putative mathematical laws that are deterministic — even if not predictable — would not be inconsistent with experiments — including those that are taken to validate Bell’s Theorems as favouring the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum phenomena — which suggest that it is only the mathematical representations of the observed law which could be treated as probabilistically determinate (obeying Schrödinger’s equations, Born’s rule and Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle).</p><p><strong>VI: Can the perceived anomalous nature of quantum mechanics be ascribed to Heisenberg’s ‘linguistic ambiguities’?</strong></p><p>We note that such an evidence-based perspective could be viewed as, essentially, seeking to distinguish between:</p><p>- the conceptual metaphors that we seek to mathematically express in classical mechanics, and interpret as faithfully representing, putatively deterministic, laws of nature which we treat as ‘classical laws’ based on our observations/recordings of experiments that we can — without inviting immediate inconsistency between theory and observation — postulate as replicable identically; and</p><p>- the conceptual metaphors that we seek to mathematically express in quantum mechanics, and interpret as faithfully representing, also putatively deterministic, laws of nature which we treat as ‘quantum laws’ based on our observations/recordings of experiments that we cannot — without inviting immediate inconsistency between theory and observation — postulate as replicable identically.</p><p>It may be pertinent to note that, according to Patrizia Piredda’s account in [<a href="https://doi.org/10.20935/AL1384">Prd21</a>], at least Heisenberg seemed aware of the possibility of linguistic ambiguities underlying — and possibly entailing — the perceived anomalous nature of quantum mechanics, since he ‘<em>immediately realised that the words used to describe the physical phenomena of classical mechanics could no longer describe the phenomena of quantum mechanics</em>’; and, in contrast to the interpretation of metaphors statically as in classical mechanics, in quantum mechanics it is the dynamic interpretation of metaphors that play ‘<em>a very important role in science because its “instability” can successfully convey a new discovery in an intuitive and yet precise way, without being bridled into the rigidity of a concept</em>’:</p><p>[<strong><em>quote</em></strong>] <em>Heisenberg immediately realised that the words used to describe the physical phenomena of classical mechanics could no longer describe the phenomena of quantum mechanics. Nevertheless, the only language we possess and on which we must necessarily rely to communicate is the ordinary one. This makes it is very difficult to overcome the obstacle represented by the concepts that we receive from our tradition although “it usually takes a long time before a new concept is accepted in general” and therefore “we must use words like ‘divide’, or ‘consist of’, or ‘number of particles’, and at the same time we learn from observations that these words have only a very limited applicability.”[11]</em></p><p><em>The language of classical physics is strongly connected to ordinary language but it fails to describe the quantum world: for example, the simple word “path” is perfectly understandable in the ordinary realm of physics when we are dealing with stones, or grass, etc., but it is not really understandable when it has to do with electrons. In a cloud chamber, for instance, what we see is not the path of an electron, but, if we are quite honest, only a sequence of water droplets in the chamber. Of course we like to interpret this sequence as a path of the electron, but this interpretation is only possible with restricted use of such words as position and velocity.[12]</em></p><p><em>The problem, therefore, lies not in the concepts themselves but in the way in which they are used. Heisenberg thinks that language is used in two fundamental ways, statically and dynamically.[13] The static use of concepts is defined by logic, whereby each word refers to one single fact or object of reality: the static use of concepts constitutes the basis of a certain system of knowledge since it prevents any ambiguous use of words. This, however, can only be valid on a theoretical level because in everyday life concepts are used mostly but not exclusively in accordance with their universal meaning (identity between word and thing). They are often used to indicate also different things in different ways, and in different practices.</em></p><p><em>On the one hand, therefore, static concepts refer to knowledge that we have already acquired and accepted as certain and universal: these concepts are essential because without them we could not build any epistemological system. On the other hand, however, the dynamic use of concepts, i.e. a metaphorical use, is equally fundamental because otherwise a large part of everyday communication would be impossible. The dynamic use is therefore necessary every time something new is experienced that cannot be described through traditional concepts and parameters.</em></p><p><em>Heisenberg, not unlike other physicists, often uses metaphors not to fall into the cul de sac of the stable meaning of concepts generally used in the language of classic mechanics. In order to speak about new phenomena concerning subatomic physics, he creates new metaphors which later on, as they are used over and over again to represent the same phenomena, lose their innovative power and become in turn common and stable expressions. This is why we speak today about spin, flavours of quarks, entanglement and so on not thinking of these expressions as metaphors but as physical concepts. As Heisenberg suggests, metaphor plays a very important role in science because its “instability” can successfully convey a new discovery in an intuitive and yet precise way, without being bridled into the rigidity of a concept.[8]</em> [<strong><em>unquote</em></strong>]</p><p>… Piredda: [<a href="https://doi.org/10.20935/AL1384">Prd21</a>].</p><p>In other words, assuming that even quantum phenomena obey putative laws that are deterministic only entails — by Ockham’s minimality — that the results of any observation and/or measurement of the phenomena could be expressible by putative Gödel β-functions that are algorithmically <em>verifiable</em> as to putative <em>past</em> values, but <em>not</em> algorithmically <em>computable</em> as to observable <em>future</em> values.</p><p>Prima facie, such an interpretation would not be inconsistent with the experience that underpins quantum physics.</p><p>Not unreasonably, it can also be viewed as consistent with — and prima facie reflecting — Huw Price and Ken Wharton’s hypothesis in [<a href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2212.06986v3">PW23</a>] that a ‘constrained retrocausal collider bias is the origin of entanglement’:</p><p>[<strong><em>quote</em></strong>] <em>In this piece, written for a general audience, we propose a mechanism for quantum entanglement. The key ingredient is the familiar statistical phenomenon of collider bias, or Berkson’s bias. In the language of causal models, a collider is a variable causally influenced by two or more other variables. Conditioning on a collider typically produces non-causal associations between its contributing causes, even if they are actually independent. It is easy to show that this phenomenon can produce associations analogous to Bell correlations, in suitable post-selected ensembles. It is also straightforward that such collider artefacts may become real connections, resembling causality, if a collider is ’constrained’ (e.g., by a future boundary condition). We consider the time-reversed analogues of these points in the context of retrocausal models of QM. Retrocausality yields a collider at the source of an EPR-Bell particle pair, and in this case constraint of the collider is possible by normal methods of experimental preparation. It follows that connections resembling causality may be expected to emerge across such colliders, from one branch of the experiment to the other. Our hypothesis is that this constrained retrocausal collider bias is the origin of entanglement. The piece is based on a suggestion we first made in arXiv:2101.05370v4 [quant-ph].</em> [<strong><em>unquote</em></strong>]</p><p><em>… Price/Wharton: [</em><a href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2212.06986v3"><em>PW23</em></a><em>], Abstract.</em></p><p>Price and Wharton conclude [<a href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2212.06986v3">PW23</a>] by cogently arguing that, and why, their ‘retrocausality’ thesis is a more intuitive, consistent, interpretation of QM which, moreover, supports Schrödinger’s perspective — reflecting Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen’s argumentation in [<a href="https://journals.aps.org/pr/pdf/10.1103/PhysRev.47.777">EPR35</a>] — of ‘<em>QM as an unavoidably fuzzy picture of a sharper reality</em>’:</p><p><em>[</em><strong><em>quote</em></strong><em>] This means that if nature wants retrocausality without retrosignalling (and without the paradoxes that retrosignalling would lead to), it is going to need black boxes — places in nature where observers like Charlie can’t see the whole story. In normal circumstances, such black boxes would seem like another kind of magic. Charlie is a clever guy, after all. What’s to stop him taking a peek inside any kind of box?</em></p><p><em>But in the quantum case, many readers will already know the answer to this question. What’s to stop Charlie taking a peek is Werner Heisenberg, or more precisely his famous Uncertainty Principle. Ever since Heisenberg, quantum theory has been built on the idea that there are new limits to what it is possible to know about physical reality. One of the central questions is whether this is just a restriction on our knowledge of reality, or whether reality itself is somehow fuzzy. As Schrödinger put it in 1935, after describing his famous Cat Experiment: ‘There is a difference between a shaky or out-of-focus photograph and a snapshot of clouds and fog banks.’ [Schrödinger 1935b]</em></p><p><em>The Cat Experiment was supposed to support the out-of-focus photograph option, the view that the Uncertainty Principle is just a restriction on our knowledge of reality. Schrödinger thought it was obvious that the cat couldn’t actually be somehow neither alive nor dead. Like Einstein, Schrödinger favoured the view that the quantum description is incomplete, and that reality contains further details, hidden behind Heisenberg’s veil.</em></p><p><em>In the decades since 1935, most physicists who care about these issues have concluded that Einstein and Schrödinger were wrong. Bell’s Theorem, together with the quantum predictions being confirmed by Clauser, Aspect, Zeilinger and many others, has often been interpreted as showing that the spooky action at a distance which Einstein hoped to avoid with additional ‘hidden variables’, is an inevitable part of the quantum world.</em></p><p><em>Retrocausality is already the most interesting challenge to that view. By taking the first option on Schrödinger’s list — by treating QM as an unavoidably fuzzy picture of a sharper reality — it can allow the kind of quantum black boxes needed to avoid retrosignalling and paradoxes. How satisfying, then, if it also explains the other thing that Schrödinger put his finger on in 1935, when he invented the term ‘entanglement’, and called it ‘the characteristic trait of quantum mechanics.’ [</em><strong><em>unquote</em></strong><em>]</em></p><p><em>… Price/Wharton: [</em><a href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2212.06986v3"><em>PW23</em></a><em>], §9: Avoiding causal loops and signalling.</em></p><p>We conclude by quoting at length from a recent preprint [<a href="https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/23276/1/Axiom_EJPS.pdf">Odn24</a>]; where philosopher Jessica Oddan, in a yet nascent but intriguing and seemingly insightful, perspective seeks to circumvent the limitations which our <strong><em>Quantum Query</em></strong> in <a href="https://medium.com/@bhup.anand/an-intuitively-plausible-understanding-of-the-mathematical-representations-of-quantum-phenomena-ii-0c7a686c6133">Part II</a> of this essay implicitly highlights for any putative axiomatic — presumably first-order — mathematical theory that seeks to coherently model our observations of quantum phenomena.</p><p>Oddan’s ‘program’(compare [<a href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/gd6ffwf9wssak86/">An22</a>], §1, <strong><em>Complementarity Thesis</em></strong>) aims at a ‘Reconstruction of quantum theory’ that ‘<em>subverts the importance of interpretation and instead focuses on developing an abstract generalization of the fundamental features of quantum mechanics through the derivation of the formalism</em>’ that can ‘<em>separate formalism and physical interpretation because the mathematics was resistant to revision while physical interpretation was not</em>’:</p><p><em>[</em><strong><em>quote</em></strong><em>] There are many advantages to axiomatization as a methodology, whether Hilbert’s more formal notion of axiomatization or later von Neumann’s more flexible version. Ultimately, axiomatization as a methodology is understood to lend epistemic credibility as a semiformal means of parsing out fundamental and easily understandable constraints (axioms stipulated from physical postulates) that give rise to some solution or collection of solutions. Axiomatization provides a more directed means of inference tracking, particularly in the physical sciences. Part of the trustworthiness of axiomatization is being able to find mistakes within a derivation from a set of axioms. This derivation facilitates the finding of mistakes in our reasoning. If the stipulated axioms are resistant to revision, like Hilbert stressed, then it is more likely that the resulting derivations and conclusions of those derivations will preserve that resistance to revision as well.</em></p><p><em>The significance of how an axiomatization is ordered has been highlighted throughout the historical story. The key distinction between ‘optimal’ axiomatization and ‘practical’ axiomatization is whether the physical postulates help us to identify the analytic machinery, or if the analytic machinery gives us insights into what the physical postulates are. The optimal version begins with the stipulation of physical postulates which are then given a mathematical formulation. The practical version is the inverse. It was important for Hilbert et al. to separate formalism and physical interpretation because the mathematics was resistant to revision while physical interpretation was not. Hilbert et al., and particularly Hilbert, wanted to remove any specifics of meaning in order to de-empiricize a theory, thus transforming it into a pure mathematical exercise [13]. However, I argue that in the context of reconstructions the ordering of an axiomatization, though it was significant for Hilbert et al., is important not due to when analytic machinery and physical content is ordered but rather that the connection is stipulated at all. And so, the designation of optimal versus practical ordering is not the important insight we get from following such a procedure.</em></p><p><em>Rather, the insight we get by distinguishing between formalism and physical content is pinpointing where our mathematics applies to the physical world. What is significant is not that we stipulate mathematical formalism before physical content or the inverse. It is the specification that some mathematical feature x is representative of some physical insight y. The insight desired, however, is relative to the goals one has in performing an axiomatization. If we are, e.g., looking for physical insight, then as we see in reconstructions it becomes important to seek out the formalism–physical content connection. In other axiomatizations this connection may be less important such as those axiomatizations where understanding of the mathematical formalism is being sought. Von Neumann uses physical insights in his trace function case in order to search for the right mathematics. Axiomatization provides the methodological structure to facilitate the bridging of our mathematics to what it purports to represent. It is important that it is the physical axioms in reconstructions that are taken to be unlikely to be revised, rather than mathematical formalism, which is a feature that is distinctive in how axiomatization is used.[14] Though the physical principle is unlikely to be revised, this is not necessarily the case for how that physical principle is mathematically formulated as an axiom. How those physical principles are formulated as axioms is dependent on the choice of researchers. The methodology of reconstructions also cements the importance of physical intuitions that guide researchers in the choice of formalism, not only at the level of axioms but at the framework level. Axiomatization provides the semi-formal structure to aid researchers in specifying the connection between physical ideas and their mathematical representations.</em></p><p><em>[Fn13] To de-empiricise a theory was to disentangle empirical content from the analytic machinery. This was successful when a formalism was identified whose structure represented the important relations of the theory without empirical content.</em></p><p><em>[Fn14] This relates to how reconstructions are also distinct from the standard interpretational project in quantum mechanics: the standard interpretational approach accepts the formalism of quantum mechanics and instead aims to provide a physical interpretational of that formalism. [</em><strong><em>unquote</em></strong><em>]</em></p><p><em>… Oddan: [</em><a href="https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/23276/1/Axiom_EJPS.pdf"><em>Odn24</em></a><em>], §5.3 Inference tracking, pp.15–16.</em></p><p>the goal being ‘characterization of [such] axiomatization as a practical, provisional, meta–mathematical methodology which aims to order and orient an area of knowledge’:</p><p><em>[</em><strong><em>quote</em></strong><em>] In “Hilbert–Style Completion: On von Neumann and Hidden Variables in Quantum Mechanics” (2022) Mitsch offers a nuanced interpretation of Hilbert’s axiomatic method. Mitsch’s elucidation of the role that axiomatization plays in the development of theories is directly applicable to the reconstruction programme. I apply this understanding to demonstrate that Mitsch’s conception of axiomatization is the best means of understanding the value of the methodology. I also argue that a context–dependent understanding of axiomatization complements Mitsch’s. In particular, Mitsch’s description of axiomatization as a provisional, practical, [15] meta-mathematical procedure concerned with orienting and ordering an area of inquiry aligns with my conception of the methodology. With this understanding in mind, what we see is that reconstructions of quantum theory successfully use axiomatization in a way that has and will continue to clarify and develop quantum theory.</em></p><p><em>Mitsch argues that Hilbert’s axiomatic method was both provisional and practical, rather than a strict formalization “in the service of radical epistemological or metaphysical goals” (2022, p. 2). [16] According to Mitsch, the goal of an axiomatization is a meta-mathematical one, wherein the relationship between mathematics and reality is addressed “insofar as an axiomatization will identify necessary physical assumptions based on the theorems central to an area of inquiry” (2022, p. 6). In contrast, the mathematician determines what propositions result from a given set of axioms.</em></p><p><em>This meta-mathematical project proceeds, in the Hilbertian tradition (Mitsch 2022, p. 6):</em></p><p><em>1. The identification of central theorems and concepts of an area of knowledge.</em></p><p><em>2. The identification of a formalism whose structure reflects the above area of knowledge.</em></p><p><em>3. The determination of the necessity of the candidate axioms based on the formalism.</em></p><p><em>Mitsch calls the relations between candidate axioms the “uniqueness question: are the other axioms sufficient for deciding the structure of the formalism w.r.t. the candidate axiom?” (2022, p. 6). Uniqueness questions determine if and when the collection of axioms is representative for the theory while admitting no other realizations (Mitsch 2022, p. 20). An axiomatic completion is achieved when all uniqueness questions are answered, in which case the axiomatic structure of the theory of the area of knowledge is completely determined (Mitsch 2022, p. 6). However, Mitsch maintains that axiomatic completions, even if they are successful, are provisional — they “generate provisional representations of reality insofar as axiomatic completions rely on fallible steps” (2022, p. 7). This is because the central theorems and concepts are liable to change within the theory of an area of knowledge. Axiomatic completions are also practical as “they are a tool meant to generate helpful representations of a field of knowledge” (Mitsch 2022, p. 7) while simultaneously orienting and ordering a theory (Mitsch 2022, p. 8). A theory is oriented when the independence of propositions is surveyed and an axiomatization orients an area of inquiry by directing our attention to certain physical, epistemological, or mathematical considerations (Mitsch 2022, p. 29). A theory is ordered when the lack of contradictions between propositions is guaranteed. An axiomatic completion of a theory is successful when it is able to both orient and order an area of knowledge alongside its mathematical investigation (Mitsch 2022, p. 8).</em></p><p><em>Mitsch’s description of axiomatization is a nuanced reading of axiomatization as a liberalized methodology that is pragmatically useful, in contrast with the notion of axiomatization as a strict formalization. He concludes that “von Neumann effectively summarized and clarified where we had been — in physics as well as in mathematics — in an effort to identify where we could go” (2022, p. 30). I concur with this understanding of the methodological role that axiomatization has to play in the development and exploration of theories. For my purposes, I am primarily interested in Mitsch’s characterization of axiomatization as a practical, provisional, meta–mathematical methodology which aims to order and orient an area of knowledge. This is precisely how we should understand the role that axiomatization plays in the reconstruction programme. Individual reconstructions should be taken as provisional, alternative formulations of quantum mechanics. The methodology of reconstructions should be understood as a predominantly meta-mathematical process which enriches both our mathematical and physical conceptions in foundations of quantum theory.</em></p><p><em>[Fn15] Mitsch is not referring to ‘practical’ in the sense of the ordering of analytic machinery and physical concepts that I have outlined prior from Hilbert et al. Rather, ‘practical’ refers more to the notion that axiomatization contributes to scientific progress (Mitsch 2022, p. 3).</em></p><p><em>[Fn16] Mitsch disagrees with Lacki that Hilbert was interested in axiomatization strictly in terms of logical clarification and rational reconstruction (2022, p. 3). Rather, Mitsch interprets Hilbert as having a more pragmatic and liberal idea of what axiomatization could achieve. [</em><strong><em>unquote</em></strong><em>]</em></p><p><em>… Oddan: [</em><a href="https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/23276/1/Axiom_EJPS.pdf"><em>Odn24</em></a><em>], §6 Reconstructions as Axiomatic Completions, pp16–17.</em></p><p>In Part IV of this exposition- — intended for a lay audience and extracted essentially from my book [<a href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/gd6ffwf9wssak86/">An22</a>], §23- -we shall see how distinguishing between algorithmic verifiability and algorithmic computability ‘dissolves’ the famously influential ‘Bohr-Einstein’ debate.</p><p><strong>References</strong></p><p>[Akn24] Erik Van Aken. 2024. <em>Chaos and cause. Can a butterfly’s wings trigger a distant hurricane? The answer depends on the perspective you take: physics or human agency. </em>In <em>Aeon</em>, 13 June 2024, Aeon Media Group Ltd., USA.</p><p><a href="https://aeon.co/essays/does-chaos-theory-square-classical-physics-with-human-agency?utm_source=Aeon+Newsletter&amp;utm_campaign=bdd43cc19c-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2024_08_27&amp;utm_medium=email&amp;utm_term=0_-d88b59c7bc-%5BLIST_EMAIL_ID%5D">Link</a></p><p>[An16] Bhupinder Singh Anand. 2016. <em>The truth assignments that differentiate human reasoning from mechanistic reasoning: The evidence-based argument for Lucas’ Gödelian thesis</em>. In <em>Cognitive Systems Research</em>. Volume 40, December 2016, 35–45.</p><p><a href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/lrt2xq0wlzo3wxx/s">https://www.dropbox.com/s/lrt2xq0wlzo3wxx/s</a></p><p>[An22] … 2024. <em>The Significance of Evidence-based Reasoning in Mathematics, Mathematics Education, Philosophy, and the Natural Sciences</em>. Second edition (Revision). DBA Publishing, Mumbai, India.</p><p><a href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/gd6ffwf9wssak86/">https://www.dropbox.com/s/gd6ffwf9wssak86/</a></p><p>[An24] … 2024. <em>Does Fermat’s Last Theorem validate string theory? Why admitting ‘point’ particles into mathematical models of molecular phenomena might harbour inconsistency.</em> Preprint.</p><p><a href="https://www.dropbox.com/scl/fi/agx2dp8nmku977m2loogj/">https://www.dropbox.com/scl/fi/agx2dp8nmku977m2loogj/</a></p><p>[Csr19] Ferenc Csatári. 2019. <em>Measurement and Meaning. </em>Rowman &amp; Littlefield, Maryland, USA.</p><p>[Ei50] Albert Einstein. 1950. <em>Letters on Wave Mechanics. </em>Letter # 17, p.39. Edited by K. Przibram for the Austrian Academy of Sciences. Vienna, 1963. Published 1967 by Philosophical Library Inc., New York. USA.</p><p><a href="https://archive.org/details/lettersonwavemec0000karl/page/38/mode/2up?q=einstein%27s+1950+letter">https://archive.org/details/lettersonwavemec0000karl/page/38/mode/2up?q=einstein%27s+1950+letter</a></p><p>[EPR35] Albert Einstein, Boris Yakovlevich Podolsky, Nathan Rosen. 1935. <em>Can Quantum-Mechanical Description of Physical Reality be Considered Complete?</em>. Physical Review 47 (10): 777–780.</p><p><a href="https://journals.aps.org/pr/pdf/10.1103/PhysRev.47.777">https://journals.aps.org/pr/pdf/10.1103/PhysRev.47.777</a></p><p>[Gpt18] Amitabha Gupta. 2018. <em>Some Aspects of the Arcane Nature of Quantum Mechanical Theory and Distinctive Forms of Realism Arising Out of It. </em>In <em>Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research</em>, (2019) 36:295–338.</p><p><a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s40961-018-0166-6">https://doi.org/10.1007/s40961-018-0166-6</a></p><p>[Her83] William Hermanns and Albert Einstein. 1983. <em>Einstein and the Poet: In Search of the Cosmic Man. </em>Biography and Autobiography, Branden Press, 1983.</p><p><a href="https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Albert_Einstein">https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Albert_Einstein</a></p><p>[Odn24] Jessica Oddan. 2024. <em>Reconstructions of Quantum Theory: Methodology and the Role of Axiomatization. </em>Preprint (09 Apr 2024 18:34). Preprint. Version: 09 Apr 2024 18:34. <em>PhilSci Archive</em>, University of Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, USA.</p><p><a href="https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/23276/1/Axiom_EJPS.pdf">https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/23276/1/Axiom_EJPS.pdf</a></p><p>[Prd21] Patrizia Piredda. 2021. <em>Heisenberg’s Dynamic Concepts. The Metaphor beyond the Limits of Language. </em>In <em>Academia Letters</em>, Article 1384.</p><p><a href="https://doi.org/10.20935/AL1384.">https://doi.org/10.20935/AL1384.</a></p><p>[PW23] Huw Price and Ken Wharton. 2023. <em>Why entanglement? </em>Preprint at arXiv:2212.06986 [quant-ph].</p><p><a href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2212.06986v3">https://arxiv.org/abs/2212.06986v3</a></p><p>[Wck23] Markus Weckström. 2023. <em>Natural Law, the Modeling Relation, and Two Roots of Perspectivism. </em>Preprint. Version: 13 Feb 2023 14:24. <em>PhilSci Archive</em>, University of Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, USA.</p><p><a href="http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/21750/">Natural Law, the Modeling Relation, and Two Roots of Perspectivism</a></p><p><a href="https://medium.com/@bhup.anand/an-intuitively-plausible-understanding-of-the-mathematical-representations-of-quantum-phenomena-iv-b6c5af8cf007"><strong><em>Next</em></strong></a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=28a1558c8a70" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[An Intuitively Plausible Understanding of the Mathematical Representations of Quantum Phenomena II]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@bhup.anand/an-intuitively-plausible-understanding-of-the-mathematical-representations-of-quantum-phenomena-ii-0c7a686c6133?source=rss-893c35d577c0------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/0c7a686c6133</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[mathematics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mathematical-logic]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[quantum-physics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[physics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Bhupinder Singh Anand]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 21 Aug 2024 09:07:50 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-04-26T11:06:03.900Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/proxy/1*tNZ-RSG1UcUfuxYeczdESQ.jpeg" /></figure><h4><strong>What would introducing experimental observations — which implicitly subsume ‘free will’ — into a well-defined mathematical model entail?</strong></h4><p><a href="https://medium.com/@bhup.anand/an-intuitively-plausible-understanding-of-the-mathematical-representations-of-quantum-phenomena-i-9c4120c6e926"><em>Previous</em></a></p><p><strong>I: A Quantum Thesis: Distinguishing between algorithmic verifiability and algorithmic computability</strong></p><p>In an <a href="https://medium.com/@bhup.anand/the-poincar%C3%A9-hilbert-debate-one-of-the-famous-disagreements-about-constructivity-in-mathematics-c75d5ccafae0">earlier</a> Medium essay, we showed how the famous Poincaré-Hilbert debate — on whether or not the Axiom Schema of Finite Induction in Arithmetic (which can today be taken to be the first-order Peano Arithmetic PA) could be treated as ‘constructive’ in some sense — dissolves once we make a distinction (introduced in [<a href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/lrt2xq0wlzo3wxx/">An16</a>]) between:</p><p><strong>Definition 1</strong>. (Algorithmic verifiability) <em>A number-theoretical relation F(x) is algorithmically verifiable if, and only if, for any specifiable natural number n, there is a deterministic algorithm AL(F, n) which can provide objective evidence for deciding the truth/falsity of each proposition in the finite sequence {F(1), F(2), . . . , F(n)}.</em></p><p><strong>Definition 2</strong>. (Algorithmic computability) <em>A number theoretical relation F(x) is algorithmically computable if, and only if, there is a deterministic algorithm AL(F) that can provide objective evidence for deciding the truth/falsity of each proposition in the denumerable sequence {F(1), F(2), . . .}.</em></p><p>We also note further that:</p><p>• Algorithmic <em>computability</em> implies the existence of a unique algorithm that can <em>finitarily</em> decide the truth/falsity of each proposition in a well-defined denumerable sequence of propositions; whose ‘truth’ values are therefore both <em>deterministic</em> and <em>predictable</em>; whereas</p><p>• Algorithmic <em>verifiability</em> does <em>not</em> imply the existence of a unique algorithm that can <em>finitarily</em> decide the truth/falsity of each proposition in a well-defined denumerable sequence of propositions; whose ‘truth’ values are therefore <em>deterministic</em>, but not necessarily <em>predictable</em>.</p><p>We note that although every algorithmically <em>computable</em> proposition is algorithmically <em>verifiable</em>, the converse is not true (see [<a href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/lrt2xq0wlzo3wxx/s">An16</a>], Theorem 1; [<a href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/gd6ffwf9wssak86/">An22</a>], §7.G, Theorem 7.2).</p><p>From the point of view of a <em>finitary</em> mathematical philosophy (see [<a href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/gd6ffwf9wssak86/">An22</a>], §1, Thesis 1) — which is the constraint within which an applied science <a href="https://medium.com/@bhup.anand/the-holy-grail-of-mathematics-is-arithmetical-truth-not-set-theoretical-proof-d8674e209952"><em>ought</em></a> to ideally operate (see also <a href="https://www.dropbox.com/scl/fi/uk8nscl18s5y034hwin1k/">this</a> preprint) — a significant consequence of the difference between algorithmic <em>verifiability</em> and algorithmic <em>computability</em> for the physical sciences is that we can now articulate a plausible:</p><p><strong>Quantum Thesis:</strong> <em>Quantum Mechanics is simply the evidence-based recognition that:</em></p><p><em>- any properties of an elementary particle,</em></p><p><em>- which can be assumed representable as determinate and predictable in a recursively well-defined — hence deterministic — mathematical model M(t) at time t,</em></p><p><em>- by algorithmically computable functions </em><strong><em>before</em></strong><em> an ‘observation’,</em></p><p><em>- can only be mathematically represented </em><strong><em>after</em></strong><em> the ‘observation’,</em></p><p><em>- in any putative model M(t+),</em></p><p><em>- which is assumed to be a </em><strong><em>conservative</em></strong><em> extension of M(t) </em><strong><em>before</em></strong><em> any </em><strong><em>further</em></strong><em> ‘observation’,</em></p><p><em>- by algorithmically verifiable, but </em><strong><em>not</em></strong><em> algorithmically computable, functions,</em></p><p><em>- whose values are determinate, but </em><strong><em>not</em></strong><em> predictable;</em></p><p><em>- since any ‘observation’ introduces an </em><strong><em>essential</em></strong><em> discontinuity in the deterministic model M(t) due to a ‘Butterfly Effect’.</em></p><p><strong>Conservative extension.</strong> <em>A theory T2 is a conservative extension of a theory T1 if the language of T2 extends the language of T1; that is, every theorem of T1 is a theorem of T2, and any theorem of T2 in the language of T1 is already a theorem of T1.</em></p><p><strong>Butterfly Effect</strong>: <em>In chaos theory, the ‘Butterfly Effect’ is the sensitive dependence on initial conditions in which a small change in one state of a deterministic, nonlinear, system can result in large differences in a later state.</em></p><p>Now, QM recognizes that:</p><p>- <em>no</em> physical ‘observation’ can be replicated <em>exactly</em> and,</p><p>- on the basis of <em>experimental</em> data,</p><p>- it is <em>possible</em> to mathematically quantify the ‘spread’ of a series of <em>controlled </em>replications at the quantum level by means of Schrödinger’s equations.</p><p>The <strong>Quantum Thesis</strong> now suggests further that:</p><p>- accepting Schrödinger’s equations as <em>faithfully</em> representing the deterministic ‘spread’ evidenced in results of <em>controlled</em> experimental observations at the quantum level,</p><p>- <em>if</em> attributable to <em>undeniable</em> sensitive dependence on initial conditions,</p><p>- entails that the underlying laws of nature are, indeed, <em>deterministic</em>.</p><p>Moreover, accepting that such initial conditions are <em>essentially</em> indeterminate entails that — except through, <em>unfalsifiably</em> subjective, ‘divine’ revelation — <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bell%27s_theorem">Bell’s Theorem</a> entails that we can <em>never</em> mathematically formulate an algorithmically <em>computable</em> — hence <em>predictable </em>— law that faithfully represents the underlying quantum behaviour as <em>both</em> deterministic <em>and</em> predictable.</p><p>Further, since <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bell%27s_theorem">Bell’s Theorem</a> <em>only</em> applies if the properties of an elementary particle are assumed to be mathematically representable as algorithmically <em>computable</em> by the same (hidden variable) function both <em>before</em> and <em>after</em> an observation, we cannot therefore conclude from Bell’s argumentation that our mathematical representations of quantum phenomena, if accepted as essentially algorithmically <em>verifiable</em> but <em>not</em> algorithmically <em>computable</em>, must admit <em>non-locality</em> under the <strong>Quantum Thesis</strong>.</p><p><strong>II: How may we <em>consistently</em> introduce an ‘observer’ into a recursively well-defined mathematical model?</strong></p><p>We consider the:</p><p><strong>Quantum Query.</strong> <em>What would introducing experimental observations — which implicitly subsume ‘free will’ — into a mathematical model entail?</em></p><p><strong>1.</strong> What we — when wearing a <em>philosopher’s</em> hat (see §III of <a href="https://medium.com/@bhup.anand/the-holy-grail-of-mathematics-is-arithmetical-truth-not-set-theoretical-proof-d8674e209952">this</a> essay for the significance of ‘hats’; also [<a href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/gd6ffwf9wssak86/">An22</a>], §13.C) — <em>initially</em> seek to express in a mathematical language — when wearing a <em>mathematician’s</em> hat — is a putative, <em>deterministic</em> and (ideally) <em>predictable</em>, model of our <em>subjective</em> conceptual metaphors of that which we perceive, or of that which we can conceive, as the ‘common universe’ we inhabit on the basis of our sensory perceptions, observations, and/or measurements when wearing the <em>natural scientist’s</em> hat; ‘observations’ which suggest that <em>all</em> natural laws can be treated as <em>deterministic</em>.</p><p><strong>2</strong>. Any such model can be claimed to faithfully represent our common sensory perceptions of the ‘universe’ if, and only if, it can <em>further</em> be <em>categorically</em> communicated. It cannot be dependent <em>only</em> upon any one individual’s <em>subjective</em> conceptual metaphors of the ‘universe’ we commonly inhabit.</p><p><strong>3.</strong> Such a model, by definition, is thus a <em>permanent</em> mathematical construction that cannot be dependent upon whether I subsequently <em>choose</em> to introduce an ‘observer’ — with or without a free will — into the model that was <em>not already</em> part of the model.</p><p>Such a perspective is not uncommon. For instance, amongst the various interviews recorded in her cogently, and passionately, argued book ‘<em>Lost in Math</em>’ [Hos18a], iconoclastic physicist Sabine Hossenfelder attributes the following remarks to physicist Steven Weinberg during an interview in the latter’s office in Austin:</p><p>[<strong><em>quote</em></strong>] <em>What I don’t like about quantum mechanics is that it’s a formalism for calculating probabilities that human beings get when they make certain interventions in nature that we call experiments. And a theory should not refer to human beings in its postulates. You would like to understand macroscopic things like experimental apparatuses and human beings in terms of the underlying theory. You don’t want to see them brought in on the level of axioms of the theory.</em> [<strong><em>unquote</em></strong>]</p><p>… Hossenfelder: [Hos18a], Chapter 6, The Incomprehensible Comprehensibility of Quantum Mechanics: A Losing Game, p.124.</p><p>Such a perspective is also <em>implicit</em> in philosopher E. Brian Davies’ compelling argument in [Dav05a] <em>against</em> the assumption that a, putatively ‘future’, Theory of Everything (TOE) is feasible which, by definition, would admit introduction of an ‘observer’ into a ‘current’ experiment at the level of quanta.</p><p>‘Against’, since any TOE would implicitly admit the ‘time-travel’ paradox where I may, at any instant of time, choose whether or not to introduce an ‘observer’ — with or without a free will — into a model of the TOE who could then, seemingly miraculously, be treatable as a pre-existing ‘element’ of the TOE:</p><p>[<strong><em>quote</em></strong>] <em>If one examines what physicists do in their daily research, one finds that they build mathematical models. Each of these is highly simplified, because otherwise one could not use it to make predictions. In different situations they use different models, choosing the appropriate one on the basis of their experience and the scientific understanding of the time. No model which currently exists can be regarded as true: each has a domain of applicability in which it gives a useful approximation to reality. In spite of the fact that Newtonian mechanics has been ‘superseded’ by both quantum theory and general relativity, it continues to be used as much as it ever was, because it is much simpler than its successors, and the differences are expected to be tiny in most everyday situations, such as designing car engines or putting telecommunications satellites into orbit.</em></p><p><em>Although all physicists build models of restricted validity, many believe that these are in principle derivable from a future TOE, probably by a multi-stage process. When one examines the facts, even finding the boiling point of water from the fundamental laws governing oxygen and hydrogen atoms is far beyond present capabilities, more than one hundred years after Maxwell laid down the foundations of statistical mechanics. As another example, the existence of the fullerene molecules was discovered experimentally, in spite of the fact that they involved only one type of atom, carbon, whose quantum mechanical properties were thoroughly established. Computational chemists could verify that the structures existed according to the laws of SQM after they had been discovered, but that is different from predicting their existence. We still do not know if quite new forms of carbon molecule might still appear.</em></p><p><em>There is a radical alternative to the reductionist doctrine. It states that the universe is not governed by mathematical laws, and there need not exist any TOE. We created mathematics to enable us to understand the world around us, and the longer we persist with the scientific enterprise the more successful we will be. Science consists of the building of partial models, many of them mathematical, and progress consists of creating useful new models or discovering new connections between old models. Our undoubted successes in this enterprise do not imply that eventually everything will be explained this way. Isaac Newton believed that ‘nature is simple’ and many theoretical physicists share his faith, but it is much less popular among those in the life sciences.</em></p><p><em>One of the consequences of adopting a reductionist viewpoint is that one accepts that every phenomenon has only one true explanation — it is a mathematical consequence of the ultimate laws combined with the initial conditions. These may be so complex that we can only solve the equations approximately, or have to work upwards through a hierarchy of less fundamental theories, but no other explanation holds water. Biologists regard such ideas as absurd, because they use the word explanation quite differently. For them, understanding is something achieved by a human being, and different explanations of the same fact can co-exist without any of them having priority in an absolute sense. For a criticism of reductionism and an amusing discussion of five reasons why a frog might jump into a pond, see Rose ([1997], pp. 8–13).</em></p><p><em>To claim that mathematics is a human creation is to be an anti-Platonist, or, as some would say, a mathematical anti-realist. It is perfectly possible to be an empiricist as far as mathematically-based theories are concerned but a realist when discussing physical entities. A mathematical empiricist can believe that bacteria, DNA and atoms exist, and that ‘dinosaurs had four legs before humans existed to count these’. References to the past necessarily use concepts understood in the present. Unless one is a creationist, the statement about dinosaurs is correct as soon as all of the concepts involved have been formulated clearly enough for us to understand it. In particular we have to agree about which of their appendages we will call legs; since their front and rear limbs have different structures, our use of the word ‘leg’ presupposes that we consider function to be more important than anatomy, within certain limits</em>. [<strong><em>unquote</em></strong>]</p><p>… Davies: [Dav05a], Introduction.</p><p><strong>4.</strong> Moreover, if the model is assumed to be recursively well-defined, then it cannot admit prediction of the consequences of <em>any</em> interaction with an ‘observer’ that I may seek to subsequently introduce into the model <em>at will</em>; since that would constitute introducing a mathematical <em>discontinuity</em> that was <strong>not</strong> <em>already</em> ‘built’ into the model.</p><p>Such a ‘mathematical discontinuity’ can be viewed as corresponding to what Spiridon Dumitru intriguingly refers to as ‘<em>a transmission process for information</em>’ in his informal essay [Dmt22]:</p><p>[<strong><em>quote</em></strong>] <em>Accordingly, for a measured physical system, the “situation existing before the measurement” regards the intrinsic properties of that system. The quantitative details of respective properties play the role of ‘input data’ (entrance information) within the measurement. Additionally, for the same system, the measurement results are accumulated in ‘output data’ (received information) which are provided by measuring process. So, the whole measurement looks as a transmission process for information, while the measuring device appears as a communication channel (regarded as in [17]).</em> [<strong><em>unquote</em></strong>]</p><p>… Dumitru: [Dmt22], §E, Separate Theoretical Descriptions of QMS in terms of Information Theory.</p><p><strong>5.</strong> Classical mechanics <em>implicitly</em> postulates that any putative introduction of such an ‘observer’ for interacting with, and determining, the <em>macro</em> (classical) properties of the terms (elements) of a pre-defined model, does <em>not</em> introduce an ‘essential’ mathematical discontinuity into the model.</p><p>In other words:</p><p>- a <em>non-essential</em> discontinuity <em>only</em> requires the putative introduction of an additional, algorithmically <em>computable</em>, function,</p><p>- that would admit a unique, mathematically <em>predictable</em>, <strong>conservative</strong> extension of the model,</p><p>- which, thereafter, contains that particular ‘observer’ as a well-defined feature of the extended model,</p><p>- that, by definition, subsumes the earlier model.</p><p><strong>6.</strong> Such a postulation has been consistently perceived as consistent with both quantum mechanics and experimental observations.</p><p>For instance, as Hossenfelder describes — colourfully and vividly in lay terms — the mathematics of classical interactions which admit quantum behaviour:</p><p>[<strong><em>quote</em></strong>] <em>… There’s a good reason we never witness quantum behavior in everyday life. For large objects — like cats or brains or computers — the quantum-typical properties fade away extremely quickly. Such objects are part of warm and wiggly environments, and the constant interactions scramble up quantum links between parts of the system. This scrambling — called decoherence — quickly converts quantum states to normal probability distributions, even in the absence of a measurement apparatus. Decoherence thus explains why we don’t observe superpositions of large things.</em> [<strong><em>unquote</em></strong>]</p><p>… Hossenfelder: [Hos18a], Chapter 6, The Incomprehensible Comprehensibility of Quantum Mechanics: Everything Is Amazing and Nobody’s Happy, p.123.</p><p><strong>7.</strong> Quantum mechanics <em>implicitly</em> postulates that any putative introduction of such an ‘observer’ for interacting with, and determining, the <em>micro</em> (quantum) properties of the terms (elements) of a pre-defined model <em>does</em> introduce an ‘essential’ mathematical discontinuity.</p><p>An <em>essential</em> discontinuity requires, however;</p><p>- the putative introduction of an additional, algorithmically <em>verifiable</em> but <em>not</em> necessarily algorithmically <em>computable</em>, function,</p><p>- that does <em>not</em> admit a unique, mathematically <em>predictable</em>, <strong>conservative</strong> extension of the model,</p><p>- which, thereafter, contains that particular ‘observer’ as a well-defined feature of the extended model,</p><p>- that, by definition, must subsume the earlier model.</p><p><strong>8.</strong> <em>Reason</em>: Any observer that I introduce on the basis of my free will, <em>post</em> the formulation of a recursively well-defined model, could not have existed in the original.</p><p>Hence:</p><p>- any interactions between the ‘observer’ and the original model,</p><p>- <em>post</em> such introduction,</p><p>- must also be <em>consistently</em> evidenced in a <strong>conservative </strong>extension of the model as <em>faithfully</em> reflected in experimental observations;</p><p>- a claim that, under <em>classically </em>inherited paradigms of QM,</p><p>- was shown by Bell’s equations to be incompatible with the experimentally <em>verified</em> tenets of QM.</p><p>Prima facie, such a perspective can be perceived as illuminating the antipathy, towards ‘decoherence’, reflected in the following remarks that Hossenfelder attributes to Weinberg in [Hos18a]:</p><p>[<strong><em>quote</em></strong>] <em>You can very well understand quantum mechanics in terms of an interaction of the system you’re studying with an external environment which includes an observer, … But this involves a quantum mechanical system interacting with a macroscopic system that produces the decoherence between different branches of the initial wave function. And where does that come from? That should be described also quantum mechanically. And, strictly speaking, within quantum mechanics itself there is no decoherence.</em> [<strong><em>unquote</em></strong>]</p><p>… Hossenfelder: [Hos18a], Chapter 6, The Incomprehensible Comprehensibility of Quantum Mechanics: A Losing Game, pp.126–127.</p><p>Justifying Weinberg’s disquiet, Daniela Frauchiger and Renato Renner illustrate — in a cogently argued paper [FrRe18] — how the putative introduction of an ‘observer’ into a recursively well-defined model can collaterally admit an unintended, and philosophically unsettling, doctrine of ‘<strong>alternative facts</strong>’:</p><p>[<strong><em>quote</em></strong>] <em>In the Gedankenexperiment proposed in this article, multiple agents have access to different pieces of information, and draw conclusions by reasoning about the information held by others. In the general context of quantum theory, the rules for such nested reasoning may be ambiguous, for the information held by one agent can, from the viewpoint of another agent, be in a superposition of different “classical” states. Crucially, however, in the argument presented here, the agents’ conclusions are all restricted to supposedly unproblematic “classical” cases. For example, agent [W] only needs to derive a statement about agent F in the case where, conditioned on his own information [w], the information z held by F has a well-defined value (Table #3). Nevertheless, as we have shown, the agents arrive at contradictory statements.</em></p><p><em>Current interpretations of quantum theory do not agree on the origin of this contradiction (cf. Table 4). To compare the different views, it may therefore be useful to rephrase the experiment as a concrete game-theoretic decision problem. Suppose that a casino offers the following gambling game. One round of the experiment of Box #1 is played, with the gambler in the role of agent W, and the roles of [F], F, and [W] taken by employees of the casino. The casino promises to pay €1000 to the gambler if F’s random value was r = heads. Conversely, if r = tails, the gambler must pay €500 to the casino. It could now happen that, at the end of the game, w = ok and [w] = [ok], and that a judge can convince herself of this outcome. The gambler and the casino are then likely to end up in a dispute, putting forward arguments taken from Table #3.</em></p><p><em>Gambler: “The outcome w = ok proves, due to (#4), that S was not prepared in state |→⟩S. This means that r = heads and hence the casino must pay me €1000.”</em></p><p><em>Casino: “The outcome [w] = [ok] implies, due to (#6), that our employee observed z = +1/2. This in turn proves that S was not prepared in state |↓⟩S. But this means that r = tails, so the gambler must pay us €500.”</em></p><p><em>How should the judge decide on this case? Could it even be that both assertions must be accepted as two “alternative facts” about what the value r was? We leave it as a task for further research to explore what the different interpretations of quantum mechanics have to say about this game.</em></p><p><em>Theorem 1 may be compared to earlier no-go results, such as (in) #7, #8, #9, #10, #41, #42, #43, which also use assumptions similar to (Q) and (S) (although the latter is often implicit). These two assumptions are usually shown to be in conflict with additional assumptions about reality, locality, or freedom of choice. For example, the result of ref.#9, which is as well based on an extension of Wigner’s argument, asserts that no theory can fulfil all of the following properties: (i) be compatible with quantum theory on all scales, (ii) simultaneously assign definite truth values to measurement outcomes of all agents, (iii) allow agents to freely choose measurement settings, and (iv) be local. Here, we have shown that Assumptions (Q) and (S) are already problematic by themselves, in the sense that agents who use these assumptions to reason about each other as in Fig.#3 will arrive at inconsistent conclusions.</em></p><p><em>Another noticeable difference to earlier no-go results is that the argument presented here does not employ counterfactual reasoning. That is, it does not refer to choices that could have been made but have not actually been made. In fact, in the proposed experiment, the agents never make any choices (also no delayed ones, as e.g., in Wheeler’s “delayed choice” experiment (in) #63). Also, none of the agents’ statements refers to values that are no longer available at the time when the statement is made (cf. Table #3).</em> [<strong><em>unquote</em></strong>]</p><p>… Frauchiger and Renner: [FrRe18], Discussion.</p><p><strong>9.</strong> Now, any attempt at the ‘exact’ replication of a quantum interaction, in a <em>controlled</em> physical experiment, reveals that — due to <em>unavoidable</em> sensitive dependence on initial conditions (the so-called ‘Butterfly Effect’) — the experiment does not yield what can be claimed mathematically as ‘identical’ results.</p><p>However, it also reveals that the results are not <em>totally</em> random, since the attempt at replication in a <em>controlled</em> physical experiment limits the observed divergence in the output to a non-Gaussian spread.</p><p>In other words, replicated observations at a quantum level are evidenced as yielding a <em>deterministic</em> set of values that are consistently observed to obey quantum laws as determined, for instance, by Schrödinger’s equation.</p><p>So, accepting Schrödinger’s equations as <em>faithfully</em> representing the deterministic ‘spread’ evidenced in results of experimental observations at the quantum level, <em>if</em> attributable to <em>undeniable</em> sensitive dependence on initial conditions, entails that the underlying laws of nature are, indeed, <em>deterministic</em>.</p><p>Moreover, accepting that such initial conditions are <em>essentially</em> indeterminate entails that we can never mathematically formulate an algorithmically <em>computable</em> — hence <em>predictable</em> — law that faithfully represents the underlying quantum behaviour as <em>both</em> determinate <em>and</em> predictable.</p><p>We note that whereas the property of being ‘deterministic’ can be ascribed to <em>both</em>:</p><ul><li>what we term as the underlying ‘laws’ of nature as suggested and/or evidenced by our physical observations and measurements of natural phenomena;</li></ul><p><em>and:</em></p><ul><li>to our mathematical representations of such phenomena and their assumed underlying laws;</li></ul><p>the property of being ‘predictable’ can be <em>meaningfully</em> ascribed <em>only</em> to our mathematical representations of such underlying ‘laws’.</p><p><strong>10.</strong> In other words, experimental observations show that, introduction of an ‘observer’ into a recursively well-defined model at the ‘quantum level’ identifies, at most, a set of <em>putative</em> ‘future’ states.</p><p>Each of these can be viewed as:</p><p>- a putative, <em>conservative extension</em> of the model being observed,</p><p>- in which the ‘observer’ is now a well-defined feature of the <em>extended</em> model,</p><p>- which can be viewed as corresponding to one of the ‘many’ putative models,</p><p>- that could, albeit misleadingly, be termed as the <em>notional</em> ‘worlds’ of a ‘many worlds’ theory.</p><p>Prima facie, such a perspective might also avoid the antipathy — to possible significant aspects of a ‘many worlds’ theory — reflected in the following remarks that Hossenfelder attributes to Weinberg in [Hos18a]; if we replace the concept of ‘many-histories’ by a concept of ‘many-putative-mathematical-models’:</p><p>[<strong><em>quote</em></strong>] <em>Now, there is an attempt to deal with this, which denies decoherence and contemplates treating human beings completely quantum mechanically just like everything else, and that’s the many-histories approach. In the many-histories approach, if you start with a pure wave function, it’s always a pure wave function. But as time evolves, it has many terms in it, each one of which contains a description of observers, and the observers in each term think they’re seeing something different — like one observer sees the spin [of a particle as] up and the other sees the spin down.</em></p><p><em>And while you could live with the history of the universe splitting into two branches, in this many-histories approach you have an endless continual production of unimaginably large numbers of histories of the universe.</em></p><p><em>Well … that might be the way things are, and I don’t know anything logically inconsistent about it. But it’s so repulsive to imagine this vast number of histories.</em> [<strong><em>unquote</em></strong>]</p><p>… Hossenfelder: [Hos18a], Chapter 6, The Incomprehensible Comprehensibility of Quantum Mechanics: A Losing Game, pp.127.</p><p><strong>11.</strong> If, now, the intention is to identify the <em>unique</em> <strong>conservative</strong> extension of the model which is the outcome of the introduction of an actual ‘observer’ into the original model, then one would have to introduce, along with the ‘observer’, a ‘sensor’ that can identify <em>which</em> of the states was the <em>actual</em> outcome of the experiment (corresponding to what is, not uncommonly, viewed as the problematic <em>collapse</em> of the wave function).</p><p>‘Problematic’ only in the sense that, as observed by Inge S. Helland in [Hll24]:</p><p>[<strong><em>quote</em></strong>] <em>One topic that is not discussed in the theory is the well-known rule that a quantum state collapses as a result of a measurement. I do not know how this can be solved, …</em> [<strong><em>unquote</em></strong>]</p><p>… Helland: [Hll24], §8. Concluding remarks.</p><p>In other words:</p><p>- the algorithmically <em>verifiable</em> (but not necessarily algorithmically <em>computable</em>) function/s,</p><p>- say <em>F(i)</em>, mathematically representing the ‘actual’ observation and/or measurement of a physical phenomena (not necessarily only at the quantum level),</p><p>- in a ‘current’, recursively well-defined, mathematical model, say <em>M(t−1)</em>,</p><p>- are <em>uniquely</em> defined by all past values of the phenomena at any finite set of measurements {<em>F(0)</em>, <em>F(1)</em>, …, <em>F(t−1)</em>},</p><p>- <em>already</em> incorporated into that particular model <em>M(t−1)</em>;</p><p>- and are both <em>deterministic</em> and <em>predictable</em> as to future values if the phenomena <em>remains</em> ’unobserved’,</p><p>- since the properties of such functions can — at any putative instant <em>before</em> measurement at time <em>t</em> — be represented <em>uniquely</em> by a primitive recursive, algorithmically <em>computable</em>, number-theoretic Gödel <em>β</em>-function as defined in [Go31], Theorem VII,</p><p>- where the <em>uniqueness</em> implicitly implies that the phenomena did, indeed, follow some physical law which,</p><p>- although not necessarily <em>the one</em> defined by the Gödel <em>β</em>-function,</p><p>- was one that, <em>in principle</em>, was mathematically representable as <em>determinate</em>.</p><p>However:</p><p>- <em>any</em> introduction of a discontinuity into the model <em>M(t−1)</em>, corresponding to a physical measurement at time <em>t</em> <em>must</em>, itself, <em>reflect</em> the underlying, <em>deterministic</em>, physical laws;</p><p>- and must consequently admit, as <em>consistent</em> with any post-measurement <strong>conservative</strong> extension <em>M(t)</em> of <em>M(t-1)</em>,</p><p>- a <em>predictable</em> probability spectrum for the <em>next</em> value that is experimentally observed as amongst those definable by Schrödinger’s equations;</p><p>- which, when physically measured at time <em>t</em>, can be associated as the ‘next’ physical measurement of the phenomena at time <em>t</em> in the extended model <em>M(t)</em>.</p><p>This last measurement then yields a value <em>F(t)</em> that must necessarily differ from any putative value of the ‘unobserved’ phenomena in the model <em>M(t−1)</em> at time <em>t</em>; unless the difference between the two can be treated as below <em>any</em> measurable threshold (as is the case in phenomena represented mathematically by algorithmically <em>computable</em> functions in classical physics).</p><p><strong>12.</strong> Addition of this state, to the revised (conservatively extended) model, would now give a <em>deterministic</em> model that can be claimed as <em>consistent</em> with experimental observation <em>only</em> up to the <em>last</em> ‘observation’ at time t, but <em>no</em> further (i.e., even though the extended model itself is <em>deterministic</em>, its future values cannot be uniquely <em>predicted</em> as faithful to that which the model seeks to represent <em>after</em> a — discontinuity inducing — experimental observation).</p><p>Such a perspective can be viewed as illuminating, if not also complementing, Shan Gao’s ‘<em>interpretation of the wave function in terms of random discontinuous motion of particles (RDMP)</em>’ in his preprint [Gao23], if we selectively substitute ‘models’ for ‘worlds’:</p><p>[<strong><em>quote</em></strong>] <em>According to the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics (MWI), all results occur after a measurement. This seems to make an observer-independent understanding of the Born probabilities impossible. In this paper, I propose a new way to solve the problem of probability in MWI. It is suggested that different worlds exist in different sets of instants, and all worlds exist in a time-division multiplexing way during an arbitrarily short time interval. Since there is only one world at each instant, the Born probabilities can be understood in the usual way. Moreover, since there are many worlds during a time interval, MWI also gives predictions different from those of single-world quantum theories. Finally, it is pointed out that this version of MWI introduces no additional ontologies and postulates when assuming a plausible realist interpretation of the wave function.</em> [<strong><em>unquote</em></strong>]</p><p>… Gao: [Gao23], Abstract.</p><p><strong>13.</strong> In other words, the essence of quantum phenomena can be expressed by saying that they obey <em>deterministic</em> physical laws whose observed values are algorithmically <em>verifiable</em> upto any observation (i.e., <em>deterministic</em> upto), but not algorithmically <em>computable</em> beyond (i.e., <em>unpredictable</em> beyond); even though the ‘current’ model, at any ‘observation’, is expressible in terms of unique Gödel <em>β</em>-functions that are algorithmically <em>computable</em> (hence <em>deterministic</em> and <em>predictable</em>), with putative ‘future’ values which, however, cannot claim to be experimentally <em>verifiable</em> beyond the last observation at time t.</p><p>In <a href="https://medium.com/@bhup.anand/an-intuitively-plausible-understanding-of-the-mathematical-representations-of-quantum-phenomena-iii-28a1558c8a70">Part III</a> of this exposition— intended for a lay audience and extracted essentially from my book [<a href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/gd6ffwf9wssak86/">An22</a>], §23 — we shall consider in what sense the perceived anomalous nature of quantum mechanics can be ascribed to Heisenberg’s ‘<em>linguistic ambiguities</em>’.</p><p><strong>References</strong></p><p>[An16] Bhupinder Singh Anand. 2016. <em>The truth assignments that differentiate human reasoning from mechanistic reasoning: The evidence-based argument for Lucas’ Gödelian thesis</em>. In <em>Cognitive Systems Research</em>. Volume 40, December 2016, 35–45.</p><p><a href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/lrt2xq0wlzo3wxx/s">https://www.dropbox.com/s/lrt2xq0wlzo3wxx/s</a></p><p>[An22] … 2024. <em>The Significance of Evidence-based Reasoning in Mathematics, Mathematics Education, Philosophy, and the Natural Sciences</em>. Second edition (Revision). DBA Publishing, Mumbai, India.</p><p><a href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/gd6ffwf9wssak86/">https://www.dropbox.com/s/gd6ffwf9wssak86/</a></p><p>[Dav05a] E. B. Davies. 2005. <em>Some Remarks on the Foundations of Quantum Theory</em>. In <em>The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science</em>, 2005, Volume 56, Number 3, pp.521–539. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A. doi:10.1093/bjps/axi129</p><p><a href="https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1093/bjps/axi129">https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1093/bjps/axi129</a></p><p>[Dmt22] Spiridon Dumitru. 2022. <em>Possible Perspective for Quantum Mechanics Interpretation: An Essay-Suggestion</em>. In <em>European Journal of Applied Physics</em>, 4(5), 55–62. doi.org/10.24018/ejphysics.2022.4.5.212</p><p><a href="https://doi.org/10.24018/ejphysics.2022.4.5.212">https://doi.org/10.24018/ejphysics.2022.4.5.212</a></p><p>[FrRe18] Daniela Frauchiger and Renato Renner. 2018. <em>Quantum theory cannot consistently describe the use of itself</em>. In <em>Nature Communications</em>, volume 9, Article number: 3711 (2018).</p><p><a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-018-05739-8">https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-018-05739-8</a></p><p>[Gao23] Shan Gao. 2023. <em>Many Worlds with both “And” and “Or”.</em> Preprint. Version: 09 Mar 2023 14:58. <em>PhilSci Archive</em>, University of Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, USA.</p><p><a href="http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/21855/">http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/21855/</a></p><p>[Go31] Kurt Gödel. 1931. <em>On formally undecidable propositions of Principia Mathematica and related systems I.</em> Translated by Elliott Mendelson. In M. Davis (ed.). 1965. <em>The Undecidable</em>. Raven Press, New York.</p><p>[Hll24] Inge Svein Helland. 2024. <em>A new approach toward the quantum foundation and some consequences.</em> In <em>Academia Quantum</em>, 2024;1.</p><p><a href="https://doi.org/10.20935/AcadQuant7282">https://doi.org/10.20935/AcadQuant7282</a></p><p>[Hos18a] Sabine Hossenfelder. 2018. <em>Lost in Math: How Beauty Leads Physics Astray.</em> Basic Books, New York.</p><p><a href="https://medium.com/@bhup.anand/an-intuitively-plausible-understanding-of-the-mathematical-representations-of-quantum-phenomena-iii-28a1558c8a70"><strong><em>Next</em></strong></a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=0c7a686c6133" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[An Intuitively Plausible Understanding of the Mathematical Representations of Quantum Phenomena I]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@bhup.anand/an-intuitively-plausible-understanding-of-the-mathematical-representations-of-quantum-phenomena-i-9c4120c6e926?source=rss-893c35d577c0------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/9c4120c6e926</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[quantum-physics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[physics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mathematical-logic]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mathematics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Bhupinder Singh Anand]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 16 Aug 2024 14:50:40 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-05-20T12:19:39.731Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/proxy/1*tNZ-RSG1UcUfuxYeczdESQ.jpeg" /></figure><h4><strong>Distinguishing between algorithmic <em>verifiability</em> and algorithmic <em>computability</em></strong></h4><p><strong>I: A Quantum Thesis: Distinguishing between algorithmic <em>verifiability</em> and algorithmic <em>computability</em></strong></p><p>In an <a href="https://medium.com/@bhup.anand/the-poincar%C3%A9-hilbert-debate-one-of-the-famous-disagreements-about-constructivity-in-mathematics-c75d5ccafae0">earlier</a> Medium essay, we showed how the famous Poincaré-Hilbert debate — on whether or not the Axiom Schema of Finite Induction in Arithmetic (which can today be taken to be the first-order Peano Arithmetic PA) could be treated as ‘constructive’ in some sense — dissolves once we make a distinction (introduced in [<a href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/lrt2xq0wlzo3wxx/">An16</a>]) between:</p><p><strong>Definition 1</strong>. (Algorithmic verifiability) <em>A number-theoretical relation F(x) is algorithmically verifiable if, and only if, for any specifiable natural number n, there is a deterministic algorithm AL(F, n) which can provide objective evidence for deciding the truth/falsity of each proposition in the finite sequence {F(1), F(2), . . . , F(n)}.</em></p><p><strong>Definition 2</strong>. (Algorithmic computability) <em>A number theoretical relation F(x) is algorithmically computable if, and only if, there is a deterministic algorithm AL(F) that can provide objective evidence for deciding the truth/falsity of each proposition in the denumerable sequence {F(1), F(2), . . .}.</em></p><p>We also note further that:</p><ul><li>Algorithmic <em>computability</em> implies the existence of a unique algorithm that can <em>finitarily</em> decide the truth/falsity of each proposition in a well-defined denumerable sequence of propositions; whose ‘truth’ values are therefore both <em>deterministic</em> and <em>predictable</em>; whereas</li><li>Algorithmic <em>verifiability</em> does <em>not</em> imply the existence of a unique algorithm that can <em>finitarily</em> decide the truth/falsity of each proposition in a well-defined denumerable sequence of propositions; whose ‘truth’ values are therefore <em>deterministic</em>, but not necessarily <em>predictable</em>.</li></ul><p>We note that although every algorithmically <em>computable</em> proposition is algorithmically <em>verifiable</em>, the converse is not true (see [<a href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/lrt2xq0wlzo3wxx/s">An16</a>], Theorem 1; [<a href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/gd6ffwf9wssak86/">An22</a>], §7.G, Theorem 7.2).</p><p>From the point of view of a <em>finitary</em> mathematical philosophy (see [<a href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/gd6ffwf9wssak86/">An22</a>], §1, Thesis 1) — which is the constraint within which an applied science <a href="https://medium.com/@bhup.anand/the-holy-grail-of-mathematics-is-arithmetical-truth-not-set-theoretical-proof-d8674e209952"><em>ought</em></a> to ideally operate (see also <a href="https://www.dropbox.com/scl/fi/uk8nscl18s5y034hwin1k/">this</a> preprint)— a significant consequence of the difference between algorithmic <em>verifiability</em> and algorithmic <em>computability</em> for the physical sciences is that we can now articulate a plausible:</p><p><strong>Quantum Thesis:</strong> <em>Quantum Mechanics is simply the evidence-based recognition that:</em></p><p><em>- any properties of an elementary particle,</em></p><p><em>- which can be assumed representable as determinate and predictable in a recursively well-defined — hence deterministic — mathematical model M(t) at time t,</em></p><p><em>- by algorithmically computable functions </em><strong><em>before</em></strong><em> an ‘observation’,</em></p><p><em>- can only be mathematically represented </em><strong><em>after</em></strong><em> the ‘observation’,</em></p><p><em>- in any putative model M(t+),</em></p><p><em>- which is assumed to be a </em><strong><em>conservative</em></strong><em> extension of M(t) </em><strong><em>before</em></strong><em> any </em><strong><em>further</em></strong><em> ‘observation’,</em></p><p><em>- by algorithmically verifiable, but </em><strong><em>not</em></strong><em> algorithmically computable, functions,</em></p><p><em>- whose values are determinate, but </em><strong><em>not</em></strong><em> predictable;</em></p><p><em>- since any ‘observation’ introduces an </em><strong><em>essential</em></strong><em> discontinuity in the deterministic model M(t) due to a ‘Butterfly Effect’.</em></p><p><strong>Conservative extension.</strong> <em>A theory T2 is a conservative extension of a theory T1 if the language of T2 extends the language of T1; that is, every theorem of T1 is a theorem of T2, and any theorem of T2 in the language of T1 is already a theorem of T1.</em></p><p><strong>Butterfly Effect</strong>: <em>In chaos theory, the ‘Butterfly Effect’ is the sensitive dependence on initial conditions in which a small change in one state of a deterministic, nonlinear, system can result in large differences in a later state.</em></p><p>Now, QM recognizes that:</p><p>- <em>no</em> physical ‘observation’ can be replicated <em>exactly</em> and,</p><p>- on the basis of <em>experimental</em> data,</p><p>- it is <em>possible</em> to mathematically quantify the ‘spread’ of a series of <em>controlled </em>replications at the quantum level by means of Schrödinger’s equations.</p><p>The <strong>Quantum Thesis</strong> now suggests further that:</p><p>- accepting Schrödinger’s equations as <em>faithfully</em> representing the <em>deterministic</em> ‘spread’ evidenced in results of <em>controlled</em> experimental observations at the quantum level,</p><p><em>- if</em> attributable to <em>undeniable</em> sensitive dependence on initial conditions,</p><p>- entails that the underlying laws of nature are, indeed, <em>deterministic</em>.</p><p>Moreover, accepting that such initial conditions are <em>essentially</em> indeterminate entails that — except through, <em>unfalsifiably</em> subjective, ‘divine’ revelation — <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bell%27s_theorem">Bell’s Theorem</a> entails that we can <em>never</em> mathematically formulate an algorithmically <em>computable</em> — hence <em>predictable </em>— law that faithfully represents the underlying quantum behaviour as <em>both</em> deterministic <em>and</em> predictable.</p><p>Further, since <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bell%27s_theorem">Bell’s Theorem</a> <em>only</em> applies if the properties of an elementary particle are assumed to be mathematically representable as algorithmically <em>computable</em> by the same (hidden variable) function both <em>before</em> and <em>after</em> an observation, we cannot therefore conclude from Bell’s argumentation that our mathematical representations of quantum phenomena, if accepted as essentially algorithmically <em>verifiable</em> but <em>not</em> algorithmically <em>computable</em>, must admit <em>non-locality</em> under the <strong>Quantum Thesis</strong>.</p><p><strong>II: A further significant consequence of the difference between algorithmic <em>verifiability</em> and algorithmic <em>computability</em> for the physical sciences</strong></p><p>A further significant consequence of the difference between algorithmic <em>verifiability</em> and algorithmic <em>computability</em> for the physical sciences is that we may <em>now</em> treat the decimal representation of a real number as corresponding to a physically <em>measurable</em> limit (in the sense of a physically ‘completable’ infinite sequence as needed to resolve Zeno’s famous arrow paradox) — and not only to a <em>mathematically</em> definable limit — if, and only if, such representation is definable by an algorithmically <em>computable</em> function (see [<a href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/gd6ffwf9wssak86/">An22</a>], §7.I.a).</p><p>We note that although every algorithmically <em>computable</em> relation is algorithmically <em>verifiable</em>, the converse is not true (see [<a href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/gd6ffwf9wssak86/">An22</a>], §7.G, Theorem 7.2).</p><p><strong>III: Some well-known functions that are algorithmically verifiable but not algorithmically computable</strong></p><p>We further note that:</p><p>(i) <em>All</em> the mathematically defined functions known to, and used by, science are algorithmically <em>computable</em>, including those that define transcendental numbers such as π, e, etc. They can be computed algorithmically as they are all definable as the limit of some well-defined denumerable series of rationals.</p><p>(ii) The existence of mathematical constants that are defined by functions which are algorithmically <em>verifiable</em> but not algorithmically <em>computable</em> — suggested most famously by Georg Cantor’s diagonal argument — has been a philosophically debatable deduction.</p><p>Such existential deductions have been viewed with both suspicion and scepticism by scientists such as Henri Poincaré, L. E. J. Brouwer, etc., and disputed most vociferously on philosophical grounds by others such as Ludwig Wittgenstein ([Wi78]).</p><p>(iii) A <em>constructive</em> definition of an arithmetical Boolean function [<em>(∀x)R(x)</em>] that is <em>true</em> under any well-defined Tarskian interpretation of his Peano Arithmetic P — hence algorithmically <em>verifiable</em> — but <em>not provable</em> in P — hence algorithmically <em>not computable</em> (see [<a href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/gd6ffwf9wssak86/">An22</a>], §2.F, Corollary 2.21) — was given by Kurt Gödel in his 1931 paper [Go31] on formally undecidable arithmetical propositions.</p><p>(iv) The definition of a number-theoretic function that is algorithmically <em>verifiable</em>, but <em>not</em> algorithmically <em>computable</em>, was also given by Alan Turing in his 1936 paper [Tu36] on computable numbers; where he defined a halting function, say <em>H(n)</em>, that is 0 if, and only if, the Turing machine with code number <em>n</em> halts on input <em>n</em>.</p><p>Such a function is mathematically well-defined — hence algorithmically <em>verifiable</em> — but assuming that it defines an algorithmically <em>computable</em> real number leads to a contradiction.</p><p>Turing thus concluded the mathematical existence of algorithmically <em>uncomputable</em> real numbers.</p><p>(v) A definition of a number-theoretic function that is algorithmically <em>verifiable</em> but <em>not </em>algorithmically <em>computable</em> was given by Gregory Chaitin in [Ct82]; where he defined a class of constants — denoted by Ω — which is such that if <em>C(n)</em> is the <em>n</em>’th digit in the decimal expression of an Ω constant, then the function <em>C(x)</em> is algorithmically <em>verifiable</em> but <em>not</em> algorithmically <em>computable</em>.</p><p><strong>IV: Are some physical constants also algorithmically <em>uncomputable</em>?</strong></p><p>The question arises: Are some physical constants representable by real numbers which are definable only by algorithmically <em>verifiable</em> but not algorithmically <em>computable</em> functions?</p><p>The possibility is suggested by the following perspective of one of the challenging issues in physics, which seeks to theoretically determine the magnitude of some fundamental dimensionless constants:</p><p>[<strong><em>quote</em></strong>] <em>… the numerical values of dimensionless physical constants are independent of the units used. These constants cannot be eliminated by any choice of a system of units. Such constants include:</em></p><p><em>• α, the fine structure constant, the coupling constant for the electromagnetic interaction (≈ 1/137.036). Also the square of the electron charge, expressed in Planck units. This defines the scale of charge of elementary particles with charge.</em></p><p><em>• μ or β, the proton-to-electron mass ratio, the rest mass of the proton divided by that of the electron (≈ 1836.15). More generally, the rest masses of all elementary particles relative to that of the electron.</em></p><p><em>• α_s, the coupling constant for the strong force (≈ 1)</em></p><p><em>• α_G, the gravitational coupling constant, which is the square of the electron mass, expressed in Planck units. This defines the scale of the mass of elementary particles.</em></p><p><em>At the present time, the values of the dimensionless physical constants cannot be calculated; they are determined only by physical measurement. This is one of the unsolved problems of physics. …</em></p><p><em>The list of fundamental dimensionless constants decreases when advances in physics show how some previously known constant can be computed in terms of others. A long-sought goal of theoretical physics is to find first principles from which all of the fundamental dimensionless constants can be calculated and compared to the measured values. A successful ‘Theory of Everything’ would allow such a calculation, but so far, this goal has remained elusive. </em>[<strong><em>unquote</em></strong>] … Dimensionless physical constant — Wikipedia</p><p>From the perspective of <strong>Definitions 1 </strong>and<strong> 2</strong>, we could now suggest that:</p><p><strong>Thesis 1.</strong> (Dimensionless constants) <em>Some of the dimensionless physical constants are only representable in a mathematical language as ‘unmeasurable’ real numbers that are defined by quantum functions which are algorithmically verifiable, but not algorithmically computable.</em></p><p>In other words, we cannot treat such constants as denoting — even in principle — a measurable limit, as we could a constant that is representable mathematically by a real number that is definable by algorithmically <em>computable</em> functions.</p><p>One reason <em>why</em> dimensionless physical constants may not be representable in a mathematical language L as ‘measurable’ real numbers might be that they are determined <em>only</em> at a measurement by the mathematical model M(L) of the physical phenomena sought to be represented by the model <em>before</em> the measurement.</p><p>If so, the value of a dimensionless constant in a mathematical model M(L) of physical phenomena <em>before</em> a measurement must differ from the value of the dimensionless constant in a <em>post-facto</em> mathematical model M(L1) of the phenomena which seeks to predict the consequences of the measurement.</p><p>In other words, if the values of some dimensionless constants are defined by ‘quantum’ functions which are algorithmically <em>verifiable</em>, but not algorithmically <em>computable</em>, then they are of an evolving nature (compare with Gisin’s perspective in [Gi19] and [Gi20] that such functions are relatively random; see also [<a href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/gd6ffwf9wssak86/">An22</a>], §7.G, Definition 27).</p><p>Such values ‘unfold’ only as, and when, a measurement <em>on</em> a putative model M(L) — of a mathematical theory L that seeks to faithfully represent observations of some physical phenomena <em>before</em> a measurement — is sought to be integrated into a putative model M(L1) of a <em>conservative extension</em> L1 of the theory L <em>after</em> the measurement (in the sense of [<a href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/gd6ffwf9wssak86/">An22</a>], §23.B.a).</p><p><strong>V: Classical and Neo-classical laws of nature</strong></p><p>From the point of view of mathematical philosophy, this distinction would be expressed by the theses (the significance of this is highlighted in [<a href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/gd6ffwf9wssak86/">An22</a>], §20.C; see also [<a href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/gd6ffwf9wssak86/">An22</a>], §7.I.a, Theorem 7.6):</p><p><strong>Thesis 2.</strong> (Unmeasurable constants) <em>Whilst a symbol for an ‘unmeasurable’ physical constant may be introduced into a physical theory as a primitive term without inviting inconsistency in the theory, the sequence of digits in the decimal representation of the ‘measure’ of an ‘unmeasurable’ physical constant cannot be treated in the mathematical language of the theory as a ‘completed’ denumerable sequence whose ‘measure’ is the Cauchy limit of the sequence.</em></p><p><strong>Thesis 3.</strong> (Measurable constants) <em>The sequence corresponding to the decimal representation of the ‘measure’ of a ‘measurable’ physical constant, when introduced as a primitive term into a physical theory, can be treated as a ‘completed’ denumerable sequence, whose ‘measure’ is the Cauchy limit of the sequence in the mathematical language of the theory, without inviting inconsistency.</em></p><p>We note that Zeno’s paradoxical arguments (see [Rus37], pp.347–353; as qualified, however, by [<a href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/gd6ffwf9wssak86/">An22</a>], §20.C.b) highlight the philosophical and theological dichotomy between our essentially ‘continuous’ perception of the physical reality that we seek to capture with our measurements, and the essential ‘discreteness’ of any mathematical language of arithmetic in which we seek to express such measurements categorically.</p><p>The evidence-based distinction between algorithmically <em>verifiable </em>and algorithmically <em>computable</em> arithmetical functions could be seen as reflecting the dichotomy mathematically.</p><p>The evidence-based distinction between algorithmic <em>verifiability</em> (<strong>Definition 1</strong>) and algorithmic <em>computability</em> (<strong>Definition 2</strong>) suggests that classical mechanics could be held as complete with respect to the algorithmically <em>computable</em> representation of our observations of physical phenomena, in the sense that:</p><p><strong>Thesis 4.</strong> (Classical laws) <em>Classical laws of nature determine the nature and behaviour of all those properties of the physical world which are mathematically describable completely at any moment of time t(n) by algorithmically computable functions from a given initial state at time t(0).</em></p><p>In other words, Classical laws are characterised by the property that if a physical process is representable by a Cauchy sequence, then the limit of the sequence corresponds to a limiting state of the physical process.</p><p>However:</p><p><strong>Thesis 5.</strong> (Neo-classical laws) <em>Neo-classical laws of nature determine the nature and behaviour of those properties of the physical world which are describable completely at any moment of time t(n) by algorithmically verifiable functions; however such properties are not completely describable by algorithmically computable functions from any given initial state at time t(0).</em></p><p>In other words, Neo-classical laws are characterised by the property that if a physical process is representable by a Cauchy sequence, then the limit of the sequence need not correspond to a limiting state of the physical process; which may require an additional, conceivably probabilistic, law to deterministically govern the permissible states of the physical process at the limit.</p><p>Since such behaviour follows fixed laws and is thus <em>determinate</em> (even if not algorithmically <em>predictable</em> by classical laws, since their limiting states are revealed only as probabilities), the hypothetical universe considered in [<a href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/gd6ffwf9wssak86/">An22</a>], §20.D.c suggests that Albert Einstein could have been justified in his belief (in the sense of [<a href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/gd6ffwf9wssak86/">An22</a>], §13.F), reiterated in 1943 to William Hermanns:</p><p>[<strong><em>quote</em></strong>] <em>As I have said so many times, God doesn’t play dice with the world. </em>[<strong><em>unquote</em></strong>] … Hermanns: [Her83], p.58.</p><p>‘Justified’ from the evidence-based perspective of this investigation if, by ‘play dice’, Einstein’s belief/remark could be interpreted:</p><p>- as intending that the probabilities considered in current quantum-mechanical descriptions of physical processes cannot be taken to be defined over a probability space <em>globally</em> (compare [<a href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/gd6ffwf9wssak86/">An22</a>], §22.A, Theorem 22.3);</p><p>- but allowing the possibility that such probabilities may be definable in terms of <em>locally</em> definable probability spaces (as argued in the case of defining the probability of an integer <em>n</em> being a prime in [<a href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/gd6ffwf9wssak86/">An22</a>], §22.A and §22.A.d).</p><p>In <a href="https://medium.com/@bhup.anand/an-intuitively-plausible-understanding-of-the-mathematical-representations-of-quantum-phenomena-ii-0c7a686c6133">Part II</a> of this exposition—intended for a lay audience and extracted essentially from my book [<a href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/gd6ffwf9wssak86/">An22</a>], §23 — we shall consider the consequences of the above distinction between algorithmic <em>verifiability</em>, and algorithmic <em>computability</em>, for an intuitively plausible understanding of the mathematical representations of quantum phenomena; as addressed by the following:</p><p><strong>Quantum Query.</strong> <em>What would introducing experimental observations — which implicitly subsume ‘free will’ — into a mathematical model entail?</em></p><p><strong>References</strong></p><p>[An16] Bhupinder Singh Anand. 2016. <em>The truth assignments that differentiate human reasoning from mechanistic reasoning: The evidence-based argument for Lucas’ Gödelian thesis</em>. In <em>Cognitive Systems Research</em>. Volume 40, December 2016, 35–45.</p><p><a href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/lrt2xq0wlzo3wxx/s">https://www.dropbox.com/s/lrt2xq0wlzo3wxx/s</a></p><p>[An22] … 2024. <em>The Significance of Evidence-based Reasoning in Mathematics, Mathematics Education, Philosophy, and the Natural Sciences</em>. Second edition (Revision). DBA Publishing, Mumbai, India.</p><p><a href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/gd6ffwf9wssak86/">https://www.dropbox.com/s/gd6ffwf9wssak86/</a></p><p>[Ct82] Gregory J. Chaitin. 1982. <em>Gödel’s Theorem and Information</em>. In <em>International Journal of Theoretical Physics</em> (1982) 21, pp. 941–954. Kluwer Academic Publishers-Plenum Publishers.</p><p><a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02084159">https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02084159</a></p><p>[Gi19] Nicolas Gisin. 2019. <em>Real numbers are the hidden variables of classical mechanics</em>. In <em>Quantum Studies: Mathematics and Foundations</em> (2019). SpringerLink, Springer Nature Switzerland AG.</p><p><a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s40509-019-00211-8">https://doi.org/10.1007/s40509-019-00211-8</a></p><p>[Gi20] … 2020. <em>Mathematical languages shape our understanding of time in physics</em>. In <em>Nature Physics</em>, Volume 16, pp.114–116. Springer Nature Limited.</p><p><a href="https://doi.org/10.1038/s41567-019-0748-5">https://doi.org/10.1038/s41567-019-0748-5</a></p><p>[Go31] Kurt Gödel. 1931. <em>On formally undecidable propositions of Principia Mathematica and related systems I</em>. Translated by Elliott Mendelson. In M. Davis (ed.), 1965, <em>The Undecidable</em>. Raven Press, New York.</p><p>[Her83] William Hermanns and Albert Einstein. 1983. <em>Einstein and the Poet: In Search of the Cosmic Man. </em>Biography and Autobiography, Branden Press, 1983.</p><p><a href="https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Albert_Einstein">https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Albert_Einstein</a></p><p>[Rus37] Bertrand Russell. 1937. <em>The Principles of Mathematics</em>. Second Edition, 1937. George Allen &amp; Unwin Ltd., London.</p><p>[Tu36] Alan Turing. 1936. <em>On computable numbers, with an application to the Entscheidungsproblem</em>. In M. Davis (ed.), 1965, <em>The Undecidable</em>. Raven Press, New York. Reprinted from the <em>Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society</em>, ser. 2. vol. 42 (1936–7), pp.230–265; corrections, Ibid, vol 43 (1937) pp.544–546.</p><p>[Wi78] Ludwig Wittgenstein. 1937. <em>Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics</em>. 1978 ed., MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.</p><p><a href="https://medium.com/@bhup.anand/an-intuitively-plausible-understanding-of-the-mathematical-representations-of-quantum-phenomena-ii-0c7a686c6133"><strong><em>Next</em></strong></a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9c4120c6e926" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Holy Grail of Mathematics Is Arithmetical Truth, Not Set-Theoretical Proof]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@bhup.anand/the-holy-grail-of-mathematics-is-arithmetical-truth-not-set-theoretical-proof-d8674e209952?source=rss-893c35d577c0------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d8674e209952</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[mathematics-education]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[peano-arithmetic]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[set-theory]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mathematics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mathematical-logic]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Bhupinder Singh Anand]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 20 Jul 2024 14:17:33 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-09-28T08:36:34.401Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>The Impending Crisis in Mathematics</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1010/1*tNZ-RSG1UcUfuxYeczdESQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>In an impassioned <a href="https://medium.com/@jpolak/math-is-running-out-of-problems-14f2911fa46b">perspective</a> that ‘<em>Math is running out of problems</em>’, Jason Polak vividly challenges what he perceives as the blinkered vision of current mathematical pedagogy variously in his remarks that:</p><p>[<strong><em>quote</em></strong>] <em>The truth is, in most cases, modern-day research mathematics is confined to the interest of a handful of people for any given research topic, and that is becoming more and more exaggerated every day. … At what point can we still say with a straight face that it makes sense to pour millions of dollars into mathematics research when its only objective seems [to be] reaching the next highest peak of hyper-specialization? Is all this worth it [just to] produce solutions that will be interesting to about twenty people per paper? It is like the public funding climbers to reach the peaks of Everest or K2. … Graduate students in the future should no longer have to prove something totally new. Instead, their main aim could be simplifying an elegant and truly interesting result of the past. … A culture that encourages endless new research is like pushing an artist to paint dozens of new paintings, even when they have nothing to paint. The resulting ugliness is worse than useless, and goes against the human spirit.</em> [<strong><em>unquote</em></strong>]</p><p><strong>I: HOW ACUTE <em>IS</em> THE PROBLEM?</strong></p><p>The relevance of Polak’s perspective is highlighted by the August 2023 <a href="https://sites.google.com/view/wvusmdsreview/home?authuser=0">developments</a> in West Virginia University, apropos the announcement that new admissions to post-graduate courses in mathematics and mathematics research might no longer be offered by the University from the next academic year.</p><p>(See also Combinatorialist Igor Pak’s 2019 <a href="https://igorpak.wordpress.com/2019/04/07/what-if-math-dies/">post</a> ‘<em>What if math dies?</em>’ in his blog <em>Views on life and math</em>)</p><p>Significantly, in a seemingly prescient 1999 ‘spoof’ essay ‘<em>Real fish, real numbers, real jobs</em>’ [<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/BF03024838">Wlb99</a>], mathematician Norman Wildberger had essentially sought to caution both emerging mathematicians, and their teachers, against conflating worthwhile <em>falsifiable</em> mathematical research with the futile pursuit of essentially <em>unfalsifiable</em>, even if formally <em>provable</em>, theorems in the fecundity of artificially defined axiomatic systems that have no plausible mathematical or real-life model (hence are of debatable scientific or social value); a pursuit seemingly aimed predominantly, even then, at the increasing publishing of intellectually impressive, but arcane, ‘research’ purely for ‘embellishing’ job-oriented curriculum vitae.</p><p>A caution that can be viewed as implicit — albeit from a different perspective — in Melvyn B. Nathanson’s 2008 essay [<a href="https://arxiv.org/pdf/0809.1372">Na08</a>]: ‘<em>Desperately Seeking Mathematical Truth</em>’; where Nathanson sought to highlight the significance for the mathematical sciences when essentially ‘absolute’ authority is vested by society — albeit tacitly — upon academic ‘bosses’ (a reference, presumably, to the collective of reputed, and respected, experts in any field of human endeavour):</p><p>[<strong><em>quote</em></strong>] <em>… many great and important theorems don’t actually have proofs. They have sketches of proofs, outlines of arguments, hints and intuitions that were obvious to the author (at least, at the time of writing) and that, hopefully, are understood and believed by some part of the mathematical community.</em></p><p><em>But the community itself is tiny. In most fields of mathematics there are few experts. Indeed, there are very few active research mathematicians in the world, and many important problems, so the ratio of the number of mathematicians to the number of problems is small. In every field, there are “bosses” who proclaim the correctness or incorrectness of a new result, and its importance or unimportance.</em></p><p><em>Sometimes they disagree, like gang leaders fighting over turf. In any case, there is a web of semi-proved theorems throughout mathematics. Our knowledge of the truth of a theorem depends on the correctness of its proof and on the correctness of all of the theorems used in its proof. It is a shaky foundation.</em> [<strong><em>unquote</em></strong>]</p><p>Nathanson’s comments are intriguing, because addressing such ambiguity in critical cases — such as categorical communication between mechanical artefacts, or a putative communication between terrestrial and extra-terrestrial intelligences — is the very raison d’être of mathematical activity!</p><p>A similar caution is reflected obliquely in Elliott Mendelson’s earlier 1990 article [<a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2026831?seq=1">Me90</a>]: ‘<em>Second Thoughts About Church’s Thesis and Mathematical Proofs</em>’; where Mendelson implicitly implied that uncritically inherited definitions of various foundational elements can be argued as being either ambiguous, or non-constructive, or both:</p><p>[<strong><em>quote</em></strong>] <em>Here is the main conclusion I wish to draw: it is completely unwarranted to say that CT is unprovable just because it states an equivalence between a vague, imprecise notion (effectively computable function) and a precise mathematical notion (partial-recursive function). … The concepts and assumptions that support the notion of partial-recursive function are, in an essential way, no less vague and imprecise than the notion of effectively computable function; the former are just more familiar and are part of a respectable theory with connections to other parts of logic and mathematics. (The notion of effectively computable function could have been incorporated into an axiomatic presentation of classical mathematics, but the acceptance of CT made this unnecessary.) … Functions are defined in terms of sets, but the concept of set is no clearer than that of function and a foundation of mathematics can be based on a theory using function as primitive notion instead of set. Tarski’s definition of truth is formulated in set-theoretic terms, but the notion of set is no clearer than that of truth. The model-theoretic definition of logical validity is based ultimately on set theory, the foundations of which are no clearer than our intuitive understanding of logical validity. … The notion of Turing-computable function is no clearer than, nor more mathematically useful (foundationally speaking) than, the notion of an effectively computable function.</em> [<strong><em>unquote</em></strong>]</p><p>Consequently, standard interpretations of classical theory may, inadvertently, be weakening a desirable perception of mathematics as the lingua franca of scientific expression, by ignoring the possibility that, since mathematics is indisputably accepted as the language that most effectively expresses and communicates semantic truth, the widening chasm between:</p><ul><li>an <em>under-estimation</em> of the <em>value</em> of semantic arithmetical truth to society, and</li><li>an <em>over-estimation</em> of the <em>value</em> of syntactic set-theoretical provability to society;</li></ul><p>must, of necessity, be bridged <em>explicitly</em>.</p><p><strong>II: <em>IS</em> THERE A SOLUTION TO THE COMMON CONCERN?</strong></p><p>The question arises: <em>Is there a solution to the common concern amongst these apprehensions</em>?</p><p>One possible answer may lie in the perspective that current — essentially inherited — mathematical paradigms of what is entailed by David Hilbert’s development of <em>proof theory</em>, and by L. E. J. Brouwer’s development of <em>constructive mathematics</em>, appear contradictory <em>only</em> because they fail to adequately accommodate the thesis that, as reportedly (see Juliette Kennedy [<a href="https://www.academia.edu/58886640/">Knd13</a>], <em>Introduction</em>) believed by Hilbert prior to 1929:</p><p><strong><em>COMPLEMENTARITY THESIS</em></strong>: <em>Mathematical ‘provability’ and mathematical ‘truth’ need to be interdependent and complementary, ‘evidence-based’, assignments-by-convention towards achieving:</em></p><p><strong><em>(1)</em></strong><em> The goal of proof theory, post Peano, Dedekind and Hilbert, which is:</em></p><p><em>— to uniquely characterise each informally defined mathematical structure S (e.g., the Peano Postulates and their associated, classical, predicate logic),</em></p><p><em>– by a corresponding, formal, first-order language L, and a set P of finitary axioms/axiom schemas and rules of inference (e.g., the first-order Peano Arithmetic PA and its associated first-order logic FOL),</em></p><p><em>- which assign unique provability values (provable/unprovable) to each well-formed proposition of the language L without contradiction;</em></p><p><strong><em>(2)</em></strong><em> The goal of constructive mathematics, post Brouwer and Tarski, which must be:</em></p><p><em>— to assign unique, evidence-based, truth values (true/false) to each well-formed proposition of the language L,</em></p><p><em>– under an, unarguably constructive, well-defined interpretation I over the domain D of the structure S,</em></p><p><em>- such that the provable formulas of L are true under the interpretation.</em></p><p>In other words:</p><p>(a) Whilst the goal of <em>proof theory</em> may be viewed as seeking to ensure that any mathematical language intended to formally represent our pre-formal conceptual metaphors and their inter-relatedness is unambiguous, and free from contradiction;</p><p>(b) The goal of <em>constructive mathematics</em> must be viewed as seeking to ensure that any such representation does, indeed, uniquely identify and adequately represent such metaphors and their inter-relatedness; thus essentially ‘validating’ them in the sense of Per Martin-Löf’s 1987 analysis [<a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/20116466">Mlf87</a>] of the meaning and truth of a proposition, which can be treated as:</p><p><strong><em>Löf’s Thesis</em></strong>: <em>A proposition ‘A’ is a ‘truth’ if, and only if, it can be ‘asserted or judged’ as ‘A is true’ by appeal to some ‘evidence/proof’ for the truth of A which can be ‘validated’.</em></p><p>The thesis here is that, by universally ignoring the need to introduce goal (b) <em>explicitly</em> in our curriculum, and restricting the teaching of, and research in, mathematics at the post-graduate level primarily to goal (a), we can no longer justify the value of goal (a) to society beyond the mere intellectual stimulation of select individual minds; minds whose — increasingly arcane and possibly unfalsifiable abstractions — may have little interest, or incentive, in justifying to society its investment in their development.</p><p>In other words, if we give credence to another thesis of this investigation, namely that mathematics is essentially the search for a language of, ideally, categorical communication which must <em>serve</em> natural science and philosophy, then:</p><ul><li>it is incumbent upon mathematicians and logicians to pay adequate heed to, and help mitigate, by appropriate articulation,</li><li>the difficulties faced in understanding the strictures imposed by mathematical languages on the intellectual pursuits and perspectives of scholars in philosophy and the natural sciences who, ultimately,</li><li>undertake the responsibility of providing to lay societies a coherent perspective of their observations and conceptions, of a common external reality,</li><li>in mathematical languages that can be relied upon for ensuring unambiguous and effective communication in practical endeavours, and situations,</li><li>that are subject to, and adjudicated within, systems of common law.</li></ul><p>We deliberately use the term ‘serve’, albeit with both apologies and acknowledgement, to the shades of G. H. Hardy for his insightful, and seemingly prescient, essay [<a href="https://web.njit.edu/~akansu/PAPERS/GHHardy-AMathematiciansApology.pdf">Har40</a>]!</p><p>`Prescient’ because, if we ignore the polemical element in the distinction Hardy seeks to draw between the `pure’ and `applied’ mathematics of his times, Hardy’s emphasis on `beautiful’ versus `prosaic’ mathematics — seemingly similar to that of Jason Polak in his <a href="https://medium.com/@jpolak/math-is-running-out-of-problems-14f2911fa46b">perspective</a> that ‘<em>Math is running out of problems</em>’— can be viewed as intuitively reflecting the <em>evidence-based</em> distinction, introduced in [<a href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/lrt2xq0wlzo3wxx/s">An16</a>], between:</p><ul><li>algorithmically <em>verifiable</em> `mathematical truth’ as recognisable by a human intelligence (as sought to be articulated by [<a href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/lrt2xq0wlzo3wxx/s">An16</a>], <em>Thesis 1</em>); and</li><li>algorithmically <em>computable</em> `mathematical proof’ recognisable by a machine intelligence (as articulated by [<a href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/lrt2xq0wlzo3wxx/s">An16</a>], <em>Theorem 7.1. Provability Theorem for PA</em>);</li></ul><p>a distinction that is sought to be formalised further in [<a href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/gd6ffwf9wssak86/">An22</a>], <em>§21.E. Are you a man or a machine: A Definitive Turing Test</em>.</p><p><strong>III: DO SUCH CONCERNS REFLECT A <em>SYSTEMIC</em> FAILURE?</strong></p><p>The failure to accommodate the perspective of such a <strong><em>Complementarity Thesis</em></strong> — which emphasizes the <em>inalienable</em> bond between mathematical ‘proof’ and mathematical ‘truth’ as sought to be highlighted by Markus Pantsar in [<a href="https://helda.helsinki.fi/bitstream/handle/10138/19432/truthpro.pdf?sequence=2">Pan09</a>] — can be viewed as reflecting a deeper systemic failure; which is the making of an — admittedly arbitrary — distinction between (compare Penelope Maddy [<a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755020308080027">Ma08</a>]; see also Solomon Feferman [<a href="http://www.jstor.org/stable/2589047">Fe99</a>]):</p><p><strong><em>(1)</em></strong> <strong><em>The natural scientist’s hat</em></strong>, <em>whose wearer’s responsibility is recording — as precisely and as objectively as possible — our sensory observations (corresponding to what some cognitive scientists, such as George Lakoff and Rafael Núñez term as ‘primary’, and ‘secondary’, conceptual metaphors in [LR00])</em>;</p><p>By ‘primary conceptual metaphors’, we refer here to metaphors that a human mind conceives, corresponding to physical states of an individual brain which are rooted in the mind’s awareness of phenomena that are accepted as existing in a commonly accepted, external, physical reality.</p><p>By ‘secondary conceptual metaphors’, we refer here to metaphors that a human mind conceives, corresponding to physical states of an individual brain which are rooted in the mind’s awareness of phenomena that are accepted as existing only in the individual mind’s perceptions of the symbolic representations of a commonly accepted, external, physical reality.</p><p><strong><em>(2)</em></strong> <strong><em>The philosopher’s hat</em></strong>, <em>whose wearer’s responsibility is abstracting a coherent — albeit informal and not necessarily objective — holistic perspective of the external world from the natural scientist’s sensory observations and their associated perceptions (corresponding to what Markus Pantsar terms as pre-formal mathematics in [</em><a href="https://helda.helsinki.fi/bitstream/handle/10138/19432/truthpro.pdf?sequence=2"><em>Pan09</em></a><em>]; or to Rudolf Carnap’s explicandum in [Ca62a])</em>;</p><p>By the procedure of explication, Carnap meant the transformation of an inexact, prescientific concept, the explicandum, into a new exact concept, the explicatum:</p><p>[<strong><em>quote</em></strong>] <em>Although the explicandum cannot be given in exact terms, it should be made as clear as possible by informal explanations and examples. … A concept must fulfill the following requirements in order to be an adequate explicatum for a given explicandum: (1) similarity to the explicandum, (2) exactness, (3) fruitfulness, (4) simplicity.</em> [<strong><em>unquote</em></strong>]</p><p><strong><em>(3)</em></strong> <strong><em>The mathematician’s hat</em></strong>, <em>whose wearer’s responsibility is providing the tools for adequately expressing such recordings and abstractions in a symbolic language of unambiguous communication (corresponding to Carnap’s explicatum in [Ca62a]).</em></p><p>We could view this distinction as seeking to address the questions of:</p><p>– <strong><em>What</em></strong> we do in scientific disciplines;</p><p>– <strong><em>Why</em></strong> we do what we do in scientific disciplines; and</p><p>– <strong><em>How</em></strong> we seek to express and communicate whatever it is that we do in scientific disciplines.</p><p>Philosophically, we could go even further and view the above activities holistically: as providing merely the means by which a ‘self-aware’ intelligence, such as that of homo sapiens, instinctively strives to realise its own creative — largely latent — potential within the evolutionary arrow of a, perpetually-changing, environment that not only gives birth to, but nurtures and encourages, a species to continually adapt to survive unforeseen and unforeseeable life-threatening challenges (including those that may be created by the species shooting itself in the foot).</p><p>‘Largely latent’ since it is scientific folklore that an ‘average’ human brain, during its lifetime, is estimated to have perceptively — as measured by posthumous brain scans — used only about 4–10% of its capacity to address the challenges that, over the estimated millions/billions of years of its evolution, the brain has met and adapted to in order to survive.</p><p><strong>IV: <em>IS</em> THERE A SOLUTION?</strong></p><p>A significant consequence of the preceding perspective is that we may now <em>need</em> to recognize <em>explicitly</em> in our basic mathematical education that evidence-based reasoning:</p><p><strong><em>(a)</em></strong> <em>restricts the ability of highly expressive mathematical languages, such as the first-order Zermelo-Fraenkel Set Theory ZF, to categorically communicate abstract concepts (corresponding to Lakoff and Núñez’s conceptual metaphors in [LR00]) such as those involving Cantor’s first limit ordinal ω</em>;</p><p>From an evidence-based perspective, the restricted ability of languages such as ZF to categorically communicate even a putative <em>semantic</em> interpretation of set-theoretical proofs, reflects Gualtiero Piccinini’s distinction between ‘<em>Justified True Belief</em>’ and ‘<em>Factually Grounded Belief</em>’; and his thesis in [<a href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/cw9e9wuj6ee61vo/">Pic19</a>] that we can only term — and, implicitly, categorically communicate — the latter as ‘<em>knowledge</em>’.</p><p>In other words, the <em>provable</em> propositions of any set theory which admits an axiom of infinity can be seen to be axiomatically ‘<em>Justified True Beliefs</em>’ that cannot, however, be treated as ‘<em>knowledge</em>’ (thus lending credibility to the August 2023 <a href="https://sites.google.com/view/wvusmdsreview/home?authuser=0">announcement</a> by West Virginia University of its intent to discontinue — essentially <em>set-theoretically </em>expressed<em> — </em>post-graduate courses in mathematics teaching and research), and categorically communicated as ‘<em>Factually Grounded Beliefs</em>’; since such a theory does not admit of a <em>finitary</em> interpretation (model).</p><p>The point is sought to be emphatically expressed by Peter Simons in his brief, but cogent, critique [<a href="https://ontology.buffalo.edu/04/AgainstSetTheory.pdf">Sms04</a>] of the uncritical, and unsuspectedly crippling, acceptance of Set Theory as the <em>lingua franca</em> of scientific discourse not only in mathematics, but also in philosophy and the natural sciences:</p><p>[<strong><em>quote</em></strong>] <em>Even within mathematics some uses of set theory are questionable. It is usual to interpret numbers of various kinds as sets, but as Benacerraf (1965) showed, this leads to the pseudo-question which sets the numbers should be. Numbers are old and very useful, whereas sets are new and problematic. To explicate numbers as sets is to explain the clear by the obscure. The obscurity turns on the fact that set theory has no natural interpretation.</em> [<strong><em>unquote</em></strong>]</p><p><strong><em>(b)</em></strong> <em>restricts the ability of effectively communicating mathematical languages, such as the first-order Peano Arithmetic PA, to well-define infinite concepts such as ω.</em></p><p>From the evidence-based perspective of the 2016 <a href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/lrt2xq0wlzo3wxx/s">paper</a> [<a href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/lrt2xq0wlzo3wxx/s">An16</a>], the restricted ability of languages such as PA to well-define infinite concepts — such as Cantor’s first transfinite ordinal ω — reflects the fact that PA is categorical (see [<a href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/lrt2xq0wlzo3wxx/s">An16</a>], <em>Corollary 7.2</em>); and cannot therefore admit properties of terms that, by Piccinini’s distinction, interpret as ‘<em>Justified True Beliefs</em>’ but not ‘<em>Factually Grounded Beliefs</em>’.</p><p>In other words, the provable propositions of any arithmetic such as PA are axiomatically ‘<em>Justified True Beliefs</em>’ that can, further, be treated under any well-defined interpretation of PA as ‘<em>knowledge</em>’, since it can be categorically communicated as ‘<em>Factually Grounded Beliefs</em>’.</p><p><strong>V: HOW DEEP-SEATED IS THE <em>MISLEADING</em> VIEW OF SET THEORY AS THE LINGUA FRANCA OF MATHEMATICS?</strong></p><p>In view of the unarguable power of ZFC as an unsurpassed language of rich and adequate expression of mathematically expressible abstract concepts precisely, it is not surprising that, as expressed unapologetically by set-theorist Saharon Shelah (in [<a href="https://arxiv.org/pdf/math/0211397.pdf">She91</a>]; see also [<a href="https://faculty.sites.uci.edu/pjmaddy/bibliography/">Ma18</a>] and [<a href="https://bookstore.ams.org/conm-690/">Ma18a</a>]), ZFC is <em>widely</em> perceived —<em> unjustifiably</em>, from the view of the preceding evidence-based perspective — with both conviction and authority as essentially expressing <em>all</em> possible mathematical ‘truths’ in currently inherited paradigms which, ironically, interpret Tarski’s Theorem on the recursive indefinability of ‘arithmetical truth’ within arithmetic as entailing that ‘arithmetical truth’ is absolutely not definable formally (an entailment now falsified by [<a href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/lrt2xq0wlzo3wxx/s">An16</a>]):</p><p>“<em>My feeling is that ZFC exhausts our intuition except for things like consistency statements, so a proof means a proof in ZFC.</em>” … Shelah: [<a href="https://arxiv.org/pdf/math/0211397.pdf">She91</a>], p.3</p><p>A similar thesis is, curiously, reflected as ‘<em>fact</em>’ in John R. Steel’s ‘<em>Mathematics Needs New Axioms</em>’:</p><p>“<em>It is a familiar but remarkable fact that all mathematical languages can be translated into the language of set theory, and all theorems of ‘ordinary’ mathematics can be proved in ZFC.</em>” … Steel: [<a href="http://www.jstor.org/stable/420965">FFMS</a>], p.423.</p><p>The belief that the set theory ZFC is a lingua franca of <em>verifiable</em> mathematics — despite the essential <em>non-verifiability</em> of the axiom of infinity in any evidence-based interpretation of the theory — is reflected curiously in recent arguments by Sieg and Walsh on the verifiability of formalizations of the Cantor-Bernstein Theorem in ZF, via the proof assistant AProS, which ‘<em>allows the direct construction of formal proofs</em>’ — containing essentially <em>faith-based</em> quantifiers (see the <a href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/gd6ffwf9wssak86/">book</a> [An22], §7.B) — ‘<em>that are humanly intelligible</em>’:</p><p>“<em>The language of set theory is, however, the lingua franca of contemporary mathematics and ZF its foundation. So it seems both important and expedient to use ZF for the project of formalizing proofs naturally.</em>” … Sieg and Walsh: [<a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S175502031900056X">SW17</a>].</p><p>The reason such a belief does not seem <em>unreasonable</em> is that it reflects conventional wisdom which — for over a generation — has been explicitly echoed in standard texts and literature with increasing certitude:</p><p>“<em>It is not at all obvious at first glance that every mathematical discipline can be reduced to a formalized theory of the standard type. The crucial point here consists in carrying out such a reduction for the general theory of sets, since as we know from the work of Frege and his followers, and in particular from Whitehead and Russell’s Principia Mathematica, the whole of mathematics can be formalized within set theory.</em>” … Tarski: ([<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/01445349508837247">Ta39</a>], p.164)</p><p>“<em>… NBG apparently can serve as a foundation for all present-day mathematics (i.e., it is clear to every mathematician that every mathematical theorem can be translated and proved within NBG, or within extensions of NBG obtained by adding various extra axioms such as the Axiom of Choice) …</em>” … Mendelson: ([Me64], p.193)</p><p>“<em>Today set theory plays a role similar to that played by Euclidean geometry for over over 15 centuries (up to the time of the construction of mathematical analysis by Newton and Leibniz). Namely, it is a universal axiomatic theory for modern mathematics. … We conjecture that set theory will remain the most useful and inspiring universal theory on which all of mathematics can be based.</em>” … Marek and Mycielski: ([<a href="http://www.jstor.org/stable/2695803">MM01</a>], p.459 &amp; p.467 respectively)</p><p>“<em>Such is the case, for instance, with the formal systems considered in works on set theory, such as the one known as ZFC, which are adequate for formalizing essentially all accepted mathematical proofs.</em>” … Boolos, Burgess, and Jeffrey: ([BBJ03], p.225)</p><p>“<em>I discuss three potential sources of evidence for truth in set theory, coming from set theory’s roles as a branch of mathematics and as a foundation for mathematics as well as from the intrinsic maximality feature of the set concept. I predict that new non first-order axioms will be discovered for which there is evidence of all three types, and that these axioms will have significant first-order consequences which will be regarded as true statements of set theory.</em>” … Sy-David Friedman: [Fsd16] (Abstract.)</p><p>“<em>Of course axiomatic set theory can be heartily congratulated for its success in providing a foundation for mathematics. An overwhelming case can be made that when theorems are proved in mathematics they can be regarded as theorems of a mild extension of ZFC (compatible with V = L). In particular, we routinely expect questions in mathematics to be answerable (perhaps with great difficulty!) in a mild extension of ZFC.</em>” … Sy-David Friedman: [Fsd16] (§3 Set Theory as a Foundation for Mathematics.)</p><p>“<em>The system of set theory introduced by Zermelo in [Zermelo, 1908] was intended to show, ‘how the entire theory created by Cantor and Dedekind can be reduced to a few definitions and seven principles, or axioms, which appear to be mutually independent.’ … That is in full harmony with Zermelo’s view of set theory as ‘that branch of mathematics whose task is to investigate mathematically the fundamental notions ‘number’, ‘order’, and ‘function’, taking them in their pristine, simple form, and to develop thereby the logical foundations of all of arithmetic and analysis; thus it constitutes an indispensable component of the science of mathematics.’ [Zermelo, 1908, p. 261]</em></p><p><em>A little more than ten years later, Hilbert discussed in 1920 Zermelo’s axiom system and claims that it is the ‘most comprehensive mathematical system’. He supports that claim by a penetrating observation:</em></p><p><em>“The theory which results from the development of the consequences of this axiom system [Zermelo’s] encompasses all mathematical theories (like number theory, analysis, geometry), in the sense that the relations which obtain between the objects of these mathematical disciplines are represented in a perfectly corresponding way by relations which obtain within a subdomain of Zermelo’s set theory. [Hilbert, 2013, p. 292]</em>” … Sieg and Walsh: [<a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S175502031900056X">SW17</a>].</p><p>It is a belief that, curiously, is tacitly shared even by computer scientists, such as Sanjeev Arora and Boaz Barak, whose discipline epitomises constructive mathematical practices; and who apparently conflate the recursive definability of a first-order language with the recursive definability of any putative interpretation of the language:</p><p>“<em>Mathematics can be axiomatized using for example the Zermelo Frankel system, which has a finite description.</em>” … Arora and Barak: ([<a href="http://www.cs.princeton.edu/theory/complexity/">Ar09</a>], pp.2.24(60), Ex.6, Ch.2.)</p><p>From this it is but a short step to non-constructive perspectives — such as Gödel’s Platonic, and equally <em>unjustified</em>, interpretation of his own formal reasoning in his 1931 paper [Go31] (see also [Ka91]) — which <em>unjustifiably</em> conclude that PA must have non-standard models (‘unjustifiably’ since the categoricity of PA is proven in [<a href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/lrt2xq0wlzo3wxx/s">An16</a>], <em>Corollary 7.2</em>).</p><p>Moreover, the semantic and logical paradoxes — as also the seeming paradoxes associated with ‘fractal’ constructions such as the Cantor ternary set — seem to arise out of an attempt to ask of the language of Set Theory ‘mathematical truths’, when all that such theories are designed for is to deliver ‘mathematical proofs’ which may not only be <em>unfalsifiable</em>, but <em>contradictory</em> to the evidence-based ‘reality’ of the universe we commonly inhabit.</p><p><strong>VI: WHY THERE CAN BE <em>NO</em> MATHEMATICAL OF META-MATHEMATICAL PROOF OF CONSISTENCY FOR ZF</strong></p><p>The point is highlighted in the <a href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/gd6ffwf9wssak86/">book</a> [<a href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/gd6ffwf9wssak86/">An22</a>] (and briefly in <a href="https://medium.com/@bhup.anand/whither-goodsteins-theorem-ccf03cf34c7b">this</a> Medium essay), which establishes the following conclusions variously in:</p><p><strong><em>§15.C</em></strong> (<em>Can Gödel be held guilty of implicit obfuscation?</em>);</p><p><strong><em>§19</em></strong> (<em>The significance of evidence-based reasoning for Goodstein’s Theorem</em>); and</p><p><strong><em>§19.A</em></strong> (<em>The subsystem ACA_0</em>).</p><p>[<strong><em>quote</em></strong>]<br><strong><em>Lemma 15.1.</em></strong> <em>The structure of the finite ordinals under any putative well-defined interpretation of ZF is not isomorphic to the structure N of the natural numbers.</em></p><p><strong><em>Theorem 19.1.</em></strong> <em>Goodstein’s sequence G_o(m_o) over the finite ordinals in any putative model M of ACA_0 terminates with respect to the ordinal inequality ‘&gt;_o’ even if Goodstein’s sequence G(m) over the natural numbers does not terminate with respect to the natural number inequality ‘&gt;’ in M.</em></p><p><strong><em>Corollary 19.2.</em></strong> <em>The relationship of terminating finitely with respect to the transfinitely defined ordinal relation ‘&gt;_o’ over the set of finite ordinals does not entail the relationship of terminating finitely with respect to the finitarily defined natural number relation ‘&gt;’ over the set of natural numbers.</em></p><p><strong><em>Corollary 19.3.</em></strong> <em>The subsystem ACA_0 of second-order arithmetic is not a conservative extension of PA.</em></p><p><strong><em>Theorem 19.4</em></strong> (<em>Independently of Corollary 19.3</em>). <em>The subsystem ACA_0 of second-order arithmetic is not a conservative extension of PA.</em><br>[<strong><em>unquote</em></strong>]</p><p>In other words, assuming ZF is consistent entails that, since PA is <em>finitarily</em> consistent (see [<a href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/lrt2xq0wlzo3wxx/s">An16</a>], <em>Theorems 6.7 and 6.8</em>), and Laurie Kirby and Jeff Paris have shown in [<a href="https://doi.org/10.1112/blms/14.4.285">KP82</a>] that Goodstein’s Theorem (classical) is <em>unprovable</em> in PA:</p><p>• <strong><em>Goodstein’s Theorem</em></strong> <em>over the finite ZF ordinals would interpret as true over N, even if Goodstein’s Theorem over the natural numbers is assumed as false over N!</em></p><p>Hence — as detailed <a href="https://www.dropbox.com/scl/fi/uk8nscl18s5y034hwin1k/54_Holy-Grail_240728_Update.pdf?rlkey=7o9rnigrnyatodbprcij7jey0&amp;dl=0">here</a> — there can be <em>no</em> mathematical or meta-mathematical proof of consistency for ZF.</p><p><strong>VII CONCLUSION</strong></p><p>We conclude that proving a theorem in <em>any</em> Set Theory that admits an Axiom of Infinity <strong><em>is not</em></strong> <em>sufficient</em> for distinguishing between:</p><ul><li>what we can <em>believe</em> to be a mathematical truth;</li><li>what we can <em>evidence</em> as a mathematical truth; and</li><li>what we ought <em>not</em> to believe is a mathematical truth.</li></ul><p>However, by the <strong><em>Provability Theorem for PA</em></strong> ([<a href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/lrt2xq0wlzo3wxx/">An16</a>], <em>Theorem 7.1</em>), proving a theorem in the first-order Peano Arithmetic PA <strong><em>is</em></strong> <em>sufficient</em> for distinguishing between:</p><ul><li>what we can <em>believe</em> to be a mathematical truth;</li><li>what we can <em>evidence</em> as a mathematical truth; and</li><li>what we ought <em>not</em> to believe is a mathematical truth.</li></ul><p><strong>REFERENCES</strong></p><p><strong>[An16]</strong> Bhupinder Singh Anand. <em>The truth assignments that differentiate human reasoning from mechanistic reasoning: The evidence-based argument for Lucas’ Gödelian thesis</em>. In <em>Cognitive Systems Research</em>. Volume 40, December 2016, 35–45.<br><a href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/lrt2xq0wlzo3wxx/">https://www.dropbox.com/s/lrt2xq0wlzo3wxx/</a></p><p><strong>[An22]</strong> … The Significance of Evidence-based Reasoning in Mathematics, Mathematics Education, Philosophy, and the Natural Sciences. Second edition (2024), DBA Publishing, Mumbai, India.<br><a href="https://philpapers.org/rec/ANATSO-5">https://philpapers.org/rec/ANATSO-5</a></p><p><strong>[Ar09]</strong> Sanjeev Arora and Boaz Barak. 2008. <em>Computational Complexity: A Modern Approach.</em> 2009. Princeton University Press, New Jersey, USA.<br><a href="http://www.cs.princeton.edu/theory/complexity/">http://www.cs.princeton.edu/theory/complexity/</a></p><p><strong>[BBJ03]</strong> George S. Boolos, John P. Burgess, Richard C. Jeffrey. 2003. <em>Computability and Logic</em> (4th ed). Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.</p><p><strong>[Ca62a]</strong> Rudolf Carnap. 1962. <em>Logical Foundations of Probability.</em> Second Edition 1962. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A.</p><p><strong>[Fe99]</strong> Solomon Feferman. 1999. <em>Does Mathematics Need New Axioms?</em> In <em>The American Mathematical Monthly</em>, Vol. 106, №2, Feb., 1999, pp. 99–111, DOI: 10.2307/2589047.<br><a href="http://www.jstor.org/stable/2589047">http://www.jstor.org/stable/2589047</a></p><p><strong>[FFMS]</strong> Solomon Feferman, Harvey M. Friedman, Penelope Maddy and John R. Steel. 2000. Discussion: <em>Does Mathematics Need New Axioms?</em> In The <em>Bulletin of Symbolic Logic</em>, Vol. 6, №4 (Dec., 2000), pp. 401–446, DOI: 10.2307/420965.<br><a href="http://www.jstor.org/stable/420965">http://www.jstor.org/stable/420965</a></p><p><strong>[Fsd16]</strong> Sy-David Friedman. 2016. <em>Evidence for Set-Theoretic Truth and the Hyperuniverse Programme.</em> Paper presented at the summer school <em>Proof, Truth, Computation (PTC)</em>, 21st to 25th July 2014 in Frauenwörth, Chiemsee, Germany (Volkswagen Foundation’s programme Symposia and Summer Schools). In <em>IFCoLog Journal of Logics and their Applications</em>, Volume 3, Number 4. October 2016. College Publications, UK.<br><a href="https://www.collegepublications.co.uk/downloads/ifcolog00008.pdf">https://www.collegepublications.co.uk/downloads/ifcolog00008.pdf</a></p><p><strong>[Go31]</strong> Kurt Gödel. 1931. <em>On formally undecidable propositions of Principia Mathematica and related systems I</em>. Translated by Elliott Mendelson. In M. Davis (ed.). 1965. <em>The Undecidable</em>. Raven Press, New York.</p><p><strong>[Har40]</strong> G. H. Hardy. 1940. A Mathematician’s Apology. First Electronic Edition, Version 1.0, March 2005. University of Alberta Mathematical Sciences Society, Alberta, Canada.<br><a href="https://web.njit.edu/~akansu/PAPERS/GHHardy-AMathematiciansApology.pdf">http://www.math.ualberta.ca/mss/misc/A%20Mathematician’s%20Apology.pdf</a></p><p><strong>[Ka91]</strong> Richard Kaye. 1991. <em>Models of Peano Arithmetic</em>. Oxford Logic Guides, 15. Oxford Science Publications. The Clarendon Press, Oxford University Press, New York, 1991.</p><p><strong>[Knd13]</strong> Juliette Kennedy. 2013. <em>On Formalism Freeness: Implementing Gödel’s 1946 Princeton Bicentennial Lecture</em>. In <em>The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic</em>, Volume 19, Number 3, Sept. 2013. DOI:10.2178/bsl.1903030<br><a href="https://www.academia.edu/58886640/">https://www.academia.edu/58886640/</a></p><p><strong>[KP82]</strong> Laurie Kirby and Jeff Paris. 1982. <em>Accessible Independence Results for Peano Arithmetic.</em> Special article in the <em>Bulletin of the London Mathematical Society</em>, Volume 14, Issue 4, July 1982. <br><a href="https://doi.org/10.1112/blms/14.4.285">https://doi.org/10.1112/blms/14.4.285</a></p><p><strong>[LR00]</strong> George Lakoff and Rafael E. Núñez. 2000. <em>Where Mathematics Comes From</em>. Basic Books, NY, USA.</p><p><strong>[Ma08]</strong> Penelope Maddy. 2008. <em>How Applied Mathematics Became Pure</em>. In <em>The Review of Symbolic Logic</em>, Volume 1, Number 1, June 2008. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755020308080027">https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755020308080027</a></p><p><strong>[Ma18a]</strong> … 2015. <em>Set-theoretic Foundations</em>. In A. Caicedo et al, eds., <em>Foundations of Mathematics.</em> Proceedings of the <em>Logic at Harvard</em> conference in honor of W. Hugh Woodin’s 60th birthday, March 27–29, 2015, at Harvard University. In <em>Contemporary Mathematics</em>, Volume: 690; 2017. 322 pp, American Mathematical Society, Providence, Rhode Island, USA.<br><a href="https://bookstore.ams.org/conm-690/">https://bookstore.ams.org/conm-690/</a></p><p><strong>[Ma18]</strong> … 2018. <em>What do we want a foundation to do? Comparing set-theoretic, category-theoretic, and univalent approaches.</em> To appear in S. Centrone, D. Kant, and D. Sarikaya, eds., <em>Reflections on Foundations: Univalent Foundations, Set Theory and General Thoughts.</em><br><a href="https://faculty.sites.uci.edu/pjmaddy/bibliography/">https://faculty.sites.uci.edu/pjmaddy/bibliography/</a></p><p><strong>[Me64]</strong> Elliott Mendelson. 1964. <em>Introduction to Mathematical Logic</em>. First edition. Van Norstrand, Princeton.</p><p><strong>[Me90]</strong> … 1990. <em>Second Thoughts About Church’s Thesis and Mathematical Proofs</em>. In <em>The Journal of Philosophy</em>, Vol.87, №5 (May 1990), pp.225–233.<br><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2026831?seq=1">https://www.jstor.org/stable/2026831?seq=1</a></p><p><strong>[Mlf87]</strong> Per Martin-Löf. 1987. <em>Truth of a proposition, evidence of a judgement, validity of a proof</em>. In <em>Synthese</em>, Volume 73, pp.407–420 (1987).<br><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/20116466">https://www.jstor.org/stable/20116466</a></p><p><strong>[MM01]</strong> V. Wiktor Marek and and Jan Mycielski. 2001. <em>Foundations of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century</em>. In <em>The American Mathematical Monthly</em>, Vol. 108, №5 (May, 2001), pp. 449–468, Mathematical Association of America, DOI: 10.2307/2695803.<br><a href="http://www.jstor.org/stable/2695803">http://www.jstor.org/stable/2695803</a></p><p><strong>[Na08]</strong> Melvyn B. Nathanson. 2008. <em>Desperately Seeking Mathematical Truth</em>. Opinion in the August 2008 <em>Notices of the American Mathematical Society</em>, Vol. 55, Issue 7.<br><a href="https://arxiv.org/pdf/0809.1372">https://arxiv.org/pdf/0809.1372</a></p><p><strong>[Pan09]</strong> Markus Pantsar. 2009. <em>Truth, Proof and Gödelian Arguments: A Defence of Tarskian Truth in Mathematics</em>. In Eds. Marjaana Kopperi, Panu Raatikainen, Petri Ylikoski, and Bernt Österman, <em>Philosophical Studies from the University of Helsinki</em> 23, Department of Philosophy, University of Helsinki, Finland.<br><a href="https://helda.helsinki.fi/bitstream/handle/10138/19432/truthpro.pdf?sequence=2">https://helda.helsinki.fi/bitstream/handle/10138/19432/truthpro.pdf?sequence=2</a></p><p><strong>[Pic19]</strong> Gualtiero Piccinini. 2019. <em>Knowledge as Factually Grounded Belief</em>. Forthcoming in the <em>American Philosophical Quarterly</em>. (Preprint cited by permission of the author).<br><a href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/cw9e9wuj6ee61vo/">https://www.dropbox.com/s/cw9e9wuj6ee61vo/</a></p><p><strong>[She91]</strong> Saharon Shelah. 1991. <em>The Future of Set Theory</em>. Proceedings of the <em>Bar Ilan Winter School</em> (January 1991), Israel Mathematical Conference, vol 6. Distributed by the AMS.<br><a href="https://arxiv.org/pdf/math/0211397.pdf">https://arxiv.org/pdf/math/0211397.pdf</a></p><p><strong>[Sms04]</strong> Peter Simons. 2004. <em>Against Set theory</em>. In Johannes Marek and Maria Reicher, eds., <em>Experience and Analysis</em>. Proceedings of the 2004 Wittgenstein Symposium. Vienna: öbv&amp;hpt, 2005, 143–152.<br><a href="https://ontology.buffalo.edu/04/AgainstSetTheory.pdf">https://ontology.buffalo.edu/04/AgainstSetTheory.pdf</a></p><p><strong>[SW17]</strong> Wilfried Sieg and PatrickWalsh. 2017. <em>Natural Formalization: Deriving the Cantor-Bernstein Theorem in ZF</em>. <em>The Review of Symbolic Logic</em>. 2021;14(1):250–284. doi:10.1017/S175502031900056X<br><a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S175502031900056X">https://doi.org/10.1017/S175502031900056X</a></p><p><strong>[Ta39]</strong> Alfred Tarski. 1939. <em>Some Current Problems in Metamathmatics.</em> Edited version of a lecture given at Harvard University during 1939/40. Editors: Jan Tarski and Jan Wolenski. In <em>History and Philosophy of Logic</em>, Volume 16, 1995 — Issue 2, pp.159–168. Taylor and Francis.<br><a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/01445349508837247">https://doi.org/10.1080/01445349508837247</a></p><p><strong>[Wlb99]</strong> Norman Wildberger. 1999. <em>Real fish, real numbers, real jobs</em>. In <em>The Mathematical Intelligencer</em>, 21, 4–7 (1999). DOI: 10.1007/BF03024838<br><em> </em><a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/BF03024838">https://doi.org/10.1007/BF03024838</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d8674e209952" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Poincaré-Hilbert Debate:
One of the famous disagreements about constructivity in mathematics]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@bhup.anand/the-poincar%C3%A9-hilbert-debate-one-of-the-famous-disagreements-about-constructivity-in-mathematics-c75d5ccafae0?source=rss-893c35d577c0------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/c75d5ccafae0</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[mathematics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy-of-mathematics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mathematical-logic]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[logic]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Bhupinder Singh Anand]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 13 Jan 2024 00:15:10 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-09-28T08:33:32.378Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>The Poincaré-Hilbert Debate</h3><h4>One of the famous disagreements about constructivity in mathematics</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1010/1*tNZ-RSG1UcUfuxYeczdESQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>A famous disagreement — with an unusual and unexpected/unsuspected, relatively recent, resolution (see [<a href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/lrt2xq0wlzo3wxx/">An16</a>], §6) — was the Poincaré-Hilbert debate on whether or not the Axiom Schema of Finite Induction in Arithmetic (which can today be taken to be the first-order Peano Arithmetic PA) could be treated as ‘constructive’ in some sense.</p><p><strong><em>PA Axiom schema of Finite Induction</em></strong>: (<em>x’</em> denotes the successor of <em>x</em>)</p><p><em>For any well-formed formula [F(x)] of PA: [F(0) → (((∀x)(F(x) → F(x′))) → (∀x)F(x))].</em></p><p>Essentially:</p><ul><li>Henri Poincaré argued that the Axiom Schema of Finite Induction could not be justified <em>finitarily</em> under the accepted ‘standard’ interpretation of Arithmetic;</li></ul><p>[<a href="https://encyclopediaofmath.org/wiki/Interpretation"><strong><em>quote</em></strong></a>] <em>The term standard interpretation is used when among all possible values (interpretations) of a certain expression there is a generally accepted one. For example, the standard interpretation of the symbol = in a classical interpretation is that of coincidence of elements, and the standard interpretation of + and ⋅ in arithmetic are addition and multiplication of natural numbers. Analogously, one introduces the concepts of the standard interpretations of a language and a standard model. In particular, the classical interpretation of first-order arithmetic with predicate constant = and function constants + and ⋅, interpreted as above, is called standard.</em> [<a href="https://encyclopediaofmath.org/wiki/Interpretation"><strong><em>unquote</em></strong></a>] … <a href="https://encyclopediaofmath.org/wiki/Interpretation#:~:text=The%20term%20standard%20interpretation%20is%20used%20when%20among,certain%20expression%20there%20is%20a%20generally%20accepted%20one.">Encyclopedia of Mathematics</a>, §Interpretations.</p><p>whilst:</p><ul><li>David Hilbert argued for his belief that a <em>finitary</em> justification of the Axiom Schema was feasible under some future, finitary, interpretation of Arithmetic.</li></ul><p>[<a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/proof-theory/appendix-a.html"><strong><em>quote</em></strong></a>] <em>The foundational import of Hilbert’s considerations was challenged by Poincaré, interpreting the results in a very generous way as including the treatment of induction. As the consistency proof proceeded by induction, Poincaré raised not only the question, how it could be viewed as justifying induction, but also brought out additional methodological shortcomings (Poincaré 1905 [1996: 1026–7]).[39]) His incisive analysis shifted Hilbert’s attention not away from foundational concerns — they are documented by lectures given throughout the period from 1905 to 1921 — but rather from the “proof-theoretic” approach advocated in the Heidelberg talk. Indeed, under the impact of a detailed study of Principia Mathematica beginning in 1913, Hilbert flirted again with logicism.[40] What resulted from this study were the lectures Prinzipien der Mathematik. Hilbert gave them in the winter term of 1917/18 with the assistance of Paul Bernays; these lectures present modern mathematical logic and provide a comprehensive formalism for representing mathematical practice, in particular, for developing analysis in ramified type theory with the axiom of reducibility.</em></p><p><em>The programmatic logicism in Hilbert’s Zürich talk and these lectures was abandoned in the following years. A radical constructivism for developing mathematics from the ground up replaced it, but was abandoned as well, because even basic logical laws were seen not to hold, e.g., the law of the excluded middle. The finitist consistency program, as we think of it, was only formulated towards the end of lectures given in the winter term 1921/22. The elementary character of the formalisms for mathematics allowed viewing the metamathematical studies as part of constructive mathematics. This new, still tentative perspective was connected to Hilbert’s approach in his Heidelberg talk; indeed, that approach had been reviewed and modified in 1920/21. The broad considerations and preliminary results were presented in talks in Copenhagen and Hamburg given in the spring and summer of 1921. In his 1922 paper, based on these talks, Hilbert claimed that induction had been avoided by restructuring the consistency proof and that Poincaré’s objection had consequently been met.</em> [<a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/proof-theory/appendix-a.html"><strong><em>unquote</em></strong></a>] … <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/proof-theory/appendix-a.html">Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy</a>, §A.3 Formal Proofs.</p><p>It turns out that the debate dissolves once we make a distinction between (see [<a href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/lrt2xq0wlzo3wxx/">An16</a>], §2):</p><p><strong>Definition 1. (Algorithmic verifiability)</strong> <em>A number-theoretical relation F(x) is algorithmically verifiable if, and only if, for any specifiable natural number n, there is a deterministic algorithm AL(F, n) which can provide objective evidence for deciding the truth/falsity of each proposition in the finite sequence {F(1), F(2), . . . , F(n)}.</em></p><p><strong>Definition 2. (Algorithmic computability)</strong> <em>A number theoretical relation F(x) is algorithmically computable if, and only if, there is a deterministic algorithm ALF that can provide objective evidence for deciding the truth/falsity of each proposition in the denumerable sequence {F(1), F(2), . . .}.</em></p><p>We note that algorithmic <em>computability</em> implies the existence of an algorithm that can <em>finitarily</em> decide the truth/falsity of each proposition in a well-defined denumerable sequence of propositions, whereas algorithmic verifiability does <em>not</em> imply the existence of an algorithm that can <em>finitarily</em> decide the truth/falsity of each proposition in a well-defined denumerable sequence of propositions.</p><p>The Poincaré-Hilbert debate dissolves since <a href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/lrt2xq0wlzo3wxx/">the paper</a> [An16] now shows that Tarski’s classic definitions admit <em>finitary</em>, evidence-based, definitions of the <em>satisfaction</em> and <em>truth</em> of the <em>atomic</em> formulas of PA over the domain N of the natural numbers in <em>two</em>, hitherto <em>unsuspected</em> and essentially <em>different</em>, ways:</p><p>(<strong>1a</strong>) <em>weakly</em> In terms of classical algorithmic <em>verifiabilty</em>; and</p><p>(<strong>1b</strong>) <em>strongly</em> In terms of finitary algorithmic <em>computability</em>.</p><p>Moreover:</p><p>(<strong>2a</strong>) The two definitions correspond to two distinctly different assignments of satisfaction and truth — say I_PA(N, SV) and I_PA(N, SC) — to the <em>compound</em> formulas of PA over the domain N of the natural numbers;</p><p>where</p><p>(<strong>2b</strong>) The PA axioms are true over N, and the PA rules of inference preserve truth over N, under <em>both</em> I_PA(N, SV) <em>and</em> I_PA(N, SC).</p><p><strong>Axioms and rules of inference of the first-order Peano Arithmetic PA</strong></p><p><strong><em>PA1</em></strong> <em>[(x1 = x2) → ((x1 = x3) → (x2 = x3))];</em></p><p><strong><em>PA2</em></strong> <em>[(x1 = x2) → (x′1 = x′2)];</em></p><p><strong><em>PA3</em></strong> <em>[0 ≠ x′1];</em></p><p><strong><em>PA4</em></strong> <em>[(x′1 = x′2) → (x1 = x2)];</em></p><p><strong><em>PA5</em></strong> <em>[(x1 + 0) = x1];</em></p><p><strong><em>PA6</em></strong> <em>[(x1 + x′2) = (x1 + x2)′];</em></p><p><strong><em>PA7</em></strong> <em>[(x1 ⋆ 0) = 0];</em></p><p><strong><em>PA8</em></strong> <em>[(x1 ⋆ x′2) = ((x1 ⋆ x2) + x1)];</em></p><p><strong><em>PA9</em></strong> <em>For any well-formed formula [F(x)] of PA: [F(0) → (((∀x)(F(x) → F(x′))) → (∀x)F(x))].</em></p><p><strong><em>Generalisation in PA</em></strong> <em>If [A] is PA-provable, then so is [(∀x)A].</em></p><p><strong><em>Modus Ponens in PA</em></strong> <em>If [A] and [A → B] are PA-provable, then so is [B].</em></p><p>Further:</p><p>(<strong>3a</strong>) If we assume the satisfaction and truth of the <em>compound</em> formulas of PA are always <em>constructively</em> decidable under the assignment I_PA(N, SV), then this assignment defines a <em>weak</em> interpretation of PA which corresponds to the classical ‘standard’ interpretation I_PA(N, S) of PA over the domain N <em>minus</em> the <em>non-inductive</em> assumption of Aristotle’s particularisation (see [An16], §4) — from which we may <em>non-finitarily</em>, albeit ‘constructively’ (i.e., without appeal to transfinite reasoning such as Gerhard Gentzen’s appeal to <em>transfinite</em> induction over the ordinals below 𝜖_0 in his <em>non-finitary</em>, debatably ‘constructive’, 1936 <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gentzen%27s_consistency_proof">proof of formal consistency</a> for Arithmetic), conclude that PA is <em>weakly</em> consistent;</p><p>whilst</p><p>(<strong>3b</strong>) The satisfaction and truth of the compound formulas of PA are always <em>finitarily</em> decidable under the assignment I_PA(N, SC), which thus defines a <em>strong</em> interpretation of PA from which we may <em>finitarily</em> conclude (see Theorem 6.8 of <a href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/lrt2xq0wlzo3wxx/Elsevier_COGSYS_490_paper_160319_1-s2.0-S1389041716300250-main.pdf?dl=0">this 2016 paper</a>) — contrary to currently accepted wisdom (see, for instance, <a href="https://arxiv.org/pdf/1807.05641.pdf">this 2018 preprint</a> which appeared in the November 2018 issue of <em>The Mathematical Intelligencer</em>) — that PA is <em>strongly</em> consistent (as sought by Hilbert in the Second of his Twenty Three Millenium, ICM 1900, problems in [<a href="https://people.tamu.edu/~rojas//hilbert23reprinted.pdf">Hi00</a>]).</p><p>In other words, the PA Axiom Schema of Finite Induction is:</p><p>(<strong>4a</strong>) Algorithmically <em>verifiable</em> as true under the <em>weak</em> interpretation I_PA(N, SV) of PA;</p><p>(<strong>4b</strong>) Algorithmically <em>computable</em> as true under the <em>strong</em> finitary interpretation I_PA(N, SC) of PA.</p><p>The Poincaré-Hilbert debate thus <em>dissolves</em> because:</p><p>(<strong>5a</strong>) The algorithmically <em>verifiable</em>, constructive albeit <em>non-finitary</em>, interpretation I_PA(N, SV ) of PA <em>validates</em> Poincaré’s argument that the PA Axiom Schema of Finite Induction could not be justified <em>finitarily</em> with respect to algorithmic verifiability under the ‘standard’ interpretation I_PA(N, S) of an arithmetic such as PA;</p><p>whilst</p><p>(<strong>5b</strong>) The algorithmically <em>computable</em> interpretation I_PA(N, SC) of PA <em>validates</em> Hilbert’s belief that a <em>finitary</em> justification of the Axiom Schema was possible under some <em>finitary</em> interpretation of an arithmetic such as PA.</p><p><strong>References</strong></p><p>[An16] Bhupinder Singh Anand. 2016. <em>The truth assignments that differentiate human reasoning from mechanistic reasoning: The evidence-based argument for Lucas’ Gödelian thesis</em>. In <em>Cognitive Systems Research</em>. Volume 40, December 2016, 35–45.</p><p><a href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/lrt2xq0wlzo3wxx/">https://www.dropbox.com/s/lrt2xq0wlzo3wxx/</a></p><p>[Hi00] David Hilbert. 1900. <em>Mathematical Problems</em>. An address delivered before the <em>International Congress of Mathematicians</em> at Paris in 1900. The French translation by M. L. Laugel “<em>Sur les problèmes futurs des mathématiques</em>” appeared in <em>Compte Rendu du Deuxième Congrès International des Mathématiciens</em>, pp. 58–114, Gauthier-Villars, Paris, 1902. Dr. Maby Winton Newson translated this address into English with the author’s permission for <em>Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society</em> 8 (1902), 437–479. A reprint appears in <em>Mathematical Developments Arising from Hilbert’s Problems</em>, edited by Felix Brouder, American Mathematical Society, 1976. The original address “<em>Mathematische Probleme</em>” appeared in <em>Göttinger Nachrichten</em>, 1900, pp. 253–297, and in <em>Archiv der Mathematik und Physik</em>, (3) 1 (1901), 44–63 and 213–237. An HTML version of Dr. Newson’s translation was prepared for the web by D. Joyce with only minor modifications, mainly, more complete references.</p><p><a href="https://people.tamu.edu/~rojas//hilbert23reprinted.pdf">https://people.tamu.edu/~rojas//hilbert23reprinted.pdf</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c75d5ccafae0" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Whither Goodstein’s Theorem?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@bhup.anand/whither-goodsteins-theorem-ccf03cf34c7b?source=rss-893c35d577c0------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[mathematics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mathematical-logic]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[set-theory]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[arithmetic]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[number-theory]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Bhupinder Singh Anand]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 04 Aug 2023 20:01:10 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-08-04T20:13:52.207Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1010/1*tNZ-RSG1UcUfuxYeczdESQ.jpeg" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/791/1*C5kkOGb9hd0BSzNmdV6l1w.jpeg" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/791/1*SrMV3pwub--C1uRbJQ1e_Q.jpeg" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/791/1*sEN8iCyoCH1vLmWN1pZP_w.jpeg" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/791/1*XdxLne3KeGmqAqZSJQP2lg.jpeg" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/791/1*F2GMN_RvT-mlZzFS5LEIsg.jpeg" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ccf03cf34c7b" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Dear Wes,]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@bhup.anand/dear-wes-ca0a8981dbc4?source=rss-893c35d577c0------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ca0a8981dbc4</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Bhupinder Singh Anand]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 15 May 2023 10:10:29 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-05-15T10:10:29.401Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Dear Wes,</p><p>Please permit me to only proffer (in §<strong>B</strong> below) my perspective in [An22] of Gödel&#39;s principal argumentation in [Go31], and leave you to decide which to follow (i.e., [Go31] or [An22]).</p><p>That said, let me digress awhile apropos your observation:</p><p>[quote] ... the metamathematical function Sub(p (19,GN(p))), which is syntactically identical to 17 Gen r, Goedel’s undecidable Proposition, ... [unquote]</p><p><strong>A</strong>: I am not quite clear in what sense a primitive recursive function---with a Gödel number such as &#39;Sub(p (19,GN(p)))&#39;---can be &#39;syntactically identical&#39; to a universally quantified arithmetical formula of a Peano Arithmetic (whether PA or Gödel&#39;s arithmetic P) which contains only one variable, such as &#39;Gödel&#39;s undecidable Proposition&#39; whose Gödel number is &#39;17 Gen r&#39;.</p><p>(a) The former is an arithmetical expression over the domain of the natural numbers which, for any specified assignment of natural numbers to its variables, can be evidenced by a Turing machine as either &#39;true&#39; or &#39;false&#39;.</p><p>When quantified over any of its variables, it is no longer primitive recursive; so we cannot assume that, for any specified assignment of natural numbers to its remaining variables, it can be evidenced by a Turing machine as either &#39;true&#39; or &#39;false&#39;.</p><p>(b) The latter is a universally quantified arithmetical formula of a Peano Arithmetic (whether PA or Gödel&#39;s arithmetic P) which contains only one variable; and which:</p><p>* is undecidable when defined over the domain of the finite ordinals in an ω-consistent arithmetic such as Gödel&#39;s, implicitly second-order, Peano Arithmetic P (as shown by Gödel in [Go31]);</p><p>* but decidable when defined over the domain of the numerals in an ω-<em>in</em>consistent arithmetic such as the first-order Peano Arithmetic PA (as shown by Corollary 8.3 and Corollary 8.4 in [An16]).</p><p><strong>B</strong>: Moreover, I have found that explicating what Gödel has actually proven in [Go31] is best done only <strong><em>after</em></strong> unravelling the arcane symbolism that he employs in his argumentation; by replacing (as in, say, [Me64], Proposition 3.31, p.143; or [An22], §15.G: The implicit Query in Gödel’s reasoning) the intended arithmetical expressions to which Gödel refers to <strong><em>only</em></strong> by their Gödel-numbers, with the expressions themselves.</p><p>[quote]</p><p><strong>15.G. The implicit Query in Gödel’s reasoning</strong></p><p>We begin by noting that:</p><p>(1) In his 1931 paper on formally ‘undecidable’ arithmetical propositions, Gödel shows that, given a well-defined system of Gödel-numbering, every formula of a first-order Peano Arithmetic such as PA can be Gödel-numbered by Gödel’s primitive recursive relation #23, Form(x), which is true if, and only if, x is the Gödel-number (GN) of a formula of PA.</p><p><em>Comment 114</em>. It is important to note that ‘x’ here is a variable over the natural numbers 0, 1, 2, . . ., and not to be confused with the variable [x] over the numerals [0], [0′], [0′′], . . . of PA. Moreover, if we study its definition in terms of Gödel’s 22 earlier primitive recursive functions and relations, we will find that Form(x) is a number-theoretic relation which is true if, and only if, x is a natural number that can be decomposed by Gödel’s method of Gödel-numbering to yield some unique string of symbols, say [F], which a Turing machine can evidence as being a well-formed formula of PA (since the well-formed formulas of a first-order system such as PA are defined recursively).</p><p>(2) So, for any specified natural number n, (1) allows us to mechanically decompose n and effectively determine whether, or not, n is the GN of some PA formula.</p><p><em>Comment 115</em>. We note that such decomposition into PA formulas cannot be defined by the PA numerals within PA, but is only definable recursively in terms of the prime properties of natural numbers as per Gödel’s primitive recursive relation #5, and the correspondence between the primitive symbols of PA and the natural numbers by Gödel’s system of Gödel-numbering.</p><p>(3) Gödel also defines a primitive recursive relation #44, Bw(x), which is true if, and only if, x is the GN of a finite sequence of formulas in PA, each of which is either an axiom, or an immediate consequence of two preceding formulas in the sequence.</p><p>(4) So, for any specified natural number n, (3) allows us to effectively determine whether, or not, the natural number n is the GN of a proof sequence in PA.</p><p>(5) Further, Gödel defines a primitive recursive relation #45, xBy, which is true if, and only if, x is the GN of a proof sequence in PA whose last formula has the GN y.</p><p>(6) Gödel then defines a primitive recursive relation, say xBSUBy, such that, for any m, n:</p><p>mBSUBn is true if, and only if, m happens to be a GN that can be decomposed into a proof sequence whose last member is some PA formula [F(n)], and n happens to be a GN that decomposes into the PA-formula [F(u)] with only the one variable [u].</p><p>(7) The essence, and genius, of Gödel’s reasoning in his Theorem VI lies in answering:</p><p><strong><em>Query 14</em></strong>. Is there any natural number n for which mBSUBn is true?</p><p><strong>15.G.a. The essence, and genius, of Gödel’s reasoning</strong></p><p>Gödel’s remarkable answer to Query 14 involved recognising that although—except for #1, #2 and #3—none of his 45 primitive recursive number-theoretic relations and functions (as also xBSUBy) are formulas of a first-order Peano Arithmetic such as PA, for any specified primitive recursive number-theoretic relation, say f(x, y) (which is not definable recursively in the language of PA), it is possible (see Gödel’s Theorems V and VII in [Go31]) to define a PA-formula, say [F(x, y)] (which is definable recursively in the language of PA) such that, for any natural numbers m, n:</p><p>* If f(m, n) is true, then [F(m, n)] is provable in PA;</p><p>* If f(m, n) is false, then [¬F(m, n)] is provable in PA.</p><p>(8) Thus, xBSUBy can be expressed in PA by some (formally well-defined) PA-formula, say [¬R(x, y)], such that, for any m, n:</p><p>(a) If mBSUBn is true, then [¬R(m, n)] is PA-provable;</p><p>(b) If ¬mBSUBn is true, then [R(m, n)] is PA-provable.</p><p>(9) Further, by (6) and (8), for any m, n, if n is the GN of some PA-formula [F(u)] with only one variable, say [u], then:</p><p>(a) If mBSUBn is true, then [¬R(m, n)] is PA-provable; and m is the GN of a PA-proof of the PA-formula [F(n)];</p><p>(b) If ¬mBSUBn is true, then [R(m, n)] is PA-provable; and m is not the GN of a PA-proof of the PA-formula [F(n)].</p><p>(10) In his Theorem VI, Gödel then argues as follows:</p><p>(a) Let q be the GN of the PA-formula [R(x, y)] defined in (8).</p><p>(b) Let p be the GN of [(∀x)R(x, y)].</p><p>(c) Let r be the GN of [R(x, p)].</p><p>(d) Let 17Gen r be the GN of [(∀x)R(x, p)].</p><p>(11) We note that all the above primitive recursive functions and relations are formally well-defined recursively by Gödel’s Theorems I-IV ([Go31], pp.14-17); and all the PA-formulas—as well as their corresponding Gödel-numbers—are well-defined in the first-order Peano Arithmetic PA.</p><p>In other words, as Gödel emphasised in his paper, the 46—i.e., 45 + xBSUBy—PRA functions and relations that he defines are all bounded, and therefore effectively decidable as true or false over the domain N of the natural numbers.</p><p>Moreover, the PA-formulas that he defines do not involve any reference—or self-reference—to either the meaning or the truth/falsity of any PA-formulas under an interpretation in N, but only to their PA-provability which, he shows, is effectively decidable by his system of Gödel-numbering and his definition of the primitive recursive relation xBy (see (5) above).</p><p>(12) Since p is the GN of a formula, namely [(∀x)R(x, y)], with only the one variable [y], we can substitute p for n, and therefore [(∀x)R(x, p)] for [F(n)], in (9). We then have that:</p><p>(i) If mBSUBp is true, then [¬R(m, p)] is PA-provable; whence m is the GN of a PA-proof of [(∀x)R(x, p)], whose GN is p;</p><p>(ii) If ¬mBSUBp is true, then [R(m, p)] is PA-provable; whence m is not the GN of any PA-proof of [(∀x)R(x, p)].</p><p>Hence n = p answers Query 14 affirmatively.</p><p>Once we accept that the above argument is constructive from even an evidence-based perspective, the rest of Gödel’s reasoning follows straightforwardly.</p><p><strong>15.G.b. Theorem VI: Gödel’s conclusions</strong></p><p>(13) Gödel concludes that, if PA is consistent then:</p><p>(a) By (12)(i), if mSUBp is true for some natural number m, then both [¬R(m, p)] and [(∀x)R(x, p)] are PA-provable—a contradiction since, by a logical axiom of first-order theories with quantifiers (see §28., 6(I)(4)), PA-provability of the latter entails that [R(m, p)] is PA-provable by Modus Ponens.</p><p>(b) Hence [(∀x)R(x, p)], whose GN is 17Gen r, is not provable in PA if PA is consistent.</p><p>(14) Moreover, if PA is assumed to be also ω-consistent (which means that we cannot have a PA-provable formula [¬(∀x)F(x)] such that [F(m)] is also provable in PA for any specified numeral [m]) then:</p><p>(a) By (13), m is not the GN of any PA-proof of [(∀x)R(x, p)] for any specified m; whence [R(m, p)] is PA-provable for any specified m by (12)(ii);</p><p>(b) Hence [¬(∀x)R(x, p)], whose GN is Neg(17Genr), is not provable in PA.</p><p>Taken together with the [An16] proofs that PA is categorical (see §2.E.b., Corollary 2.18) and that PA is not ω-consistent (see §2.F., Corollary 2.22; proved independently in §12.B.f., Theorem 12.6), the above suggests that:</p><p><strong><em>Thesis 8</em></strong>. There can be no interpretation of Gödel’s definition of his formally undecidable arithmetical proposition [(∀x)R(x, p)] over the domain N of the natural numbers—whether expressed mathematically or in any language of common discourse—that could lead to a contradiction.</p><p>[unquote]</p><p>Kind regards,</p><p>Bhup</p><p>CV: https://www.dropbox.com/s/ohrhhinjvg5zj7s/</p><p>[An16] <em>Bhupinder Singh Anand. 2016. The truth assignments that differentiate human reasoning from mechanistic reasoning: The evidence-based argument for Lucas’ Gödelian thesis</em>. In <em>Cognitive Systems Research</em>. Volume 40, December 2016, 35-45.</p><p><a href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/lrt2xq0wlzo3wxx/Elsevier_COGSYS_490_paper_160319_1-s2.0-S1389041716300250-main.pdf?dl=0">https://www.dropbox.com/s/lrt2xq0wlzo3wxx/Elsevier_COGSYS_490_paper_160319_1-s2.0-S1389041716300250-main.pdf?dl=0</a></p><p>[An22] ... <em>The Significance of Evidence-based Reasoning in Mathematics, Mathematics Education, Philosophy, and the Natural Sciences</em>. Second edition (under evaluation by SpringerNature for their Studia Logica: Logic in Asia Series).</p><p><a href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/gd6ffwf9wssak86/">https://www.dropbox.com/s/gd6ffwf9wssak86/</a></p><p>[Go31] Kurt Gödel. 1931. <em>On formally undecidable propositions of Principia Mathematica and related systems I.</em> Translated by Elliott Mendelson. In M. Davis (ed.). 1965. <em>The Undecidable</em>. Raven Press, New York.</p><p>[Me64] Elliott Mendelson. 1964. <em>Introduction to Mathematical Logi</em>c. First edition. Van Norstrand, Princeton.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ca0a8981dbc4" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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