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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Bilyaminu Umar Shehu on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Bilyaminu Umar Shehu on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Bilyaminu Umar Shehu on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Threat Hunting invoice.exe with Splunk]]></title>
            <link>https://bilyaminu1.medium.com/threat-hunting-invoice-exe-with-splunk-17a6f46042aa?source=rss-98d8defc54bb------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/17a6f46042aa</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[incident-response]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[digital-forensics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[threat-hunting]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[splunk]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cyber-threat-hunting]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Bilyaminu Umar Shehu]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 31 May 2026 13:26:35 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-05-31T13:44:48.704Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Introduction</strong></p><p>This project was a Digital Forensics and Incident Response investigation focused on suspicious activity found on a corporate workstation within an enterprise network. Splunk Enterprise was used to analyze multiple forensic artifacts, including Windows Event Logs, Sysmon logs, DNS activity, HTTP traffic, FTP communications, registry persistence artifacts, and timeline data.</p><p>The investigation revealed evidence of a malware infection that began with a malicious e-mail attachment. The infection continued with the download and execution of a suspicious executable file named invoice.exe. After execution, the compromised workstation communicated with external IP addresses and domains, executed PowerShell scripts with encoded payloads, created persistence using scheduled tasks and registry Run keys, and transferred files to external computers through FTP communication.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*0vSe1kU_PJozozsfh74WkQ.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*SALTJEJhBI3oqo2w5rWgUw.png" /></figure><p><strong>Project Objective</strong></p><p>The objective of this investigation was to identify suspicious activity taking place in the enterprise environment and determine the overall impact of the incident. The investigation focused on identifying suspicious user activity, malware execution, PowerShell usage, external network communications, persistence mechanisms, credential usage, potential data exfiltration, indicators of compromise, and the overall impact of the incident.</p><h4>Environment &amp; Tools</h4><p>The investigation was performed using <strong>Splunk Enterprise</strong>. Logs were imported and analyzed from the following indexes:</p><pre>network<br>windows<br>sysmon<br>forensics</pre><p>The evidence sources reviewed during the investigation included:</p><pre>Windows Event Logs<br>Sysmon process execution logs<br>DNS query logs<br>HTTP request logs<br>FTP activity logs<br>Registry persistence artifacts<br>File creation and file execution logs<br>Authentication logs<br>Timeline reconstruction data<br>IOC summary dashboards<br>MITRE ATT&amp;CK mapping dashboards</pre><h4>Methodology / Steps Performed</h4><p>The investigation followed a structured DFIR methodology. This included evidence collection, log ingestion, threat hunting, correlation of events, extraction of indicators of compromise, and reconstruction of events over time.</p><p>Logs were uploaded into Splunk Enterprise and analyzed by running SPL queries to look for suspicious processes, PowerShell activity, external communication, authentication activity, persistence mechanisms, malicious downloads, and possible data exfiltration activity. Results from the different evidence sources were correlated to understand the attacker’s actions and the sequence of events.</p><p>Specific SPL queries are not present in the provided file.</p><h4>Findings / Output</h4><h4>Suspicious Activity Identified</h4><p>The investigation found several signs of suspicious and malicious activity. The attack began with an infected email attachment and continued with the download and execution of a suspicious executable file named invoice.exe.</p><p>After execution, the compromised system performed unusual DNS queries, connected to external systems over HTTP and FTP, ran encoded PowerShell scripts, created persistence mechanisms through registry changes and scheduled tasks, and moved files outside the system in a way that could be related to data exfiltration.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/512/1*oqQVB04HhySxIi8raD32_Q.png" /></figure><h4>User Accounts Involved</h4><p>Multiple user accounts were observed through authentication logs, FTP activity, and PowerShell execution logs. The accounts identified were:</p><pre>admin<br>administrator<br>user<br>user1<br>anonymous<br>test</pre><p>The accounts admin and user were the most common accounts linked to suspicious activity. They were associated with FTP communications, PowerShell execution, and authentication events.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*UlMSldOw4BYCv2TRdP4jbQ.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*_nHkae1B7WTFKD5ra-hhpg.png" /></figure><h4>Affected Hosts and Systems</h4><p>The main compromised internal system was:</p><pre>192.168.1.10</pre><p>Additional suspicious external systems communicating with the compromised workstation were:</p><pre>185.225.69.45<br>91.243.50.12<br>203.0.113.55</pre><p>The suspicious domains identified during the investigation were:</p><pre>malicious-domain.com<br>update-check.net</pre><p>These systems and domains were linked to suspicious activity involving HTTP, FTP, and DNS protocols.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*D2x3Uef15RQeFhS7rC9nuA.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/796/1*ymaFnFsLXk6SLxBK7vRcvQ.png" /></figure><h4>Processes and Commands Executed</h4><p>Sysmon process creation logs showed several suspicious processes running on the compromised workstation. The executables identified were:</p><pre>powershell.exe<br>cmd.exe<br>rundll32.exe<br>wmic.exe<br>ftp.exe</pre><p>PowerShell commands used hidden windows and encoded payloads with command-line arguments such as:</p><pre>-enc<br>Execution Policy Bypass</pre><p>These activities appeared to be attempts to evade detection and run malicious scripts.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*QHMrsoPjGNylNMTavvt6GA.png" /></figure><h4>PowerShell Activity</h4><p>PowerShell was used heavily during the incident. Logs showed attempted execution of encoded and obfuscated PowerShell commands to run hidden malicious payloads. The PowerShell activity included Execution Policy bypass attempts, encoded command execution, hidden PowerShell windows, download and execution of remote payloads, and post-exploitation scripting activity.</p><p>The PowerShell scripts probably enabled malware execution, persistence establishment, and defense evasion.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Yd3mq081NYrKZMD07MpZ2A.png" /></figure><h4>Suspicious Files Downloaded and Executed</h4><p>HTTP logs showed requests for suspicious files. The identified files were:</p><pre>invoice.exe<br>update.exe<br>payload.dll</pre><p>Sysmon logs showed execution of these files on the compromised workstation. The file download and execution activity strongly indicated malware delivery and compromise.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*EvTgtETYf0mpsxolOV5PHA.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*nouM6RVptpnXFURdCoatVw.png" /></figure><h4>External Network Connections</h4><p>The compromised host made multiple suspicious outbound network connections using HTTP, FTP, and DNS. The most suspicious external IP address identified was:</p><pre>185.225.69.45</pre><p>FTP activity was detected from this IP address and included file transfer activity, indicating possible data exfiltration. Other suspicious communications included DNS queries to malicious domains and HTTP requests for executable payloads.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*G51LG8s1fSc764pqj2w1JA.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Qo1LJA9KWkj-Vx6ndhRApQ.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*9cV4cJoMxWyp7_9iPIusVQ.png" /></figure><h4>Persistence Mechanisms</h4><p>The investigation found evidence of persistence mechanisms. Scheduled tasks and registry Run keys were created in the logs and pointed to malicious payloads. These mechanisms allowed the malware to run after system reboot or user logon.</p><p>The identified persistence techniques were:</p><pre>Registry modification<br>Scheduled task creation</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*4smBxIZ-8I5idBq-Xuun0g.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*TH_Snq8RTO4RyZNsADUu2A.png" /></figure><h4>Credential Access and Privilege Activity</h4><p>Windows authentication logs showed successful and unsuccessful administrative account login attempts. FTP logs also contained plaintext credentials, including usernames and passwords. The accounts admin and administrator appeared in suspicious authentication activity, indicating that they may have been compromised.</p><p>There was no evidence of privilege escalation, but the use of administrative accounts suggested that existing privileged credentials may have been compromised and reused during the attack.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*GK82ZDfgfnKOOX7Q6evm0w.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*xcfB4-v-HYfduP7VFHhLLA.png" /></figure><h4>Attack Timeline</h4><p>The likely attack sequence began when a malicious e-mail attachment named invoice.docm was delivered. The infected machine then sent an HTTP request to download invoice.exe, which was executed on the workstation.</p><p>After execution, the malware began DNS communications with suspicious domains, started running encoded PowerShell commands, established persistence, and transferred files outside the environment using FTP communications.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*8gIXZX3TO484XxVefmGycQ.png" /></figure><h4>Indicators of Compromise</h4><p>The investigation identified several indicators of compromise, including suspicious IP addresses, domains, executable payloads, and malicious URLs. The identified IOCs were:</p><pre>185.225.69.45<br>91.243.50.12<br>203.0.113.55<br>malicious-domain.com<br>update-check.net<br>invoice.exe<br>update.exe<br>/invoice.exe<br>payload.dll</pre><p>These indicators were associated with malware infection, external malicious communications, unauthorized network communications, and persistence-related artifacts.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Q4OjMUccSjBrHMV4LVBv3A.png" /></figure><h4>Evidence Supporting the Investigation Findings</h4><p>The investigation findings were supported by several evidence sources reviewed in Splunk Enterprise. These included Sysmon process execution logs, PowerShell activity logs, HTTP download records, FTP authentication and transfer logs, DNS query activity, registry persistence artifacts, scheduled task creation logs, Windows authentication logs, and timeline reconstruction analysis.</p><p>The evidence showed that suspicious processes were executed on the compromised workstation, including:</p><pre>powershell.exe<br>cmd.exe<br>rundll32.exe<br>wmic.exe<br>ftp.exe</pre><p>HTTP records showed suspicious downloads such as:</p><pre>invoice.exe<br>update.exe<br>payload.dll</pre><p>DNS logs showed communication with suspicious domains:</p><pre>malicious-domain.com<br>update-check.net</pre><p>FTP activity involving 185.225.69.45 showed file transfer activity, which indicated possible data exfiltration. Registry Run keys and scheduled tasks also showed that persistence was established. Together, these artifacts supported the conclusion that malware was executed, persistence was created, credentials were exposed, and data may have been exfiltrated.</p><h4>Incident Impact</h4><p>The likely impact of the incident was serious. The first compromised system was identified as:</p><pre>192.168.1.10</pre><p>The workstation was likely infected with malware after the download and execution of invoice.exe. Other suspicious files, including update.exe and payload.dll, were also identified during the investigation.</p><p>The incident may have exposed credentials because FTP logs contained plaintext usernames and passwords. Suspicious activity involving admin and administrator also suggested possible account compromise.</p><p>The FTP file transfer activity involving 185.225.69.45 indicated possible data exfiltration. The attacker may also have gained a foothold for further access because scheduled tasks and registry Run keys were created for persistence.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*-eiT-hcgIeldrjzCi_AxnQ.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*rREN57krNRXxWmxbv_X5eg.png" /></figure><h3>Preventing Recurrence</h3><p>To prevent a similar incident, I recommend blocking the malicious IP addresses and domains, such as:</p><pre>185.225.69.45<br>91.243.50.12<br>203.0.113.55<br>malicious-domain.com<br>update-check.net</pre><p>Outbound FTP traffic should be restricted because FTP activity was linked to possible data exfiltration. PowerShell usage should also be limited, and PowerShell logging should be improved to detect encoded commands, hidden PowerShell windows, and Execution Policy bypass activity.</p><p>The organization should deploy endpoint detection and response, enable advanced Sysmon monitoring, use application whitelisting, apply least privilege access controls, use MFA for privileged accounts, provide phishing awareness training, maintain offline backups, patch systems regularly, and conduct regular threat hunting.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*yt6tcVXXm8EXS5u9wJdUrA.png" /></figure><h4>MITRE ATT&amp;CK Mapping</h4><p>The attacker behavior was mapped to MITRE ATT&amp;CK techniques commonly used in malware infections and post-exploitation activity.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/905/1*Jcjcqceom7fYFh0hyJLNHA.png" /></figure><p>This mapping showed that the incident involved initial access, execution, persistence, defense evasion, credential access, command-and-control activity, and possible exfiltration.</p><h4>Conclusion</h4><p>This DFIR investigation confirmed malicious activity on the enterprise workstation 192.168.1.10. The evidence showed malicious file delivery, suspicious PowerShell activity, outbound communication with suspicious infrastructure, persistence, credential exposure, and likely data exfiltration activity.</p><p>The investigation reconstructed the attack timeline, identified affected systems and accounts, extracted IOCs, and mapped attacker behavior to MITRE ATT&amp;CK techniques. It also showed the value of centralized log analysis and proactive threat hunting in detecting and responding to advanced cyber threats.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=17a6f46042aa" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[CTF Write-Up: RansomCare Memory Forensics with Volatility 3]]></title>
            <link>https://bilyaminu1.medium.com/ctf-write-up-ransomcare-memory-forensics-with-volatility-3-208cfa5a014c?source=rss-98d8defc54bb------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/208cfa5a014c</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Bilyaminu Umar Shehu]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 15 Mar 2026 16:03:28 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-03-15T16:03:28.049Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Introduction</h3><p>This case involved a memory forensics investigation of a Windows 10 Pro system affected by RansomCare. The objective was to identify the malicious process in memory, extract its code, and reconstruct what happened on the victim system. The analysis was performed using Volatility 3 on Parrot Security OS against the memory image ransomcare4.raw.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*FlrwsCHzM8C6O0FCGqnrUg.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://www.ashemery.com/dfir.html">https://www.ashemery.com/dfir.html</a></figcaption></figure><h4>Challenge Background</h4><p>The case is identified as a ransomware investigation involving RansomCare on a Windows 10 Pro system. The task required analysis of the memory dump to locate the malicious code, dump it, and explain what occurred on the compromised system.</p><p>This blog shows that the investigation centred on identifying suspicious processes, confirming their presence, examining execution flow, analysing command-line activity, detecting suspicious executable memory, and dumping the memory associated with the malicious process.</p><p><strong>Project Objective</strong></p><p>This investigation aims at analysing the given memory image ransomcare4.raw with the help of Volatility 3 framework of memory forensics.</p><p>This analysis will be used to detect the processes that were suspicious, to establish whether this is because the system has been compromised by the ransomware, and the timeline of the attack. Memory forensics enables the investigator to examine running programmes, malicious code injections and concealed artefacts which can not be seen by conventional disc examination.</p><h4><strong>Environment &amp; Tools</strong></h4><p>Tool Used: Volatility 3 (Command Line Interface)<br>Operating System: Parrot Security OS<br>Memory Image: ransomcare4.raw<br>Case Type: Ransomware Investigation</p><p>Tool Purpose<br>Volatility 3 Memory forensic framework used to analyse memory images and detect malicious activity</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/899/1*hpnLIjmB9V66zI3POnGkRg.png" /><figcaption>The Volatility 3 command line interface in the Parrot Security OS terminal was used to analyse it.</figcaption></figure><p>Example command used:</p><pre>~/.local/bin/vol -f ransomcare4.raw windows.pslist</pre><p>The plugins used in the investigation were:</p><ul><li>windows.pslist</li><li>windows.psscan</li><li>windows.pstree</li><li>windows.cmdline</li><li>windows.malfind</li><li>windows.memmap</li></ul><p>These were the plugins that I used to analyse active processes, identify the hidden processes, examine command line arguments, and identify suspicious memory regions</p><h3>Executive Summary</h3><p>The memory forensic examination identified a suspicious executable named Agent.exe running from the user Downloads folder at C:\Users\user1\Downloads\Agent.exe. The analysis confirmed that the process existed with PID 3624, and that it was launched from explorer.exe before spawning notepad.exe.</p><p>Further analysis with windows.malfind detected executable memory regions with suspicious permissions such as PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE, indicating possible malicious code injection or unpacked malware. The malicious process memory was then dumped using windows.memmap, resulting in the file pid.3624.dmp.</p><p>The reconstructed timeline showed that explorer.exe started at 06:14:47, Agent.exe executed at 06:19:03, notepad.exe launched at 06:19:03, and Agent.exe terminated at 06:19:04. Based on the report, the system showed activity involving ransomware.</p><h3>Methodology / Steps Performed</h3><h4>Process Listing Analysis</h4><p>The list of running processes was obtained using the windows.pslist plugin.</p><pre>~/.local/bin/vol -f ransomcare4.raw windows.pslist</pre><p>Most of the processes observed were legitimate Windows system processes including:</p><ul><li>System</li><li>smss.exe</li><li>winlogon.exe</li><li>services.exe</li><li>svchost.exe</li><li>explorer.exe</li></ul><p>However, a suspicious process named Agent.exe was detected.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/893/1*NOs6lcGT2sIpGfHMrkBypA.png" /><figcaption><em>Process listing obtained using the Volatility windows.pslist plugin showing all running processes including the suspicious process Agent.exe</em></figcaption></figure><h4>Hidden Process Detection</h4><p>To verify whether the suspicious process was hidden or terminated, the windows.psscan plugin was used.</p><pre>~/.local/bin/vol -f ransomcare4.raw windows.psscan | grep Agent</pre><p>The analysis confirmed the presence of the process:</p><ul><li><strong>Process Name:</strong> Agent.exe</li><li><strong>PID:</strong> 3624</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*383SCnHX8pqeE2bVyP6e_w.png" /><figcaption><em>Process scanning using the Volatility windows.psscan plugin confirming the presence of the malicious process Agent.exe.</em></figcaption></figure><p><strong>Suspicious Process Details</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*3AaPiiEBRt8tdvsc5ozR0Q.png" /></figure><p>The fact that the executable file is located in the Downloads folder is a red flag because the infectious programmes are usually downloaded and launched in this place.</p><h4>Process Tree Analysis</h4><p>The process chart identified the following sequence of execution.</p><pre>~/.local/bin/vol -f ransomcare4.raw windows.pstree</pre><p>The process tree revealed the following execution chain:</p><pre>explorer.exe<br>   └── Agent.exe<br>        └── notepad.exe</pre><p>This implies that the user must have launched the malicious process Agent.exe in the explorer.exe meaning that it has to have been run manually.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*1DVPw1sgFCgv3xO1FobXuA.png" /><figcaption><em>Process hierarchy displayed using the Volatility windows.pstree plugin showing explorer.exe launching Agent.exe and notepad.exe.</em></figcaption></figure><h4>Command Line Analysis</h4><p>The windows.cmdline plugin was used to analyse command line arguments associated with running processes.</p><pre>~/.local/bin/vol -f ransomcare4.raw windows.cmdline</pre><p>The analysis confirmed that the executable Agent.exe was launched and subsequently spawned notepad.exe. This behaviour is typical of ransomware infections where the ransom message is displayed using a text editor.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*9qOTUkb7KYoj0UuYbBojxg.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*LTFJrr89GV10wABYkheEsg.png" /><figcaption><em>Command line analysis using the Volatility windows.cmdline plugin showing execution of Agent.exe and notepad.exe.</em></figcaption></figure><h4>Malware Memory Detection</h4><p>To identify suspicious memory regions, the windows.malfind plugin was executed.</p><pre>~/.local/bin/vol -f ransomcare4.raw windows.malfind</pre><p>The plugin detected executable memory regions with suspicious permissions such as PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE, indicating possible malicious code injection or unpacked malware.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*XPufVdLhhfQQSTLQCZ__wA.png" /><figcaption><em>Suspicious executable memory regions detected using the Volatility windows.malfind plugin</em></figcaption></figure><h4>Malware Memory Extraction</h4><p>To extract the memory associated with the malicious process, the windows.memmap plugin was used.</p><pre>~/.local/bin/vol -f ransomcare4.raw windows.memmap --pid 3624 --dump</pre><p>This command successfully dumped the memory regions of the malicious process into a file.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*0A6EKNH3BRzsHgB8iUCEwQ.png" /><figcaption><em>Memory extraction of the malicious process Agent.exe resulting in the dump file pid.3624.dmp.’</em></figcaption></figure><h4>Dump File Verification</h4><p>After extracting the memory dump, the presence of the dump file was verified.</p><pre>ls</pre><p>Output confirmed the creation of:</p><pre>pid.3624.dmp</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/995/1*ULDFa1sXCdP6DGtLZ3wvcA.png" /><figcaption><em>Verification of the extracted malware dump file pid.3624.dmp.</em></figcaption></figure><h4>String Analysis</h4><p>The extracted memory dump was analysed using the strings utility to identify embedded URLs and cryptographic references.</p><pre>strings pid.3624.dmp | grep http</pre><p>This analysis helps identify potential download sources, encryption methods or communication indicators embedded within the malware.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*OmAIG1vgPxMrAgz6-0yPhw.png" /><figcaption><em>String analysis of the extracted malware memory dump showing embedded strings and URLs.</em></figcaption></figure><h4>Findings / Output</h4><p>Attack Timeline</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/807/1*L47LdIq5YbfiBqxl1hwC1A.png" /></figure><p>This timeline indicates that the ransomware was executed shortly after the user logged into the system.</p><p>Indicators of Compromise (IOC)</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/828/1*TpoPnfvWnCAyX22QWOTFHw.png" /></figure><h4>Event Reconstruction</h4><p>By aligning process activity, process hierarchy, command-line analysis, suspicious memory findings, and dump verification, the investigation reconstructed the sequence of activity on the victim system. The CTF shows that explorer.exe was active first, then Agent.exe executed from the Downloads folder, after which notepad.exe was launched. The malicious process memory was then identified and dumped as pid.3624.dmp.</p><p>This concludes that the ransomware was executed shortly after user login and that the system showed ransomware-related activity during the period analysed.</p><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>The memory forensic examination found that there was a suspicious executable called the Agent.exe that ran in the user Downloads folder. The process analysis showed that the malware was initiated through the explorer.exe meaning that it was most likely initiated through user action. The process then started the notepad.exe as is typical with ransomware behaviour where a ransom note is presented to the victim.</p><p>Additional investigation with Volatility plugins established suspicious memory activity and provided the opportunity to extract the malware process memory to further investigation. The investigation was able to recreate the timeline of the attack, and it was able to confirm that there was activity involving ransomware in the system under analysis.</p><h4>CTF Takeaway Overall Thoughts</h4><p>This case focused on practical memory forensics in a ransomware investigation using Volatility 3. The investigation required process identification, hidden process verification, command-line analysis, suspicious memory detection, malware memory dumping, and timeline reconstruction.</p><h4><strong>Skills Demonstrated</strong></h4><ul><li>Memory forensics using Volatility 3</li><li>Process listing and hidden process detection</li><li>Process tree analysis</li><li>Command-line artefact analysis</li><li>Suspicious memory region detection</li><li>Malware memory extraction</li><li>Timeline reconstruction in a ransomware investigation</li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=208cfa5a014c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Web Server Breach Investigation -Ali Hadi CTF]]></title>
            <link>https://bilyaminu1.medium.com/web-server-breach-investigation-ali-hadi-ctf-98daa0a1e0e9?source=rss-98d8defc54bb------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/98daa0a1e0e9</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Bilyaminu Umar Shehu]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 18 Feb 2026 16:31:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-02-18T16:31:01.178Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Introduction</h3><p>Digital forensics is the logical process of evidence identification, preservation, analysis, and presentation of digital evidence related to cyber incidents. This investigation examines a compromised web server in which a company’s website was breached. A forensic image of the running system and its memory was acquired for analysis.</p><p>The investigation focused on identifying the vulnerabilities exploited, determining how the attacker gained access, analyzing web server logs and memory artifacts, identifying persistence mechanisms, and reconstructing a timeline of attacker activity.</p><p>This investigation was conducted as part of the <strong>Ali Hadi CTF Web Server Case</strong>, which simulates a real-world digital forensic incident involving SQL injection, command injection, web shell deployment, and unauthorized user creation.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*iYR6cchy0x-Wemz81e74pA.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://www.ashemery.com/dfir.html">https://www.ashemery.com/dfir.html</a></figcaption></figure><h3>Project Objectives</h3><p>The objective of this investigation was to determine how the web server was compromised and to identify the attacker’s methods and persistence mechanisms.</p><p>Additional goals included:</p><ul><li>Identifying exploited vulnerabilities</li><li>Analyzing Apache access logs</li><li>Investigating command injection activity</li><li>Examining memory artifacts using Volatility</li><li>Identifying unauthorized user accounts</li><li>Reconstructing a detailed attack timeline</li></ul><p>Forensic Analysis of Web Server and Memory Artifacts</p><p>I began by opening the `s4a-challenge4` file using FTK Imager and extracted the `access.log` file located in the `/root/xampp/apache/logs/` directory. This log file records all requests made to the Apache web server from various devices. By analyzing the contents, I aim to gather information about the attacker and determine the type of attack that occurred.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*14cWUfx3hZO6faAFCJUipg.png" /></figure><p>Noticing the ‘xampp’ folder at the root suggests the installation of XAMPP, a web-server solution that typically runs on a LAMP stack. To investigate further, I examine the server’s folder, particularly looking for Apache logs.</p><p>For Windows-based Apache installations, access or error logs are usually located within the XAMPP folder. However, the exact location of this folder may vary depending on the web-server’s configuration.</p><p>“C:\xampp\apache\logs”</p><p>Let’s transfer these files to the forensic workstation to analyze them further and gain more insight into the attack. By examining the `install.log` file, I was able to uncover the following details:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/894/1*ersqzeNnjnEt3d4iA7FIQw.png" /></figure><p>The web server is running on standard HTTP/HTTPS ports of <strong>80/443</strong>.</p><p>The key piece of evidence is the `access.log` file. The first step is to count the total number of IP addresses that attempted to communicate with the server.</p><p><strong>awk -F\” ‘{print $6}’ access_log.log | sort | uniq -c | sort -nr</strong></p><p>“This command extracts and counts unique user agents (the 6th field) from the `access_log.log` file. It then sorts the results by frequency, showing the most common user agents accessing the server.”</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/963/1*IhlqZ1k4jeSuNW3z8h6PRg.png" /></figure><p>In this dataset, the IP address <strong>192.168.56.102</strong> stands out as the most frequently interacting with the server. To minimize distractions, we’ll extract logs related to this IP address into a separate file. (I’ve also examined logs from other IPs, which seem to be harmless. It’s important to thoroughly investigate all evidence for potential leads during an investigation.)</p><p><strong>grep “192.168.56.102” access.log &gt;&gt; access_log.log</strong></p><p>let’s examine the user-agent field in these logs to see if we can uncover any useful information.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*hivL84XLES7LTp7MWPMntQ.png" /><figcaption>Use of SQLMAP</figcaption></figure><p>Given the top user-agent, it’s evident that the attackers used sqlmap, an automated tool for detecting SQL injection vulnerabilities. This suggests that the Initial Access tactic involved exploiting SQL injection vulnerabilities.Since the remaining user-agents are mostly generic, I’ll focus on the logs with the sqlmap user-agent. After isolating these entries from the main log file, we’re left with a more targeted dataset. By examining the URI field in these logs, we can clearly identify the SQL injection attempts.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*mI78id3jPZBrOnh012yo8g.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*R9_ToBp76WWXmsftOhy10Q.png" /></figure><p>I found several temporary files, and using the `grep` command, I identified a file named `<strong>tmpbrjvl.php</strong>`. It appears that the last part of the file’s content included a command to delete itself.In addition, the access logs reveal attempts to exploit XSS vulnerabilities.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*p5Aaz3UIJUuI1BGGd53CzA.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*uwk0YgUsmUfK0FKvO8eCYg.png" /><figcaption>Unrestricted file upload vulnerabilities shows PHP based web shells</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*GhbtZll69QUqmh1YtNWvxQ.png" /><figcaption><strong>‘exec’ endpoint — POST requests show the attacker must’ve sent some input here</strong></figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*g6CvLBVT46Ahmhh0zmVvow.png" /><figcaption><strong>Proof the commands were executed by the attacker</strong></figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*q0dXBTsMMwxeYl2CJInoWA.png" /><figcaption><strong>“cmd” spawned using the webshell</strong></figcaption></figure><p>Finally, it appears that the attacker launched a command prompt window by executing the `cmd` command from the web shell.</p><p>For accurate time-lining, note the timestamp: `03/Sep/2015:00:21:37 -0700`.</p><p><strong>Since the Windows event logging service had minimal logs, I need to shift our focus to the memory image. Using Volatility, I can gather more information about the memory image and determine the appropriate profile with the following command:</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*12gU96vv6g01cDJqRefsfA.png" /><figcaption><strong>Using the `VistaSP1x86` profile, let’s start by examining the processes.</strong></figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/880/1*hbaDZrNVX_BGxzXOs_j88g.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/879/1*6dx2dQO-f4Orpx50iUnciw.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/775/1*cAwywLN4KFEC8S-9XSZ_yg.png" /></figure><p>Based on the process scan output, no malicious binaries are currently running on the system. Since there are two open command prompt windows [PID: 612, 1972], let’s investigate these further.</p><p><strong>. 0x83e7b7f8:cmd.exe 612 816 1 72 2015–08–23 10:30:44 UTC+0000 . 0x84259100:cmd.exe 1972 816 1 19 2015–09–02 09:28:30 UTC+0000</strong></p><p>Note the execution dates of the two consoles. The one from `2015–08–23` is not relevant to our case, as the actual execution via the web shell occurred on `03/Sep/2015:00:21:37 -0700` (UTC and GMT times differ). Therefore, we’ll exclude the console window with PID 612 from our analysis.</p><p>Let’s run scans to investigate the consoles, command prompt arguments, and command history.</p><p>By using the `cmdscan` command, we found a list of commands entered by the attacker.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*HUrqQXIkCtv_LUS1Ju34xw.png" /></figure><p>Here’s the overview of the commands observed:</p><p>- The attacker executed IP configuration commands to determine the system’s source IP.</p><p>- The attacker used the `net` command to add the user `user1` to the Remote Desktop Users group.</p><p>- The attacker adjusted the firewall settings to allow Remote Desktop connections within the same subnet.</p><p>I’ve also extracted the netscan from the memory:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Kcoh6qGEIhaWNjh4jXR_Ug.png" /></figure><p><strong>I can also observe that a network connection is being established from IP address `192.168.56.1`.</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*QXyNlLDSl7PAlz_7wcJQQw.png" /></figure><p><strong>We didn’t find evidence of the hacker user being added through the web shell. Another possible cause could be the exploitation of the `exec` endpoint we previously noted. Since we lack the POST data, we should investigate further. Let’s return to our memory sample and check for processes related to the Apache server to explore this possibility.</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*CtADItv7ICKOilU7i3YKiQ.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1019/1*-yuB9bKFlPQd9q8a4D2h-g.png" /></figure><p><strong>By filtering for the Apache web service (`httpd.exe`), we identified two Process IDs: 2796 and 2880. Let’s use the Volatility tool to dump the memory for these processes.</strong></p><p><strong>Extract the strings from each dump file using the `strings` command, then analyze the content to gather insights.</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*4OfUxHNZGAgYU31t1ynmAg.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*DW2MeSxU5JmugAuWwLs4WA.png" /></figure><p><strong>By analyzing the strings, we found an interesting result using the keyword `hacker`. We discovered a command injected by the attacker to add a new user named `hacker`. Parsing the value revealed a command with an IP address followed by `%26%26`, which URL decodes to `&amp;&amp;`. This indicates the attacker sent two commands, and since the input wasn’t filtered, both were executed. This pattern of command injection — an IP address followed by `&amp;&amp;` and then the attacker’s command — can be used to identify other similar commands on the system.</strong></p><p><strong>While we can conclude that the command injection was primarily used for reconnaissance, it’s time to shift our focus from the `exec` endpoint to the more critical web shells written to disk by SQLmap during the SQL injection exploitation.</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*m6tg_GsXPtIJ8PMlMkSdog.png" /></figure><p><strong>Two of these ‘tmp’ files seem to be droppers. After their execution, we observe GET requests to the `tmpukudk` file, followed by the creation of a new shell file named `tmpbiwuc.php`. The actual shell commands are executed by the `tmpbiwuc.php` file. Subsequently, both files are removed from the system.</strong></p><h3><strong>Challenge Questions</strong></h3><h3><strong>Was the server breached?</strong></h3><p>Yes. The investigation identified multiple exploited vulnerabilities including SQL injection, command injection, Local File Inclusion (LFI), Cross-Site Scripting (XSS), unrestricted file uploads, web shell deployment, and brute-forcing.</p><h3><strong>What operating system was the compromised system running?</strong></h3><p>The compromised system was running:</p><p><strong>Windows Server 2008 Standard</strong></p><p>Timezone identified:</p><p><strong>PDT (ActiveTimeBias is -7UTC)</strong></p><h3><strong>What vulnerabilities were exploited?</strong></h3><p>The server was targeted using:</p><ul><li>SQL Injection</li><li>Command Injection</li><li>Local File Inclusion</li><li>Cross-Site Scripting</li><li>Unrestricted File Uploads</li><li>Web Shells</li><li>Brute-forcing</li></ul><h3><strong>Was SQL injection used?</strong></h3><p>Yes. Analysis of the Apache access.log revealed the use of <strong>sqlmap</strong>, an automated SQL injection tool.</p><p>Command used to count unique user agents:</p><pre>awk -F\&quot; &#39;{print $6}&#39; access_log.log | sort | uniq -c | sort -nr</pre><p>The IP address 192.168.56.102 appeared most frequently and was isolated using:</p><pre>grep &quot;192.168.56.102&quot; access.log &gt;&gt; access_log.log</pre><h3>Was command injection observed?</h3><p>Yes. The exec endpoint was exploited through POST requests. Evidence showed that cmd was spawned using a web shell.</p><p>Timestamp of execution:</p><pre>03/Sep/2015:00:21:37 -0700</pre><p>Memory analysis revealed injected commands containing %26%26, which URL decodes to &amp;&amp;, indicating multiple chained commands were executed due to lack of input filtering.</p><h3>Were unauthorized users created?</h3><p>Yes. Two users were created:</p><ul><li>user1</li><li>hacker</li></ul><p>Memory analysis using Volatility cmdscan revealed:</p><ul><li>Use of net command to add user1 to the Remote Desktop Users group</li><li>Firewall modification to allow RDP connections</li></ul><h3>Were web shells deployed?</h3><p>Yes. Multiple temporary PHP files were identified:</p><ul><li>tmpbrjvl.php</li><li>tmpukudk</li><li>tmpbiwuc.php</li></ul><p>Two droppers (tmpukudk and tmpbiwuc) were deployed, followed by execution of shell commands and file removal.</p><p>Additionally, the archive:</p><pre>/root/xampp/htdocs/DVWA/webshell.zip</pre><p>Contained:</p><ul><li>c99.php</li><li>webshell.php</li></ul><p>The webshell.php file was used for command injection, and c99.php is identified as a well-known web shell.</p><h3>What evidence was found in memory?</h3><p>Using Volatility with profile:</p><pre>VistaSP1x86</pre><p>Two cmd.exe processes were identified:</p><pre>0x83e7b7f8:cmd.exe 612 816 1 72 2015–08–23 10:30:44 UTC+0000<br>0x84259100:cmd.exe 1972 816 1 19 2015–09–02 09:28:30 UTC+0000</pre><p>The process with PID 1972 was relevant to the attack timeline.</p><p>Apache processes identified:</p><pre>httpd.exe (PID 2796, 2880)</pre><p>Memory dumps of these processes revealed injected commands used to create the hacker account.</p><p>A network connection was observed from:</p><pre>192.168.56.1</pre><h3>Attack Timeline</h3><p>02/09/2015 07:10:41 — Requests begin from IP 192.168.56.102 using IceWeasel browser<br> 02/09/2015 09:04:35 — exec endpoint exploited; users hacker and user1 created<br> 02/09/2015 09:31:16 — Local File Inclusion exploited<br> 02/09/2015 10:49 — SQL Injection attacks conducted<br> 02/09/2015 11:15:40 — SQLmap used to automate SQL injection<br> 02/09/2015 11:25 — Droppers tmpukudk and tmpbiwuc deployed<br> 03/09/2015 07:14:41 — webshells.zip created containing additional shells<br> 03/09/2015 07:21:40 — Commands accessed and executed via web shell</p><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>The Ali Hadi CTF Web Server Case confirmed that the server was compromised through multiple web application vulnerabilities. The attacker leveraged SQL injection and command injection to deploy web shells, create unauthorized users (user1, hacker), modify firewall settings, and enable remote access.</p><p>Disk forensics (Apache logs, registry hives) and memory forensics (Volatility process analysis, command history, process dumps) were correlated to reconstruct the full attack chain. The investigation demonstrates how log analysis and volatile memory examination can be combined to identify exploitation techniques, persistence mechanisms, and attacker behavior.</p><h3>CTF Takeaway</h3><p>From a digital forensics analyst’s perspective, this investigation reinforced the importance of correlating multiple evidence sources rather than relying on a single artifact. Apache access logs provided visibility into the attacker’s initial access and exploitation attempts, but it was the memory analysis that confirmed command execution, user creation, and post-exploitation activity.</p><p>This case highlighted how web application vulnerabilities such as SQL injection and command injection can quickly escalate into full system compromise when proper input validation and access controls are not enforced. The transition from SQLmap exploitation to web shell deployment demonstrated a clear attack progression: initial access, execution, persistence, and remote access enablement.</p><p>Memory forensics proved critical in validating attacker intent. While disk artifacts showed web shell presence, Volatility analysis exposed executed commands, firewall modifications, and account manipulation that were not fully visible through logs alone. This reinforces the importance of acquiring volatile memory during live incident response whenever possible.</p><p>Additionally, the investigation emphasized the need for:</p><ul><li>Continuous monitoring of web server logs</li><li>Restricting public access to intentionally vulnerable platforms such as DVWA</li><li>Proper input validation to prevent command chaining (e.g., &amp;&amp; injection)</li><li>Hardening remote services such as RDP</li><li>Enforcing least privilege and strict access control policies</li></ul><p>Overall, this challenge demonstrated how attackers chain multiple vulnerabilities to achieve persistence and control, and how structured forensic methodology can reconstruct attacker behavior with defensible evidence.</p><h3>Skills Used</h3><p>Disk image mounting and forensic acquisition handling<br> Apache log analysis and user-agent correlation<br> Command-line log parsing (awk, grep)<br> SQL injection detection (sqlmap activity analysis)<br> Web shell identification and analysis (c99.php, webshell.php)<br> Dropper behavior analysis<br> Command injection artifact identification<br> Volatile memory analysis using Volatility<br> Process enumeration and PID correlation<br> Command history reconstruction (cmdscan)<br> Network connection analysis (netscan)<br> Process memory dumping and string extraction<br> Unauthorized account creation detection<br> Firewall configuration change identification<br> Attack timeline reconstruction<br> Cross-artifact correlation (disk + memory)<br> Structured forensic reporting and documentation</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=98daa0a1e0e9" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Android Forensic Analysis Magnet User Summit 2023 CTF]]></title>
            <link>https://bilyaminu1.medium.com/android-forensic-analysis-magnet-user-summit-2023-ctf-fd677c5b77f4?source=rss-98d8defc54bb------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/fd677c5b77f4</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Bilyaminu Umar Shehu]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 13 Feb 2026 03:41:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-02-13T03:41:01.206Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Introduction</h3><p>Mobile device forensics has become an essential component of modern digital investigations due to the extensive volume of user, system, and application artifacts stored on smartphones. This analysis documents an Android forensic examination conducted as part of the <strong>Magnet User Summit 2023 Capture The Flag (CTF)</strong> challenge.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*xJ5lOQrg5_yKT8oOZpov6A.png" /></figure><h3>Objective</h3><p>The objective of this investigation was to analyze a provided Android TAR image and extract relevant forensic artifacts to answer challenge-based investigative questions. The scope of the analysis included:</p><ul><li>Processing the Android image using Magnet Axiom</li><li>Supplementing findings using ALEAPP (Android Logs, Events, and Protobuf Parser)</li><li>Reviewing system artifacts, application data, web activity, device configuration, and user behavior</li><li>Correlating artifacts across multiple tools for validation</li></ul><p>All findings were derived from the provided forensic image and processed artifacts. No live device interaction was performed.</p><h3>Scope of the challenge</h3><p>The Android TAR image was ingested and processed using <strong>Magnet Axiom Process</strong>, where artifact selection parameters were configured under <em>Processing Details</em> prior to analysis. Upon completion of processing, the evidence was examined within <strong>Magnet Axiom Examine</strong>, allowing structured navigation across artifact categories including communications, media, system logs, and application data. Filtering capabilities were applied to refine and isolate relevant findings.</p><p>To supplement and validate the artifacts identified in Magnet Axiom, the image was further analyzed using <strong>ALEAPP (Android Logs, Events, and Protobuf Parser)</strong>. The TAR file was processed through the ALEAPP GUI, generating structured HTML reports containing detailed system-level artifacts, account data, application records, configuration settings, and additional device metadata. These reports provided deeper visibility into Android system files and XML-based data structures not immediately apparent within the primary analysis platform.</p><p>The combined use of Magnet Axiom and ALEAPP enabled comprehensive artifact extraction, cross-validation of findings, and structured reconstruction of device activity. This multi-tool approach strengthened evidentiary confidence and enhanced the overall depth of the forensic examination.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/967/1*hcf1zLZRubLmLCmAT0zzbA.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/735/1*FhPq6K26fBwEC5-oKZ3LGQ.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Jl_hIzp4J1HFLGk0DDLDpw.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/935/1*BzdFJdrodF0iZieuhq2i7w.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/562/1*bN481QkMJwe5kZ_lOEFSXw.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/698/1*1P_VvwSGc4Xg-hVhA6xINw.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*G0A0ZzNEE1x-PXAWzrMdjw.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*AGjmpQ6ThnoQ-cwD6vJflQ.png" /><figcaption>ALEAPP (GUI version) was downloaded from its official GitHub repository and used to process the TAR image for supplementary artifact extraction.</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/725/1*5AWGfJk1vyaUF19koz6few.png" /><figcaption>Downloaded aleappGUI.exe. When I opened the app, I saw this screen</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/935/1*7mF48vRQdChKQ-yskVzoTg.png" /><figcaption>Now select your tar file and a folder to output the results to. Press Process. It will spit out a folder that looks like this</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/516/1*Wf886Bv-ECkNz9_qNTUhFw.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*vEPQlkdimjjcAwbYhDmqLw.png" /></figure><p><strong>Challenge Solutions along with Questions</strong></p><p><strong>What username was used for Twitter?</strong></p><p>LTina1900. This can be found in many places. One such place is the ALEAPP Accounts_de report.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*NkGRHiCVYEbw5QztZztfSA.png" /></figure><p><strong>What was the default browser used on this device?</strong></p><p>Google Chrome. The attribute for the default browser is listed as android.app.role.BROWSER. When we look at ALEAPP’s App roles report, we see the value for this attribute is com.android.chrome, the value for google chrome.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*rzuQWdyPJUHNEaJVXZlO0w.png" /></figure><p>What is the IMSI of this device?</p><p>272023204347291. Find this the ALEAPP device info report.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/586/1*-yr8DhPVfk7A7BgHNcWjuw.png" /></figure><p>What version of Android was on the system?</p><p>Version 12</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*K6-S1tDRtQKAHKkW0fUNgQ.png" /></figure><p>What is the bluetooth mac address of this device?</p><p>58:cb:52:4e:67:55. Find this in the ALEAPP Bluetooth Adapter Information Report.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*IUKsY9313ignzlNR7bMxeQ.png" /></figure><p>What time zone was selected for the users Calendar?</p><p>UTC. Find this in the ALEAPP Calendar-calendars report</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*z0wc82gU0ZZMrFhZM7bJkQ.png" /></figure><p>What is the android id of this device?</p><p>b00fd41a87f574ce. Find in ALEAPP Settings Secure report</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*t_ltFIwhlzZ4mNKAY7g4iA.png" /></figure><p>What is the build version of this device?</p><p>8177914. This can be found in the OS Version report of ALEAPP</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*G1IeadzT0QKl9Efhl6tDuw.png" /></figure><p>What was the GUID for the primary account registered to this device?</p><p>102066635235203906215.Found in this bit from the Wellbeing report from ALEAPP</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/693/1*XtCtHIu8SPlx0O8y8n9lvA.png" /></figure><p>What name is set in chrome autofill entries?</p><p>Operation Outsource. Found in the ALEAPP Chrome Autofill entries report</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*e_Uk_a83PrwSEQEpzbdHNA.png" /></figure><p>What was the password of the hotspot on this device?</p><p>enc8px7tpftac4c. Find this in the WiFi Hotspot report of ALEAPP</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*EhOTGqsZmzhWw7LDTmAjoA.png" /></figure><p>What software that may aid in privilege escalation exists on this device?</p><p>Magisk.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*BKE8ZUMOBIzzm_YaGp4HlQ.png" /></figure><p>What is the last boot time in UTC associated with this device? (FORMAT YYYY-MM-DD HH:MM:SS based on 24 hour clock)</p><p>2023–01–09 06:04:28: Found in Last Boot Time Report from ALEAPP.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*wYwAj5UUzEdCy8uGI4yQ5w.png" /></figure><p>When was the last time in UTC the twitter account typed their password? (FORMAT YYYY-MM-DD HH:MM:SS based on 24 hour clock)</p><p>2022–12–18 09:42:51. Found in the ALEAPP Accounts_de report</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*w7vmp90JI_kMm-cC2mwK-w.png" /></figure><p>What is the application package name of the messaging app with the most number of messages received?</p><p>In Magnet Axiom Examine, go to the communications tab within your case. After that notice that the second subcategory has the most. Find the package name by scrolling down the details panel at the right. You will find the following</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*h-mtazv2e1KFuVJ0Uqkcyg.png" /></figure><p>What WiFi network was the registered user connected to at the time the document “Banana_split_(1).pdf” was added to google drive?</p><p>Abo South.This is the final entry of the WiFi Profiles report on ALEAPP</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*dQQc5OSMt-NvAOAivLx04g.png" /></figure><p>At 10:48, How many flags did Tina get correct?</p><p>19. There is an image within/data/media/0/Pictures/Screenshots with some flags on it. Specifically Screenshot_20221206–104819.png. This one has the answer on it.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/361/1*Qp--lkAchpbEX3nQMTVesA.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*swP3cDlnpR52SpJN346STQ.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/349/1*xp_TRa5s1UlknCxeBB_XQA.png" /></figure><p>What was the password that the user used to log into fiver with?</p><p>Got2Sell. Go to ALEAPP Chrome Login data report</p><p>What animals killed the figure who was renowned for his strength?</p><p>Wolves.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/558/1*68Hi2hDhN4bLdW6x5BxlVg.png" /></figure><p>This user seems to have been shopping for some sort of personal hygiene item, what was the price of the red item?</p><p>$23.99. Find this evidence in the location /data/dat/com.google.android.googlequicksearchbox/files/recently/tlouis@kurvalis.com-7133291355466100338.jpg</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/361/1*EjpJ46pgBUlHqnV6f7-Pyg.png" /></figure><p>This user installed an app on the phone relating checking privileges. What did the user specifically search for in the appstore when looking for it?</p><p>root checker. See the image at /data/system_ce/snapshots/121.jpg</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/387/1*grElTYDqjUdksYxEOPGy8w.png" /></figure><p>What was the “Ease of Root Install Rank” of this device?</p><p>5737. See this image from /data/system_ce/snapshots/134.jpg</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/358/1*SNZi3On455nF0Ei7z-n74g.png" /></figure><p>What was Tinas battery % when she entered the Copenhagen timezone?</p><p>83%. Find this in the Turbo — Phone Battery report in ALEAPP. Modify the Show: filter to “All” and scroll down till you see 2022–12–04 18:03:57 on the time column. You will see that the column directly to the left of the time shows 83. That is our answer</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*uh8sjaCFcbK8tfToLGcO1Q.png" /></figure><p>It seems Tina did a lot of traveling. What was Tinas battery percentage when she left the Copenhagen timezone?</p><p>44%. Keep scrolling down on the report from the result of the previous question. Look at the entry to the right of 2022–12–07 08:27:53. Find this answer to the right of that time</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*nVqIGgplNPfbVHMHjrVUaA.png" /></figure><p>What email address is associated with this device that is NOT a gmail account?</p><p>I used Magnet Axiom Examine for this one. I looked at the protonmail contacts and found this one wilts1991@protonmail.com.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*3pvPxBwnQxdClbQpe8v9AQ.png" /></figure><p>It seems that this user may have received a document with some PII. How many different individuals are listed in this document.</p><p>A: 5. Look in banana_split(1).pdf. There is XML code in it that shows 5 objects that are people</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/972/1*FOQ9dFUIgOEM-nPeAFiRZA.png" /></figure><p>What was the danger type of magisk?</p><p>Dangerous But User Validated. Navigate to the ALEAPP Chrome — Downloads report and see that the “Danger Type” column says “Dangerous Bt User Validated”.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*jH8Vqk0X8NAKTi_4UvCGIA.png" /></figure><p>It seems this user downloaded a game. How many hints were they allowed in the game?</p><p>75.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1012/1*QxN2liHw16ZYXhcMGpE0ew.png" /></figure><p>Right at the top of the XML file we can see a key/value pair showing “hints” was 75.</p><p>It seems that Tina had intentions of spawning some sort of office romance, as she searched for the legality behind it. What was the article called that gave her the answer to her question?</p><p>Can an Employer Prohibit Workplace Dating?. Find this in ALEAPP chrome Web History report.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*mak7ShwHugirQO_zcOn3Qw.png" /></figure><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>The Magnet User Summit 2023 Android CTF investigation demonstrated structured artifact extraction and correlation using both commercial and open-source tools. Magnet Axiom provided organized artifact categorization, while ALEAPP enabled deeper system-level artifact parsing.</p><p>The investigation demonstrates the importance of multi-tool validation in Android forensic workflows. Structured correlation between commercial and open-source tools increased artifact visibility and investigative confidence.</p><p>Through systematic review of account artifacts, configuration data, connectivity logs, and behavioral indicators, a comprehensive reconstruction of device activity was achieved.</p><h3>Takeaway</h3><p>From an investigative standpoint, this challenge highlights the importance of combining commercial forensic platforms with open-source parsers to ensure comprehensive artifact visibility. Cross-validation between Magnet Axiom and ALEAPP strengthened evidentiary confidence and reduced reliance on a single parsing engine.</p><p>This challenge reflects real-world mobile forensic investigations, where analysts must validate findings across multiple artifact sources rather than relying on a single parsing engine.</p><p>Android forensic investigations require examination beyond surface-level artifacts, extending into system configuration files, XML-based data, secure settings, and application behavior analysis.</p><h3>Skills Used</h3><ul><li>Android forensic image processing (TAR format)</li><li>Artifact parsing with Magnet Axiom</li><li>System-level analysis using ALEAPP</li><li>XML artifact examination</li><li>Account and application correlation</li><li>Device configuration extraction</li><li>Root artifact identification</li><li>Behavioral artifact reconstruction</li><li>Structured forensic documentation</li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=fd677c5b77f4" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Android Forensic Analysis DFRWS 2011 Forensic Challenge]]></title>
            <link>https://bilyaminu1.medium.com/android-forensic-analysis-dfrws-2011-forensic-challenge-b74e18a192d7?source=rss-98d8defc54bb------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b74e18a192d7</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Bilyaminu Umar Shehu]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 10 Feb 2026 13:46:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-02-10T13:46:00.766Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Introduction</h3><p>The Digital Forensic Research Workshop (DFRWS) is a non-profit organization that promotes research and the dissemination of knowledge in digital forensics. As part of this mission, DFRWS hosts an annual forensic challenge designed to encourage innovation and practical investigative proficiency within the forensic community. This challenge-based format closely aligns with Capture The Flag (CTF)–style digital forensics exercises, where participants analyze provided datasets to reconstruct events and uncover hidden relationships.</p><p>The DFRWS 2011 Forensic Challenge focused on Android smartphone forensic analysis, requiring participants to use custom-written forensic utilities in C to extract and reconstruct artifacts from SQLite databases. These artifacts included SMS messages, browser history, and application records, which were used to rebuild user activity timelines</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*CqJyi0zU_aDlHRP5ad0v8w.png" /></figure><p><strong>Scope and Constraints</strong><br>This investigation was conducted using pre-acquired forensic images provided as part of the DFRWS 2011 Forensic Challenge. The analysis was limited to the artifacts available within the internal flash and SD card images, and findings are based solely on recovered data rather than live device interaction.</p><p><strong>Challenge Background</strong></p><p>The challenge was concerned with Android smartphone forensic analysis because these gadgets have become common digital evidence that investigators need to use in their investigations. Two investigative cases were given.</p><p>The former case was a suspicious death of Donald Norby who was discovered dead with a gunshot hole in his head. The investigators did not know if it was a suicide or homicide or there was any possibility of an organized criminal group, KRYPTIX, to which he might have been involved. An analysis on the Android phone that Norby used would have to be forensically examined in order to reconstruct the activities and communication of Norby before his death.</p><p>The second case involved a theft of intellectual property in SwiftLogic Inc. as secret design information on a product called Palomino was leaked. One of the SwiftLogic employees Yob Taog was suspected and voluntarily turned in his Android phone to check whether the data leak was intentional or the outcome of the compromise.</p><p><strong>Challenge Data</strong></p><p>In both cases, the forensic image of the internal flash storage and external SD card memory was delivered in compressed form of an archive file. Such datasets were application data, system artifacts, records of communication and files generated by the user to fully conduct forensic analysis. To verify the integrity before examination, cryptographic hash values were provided.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/855/1*RB7Bx1Txp5xChtA92jaUIQ.png" /></figure><p><strong>Executive Summary</strong></p><p>The case forensic analysis created a definite relationship between the two scenarios. The case was found to have had Donald Norby who had provided Yob Taog with a new android with malicious software. This malware silently sent SMS messages and would upload PDF files on a regular basis on an IP address client in IP 50.56.29.109 to a remote server owned by Taog. The leaked files were found to be SwiftLogic confidential files. It was proven that Norby was planning to sell these documents and has negotiated the deal with a person known as Mr. E. In cases where Norby was trying to use the opportunity to renegotiate and demand a higher payment, there emerged tension. The latest read message on the phone of Norby stated that he was going to meet Mr. E and afterwards his activity stopped implying that he was dead soon afterwards.</p><p><strong>Procuring and Authenticating Memory Dumps.</strong></p><p>The process of acquiring used in the two situations varied. The former case involved obtaining the flash memory through the dd utility after rooting the device as well as activating the Android Debug Bridge (ADB) although the SD card was imaged in isolation. The SD card could have been imaged before rooting to mitigate a risk of contamination although the rooting was monitored. The dd utility fails to grab any out-of-band (OOB) data, so it will not be able to recreate the file system of YAFFS. The device neither supported hash verification nor did post-acquisition hashes verification prior to analysis.</p><p>In the second case, the flash memory was obtained with the help of nanddump and this program can record OOB data but the operation to obtain flash memory was not well documented. Missing partition details and tool install log entries, the other memory image was without a post acquisition hash. These limitations notwithstanding, hashes were available and checked prior to forensic analysis.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/807/1*iBq29BaDL7OB62XqSHayrw.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/874/1*r3hoeWa-TNLlbxC4KjJ33Q.png" /></figure><p><strong>Statistical Correlation and Analysis.</strong></p><p>Browsing history, contact records, SMS messages, emails and downloads and file system artifacts evidence made it possible to correlate pieces of evidence and therefore reconstruct what transpired in both situations. According to the browser history utilized on the device of Norby, he was searching in relation to SwiftLogic employees, indicating that he was reconnaissance. Communication links between Norby and Mr. E, and Yob Taog were proven through contact records.</p><p>The SMS messages that were retrieved proved that Norby was busy making and tracking the malicious software that was installed in Taogs phone. The malware shared SMS messages and gave notification messages when files were posted. There were browser artifacts and a HTML page stored in a cache, which provided Norby with the evidence of the unauthorized access to the password-protected server based at 50.56.29.109 IP address and retrieved credentials.</p><p>Recovery of PDF files and download of files to the SD card of Norby were systematically retried at SwiftLogic document retrieval. By use of emails and SMS, negotiations between Norby and Mr. E exposed the fact that Norby aimed to make a higher payment that was agreed on in the agreement and sent sample documents to Mr. E as evidence of value.</p><p>The phone of Taog was analyzed, and there was no indication of premeditated data theft or even direct contact with Norby. Recovery of malware code fragments on the device included hardcoded references to the exfiltration server, which is in favor of the conclusion that Taog was an unknowing victim of compromise.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/874/1*NnaiqNYYgQyIPs9lC0xfDg.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/588/1*R7-xq07KNMoZqyerkj8Jug.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/817/1*W4dx2BIddTTSy7-LIPQTdQ.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/866/1*vTsTn_tA4BQ3TB5dxcvXVA.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/850/1*ZMGICfIvWCEQ-Wpe4R9XyA.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/840/1*OyFDsEKdFZoIgLr9VFGyqg.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/840/1*lgAObld28fD7t-uQBT3gkA.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/847/1*6w8qMZz0xwtpmfgKUTmAbA.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/702/1*YrXh256Vw1ut2W7H5eP-_w.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/801/1*1vR3bWiOjpQB0BUx4riyGg.png" /></figure><p><strong>Event Reconstruction</strong></p><p>By aligning SMS messages, email correspondence, record of downloads and file time, a consolidated timeline was established. The flow chart shows how the process of reconnaissance and malware deployment leads to data exfiltration, negotiating and final planning session between Norby and Mr. E. The fact that Mr. E. Norby suddenly stops activity after the meeting confirms the hypothesis that he is killed shortly afterward.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/761/1*h5jvc6q97S2fFIPVJ_vr1g.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/763/1*W7Oi3gx49yaiABBFSf-Ruw.png" /></figure><p><strong>Installed Applications</strong></p><p>Carving of the application database found that Norby had installed applications like twitter. In the second case, application records retrieved by the Taog device revealed information on installed applications and their usage, and they were used to reconstruct overall activities.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/847/1*9zbCm_Vpg2bMqRbmHuyiNQ.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*HpDKgOVv9wyY5xehnkYE9w.png" /></figure><h3><strong>EXIF provides version data about the software used in capturing a photo</strong></h3><p>Metadata (EXIF) extracted by the device on all types of images in both devices determined the device make, model, and version of the Android operating system. Examination proved that the two gadgets were Motorola Droid smartphones that were operating under the Android version that was used during the occurrence of the incidents. Reports on mind readings of the photos included in Case1exif.html and Case2exif.html.</p><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>The DFRWS 2011 Forensic Challenge demonstrated how forensic analysis of Android smartphones can be used to reconstruct complex investigative scenarios. Correlation of multiple artifact types across two devices established a definitive relationship between a suspicious death and an intellectual property theft.</p><p>The analysis showed that Donald Norby orchestrated the theft and attempted sale of confidential SwiftLogic documents, while Yob Taog was determined to be an unknowing victim of malware compromise. This challenge highlighted the importance of artifact correlation, timeline reconstruction, and cautious interpretation of mobile forensic evidence.</p><h3>CTF Takeaway Overall Thoughts</h3><p>This CTF-style forensic challenge provided practical experience in Android smartphone forensic analysis using realistic investigative datasets. It reinforced the importance of correlating communication records, file system artifacts, malware evidence, and timestamps to accurately reconstruct events.</p><p>From an analyst’s perspective, this case demonstrates the importance of correlating multiple artifact types rather than relying on a single data source. SMS messages, browser artifacts, file downloads, and timestamps collectively revealed intent, sequencing, and relationships between individuals. This correlation was critical in distinguishing between an intentional actor and an unknowing victim of compromise.</p><p>The DFRWS challenge effectively demonstrated how digital forensic methodologies can uncover relationships between cases and distinguish between malicious actors and compromised victims.</p><p><strong>Skills Demonstrated</strong></p><ul><li>Android smartphone forensic analysis</li><li>Artifact correlation across SMS, browser history, and file systems</li><li>Timeline reconstruction using multi-source evidence</li><li>Malware impact analysis on mobile devices</li><li>Interpretation of forensic acquisition limitations</li><li>Technical reporting and documentation</li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b74e18a192d7" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[MART CTF — Malware Traffic Analysis: It’s a Trap]]></title>
            <link>https://bilyaminu1.medium.com/mart-ctf-malware-traffic-analysis-its-a-trap-8b348fc48140?source=rss-98d8defc54bb------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/8b348fc48140</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Bilyaminu Umar Shehu]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 09 Feb 2026 13:56:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-02-09T13:56:01.243Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>MART CTF — Malware Traffic Analysis: It’s a Trap</h3><h3>Introduction</h3><p>This write-up documents the analysis performed for a Malware Analysis and Network Traffic (MART) Capture The Flag (CTF) exercise titled <em>It’s a Trap</em>. The challenge is based on a network traffic capture and focuses on identifying an infected host, determining the method of compromise, analyzing malicious activity, and extracting indicators of compromise using packet-level inspection and IOC verification tools. The CTF scenario originates from Malware-Traffic-Analysis.net and simulates a real-world malware infection observed through network traffic.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Pdy9Ko0UFx5_vIg2qHM37g.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://www.malware-traffic-analysis.net/2025/06/13/index.html">https://www.malware-traffic-analysis.net/2025/06/13/index.html</a></figcaption></figure><h3>Objective</h3><p>The objective of this CTF was to analyze captured network traffic in order to identify the infected Windows host, determine how the compromise occurred, identify the malware activity and command-and-control infrastructure involved, and extract actionable indicators of compromise. Additional goals included validating malicious domains and recommending appropriate response and prevention actions based on the observed evidence.</p><p>Tools used</p><p>Wireshark, VirusTotal, packet-level inspection techniques, and IOC verification tools such as AbuseIPDB and ipinfo.io were used.</p><p>Challenge questions</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*kyor9A5wDhwUAdYR2VAOag.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*OIkGhG899s6Ys1E_DIsmUg.png" /></figure><h3>What is the IP address of the infected Windows client?</h3><p><strong>Answer:</strong><br> 10.6.13.133</p><h3>What is the MAC address of the infected Windows client?</h3><p><strong>Answer:</strong><br> 24:77:03:ac:97:df</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*mSAIhKQUT_S3qZkZbpHxlA.png" /></figure><h3>What is the host name of the infected Windows client?</h3><p>DESKTOP-5AVE44C</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*m3FUetAFRe1VNQPBmZy3Lg.png" /></figure><h3>What is the user account name on the infected Windows client?</h3><p><strong>Answer:</strong><br> rgaines</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*EuhGqNNuxmnK7eRoOv30zw.png" /></figure><h3>Which host(s) were compromised?</h3><p>The compromised host was identified using indicators of compromise such as malicious domains and URLs, malicious IP addresses, suspicious DNS queries, and suspicious traffic patterns.</p><ul><li>Hostname: DESKTOP-5AVE44C</li><li>IP Address: 10.6.13.133</li><li>MAC Address: 24:77:03:ac:97:df</li><li>Username: rgaines</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*GUq-yDzAk9tuhJOJt6VQjA.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*IJUnuqUAVdyyYRw-1aI6fw.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/779/1*6_XGsukBywvVBbiH-f7--Q.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*FYOx_IKrPc2KJnN8bMm7Bw.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/930/1*Wxej-w3_5qQXhDQdQ4fW_g.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*wrDUK1U9qhDgFHdB-NQb3A.png" /></figure><h3>So, clearly the details of compromised host are:</h3><p><strong>Hostname </strong>DESKTOP-5AVE44C</p><p><strong>IP Address </strong>10.6.13.133</p><p><strong>MAC Address </strong>24:77:03:ac:97:df</p><p><strong>Username </strong>rgaines</p><h3>How did the initial compromise happen?</h3><p><strong>Stage:</strong> Initial Access<br><strong>Description:</strong> Compromise occurred via a malicious domain contact, likely through phishing or a malicious web request<br> <strong>Evidence:</strong> DNS query to a known malicious domain</p><p><strong>Stage:</strong> Affected Host<br><strong>Description:</strong> Windows endpoint initiated the malicious activity<br><strong>Evidence:</strong> DESKTOP-5AVE44C (10.6.13.133)</p><p><strong>Stage:</strong> Malicious Domain<br><strong>Description:</strong> Domain impersonated a legitimate Microsoft service through typosquatting<br><strong>Evidence:</strong> event-datamicrosoft.live</p><p><strong>Stage:</strong> DNS Activity<br><strong>Description:</strong> Host resolved the malicious domain<br><strong>Evidence:</strong> Timestamp: 2025–06–13 21:05:58</p><p><strong>Stage:</strong> Follow-up Action<br><strong>Description:</strong> Automated HTTP exploit request immediately after DNS resolution<br><strong>Evidence:</strong> Same timestamp indicates malware execution</p><p><strong>Stage:</strong> Attack Technique<br><strong>Description:</strong> Brand impersonation and automated payload delivery<br><strong>Evidence:</strong> Non-legitimate Microsoft domain</p><h3>What malware or malicious activity was involved?</h3><p><strong>Answer:</strong></p><ul><li>Likely malware type was phishing-delivered malware or a malicious downloader</li><li>Malicious behavior included command-and-control (C2) beaconing</li><li>The domain was flagged for phishing, malware delivery, and C2 communication</li><li>Network evidence showed immediate HTTP traffic following DNS resolution</li><li>Malware action involved payload retrieval or C2 beaconing activity</li><li>There was no legitimate business justification for contacting the domain</li></ul><h3>What evidence proves each step of the attack?</h3><p><strong>Answer:</strong></p><ul><li><strong>Initial Access:</strong> DNS query to event-datamicrosoft.live</li><li><strong>Execution:</strong> HTTP exploit request at the same timestamp</li><li><strong>Persistence / Control:</strong> Continued suspicious traffic patterns</li><li><strong>Affected Asset:</strong> DESKTOP-5AVE44C (10.6.13.133)</li><li><strong>Attribution:</strong> Domain categorized as malicious (phishing and C2)</li></ul><h3>What command-and-control (C2) infrastructure was used?</h3><p><strong>Answer:</strong></p><ul><li>C2 Domain: event-datamicrosoft.live</li><li>Infrastructure Type: Single-domain command-and-control</li><li>Primary Function: Command-and-control communication and payload hosting</li><li>Attacker Technique: Microsoft brand impersonation</li><li>Evasion Method: Trusted-brand lookalike domain</li></ul><h3>What indicators would you block?</h3><p><strong>Answer:</strong></p><ul><li>Immediately block the domain event-datamicrosoft.live</li><li>Block all IP addresses resolved from the malicious domain</li><li>Block future <em>.live</em> domains impersonating Microsoft services</li><li>Block Microsoft-themed phishing emails linking to non-Microsoft domains</li><li>Block unknown or unsigned executables spawned after browser activity</li><li>Enable DNS sinkholing for known malicious domains</li><li>Generate alerts for newly registered domains contacting internal endpoints</li></ul><h3>What would you recommend to the business?</h3><p><strong>Answer:</strong></p><p><strong>Immediate Response:</strong></p><ul><li>Isolate the compromised host DESKTOP-5AVE44C</li><li>Perform full memory and disk forensic analysis</li><li>Reset credentials for user rgaines</li><li>Investigate potential lateral movement from 10.6.13.133</li></ul><p><strong>Preventive Controls:</strong></p><ul><li>Deploy enterprise-wide DNS filtering</li><li>Strengthen email phishing detection and filtering</li><li>Enforce least-privilege access for all users</li><li>Enable EDR behavioral alerts correlating DNS and HTTP activity</li></ul><p><strong>User Awareness:</strong></p><ul><li>Conduct regular phishing awareness training</li><li>Educate users to carefully verify Microsoft-related URLs</li></ul><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>The MART <em>It’s a Trap</em> CTF demonstrated how malicious activity can be identified solely through network traffic analysis. The investigation confirmed that a Windows endpoint was compromised through interaction with a Microsoft-impersonating malicious domain, followed by immediate HTTP exploit activity. By correlating DNS queries, HTTP traffic, and threat intelligence data, the compromised host, attack technique, and command-and-control infrastructure were clearly identified.</p><h3>Takeaway</h3><p>This CTF reinforced the importance of DNS visibility, domain reputation analysis, and packet-level inspection in detecting malware infections. It highlighted how attackers leverage brand impersonation and automated payload delivery, and how timely network-based detection can prevent further compromise. The challenge provided strong hands-on experience in identifying, validating, and responding to malware-related indicators using real-world traffic.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8b348fc48140" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Digital Forensic Investigation of the Stolen Szechuan Sauce (CTF)]]></title>
            <link>https://bilyaminu1.medium.com/digital-forensic-investigation-of-the-stolen-szechuan-sauce-ctf-1f977e3e1597?source=rss-98d8defc54bb------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/1f977e3e1597</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Bilyaminu Umar Shehu]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 08 Feb 2026 21:11:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-02-08T21:11:00.801Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Introduction</h3><p>Digital forensics is the logical process of evidence identification, preservation, analysis, and presentation of digital evidence related to cyber incidents. This investigation examines a simulated security breach involving the theft of a proprietary document known as the <em>Szechuan Sauce Recipe</em>. Using forensic tools available in Kali Linux, disk images, memory dumps, registry hives, and network traffic were analyzed to reconstruct the events surrounding the compromise. The investigation focused on determining whether a breach occurred, identifying the attacker’s entry vector, analyzing malware activity, tracing network communication, and confirming potential data exfiltration.</p><p>This investigation was conducted as part of a Capture The Flag (CTF) challenge titled <strong>The Stolen Szechuan Sauce</strong>, hosted by DFIR Madness. The challenge simulates a real-world digital forensic incident involving unauthorized access, malware execution, and suspected data theft.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*woYovrQvRhXSuP9UGj0SLA.png" /></figure><h3>Project Objective</h3><p>The objective of this investigation was to determine whether an unauthorized breach occurred and to identify how the attacker gained access to the system. Additional goals included analyzing malware activity, identifying malicious network communications, determining whether sensitive data was accessed or stolen, and reconstructing a timeline of the attacker’s actions using available forensic artifacts.</p><p><strong>Challenge Questions</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*lhUG_8uyTsbwjAuoeqxD2g.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/894/1*iXEi2FjoFCaeLa0WCWU0Fg.png" /></figure><h3>Was there a breach?</h3><p>Yes as seen above. The presence of unauthorized access to a confidential document indicates a security breach.</p><h3>Did the attacker steal the Szechuan sauce?</h3><p>Yes. The file <em>Szechuan_Sauce_Recipe.docx</em> was accessed and later deleted, indicating potential data theft.</p><h3>When was the Szechuan sauce accessed or stolen?</h3><p>The file was accessed on <strong>2020–09–19 at 12:25:43 UTC</strong>, as shown in the Autopsy timeline and file metadata.</p><h3>Did the attacker access any sensitive files?</h3><p>Yes. The proprietary Szechuan sauce recipe file was accessed, which qualifies as sensitive information.</p><h3><em>Volatility imageinfo output(</em><strong>imageinfo and pstree</strong><em>)</em></h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/892/1*VJqn4jwHEnzDtwLYxWGjIQ.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/941/1*BzLl_8BX5O8-ZzuxdLTg2Q.png" /></figure><h3>What is the operating system of the compromised system?</h3><p>The operating system of the compromised system is <strong>Windows 7 Service Pack 1 (Build 7601)</strong>.</p><h3>Was malware used in the attack?</h3><p>Yes. A suspicious executable named <em>coreupdater.exe</em> was found running in system memory.</p><h3>Was malware used in the attack?</h3><p>Yes. A suspicious executable named <em>coreupdater.exe</em> was found running in system memory.</p><h3>Was malware used in the attack?</h3><p>Yes. A suspicious executable named <em>coreupdater.exe</em> was found running in system memory.</p><h3>How was the malware running?</h3><p>The malware was running under legitimate processes such as <em>explorer.exe</em>, indicating stealthy execution and process masquerading.</p><p><strong>Volatility netscan + Wireshark (Brute Force &amp; Exfiltration)</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/897/1*6R9YVesKpif-bJXGD0jTxg.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/906/1*xgtVCKaQgv6VLU4pBGqM3A.png" /></figure><h3>What was the initial entry vector?</h3><p>The initial entry vector was an RDP brute-force attack, indicated by repeated TCP connection attempts on port 3389 in the network traffic.</p><h3>What malicious IP addresses were involved?</h3><p>The attacker IP address identified was <strong>192.61.24.102</strong>, which repeatedly communicated with the compromised system.</p><h3>Was malware delivered over the network?</h3><p>Yes (inferred). Network activity combined with the presence of the malware <em>coreupdater.exe</em> indicates it was delivered over the network, likely via HTTP-based transfer.</p><h3>Was there data exfiltration?</h3><p>Yes (inferred). Sustained outbound network traffic following compromise suggests data exfiltration activity.</p><h3>Was the attacker actively communicating with the system?</h3><p>Yes. Multiple ESTABLISHED TCP connections were observed in memory using Volatility netscan.</p><h3>Was there a command-and-control (C2) connection?</h3><p>Yes. An ESTABLISHED TCP connection on port <strong>4444</strong> was identified, which is commonly associated with C2 backdoors.</p><h3>Did the attacker access other systems?</h3><p>Yes (inferred). Connections to multiple internal IP addresses within the <strong>10.42.85.0/24</strong> network indicate lateral movement.</p><h3>What was the last known contact with the adversary?</h3><p>The last known contact corresponds to the final ESTABLISHED TCP session observed in memory during Volatility analysis.</p><p><strong>RegRipper: Timezone Analysis</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/553/1*0PrN1COaw3ROfW9ABlaKVA.png" /></figure><h3>What is the local time of the server?</h3><p>The server was configured to <strong>Eastern Daylight Time (EDT), UTC-04:00</strong>.</p><h3>How were timestamps interpreted during the investigation?</h3><p>All timestamps were correlated and normalized using the extracted timezone (EDT, UTC-04:00) to ensure accurate and consistent timeline analysis.</p><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>The <em>Stolen Szechuan Sauce</em> CTF investigation confirmed that the system was compromised through an RDP brute-force attack, which resulted in unauthorized access, malware execution, and the theft of a sensitive proprietary document. Forensic analysis of disk artifacts, memory data, registry information, and network traffic provided sufficient evidence to validate the breach and reconstruct key stages of the attack. The identification of malicious processes, attacker-controlled IP addresses, and command-and-control communication demonstrated how multiple forensic data sources can be correlated to support investigative findings.</p><h3>CTF Takeaway Overall Thoughts</h3><p>This CTF provided practical experience in conducting a structured digital forensic investigation using real-world style artifacts. It reinforced the importance of correlating file system activity, memory analysis, and network traffic to validate attacker behavior and confirm data theft. The challenge highlighted how exposed remote access services, such as RDP, can lead to full system compromise when improperly secured. Overall, the CTF effectively demonstrated how forensic tools and methodologies can be applied to identify breaches, analyze malware activity, and establish an accurate incident timeline.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1f977e3e1597" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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