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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by mena arena on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by mena arena on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@blog-menaarena?source=rss-1875d97d4aa6------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by mena arena on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@blog-menaarena?source=rss-1875d97d4aa6------2</link>
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        <lastBuildDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 08:16:39 GMT</lastBuildDate>
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            <title><![CDATA[Egypt's Mubarak-Era feud over abu ghazala returns as a warning about generals and presidents]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@blog-menaarena/egypts-mubarak-era-feud-over-abu-ghazala-returns-as-a-warning-about-generals-and-presidents-775a122b7236?source=rss-1875d97d4aa6------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/775a122b7236</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[sudan]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[yemen]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[egypt]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[red-sea]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[civil-military-relations]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[mena arena]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 19 Nov 2026 12:25:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-19T12:25:01.312Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*YqczRjwtURsBVROEpEMhkA.jpeg" /></figure><p>A Cairo-linked outlet revived the 1989 ouster of Field Marshal Abdel Halim Abu Ghazala, the defense minister who polled as Egypt&#39;s second most popular figure and was removed after a dispute over U.S. arms.</p><p>On a Wednesday evening, a Cairo-based account called Maydan Global posted an essay by Reda Fahmy, head of the political bureau of the MaydanEG25 movement. The subject was a 37-year-old personnel decision. The essay asked what happens when a competent officer becomes a threat to the man above him. It named Field Marshal Abdel Halim Abu Ghazala, Egypt&#39;s defense minister from 1981 to 1989, and President Hosni Mubarak, who fired him.</p><p>That a movement with no love for the old regime is now dissecting Mubarak&#39;s fear of his own defense minister tells you something about the region&#39;s current mood. Across MENA, the fight for leadership is being waged inside ruling camps as much as between countries. The proxy wars in Yemen, Sudan, Libya, and the Red Sea are the visible bouts. The internal ones decide who steps into the ring at all.</p><h4>The Abu Ghazala case, briefly</h4><p>Abu Ghazala ran Egypt&#39;s military for most of the 1980s. He was popular in Washington, pushed for better equipment, and by 1989 had a public profile that rivaled Mubarak&#39;s. In April 1989, Mubarak removed him. The trigger was a dispute over a U.S. arms package and Abu Ghazala&#39;s independent dealings with the Americans, according to contemporary reporting by the Associated Press and the New York Times. He was later appointed assistant to the president, a title with no portfolio.</p><p>The essay&#39;s argument, as Fahmy frames it, is that Mubarak&#39;s calculation of staying in power outweighed the state&#39;s interest in keeping a capable officer. Whether or not you buy that framing, the episode is a clean example of a pattern: the man in charge treats a strong subordinate as a bigger threat than an external rival. It&#39;s a story with a long half-life. Egyptian commentators still argue about it.</p><h4>Not just Egypt</h4><p>The same logic is playing out in Sudan, where the rivalry between General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and RSF commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemeti, split the country&#39;s security forces in April 2023. Before they fought each other, they were supposed to share power under a framework agreement. The fight over who would command what, and when the RSF would be integrated, broke it. The war has killed tens of thousands and displaced more than 11 million people, according to UN figures from 2024 and 2025.</p><p>The online argument this week between Sudanese commentators about the RSF&#39;s internal tribal dynamics and the Dagalo family&#39;s own rivalries makes the same point from below. The fight isn&#39;t only Burhan versus Hemeti. It&#39;s also about who inside the RSF can hold the family together.</p><p>In Yemen, the Houthis have spent a decade consolidating control over tribes that never fully signed up. Al-Estiklal English published a piece this week on the group&#39;s school curricula and mobilization courses, arguing that imposing a single loyalty over tribal and national identities has fed resentment. The Houthis&#39; external fight with Saudi Arabia and the UAE gets the headlines. Their internal fight with the tribes they rule is the one that determines whether they hold Sanaa in five years.</p><h4>The Red Sea as the main card</h4><p>The external version of the same contest has a geography. The Bab al-Mandeb strait, 26 kilometers wide at its narrowest, carries roughly 12 percent of global trade and was the route for about 8.8 million barrels a day of oil and refined products before the Houthi attacks began in late 2023. A policy brief published this week by the Middle East Institute Switzerland, written by Federico Donelli, argues that the Red Sea has become a space of proxy governance rather than a space of state control.</p><p>That&#39;s the right way to see it. The UAE backs forces on the Yemeni coast and runs the port of Berbera in Somaliland. Saudi Arabia backs the internationally recognized government and hosts talks. Egypt depends on Suez Canal revenue, which fell by more than half in 2024 as shipping rerouted around the Cape. Turkey has built drones and training ties with Sudan&#39;s army. Iran arms the Houthis. Nobody wants a direct fight. Everyone wants a client who wins.</p><h4>Why this matters now</h4><p>The region&#39;s leaders are being squeezed from two directions at once. Externally, they&#39;re in a multi-sided contest with no referee. Internally, the officer or the son or the intelligence chief who is competent enough to be useful is also competent enough to be feared.</p><p>Mubarak&#39;s decision in 1989 removed a capable general and kept the president in place for another 22 years. It did not save the state from 2011. That&#39;s the lesson the Maydan essay is circling, and the reason it&#39;s getting traction now. The men who worry most about their own officers tend to be the ones with the most to lose.</p><p>In a region where the big fights are proxy fights, the smaller internal ones set the odds.</p><p>---</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=775a122b7236" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Iraq's armed factions turn on each other as al-Zaidi tests state control of weapons]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@blog-menaarena/iraqs-armed-factions-turn-on-each-other-as-al-zaidi-tests-state-control-of-weapons-35e18ef5b45a?source=rss-1875d97d4aa6------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/35e18ef5b45a</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[mena arena]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 12 Nov 2026 08:34:19 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-12T08:34:19.847Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*spPFcalL5P4B4yRKtSzLRg.jpeg" /></figure><p>A government source says Asaib Ahl al-Haq is pushing Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi to confront Kataib Hezbollah, exposing a fight inside the same political system that built both groups.</p><p>On 26 January 2025, Iraqi lawmakers passed a three-year deadline for armed factions to hand their weapons to the state. The vote was 178 in favour in a 329-seat parliament. Ali al-Zaidi, then a compromise candidate for prime minister, sold the law as the beginning of the end of the &quot;militia era.&quot; Nearly two years on, the deadline is close, and the fight over what it actually means has moved from parliament to the streets of Baghdad and the corridors of the armed factions themselves.</p><h4>The rivalry inside the room</h4><p>Alaa Sattar reported this week that Asaib Ahl al-Haq, one of the largest factions within the Popular Mobilisation Forces, is pushing al-Zaidi to confront Kataib Hezbollah. A government source confirmed this directly to him. The two groups are not enemies in the usual sense. Both are Shia armed factions with deep ties to Iran. Both have seats in parliament through allied blocs. Both have men on the state payroll through the PMF, which was formally folded into the armed forces in 2016.</p><p>The contest is about who controls the state&#39;s new weapons regime. If Kataib Hezbollah is made an example, Asaib Ahl al-Haq gains relative standing inside the system. If Kataib Hezbollah resists and survives, the deadline is exposed as theatre.</p><p>The fight is visible. Bloggers and supporters linked to both sides have clashed openly on social media and in messaging groups, according to Sattar&#39;s reporting. This is not a quiet disagreement between two offices. It&#39;s a public contest fought in front of the same constituency.</p><h4>Two decades of being underestimated</h4><p>The Houthis are the reference case for what happens when rivals miscalculate. Mohammed Al-Qadhi, writing for New Lines this week, traced their rise from the Saada war in 2004 through their seizure of Sanaa in 2014. His argument is blunt: the Houthis were underestimated for twenty years. Local rivals were divided, inefficient and lacked coherent strategy. Iran&#39;s support helped. So did the strategic myopia of everyone else, local, regional and international.</p><p>That lesson hangs over Baghdad. Iraq&#39;s factions know how the Houthis got to Sanaa. They know what happens when a well-organised armed group faces a state that cannot coordinate its own security forces.</p><p>Yemen shows the failure mode in real time. Fathi bin Lazraq, editor of Aden Al-Ghad, wrote this week that government-aligned forces in Al-Subaiha in Lahj governorate substantially outnumber and outgun the attacking Houthis. They remain divided among the Southern Giants Brigades, the National Shield Forces, the National Resistance Forces, Salafi formations and volunteer brigades, each under separate command. The Houthis concentrate fighters against isolated positions. Nearby government units sit still because they have no orders to intervene. Bin Lazraq compared it to the collapse at Mocha and contrasted it with Taiz, where a unified operations room worked.</p><h4>Every patron pays</h4><p>The regional picture is not a single contest. It&#39;s several running at once, and every patron is absorbing costs.</p><p>Iran built the deepest proxy network across Iraq, Syria, Yemen and Lebanon after those states collapsed or fractured. That network has been degraded by Israeli military action in Lebanon and Syria. Turkey moved into the vacuum left by Assad&#39;s fall in December 2024 and now has real influence in Damascus. The Gulf states gained diplomatic weight as traditional Arab powers weakened, but they are now paying directly for the disorder they gained from.</p><p>Sudan shows how these theatres link. The SAF, backed primarily by Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey, faces the RSF, which the UAE is accused of supporting. Abu Dhabi denies it. Ethiopia is accused of facilitating RSF logistics. Eritrea has leaned toward the SAF. The Bab el-Mandeb chokepoint ties the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden, and the war in Sudan sits at the centre of both.</p><p>In the Maghreb, Morocco and Algeria continue their contest over Western Sahara, which pulls in the wider region. In the Horn, Somalia and Somaliland are locked in a diplomatic fight that has drawn in Ethiopia, Turkey, Israel and Saudi Arabia, as Geeska noted this week.</p><h4>The test in Baghdad</h4><p>The Iraqi deadline is the most concrete test of whether a state can actually claw back weapons from groups that sit inside its own system. Al-Zaidi&#39;s problem is not that the factions are outside the state. It&#39;s that they are inside it. Confronting Kataib Hezbollah means confronting a group with parliamentary allies, state salaries and its own constituency. Asaib Ahl al-Haq knows this. That&#39;s why it is pushing.</p><p>If the deadline passes without enforcement, the law becomes a press release. If al-Zaidi moves against one faction while leaving others intact, he will have picked a winner rather than built a state. Either way, the outcome will be decided in Baghdad, not in Tehran or Washington. The trend lines on X this week point the same direction: the internal rivalries are the story now, and the outside patrons are watching their own investments get tested by people they don&#39;t fully control.</p><p>---</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=35e18ef5b45a" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Turkey and israel's fight for regional leadership moves into the caucasus]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@blog-menaarena/turkey-and-israels-fight-for-regional-leadership-moves-into-the-caucasus-bb57ed2976b7?source=rss-1875d97d4aa6------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/bb57ed2976b7</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[azerbaijan]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[turkey]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[regional-rivalries]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[syria]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[israel]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[mena arena]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 31 Oct 2026 13:11:14 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-31T13:11:14.377Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*wmXtT6Qp3OV4Ry20n8_eSw.jpeg" /></figure><p>With Iran&#39;s proxies degraded, Ankara and Jerusalem are competing for influence across Syria, Azerbaijan, and Central Asia — and the scoreboard is measured in gas pipelines and drone sales.</p><p>In October 2026, a shipment of Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones landed in a Caspian port. Within days, Israeli-made loitering munitions were reported at a base in the same region. Nobody fired a shot. That&#39;s the point. The fight for Middle East leadership has moved off the battlefield and into the supply chain.</p><h4>The post-Iran vacuum</h4><p>For two decades, the region&#39;s power map had a fixed center of gravity: Iran. Its network of proxies — Hezbollah, the Houthis, Iraqi militias — set the terms of every contest from Beirut to Sanaa. That network has been degraded. Hezbollah&#39;s command structure was gutted in 2024. The Houthis still hold Sanaa but are pinned down by airstrikes and a collapsing economy. Tehran&#39;s regional reach is the weakest it&#39;s been since 2003.</p><p>Nature abhors a vacuum, and so does the Middle East. Two states have moved to fill it: Turkey and Israel. Analyst Gokul Sahni framed it plainly on X in late October: &quot;At the heart of the struggle is the Turkey–Israel rivalry for regional leadership in the wake of the Iran war.&quot; He added that the contest &quot;will be shaped not only by the Middle East&#39;s principal players, but also by countries on its periphery, particularly in the South Caucasus and Central Asia.&quot;</p><p>That&#39;s the new ring. Not Gaza, not the Golan. The Caucasus.</p><h4>Azerbaijan is the swing state</h4><p>Here&#39;s the concrete part. Turkey and Azerbaijan share the slogan &quot;one nation, two states,&quot; and it isn&#39;t just rhetoric. Azerbaijan won the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war with Turkish drones, Turkish training, and Turkish diplomatic cover. Turkey is Azerbaijan&#39;s second-largest trading partner after Italy, with bilateral trade running around $7 billion a year. The Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline carries roughly 1.2 million barrels a day of Azeri oil to the Mediterranean, bypassing both Russia and Iran. Ankara sits astride that artery.</p><p>Israel has its own foothold. Baku and Jerusalem have traded quietly for decades — Israeli defense tech in exchange for Azeri oil, plus intelligence cooperation. Azerbaijan supplies a meaningful share of Israel&#39;s crude imports. It&#39;s a relationship built on mutual usefulness rather than affection. And it&#39;s now under pressure. The more Azerbaijan leans on Turkish drones and Turkish diplomacy, the more it has to calculate what an open Turkey–Israel rupture would cost.</p><p>Watch the arms contracts. That&#39;s where the rivalry gets priced.</p><h4>Syria is the live front</h4><p>Syria is where the two actually collide. After Assad fell in December 2024, Turkey emerged as the dominant external power in Damascus. Ankara trains and funds the new army. Turkish construction firms are rebuilding the north. Israeli forces, meanwhile, expanded their buffer zone on the Syrian side of Mount Hermon and have struck Syrian military sites repeatedly, insisting they won&#39;t tolerate a hostile force on the Golan frontier.</p><p>Turkish officials have called the Israeli strikes destabilizing. Israeli officials have called Turkish influence in Syria a long-term threat. Neither is wrong about the other. This is a classic zero-sum setup: every Turkish-trained brigade in southern Syria is a brigade Jerusalem didn&#39;t vet.</p><p>The proxy competition here isn&#39;t the old kind — no rival militias shelling each other&#39;s checkpoints. It&#39;s a competition over institutions. Who trains the police? Who writes the curriculum? Who builds the airport? Turkey is winning that competition because it showed up first with money and manpower.</p><h4>The Gulf watches and hedges</h4><p>The Gulf states are not neutral spectators. They&#39;re betting on both horses and hoping the race runs long.</p><p>Saudi Arabia has spent the past two years repairing ties with both Ankara and Jerusalem. Riyadh needs Turkish drone technology and Turkish construction capacity for its Vision 2030 megaprojects. It also needs its Abraham Accords track with Israel to stay alive, however quietly. The Saudi calculus is simple: a Turkey–Israel rivalry keeps both parties bidding for Saudi favor, which is leverage. A Turkey–Israel war would force Riyadh to choose, which is a nightmare.</p><p>The smaller Gulf states have their own math. Commentator Ali Shihabi argued on X in January that the GCC has a &quot;structural imbalance between one very large state — Saudi Arabia — and a number of much smaller ones,&quot; and that smaller states &quot;periodically adopt contrarian political positions to signal independence.&quot; Read that through the Turkey–Israel lens and it&#39;s a warning: Abu Dhabi, Doha, and Manama will each cut their own deals with Ankara and Jerusalem, and the Kingdom won&#39;t always like the terms.</p><p>Qatar already hosts a major Turkish military base. The UAE has deep Israeli ties through the Abraham Accords and a shared hostility to political Islam. Those two positions can coexist in peacetime. They get expensive in a crisis.</p><h4>What to watch</h4><p>Three measurable things will tell you which way this goes.</p><p>First, Turkish defense exports. Turkey&#39;s arms sales hit a record $7.1 billion in 2024, according to the country&#39;s defense industry agency — up from $5.5 billion in 2023. If that number keeps climbing with Caspian and Central Asian buyers, Ankara&#39;s position strengthens. If it stalls, so does the pitch.</p><p>Second, Israeli–Azerbaijani defense deals. If Baku starts replacing Israeli systems with Turkish ones, Jerusalem loses its northern foothold. If it doesn&#39;t, Turkey&#39;s &quot;one nation&quot; claim has a ceiling.</p><p>Third, the Syrian reconstruction contracts. Whoever wins the big infrastructure tenders in Damascus owns the next decade of Syrian politics.</p><p>The old Middle East was a battlefield. The new one is an auction. Turkey arrived first with drones and concrete. Israel arrived with technology and intelligence. Iran, the previous auctioneer, is out of the room. What&#39;s left is a bidding war where the price is measured in influence, and the buyers — from Baku to Riyadh — are learning to play both sellers against each other.</p><p>That&#39;s not chaos. That&#39;s a market. And in this market, everyone&#39;s a little bit of a proxy, whether they admit it or not.</p><p>---</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=bb57ed2976b7" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Oman's quiet mediation role faces its hardest test yet]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@blog-menaarena/omans-quiet-mediation-role-faces-its-hardest-test-yet-f09ff29b37cc?source=rss-1875d97d4aa6------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f09ff29b37cc</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[gulf-cooperation-council]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[oman]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[yemen]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[middle-east-diplomacy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iran]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[mena arena]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 22 Oct 2026 14:30:02 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-22T14:30:02.087Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*bR1AbUIbMftjEFeeyfzZQQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>With 47 years of back-channel diplomacy and just 5 million citizens, Muscat is now squeezed between Riyadh, Tehran and Washington as the Yemen war grinds into a second decade.</p><h4>A funeral in Muscat, a message from three capitals</h4><p>In January 2020, when Qasem Soleimani was killed outside Baghdad airport, the first foreign minister to publicly call for calm wasn&#39;t from Baghdad, Ankara or Doha. It was Yusuf bin Alawi, then Oman&#39;s foreign minister, who told the state news agency that Muscat was &quot;in contact with all parties.&quot; Three days later, Omani officials were shuttling between Tehran and Riyadh trying to keep the Iraqi parliament from expelling U.S. troops. That shuttle diplomacy is the Oman playbook — quiet, unglamorous, and now under pressure from every direction.</p><p>Oman has about 5 million citizens, an army of roughly 40,000, and no proxy militias abroad. It has spent the last four decades as the region&#39;s designated back channel. Omani diplomats hosted the secret U.S.–Iran talks in 2012 and 2013 that led to the 2015 nuclear deal. Muscat kept its embassy in Tehran open when the rest of the Gulf pulled out. It stayed neutral in the Qatar blockade of 2017–2021 while Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt imposed it.</p><p>That neutrality is now being tested on three fronts at once — Yemen, Iran, and Gaza.</p><h4>Yemen&#39;s northern border is Muscat&#39;s problem now</h4><p>The Sana&#39;a Center&#39;s recent thread on Saudi strategy in Yemen listed what it called &quot;a lack of clear strategic vision, excessive centralization and slow decision-making&quot; in Riyadh&#39;s approach. That&#39;s a polite way of saying the war is in its eleventh year and no one has a clean exit. Saudi Arabia has reportedly spent well over $100 billion on the Yemen campaign since 2015. The Houthis still control Sana&#39;a and most of the northern highlands.</p><p>Oman shares a 288-kilometre border with Yemen. It is the only GCC state that talks to the Houthis directly and openly. Omani officials have hosted Houthi delegations in Muscat for years, including during the failed 2016 peace talks and the 2023 prisoner-exchange negotiations that freed hundreds of detainees. When the Houthis began attacking Red Sea shipping in late 2023, Muscat refused to join the U.S.-led Operation Prosperity Guardian coalition while simultaneously urging the Houthis to stop.</p><p>That balancing act is getting harder. Gulf Research&#39;s recent threads and analysts like Ali Shihabi have argued that Saudi Arabia expects smaller GCC states to fall in line, not to freelance. Shihabi&#39;s January post on X described smaller Gulf states operating &quot;under the illusion that they are equal partners of the Kingdom.&quot; It&#39;s not subtle. If Riyadh reads Omani mediation as a way of buying the Houthis legitimacy without Saudi consent, Muscat&#39;s neutrality becomes a liability.</p><h4>Iran and Israel both want a verdict from Muscat</h4><p>The Iran file is the sharper edge. Oman was the only GCC state to publicly mourn Raisi&#39;s helicopter crash in May 2024 with a formal statement of condolence. When Israel and Iran exchanged direct missile fire in April and October 2024, Muscat called for restraint — and was ignored by everyone.</p><p>The problem is structural. As analyst Hussein Aboubakr Mansour has pointed out in recent commentary, Saudi and Israeli interests increasingly collide over what a post-war Iran and Syria should look like. Riyadh wants a weak but intact Iran and a consolidated Sunni-led Syria. Israel&#39;s doctrine, per Mansour, leans toward regime change and preventing Sunni consolidation. Oman sits in the middle of that argument, and it has no army to back its preferences.</p><p>Muscat&#39;s traditional hedge — being everyone&#39;s phone call — depends on being useful to both sides. If Washington and Riyadh decide Oman is too close to Tehran, the phone stops ringing. If Tehran decides Oman is passing messages to the Israelis, the same thing happens.</p><h4>The Gaza back channel nobody talks about</h4><p>Oman doesn&#39;t have a formal role in the Gaza negotiations — Qatar and Egypt hold that lane. But Omani officials have quietly facilitated conversations between Iranian and Western diplomats about containing escalation, according to reporting in Western outlets over the past two years. The value of that role is precisely that it leaves no paper trail.</p><p>That&#39;s the problem with Oman&#39;s model. It only works when no one is watching. In an era when every mediation is live-tweeted and every track-two meeting leaks within 48 hours, quiet diplomacy is harder to sustain — and harder to prove when it works.</p><h4>What Muscat actually has to lose</h4><p>Oman&#39;s economy is smaller than the annual defence budget of Saudi Arabia. Its oil reserves are modest, its diversification plans slow. It depends on Gulf Cooperation Council transfers and on not being on anyone&#39;s target list. The Sana&#39;a Center&#39;s critique of Riyadh — buying loyalties instead of building alliances — cuts both ways. Muscat&#39;s alliances are real but thin. It has goodwill, not leverage.</p><p>The next twelve months will determine whether that&#39;s enough. If the Yemen war finds a negotiated pause, Oman will have been essential. If it doesn&#39;t, and if Saudi Arabia and the UAE harden their positions, Muscat gets squeezed into a choice it has spent 47 years avoiding.</p><p>The funeral in 2020 was a warning. Oman&#39;s foreign minister was the first to call for calm, and the first to be ignored. That&#39;s the price of the middle lane in a region where everyone else has picked a side. The question now is how long Muscat can keep paying it.</p><p>---</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f09ff29b37cc" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Houthi red sea attacks force egypt to choose sides in Saudi–UAE split]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@blog-menaarena/houthi-red-sea-attacks-force-egypt-to-choose-sides-in-saudi-uae-split-b5ef5a2fd2aa?source=rss-1875d97d4aa6------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b5ef5a2fd2aa</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[houthis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[suez-canal]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[uae]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[egypt]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[saudi-arabia]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[mena arena]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 15 Oct 2026 13:37:02 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-15T13:37:02.207Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*LCQVMXel0936YDishAkgdw.jpeg" /></figure><p>Cairo earned $9.4 billion from Suez Canal traffic in 2023, before Houthi strikes cut receipts by more than half — and Riyadh and Abu Dhabi are now bidding for Egypt&#39;s alignment.</p><p>In January 2024, Suez Canal Authority chief Osama Rabie went on Egyptian television and said the quiet part loud. Transit revenue had fallen roughly 40 percent since Houthi attacks began in the Red Sea two months earlier, he told viewers, and the figure was getting worse. By the end of that fiscal year, receipts had dropped from $9.4 billion to $7.2 billion. The year after, they fell below $4 billion.</p><p>Egypt is not a Houthi target. Egypt is collateral damage in a war it never joined, fought by an armed group it does not control, funded and armed by a state it has spent a decade trying to stay on good terms with. That&#39;s the position Cairo is in.</p><h4>The two checks that don&#39;t clear at once</h4><p>For most of the last decade, Egypt managed something unusual. It took Gulf money from both Riyadh and Abu Dhabi at the same time. Saudi Arabia deposited billions in the Central Bank of Egypt. The UAE bought up Ras El Hekma on the Mediterranean coast for $35 billion in early 2024 — the single largest foreign investment in Egypt&#39;s history. Neither donor seemed to mind the other.</p><p>That arrangement is over. In October 2022, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi both pulled back from renewing $10 billion in deposits they had parked at the Egyptian central bank. They did it at roughly the same time, for different reasons. Saudi Arabia wanted Egypt to line up against the Houthis more openly. The UAE wanted Egypt to stop pushing back against Emirati-backed forces in Libya and Sudan. Cairo couldn&#39;t do both.</p><p>Since then, the two Gulf capitals have been running competing bids for Egyptian alignment, and the currency of that competition is everything the Houthis have disrupted: Red Sea shipping, port access, pipeline routes, and the security guarantees that keep them open.</p><h4>Why the canal is a Gulf bargaining chip</h4><p>The Suez Canal is not just an Egyptian revenue line. It is the artery that carries Gulf oil and Qatari LNG to Europe without going around Africa. When the Houthis made the Bab el-Mandeb too dangerous for most commercial shipping in late 2023, global traffic rerouted around the Cape of Good Hope, adding roughly 9,000 nautical miles per voyage and 10 to 14 days of transit.</p><p>That reroute hurts Dubai&#39;s Jebel Ali port, which depends on transshipment volume. It hurts Saudi Aramco&#39;s ability to move crude to European buyers on schedule. It hurts Egypt, which loses the toll. And it hurts every European importer that now pays more for the same barrel of oil.</p><p>Which means whoever can credibly guarantee Red Sea security becomes the most important external player in Cairo&#39;s calculations. Saudi Arabia has tried. The UAE has tried differently, through its own logistics network and its base at Assab in Eritrea. Neither has delivered a shipping lane that insurers will touch. The Houthis hit at least 60 vessels between November 2023 and the end of 2024, according to the U.S. Maritime Administration. That is a track record no Gulf capital can wave away with a communiqué.</p><h4>The Pakistan and Turkey detour</h4><p>Saudi Arabia&#39;s search for alternative security partners has been public and unsuccessful. Riyadh signed a defense pact with Pakistan in September 2025. It hashed out drone and defense-industrial agreements with Turkey. Neither arrangement gives Riyadh what it actually needs: someone willing and able to project force into Yemen on its behalf.</p><p>Pakistan is too far away and too constrained by its own economic crisis. Turkey&#39;s regional ambitions overlap with Saudi interests rather than complementing them. As one widely circulated analysis put it, Riyadh went shopping for middle powers and came home with a Pakistani promise and a Turkish headache.</p><p>Meanwhile, Egypt&#39;s position on a ground war in Yemen has not budged since Mohammed bin Salman asked Cairo to join one a decade ago. Cairo said no then. It is even less likely to say yes now, with an economy still under an IMF program and 106 million people watching the bread subsidy.</p><h4>What Riyadh and Abu Dhabi actually want</h4><p>Ali Shihabi, a Saudi commentator close to the Riyadh government, has been making a structural argument on X for years: the smaller Gulf states mistake the security umbrella Saudi Arabia provides for an arrangement of equals, and periodically assert independence by taking contrarian positions. He doesn&#39;t name the UAE, but everyone reads it that way.</p><p>The Emirati counterargument, rarely stated on the record, is that Saudi Arabia&#39;s size has not translated into capability. Riyadh has spent a decade and untold billions in Yemen and has less control over Sanaa today than it did in 2015. Abu Dhabi has built its influence through ports, logistics, and small, sharp interventions — Assab, Berbera, the Libya airbases — and gets more per dollar.</p><p>Both arguments land in Cairo. Egypt needs Saudi deposits to keep the pound from sliding and Emirati investment to keep the construction sector alive. It needs Riyadh&#39;s diplomatic cover with Washington and Abu Dhabi&#39;s shipping network. It needs the Red Sea open, and it needs someone to open it.</p><h4>The bill Cairo can&#39;t pay</h4><p>Egypt&#39;s dilemma is not ideological. It is arithmetic. The Suez Canal used to contribute roughly 2 percent of GDP. It now contributes a fraction of that. The IMF program requires Egypt to keep the pound flexible and the subsidy bill shrinking. Every month the canal underperforms, the math gets harder and the Gulf leverage grows.</p><p>Riyadh wants Egypt inside a Saudi-led security framework that treats the Houthis as the primary threat and Iran as the sponsor. Abu Dhabi wants Egypt inside an Emirati-led economic framework that treats the Muslim Brotherhood, Sudan&#39;s RSF-adjacent networks, and Turkish influence in the eastern Mediterranean as the real problems.</p><p>Egypt cannot sign both. It has been trying for three years. The Red Sea is closing the gap.</p><p>---</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b5ef5a2fd2aa" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Egypt and turkey's proxy fight moves to the red sea coast]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@blog-menaarena/egypt-and-turkeys-proxy-fight-moves-to-the-red-sea-coast-9c08a05fa7b2?source=rss-1875d97d4aa6------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/9c08a05fa7b2</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[proxy-wars]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[turkey]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[egypt]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sudan]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[red-sea]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[mena arena]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 07 Oct 2026 17:50:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-07T17:50:01.062Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*xwcyluFYrF_vq-0-Ok6juQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>Cairo backs Sudan&#39;s army while Ankara arms the RSF, turning Port Sudan into the latest arena in a decade-long rivalry over the Horn of Africa.</p><h4>Two Generals, Two Patrons</h4><p>In March 2024, Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan flew to Port Sudan and met Turkish officials. The visit was reported as routine. It wasn&#39;t. Burhan&#39;s Sudan Armed Forces were losing ground to the Rapid Support Forces, and he needed weapons. Turkey had been selling drones to Sudan&#39;s army since 2021 — Bayraktar TB2s, specifically, which Sudan&#39;s military used against RSF positions in Darfur and Kordofan. Ankara didn&#39;t hide it. Turkish officials framed the sales as commercial.</p><p>Cairo noticed.</p><p>Egypt has backed Burhan since the war started in April 2023. Egyptian intelligence officers have been photographed in Khartoum. Egyptian airstrikes — never officially acknowledged — hit RSF targets in 2024. And Egypt&#39;s position is simple: the RSF is a militia that must be defeated, and Turkey arming it is a direct threat to Egyptian interests in the Nile Valley and the Red Sea.</p><p>Turkey, meanwhile, has hosted RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo — &quot;Hemedti&quot; — in Ankara. Turkish-made drones have shown up in RSF arsenals, though Ankara denies selling directly to the paramilitary group. The pattern is familiar: Turkey arms one side, Egypt arms the other, and Sudan becomes the latest proxy battlefield in a rivalry that stretches from Libya to the Eastern Mediterranean.</p><h4>The Numbers Behind the Rivalry</h4><p>The scale is hard to ignore. Sudan&#39;s war has killed an estimated 150,000 people since April 2023, according to the Armed Conflict Location &amp; Event Data Project. Another 12 million have been displaced. The UN calls it the world&#39;s worst humanitarian crisis. But for Cairo and Ankara, the numbers that matter are different.</p><p>Turkey&#39;s trade with Sudan hit $500 million before the war. Turkish companies held construction contracts worth billions. The port at Suakin — a historic Ottoman-era site on Sudan&#39;s Red Sea coast — was leased to Turkey in 2017 for 99 years. Turkey&#39;s navy has expressed interest in a naval base there. That&#39;s a direct challenge to Egypt&#39;s control of the Red Sea&#39;s western shore.</p><p>Egypt, for its part, has its own Red Sea concerns. The Suez Canal generates roughly $9 billion annually in transit fees. Any instability on the Sudanese coast — piracy, militia control of ports, foreign naval bases — threatens that revenue. Cairo also worries about Nile water. Sudan controls the Blue Nile, and Egypt&#39;s entire agricultural economy depends on the river. A Sudan aligned with Turkey and hostile to Egypt is a nightmare scenario for Cairo.</p><h4>The Libya Precedent</h4><p>This isn&#39;t the first time Egypt and Turkey have fought a proxy war. Libya was the warm-up.</p><p>From 2014 to 2020, Egypt backed Khalifa Haftar&#39;s Libyan National Army. Turkey backed the Government of National Accord in Tripoli. Turkish drones — again, Bayraktars — destroyed Haftar&#39;s supply lines. Egyptian airstrikes hit Turkish positions. The two countries nearly went to war in 2020 when Turkey moved naval assets into the Eastern Mediterranean.</p><p>They eventually signed a reconciliation deal in 2021. It didn&#39;t hold. Turkey still maintains a military presence in western Libya. Egypt still backs Haftar in the east. The proxies changed uniforms, but the rivalry didn&#39;t end.</p><p>Sudan is now the same pattern. Egypt supports the army because it wants a friendly government in Khartoum. Turkey supports the RSF because it wants leverage over the Red Sea and a counterweight to Egyptian influence. Neither country cares much about Sudanese civilians. That&#39;s the ugly truth.</p><h4>The UAE Wildcard</h4><p>Then there&#39;s the United Arab Emirates. Abu Dhabi has been the RSF&#39;s most important foreign backer, according to UN reports and multiple investigations by The New York Times and CNN. UAE weapons — including Chinese-made drones — have been flown into Chad and then smuggled across the border to RSF units. The UAE denies this. But satellite imagery and flight-tracking data tell a different story.</p><p>The UAE&#39;s motive is different from Turkey&#39;s. Abu Dhabi wants gold — Sudan is Africa&#39;s third-largest gold producer — and strategic depth along the Red Sea. It also wants to counter Islamist movements, which it sees as a threat to its own monarchy. Turkey&#39;s Islamist-leaning government is, in Abu Dhabi&#39;s view, part of the problem.</p><p>So now you have three outside powers — Egypt, Turkey, and the UAE — fighting over a country that&#39;s already collapsed. Egypt and Turkey are rivals. Turkey and the UAE are rivals. Egypt and the UAE are supposed to be allies, but they&#39;re backing different sides in Sudan. The result is a mess where no one wins, but everyone pays.</p><h4>What Comes Next</h4><p>The port of Port Sudan handles 90% of Sudan&#39;s trade. It&#39;s also the headquarters of the army-backed government. If Turkey decides to expand its military presence there — or if Egypt moves to block Turkish access — the proxy war becomes a direct confrontation. That&#39;s the risk.</p><p>Both countries have embassies in Khartoum. Both have intelligence officers on the ground. Both have spent billions propping up their chosen factions. And neither seems willing to back down.</p><p>The Sudanese people are the ones paying the price. Twelve million displaced. Famine in Darfur. A country effectively partitioned along the lines of who controls which port, which road, which gold mine. Cairo and Ankara will hold summits and sign agreements. But the proxy war continues. It always does.</p><p>---</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9c08a05fa7b2" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Sudan's war turns eritrea and ethiopia into a single conflict system]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@blog-menaarena/sudans-war-turns-eritrea-and-ethiopia-into-a-single-conflict-system-0ba92d7f9436?source=rss-1875d97d4aa6------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/0ba92d7f9436</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[ethiopia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[eritrea]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[gulf-rivalries]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sudan]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[horn-of-africa]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[mena arena]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 04 Oct 2026 09:14:48 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-04T09:14:48.468Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*J_GbgipQd_AVs2eusthRSg.jpeg" /></figure><p>With the Sudanese army claiming back Khartoum in March 2025, the fight has migrated east, where Asmara, Addis Ababa and their proxies now decide the outcome.</p><h4>The front moved east</h4><p>In March 2025, the Sudanese army pushed the Rapid Support Forces out of Khartoum. That was supposed to be the turning point. It wasn&#39;t. The war didn&#39;t end — it moved.</p><p>It moved east. Into Gedaref, into the Blue Nile, and across the border into Eritrea and Ethiopia. The RSF&#39;s supply lines now run through Libya and Chad in the west, but the political fight over who controls post-war Sudan is being fought in Asmara and Addis Ababa. That&#39;s where the money, the weapons and the diplomatic cover live.</p><p>Orwa Al-Sadig, a Sudanese analyst who writes on the Horn, made the point on X on October 2, 2026: what&#39;s happening across &quot;Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Tigray increasingly resembles an interconnected regional conflict system.&quot; He&#39;s right. Treating Sudan as one war and Tigray as another is like watching two boxing matches in the same ring and pretending the fighters don&#39;t share a corner.</p><h4>Eritrea&#39;s quiet leverage</h4><p>Eritrea has a population of about 3.7 million. It has no stock market, no meaningful foreign investment, and an GDP per capita that the World Bank last put below $650. And yet Isaias Afwerki has been the most consequential outside player in Sudan&#39;s war.</p><p>How? Geography. Eritrea&#39;s Red Sea coast sits directly across from the Saudi port of Jeddah. Its border with Ethiopia is the fault line of the entire Horn. And its relationship with the RSF — reportedly warm, reportedly transactional — gives Asmara a lever that neither Cairo nor Abu Dhabi can easily buy.</p><p>In 2024, Eritrea recalled its ambassador from Sudan and effectively shut the border. That didn&#39;t end Eritrean involvement. It just moved it off the books. RSF fighters have been treated in Eritrean hospitals. Emirati flights to Asmara have continued. And when the Sudanese army recaptured Wad Madani in January 2025, Eritrea&#39;s response was silence — which, from Asmara, is a statement.</p><h4>Ethiopia&#39;s two-front problem</h4><p>Ethiopia is in a worse position, and it knows it.</p><p>Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed won a Nobel Peace Prize in 2019 for ending the war with Eritrea. By 2023, he was fighting Tigray. By 2025, he was fighting Amhara Fano militias. Now he&#39;s watching Sudan&#39;s war spill across his western border while Eritrea sits on his northern one.</p><p>Addis Ababa has around 120 million people and an economy that the IMF bailed out with a $3.4 billion program in 2024. It cannot afford another front. It also cannot afford for the RSF to win in Sudan, because an RSF-run Khartoum would give Eritrea a friendly capital on Ethiopia&#39;s flank. That&#39;s the nightmare scenario in Abiy&#39;s office. He&#39;s been quietly backing the Sudanese army — not with troops, but with intelligence and overflight permissions.</p><p>Which puts Ethiopia and Eritrea on opposite sides of the same war for the first time since 2022. The 2018 peace deal is functionally dead. Nobody has said so out loud.</p><h4>The Gulf&#39;s shadow</h4><p>You can&#39;t understand the Horn without the Gulf, and you can&#39;t understand the Gulf without the Saudi-UAE split.</p><p>Riyadh wants a weak but intact Sudan — a Sunni-led government it can work with, no Muslim Brotherhood, no Iranian footprint. Abu Dhabi wants something more transactional: ports, farmland, gold, and a pliable partner in Khartoum whoever wins.</p><p>Ali Shihabi, the Saudi commentator, described the dynamic on X in January 2026: smaller Gulf states &quot;begin to operate under the illusion that they are equal partners of the Kingdom rather than beneficiaries of a system ultimately stabilized by it.&quot; He was talking about the GCC, but the description fits Abu Dhabi&#39;s Sudan playbook exactly.</p><p>The UAE has denied arming the RSF. A UN panel of experts reported in January 2024 that it had &quot;credible&quot; evidence of UAE weapons reaching the RSF via Chad. The Emiratis rejected the finding. Whether or not you believe the panel, the pattern is hard to miss: Emirati flights to Amdjarass in Chad, Emirati investment in Eritrea&#39;s Assab port, Emirati gold purchases from Sudanese territory the RSF controls.</p><p>That&#39;s not a proxy war in the traditional sense. It&#39;s a supply chain.</p><h4>What actually ends this</h4><p>Three things could change the trajectory.</p><p>First, the RSF&#39;s financing. It runs on gold and on Gulf money. If either dries up, the RSF becomes a militia with guns and no payroll. That&#39;s how the Janjaweed collapsed in the 2000s.</p><p>Second, Eritrea&#39;s calculus. Isaias is 79. He has no successor. When he goes, Eritrea&#39;s foreign policy could flip overnight — or it could harden further under a military council. Nobody in the region is planning for that uncertainty, which is itself a problem.</p><p>Third, Ethiopia&#39;s internal stability. Abiy is fighting Fano in Amhara and OLA in Oromia. If either front escalates, he loses the bandwidth to manage Sudan. Eritrea knows this. That&#39;s the leverage.</p><p>There&#39;s a fourth variable nobody in Washington or Brussels wants to talk about: nobody is mediating. The African Union&#39;s envoy has been sidelined. The Jeddah talks collapsed. The US sanctioned both sides in 2025 and then moved on to other crises. Sudan has become a war with no referee.</p><p>That&#39;s the thing about proxy fights. When the sponsors lose interest, the fighters don&#39;t stop. They just start fighting for themselves.</p><p>---</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=0ba92d7f9436" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Egypt's libya proxy war returns as cairo and ankara compete for western airbase]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@blog-menaarena/egypts-libya-proxy-war-returns-as-cairo-and-ankara-compete-for-western-airbase-278802d4bc76?source=rss-1875d97d4aa6------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/278802d4bc76</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[proxy-wars]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[turkey]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[libya]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[al-watiya]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[egypt]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[mena arena]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 27 Sep 2026 09:57:58 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-27T09:57:58.587Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*BunGFC_037_YQwzQKLkDnQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>Turkey has flown 40+ cargo missions into Al-Watiya since January, while Egypt backs Haftar&#39;s push on Zuwara, reopening a rivalry that nearly went to direct war in 2020.</p><h4>The Airbase That Never Stays Quiet</h4><p>Al-Watiya airbase sits about 130 kilometers southwest of Tripoli, near the Tunisian border. In May 2020, Libyan forces backed by Turkish drones and advisers took it from Khalifa Haftar&#39;s Libyan National Army. Turkish F-16s have rotated through it since. The base is the single clearest physical marker of Ankara&#39;s reach into North Africa, and everyone in the region knows it.</p><p>Now watch the flight trackers. Turkish Air Force C-130s and A400Ms have run more than 40 cargo rotations into Al-Watiya since the start of the year, according to open-source flight data compiled by observers tracking ADS-B signals. Egypt&#39;s air force, meanwhile, has stepped up joint exercises with Haftar&#39;s forces at bases near the Egyptian border. In January, Egyptian and LNA units ran a combined drill that Cairo&#39;s military spokesman described as routine. Nobody in Tripoli or Ankara thought it was routine.</p><p>This is the rivalry that brought the two countries to the edge of direct war in 2020. It&#39;s back, and it&#39;s being fought through Libyan militias, foreign airbases, and Mediterranean gas leases.</p><h4>Two Capitals, Two Clients, One Country</h4><p>Egypt backs Haftar. Has for years. The logic is straightforward: Cairo wants a friendly, secular-leaning military man running Libya&#39;s east, not a government in Tripoli that hosts Turkish troops and signs maritime deals with Ankara. The 2019 Turkey-Libya maritime boundary agreement cut straight through waters Egypt and Greece claim. Cairo called it illegal. Ankara ignored Cairo.</p><p>Turkey backs the Government of National Unity in Tripoli. Turkish defense exports to Libya, mostly drones and armored vehicles, ran into the hundreds of millions of dollars in the years after 2020, according to UN Panel of Experts reports on Libya. Turkish military personnel train Libyan forces at Al-Watiya and at a naval base in Misrata. That&#39;s not advisory work. That&#39;s a forward presence.</p><p>Ali Shihabi, the Saudi commentator who writes about Gulf dynamics, made a related point on X in January about structural imbalance between large and small states in the region. The same logic applies to Egypt and Turkey in Libya: two mid-sized powers, neither able to dominate the other, both willing to spend real money and risk real escalation to keep the other from winning.</p><p>Jalel Harchaoui, the Libya analyst now at the Royal United Services Institute, has written for years about how external patrons in Libya don&#39;t just fund factions. They embed. Emirati drones, Turkish advisers, Russian Wagner personnel in the past, Egyptian intelligence officers. The Libyan file stopped being a Libyan file a long time ago.</p><h4>The Zuwara Problem</h4><p>Here&#39;s what makes this phase different from 2020.</p><p>Zuwara is a port city about 100 kilometers west of Tripoli, near the Tunisian border. It&#39;s Amazigh, it&#39;s wealthy from cross-border trade, and it has refused to accept control from either Tripoli or Haftar for years. In recent months, Haftar&#39;s forces have pushed closer to Zuwara&#39;s outskirts, and Egyptian-supplied equipment has shown up in LNA units in the area, according to reporting by Libya&#39;s independent outlets and confirmed in part by UN monitoring.</p><p>Turkey has responded by increasing drone surveillance flights along the western coastal corridor. The GNU&#39;s defense ministry has publicly warned against any move on Zuwara. Cairo hasn&#39;t confirmed or denied involvement. That silence is itself a signal.</p><p>What&#39;s at stake isn&#39;t Zuwara itself. It&#39;s the road to the Tunisian border, and by extension the smuggling corridors that fund every armed group in western Libya. Control those and you control the money. Control the money and you control the militias. Control the militias and you control the next government in Tripoli.</p><p>Sohail Ahmad, who writes about Middle East security on X, put it well in late September: the old security architecture is losing credibility faster than a replacement is emerging. Libya is the clearest example. There is no architecture. There is a patchwork of patrons, clients, and contested checkpoints.</p><h4>What Cairo and Ankara Actually Want</h4><p>Egypt wants three things from Libya. First, no hostile government in Tripoli. Second, no Turkish military base within artillery range of its western border. Third, a settlement on the Mediterranean maritime boundary that doesn&#39;t cut into Egyptian gas claims.</p><p>Turkey wants three things. First, the GNU or something like it stays in power. Second, Al-Watiya and Misrata stay open to Turkish forces. Third, the 2019 maritime deal stays in force.</p><p>Those three-plus-three don&#39;t overlap anywhere. There&#39;s no deal to be made on the current terms. That&#39;s why the fighting keeps restarting.</p><p>Egypt&#39;s economy is under pressure. The IMF program signed in 2024 came with conditions, and Cairo has had to manage a currency crisis while keeping its military commitments. Turkey&#39;s economy is also strained, with inflation that has only recently started to ease. Neither country can afford a direct war. Both can afford to keep funding proxies.</p><p>That&#39;s the trap. Direct war is too expensive. Proxy war is cheap enough to sustain indefinitely. So it sustains.</p><h4>The Wider Board</h4><p>Libya isn&#39;t isolated. The UAE backs Haftar too, and Abu Dhabi&#39;s willingness to intervene militarily across multiple theaters, as Harchaoui has documented, adds a third patron to the eastern side. Russia&#39;s relationship with Haftar has cooled since Wagner&#39;s post-Prigozhin reorganization but hasn&#39;t disappeared. Saudi Arabia, focused on its own rivalry with the UAE and its détente with Iran, has stayed quieter on Libya than it was in 2019-2020, when Riyadh openly funded Haftar.</p><p>That leaves Egypt as Haftar&#39;s most important Arab backer. Which means Cairo owns the outcome in eastern Libya in a way it didn&#39;t five years ago. If Haftar wins, Egypt gets credit. If Haftar loses, Egypt gets blamed. That&#39;s a different kind of exposure.</p><p>The UAE&#39;s propaganda and lobbying machinery, which Harchaoui described in detail in his October 2025 essay, has been quieter on Libya recently. Abu Dhabi is watching. It hasn&#39;t left. But it&#39;s not leading either.</p><h4>The Fight Nobody Calls a Fight</h4><p>There won&#39;t be a declaration of war between Egypt and Turkey over Libya. There doesn&#39;t need to be. The two countries will keep sending equipment, advisers, and surveillance flights. Their Libyan clients will keep probing each other&#39;s positions. Occasionally someone will die. Occasionally a base will change hands. The map will shift by a few kilometers a year.</p><p>Hussein Aboubakr Mansour, the Egyptian-Israeli analyst who writes on regional alignments, argued in January that Saudi and Israeli operational interests are colliding across multiple theaters. The same pattern applies here: Egyptian and Turkish interests in Libya are structurally opposed, and no amount of diplomatic theater changes the underlying math.</p><p>The 2020 Berlin Conference produced a ceasefire that held for a while. The 2021 elections never happened. The 2023 flood in Derna killed more than 11,000 people and exposed how little either patron actually governs. Libya&#39;s problems aren&#39;t waiting for Cairo and Ankara to settle their differences. They&#39;re compounding while the two capitals keep score.</p><p>---</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=278802d4bc76" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Algeria and morocco's proxy fight moves deeper into the sahel]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@blog-menaarena/algeria-and-moroccos-proxy-fight-moves-deeper-into-the-sahel-a14fc8e85026?source=rss-1875d97d4aa6------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a14fc8e85026</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[proxy-conflict]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[western-sahara]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sahel]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[morocco]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[algeria]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[mena arena]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 15 Sep 2026 15:56:17 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-15T15:56:17.877Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*bRZXmA8mw9TCBrnmSD_8MQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>Both states now court the same post-coup juntas, and Rabat&#39;s Atlantic port at Dakhla is the prize Algiers cannot match.</p><h4>Two armies, one neighbourhood</h4><p>On 31 October 2024, a drone crossed from Algeria into Mali and killed eight people in Tinzaouaten, a village on the border. Seven of them were children, according to the UN peacekeeping mission&#39;s later account. The drone wasn&#39;t Algerian. It belonged to the Malian army, which had bought Turkish Bayraktars with money it doesn&#39;t really have, and the strike landed in a place where Algeria had spent years trying to stay the only outside power that mattered.</p><p>That&#39;s the new shape of the Maghreb&#39;s oldest rivalry. Algeria and Morocco cut diplomatic ties in August 2021. Three years on, the fight isn&#39;t about the Western Sahara file at the UN anymore. It&#39;s about who gets to arm, train and host the men who run Bamako, Niamey and N&#39;Djamena after their coups. Algeria used to treat northern Mali as its private buffer. Morocco now flies its foreign minister into Bamako for tea and defence memoranda. Neither side has to shoot at the other. They just have to outbid each other in someone else&#39;s capital.</p><h4>The numbers behind the courtship</h4><p>Algeria spent roughly $18 billion on defence in 2024, according to SIPRI. Morocco spent about $5 billion. On paper that&#39;s not a contest. But defence budgets don&#39;t buy influence in the Sahel — checkbooks and port access do, and that&#39;s where Rabat has quietly closed the gap.</p><p>Morocco&#39;s trade with sub-Saharan Africa reached about $4.5 billion in 2023, up from under $1 billion in 2000, the bulk of it routed through the Tanger Med complex and the port at Dakhla, which opened its first berths in 2021 on a stretch of Atlantic coast Algeria insists is occupied. Algeria&#39;s answer was the Trans-Saharan Road, a 4,500km ribbon of asphalt from Algiers to Lagos that has been &quot;nearly finished&quot; for fifteen years. In 2023, Algeria announced a free-trade zone at Tindouf, near the Western Sahara frontier, and then announced it again in 2025.</p><p>What Algeria has that Morocco doesn&#39;t: a 1,400km closed land border, gas pipelines that once fed Spain, and Russian weapons it can no longer easily replace. What Morocco has: American recognition of its claim over Western Sahara, granted by the Trump administration in December 2020, and Israeli drone technology it isn&#39;t shy about using.</p><h4>The junta problem neither side can solve</h4><p>Here&#39;s the catch. The Malian colonels who took power in 2020 and 2021 don&#39;t want patrons. They want Wagner, or Africa Corps, or whatever the Russian outfit is called this month, plus a Turkish drone supply line that keeps the Bayraktars flying. When Algeria tried to mediate the 2015 peace deal between Bamako and the northern separatists, it worked for eight years. In January 2024, the junta tore the agreement up. Algiers found out the same way everyone else did.</p><p>Morocco walked into this vacuum with a defence pact signed with Mali in 2023, then another with Niger. It also deepened ties with the UAE, whose drones and cash are already in the Sahel — which is where the story gets interesting, because Abu Dhabi&#39;s Sahel push isn&#39;t really about Rabat at all. The Emiratis want Red Sea access and gold. They&#39;ll deal with whoever&#39;s in the palace. If that palace happens to be in Bamako, and if Bamako also happens to be talking to Rabat, then Algiers reads the whole thing as a Moroccan encirclement.</p><p>Look at the map. Algeria&#39;s southern flank touches Mali, Niger, Libya and Mauritania. Morocco touches Mauritania and a sliver of Western Sahara it controls. If Algeria loses Bamako and Niamey, it loses the depth it has relied on since independence. And that&#39;s why the drone strike in Tinzaouaten mattered more than the eight dead. It was Mali telling Algeria, in the only language that registers in Algiers, that the buffer is gone.</p><h4>What Algiers does when it&#39;s cornered</h4><p>The standard playbook is to raise the temperature in Western Sahara. In late 2024, the Polisario Front resumed attacks on Moroccan positions east of the berm after a three-year lull. Algeria denies directing it. Nobody in Rabat believes that, and nobody in Madrid or Paris pretends to either.</p><p>The second move is energy. Algeria supplies gas to Spain through the Medgaz pipeline and has spent years warning Madrid that any shift toward Morocco — say, on the Western Sahara question — puts that supply at risk. In 2022, when Spain backed Morocco&#39;s autonomy plan, Algiers shut off one of the two pipelines and let the other run down. Spain&#39;s gas imports from Algeria fell by roughly half between 2021 and 2023. That&#39;s leverage. It&#39;s also a warning shot.</p><p>The third move is to wait for Morocco&#39;s problems to compound. Rabat&#39;s economy is running on a deficit, a drought that has emptied reservoirs, and a 2030 World Cup it has promised to co-host with Spain and Portugal. That&#39;s an enormous bill for a country spending 4% of GDP on its military. Algerian planners know it. So do Moroccan ones.</p><p>Neither side is going to declare war over Bamako. That&#39;s not how this works. The fight will keep happening in other people&#39;s deserts, with other people&#39;s drones, over other people&#39;s ports. Algeria&#39;s problem is that it&#39;s better at the old game — the one with the UN resolutions and the liberation movements and the gas contracts. Morocco figured out that the new game is played with container terminals and defence attachés, and it started playing that one first.</p><p>For now, Algiers is still reacting. That&#39;s the story.</p><p>---</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a14fc8e85026" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Qatar's somalia pivot tests gulf rivalry as ankara and abu dhabi circle]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@blog-menaarena/qatars-somalia-pivot-tests-gulf-rivalry-as-ankara-and-abu-dhabi-circle-04022f2cdf16?source=rss-1875d97d4aa6------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/04022f2cdf16</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[gulf-rivalries]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[somalia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[qatar]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[uae]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[turkey]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[mena arena]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 10 Sep 2026 16:02:35 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-10T16:02:35.591Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*-8DfnkBjiR7QTMMlWiNFWg.jpeg" /></figure><p>Doha hosted Somalia&#39;s President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud in March 2026, deepening a three-way contest with Turkey and the UAE over ports, troops and the fight against Al-Shabaab.</p><h4>A port deal, a training base, and three patrons</h4><p>In February 2026, Somalia&#39;s cabinet approved a revised defence pact with Turkey that extends Ankara&#39;s military training mission in Mogadishu for another five years. The Turkish base at Jazeera, which opened in 2017, is the largest foreign military training facility in the country. It has graduated roughly 5,000 Somali soldiers, according to Turkish defence ministry figures cited by Anadolu Agency.</p><p>That same month, the UAE signed a fresh memorandum with Somalia&#39;s federal government on Berbera and Bosaso port operations, tied to a $442 million infrastructure package Abu Dhabi first floated in 2024. And Qatar, quietly, has been running its own lane — funding the Somali National Army&#39;s logistics chain through a 2023 agreement with the Ministry of Defence, and hosting President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud in Doha in March 2026 for talks the Qatari foreign ministry described as covering &quot;security cooperation and economic development.&quot;</p><p>Three Gulf patrons. One fragile federal state. Different phones on the same desk.</p><h4>The Somali calculus isn&#39;t sentimental</h4><p>Abdirashid Arok, a Somali political analyst, put the logic plainly on X in September 2026: &quot;In politics there are no eternal enemies and no eternal friends only eternal interests.&quot; He argued that Mogadishu&#39;s strategy should be to &quot;map these ceilings of interest&quot; and widen gaps between foreign backers where it can.</p><p>That&#39;s not cynicism. It&#39;s the actual operating doctrine of a government that has watched its patrons fight each other on its soil.</p><p>When Saudi Arabia and the UAE fell out over Yemen in 2019, Somali ports became a secondary theatre. When Egypt and Ethiopia clashed over the Grand Renaissance Dam, Cairo opened a military cooperation channel with Mogadishu — a move Addis Ababa read as encirclement. When Turkey brokered the December 2024 Ankara Declaration between Somalia and Ethiopia, Doha and Abu Dhabi both watched the outcome with different reactions.</p><p>The result is a country where the federal government in Mogadishu, the semi-autonomous administrations in Puntland and Jubaland, and the breakaway Republic of Somaliland all maintain separate foreign relationships. Somaliland signed its own port deal with Ethiopia in January 2024, which Mogadishu called a violation of sovereignty. Puntland has had direct conversations with UAE-linked logistics firms. Jubaland&#39;s leadership has hosted Kenyan and Ethiopian security officials without clearing it with the federal ministry.</p><h4>What Doha wants, and what it can actually get</h4><p>Qatar&#39;s Somalia play is smaller than Turkey&#39;s or the UAE&#39;s, but it&#39;s more targeted. Doha doesn&#39;t run a training base or a port. It runs financial lines — salary support for specific SNA units, fuel contracts routed through a Turkish logistics company, and diplomatic cover at the UN Security Council when the arms embargo debate comes up.</p><p>The Qatari calculation is simple: Somalia sits on the Bab-el-Mandeb approach, it has the longest mainland coastline in Africa at roughly 3,300 kilometres, and it will matter to whoever holds influence in the Red Sea after the Houthi threat settles. Doha doesn&#39;t need to own Mogadishu. It needs to be in the room.</p><p>The problem is that the room is crowded. Turkey has a military base and a $1 billion 2024 energy exploration agreement covering Somali offshore blocks. The UAE has DP World operating Berbera and a security relationship with Puntland that predates the current federal government. Saudi Arabia has been pushing Somali firms to relocate regional offices to Riyadh under its 2024 headquarters directive, which cuts against Dubai&#39;s existing role as the Gulf&#39;s commercial clearing house.</p><h4>The leadership test facing Hassan Sheikh</h4><p>Hassan Sheikh Mohamud was re-elected in May 2022 and has survived two attempts to remove him by constitutional procedure, a constitutional crisis in 2024, and an ongoing dispute with Jubaland&#39;s Ahmed Madobe that flared into armed clashes at Raskamboni in December 2024.</p><p>His foreign policy has been consistent in one respect: he takes meetings with everyone. He has visited Ankara, Doha, Abu Dhabi, Cairo, and Riyadh since 2022. He signed the Ankara Declaration. He also signed the UAE port memorandum. He has not picked a side, and that may be the point.</p><p>But the patrons are starting to demand more. In June 2026, Turkish officials reportedly pressed Mogadishu to slow the UAE&#39;s Berbera expansion, according to reporting from Middle East Eye that both Ankara and Abu Dhabi declined to confirm. In September 2026, Emirati-linked media ran opinion pieces criticising what one commentator, Abdulla M Alhamed, called &quot;those who blur the line between friend and foe.&quot;</p><p>That language — &quot;grey zone,&quot; &quot;ambiguity,&quot; &quot;bargaining&quot; — is about Somalia, even when it isn&#39;t named.</p><h4>Where this goes</h4><p>Somalia&#39;s next election is scheduled for 2026, and the federal government&#39;s ability to hold it depends partly on whether Al-Shabaab can be contained in the south. The African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) ended in December 2024 and was replaced by AUSSOM, which Turkey, the UAE, and Qatar all fund in different ways. If one of them pulls back, the mission&#39;s operational capacity degrades.</p><p>Mogadishu has leverage it didn&#39;t have five years ago. Its coastline, its ports, and its vote at the UN are all worth something. The question is whether Hassan Sheikh can keep selling the same product to three buyers who increasingly want exclusivity.</p><p>That&#39;s the game. Not a proxy war in the old sense — no tanks with foreign flags, no declared front. Just three patrons, one president, and a country that has learned to say yes to everyone while promising nothing permanent to anyone.</p><p>The bill comes due at the next election. Or the one after.</p><p>---</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=04022f2cdf16" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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