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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Blake Hunsicker on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Blake Hunsicker on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Blake Hunsicker on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Pre-election intrigue and uncertainty haunts Muslims in Myanmar]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@blakehunsicker/pre-election-intrigue-and-uncertainty-haunts-muslims-in-myanmar-36fb5502c9b3?source=rss-70509f6b9648------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[burma]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[rohingya]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[myanmar]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Blake Hunsicker]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 26 Oct 2015 16:27:22 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-10-30T17:27:10.646Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>by Blake Hunsicker and Niels Larson</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*UK4CEVd8K-7rBESu0X6nLw.jpeg" /><figcaption>A National League for Democracy party (NLD) flyer hangs on a vendor stall in Yangon, Myanmar. (Elizaveta Kanaeva)</figcaption></figure><p>Tucked away behind his school’s basketball court, P.E. teacher and Islamic scholar Hajji U Aye Lwin fielded calls from a nearby township where worshippers claimed to be surrounded by thugs.</p><p>Because they have no mosques of their own, Muslims in Yangon’s Thaketa township had taken to praying in their madrasas, or religious schools. A group of unidentified people, first thought to be Buddhist monks but later said to be laymen, demanded that worshippers sign a pledge that they wouldn’t pray in the buildings.</p><p>Sitting in his office at the Diplomatic School of Yangon, Lwin answered his friends’ calls and told them to take the case to local administrators. After hanging up, he said they didn’t know who started the trouble or what would happen.</p><p>Later that day, the madrasa leaders <a href="http://yangon.coconuts.co/2015/10/21/buddhist-nationalists-force-yangon-muslims-stop-praying-madrasas">signed the pledge</a>.</p><p>The mystery of who instigated the standoff in Thaketa, and whether the mob had the blessing of authorities, hardline Buddhist groups, or were acting on their own accord, is indicative of recent anti-Muslim activity in Myanmar, also known as Burma. The tensions, which resulted in violence in 2012 and 2013 and spurred the recent Rohingya refugee crisis, have once again intensified in the lead-up to next month’s general election, the country’s first since the end of direct military rule in 2011.</p><p>“They are playing games. These mobs are created by them, they are their men,” Lwin said, referring to the military and the incumbent United Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), whom he believes instigate anti-Muslim mobs and encourage hardline Buddhist nationalist groups for political gain.</p><p>Lwin is the chief convener of the Islamic Centre of Myanmar.</p><p>Tensions between Muslims and Buddhists allow the USDP and military to pose as peacekeepers, he said, able to quell violence against Muslims and at the same time protect Buddhists from them.</p><p>“They are afraid. And you know what they ask for? The military. Where are the soldiers? The army, the military, as the savior.”</p><p>Whether recent anti-Muslim sentiment is promoted by the military or the USDP is the subject of fierce rumor and debate among Muslims and others.</p><p>At the center of the speculation are Buddhist nationalist groups like the Patriotic Association of Myanmar, or Ma Ba Tha, which is made up of hardline, anti-Muslim Buddhist monks who some say have outsized influence in political life in the country.</p><p>Earlier this year, Ma Ba Tha, which is not a political party and has no candidates in the upcoming elections, successfully lobbied four “race and religion” laws many say target Muslims. <a href="http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/burma-four-race-and-religion-protection-laws-adopted/">The laws</a>, which include restrictions on faith conversion, interfaith marriages, polygamy and childbirth, were signed into law by incumbent president and USDP member Thein Sein.</p><p>The laws were, for some, the smoking gun proving the connection between anti-Muslim Buddhist monks and the USDP. Another telltale sign came later — in their nationwide victory lap celebrating the legislation, Ma Ba Tha had difficulty booking Yangon’s Thuwanna stadium. At the last moment, <a href="http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/national-news/16795-pres-intervenes-to-let-monks-use-thuwanna.html">according to media sources</a>, the president stepped in to permit the celebration, which was initially stalled because the stadium wasn’t permitted to host non-sporting events.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*AvcBBcaMNq5bUa-k5iINVQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Muslim Rohingya activist Wai Wai Nu in her office in Yangon, Myanmar. (Elizaveta Kanaeva)</figcaption></figure><p>“I never expected that the Buddhist nationalist movement would get this powerful,” Wai Wai Nu, a well known Rohingya activist in Myanmar, said. “It happened because of encouragement from powerful actors, including the government.”</p><p>Ma Ba Tha remains highly popular, particularly in rural areas of the country.</p><p>Among some Muslims, the most promising alternative to the USDP is its main contender, the National League for Democracy (NLD), and its leader, Nobel peace laureate Aung San Suu Kyi. There are a total of 92 parties contending for seats in the parliament, which will go on to chose the country’s new president next year. The military is guaranteed 25% of the seats beforehand, giving them strong advantage ahead of the polling.</p><p>Support for the NLD is palpable in Yangon, where the party’s trademark red flag can be seen waving from taxi antennas and sprawled across backseat windows in the city’s notoriously congested traffic. For many, it’s a startling sight in a country where public support for the party and car ownership were all but unheard of five years ago.</p><p>“I will vote for Aung San Suu Kyi because she hasn’t rested since 1988,” Mr. Doe, a Yangon native, said, referring to the year she and others founded the NLD.</p><p>In the crowded basement of a Shiite mosque in downtown Yangon, a retired seaman confided that, as a Muslim, he feels persecuted in his country. When asked about the elections, the man paused, focusing on his meal of rice and potatoes before answering.</p><p>“Nothing will happen,” he said, speaking on the condition that his name not be used because he fears harassment. “If the NLD wins, the military won’t give up power.”</p><p>He believes that a coalition government, made up of NLD members and those of the USDP, closely aligned with the military, has the best chance for immediate stability.</p><p>This sentiment was shared by many, including Lwin and Nu, who admit there’s a chance that if Ms. Suu Kyi’s party wins by landslide, as they did in the 1990 general elections, the military may refuse to hand over power, just as they did 25 years ago.</p><p>“There will be a coalition, because the army needs — the USDP needs Aung San Suu Kyi to appease the international community,” Lwin said. “And Aung San Suu Kyi needs the military as a shield, so that history won’t repeat just like in 1990. So, I think she is out-maneuvering this now.”</p><p>Her political gaming, however, has brought criticism to her and her party. In September, the NLD sacked its Muslim candidates, who were slated to run in Muslim majority areas of Yangon and elsewhere. It was a move some say <a href="http://www.irrawaddy.org/election/news/nld-blocked-muslim-candidates-to-appease-ma-ba-tha-party-member">was meant to appease hardliners</a>, but nonetheless brought criticism from Muslim supporters. Similarly, <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-32974061">many criticized her</a> for not speaking out against discriminatory policies against Muslim Rohingya, who are not allowed to vote next month.</p><p>Her political allegiance with former USDP party head Shwe Mann, the speaker of the Pyithu Hluttaw — the lower house of parliament — was another point of contention. Rumor had it that Mann could be Ms. Suu Kyi’s choice for president. His ambitions, however, have been thrown into uncertainty after being stripped of his party title in August. He remains speaker of the lower house.</p><p>Despite her ambiguous political maneuvering, many of her longtime supporters still hold faith.</p><p>“One thing consistently she will say is there must be no infringement of human rights, which includes freedom of worship,” Lwin said.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=36fb5502c9b3" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Family Man’s Civil War]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@blakehunsicker/the-family-man-s-mujahideen-3d67a7d5e879?source=rss-70509f6b9648------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/3d67a7d5e879</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[syria]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[isis]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Blake Hunsicker]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 19 Aug 2015 22:58:44 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-10-26T13:04:01.301Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*LBfkXmYx_LZhFXHR84z4LA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Mohammad at his home in Kilis, Turkey</figcaption></figure><h3>The Family Man’s Mujahideen</h3><p><em>This is the longer draft of </em><a href="http://www.syriadeeply.org/articles/2014/01/4538/conversations-jihadi-praising-jabhat-al-nusra/"><em>a story</em></a><em> I wrote in January, 2014 for Syria Deeply.</em></p><p>Mohammad sat on his couch, barefoot and politely reserved, and described his wedding night. His family had insisted on a non-religious ceremony, he explained. At the reception, just has his relatives began celebrating, he went home.</p><p>“I left early,” he said, “Because the music made me uncomfortable.”</p><p>Compelled by the same ideas that have led some militants to outlaw music in parts of rebel-held Syria, Mohammad chose to spend the evening at home with his sister. He shrugged, saying they didn’t talk about anything important.</p><p>Mohammad, a former salesman from the mountains above Syria’s northern coast, is a courteous man though he was late the morning I met him, busy at the market buying fruit for his daughters. He’s slowed down by his broken arm—an injury he brought with him from Syria, where he lost control while driving a Moroccan and three other mujahideen through the mountains. The x-rays show both bones in his forearm shattered. You can see it on his face when his daughters, one and two years old, lean back against the cast. He doesn’t say anything to them, just pauses and breaths in through his teeth.</p><p>The arm brought him here to Kilis, a dusty Turkish border town surrounded by farmland and skeletal, half-finished apartment blocks. In need of surgery and at the behest of his wife, Mohammad and his family—his brother, his parents, his wife, child and a rotating cast of relatives—came to Turkey and rented an apartment, placing rollout mattresses in the corners of the living room because there are so many of them. More family—his sister, brother-in-law, his nieces and nephews—live in a nearby refugee camp at the border, several miles away.</p><p>He doesn’t try to hide himself or his family. He walks freely around Kilis, buying chocolate at the market or going to the mosque here in NATO territory. When asked how he feels raising two girls in a foreign country, far more liberal than the kind of Syria he hopes to live in, he shrugs.</p><p>“Inshallah, it will all be fine.”</p><p>Mohammad is about 30 with a beard he jokes is too thin. He casually throws his folded cloth after prayer, where he kneels across the room from his father smoking. Sitting on his couch with Mahmoud (my translator, his brother-in-law) between us, I told him I wanted to know about his personal life and his beliefs to which he only said: “That will be difficult.”</p><p>He grew up hunting birds, and he’d chase pigs out of his family’s apple orchard high above the Mediterranean. “Everyone planted apples,” he said. Mahmoud’s phone rang and he answered, speaking for a few moments. Mohammad looked directly at me. “Hunting,” he said, having picked up the word from our back-and-forth. Without knowing the word for love, he pointed to his heart.</p><p>He got talking quickly. He lived and worked in Idlib province before the Syrian uprising began in 2011, when in that December he took his hunting gun and, with six others, began camping above town, taking potshots at regime soldiers and trucks. In the beginning they’d sleep outside and take turns keeping watch. They called themselves an unimaginative name — the Liberation Rebels Group.</p><p>Before that, before his religion and the war, he was like any other young man. He tried drinking, looking for girls. That all changed. He sat cross legged on the couch, his hand against his cast, and patiently described his idea of Islam. His father offered me a cigarette, but I declined.</p><p>“Don’t say no because of me,” Mohammad said, laughing. “I will judge him first.”</p><p>He stops what he’s doing five times a day, wherever he is, to briefly pray. He did so twice during our interview, politely excusing himself to the next room where he and Mahmoud stood, shoulders touching, before kneeling to the ground. He got up and quietly walked back to the couch. “Sometimes I miss one or two,” he said, smiling.</p><p>“My friends, they guided me,” he said of his early religious days.</p><p>How did it change his life?</p><p>“Islam is the religion of justice, forgiveness, and morals,” he said.</p><p>His little girls will begin covering their heads when they are 7, 8 or 9. The number isn’t important.</p><p>“The woman in Islam is like a jewel,” he said, “We protect them.”</p><p>The apartment’s frosted glass doors only showed shadows of his extended family — women who cooked lunch and only appeared to clean up a broken glass. His little girls ran throughout the house, too young to be caught up in the rules of family life. And his father, free to roam, sat in his own chair barefoot and surrounded by cigarette smoke, listing the names of world leaders he didn’t like. A little boy in glasses peaked his head in and scurried away.</p><p>His cell phone is full of pictures, many of which are essentially the same — bearded, pale faces surrounded by blankets. The stories behind them are the same, too — this man died last year in Jabal al-Akrad, that one last week, fighting on the Aleppo-Latakia highway. If you ask Mohammad what happened to his country, he will say the revolution began because there were no chances for a Sunni to make it on his own. He couldn’t go to college, he said, because a Shiite took his place.</p><p>The uprising began in early 2011, when over a dozen boys were arrested in Daraa for writing anti-regime slogans on the walls of their school. They were reportedly tortured. Their parents couldn’t negotiate with authorities and, in the protests demanding the boys’ release, police shot several civilians.</p><p>Late 2010-early 2011 was an unbelievable and exhilarating time for many people in the Arab world. Tunisia and Egypt had revolutions. Libya came after, but Syria, a country of 22 million that had lived through decades of Assad family rule, did not live the naive optimism of people who just pushed out a tyrant. There were no triumphant young guys in Damascus, as there were in Tahrir Square in Cairo, to promise a BBC reporter that they were renaming the country. Other people affected by the Arab Spring have suffered since, but none more so than the Syrians.</p><p>In April 2011, Mohammad went with a friend to protests. On May 13, his first daughter was born in a hospital that had just been tear gassed. And in June, the regime set up checkpoints in the area. He and others tagged walls with graffiti and later that year began shooting at Shabiha — Assad’s brutal, thuggish security — later that year along the highways outside Latakia. They’d drive through the mountains in packed cars, stop far off from a checkpoint and hike to a vantage point on foot, quietly. The Liberation Rebels Group hid behind hills above the road, quietly aimed and shot a few times before running off to hide in riverbeds.</p><p>“Latakia is a Sunni city, but outside are mostly Alawites,” Mohammad explained, referring to the Shiite minority sect to which the Assad family belongs. “The regime armed some Alawite civilians. We fought them too.”</p><p>The number of fighters grew. Bands came from nearby towns and their numbers surged from under ten people to somewhere around 140. Someone gave them a farmhouse to occupy, and they filled apartments in the countryside. They blocked roads with overturned barrels.</p><p>He talked about how groups within groups disagreed and argued, and how some men left. Back then, in the early days of the fighting, the germination of several of the major opposition groups had started taking hold. He called the moderate Free Syrian Army (FSA) — founded by several regime defectors — dishonest.</p><p>Some of the men he fought with changed groups several times. On the ground the lines between militias — even between the moderates and the hardliners — are not as clear as they are in news articles. There are freelance fighters, guys who fought for the moderate FSA, then an extremist militia, then another, then back for the FSA. Sometimes money makes the decision for them. Other times it’s just whoever is nearby.</p><p>Later that night the three of us — Mohammad, Mahmoud and I — visited an FSA safe house where, underneath a giant Syrian flag, a television played scenes from the war on mute. When asked what he wants out of a post-Assad government, a fighter from the FSA’s Northern Storm brigade, a group regularly accused of banditry, responded enthusiastically.</p><p>“Oh, Democracy,” the 23-year-old father of twins said. “We want secular democracy.”</p><p>The two men who run the FSA office chain smoked, talking about aid shipments that they couldn’t get over the border. Azaz, the town just inside Syria, was heavily contested — the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) were fighting the FSA. Mahmoud and I had taken a bus to the border, and Mahmoud pointed to a nearby hill: “The FSA and Kurdish fighters are in the mountain, and the ISIS is in the town below,” he told me. Everything was so close, and yet they couldn’t move a thing.</p><p>Mohammad’s jacket, zipped to the collar, made him look like a distance runner. He sat and stayed quiet, listening intently, his beard and demeanor setting him apart from the rest of the men in the room.</p><p>“We still haven’t finished the first battle,” one of FSA men said, referring to the fight against Assad, “And now this one begins.”</p><p>Mohammad shook their hands warmly afterward, shrugging away their differences.</p><p>Founded during the early days of the U.S.-Iraq war, ISIS is made up of Syrians, Iraqis and jihadis from North Africa, Europe, Chechnya and elsewhere. Mohammad called ISIS brothers, though he’s not a member. He does not have a problem with foreign fighters. The old men from Europe, he said, are tough and able.</p><p>But many Syrians, like <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-24926584">those living in ISIS-run Raqqa</a>, have fled cities and territory occupied by the jihadis, <a href="http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/al-qaedas-governance-strategy-raqqa-chris-looney/">swearing they persecute</a> Christians, Shiites and Alawites, and force their beliefs on people who don’t share them.</p><p>Mohammad admits that ISIS may be too strict. He believes another group, the Syrian-grown, al-Qaeda-aligned Jabhat al-Nusra, has a wiser approach. Their leadership begins in the mosque, he claimed, where they introduce people to their interpretation of religious law. ISIS is more strict, unpredictable — they <a href="https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/nowsyrialatestnews/522064-jihadists-cut-down-150-year-old-oak-in-syria">cut down a 150-year-old oak tree</a> outside a nearby town after accusing locals of worshipping it. But still: they are brothers. They share a common cause.</p><p>Mohammad, Mahmoud and I had lunch on the floor of his apartment, leaning over small bowls of hard boiled eggs, sour cheese, tomatoes and olives. His father asked about my family.</p><p>Mohammad said that he had been waiting for jihadis to come, and when they did he joined them. The group Mohammad says he’s now a part of— Harakat Sham al-Islam— was officially announced shortly before he left Syria for Turkey in September. They’ve coordinated and fought alongside Nusra and ISIS, and are led by former Guantanamo detainee <a href="http://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/587.html">Ibrahim bin Shakaran</a>— a white haired, <a href="http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/exclusive-former-moroccan-ex-guantanamo-detainee-mohammed-mizouz-identified-syria/">34-year-old man from Casablanca</a> who had lived in a terrorist training camp outside Kabul in the months leading up to September, 11 2001. Before coming to Syria, he recruited for al-Qaeda in Morocco.</p><p>Sham al-Islam is best known for <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/26/us-syria-crisis-rebels-idUSBRE97P0FG20130826">kidnapping an Alawite cleric</a> named Badr Ghazal from Latakia last August. They handed him over to Jabhat al-Nusra, who accused him of being pro-regime, then killed him.</p><p>The kidnapping <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/11/world/middleeast/syrian-civilians-bore-brunt-of-rebels-fury-report-says.html?_r=1&amp;">was part of a larger event</a> that rebels— Nusra, Ahrar al-Sham, and others— called Operation Liberation of the Coast. <a href="http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/syria1013_ForUpload.pdf">Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported</a> that Sham al-Islam, along with other groups, abducted Alawite women and children for use in prisoner exchanges, and that hundreds of Alawite citizens <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/02/syria-massacre-reports-alawites-assad">were killed</a>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*s02Us1NLWpqyanZ0i-Riyg.png" /><figcaption>Sham al-Islam leader Ibrahim bin Shakaran. Photo courtesy of YouTube.</figcaption></figure><p>I can’t verify to what extent Mohammad or Sham al-Islam participated in civilian killings. HRW’s investigation mentions several other groups, such as Suquor al-Izz — the the group’s name was tagged on the walls of one home in which nine members of a single family were killed. One video, however, <a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ualQ_3MKJ2Y&amp;t=6m3s">is incriminating</a> to Sham al-Islam: a man with a white beard closely resembling Shakaran can be seen walking an elderly lady that HRW <a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U10D0-wiJ8A&amp;t=2m24s">confirmed was later killed</a>.</p><p>“Alawites are unbelievers,” Mohammad said, but called ethnic cleansing categorically wrong when I pushed the question: “We don’t have a problem with anyone who doesn’t fight us.”</p><p>Mohammad said that, from the beginning of the war, he and his comrades only killed those who had guns. In Latakia, this is not as clean a statement as it sounds. Alawite civilians <a href="http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Syrias-Alawites-go-on-arms-shopping-spree">had been stockpiling weapons since 2011</a>, and many had guns in their homes — some because the war <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/22/syria-sunnis-fear-alawite-ethnic-cleansing">strengthened their sense of community</a> with the regime, but others because they were afraid of becoming rebel targets in what looks, from afar, like a tragic case of self-fulfilling prophecy.</p><p>One aggressive old man, a retired Syrian government employee who hung out near the border gate outside Kilis, gave the closest thing to an explanation of citizen killings: “People make mistakes,” he waved his hand, “Especially in wartime.”</p><p>Sham al-Islam, in the most conservative estimate, kidnapped Badr Ghazal and abducted women and children—at least some of whom have remained unaccounted for since August.</p><p>Accounts of mujahideen treatment of Syria’s civilian population paint a different picture— jihadis, <a href="http://www.amnesty.org.uk/press-releases/syria-prisoners-tortured-and-summarily-killed-secret-isis-detention-centres-new">most often the ISIS</a>, have <a href="http://humanrightsinvestigations.org/2013/05/16/syrian-rebels-public-execute-alawites-in-al-raqqa/">killed many unarmed prisoners on video</a> and in secret. And Nusra publicly <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/25/syria-nusra-chemical-attacks_n_3812732.html">vowed to target Alawite villages</a> in the aftermath of August’s chemical weapons attack in Damascus.</p><p>I asked Mohammad about his conscience, if he regrets anything he did. Does he get nightmares from his time fighting in Syria? He proudly said no. Everything was blessed.</p><p>Disgusted as he is with some of his Shiite countrymen, Mohammad welcomes foreign jihadis to fight in the towns and cities only he and other Syrians know intimately. He is not a proud Syrian, he says. He is a proud Muslim.</p><p>“We don’t believe in Sykes-Picot,” he said, referring to the WWI agreement that <a href="https://www.khanacademy.org/humanities/history/euro-hist/middle-east-20th-century/v/sykes-picot-agreement-and-the-balfour-declaration">decided the international borders</a> of modern Syria, Lebanon, and other nearby countries. There’s a sense of community among Muslims, the <em>ummah</em>, that is more important than borders. This is what the jihadis claim they fight for— the Muslim world, which they’re trying to pull out from under foreign influence.</p><p>“Nothing changed in Tunisia or Egypt,” Mohammad said, “One dictator was replaced with another. It wasn’t an Islamic Sping. It wasn’t what we’re looking for. We want a just, Islamic government.”</p><p>I asked if he and the jihadis would be able to fill the power vacuum in post-Assad Syria, and Mohammad said the fighters cannot do that. The armed groups would need to rely on the religious community, and they will choose a new leader. Look at Somalia or Gaza, he said, where the same people who fight have tried to govern. In Syria it will be different.</p><p>“There are no rules more merciful than those in the Islamic ruling system,” Mohammad said, playfully taunting his daughter. “Islam encourages people to be free.”</p><p>In the state of his imagination there are very few crimes that justify jail time, and even fewer that are punishable by death. He believes that punishments like lashings and lacerations are far more humane than executions or years in prison. They allow people to wake up in the morning in their own bed and not in a cage.</p><p>But would his country tolerate terrorist organizations, people making bombs in their kitchens? He has no idea. Muslim scholars and leaders decide that, not fighters like him.</p><p>And what about the rest of his life? Say he outlives Assad. If a revolution were to begin in Jordan, Mohammad will go and fight there too, to liberate the country until he can travel, back-and-forth, across international borders that he calls fabrication.</p><p>“Jihadis help one another,” he said, explaining that young men who want to do jihad in Syria can find someone online who will help them get to Turkey, where they can catch a bus to the border and step into the war zone. Mohammad said he will manage to make his way to Iraq, Lebanon, Turkey, Egypt, Chechnya or anywhere else that nurtures a homegrown, Islamic movement.</p><p>And about al-Qaeda itself? “There is no difference between us and them,” he said. “Each of us has his own point of view.”</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*AF2kueTQ7-VazTFZ-1bSRQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>And so in the early days of what he believes is an Islamic revolution, after fighting Assad for two years, Mohammad and four others were driving through Latakia’s mountain roads late last summer. They were on their way back from a hospital where a Moroccan mujahideen sought treatment for his hurt shoulder. Mohammad told me how the breaks gave out and the car flew off the edge of the road and flipped twice.</p><p>They found the Moroccan, whom the doctor claimed had only a minor injury, lying motionless ten meters away. Mohammad’s arm was badly broken and, to get the attention of anyone up above them, they fired off a few shots in the evening air.</p><p>Mohammad suffered a painful, incomplete surgery—a doctor placed four rods looking like pistons stick out of a shabby cast. A fifth rod sticks out of the skin of his elbow, which he has to adjust from time to time.</p><p>He admitted that, months after the accident, he still couldn’t sleep without painkillers.</p><p>When asked how long he’ll stay in Turkey, he said he and his family will go back after his surgery. Latakia is the best place for jihad, he said proudly: “To take Damascus, you need the coast.”</p><p>Two days later we sat in his home and had coffee, and I asked where his father was— he had taken the short trip back to Syria, Mohammad said, but would return in a few days. I met his brother, a busy looking man who looked like he belonged in a much larger city.</p><p>I had to catch a bus to Istanbul. We walked through Kilis back towards the bus station, where Mohammad cracked up after confusing the English words <em>fish </em>with <em>finish. </em>We passed by a mosque and saw old men leaned over, putting their shoes back on. Mohammad pointed to his wrist, asking for a moment inside. I waited for him, reviewing the pictures I’d taken in the mosque’s empty courtyard.</p><p>We left, back into the dusty alley, where a man stopped us and, with bright eyes, asked if we were on our way to fight. Mohammad laughed and told him something, I have no idea what. The muezzin began reciting the call to evening prayer over the loud speaker.</p><p>“This sound,” Mohammad said, searching for a word but coming up with nothing, and placed his hand over his heart, “This sound.”</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3d67a7d5e879" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[An ISIS Twitter census shows the group’s scope and changing strategy]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@blakehunsicker/an-isis-twitter-census-shows-the-group-s-scope-and-changing-strategy-bcaacc9e39b6?source=rss-70509f6b9648------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/bcaacc9e39b6</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Blake Hunsicker]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 09 Mar 2015 20:16:51 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-03-09T20:16:51.757Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/816/1*jyi_oHzM_e4elX36ioEIJQ.png" /><figcaption>Courtesy of the Brookings Institute.</figcaption></figure><h4>There could be as many as 90,000 pro-Islamic State accounts</h4><p>The Brookings Institute <a href="http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2015/03/isis-twitter-census-berger-morgan/the-isis-twitter-census-defining-and-describing-the-population-of-isis-supporters-on-twitter.pdf">released a study last week</a> that attempts to make sense of one of Twitter’s loudest and most controversial subcultures: the supporters and members of the Islamic State.</p><p>Their findings, collected over October and November of 2014, show a fairly robust user ship — the average follower and post counts are 1,004 and 2,219. The majority tweet from Syria, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. The report also claims to find some strategy in the user set’s activity — specifically, how users make hashtags trend, and how a tight nit group of accounts releases propaganda.</p><p>Researchers used a number of ways to verify users’ locations. Not surprisingly, only 3% of the user set enabled their phone’s geo-location function, and of those the vast majority were in either Syria or Iraq. Other data, such as the location field in their bio or their time zone, tells a different story: of those who voluntarily indicated their location, the most popular location was Saudi Arabia, followed by Syria, Iraq and the United States.</p><p>Among the timezones users set, two very odd choices popped up — 234 users chose Hawaii, and 180 chose Arizona. Languages were not as surprising: 73% Arabic, 18% English and 6% French.</p><p>Determining gender was nearly impossible, but two telling metrics are the display names and account handles users chose. Looking for gender-specific Arabic words <em>abu </em>(“Father” in Arabic), <em>umm </em>(“Mother”) and <em>bint </em>(“Girl”), researchers were able to find gender-identified profiles among less than 25% of the top 20,000 accounts. 239 accounts used either <em>umm </em>or<em> bint.</em> 4,563 used <em>abu.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/591/1*MEosWC1AidVCGvdKg7q2AQ.png" /><figcaption>2014 was by far the most active year for ISIS twitter.</figcaption></figure><p>Account registration dates illustrate the group’s steep rise to prominence. 2 ISIS-associated accounts were registered in 2008, back when the group was among the many combatants in the Iraq war. In 2009, 98 were created. In 2013, the year the group rebranded itself and entered the Syrian civil war, 4,378 were registered. 2014 was by far the most prolific — 59% of all Islamic State accounts were registered last year, totaling 11,902.</p><p>Twitter, of course, is a chief way ISIS spreads its propaganda. In an effort to stay ahead of Twitter administrators, ISIS has relied on several apps to automate and promote tweets.</p><p>The most popular of these was called “Dawn of Good Tidings.”</p><p>“At its peak, it sent tens of thousands of tweets per day. The app was terminated by Twitter in June 2014, silencing thousands of ISIS-supporting accounts overnight,” the report reads.</p><p>ISIS members use more popular tools that are less likely to be axed by Twitter due to their widespread use. Among these are <a href="https://ifttt.com/">IFTTT</a> — If This, Then That — which allows users to post to multiple sites simultaneously.</p><p>Perhaps the key to ISIS’s online success is thanks to groups of users called the industrious ones, or <em>mujtahidun</em>, who arrange short periods of sprint tweeting that vault specific hashtags into viral phenomenons.</p><p>“Prolonged bursts of activity cause hashtags to trend,” the report reads, “Resulting in third-party aggregation and insertion of tweeted content into search results.”</p><p>How ISIS disseminates information on Twitter has changed according to Twitter policy. The company began aggressively deleting ISIS accounts last summer — ISIS, in turn, strengthened the privacy settings on a limited number of regional accounts, often leaving the default egg avatar in place, and prohibiting all but a small number of followers. When it comes time to send out a video or press release, these discrete, private accounts tweet a link and the rotating cast of <em>mujtahidun </em>accounts sprint tweet them to the world.</p><p>This strategy is the latest in the long history of jihadi online culture. Shiraz Maher, senior fellow at the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation at Kings College London, put ISIS’s networks in historical context for the Guardian last year.</p><p>“The traditional repository of this activity was password-protected forums,” Maher <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/16/terrifying-rise-of-isis-iraq-executions">wrote</a>. “Jihadists and their supporters could be connected in a safe environment to share information and discuss events.”</p><p>With the increasing popularity of Twitter and social networks, Maher wrote, they have lost some control over their narrative, but they’ve gained a far wider audience.</p><p>Thousands of accounts were deleted during the study period, which made finding an estimate on the total number of ISIS accounts nearly impossible.</p><p>“We estimate a hard ceiling for ISIS supporters in the vicinity of 90,000 accounts,” the report reads, though it doubts the real number goes so high. “We could not establish a definitive upper limit.”</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=bcaacc9e39b6" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[ISIS continues its assault on Assyrian villages in hopes of creating a Syria-Mosul corridor]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@blakehunsicker/isis-continues-its-assault-on-assyrian-villages-in-hopes-of-creating-a-syria-mosul-corridor-bb000e4f3053?source=rss-70509f6b9648------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/bb000e4f3053</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[isis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iraq]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[syria]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Blake Hunsicker]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 09 Mar 2015 16:57:31 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-03-12T17:27:27.203Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/964/1*QCe6KTEdyY6LIV7pyrpJpQ.png" /><figcaption>ISIS militants are attempting to overtake Tal Tamr and its bridge, which would create a logistics line to Mosul in Iraq.</figcaption></figure><h3>ISIS continues assault on Assyrian villages in hopes of building a Syria-Mosul corridor</h3><p>Fighting between ISIS and Kurdish-led militias in Syria’s Christian enclave intensified Saturday when, at 2 am, ISIS militants crossed a narrow river and stormed a string of small Kurdish-held villages.</p><p>Street fighting <a href="http://www.aina.org/news/20150307144915.htm">was reported</a> in the villages of Tal Maghas and Tal Nasri, two of dozens of contested Assyrian Christian towns dotting the Khabur river in Syria’s northeastern al-Hasakah province. ISIS shelled several area villages, including Tal Tamr—the county seat and principle reason for the conflict.</p><p>ISIS’s goal is to overtake Tal Tamr’s bridge, which would strengthen its presence in Syria’s northeast and create a logistics line to the northern Iraqi border and, by extension, Mosul. ISIS has held Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city, since last June. The Khabur river fighting appears to be in preparation for the upcoming Iraqi and US-led coalition offensive to retake Mosul from the militants later this Spring.</p><p>A German woman fighting for the Kurdish YPG <a href="http://syriahr.com/en/2015/03/a-female-german-fighter-in-ypg-ranks-killed-in-clashes-in-al-hasakah/">died in the vicinity of Tal Tamr</a> Sunday—Ivana Hoffman, 19, had been in al-Hasakah province for six months, <a href="http://www.bild.de/politik/ausland/isis/erste-deutsche-im-kampf-gegen-die-terrormiliz-getoetet-40074794.bild.html">according to German media</a>. She is the third Westerner to die fighting for the Kurdish YPG. British and Australian volunteers died February 25 and March 4.</p><p>The Assyrian International News Agency (AINA) reported that ISIS has <a href="http://www.aina.org/news/20150307144915.htm">begun sending soldiers and weapons</a> to the Khabur river area from nearby mount Abdul Aziz, where, among the relative isolation, the group has gained a foothold.</p><p>Some of ISIS’s released Assyrian prisoners claim to have been held on mount Abdul Aziz. In an interview with AINA, a local man <a href="http://www.aina.org/news/20150304211011.htm">described his time as a captive</a>.</p><p>On the morning of February 23, ISIS woke up the village of Tal Goran and forced them into a small home for the duration of the morning’s fighting. Afterward, they transported 21 to Abdul Aziz and kept them there overnight. They moved them again in the morning north, toward the Turkish border, where they kept them in some area homes before hiring a driver to deliver them to Hasakah city 5 days later.</p><p>They did not ask for ransom or abuse any of them, the man said.</p><p>“Many bearded people spoke to us, and everyone asked us to convert to Islam,” he told AINA.</p><p>ISIS warned them against returning home.</p><p>“They said that they would release us on condition that we not return to our village. They said if we returned and they captured us again they would kill us without any other option, they would behead the men and enslave the women.”</p><p>Fighting in the area caught the media’s attention after February 23, when ISIS overran dozens of Assyrian villages in a weeklong kidnapping spree that left over 300 people missing. 3,000 civilians fled for nearby Hasakah city and Qamishli. Some even sought safety <a href="http://www.worldmag.com/2015/03/one_family_s_night_flight_from_isis/page1">across the Iraq border</a>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=bb000e4f3053" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Obama’s ISIS war law could make the war on terror more transparent, but only if Congress edits it]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@blakehunsicker/obama-s-isis-war-law-could-make-the-war-on-terror-more-transparent-but-only-if-congress-edits-it-6ede7f86cde9?source=rss-70509f6b9648------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/6ede7f86cde9</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[syria]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[isis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iraq]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Blake Hunsicker]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 04 Mar 2015 19:51:06 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-03-05T16:10:58.587Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Obama’s ISIS war law could make the war on terror more transparent, but only if Congress makes it a priority.</h3><p>The House Armed Services Committee (HASC) has <a href="http://armedservices.house.gov/index.cfm/hearings-display?ContentRecord_id=39513509-1D57-41AB-85B1-D81DEC2E9B51&amp;ContentType_id=14F995B9-DFA5-407A-9D35-56CC7152A7ED&amp;Group_id=64562e79-731a-4ac6-aab0-7bd8d1b7e890">held</a> <a href="http://armedservices.house.gov/index.cfm/hearings-display?ContentRecord_id=D092FFB5-57C3-4D9A-BC88-D08A3B8D93C3">two hearings</a> on President Obama’s ISIS war law draft over the last week. In each, lawmakers explored the draft’s relationship to the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF), the al-Qaeda war law passed a week after the attacks of September 11. At 3 pages, Obama’s draft is longer than the notoriously short <a href="http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-107publ40/html/PLAW-107publ40.htm">2001 AUMF</a>, and is partly branded as an improvement — the would-be successor to the Bush-era war authorizations that sent troops to Afghanistan, Iraq, and launched the drone programs in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia.</p><p>US CENTOM Commander Gen. Lloyd Austin defended the draft in front of House lawmakers yesterday, saying he believes the United States can defeat the Islamic State without the use of US ground forces, and that the operation is working so far.</p><p>“You go back several months ago—ISIL was moving around in large convoy formations, flying a lot of black flags, taking up large swaths of territory. They can no longer do that,” Gen. Austin <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W-19Hhj65y8&amp;feature=youtu.be&amp;t=2h29m55s">said</a>.</p><p><a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/aumf_02112015.pdf">Obama’s draft</a>, sent as an opening bid to Congress on Feb. 11, would make the war legal for 3 years, prohibit US ground forces, and require a Congressional review every 6 months. Broadly, it would authorize military actions against ISIS members and their “associated forces,” a term borrowed from the 2001 AUMF.</p><p>At yesterday’s hearing, lawmakers asked Gen. Austin how he would use Obama’s draft to find success where more flexible laws, such as the 2001 and 2002 AUMFs, have failed.</p><p>“We certainly have learned some lessons,” Gen. Austin <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W-19Hhj65y8&amp;feature=youtu.be&amp;t=3h21m33s">said</a>.</p><p>He and Senate Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Christine Wormuth claimed the US would succeed this time by playing a more supplementary role in the fight against ISIS, advising the Iraqi security forces rather than running the show.</p><p>“At the end of the day, this has to be done by the Iraqis,” Gen. Austin <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W-19Hhj65y8&amp;feature=youtu.be&amp;t=2h47m54s">told the committee</a>.</p><p>Many in the hearing raised the question of Iranian militias, and asking how growing Iranian influence in the Iraqi security forces and the Baghdad government will interfere with US advisors’ work on the ground. Several asked about the joint Iraqi-Iranian effort to retake Tikrit, which <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/03/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-idUSKBN0LZ10Q20150303">launched Monday</a> without any US involvement.</p><p>“We do not coordinate with the Iranians, there is no communication,” Gen. Austin <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W-19Hhj65y8&amp;feature=youtu.be&amp;t=2h57m44s">said</a> before claiming he knew of the Tikrit plan.</p><p>“The activity in Tikrit was no surprise,” he said. “It was a logical progression of what they had been doing in the east of the country.”</p><p>Both Wormuth and Gen. Austin acknowledged that, despite the ISIS AUMF’s 3 year sunset, the fight against ISIS may take much longer.</p><p>“It’s just the recognition that the Executive branch and Legislative branch may well want to revisit the authorization at that time,” Wormuth <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W-19Hhj65y8&amp;feature=youtu.be&amp;t=2h52m01s">said</a>. “We think the campaign could well go on longer.”</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/640/1*V8tfHXw1WA34EKoGNNeJjQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Courtesy of <a href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/soldiersmediacenter/7930040580">the U.S. Army Flickr account</a></figcaption></figure><p>At last Thursday’s <a href="http://armedservices.house.gov/index.cfm/hearings-display?ContentRecord_id=39513509-1D57-41AB-85B1-D81DEC2E9B51&amp;ContentType_id=14F995B9-DFA5-407A-9D35-56CC7152A7ED&amp;Group_id=64562e79-731a-4ac6-aab0-7bd8d1b7e890">hearing</a>, the HASC explored the legal consequences written into the ISIS AUMF draft.</p><p>Lawfare writer Benjamin Wittes told lawmakers that, contrary to criticism that Obama’s law is too limited, the draft’s ambiguous language would allow the President to rely on other laws, like the 2001 AUMF, to skirt restrictions written into his ISIS AUMF.</p><p>“Despite the appearance of accepting restraint, the document contains virtually no meaningful restraints at all,” Wittes <a href="http://youtu.be/FQd4w68QM_c?t=32m7s">said</a>.</p><p>This is due to the ambiguous relationship between Obama’s draft and the 2001 AUMF, which could allow the President to use the ISIS AUMF as a complement to the expansive, open-ended 2001 AUMF, rather than as a replacement bill.</p><p>“The president would have all the authority he has today, including all the authority to fight ISIL under the 2001 AUMF. And in addition to that, he would also be granted three years of even broader authority to target ISIL and its associated forces,” Wittes <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FQd4w68QM_c&amp;feature=youtu.be&amp;t=33m21s">said</a>.</p><p>Wittes and his colleagues were <a href="http://www.lawfareblog.com/2014/11/a-draft-aumf-to-get-the-discussion-going/">among the first to draft an ISIS AUMF</a> after the US coalition began its campaign against the Islamic State. In it, they repeal the 2001 and 2002 AUMFs, and consolidate the 2001 AUMF’s authority to pursue al-Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban into a new, pan-intervention AUMF— thereby authorizing continued force against militant groups while still restricting ground forces and instilling a 3 year sunset.</p><p>Committee members also <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FQd4w68QM_c&amp;feature=youtu.be&amp;t=59m37s">asked about the 6-month review cycle</a> Obama’s ISIS AUMF suggests. Wittes recalled that, acting under authority of the 2001 AUMF, neither the Bush nor the Obama administrations ever released a list of the “associated forces” they’ve targeted outside Afghanistan, which include members of al-Shabaab in Somalia and AQAP in Yemen.</p><p>“I think this is kind of a mind boggling thing,” he said.</p><p>Wittes’s AUMF shortens the 6 month review schedule to 3 months, and specifies what information the President should include — specifically, the names of associated forces, the reason for their being targeted, and the location where operations against them took place.</p><p>Whether or not Congress insists the ISIS AUMF include these suggestions, it is an opportunity to consider what aspects of the wider war on terror should be divulged publicly.</p><p>“Once you decide who is an associated force, who gets to know that?” <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FQd4w68QM_c&amp;feature=youtu.be&amp;t=01h02m23s">Wittes asked</a>.</p><p>Others, like ASC chairman Mac Thornberry, argued that the liquid nature of extremist and other non-state groups requires the authorization to be flexible.</p><p>“Defining the enemy is difficult, especially as they adapt and form new allegiances and seek to manipulate our system,” <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FQd4w68QM_c&amp;feature=youtu.be&amp;t=7m45s">he said</a>.</p><p>Thornberry called into question the restriction on ground troops— the Kurdish forces, Syrian rebel groups, Iraqi military and Shiite militias aren’t homogenous, he said, and there may very well be situations in which a US-led ground force is necessary.</p><p>“Going into battle with a lawyer nearby to decide whether a particular action is enduring, of offensive, or a ground combat operations seems problematic.”</p><p>In yesterday’s hearing, Gen. Austin remained adamant that he did not need sustaining, offensive US ground forces to complete his mission against ISIS. The 3,100 ground troops in Iraq, stationed as advisors, could be used for various reasons, the qualifications of which he agreed to submit on a case-by-case basis.</p><p>When asked what he wanted for himself in the ISIS AUMF, Gen. Austin made a single statement.</p><p>“Policy-wise, as much flexibility as you can give us as you consider the legislation going forward,” he <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W-19Hhj65y8&amp;feature=youtu.be&amp;t=2h48m35s">said</a>. “I think flexibility in combating an enemy like this is absolutely essential.”</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=6ede7f86cde9" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Primer on the Assyrians under ISIS attack]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@blakehunsicker/primer-on-the-assyrians-under-isis-attack-67d9086a3979?source=rss-70509f6b9648------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/67d9086a3979</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[isis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iraq]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[syria]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Blake Hunsicker]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 27 Feb 2015 15:32:21 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-02-27T16:15:30.986Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/770/1*m0YraL5Ownn9BSqfPW0PeA.png" /></figure><p>It began Monday at 5 am. On the banks of a Euphrates river tributary, ISIS militants overran village after village, kidnapping families before disappearing into the clear morning air. Where they’ve gone remains a mystery — some say they <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-31601451">separated the men</a>, taking them to a nearby mountain. Others say they were <a href="http://aranews.net/2015/02/isis-transfers-assyrian-hostages-to-raqqa/">moved to Raqqa</a>, just over 100 miles away. The abductions were the boiling point after weeks of harassment and negotiations between the militant group and locals, played out in villages across one of Syria’s most ethnically diverse and strategically important areas.</p><p>The day before, Kurds and Christian militias, aided by US air support, <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/22/us-mideast-crisis-syria-iraq-idUSKBN0LQ0RG20150222">fought their way</a> within a few miles of Tal Tamr village, ISIS’s current stronghold in western al-Hasakah province. Nearby Christian villages dot the Khabur river, which runs from Hasakah city to the Turkish border. Many village names feature the word <em>Tal</em>, meaning <em>hill</em> in Arabic— the area, so near the Iraq border, is dusty and occasionally crowded with thick green vegetation.</p><p>Weeks earlier, ISIS approached villagers in much the same way they dealt with Christians in Mosul, Iraq last summer— they were told to <a href="http://www.aina.org/news/20150203164724.htm">remove crosses from local churches and pay <em>jizya</em></a>, or a Christian-only tax. Assyrian Christians, an ethnic group stretching across the corners joining Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran, number about 40,000 in Syria. UNESCO classifies their traditional Suret language, a neo-Aramaic derived from the time of Christ, as “<a href="http://www.unesco.org/languages-atlas/index.php?hl=en&amp;page=atlasmap">definitely endangered</a>,” meaning the latest generation of children may not learn it.</p><p>ISIS’s early harassment led some to leave the area for nearby Hasakah city, but the true swell began Monday— some <a href="http://www.aina.org/news/20150223174904.htm">3,000 residents have fled</a> since kidnappings began, <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/27/world/middleeast/more-assyrian-christians-captured-as-isis-attacks-villages-in-syria.html">leaving up to 30 villages empty</a>. The number of abductions have risen as well, from around 50 at first count to over 300 Thursday afternoon. The area has seen sustained fighting between ISIS and the Kurdish YPG and Syriac Military Council— heavy shelling was reported near Tal Tamr, and US CENTCOM has announced daily airstrikes.</p><p>Family members and friends far away have struggled to account for those who haven’t answered their phones calls. In worse cases, ISIS members <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-31601451">have answered stolen phones themselves</a>.</p><p>The crisis resembles <a href="http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2014/06/10/320613630/insurgent-group-claims-large-part-of-iraqs-second-largest-city">the fall of Mosul</a> last summer, where Assyrians and other Christians <a href="http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/07/22/isis-robs-christians-fleeing-its-edict-in-mosul-convert-leave-or-die.html">fled the city</a> after ISIS took control. They too were told to pay a tax, and in some cases were told to convert or leave.</p><p>“They said we have conditions: either you comply with them or you leave. So we left,” Bashar Nasih Behnam, a Mosul resident who fled last summer, <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/24/iraqi-christians-mosul-isis-convert-islam-or-be-executed">told the Guardian</a>.</p><p>The Iraqi city, still under ISIS control and reportedly the soon-to-be target of a coalition offensive <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/us-and-iraq-prepare-offensive-to-retake-mosul-1421949677">later this spring</a>, also made news today when ISIS-aligned social media accounts posted a video of militants <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/26/isis-fighters-destroy-ancient-artefacts-mosul-museum-iraq">destroying ancient Assyrian and Akkadian artifacts</a> in the Mosul’s central museum.</p><p>Since summer, some of Mosul’s Christians have found relative peace in Jordan. Around 4,000 now <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/27/world/middleeast/for-mosuls-christians-a-shelter-in-jordan.html">live in shelters and churches</a> across Amman, where the government agreed to expedite refugee applications to displaced Mosul residents.</p><p>The fate of many of eastern Hasakah’s Assyrian Christians, however— many of whom are either missing, seeking shelter in nearby cities, or lost in ISIS custody— remains terrifyingly unclear.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=67d9086a3979" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[river.syriaFAQ.com: get the full story, then watch it disappear]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@blakehunsicker/river-syriafaq-com-get-the-full-story-then-watch-it-disappear-3cb5e01eff1c?source=rss-70509f6b9648------2</link>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Blake Hunsicker]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 02 Oct 2014 17:46:26 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-02-27T15:44:20.736Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/640/1*MGBHwCCm8x0n6-2QEdtACQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Image courtesy of Flickr user <a href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/12656278@N02/5860905589/in/set-72157626790834421"><strong>Aleazzo</strong></a>.</figcaption></figure><p>Last week I made a list of news sites that cover Syria and Iraq. Many are familiar: the Wall Street Journal, Guardian and BBC are there. Some, like <a href="https://bellingcat.com/"><strong><em>Bellingcat</em></strong></a>, <a href="http://vox.com/"><strong><em>Vox</em></strong></a> and <a href="http://justsecurity.org/"><strong><em>Just Security</em></strong></a><strong><em>, </em></strong>are less than a year old. The list includes orgs based in Syria and the region (<a href="http://www.naharnet.com/"><strong><em>Naharnet</em></strong></a>, <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/home.html"><strong><em>Al-Monitor</em></strong></a>, <a href="http://english.alarabiya.net/"><strong><em>Al Arabiya</em></strong></a>, <a href="http://rudaw.net/english"><strong><em>Rudaw</em></strong></a>, <a href="http://www.sana.sy/en/"><strong><em>SANA</em></strong></a>, etc.), and some aren’t traditional press at all: there are <a href="http://reddit.com/r/SyrianCivilWar/"><strong><em>two</em></strong></a><strong><em> </em></strong><a href="http://reddit.com/r/LevantineWar"><strong><em>subreddits</em></strong></a>, <a href="http://www.centcom.mil/"><strong><em>U.S. CentCom</em></strong></a>, <a href="http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e486a76&amp;submit=GO"><strong><em>UNHCR</em></strong></a><strong><em> </em></strong>and the <a href="http://www.un.org/News/"><strong><em>U.N. News Centre</em></strong></a>.</p><p>I took rss feeds from the above mentioned sites (plus about seventy others) and, using Dave Winer’s <a href="http://river4.smallpict.com/2014/06/04/welcomeToRiver4.html"><strong><em>River4 software</em></strong></a>, built river.syriaFAQ.com: a live, flowing news feed that shows the latest published Syria/Iraq news, refreshed every five minutes.</p><p>It’s always humming in the background, but sometimes it hums very quietly: in the morning here in New York it explodes, in the evening there’s a lull. It reflects the workflow of organizations it monitors, but it also reflects the nature of longterm, unfolding news events: you can jump in the river at any time, see the latest and, if you stay long enough, watch what was important an hour ago fade away as new issues present themselves.</p><p>A good Twitter list could basically do what this does. But some great articles, despite the fact that they’re posted publicly, get missed one way or another. <a href="http://river.syriafaq.com/"><strong><em>river.syriaFAQ.com</em></strong></a><strong><em> </em></strong>captures all of them and presents them in an untouched, unmonitored list. You can explore the river knowing everything is there.</p><p>Last point: if I missed something, feel free to email me and I’ll add it to the list. Hoping to figure out how to include Facebook posts to the list, because I know some on-the-ground sources in Syria post to Facebook first. It will be great to include those.</p><p>Please feel free to email me: blakehunsicker [at] gmail [dot] com.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3cb5e01eff1c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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