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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Bidemi Ologunde on Medium]]></title>
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            <title>Stories by Bidemi Ologunde on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Cause & Effect: Unintended Consequences of the George Floyd Protests in Cyberspace]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/discourse/cause-effect-unintended-consequences-of-the-george-floyd-protests-in-cyberspace-3714b3c487b?source=rss-10d6e75e45f1------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[investigative-journalism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[threat-intelligence]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[intelligence]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blacklivesmatter]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Bidemi Ologunde]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 09 Jun 2020 01:41:29 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-06-18T17:54:17.644Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Crisis escalations, private data breaches, FBI Intervention and public embarrassments</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*DWRyRvvLduYA-9ll.jpg" /><figcaption>A screenshot from a video posted by the Anonymous hacker group, calling for a collective hacking operation against the City of Minneapolis</figcaption></figure><p><strong><em>The events described below are real-life consequences of the ongoing George Floyd protests as pertaining to cyberspace.</em></strong></p><h4>—<br>Dark Web Chatter</h4><p>On Friday evening, May 29, 2020, while Jewish Jess (not her real name/nickname) was taking part in a virtual “happy hour” with some of her friends, relatives and a few work colleagues, she had the TV on mute to follow the news coverage of the day’s events — the CNN Center in downtown Atlanta was vandalized by <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_Floyd_protests">George Floyd protesters</a> who broke the front windows and spray-painted the CNN logo with graffiti. The protesters then set police cars on fire, and at one point during the protests, one protester threw a firecracker towards the police officers who formed a protective barricade inside the CNN lobby. In return, police SWAT teams in tactical gear dispersed the crowds of protesters with tear gas, flash-bang grenades and rubber bullets. Towards late evening, the situation devolved into a standoff: crowds chanting, police growling, news and police helicopters circling overhead, and social media platforms buzzing nonstop at almost 1,800 posts per minute. Wild stuff.<br>—<br>Jewish Jess works as a cyber threat intelligence analyst for a large financial organization in Atlanta. Part of her job involves secretly hanging out on hacker forums in the underground parts of the Internet — the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dark_web">Dark Web</a> — trying to figure out who is contemplating attacking her company, why they want to do it, when they plan to do it, and how. In a previous life, Jess was a Cyber Threat Investigator in the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Israel_Defense_Forces">Israel Defense Forces</a> (IDF), where she used a similar set of skills to protect the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Israel">State of Israel</a>.<br>—<br>Back on Wednesday, May 27th, Jewish Jess had noticed increased chatter on one of her favorite Dark Web forums, referencing the recent protests against police brutality in Minneapolis. Some hackers called for outright retaliation by going after the websites and email servers of the City of Minneapolis and the Minneapolis Police Department, others called for attacks on the Internet infrastructure of the entire State of Minnesota, and yet others called for targeted <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Doxing">doxxing</a> on the four police officers that were involved in George Floyd’s murder, including their families. A few others offered anti-black sentiments — after all, it’s the Dark Web, all kinds of interests and viewpoints are well represented.</p><p><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Doxing">Doxxing</a> (or doxing) is a cyber jargon mostly used in underground online communities and it refers to the “practice of researching and publicly broadcasting private…information (especially <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Personally_identifying_information">personally identifying information</a> — PII) about an individual or organization.” The word “dox” is an abbreviation of <em>documents</em>.</p><p>By Thursday, May 28th, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anonymous_(group)">Anonymous</a> — the international hacktivist movement widely known for its major cyber attacks against several governments, corporations, and even the Church of Scientology — declared a large hacking operation against the City of Minneapolis. In a now-deleted video released online, an individual appeared wearing a <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guy_Fawkes_mask">Guy Fawkes mask</a> and stated: “We are Legion. We do not forgive. We do not forget. Expect us.” Anonymous addressed police brutality and vowed that they will be exposing the many crimes of the Minneapolis Police Department to the world.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*vBigf8RF0oHb3kEc" /></figure><h4>Vendor-Client Crisis</h4><p>Greg Hart (not his real name/surname) is the Chief Cyber Security Architect at a cybersecurity consulting company in Minneapolis. His team handles cyber defense and monitoring capabilities for their clients’ Internet infrastructure. Some of their clients include agencies and departments funded by the City of Minneapolis as well as the Minneapolis Police Department.</p><p>Greg woke up early on Tuesday morning, May 26th, to a series of email and text message alerts on his work phone, from both the Chief Security Officer and the Public Relations Officer. The emails carried bad news: the previous day, at about 8:19PM, a white police officer — Derek Chauvin — knelt on George Floyd’s neck for almost nine minutes while Floyd was handcuffed and lying face down on the street. Two other officers further restrained Floyd while he was on the ground, and a fourth officer prevented onlookers from intervening. George Floyd was pronounced dead at the Hennepin County Medical Center emergency room around 9:25PM.</p><p>Two days later on Thursday, May 28th, following the Anonymous hacker group’s call to action, the websites of the <a href="https://www.ci.minneapolis.mn.us/police/">Minneapolis Police Department</a> and the <a href="https://www.minneapolismn.gov/">City of Minneapolis</a> went offline as a result of <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Denial-of-service_attack#Distributed_attack">distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks</a> — basically when a website or computer network is intentionally paralyzed by flooding it with data sent simultaneously from many individual computers. DDoS attacks are similar to the slowness or lag experienced by customers of a retail store’s website when several people all try to purchase a trending new product or during other seasonal shopping events such as <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Back_to_school_(marketing)#:~:text=In%20merchandising%2C%20back%20to%20school,adults&#39;%20clothing%20goes%20on%20sale.">Back to School</a>, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Black_Friday_(shopping)">Black Friday</a>, or <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyber_Monday">Cyber Monday</a>.<br>—<br>As expected, the website attacks created a new set of stressors for Greg’s clients, which naturally led to several phone calls and Zoom video meetings between executives, lawyers, cybersecurity specialists, and public relations officials on both sides. As Greg’s company scrambled to get in front of the catastrophe from both a public relations and a client relations <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Service-level_agreement">service level agreement</a> (SLA) standpoint, the City of Minneapolis and the Minneapolis Police Department were putting out fires literally and figuratively: dealing with protests <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/05/28/minneapolis-protests-george-floyd-death/">and a burned precinct</a>; answering questions from clergy members, community leaders, Minnesota state government officials, Minnesota federal senators and representatives, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents, Native American tribal leaders and other minority groups, concerned private citizens, and so on.</p><p>It didn’t exactly help that the websites that could have served as key sources of information during those stressful first few days both went down in a coordinated manner, severely escalating the ongoing crisis as well as the corresponding crisis management techniques. On top of all that, morale, motivation and operational effectiveness has been severely affected in the day-to-day work of the Minneapolis Police Department. In addition, with the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, the disabled city website is also impeding the flow of crucial public health information to the general public.</p><p>Similar cyber attacks on city and police websites took place in 2014 in response to the <a href="https://www.cnet.com/news/st-louis-police-website-suffers-ddos-attack/">police shooting of Michael Brown</a> in Ferguson, Missouri, and in 2015 in response to the <a href="https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/investigations/bs-md-ci-cyber-riot-20150731-story.html">killing of Freddie Gray</a>, who suffered a spinal injury while being subjected to a <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rough_ride_(police_brutality)">rough ride</a> in the back of a police van in Baltimore, Maryland.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*qDlBS5xXLfsqBGSy" /></figure><h4>Weak Links</h4><p>By May 28th, Jewish Jess began seeing parallels in what was playing out in real time both on the Dark Web and on TV all over the country. When a company intends to acquire another company, they conduct comprehensive risk assessments to determine if there are any red or yellow flags before going ahead with the deal. In recent times, those risk assessments have now included cybersecurity risk assessments as part of the overall assessments — more companies are falling victim to cyber attacks <a href="https://www.csoonline.com/article/3398700/why-businesses-don-t-report-cybercrimes-to-law-enforcement.html">without reporting them</a> to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), law enforcement agencies, or during merger and acquisition talks. An example of this happened <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yahoo-m-a-verizon/verizon-yahoo-agree-to-lowered-4-48-billion-deal-following-cyber-attacks-idUSKBN1601EK">during acquisition talks between Verizon and Yahoo in 2017</a> — two massive cyber attacks were discovered at Yahoo between August 2013 and September 2016, which made Verizon to significantly lower their original offer by $350 million.</p><p>Jewish Jess’s company had been in acquisition talks with a medium-sized Minneapolis-based <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Registered_investment_adviser">registered investment advisor</a> (RIA) firm since January 2020, and she was part of the team that was tasked with conducting a cyber risk assessment for the potential acquisition.<br>—<br>Because retaliatory cyber attacks during racially-charged protests — or any other kinds of protests — are usually free-for-all, everything available on the Internet related to the targets is usually considered fair game and hackers will go after whatever they can get their hands on without regard for who or what will be affected. Jewish Jess knew this, so she immediately began correlating the client list of the medium-sized RIA firm with the publicly available list of officers and employees of the Minneapolis Police Department and the City of Minneapolis.</p><p>Most cyber attacks are carried out with the goal of obtaining private information, email correspondence, sensitive documents, and anything of value that can cause embarrassment for the targets. Interestingly, Jewish Jess found out that not only did the medium-sized RIA firm have Minneapolis police officers and city officials as part of its clientele, there were also some Minneapolis state senators, community leaders, as well as private citizens.</p><p>This automatically created a tricky situation for Jewish Jess and her company. Most of their potential acquisition’s clients could very likely have their private information floating around on the Dark Web. By the time cyber criminals decide to commit fraud using those private data, the clients would have become the Atlanta-based financial organization’s clients.</p><p>That could only mean bad news: unlimited lawsuits and bad PR.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/720/0*k2kLCr6pNWiftZsu.jpg" /></figure><h4>Doxxed</h4><p>On Monday morning, June 1st, Jewish Jess got up very early to meet with one of her contacts on <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Hub_(forum)">The Hub Forum</a>, an underground Dark Web forum where users review other Dark Web marketplaces, buy and sell cryptocurrencies, and discuss cybersecurity. The meeting was with a 22-year old professional hacker from Sakhalin, a mountainous island located in Russia’s far east region, about a work-related project she was working on, which was unrelated to the ongoing George Floyd protests. As soon as she logged onto the forum’s lobby, she noticed a post that had “Minneapolis”, “protests” and “doxxed” in the same sentence, and that grabbed her attention instantly.</p><p>A click on the post’s title took her to a live chat session that had at least 18 other hackers contemplating what to do with a cache of “fresh” private data that had recently been “collected in Minneapolis”.</p><p>That just confirmed Jewish Jess’s worst nightmare. The unlimited lawsuits and bad PR <em>will now be a real possibility.</em></p><h4>Federal Assistance</h4><p>The Minneapolis Division of the FBI is located in Brooklyn Center, a suburb in the city’s northwest — a 5-floor, 3-building office complex on the corner of Humboldt Avenue and Freeway Blvd. As soon as the news of George Floyd’s murder got out on Monday, May 25th, the FBI opened an investigation into the case and released statements asking the public for any helpful information. Their investigation would run concurrently with the ongoing investigation by the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (BCA), and in addition, the FBI requested anyone with digital media — photos or videos — that could be relevant to the case to post them to <a href="https://tips.fbi.gov/digitalmedia/1d27f76cefae92f">fbi.gov/MinneapolisTips</a>.</p><p>When Jewish Jess stumbled upon that Dark Web chat room referencing the Minneapolis doxxing incident, she contacted her manager at work to figure out what to do with that information. After a nearly 2-hour meeting with other key members of her team, two Directors, and her company’s Chief Information Security Officer (CISO), they all agreed to forward the information to the FBI. She looked up the website of the FBI Minneapolis Division and found the page for reporting digital media information relating to the George Floyd case.<br>—<br>As of Friday, June 5th, both websites of the City of Minneapolis and the Minneapolis Police Department were still down, with Greg and his team working round the clock trying to get them back to normal operations. Understandably, there was mounting pressure from all angles, which was becoming unbearable by the minute, in addition to the multiple concurrent obligations his company had to fulfill for their client, regardless of what was going on in the news — contractual, legal, financial, express, moral, absolute, and so on.</p><p>By late afternoon that Friday, Greg’s team decided to contact the FBI Cyber Investigative Squad located in the FBI Minneapolis Division office complex, as well as the National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force, the primary U.S. agency responsible for coordinating cyber threats investigations. That official request for federal assistance took the edge off just a little bit, so to speak, and allowed Greg and his team to be able to report <em>something</em> to their own company leadership, as well as their clients.<br>—<br>For Jewish Jess and her cybersecurity risk assessment, it just means there was more work to do. Her company’s leadership team and the Minneapolis RIA firm would now have to pivot sharply away from their current negotiating position in a whole new different direction.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/720/0*ZdenCInNagzh6Qwz.jpg" /></figure><h4>Conclusion — Moving Forward</h4><p>On Sunday, June 7th, the Minneapolis City Council passed a resolution to begin the process of abolishing the Minneapolis Police Department “and creating a new, transformative model for cultivating safety in Minneapolis.” That afternoon, members of the city council walked onto a stage at <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Powderhorn_Park,_Minneapolis">Powderhorn Park</a> to support members of an advocacy group — <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Black_Visions_Collective">Black Visions Collective</a> (BLVC), who were calling for the end of the Minneapolis Police Department. On that stage were nine city council members — council President Lisa Bender, Vice President Andrea Jenkins, Alondra Cano, Phillippe Cunningham, Jeremiah Ellison, Steve Fletcher, Cam Gordon, Andrew Johnson and Jeremy Schroeder.</p><p>All over the country, efforts to defund police departments have been gaining momentum for a while. On Wednesday, June 3rd, Los Angeles Mayor Eric Garcetti <a href="https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-06-03/protests-demanding-racial-justice-gain-momentum-across-l-a">pledged to cut $100 million to $150 million</a> from its nearly $2 billion annual police budget to redirect to black communities. New York City Mayor Bill de Blasio also pledged to cut the city’s police funding for the first time, following 10 straight nights of mass protests against police violence.</p><p>Also on Sunday, Acting Homeland Security Secretary Chad Wolf <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-06-07/defunding-police-absurd-says-acting-homeland-security-chief">said during an interview</a> on “Fox News Sunday” that calls to defund police were a “political statement,” and that slashing police budgets would harm law enforcement oversight and leadership.</p><p>In Washington DC, congressional Democrats are expected to roll out <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/06/06/congressional-democrats-unveil-police-reform-package-next-week/?itid=lk_inline_manual_9">sweeping police reform legislation</a> on Monday, June 8th, following nearly two weeks of sustained protests against police violence. The legislation, called the Justice in Policing Act of 2020, includes an array of measures aimed at boosting law enforcement accountability, changing police practices and curbing racial profiling.</p><p>The legislation is sponsored by <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Karen_Bass">Rep. Karen Bass</a> (Democrat, CA), who chairs the Congressional Black Caucus, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jerry_Nadler">Rep. Jerrold Nadler</a> (Democrat, NY), chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cory_Booker">Senator Cory Booker</a> (Democrat, NJ) and <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kamala_Harris">Senator Kamala Harris</a> (Democrat, CA). It was not clear whether Republicans in Congress or President Trump would back the bill.</p><p>The House Judiciary Committee has planned a hearing for Wednesday, June 10th, the first on police issues since the protests broke out. The Senate Judiciary Committee has a hearing slated for Tuesday, June 16th.</p><p>— <br>— <br>—</p><h4>Additional Readings:</h4><p><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_Floyd_protests">George Floyd protests</a><br><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_George_Floyd_protests_in_the_United_States">List of George Floyd protests in the United States<br></a><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_George_Floyd_protests_outside_the_United_States">List of George Floyd protests outside the United States</a><br><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Racism_in_the_United_States">Racism in the United States</a><br><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_Floyd_protests_in_the_United_Kingdom">George Floyd protests in the United Kingdom</a><br><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Killing_of_George_Floyd">Killing of George Floyd</a><br><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shooting_of_Ahmaud_Arbery">Shooting of Ahmaud Arbery</a><br><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shooting_of_Philando_Castile">Shooting of Philando Castile</a><br><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shooting_of_Tamir_Rice">Shooting of Tamir Rice</a><br><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shooting_of_Trayvon_Martin">Shooting of Trayvon Martin</a><br><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shooting_of_Jeremy_McDole">Shooting of Jeremy McDole</a><br><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shooting_of_Alton_Sterling">Shooting of Alton Sterling</a><br><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shooting_of_Andy_Lopez">Shooting of Andy Lopez</a><br><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Death_of_Sandra_Bland">Death of Sandra Bland</a><br><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Death_of_Jonny_Gammage">Death of Jonny Gammage</a><br><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Death_of_Jonathan_Sanders">Death of Jonathan Sanders</a><br><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Driving_while_black">Driving while black</a><br><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Black_Lives_Matter">Black Lives Matter</a><br><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shooting_of_Breonna_Taylor">Shooting of Breonna Taylor</a><br><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Death_of_Eric_Garner">Death of Eric Garner</a><br><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2015_Baltimore_protests">2015 Baltimore protests</a><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ferguson_unrest"><br>Ferguson unrest</a><br><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_rights_in_the_United_States">Human rights in the United States</a><br><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_the_civil_rights_movement">Timeline of the civil rights movement</a><br><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_African-American_history">Timeline of African-American history</a><br><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lists_of_killings_by_law_enforcement_officers_in_the_United_States">Lists of killings by law enforcement officers in the United States</a><br><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Buffalo_Police_Department#Niagara_Square_police_violence_incident">Niagara Square police violence incident</a><br><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Police_brutality_in_the_United_States">Police brutality in the United States</a><br><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/King_assassination_riots">King assassination riots</a><br><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_incidents_of_civil_unrest_in_the_United_States">List of incidents of civil unrest in the United States</a><br><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Post%E2%80%93civil_rights_era_in_African-American_history">Post–civil rights era in African-American history</a><br><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Long,_hot_summer_of_1967">Long, hot summer of 1967</a><br><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1992_Los_Angeles_riots">1992 Los Angeles riots</a><br><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gypsy_cop">Gypsy cop</a><br><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Police_brutality_against_Native_Americans">Police brutality against Native Americans</a><br><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rough_ride_(police_brutality)">Rough ride (police brutality)</a><br><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hands_up,_don%27t_shoot">Hands up, don’t shoot</a><br><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/I_can%27t_breathe">I can’t breathe</a><br><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Racial_profiling#In_the_United_States">Racial profiling</a><br><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Police_use_of_deadly_force_in_the_United_States">Police use of deadly force in the United States</a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*vteN0yIo0A1FnvM8.JPG" /><figcaption>Los Angeles Mayor Eric Garcetti walking with protesters and clergy members outside LAPD headquarters on Tuesday, June 2, 2020. Photo: Kent Nishimura/Los Angeles Times.</figcaption></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3714b3c487b" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/discourse/cause-effect-unintended-consequences-of-the-george-floyd-protests-in-cyberspace-3714b3c487b">Cause &amp; Effect: Unintended Consequences of the George Floyd Protests in Cyberspace</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/discourse">Dialogue &amp; Discourse</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Deceit, Theft & Socio-Economic Leverage in Cyberspace]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/discourse/cyber-spy-games-the-2020-pandemic-edition-aac245cb728e?source=rss-10d6e75e45f1------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/aac245cb728e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[phishing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[covid19]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[coronavirus]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hacking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Bidemi Ologunde]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 21 May 2020 16:50:44 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-05-28T11:10:35.090Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>How COVID-19 is shaping countries’ foreign policies (in cyberspace)</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1000/0*GXAkaoUzzkI6iRH_.jpg" /><figcaption>Source: National Business Investigations</figcaption></figure><h4>Fake Interview Emails</h4><p>During the 12-day period from February 2 — 13, 2020, six Iranian-American scientists received emails supposedly sent by <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Farnaz_Fassihi">Farnaz Fassihi</a>, an award-winning Iranian-American journalist who previously wrote for the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) for 17 years, and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/search?query=farnaz+fassihi">now writes</a> for the New York Times. All six recipients are affiliated with top-ranked American universities — Harvard University, University of California Santa Cruz, University of Pittsburgh, Arizona State University, Yale University, and the University of Washington.</p><p>The fake emails were written in Persian, with the WSJ logo as the heading. The message itself was to notify the recipients of their selection by WSJ’s Middle East team to set up individual interviews to discuss some of their important achievements in research and the philosophy of science. The goal, according to the “sender”, was to motivate younger Iranians to discover their talents and achieve success.</p><p>The links in the fake email were crafted to download malware and spyware on the recipients’ computers, from sites controlled by <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charming_Kitten">Charming Kitten</a>, an Iran-linked <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advanced_persistent_threat">advanced persistent threat</a> (APT) actor. Considering the timing of the phishing emails and the targeted recipients, the threat actors were trying to get ahead of the COVID-19 pandemic on behalf of the Iranian government, looking for non-public information regarding treatments, cures, testing and vaccine research related to the COVID-19 pandemic — by all means.</p><p>On February 19, Iran <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2020/02/19/world/middleeast/ap-ml-china-outbreak-iran.html">reported</a> its first confirmed cases of coronavirus infections in <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qom">Qom</a>, the country’s seventh largest city located about 80 miles south of <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tehran">Tehran</a>. It is believed that the virus was <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/how-iran-became-a-new-epicenter-of-the-coronavirus-outbreak">brought to the country</a> by a Qom-based merchant who had travelled to China. Iran currently has the highest number of confirmed COVID-19 cases in the Middle East, and ranks 9th globally in terms of COVID-related deaths as of May 21, 2020.</p><h4>Cyber Espionage for Pandemic Leverage</h4><p>Since the COVID-19 pandemic began, several countries have turned the priorities of their intelligence agencies to the sourcing of any and all COVID-related information in order to obtain political, social and economic leverage over other countries dealing with the same pandemic. Some of the potentially valuable data being sourced include World Health Organization (WHO) estimates for infection rates, country-level coronavirus response plans, and effective treatment information.</p><p><a href="https://www.blog.google/technology/safety-security/threat-analysis-group/findings-covid-19-and-online-security-threats/">Research</a> conducted by Google’s <a href="https://www.blog.google/technology/safety-security/threat-analysis-group/">Threat Analysis Group</a> (TAG) showed that more than a dozen nation-state-backed advanced persistent threat (APT) groups are using the COVID-19 pandemic as a cover for their cyber espionage and other offensive cyber operations. Some of the techniques the hackers used include fake solicitations for charities and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), messages that try to mimic employer communications, and websites posing as official government pages and public health agencies.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/900/0*3brWKBX8bGAGYXfV.png" /></figure><p>On a daily basis, there are more than 18 million phishing and malware Gmail messages related to COVID-19. One of those campaigns was observed to be distributing a new version of the <a href="https://threatpost.com/revamped-hawkeye-keylogger-coronavirus-fears/154013/">HawkEye keylogger</a> malware in an “alert” email supposedly sent by WHO Director-General, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tedros_Adhanom">Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus</a>. Another major campaign attempted to target the personal accounts of U.S. government employees with lures using American fast food franchises and COVID-19 messaging. Some of those emails offered free meals and shopping coupons, while others offered online ordering and delivery options. Clicking on the links in those messages would then lead to phishing websites that were designed to capture Google account credentials. From there the hackers could sign into email accounts, Google Docs accounts, and many more, therefore getting access to potentially sensitive information or going ahead to launch further impersonation campaigns.</p><h4>Targets</h4><p>One such instance of an impersonation campaign was <a href="https://threatpost.com/spearphishing-campaign-exploits-covid-19-to-spread-lokibot-infostealer/154432/">observed in late March 2020</a>, when spear-phishing emails designed to spread the <a href="https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/new-infostealer-attack-uses-lokibot.html">Lokibot</a> information-stealing malware were sent to targets using the WHO trademark as a lure.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/974/0*ktcOLqBcUm6ilAeB.png" /></figure><p>Another instance of cyber attacks involving WHO was <a href="https://threatpost.com/who-attacked-possible-apt-covid-19-cyberattacks-double/154083/">observed on March 13</a>, when a malicious website was setup that mimicked WHO’s internal email system. The objective was to steal as many passwords as possible from several WHO employees, in an attempt to gain a foothold within the organization and then steal non-public information regarding vaccine research and official WHO estimates for country-by-country infection rates.</p><p>On April 20, the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation <a href="https://www.ic3.gov/media/2020/200420.aspx">warned of ongoing extortion scams</a> against American healthcare providers using COVID-19-themed lures to distribute malicious attachments.</p><p>On May 5, the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and UK’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) <a href="https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/AA20126A">issued a joint alert</a> about the persistence of APT groups that are exploiting the COVID-19 pandemic as part of their cyber operations against organizations involved in both national and international COVID-19 responses. The organizations listed in the joint alert include healthcare companies, pharmaceutical companies, academia, medical research organizations, and local governments. The alert stated that the ultimate goal of the APT actors are to obtain intelligence on national and international healthcare policy, or acquire sensitive data on COVID-19-related research. The alert also reported ongoing large-scale “<a href="https://www.beaming.co.uk/knowledge-base/what-is-password-spraying-2/">password spraying</a>” tactics aimed at healthcare and medical research organizations.</p><p>Between January and April 2020, an APT group linked to the Vietnamese government (<a href="https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/actor/apt32">APT32</a>) was observed to be launching attacks against China’s Ministry of Emergency Management, as well as the government of Wuhan province, in an apparent bid to steal information regarding China’s handling of the COVID-19 pandemic. The emails claimed to offer news updates on the spread of the coronavirus, and contained a <a href="https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.metaljack">METALJACK malware</a> loader that displayed a Chinese-language-titled COVID-19 decoy document while launching its malicious payloads.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/936/0*ZlqEqFT3ns9i8tYi.png" /><figcaption>Phishing email sent to China’s Ministry of Emergency Management</figcaption></figure><p>Around January 15, 2020, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DarkHotel">DarkHotel</a>, an APT group linked to the South Korean government was observed to be launching cyber espionage operations against the Chinese government. The threat group successfully targeted more than 200 <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virtual_private_network">virtual private network</a> (VPN) servers to compromise several Chinese institutions and government agencies. The timing of the attacks coincided with the instructions from the Chinese government mandating Chinese citizens to work from home in order to mitigate the spread of COVID-19.</p><p>About two months later, on March 26, security researchers <a href="https://www.wired.com/story/north-korea-hacking-zero-days-google/">revealed</a> that DarkHotel used five zero-day vulnerabilities in 2019 to launch attacks against Chinese and North Korean targets. The group has been active since at least 2004, and has differentiated itself by using hotel and business WiFi networks to spread its attacks undetected. The hacking operations exploited flaws in Internet Explorer, Chrome, and Windows with phishing emails that carried malicious attachments or links to malicious sites. In addition, the group also utilized so-called watering hole attacks that planted malware on victims’ machines when they visited certain websites. While it is fairly routine for South Koreans to spy on their northern adversary who frequently threatens to launch missiles across the border, the country’s ability to use five zero days in a single espionage campaign within a year represents a surprising level of sophistication and resources.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*EzviIPO_Xaof8QWn.png" /><figcaption>A DarkHotel Espionage Campaign</figcaption></figure><h4>More Targets</h4><p>On February 21, the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Institute_of_Allergy_and_Infectious_Diseases">National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases</a> (NIAID) launched a randomized, controlled clinical trial to evaluate the use of <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Remdesivir">Remdesivir</a> as an experimental treatment for COVID-19. The trial, known as the <a href="https://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/show/NCT04280705">Adaptive COVID-19 Treatment Trial</a> (ACTT), involved 1,063 hospitalized adult patients diagnosed with COVID-19. Remdesivir, developed by <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gilead_Sciences">Gilead Sciences Inc.</a>, is an investigational broad-spectrum antiviral treatment administered via daily infusion for 10 days. It has shown promise in animal models for treating the coronavirus infection and has been examined in various clinical trials.</p><p>By April 27, an <a href="https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2020/04/200429141311.htm">assessment of the clinical trial</a> revealed that the patients who received Remdesivir recovered faster than similar patients who received a placebo. An independent data and safety monitoring board (DSMB) overseeing the trial met to review data and shared their interim analysis with the study team. Based upon their review of the data, they noted that remdesivir was better than placebo from the perspective of the primary endpoint, time to recovery, a metric often used in influenza trials. Recovery in this study was defined as being well enough for hospital discharge or returning to normal activity level.</p><p>Sometime in April, very likely during the Remdesivir clinical trials, a top Gilead executive involved in legal and corporate affairs received a phishing email that impersonated a journalist. The email contained links designed to steal passwords in order to gain access to the top-level executive’s email messages and other sensitive documents related to the COVID-19 drug. The attack was mapped to Charming Kitten, the APT group linked to the Iranian government. It is unclear whether that attack was successful.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*a1Hj6M1f7f1HIUZW" /></figure><p>Historically, Charming Kitten has always been focused on stealing information from academics, but there appears to have been a change in their strategy around late January 2020, to coincide with efforts to acquire COVID-19-related information from other countries and international health organizations. Their primary objective now seems to be obtaining COVID-19 intelligence from wherever they can get it from.</p><p>Shortly after the Remdesivir clinical trials assessments, on May 1, the <a href="https://www.fda.gov/home">U.S. Food and Drug Administration</a> (FDA) granted Remdesivir an emergency use authorization. The drug is the only new therapy so far authorized to treat COVID-19, and Gilead has said it would donate its entire existing supply — about 1.5 million doses — to the U.S. government for distribution. So far, the Trump administration has shipped about 32,000 doses to Indiana, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, Tennessee and Virginia. On May 12, Gilead <a href="https://www.gilead.com/purpose/advancing-global-health/covid-19/voluntary-licensing-agreements-for-remdesivir">announced a deal</a> with five generic drug makers in India and Pakistan to “further expand the supply of Remdesivir” in 127 countries that “consist of nearly all low-income and lower-middle income countries, as well as several upper-middle- and high-income countries that face significant obstacles to healthcare access”. The U.S. is not included among the 127 countries.</p><h4>Conclusion</h4><p>In recent times, countries that would be otherwise reluctant to target international public health organizations, hospitals and commercial biotechnology companies are crossing that line because there is now an unprecedented need for knowledge and information. In addition, the COVID-19 pandemic has placed the global biotechnology industry under attack from all angles, and companies are having to take extra precautions to guard against attempts to steal COVID-19 research, such as conducting all work related to vaccine trials on “air-gapped” computers that are disconnected from the internet.</p><p>However, there have been <a href="https://www.welivesecurity.com/2020/05/13/ramsay-cyberespionage-toolkit-airgapped-networks/">reports</a> of a cyber espionage toolkit called <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ramsay_Malware">Ramsay</a> that is designed to infiltrate <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_gap_(networking)">air-gapped networks</a> to steal documents, take screenshots and compromise devices within the networks. Large-scale industrial companies, such as power companies and oil and gas firms, as well as government agencies are among the most common users of these air-gapped networks.</p><p>Researchers <a href="https://threatpost.com/ramsay-malware-air-gapped-networks/155695/">found</a> that Ramsay shares some code, tokens and other features that have been previously observed in a backdoor called Retro, which is used by the DarkHotel APT group.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1000/0*8i0UXDFAdpXf4o0-" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=aac245cb728e" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/discourse/cyber-spy-games-the-2020-pandemic-edition-aac245cb728e">Deceit, Theft &amp; Socio-Economic Leverage in Cyberspace</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/discourse">Dialogue &amp; Discourse</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[An Analysis of New & Improved Russian Cyber Operations]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/discourse/from-russia-with-love-9d76b899858a?source=rss-10d6e75e45f1------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/9d76b899858a</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[russia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[united-states]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iran]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[saudi-arabia]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Bidemi Ologunde]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 17 May 2020 05:42:51 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-05-28T11:14:33.887Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Regional influence &amp; force projection capabilities</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/844/0*DLkR5QiwMKnc-m0N.jpg" /></figure><h4>A Private Meeting</h4><p>On Monday, July 31, 2017, four men met for a private meeting in one of the luxurious suites at the <a href="https://www.kempinski.com/en/moscow/hotel-baltschug/">Baltschug Kempinski Moscow</a> hotel in Central Moscow. The <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moscow_Kremlin">Kremlin</a>, the Kremlin Wall, its towers and their spires, the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_Square">Red Square</a> and the onion domes of <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saint_Basil%27s_Cathedral">St. Basil’s Cathedral</a> were all visible across the Moskva River from their 8th floor suite. One of the four men was a technical scientist from the Center for Experimental Mechanical Engineering — a division of the Central Scientific Research Institute of Chemistry and Mechanics (CNIIHM), which, at the time was a Russian government-owned technical research institution. The scientist briefed the other three men about ongoing modifications to a malicious computer program called <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Triton_(malware)">Triton</a> that he and his colleagues at CNIIHM had been working on since early 2016. The other attendees were representatives from the Federal Service for Technical and Export Control, the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, and the Russian Academy of Missile and Artillery Sciences.</p><p>About two months prior to this July 31st meeting, on a Saturday in June, during the Islamic holy month of <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ramadan">Ramadan</a>, the Triton malware was deployed to test for detection on a custom-built industrial control system manufactured by <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schneider_Electric">Schneider Electric</a>. The control systems were exclusively designed and built for <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Petro_Rabigh">Petro Rabigh</a>, an oil facility located on the Red Sea coast in Western Saudi Arabia, about 650 miles west of Riyadh. Petro Rabigh was established as a joint venture between the world’s largest oil company, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saudi_Aramco">Saudi Aramco</a>, and <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sumitomo_Chemical">Sumitomo Chemical</a>, a Japanese company. The facility produces over 5 million tons of petrochemicals annually.</p><p>In Saudi Arabia, the work week starts on Sunday and ends on Thursday, therefore companies and institutions that run 24/7 operations, such as oil and gas facilities, are usually minimally-staffed on Fridays and Saturdays. Because the June 2017 malware detection test against Petro Rabigh’s systems happened on a Saturday during the Islamic holy month of Ramadan, the plant was even less staffed than on a typical weekend. On that day, specialists from Schneider Electric were called in to check out an apparent malfunction on one of their control systems. They ran on-site tests and conducted further off-site tests, but did not find any issues with the control system. The control system was placed back into normal operation, and the plant was subsequently restarted.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/710/0*f68oUug5Jgle3aKn.png" /><figcaption>Source: Varonis</figcaption></figure><h4>This is Not a Drill</h4><p>Two months after the June detection test and 4 days after the private meeting at the Moscow hotel, on another weekend evening — at about 7:43 PM on Friday, August 4, 2017 — Petro Rabigh plant operators noticed that two emergency shutdown systems had been turned on automatically, with some of the plant’s industrial equipment randomly shutting down during their scheduled time of operation. That eventually led to an unplanned shut down of the entire facility. The plant operators and engineers immediately placed a call to Saudi Aramco engineers — because Aramco has a 37.5% stake in Petro Rabigh, and also because Aramco had to deal with its own major cyber attack five year earlier in 2012. Subsequent investigations revealed the presence of two suspicious files in Petro Rabigh’s industrial control systems manufactured by Schneider Electric.</p><p>Back in 2012, Saudi Aramco was targeted by <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shamoon">Shamoon</a>, a wiper virus that infected about 35,000 of their corporate computers, completely wiping off all the data — including files, emails, and vital operating software — on the computers and rendering the physical computers useless afterwards. The Shamoon virus replaced the Windows image on the computers’ startup screens with an image of a burning American flag, and the incident cost Saudi Aramco millions of dollars in recovery costs. It however improved their cyber security awareness exponentially.</p><p>It became immediately clear that the August 4th incident at Petro Rabigh was a cyber attack, and both internal and external investigators confirmed it in the days after the attack. Several different types of malware were also found on the plant’s systems, but no one knew how they got there. By August 14th, 10 days after the incident was discovered, <a href="https://www.argaam.com/en">Argaam</a>, a Saudi financial news organization declared that the “brief outage” at Petro Rabigh had been “solved.” About the same time, the hackers realized that their malware had been discovered, so they began deleting traces of their Triton toolset from all workstations at the oil facility.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/0*DXuEV0WHM55yTrRu" /></figure><p>Notably, the Triton hackers displayed ingenuity and skill during the containment process. When the security teams began changing user passwords and enabling <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multi-factor_authentication">two-factor authentication</a> (2FA) to provide an extra layer of security when logging into accounts, the hackers had already preempted this and had already penetrated the plant’s corporate network much earlier during the reconnaissance stage of their attack. The registered phone numbers linked to certain high-privilege accounts were modified to redirect to websites controlled by the hackers. They were therefore able to capture the login codes sent as text messages to those phone numbers.</p><p>Invariably, the hackers proved that they had deep knowledge of their target’s systems, showed the ability to change tactics at short notice, showed the ability to pivot from the initial infection point into Petro Rabigh’s core control systems, and also showed the ability to compromise a crucial fail-safe system that was designed to stop hackers in their tracks (2FA).</p><p>Compared to other malware that have previously targeted industrial control systems — <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stuxnet">Stuxnet</a>, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Industroyer">CrashOverride</a>, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BlackEnergy">BlackEnergy 1, 2 &amp; 3</a>, and <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Havex">Havex</a>— the Triton malware was able to directly interact with, remotely control, and effectively compromise the safety components of an industrial control system — which, by itself, is a nearly unprecedented feat. The hackers’ goal was not to cause a shutdown, rather to sabotage the plant’s operations and trigger an explosion. However, their Triton malware malfunctioned, which led to the plant triggering its emergency shut down systems, rather than ending with a catastrophic explosion.</p><h4>Helix Kitten</h4><p><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advanced_persistent_threat">Advanced Persistent Threat</a> (APT) actors are groups of hackers usually backed by state- or non-state sponsors, and possess significant amounts of cyber resources, skills and capabilities for conducting large-scale targeted cyber attacks for specific goals.</p><p>The <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Helix_Kitten">Helix Kitten</a> hacker group, also known as APT34 or OILRIG (due to their tendency for attacking oil companies and facilities in the Middle East), is an Iranian threat group that has been active since at least 2014. They have been observed to conduct reconnaissance aligned with the strategic interests of Iran, and have targeted organizations in the financial, energy, telecommunications, and chemical industries, as well as critical infrastructure systems such as dams, power plants, and oil and gas facilities. Their use of infrastructure tied to Iranian operations, their timing, and their alignment with the national interests of Iran led analysts to assess that APT34 acts on behalf of the Iranian government. Other APT groups associated with the Iranian government are <a href="https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html">Elfin Team</a> (APT33), <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charming_Kitten">Charming Kitten</a> (APT35) and <a href="https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/01/apt39-iranian-cyber-espionage-group-focused-on-personal-information.html">Chafer</a> (APT39).</p><p>The Shamoon cyber attack that hit Saudi Aramco in 2012 was widely believed to be the work of Iran’s APT33. Iran has been Saudi Arabia’s perennial foe, and would therefore have more than enough motive to attack Saudi oil and gas facilities with destructive intent. The Petro Rabigh incident would also fit Iran’s reputation as an emerging cyber power: following the damage to Iran’s nuclear enrichment facilities in Natanz by the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stuxnet">Stuxnet</a> worm in 2010, the regime vowed to ramp up both their offensive and defensive cyber security capabilities.</p><h4>From Russia With Love</h4><p>As the investigations proceeded during the months following the Triton attack, security teams found clues that pointed to Russia, rather than Iran, but the geopolitical context did not particularly add up. On October 5, 2017, Saudi Arabia’s King Salman met with Russia’s President Putin in Moscow where they had “substantive and meaningful” talks. The high level of rapport and goodwill between both countries at the time therefore made a Russia-backed cyber attack on a Saudi oil facility quite strange.</p><p>This led observers and analysts to conclude that Petro Rabigh could have been a target of convenience; a live test bed for the hackers to become familiar with industrial networks and control systems in preparation for a much larger and higher-impact target in the future.</p><p>Another theory was that Petro Rabigh’s location on the Red Sea provides it with easier access to African and European markets, which is in direct competition with Russia’s goals of expanding its global footprint in petrochemicals. Russia has always considered the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Horn_of_Africa">Horn of Africa</a> as a strategic location to affect global trade routes, and cyber intrusions into such a strategically located oil facility could maximize Russia’s options in the event of future conflicts.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*bomJklVfO6lp0oZn" /></figure><p>On December 14, 2017, four months after the cyber attack on Petro Rabigh, cyber security company FireEye <a href="https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/12/attackers-deploy-new-ics-attack-framework-triton.html">reported</a> “with high confidence” that the intrusion activity that led to the deployment of TRITON was supported by the Central Scientific Research Institute of Chemistry and Mechanics (CNIIHM) in Moscow. Their assessment was based on a number of factors including the use of an Internet protocol (IP) address that was registered to CNIIHM, the existence of multiple independent ties between the malware and a specific individual in Moscow, and the links between this individual’s online activities and CNIIHM.</p><p>FireEye’s assessment concluded with a caveat stating that while they could not rule out the possibility that one or more CNIIHM employees could have been responsible for creating the Triton malware without their employer’s approval, that explanation is less plausible than the Triton malware operating with the support of the institute.</p><h4>Conclusion</h4><p>The U.S. Director of National Intelligence in 2016 — James Clapper — stated in an analysis that Russia was laying the groundwork for disrupting power grids and oil and gas facilities. In 2019, Clapper’s successor, Dan Coats, reiterated that Russia is now staging cyber attack assets to allow the disruption of U.S. civilian and military infrastructure during a crisis.</p><p>Three years after a series of cyber attacks were launched against industrial control systems in Europe and the Middle East, the extent to which these warnings are being heeded in the U.S. still remains to be seen.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1000/0*Wxs-SFUPaeM_WG3-" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9d76b899858a" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/discourse/from-russia-with-love-9d76b899858a">An Analysis of New &amp; Improved Russian Cyber Operations</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/discourse">Dialogue &amp; Discourse</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon — Analyzing The Effectiveness of Chinese Cyber-Military Operations]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/discourse/crouching-tiger-hidden-dragon-112eff4980f9?source=rss-10d6e75e45f1------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/112eff4980f9</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[defense]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[china]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[military]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[espionage]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Bidemi Ologunde]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 12 May 2020 11:46:40 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-05-28T11:17:19.039Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon — Analyzing The Effectiveness of Chinese Cyber-Military Operations</h3><h4>How to use APTs in territorial disputes</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1000/0*VtXaSHcx5QAv1n9R" /><figcaption>Photo: chuttersnap (Unsplash)</figcaption></figure><h4><strong>Strategic Support Force (SSF)</strong></h4><p>On December 31, 2015, the Chinese government re-organized its military and created a <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/People%27s_Liberation_Army_Strategic_Support_Force">Strategic Support Force</a> (SSF) that was tasked with enhancing the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/People%27s_Liberation_Army">People’s Liberation Army</a>’s (PLA) space, cyberspace, electromagnetic spectrum, and psychological warfare capabilities. The core objective of the SSF was to facilitate and guarantee the PLA’s victory in any future conflict scenario where superiority in “informatized” warfare is required against a “stronger military opponent”. Since its creation, the SSF has been responsible for conducting many of China’s most sensitive cyber espionage and propaganda missions in ways that combine the Chinese government’s desire for asymmetric warfare capabilities with the ability to collect any and all intelligence stored on electronic devices in any part of the world.</p><p>The SSF reports directly to China’s <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_Military_Commission_(China)">Central Military Commission</a> rather than any of the five Theater Commands, and it was created by the fusion of core segments of the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/People%27s_Liberation_Army_Strategic_Support_Force">3PLA</a> — China’s version of the U.S. National Security Agency — and the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fourth_Department_of_the_General_Staff_Headquarters_Department">4PLA</a>, a much more secretive unit that was responsible for electronic warfare and information operations. As a result of this, known <a href="https://www.fireeye.com/current-threats/apt-groups.html">Chinese advanced persistent threat (APT) groups</a> such as PLA Unit 61398 (APT1), PLA Unit 61486 (APT2), Buckeye (APT3), Red Apollo (APT10), Codoso Team (APT19), Wocao (APT20), Bronze Union (APT27), PLA Unit 78020 (APT30), Periscope Group (APT40), and Double Dragon (APT41) are most likely now part of the newly-created SSF.</p><h4>Force Projection, All-Source Intelligence &amp; Cultural Norms</h4><p>Recently, China has been striving to catch up with the likes of the United States, Israel, Germany, France and the United Kingdom in terms of military technology, expenditure and manpower. The SSF therefore presents an opportunity to match Western military capabilities by following a radically different model.</p><p>In absolute comparative terms, the totality of the missions conducted by the Chinese SSF matches up with those conducted by the combination of 18 U.S. intelligence agencies and major American private defense contractors such as Boeing, Raytheon, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and General Dynamics. China’s annual defense budget, including a description of how much resources are dedicated to espionage activities, is however always kept secret.</p><p>A <a href="https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/1/2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf">2019 unclassified report</a> by the U.S. Department of Defense noted that the SSF’s Network Systems Department is responsible for information warfare with a mission set that includes cyber warfare, technical reconnaissance, electronic warfare, and psychological warfare. U.S. lawmakers and private sector researchers have long claimed that the PLA hacks into foreign targets, but Chinese government officials have constantly refuted those claims. A <a href="https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/press-releases/sasc-investigation-finds-chinese-intrusions-into-key-defense-contractors">September 2014 report</a> by the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee blamed China for a series of data breaches between 2008 and 2012 that affected U.S. Transportation Command contractors. The culprits were able to steal sensitive documents, flight details, credentials and passwords for encrypted email messages.</p><p>The differences between Western and Chinese military doctrines, domestic rule of law, and cultural norms cause Chinese officials to view cyber security in a much different light. For instance, information operations, also known as psychological warfare, is more closely aligned with China’s offensive operations in cyberspace because China, and other member states of the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shanghai_Cooperation_Organisation">Shanghai Cooperation Organization</a> — Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan — perceive <em>information security</em> <a href="https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2011/09/russia-china-tajikistan-propose-un-code-of-conduct-for-the-net/">threats</a> as “the dissemination of information that…undermines other countries’ political, economic and social stability, as well as their spiritual and cultural environment.”</p><p>The U.S. and other Western countries’ militaries are mandated by their Constitutions to answer to their citizens, but the PLA supports the Chinese ruling party as a matter of principle — Chinese generals and other top defense officials are recognized long-term party members. The SSF is therefore seen as a direct extension of the Communist Party of China, with missions and objectives such as international espionage and the targeting of dissidents, local hackers, and individuals or organizations that are considered to be domestic threats. In addition, private companies in China can be forced or pressured to comply with Communist Party mandates, unlike in Western states where there are strict legal boundaries.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*H-ftonMmTkTJURNq.jpg" /><figcaption>Chinese Military Forces. Source: CyberScoop.</figcaption></figure><h4><strong>Naikon APT</strong></h4><p>In September 2015, American cybersecurity company ThreatConnect, in conjunction with Defense Group Inc., published <a href="https://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/454298/Project_CAMERASHY_ThreatConnect_Copyright_2015.pdf?t=1443030820943&amp;submissionGuid=81f1c199-859f-41e9-955b-2eec13777720">an extensive report</a> on the Naikon APT group. The report linked Naikon to a branch of the People’s Liberation Army — the Chengdu Military Region Second Technical Reconnaissance Bureau (TRB), Military Unit Cover Designator (MUCD) 78020. Also known as Unit 78020, the group operates out of <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kunming">Kunming</a>, the capital city and transportation hub of <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yunnan">Yunnan Province</a> in southwestern China.</p><p>Similar to how the nine other Chinese military TRBs operate, Unit 78020 is heavily involved in cyber espionage operations against foreign interests, specifically Southeast Asian nations, for military, economic and diplomatic leverage, especially on issues regarding the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_China_Sea">South China Sea</a>. Historically, Unit 78020&#39;s targets have included government entities in Australia, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Nepal, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam, as well as international organizations such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).</p><p>In that 2015 report, a comprehensive technical analysis of Naikon threat activity was presented alongside native language research on a PLA officer within Unit 78020 named Ge Xing, aka GreenSky27. Shortly after the report was released, the Naikon group seemed to disappear, the timing of which also coincided with the massive re-organization of China’s military, and the creation of the SSF in late December 2015. Some of China’s cyber capabilities have now been divested and placed under control of the Chinese <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ministry_of_State_Security_(China)">Ministry of State Security</a> (MSS), alongside the PLA.</p><p>However, in early 2019, the Naikon group began accelerating efforts to expand their online infrastructure. They purchased server space from <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alibaba_Group">Alibaba</a>, a Chinese technology company, and registered domain names on <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GoDaddy">GoDaddy</a>, an American web-hosting company. In <a href="https://threatpost.com/naikon-apt-five-year-espionage-attack/155492/">one remarkable espionage incident</a>, Naikon threat actors took over a server belonging to the Philippines Department of Science and Technology and used it to mask the origin of a sophisticated attack. By late 2019, Naikon was ready to resume their offensive cyber operations after almost 5 years of restructuring, developing new tools, and expanding their infrastructure.</p><h4><strong>Contexts and Pretexts — Geo-Political Tensions</strong></h4><p>On January 1st, 2020, Chinese fishing boats, escorted by Chinese coast guard vessels, conducted fishing off the coast of the northern Natuna Islands in waters claimed by Indonesia as its exclusive economic zone (EEZ). This led to a stand-off between both countries and five days later, Indonesia decided to send its fishermen to join its warships in the area to help defend against the Chinese vessels. Few days later, Indonesia deployed two Kapitan Pittimura-class anti-submarine corvettes at Great Natuna Island, and later added one Martadinata-class guided-missile frigate, two Bung Tomo-class corvettes, one Ahmed Yani-class frigate, one Makassar-class landing platform dock (LPD), one Cakra-class diesel submarine and four F-16C/D fighter jets to the deployment even when the Chinese vessels appeared to have backed down from the area.</p><p>Both countries have repeatedly clashed over fishing rights around the Natuna Islands, with Indonesia often detaining Chinese fishermen and expanding its military presence in the area. For a long time, China has claimed most parts of the South China Sea, which is an important trade route and is believed to contain large quantities of oil and natural gas.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*foEfRsVhp0U5Ovv0.jpg" /><figcaption>Source: Nations Online Project</figcaption></figure><h4><strong>Temples, Airports, Proxy Agents &amp; Command Centers</strong></h4><p>The <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Laba_Festival">Laba Festival</a> is a traditional Chinese holiday that corresponds with the enlightenment day of the Buddha, and is usually celebrated on the 8th day of the 12th month of the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_calendar">Chinese calendar</a>. On January 2nd, 2020, the Guandu Shaolin Temple, a Buddhist temple in Kunming, celebrated the festival by offering prayers for good luck, plentiful harvest, peace, and good health. During the ceremony, monks, disciples and other volunteers served free food (<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Laba_congee">Laba congee</a>) to visitors.</p><p>Shortly after 5:00 PM, two PLA officers who were part of the volunteers during the festival ceremonies excused themselves, said their goodbyes to the Abbot, Masters, monks, disciples, and other volunteers, got into their car, and headed towards Kunming Changshui International Airport, about 20 minutes from the temple. They had orders from all the way up their chain of command to pick up two cyber security specialists from <a href="http://en.sjtu.edu.cn/">Shanghai Jiao Tong University</a> — male graduate students in their early 30s.</p><p>At about 6:23 PM, China Eastern Airlines flight MU5806 from Shanghai Hongqiao International Airport landed in Kunming, 16 minutes ahead of schedule. The Airbus A330 was full to capacity — 30 business seats and 204 economy seats — and the airport was especially busy due to the time of the year, so the two men from the temple had to wait a while before picking up the two specialists from Shanghai. Shortly after 7:30 PM, they all headed back into the city to the 020 Hotel next to the TRB compound in Wuhua District, northwest Kunming.</p><h4>False-Flag Operations</h4><p>On the morning of January 3rd, 2020, a Naikon threat actor took over the computer of an Indonesian diplomat in Canberra, Australia and then sent a malicious email from the Indonesian embassy to the office of the premier of Western Australia. Since the email was supposedly sent from a trusted source, the recipient opened it without having second thoughts. This technique has been used in several other attacks against government ministries and entities in Australia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Vietnam, Thailand, Myanmar and Brunei where successive attacks were launched from within the networks of previously compromised networks. The technique is commonly referred to as <a href="https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/news/cybercrime-and-digital-threats/utilizing-island-hopping-in-targeted-attacks">island hopping</a>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/490/0*BJm--KeNxRNUG-NL.jpg" /><figcaption>Island Hopping. Source: Trend Micro</figcaption></figure><p>The email attachment that was sent from the Indonesian embassy’s network contained an invisible cyber attack tool called <a href="https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-aria-body-backdoor-gets-advanced-hackers-back-in-the-spy-game/">Aria-body</a>, which had never been detected before and had alarming new capabilities. Hackers who used it to remotely take over a computer could copy, delete or create files and carry out extensive searches of the device’s data, and the tool had new ways of covering its tracks to avoid detection.</p><h4>The Endgame</h4><p>An unintended outcome of the misattributed offensive cyber operation might have been to embarrass the Indonesian government, but based on Chinese APTs’ known tactics, techniques and procedures, diplomatic embarrassment was probably not the main focus of the entire operation. As stated earlier, Chinese threat actors usually carry out cyber espionage in a low and slow manner, probing networks for weak points and then launching subsequent attacks using the infrastructure of the previous victim.</p><p>China’s cyber force is now split between the PLA and the MSS, with thousands of officers responsible for collecting signals intelligence. The Naikon group in particular has been observed to attack embassies, ministries and state-owned corporations that deal with science and technology. In addition to the manpower and motive, the group also has the technical capability to customize their signature attack tools to search for specific files by their names within the compromised entities.</p><p>It remains to be seen how other countries will deal with the threats they face from Chinese cyber threat actors. Since there are currently no specific rules guiding the behavior of states and proxy actors in cyberspace, what appears to be a relatively new warfare domain might just continue to prove more and more chaotic as time goes on, with each country adopting the peculiarities of cyberspace to meet their sovereign needs.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=112eff4980f9" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/discourse/crouching-tiger-hidden-dragon-112eff4980f9">Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon — Analyzing The Effectiveness of Chinese Cyber-Military Operations</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/discourse">Dialogue &amp; Discourse</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Russia in Africa: Debt Diplomacy & Influence Operations]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/discourse/russia-in-africa-debt-diplomacy-influence-operations-dc617ade81aa?source=rss-10d6e75e45f1------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/dc617ade81aa</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[russia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[africa]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mozambique]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[military]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Bidemi Ologunde]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 23 Dec 2019 07:53:28 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-12-25T19:16:06.924Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Mozambique, Africa</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*agYINXhmAKqoYueq.jpg" /><figcaption>Source: Encyclopedia Britannica</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*Pg-B2j0u3U-akJIq.png" /><figcaption>Source: ISS Africa</figcaption></figure><h4>Mysterious Terror Attacks</h4><p>On Saturday, July 6, 2019, the Islamic State (IS) terror group claimed responsibility for an attack that killed seven people in Lidjungo village — including a policeman and two children — in Mozambique’s northern Cabo Delgado province. It was the Islamic State’s second such claim within roughly one month: the first was for an attack carried out on June 3 in Metubi village, about 90 miles east of Lidjungo village.</p><p><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamist_insurgency_in_Mozambique">Since October 2017</a>, IS fighters have targeted the Muslim-majority Cabo Delgado province, which also happens to be rich in natural gas, killing more than 250 people and forcing thousands to evacuate their homes, despite the strong police and military presence in that northern province.</p><p>It is however interesting to note that the identities of the IS militants staging these attacks in northern Mozambique remain unclear, with their motives still unknown. Intelligence analysts have <a href="https://news.yahoo.com/islamic-state-claims-first-presence-mozambique-denied-police-143007715.html">expressed doubts</a> over these claims by the Islamic State, suggesting that it is unlikely that the group would have direct contact with local fighters in Mozambique.</p><h4>Russian Influence — Debt Diplomacy</h4><p>Russia has been trying to expand its sphere of influence globally, and sees Mozambique, an oil- and gas-rich nation, as a ready and willing partner. Mozambique already signed a <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/russia-and-mozambique-agree-big-debt-for-development-swap/">$40 million debt-for-development swap agreement</a> with Russia in 2017.</p><p>On Thursday, August 22, 2019, during a state visit to Moscow, the President of Mozambique, Filipe Nyusi, signed energy and security agreements with Russian President Vladimir Putin. The agreements include extensive cooperation between both countries’ interior ministries on “information protection” and a deal between Russia’s oil company Rosneft and Mozambique’s National Hydrocarbons Company. Mozambique is trying to develop its natural gas reserves, which could make the country a major exporter of liquefied natural gas. Both countries share a long history dating back to the 1960s when the Soviet Union supported Marxist fighters against Portuguese colonial rule.</p><p>Incidentally, Mozambique is also battling Islamist insurgency in its northern region, which Russia agreed to help with by sending military advisers.</p><h4>Wagner Group</h4><p>In early August 2019, military contractors submitted proposals to the government of Mozambique to help the country fight Islamic insurgency in its volatile northern region. The proposals were submitted by companies familiar with Mozambique, in terms of the terrain, culture, politics, and so on. One former colonel in the South African army whose company submitted a proposal stated that he knows Mozambique “like the palm of his hand.”</p><p>These military contractors however lost to a newcomer to Mozambique — Wagner Group. The company is linked to the Russian government, and is widely believed to be owned by Yevgeny Prigozhin, a businessman with close ties to Russian President Putin. Although there are no publicly available information on how much Wagner Group pays its mercenaries, the company is thought to be a relatively low-cost option compared to other military contractors that operate in the area, but its high-level political connections makes it extremely competitive. Wagner mercenaries have also been deployed in other African countries such as Libya, Sudan, Central African Republic, Madagascar, and Democratic Republic of Congo.</p><p>In late September 2019, about 200 Wagner mercenaries arrived in Mozambique. They have been engaged in a fierce fight with islamist insurgents in the Cabo Delgado province ever since, but neither their modern weaponry nor their experience in war zones such as Syria were enough to overcome the Islamist insurgents. A series of ambushes and dozens of killings followed by decapitations have forced Wagner mercenaries into a “strategic retreat”, while they try to figure out a new operational plan on the ground in northern Mozambique.</p><p>The setbacks in Mozambique show the challenges that Russia faces in its attempts to expand its sphere of influence by using an array of economic, political and military options.</p><h4>Russian Influence — Information Operations</h4><p>On October 15, 2019, Mozambique held general elections, with the incumbent president Filipe Nyusi winning re-election with 73% of the vote. The main opposition party, RENAMO, however <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20191030-mozambique-opposition-files-suit-against-massive-electoral-fraud">claimed there were widespread irregularities</a>, including hundreds of thousands of ghost voters. While there are no evidence of Russia’s direct influence on Mozambique’s general elections, a Russian NGO linked to Yevgeny Prigozhin, Wagner Group’s supposed owner, was fingered for carrying out influence operations.</p><p>During the run-up to the elections, a think tank called Afric conducted a poll that predicted victory for President Nyusi. Since it was illegal to publish election-related polls during election cycles in Mozambique, Afric’s founder, Jose Matemulane, <a href="https://iaccenters.com/2019/10/04/forecast-for-general-election-results-in-the-republic-of-mozambique/">published</a> the poll results on the website of the International Anticrisis Center, the NGO <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/may/08/documents-suggest-russian-plan-to-sway-south-africa-election">linked to Prigozhin</a>. The poll then found its way to several social media networks within Mozambique.</p><p>By the end of October, after the general elections, Facebook eventually <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/10/30/facebook-suspends-accounts-tied-to-putin-ally-over-alleged-africa-meddling-a67982">suspended</a> Afric’s page. Nathaniel Gleicher, Facebook’s head of cybersecurity policy, stated that Afric was linked to Prigozhin and had attempted to interfere in the domestic politics of a number of African countries — Libya, Sudan, Central African Republic, Madagascar, Mozambique and Democratic Republic of Congo.</p><p>In addition, the <a href="https://cyber.fsi.stanford.edu/io/content/io-landing-page-2">Stanford Internet Observatory</a> cyber policy center identified four separate pages also linked to Prigozhin created on September 23, 2019, which frequently posted identical content: they praised President Nyusi’s successes in fighting Islamist insurgency in Cabo Delgado and criticized the main opposition party RENAMO.</p><h4>Conclusion</h4><p>Russia continues to take advantage of global events to shape its foreign policy. In addition, debt diplomacy, political and military options are still part of Russia’s tactics, techniques and procedures when it comes to exerting influence globally.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*w7pdI49YeZl547kW.jpg" /><figcaption>Source: The Moscow Times</figcaption></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=dc617ade81aa" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/discourse/russia-in-africa-debt-diplomacy-influence-operations-dc617ade81aa">Russia in Africa: Debt Diplomacy &amp; Influence Operations</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/discourse">Dialogue &amp; Discourse</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[US/Russia Proxy Wars: Oligarchs & Russian Mercenaries]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/discourse/us-russia-proxy-wars-oligarchs-russian-mercenaries-92ffc857412e?source=rss-10d6e75e45f1------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/92ffc857412e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[united-states]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[russia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[war]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[military]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[syria]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Bidemi Ologunde]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 12 Dec 2019 08:13:08 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-12-20T18:13:48.692Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Date: February 7, 2018 | Location: Deir al-Zour, Syria</h4><p>On February 7, 2018, the U.S. military had to defend itself against pro-Syrian government forces <em>and Russian mercenaries,</em> while deployed to fight the Islamic State in Syria. Back then, there was a high probability that Russian military forces would eventually clash with American troops since both sides began taking opposing sides in the seven-year long Syrian civil war.</p><p>In the days leading up to this massive attack, both Russia and the U.S. supported separate offensives against the Islamic State on opposite sides of the Euphrates River in the oil-rich Deir al-Zour Province bordering Iraq. American officials watched as hundreds of approaching rival troops, vehicles and artillery pieces took up positions near the river. Russian military officials denied any involvement in the troop buildup across the river, stating that they had no control over those fighters taking up positions. U.S. surveillance equipment however revealed through the monitoring of radio transmissions that those ground forces were communicating in Russian.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/243/1*68ahWYEFAoHlc36UyOI26g.png" /><figcaption>Source: New York Times</figcaption></figure><p>As a matter of fact, those fighters were pro-Syrian government forces loyal to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, and were made up of Syrian government soldiers and militias. U.S. intelligence officials added that majority of those fighters were private Russian paramilitary mercenaries, most likely belonging to <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wagner_Group">Wagner Group</a>, a Kremlin-linked private military contractor typically used when deniability is necessary, to carry out off-the-book missions that can’t be linked directly to the Russian government.</p><p>During an April 2018 testimony in the U.S. Senate, former Defense Secretary, General Jim Mattis told senators that the Russian high command in Syria had assured Pentagon officials that those menacing ground forces were not their people, to which General Mattis then gave the order for the force “to be annihilated.”</p><p>Early in the morning of February 7th, a platoon of infantry Marines and a team of Green Berets were monitoring overhead drone feeds of a Conoco gas plant from their mission support site 20 miles away; there, the pro-Syrian government forces and Russian mercenaries had been converging all week. Incidentally, a team of about 30 Delta Force soldiers and Rangers from the Joint Special Operations Command were working alongside Kurdish and Arab forces at a small dusty outpost near the gas plant. At about 3:00PM local time, the opposing forces began edging toward the gas plant, and by early evening, over 500 troops and 27 vehicles, tanks and armored personnel carriers had gathered.</p><p>Military officers and intelligence analysts at the Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar and at the Pentagon in Washington watched in disbelief as the scene unfolded. The military commanders in Qatar immediately briefed their pilots and ground crew, and aircrafts across the entire region were placed on alert. Back at the mission support site 20 miles from the gas plant, the Marines and Green Berets prepared a small reaction force of about 16 troops in four mine-resistant vehicles. They inspected their weapons and loaded up their trucks with anti-tank missiles, thermal optics, food and water; just in case they were needed at the gas plant.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*Vcd7oOhs9NVGYo5Y.jpg" /><figcaption>Russian-made T-72 tank. Source: Wikipedia</figcaption></figure><p>At 8:30PM, Russian-made T-72 tanks weighing almost 50 tons and armed with 125-millimeter guns moved within a mile of the gas plant. In anticipation of an attack, the Marines and Green Berets prepared to launch the small reaction force. Around 10:00PM, a column of tanks and other armored vehicles emerged from a neighborhood of houses where they had tried to gather undetected — a typical Russian <a href="https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_military_deception"><em>maskirovka</em></a> tactic. At about 10:30pm, the pro-Syrian forces and the Russian mercenaries began their attack.</p><p>For the first 15 minutes, the small dusty outpost near the gas plant was hit with a barrage of tank fire, large artillery and mortar rounds. The Rangers and Delta Force soldiers took cover and responded with machine gun fire, anti-tank missiles, warning shots and a howitzer. During all these mayhem, American military officials called their Russian counterparts to literally cut it out, but the offensive continued in an unrelenting manner.</p><p>By that time, the pilots in Qatar had received their orders, and U.S. warplanes arrived in waves — Reaper drones, F-22 stealth fighter jets, F-15E Strike Fighters, B-52 bombers, AC-130 gunships and AH-64 Apache helicopters. Between 11:00PM and 1:00AM, superior U.S. air power was unloaded on the enemy troops, tanks and other vehicles, in addition to Marine rocket artillery being fired from the ground.</p><p>The Marines’ and Green Berets’ small reaction force sped toward the fight from their mission support site 20 miles away but they were however hampered by the darkness, as they could not risk using their vehicles’ headlights and had to rely on thermal-imaging cameras to navigate. In addition, the road was littered with felled power lines and shell craters. They were forced to stop as they neared the gas plant around 11:30PM because the barrage of artillery was too dangerous to drive through. So they waited until air strikes silenced the enemy forces’ tanks and howitzers.</p><p>At this point, the commandos at the gas plant were basically pinned down by enemy artillery and were running low on ammunition. Around 1:00AM the enemy forces’ artillery fire began dwindling, so the Marines’ and Green Berets’ small reaction force pulled up to the small outpost and began firing at enemy positions. American warplanes had also returned to base by then to refuel and reload their ammunition. At about the same time, the Russian mercenaries left their vehicles and headed toward the outpost on foot.</p><p>The vastly outnumbered American troops (a ratio of about 10 to 1) organized their assault effectively and efficiently: a few Marines loaded ammunition onto machine guns and Javelin missile launchers that were wedged among the trucks; some Green Berets and Marines took aim from exposed hatches, while others remained in their trucks to use thermal screens and joysticks to fire the heavy machine guns on the roof of their trucks; some commandos and U.S. Air Force combat controllers manned the radios to guide the next wave of bombers flying toward the battlefield; and some Marines used missile guidance computers to find the targets’ locations and pass them on to the commandos calling in the airstrikes.</p><p>At about 2:00AM, the enemy fighters started retreating, the U.S. troops stopped firing, and the Russian mercenaries/Syrian fighters returned to collect their dead — more than 100 pro-Syrian government troops were killed.</p><p>Not one American fighter was harmed.</p><p>The outcome of the February 7, 2018 fight showed that the Russian mercenaries and their Syrian allies made the costly mistake of attempting an assault on an American military position, which resulted in their annihilation. Since the Iraq invasion of 2003, the U.S. Central Command has ensured a refinement of the amount of equipment, coordination, tactics and logistics required to mix air- and ground-fired weapons.</p><h4><strong>Wagner Group</strong></h4><p>But why did the mercenaries attack a U.S. military position? U.S. intelligence officials say that Wagner Group is in Syria to seize oil and gas fields and protect them on behalf of the Assad government, and the mercenaries get a cut of the production proceeds from the oil fields they reclaim. Wagner Group’s leaders have received awards in the Kremlin, and its mercenaries are trained at bases owned by the Russian Defense Ministry.</p><p>On July 30, 2018, three Russian journalists were murdered in the Central African Republic, where they had been trying to investigate the activities of Wagner Group. They worked for an organization financed by Mikhail Khodorkovsky, a former oil tycoon and fierce critic of the Russian President. The Russian government had begun collaborative efforts with the President of the Central African Republic in October 2017 that included mining rights within the mineral-rich African country.</p><p>Wagner Group is also strongly linked with Yevgeny Prigozhin, a businessman and Putin ally whose restaurants and catering businesses has hosted dinners that Putin attended with foreign dignitaries. Prigozhin controls “a network of companies,” including three accused of interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential elections. He is also accused of attempting to influence the 2018 U.S. midterm elections. His companies and associates face economic sanctions and criminal charges in the United States.</p><p>Thoughts? <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/bidemiologunde">LinkedIn</a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/660/0*MrES4iQM5c9W_T_t.jpg" /><figcaption>Yevgeny Prigozhin. Photo: BBC</figcaption></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=92ffc857412e" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/discourse/us-russia-proxy-wars-oligarchs-russian-mercenaries-92ffc857412e">US/Russia Proxy Wars: Oligarchs &amp; Russian Mercenaries</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/discourse">Dialogue &amp; Discourse</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The (Recent) Tribalization of Cyber Crime in Nigeria]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/swlh/the-recent-tribalization-of-cyber-crime-in-nigeria-2cf7cd0c8af2?source=rss-10d6e75e45f1------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2cf7cd0c8af2</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[criminal-justice]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[fraud]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[organized-crime]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[nigeria]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Bidemi Ologunde]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 24 Aug 2019 17:59:44 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-09-08T21:35:26.039Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Incomplete Facts, Echo Chambers and Value Systems</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1000/0*zMl0W6g1jk1Yr3JS" /><figcaption>Photo: Bill Oxford (Unsplash)</figcaption></figure><h4>#FactsOnly</h4><p>On Thursday, August 22, 2019, the United States Attorney’s Office in the Central District of California unsealed a <a href="https://www.justice.gov/usao-cdca/press-release/file/1197341/download">145-page</a>, 252-count <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grand_jury">Grand Jury</a> Indictment, which was dated October 2018 and filed on June 27, 2019. The indictment charged 80 defendants — mostly Nigerians of <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Igbo_people">Igbo</a> extraction — with participating in a massive conspiracy dating back to no later than Tuesday, October 7, 2014 to steal millions of dollars through a variety of fraud schemes such as <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Business_email_compromise">Business Email Compromise</a> (BEC), <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bogus_escrow">Escrow Fraud</a>, and <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Romance_scam">Romance Scams</a> (these dates are very important). These individuals then allegedly laundered the funds through a Los Angeles-based money laundering network. In addition to these 80 individuals, 26 others were also identified (but unnamed) as unindicted co-conspirators (UICCs).</p><p>The indictment was unsealed following arrests made on the morning of Thursday, August 22, 2019, when 11 individuals were arrested in the Los Angeles area of California. Two others were already being held in federal custody based on other charges, while one individual was arrested earlier on Sunday, August 18, 2019. All the identified individuals face charges such as: conspiracy to commit fraud, conspiracy to launder money, aggravated identity theft, operation of illegal money transmitting businesses, among others. Interestingly, three of the defendants had been interviewed by Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents in July 2017, and they attempted to destroy evidence of their criminal activities by destroying their cell phones shortly before FBI agents executed the search warrants. Earlier in August 2019, another Nigerian scammer/entrepreneur (also of Igbo extraction) <a href="https://www.bankinfosecurity.com/fbi-arrests-nigerian-suspect-in-11-million-bec-scheme-a-12932">was arrested</a> while visiting the U.S. and charged with similar crimes dating back to April 2018. He is still in federal custody.</p><p>It is clear that U.S. authorities have been following and investigating these individuals for a long time, which has culminated in the series of arrests that have now been made, as well as ongoing investigations in the United States, Nigeria as well as other countries. The FBI leads the investigation with substantial assistance from the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office, the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, the United States Department of State, the United States Postal Inspection Service, the Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) unit of the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), the United States Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the Ventura County District Attorney’s Office and the California Franchise Tax Board. In addition, the United Kingdom’s National Crime Agency and the Public Prosecutor’s Office in <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Osnabr%C3%BCck">Osnabrück</a>, a city in northwest Germany also contributed to the investigations.</p><h4>An Unbiased Analysis</h4><p>As expected, there has been outrage and reactions on every social media platform regarding this sweeping indictment. Some of the conversations are centered around why and how Nigerians have continued to soil the name of their fatherland — many people already associate Nigeria and Nigerians with terms such as “advanced fee fraud”, “419”, “Yahoo Yahoo”, the “Nigerian Prince” scam, among others. Other reactions exhibit <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Confirmation_bias">confirmation bias</a> about how Igbos are especially fraudulent compared to other Nigerian tribes. Another echo chamber chose to focus on the unfairness and irony in the fact that the American pot has the guts to call the Nigerian kettle black, knowing fully well that the amount of money these Nigerian scammers stole is only a fraction of what American corporations steal on a daily basis <em>in broad daylight</em>. Whichever online echo chamber you subscribe to, it is important to analyze facts for what they are, and leave opinions to your living room couch, or your local Whatsapp group.</p><p>A number of key points stand out when considering the aforementioned background facts: (1) U.S. officials deploy a huge amount of manpower in terms of inter-agency and international collaborations when investigating any and all forms of crimes, including cyber crimes; (2) the timeline of the investigations and the secrecy surrounding the entire process shows the value of patience and the specific attention to detail devoted to disrupting and destabilizing such an extensive criminal organization; (3) from knowing a few things about how and why U.S. law enforcement agencies carry out investigations, it is apparent that this was not targeted at a particular tribe of Nigerians, rather, U.S. authorities began building a case against a few individuals, which then spread to other individuals. It is not far-fetched to assume that organized crime syndicates would usually recruit people they trust to become part of their crime family. In addition, investigating cross-border crimes such as this require huge amounts of time and resources, which have to be appropriately prioritized, considering how many threats the FBI and other agencies have to process on a daily basis. For comparison, there are several other crime syndicates that are currently on watch lists of agencies like the FBI, <a href="https://www.cia.gov/">CIA</a>, <a href="https://www.dea.gov/">DEA</a>, and <a href="https://www.atf.gov/">ATF</a>, just to name a few.</p><p>As desirable as patriotism is, engaging in online shouting matches without having the necessary background info serves no tangible purpose. What is practical is to recognize the greed and laziness that is rampant in the Nigerian culture — which apparently is not peculiar to Nigeria — and then do whatever is in our power to do to prevent it from spreading to the next generation. Even if the government won’t do it for the society as a whole, we could start by making sure that our kids are taught the value of hard work, courage, skill and determination, and that every criminal endeavor will always lead to future regrets. Here are some African proverbs to serve as food for thought:</p><ul><li>You have little power over what’s not yours. — Zimbabwean proverb.</li><li>Nothing ever satisfies a thief. — Nigerian proverb.</li><li>The night has ears. — Kenyan proverb.</li><li>Where you will sit when you are old shows where you stood in your youth. — Nigerian proverb.</li><li>A fly can trouble a lion more than the lion can trouble the fly. — Kenyan proverb.</li><li>A man who is advised and he takes it, is still a man who acts from his own free will. — Nigerian proverb.</li><li>One does not gather edible mushrooms in haste; two hundred of them are not even enough to make soup. — Nigerian proverb</li></ul><h4>Epilogue</h4><p>In 2018, the FBI conducted <a href="https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/international-bec-takedown-061118">Operation WireWire</a>, an international effort to disrupt international Business Email Compromise scams. Federal authorities in the U.S., Canada, Nigeria, Poland, Malaysia, Mauritius and Indonesia conducted a six-month sweep that resulted in 42 arrests in the U.S., 29 in Nigeria, and three in Canada, Mauritius, and Poland. The operation also resulted in the seizure of nearly $2.4 million and the disruption and recovery of approximately $14 million in fraudulent wire transfers. These are some of the most common BEC scenarios that have been identified by the FBI:</p><ul><li>Business Executive: Criminals spoof or compromise e-mail accounts of high-level business executives, including chief information officers and chief financial officers, which result in the processing of a wire transfer to a fraudulent account.</li><li>Real Estate Transactions: Criminals impersonate sellers, realtors, title companies, or law firms during a real estate transaction to ask the home buyer for funds to be sent to a fraudulent account.</li><li>Data and W-2 Theft: Criminals, using a compromised business executive’s e-mail account, send fraudulent requests for W-2 information or other personally identifiable information to an entity in an organization that routinely maintains that sort of information.</li><li>Supply Chain: Criminals send fraudulent requests to redirect funds during a pending business deal, transaction, or invoice payment to an account controlled by a <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Money_mule">money mule</a> or bad actor.</li><li>Law Firms: Criminals find out about trust accounts or litigation and impersonate a law firm client to change the recipient bank information to a fraudulent account.</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1000/0*lJgSa6EcK1HCPzcO" /><figcaption>Photo: Bill Oxford (Unsplash)</figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/bidemiologunde/"><strong><em>Bidemi Ologunde</em></strong></a><strong><em> is an intelligence analyst and cybersecurity researcher in Tampa, Florida.</em></strong></p><p>📝 Read this story later in <a href="https://usejournal.com/?utm_source=medium.com&amp;utm_medium=noteworthy_blog&amp;utm_campaign=tech&amp;utm_content=guest_post_read_later_text">Journal</a>.</p><p>👩‍💻 Wake up every Sunday morning to the week’s most noteworthy stories in Tech waiting in your inbox. <a href="https://usejournal.com/newsletter/noteworthy-in-tech/?utm_source=medium.com&amp;utm_medium=noteworthy_blog&amp;utm_campaign=tech&amp;utm_content=guest_post_text">Read the Noteworthy in Tech newsletter</a>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2cf7cd0c8af2" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/swlh/the-recent-tribalization-of-cyber-crime-in-nigeria-2cf7cd0c8af2">The (Recent) Tribalization of Cyber Crime in Nigeria</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/swlh">The Startup</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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