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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Bocconi University on Medium]]></title>
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            <title>Stories by Bocconi University on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@bocconiuniversity?source=rss-52ae1adc26c5------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[Paranoid Politics in the Trump Era & What Is at Stake for European Democracy]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@bocconiuniversity/paranoid-politics-in-the-trump-era-what-is-at-stake-for-european-democracy-8e2962ad7c18?source=rss-52ae1adc26c5------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[europe]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[democracy-in-america]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[trump]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[populism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[democracy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Bocconi University]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 26 Nov 2024 14:46:41 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-11-26T14:46:41.819Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The current American crisis has significant implications for Europe. Many European nations are grappling with their own versions of social conflict, fueled by cultural fragmentation, economic inequality and the rise of populist movements</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*aA0cLngzMVQ4aMw3YtpBcA.jpeg" /></figure><p><em>By Graziella Romeo, Department of Legal Studies, Bocconi University</em></p><p>American politics has often been an arena for angry minds,” wrote historian Richard Hofstadter in Harper’s Magazine in November 1964. His essay, “The Paranoid Style in American Politics”, explored a recurring phenomenon: the tendency to construct paranoid visions, identifying a nefarious enemy plotting to undermine the American ideal. Hofstadter described this as a psychological posture, an exaggerated suspicion and conspiratorial fantasy — not a psychiatric madness, but a way of thinking embraced by otherwise healthy individuals. This paranoid style, visible in Barry Goldwater’s 1964 presidential campaign, has gained renewed relevance in the era of Donald Trump, where political life is again driven by deep-seated fears and extremist rhetoric.</p><p>Hofstadter’s insights, initially tied to Goldwater’s inflammatory rhetoric, resonate strongly with today’s political climate. In the 1960s, Goldwater stoked fears of a country in peril, legitimizing extreme measures to preserve freedom. He famously declared, “extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice.” Fast forward to the Trump era and we find similar rhetoric, framing political opponents not just as rivals, but as existential threats to American values. Trump’s political messaging fueled the notion that the country’s identity and future were at stake, leading to dangerous outcomes, such as the violent insurrection on 6 January 2021.</p><p>The Capitol riot was a stark manifestation of the paranoid style in modern American politics. A mob, convinced that the election had been stolen, stormed the Capitol in a violent attempt to overturn the results, threatening the peaceful transition of power — one of the cornerstones of constitutional democracy. This event was a reminder, familiar to Europeans, that political rhetoric can, in fact, lead to real-world violence. These are the circumstances where constitutional structures are truly tested. The existing constitutional and legal safeguards led to the former President being brought to trial by a special prosecutor, and parallel lawsuits brought Trump before the Supreme Court to challenge his right to run in an election.</p><p>However, the Court — as it should in normal circumstances — did not take the extraordinary step of removing a political leader from the political arena during an election year. The fact that the courts could not definitively resolve political tensions is not necessarily a failure of the constitutional system. Rather, it demonstrates that constitutions are called to exercise resilience by ensuring that political processes do not overstep their bounds.</p><p>To understand the crucial role of constitutional systems, we must acknowledge that American politics today reflects deep cultural anxiety, amplified by demographic changes and the perception that a once-dominant majority — white, male, and Protestant — no longer entirely controls political discourse, leaving its social and economic position feeling under threat. Identity politics has taken on a new form, where this traditionally powerful group now sees itself as marginalized, fearing displacement by a changing society. This reversal has given rise to a political movement that frames itself as the last defender of traditional American values.</p><p>On the other side of the political spectrum, opponents of this identity-based movement are moving away from identity politics to focus on broader issues of inequality and social justice. The challenge for the US is whether it can still chart a path forward based on democratic ideals, or whether anger will continue to escalate and divide the nation further.</p><p>A vision grounded in constitutional democracy seeks to address these divisions through the language of peace, compromise and inclusivity. It calls for dialogue, mutual respect and a return to civil political discourse. This approach is not just about moderating rhetoric, but about reaffirming the principles that underpin democratic systems: that compromise is not capitulation, but a normal element of political life.</p><h4>What Is at Stake for European Democracy</h4><p>This American crisis has implications beyond US borders, particularly for Europe. Many European nations are facing their own version of social conflict, driven by cultural fragmentation, economic inequality, and populist movements. The tensions seen in the US may well foreshadow challenges that European democracies confront. Social conflict in Europe — fueled by anxieties about immigration, globalization and shifting social norms — echoes many of the same dynamics that have destabilized American politics.</p><p>The danger level of these social and political conflicts is alarmingly high, even if not unprecedented. Constitutional democracy thrives on disagreement and debate, but it is built on a foundation of dialogue and compromise. The ability to disagree while maintaining respect for the system itself is essential, as is the existence of robust political processes, participation mechanisms, and the protection of fundamental rights like freedom of speech and the right to vote.</p><p>This American election can serve as a wake-up call for Europe to examine its own democratic health. European states, and the European Union as a whole, must focus on strengthening their democratic credentials, ensuring that political systems remain resilient in the face of growing division. The ideal of progress, which has animated the European project since its inception, is not something to be taken for granted. It requires continuous, collective effort and engagement across the political spectrum.</p><p>Ultimately, democratic principles cannot rely solely on enlightened leaders; they must be upheld by a broad, inclusive consensus. In an era of heightened political tensions, the success of constitutional democracy depends on a collective understanding that progress is a shared responsibility, and the health of a democracy is measured not just by its institutions, but also by the commitment and participation of its citizens.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8e2962ad7c18" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[In a ‘Permacrisis’ the biggest challenge is sustainable growth]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@bocconiuniversity/in-a-permacrisis-the-biggest-challenge-is-sustainable-growth-83770e7fa40d?source=rss-52ae1adc26c5------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/83770e7fa40d</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[global-economy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economic-crisis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sustainable-growth]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Bocconi University]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 27 Jun 2024 11:16:42 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-06-27T11:16:42.038Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Interview with Nobel laureate Michael Spence who outlines need to increase productivity through new technologies, overcome old profit patterns and revitalise international cooperation</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*7hxe67UcFwrkWVZjMAw2bQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>The world is changing and not necessarily for the better. We are at the centre of a permacrisis that stems from outdated approaches to growth, economic management and global governance. Acknowledging this is the first step in turning the crisis into an opportunity.” This is how <strong>Michael Spence</strong>, Nobel Prize winner in 2001 and Distinguiesd Professor at Bocconi University, explains the decision he took together with his colleagues Gordon Brown and Mohamed A. El-Erian to recount the complexity of the historical period we are living through in the book ‘Permacrisis.</p><p>The starting point of the essay, which offers a toolbox for understanding current events and hypothesizing exit strategies from the economic stagnation towards which advanced economies are moving, is a snapshot of the difficulties of today’s world. The economist focuses on the multiple crises of our time: from stagnant growth to inflation to inadequate government policies, from the climate emergency to worsening inequalities with nationalisms in full swing and the impasse of global cooperation. “The first big challenge,” says Spence, “is to understand the constant shocks we are experiencing, upheavals that touch different areas. I am thinking of climate change, wars, pandemics or the supply chain crisis. All phenomena that have occurred over a limited period and that lead people to believe they are living in an abnormal era.” In reality, as the text states, cascading crises are a condition that will be with us for a long time. “We will not return to the globalization world that prevailed until recently, for much of the post WW II decade’s,” Spence clarifies, “which is why we need to act now to improve the situation. We should try to counter the fragmentation of the global economy by investing in key levers such as productivity and technology and reforming the institutions for international cooperation.” From the WTO to the IMF.</p><p>In a context of continuous crises, the countries of the world must (and can), according to the Nobel Prize winner, learn to design new growth models ‘without making the mistakes of the past’. And the reference is to the neo-liberal era of the 1980s between privatization and deregulation or to the export-led industrialization model that led the countries of East Asia to an economic boom. China above all. Models that have contributed to exacerbating the climate crisis and widened inequality. “We need a sustainable growth model,” says Spence. “A first step is to make up lost ground on the productivity front. Since 2000, there has been a continuous decline in the growth rate of labor productivity with some sectors more affected than others. If I think of Italy, among the sectors most in difficulty are the public sector, the health sector, government institutions and schools. Globally, however, production and growth remain high in tradable goods: in the tech sector and in parts of the financial world. To put it in numbers in the US alone, the Bureau of Labor Statistics estimates that $10.9 trillion has been lost since 2005 with productivity at a standstill. Spence then underlines the fact that we will live in a world with structural inflation. “With the exception of China which for now is in a deflationary pattern with the main problem being a shortage of aggregate demand, in the advanced economies the limits are on the supply side (of production, ed.) and not on the demand side. Inflation in Europe is coming down now, but in the event of new peaks in demand we will find ourselves with production chains once again struggling to keep up.”</p><p>In this context, a major source of growth will come from technology, especially digital technology and Gen AI. Indeed, technological progress can help create the conditions to reduce inequality and reverse the decline in productivity. Says Spence: “In this respect we are living in an amazing time. Think of the digital revolution, Ai and breakthroughs in life science or innovation for the energy transition. Technology can already help people to create added value in their daily activities. I am thinking of the medical profession or software engineers writing code.” He adds: “If we took a poll on the streets today about artificial intelligence, most people would answer that AI is going to steal their jobs. This is an understandable concern because many people think that AI is about full automation — the replacement of humans by digital machines. But instead of ‘automation’ I think it makes more sense to talk about ‘human-machine collaboration or augmentation.’’ For Spence, the public agenda should therefore focus ‘not only on containing the risks associated with artificial intelligence but also on AI as a lever for growth’. Both for job and income creation. In addition, countries should also ensure access for small companies.</p><p>To counter the fragmentation of the global economy, according to the professor, the issue of geopolitics must finally be addressed. Without riding the growing wave of nationalism and unilateralism in the USA, to some extent in Europe and in the rest of the world. “The discourse,” he points out, “is analogous to that for combating climate change. You cannot put in place effective actions for sustainable growth at a global level without new mechanisms for international cooperation.” Which, for Spence, also involve reforming the Bretton Woods institutions with, for example, the International Monetary Fund that could become the guarantor of the global economy. “In short, we need new tools to respond to shocks and rebuild a functional global order. The best response to the permacrisis is a new form of cooperation between countries, open markets that are never closed.” For an inclusive and no longer exclusive world.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=83770e7fa40d" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Interest rates in Europe: why it’s a mistake to cut too soon]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@bocconiuniversity/interest-rates-in-europe-why-its-a-mistake-to-cut-too-soon-fabacb634959?source=rss-52ae1adc26c5------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/fabacb634959</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[interest-rates]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[central-bank]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[inflation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[federal-reserve]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cbse]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Bocconi University]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 15 May 2024 09:31:17 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-05-15T09:32:29.234Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Central banks in Europe are facing the old dilemma: when they lower interest rates because inflation is slowing down, it’s likely to weaken their currencies.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*i9nzpy34W_oIEUhUU8l4aw.jpeg" /></figure><p><em>by Daniel Gros, Director of the Institute for European Policymaking (IEP@BU) at Bocconi University, and Pietro Galeone, research fellow IEP@BU</em></p><p>Central banks in Europe are discovering an old dilemma: when they lower interest rates because inflation is slowing down, it’s likely to weaken their currencies. This in turn may delay the fall in inflation towards their canonical 2% target.</p><p>The Swedish Riksbank experienced this first hand when it <a href="https://think.ing.com/snaps/swedens-riksbank-cuts-rates-amid-mounting-economic-woes/">cut rates</a> on May 8 and saw the Swedish krona slide against the euro and US dollar. The krona had already depreciated by several percentage points in anticipation of this move. Something similar might happen to the euro if the European Central Bank (ECB) cuts rates as is widely expected on June 6.</p><p>More generally, traders are betting heavily that countries whose central bank looks poised to cut rates will see their currencies plummeting. We’re seeing this with <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/6f5abb81-e1a2-4632-9f02-a87ba21081c6">the British pound</a>, for instance, with the Bank of England <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/article/2024/may/09/bank-of-england-keeps-interest-rates-on-hold-uk-economy-inflation">recently signalling</a> that it too might start cutting in June.</p><h3>The transatlantic divide</h3><p>The concern that cutting rates leads to currency depreciation is not new, but in recent years it has been obscured by the fact that the burst of inflation and its subsequent fall were largely synchronised across the developed world. This meant their monetary policies were in lockstep, so countries’ currencies were roughly in line with one another.</p><p>However, important differences have emerged lately. The US economy remains very strong, whereas the euro area and UK have not grown over the last quarters and the outlook remains much weaker there. This has meant comparatively more inflationary pressure in the US than in Europe.</p><p>So far, the variation in inflation data has been modest, but this divergence in growth has important implications for monetary policy. Central banks know their decisions take time to take effect, so they’re always trying to act according to where inflation is heading, not where it was over the last months.</p><p>When we see the euro area, UK and also Sweden planning to cut rates while the US Federal Reserve is talking about “<a href="https://www.ft.com/content/5babf13a-3a23-4b24-947f-a958c3df0192">higher for longer</a>”, it’s therefore being driven more by differences in GDP growth than inflation readings.</p><p>ou can see this by looking at medium-term interest rates, which are set not by central banks but by the debt markets, and incorporate expectations of what central banks are likely to do next. For example, 1-year interest rates in the US have remained above 5% and very close to the Fed’s <a href="https://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/reference-rates/effr">5.25% to 5.50% target</a> for its benchmark interest rate. This indicates that investors expect the Fed to keep the benchmark rate at today’s levels for another year.</p><p>By contrast, 1-year rates in the euro area <a href="https://ycharts.com/indicators/1year_eurozone_central_government_bond_par_yield_curve">are 3.4%</a>, more than 0.6 percentage points below the <a href="https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/policy_and_exchange_rates/key_ecb_interest_rates/html/index.en.html">ECB’s benchmark rate</a>. The situation in the UK is similar.</p><p>This large difference in expectations makes the US dollar more attractive to investors, since it broadly means they can get paid more interest by buying and investing dollars. We know from <a href="https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/monetary-policy-and-exchange-rates-during-the-global-tightening-20240510.html">recent research</a> by the Fed that this has continued to be the case during the inflationary period of the past couple of years.</p><p>A cut by the European central banks would increase the difference in medium-term interest rates even further. This could potentially weaken their currencies considerably.</p><h3>The implications</h3><p>A weaker currency stimulates growth, but also puts pressure on prices via imports. This is welcome when inflation is too low because it reinforces the direct impact of a central bank cutting interest rates. Today, however, there is a risk that a weaker currency could further aggravate inflation and delay the time it takes to return to the 2% target.</p><p>But is this concern justified? It does not seem so.</p><p>Any fears of a currency plunge seem far-fetched when you look at nominal effective rates, which refers to a currency’s value against a basket of international rivals. The euro’s nominal effective rate is presently hovering at close to its <a href="https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/balance_of_payments_and_external/eer/html/index.en.html">historical maximum</a>. The <a href="https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/RBGBBIS">UK pound’s</a> is not trading at a low level either — at least compared to the recent past — and has appreciated by about 10% over the last 18 months.</p><p>Experience has also shown that a weak currency does not actually ignite inflationary pressures in practice. For instance, the euro fell to record lows in its early years in the 2000s, but inflation barely budged. The <a href="https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/economic-bulletin/articles/2020/html/ecb.ebart202003_01%7E7fc0abdec2.en.html">ECB estimates</a> that a 1% depreciation in the euro only increases annual inflation by 0.04%. This means that even a 10% euro depreciation would only produce an 0.4% inflation increase.</p><p>The reason why the impact of the exchange rate on inflation is small is thought to be because of retailers. They often keep their prices stable even when currency depreciation means that they have to pay more for imported goods.</p><p>It is therefore unlikely that European central banks will be prevented from cutting rates by currency depreciation. What should make them hesitate is the unusually high uncertainty surrounding the inflation path at present. This is because we’re living through a unique combination of recovering from the COVID recession and the aftermath of the energy-price shock caused by the Ukraine war.</p><p>Standard economic models <a href="https://www.ceps.eu/ceps-publications/the-ecbs-normalisation-path/">would predict</a> a smooth return of inflation to the 2% target, but these are unlikely to be useful to central bankers in such unusual circumstances. A <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2024/03/07/Monetary-Policy-with-Uncertain-Inflation-Persistence-545762">recent report</a> from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) argued that this uncertainty is a reason to move slowly with rate-cutting to ensure that central banks can re-establish their reputations as inflation fighters.</p><p>According to the IMF, keeping rates high in this environment entails a smaller disruption than cutting quickly only to find that inflation does persist and rates must be raised quickly again. This “better safe than sorry” argument implies keeping rates on hold until inflation returns to target levels.</p><p><em>This article is republished from </em><a href="https://theconversation.com/"><em>The Conversation</em></a><em> under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article: </em><a href="https://theconversation.com/interest-rates-the-ugly-dilemma-facing-europes-central-banks-and-why-its-a-mistake-to-cut-too-soon-229934">https://theconversation.com/interest-rates-the-ugly-dilemma-facing-europes-central-banks-and-why-its-a-mistake-to-cut-too-soon-229934</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=fabacb634959" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The positive impact of women on climate action]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@bocconiuniversity/the-positive-impact-of-women-on-climate-action-d4c89e630904?source=rss-52ae1adc26c5------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d4c89e630904</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[gender-equality]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[climate-action]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[women]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[female-leadership]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cop29]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Bocconi University]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 12 Mar 2024 11:19:25 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-03-12T14:33:48.711Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>The positive impact of women on climate action</strong></p><p>More female leaders would be a positive step for the climate and would bring different qualities and perspectives to the table</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/618/1*X8HQvtxJOrIdIS7hV8QROw.jpeg" /></figure><p><em>by Paola Profeta, Dean for Diversity, Inclusion &amp; Sustainability, Bocconi University</em></p><p>Initially, everyone on the organising committee for the COP29 global climate summit was male. In response, the She Changes Climate campaign group stated that “climate change affects the whole world, not half of it”. A backlash followed and women have since been included to enhance representation within the committee.</p><p>A gender-balanced committee is not only a matter of justice and representation, but it also represents a strategic choice. Addressing the complex global challenge of climate change requires diverse perspectives and experiences. Female leaders can bring different qualities to the table.</p><p>1. Caring about nature</p><p>If leaders care about the planet, climate policies will reflect that. Data shows that as citizens, women tend to care for nature and the environment more than men and they tend to be more responsible for actions which may impact the climate change.</p><p>According to this European Social Survey data, the share of women who agreed that it’s important to care for nature and the environment is higher than the share of men in all European countries. The difference is not large, ranging from 7% in Austria to 0.3% in France, but the pattern is consistent across all countries.</p><p>When people were asked whether they feel personally responsible for reducing greenhouse gas emissions, 52% women agreed compared with 48% of men. More than 63% of women agreed that limiting their energy use reduced greenhouse gas emissions, compared to just 36% of men.</p><p>2. Wanting to take action</p><p>When first appointed to their roles of prime minister in New Zealand and Finland respectively, Jacinda Ardern and Sanna Marin both declared that climate change was an emergency and announced actions for their country which influenced the global efforts to mitigate climate change.</p><p>Female policymakers agree more than men on the need of measures for the environment, according to data from the Comparative Candidate Survey . Among politicians who ran for the national parliament elections, 83% of women believed that stronger measures should be taken to protect the environment, compared to 75% of men.</p><p>My own research shows that the difference between men and women is significant even when we control for individual characteristics, including age, ideology, education, religion, occupation and number of children.</p><p>3. Making change happen</p><p>Firms with more women in decision-making positions tend to perform better on environmental and sustainable outcomes. I found that companies with three or more female directors perform better on specific measures of environmental performance.</p><p>The share of managers also matters: a higher female presence in managerial positions is associated with better environmental performance. This is measured by an indicator which considers different factors: pollution of air, land and water and the impacts on biodiversity, the use of non-renewable energy, water, land, forests, minerals, the production of waste and new product development efforts to remedy these problems.</p><p>4. Being altruistic</p><p>Men and women tend to show differences in social orientation. As American sociologist Nancy Chodorow outlined in her 1978 book, The Reproduction of Mothering: Psychoanalysis and the Sociology of Gender, women are directed toward the caregiver role, so they are encouraged to be more compassionate, nurturing, protective, and cooperative than men. Experimental research in 2001 confirmed that women tend to be more altruistic and socially oriented than men.</p><p>5. Having more opportunities</p><p>Gender roles and different opportunities may also play a role in gender differences in attitudes towards the environment. The biological availability hypothesis suggests that women spend less time at work than men and more time at home, so they have more opportunities to engage in private pro-environment behaviours such as recycling and water use (although this doesn’t mean they have more free time). Women also tend to be more concerned than men about health and safety issues and this is reflected in higher levels of environmental concerns.</p><p>6. Approaching risk with caution</p><p>Women perceive risks differently. Women tend to be more risk averse than men, as they tend to prefer an outcome which is certain to an uncertain one associated to higher return.</p><p>7. Taking the long-term view</p><p>When approaching climate change, women tend to offer fresh perspectives, creative problem-solving skills and inclusive leadership styles. As climate change affects everyone, our collective effort benefits from acknowledging the diverse ways in which men and women express concerns about the issues and propose actions for the future. Women tend to be more patient and willing to wait for higher reward in the future and they care about the consequences of their actions over a longer time frame.</p><p>In any decision-making process, personal leadership style is a crucial factor. Gender plays a significant role in shaping that style and female leadership style tends to focus more on long-term goals. That can help drive solutions that mitigate and adapt the impact of climate change.</p><p>Including more women at the table at the future climate summits is an essential step towards making real change. Each of us can make the difference, as citizens, voters, business entrepreneurs and decision-makers to promote better representation and more balanced decisions, for now and for future generations.</p><p><em>This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article:</em></p><p><a href="https://theconversation.com/seven-reasons-more-female-leaders-would-be-a-positive-step-for-the-climate-221908"><em>https://theconversation.com/seven-reasons-more-female-leaders-would-be-a-positive-step-for-the-climate-221908</em></a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d4c89e630904" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The new values for an ideal family]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@bocconiuniversity/the-new-values-for-an-ideal-family-3bb0ab86660a?source=rss-52ae1adc26c5------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/3bb0ab86660a</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[sociology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[society]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[family]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[demographics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Bocconi University]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 04 Mar 2024 13:26:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-03-04T13:26:01.550Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>People no longer necessarily view a large family as important but give more value to the role of communication — both within the nuclear family and also with grandparents</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/850/1*XcCn0yFf5dT31M4-dmS2Cw.jpeg" /></figure><p>by Arnstein Aassve, Professor in Demography, Bocconi University</p><p>Picture your ideal family. Do you have children? How many?</p><p>It’s fairly well established that when asked about their ideal family, people tend to say that two children is the best number to have. But this regularity has come about from asking the simple question: “Ideally, how many children would you like to have?”.</p><p>But if two children really was the best number to have, surely most people would have two — but they don’t. In South Korea, the average number of children is less than one per woman. In the US it’s 1.64.</p><p>A huge number of studies have tried to figure out why this is — why there’s a gap between the number of children people say they want, and how many they have. But it turns out we may have been asking the wrong questions.</p><p>When you take a different approach and ask people to rate different options of family life, you get a far more accurate idea of what people are happy with. My research with colleagues has done just this. I found that people still valued parenthood. But they valued having one child just as highly as having two or three.</p><p>Family values</p><p>A family isn’t just about the number of children. There are a whole range of other things to consider when thinking about what your ideal family might look like. Are you married, cohabiting, or a single parent? Who does the washing up and changes the nappies? What does the work-life balance in your family look like?</p><p>When you bring in factors like this, the ideal number of children starts to change.</p><p>We carried out research with around 10,000 people in a range of countries: the US, Norway, Italy, Spain, Japan, China, South Korea and Singapore. We showed each person in the study six scenarios with descriptions of different families. Half of the respondents were shown scenarios that included families with no children as well as with children, and the other half saw scenarios that included families with one, two or three children.</p><p>These scenarios had further varying factors, such as traditional or egalitarian gender roles and the amount of contact with extended family. In some, family members communicated well, and not in others. We asked the people in our study to rate these different scenarios on a scale from one to ten.</p><p>The findings are clear. Looking at all the responses, overall people do feel that a family with no children is not ideal. Parenthood still matters. But there is no discernable difference in how people rated the families with one, two or three children.</p><p>The only outlier is China, where people viewed having three children somewhat negatively: understandable after decades of policies curbing fertility. Nowhere in our study was having just one child viewed more negatively.</p><p>What does come out very strongly is the role of communication, both within the nuclear family but also with grandparents. This characteristic is the most important feature of the ideal family of today.</p><p>If you think about it, this finding is not all too unexpected. Good communication means strong emotional support — and that is what most people would like to receive from a family. If communication breaks down, then why bother with having a family if you can get the necessary support elsewhere through friends and other social networks?</p><p>Other features matter too — obviously. Respondents viewed low income negatively (apart from in Norway). More egalitarian gender roles and good work-life balance are important. But our findings, which are remarkably similar across different countries, show that good communication matters the most in people’s vision for good family life — more than the number of children they might have.</p><p><em>This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article:</em></p><p><a href="https://theconversation.com/most-people-would-be-equally-satisfied-with-having-one-child-as-with-two-or-three-new-research-222567"><em>https://theconversation.com/most-people-would-be-equally-satisfied-with-having-one-child-as-with-two-or-three-new-research-222567</em></a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3bb0ab86660a" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Taking Putin to Court?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@bocconiuniversity/taking-putin-to-court-0313c5e876f0?source=rss-52ae1adc26c5------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/0313c5e876f0</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[war-crimes]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[international-justice]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[putin]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Bocconi University]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 22 Jan 2024 15:30:47 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-01-22T15:30:47.046Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Europe’s moral and practical response against the Russian invasion of Ukraine has seen a flourishing of initiatives on international criminal justice. However, not everything that has been proposed is legally justifiable, such as the prosecution of a sitting head of state without the consent of that state</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*e8GWI9vFQ_yr2Fyr" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@jdomito?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">José Pablo Domínguez</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p><em>by Roger O’Keefe, Professor at the Department of Legal Studies, Bocconi University</em><br> <br> ‘We will leave no stone unturned to hold Putin and his henchmen accountable.’ The stirring words of Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, in July 2023 speak to Europe’s leadership of criminal-justice responses to Russia’s brutal attack on Ukraine. For eighteen months the European Union (EU), the Council of Europe and individual European states have been at the forefront of efforts to bring to justice those responsible, especially at the highest levels, for what are credibly alleged to be international crimes committed in the context of the conflict — war crimes and crimes against humanity on a massive scale, perhaps even the crime of genocide, and the crime of aggression constituted by the unlawful invasion itself.<br> <br> European states were instrumental in the March 2022 referral of the situation in Ukraine to the International Criminal Court (ICC), which one year later issued a warrant for the arrest of Vladimir Putin for alleged war crimes. Seven of these states have also combined with Ukraine and the ICC to deploy, with the assistance of the European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation (Eurojust), a joint investigations team to facilitate both international and national investigations into international crimes in Ukraine. In further support of all such efforts, Eurojust now hosts too the Core International Crimes Evidence Database and the International Centre for the Prosecution of the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine. Additionally, the EU has joined with the UK and the US to form the Atrocity Crimes Advisory Group, which lends technical expertise to improve the capabilities of the War Crimes Unit of the Office of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine.<br> <br> A separate focus has been a civil-society proposal, backed politically by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe but still under discussion, to establish a special international criminal tribunal or internationally-assisted tribunal within the Ukrainian criminal justice system to prosecute the Russian and Belorussian leadership for the crime of aggression, which falls outside the jurisdiction of the ICC in this instance.<br> <br> The moral and practical leadership shown by Europe in these ways is a fitting response to the revulsion and anger felt across the continent at the horrors visited on the Ukrainian people by ordinary Russian soldiers, their military commanders and those in charge of their country and its Belorussian satrapy. At the same time, it presents challenges both legal and political.<br> <br> Legally, the prosecution of the sitting head of a foreign state before a national or international court without the express or implied consent of that state is difficult to justify in the light of the immunity from prosecution by other states from which that head of state benefits under international law. The same goes for the prosecution of any serving or former foreign state functionary, including ordinary soldier, in respect of acts performed on behalf of the state. That said, some European states claim that the latter is not the case in respect of alleged international crimes, while the ICC has held, albeit unconvincingly, that even the former is not so for an international criminal court. The fact remains, however, that Russia cannot be legally compelled to surrender suspects to either a foreign or international criminal court. While this does not prevent prosecution <em>in absentia</em> before a Ukrainian or other national court, it bars the trial of Putin and others before the ICC.<br> <br> Politically, the establishment an international tribunal specifically to try Putin and others for the crime of aggression would smack of selectivity, even hypocrisy, given the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, NATO’s military campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999 and other manifest yet unpunished violations of the UN Charter.<br> <br> The wisest course of action for the EU and European states for now would be simply to continue to support and cooperate in the collection, preservation and sharing of evidence, including with the ICC, of international crimes in the context of the war in Ukraine and to continue to help to build capacity to prosecute such crimes at the national level, especially in Ukraine. The future is unknowable, but it is prudent to be ready for favourable twists of fate.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=0313c5e876f0" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Differing inflation in UK, US and Europe]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@bocconiuniversity/differing-inflation-in-uk-us-and-europe-4aee42ad77ba?source=rss-52ae1adc26c5------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/4aee42ad77ba</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[economy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[central-bank]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[inflation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[interest-rates]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Bocconi University]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 14 Dec 2023 10:32:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-12-14T10:33:04.140Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>How inflation stories in the three major economies are divergent and what it means for interest rates</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/850/1*kC4GF01K8vodNcokD68MFg.jpeg" /></figure><p><em>by Daniel Gros, Director of the Institute for European Policymaking (IEP@BU) at Bocconi University, and Pietro Galeone, research fellow IEP@BU</em></p><p>The Bank of England’s governor has <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cjrpzxpv90eo">repeatedly warned</a> that it will not cut UK interest rates <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2023/11/02/bank-of-england-leaves-interest-rates-unchanged.html">any time soon</a>, even with a recent sharp fall in consumer price inflation.</p><p>Like central banks in the US and eurozone, the bank has been sharply increasing its base rate to try to tame a spike in inflation. But this has increased the interest people must pay on loans like mortgages, as well as businesses’ financing costs, leading to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/markets/rates-bonds/uk-economy-shows-signs-slowdown-boe-rate-hikes-mount-2023-08-23/">an economic slowdown</a>.</p><p>Inflation has roared back around the world over the past two years after many years of “low-flation”. A period of slow consumer price growth since the mid-2010s had left central banks struggling for ways to stimulate economic activity. But how they have tackled inflation since have diverged in line with the specific issues and items driving price growth in each economy. Understanding these differences could shed light on the likely direction of interest rates in the coming months.</p><p>When COVID hit and lockdown measures stopped the economy altogether, price pressures fell even more than they had during the low-flation period. Some inflation gauges even turned negative. The world’s major central banks used more monetary stimulus to keep their economies afloat. The eurozone implemented the pandemic emergency purchase programme (<a href="https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/implement/pepp/html/index.en.html">PEPP</a>), while <a href="https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/coronavirus">the UK</a> and <a href="https://www.stlouisfed.org/open-vault/2020/august/fed-response-covid19-pandemic">the US</a> came up with similar measures.</p><p>The COVID recession also had a particularly pronounced effect on energy prices — US <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-52350082">oil prices even went negative</a> for a few days in March 2020.</p><p>But this shock was temporary. As lockdowns eased throughout the western world in the second half of 2020 and into 2021, the economy jumped back quickly. This happened faster and to a greater extent than anyone had anticipated thanks to the stimulus programmes countries enacted.</p><p><strong>Diverging fortunes</strong></p><p>Of course, since every country didn’t experience this snapback at the same time, global supply chains could not keep up. Production in some countries was still in lockdown, while in others factories were ramping up production as people in recovering countries were starting to buy again. Orders became backlogged and shipments were queued.</p><p><a href="https://theconversation.com/global-economy-2023-covid-19-turned-global-supply-chains-upside-down-3-ways-the-pandemic-forced-companies-to-rethink-and-transform-how-they-source-their-products-196764">These bottlenecks</a> led to shortages and price hikes for many goods — from <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2021/08/25/auto-industry-supply-chains-hit-hardest-during-covid-pandemic-survey.html">cars</a> to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/technology/apples-iphone-shipments-seen-sagging-under-china-disruptions-2022-11-30/">phones</a> to over-the-counter <a href="https://www.fastcompany.com/90828462/from-baby-formula-to-tylenol-2022-was-the-year-in-shortages-but-whats-in-store-for-2023">pain meds and baby formula</a>.</p><p>Energy prices also shot up again. Crude oil prices reached pre-pandemic levels by <a href="https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/100615/will-oil-prices-go-2017.asp#:%7E:text=9-,WTI%20closed%20out%202020,-at%20around%20%2448">the end of 2020</a> and surpassed them throughout 2021. So even before the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, energy prices and the reopening of the economy were pushing inflation up.</p><p>The outbreak of the war in Ukraine gave energy prices another jolt, of course — especially natural gas in Europe. This led <a href="https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/explainers/will-inflation-in-the-uk-keep-rising#:%7E:text=For%20example%2C%20if%20there%20is,&#39;cost%2Dpush&#39;%20inflation.">central banks to argue</a> they were fighting global cost-push inflation. This means external factors were pushing up the prices of key goods, leaving central banks with little control.</p><p>But a closer look at the figures shows that the inflation stories in the three major economies of the US, UK and eurozone had already started to diverge at this point. Since then, they have become even more different.</p><p>In all three, inflation peaked at close to 10% in the second half of 2022, but the drivers differed. The following charts show the major contributors to overall consumer price inflation in each of these regions were energy, food and then services and other goods.</p><p>In the eurozone, inflation was mostly due to higher energy and, later, food prices. But in the UK and US the prices of non-energy, non-food items were more important to the inflationary push.</p><h3>The current inflation picture</h3><p>Now the height of the pandemic is behind these economies, supply chain pressures have eased, and energy prices are back to pre-war levels — hence the fall in inflation that’s <a href="https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/inflationandpriceindices/timeseries/l55o/mm23">now being reported</a> relative to last year.</p><p>But the latest headline inflation figures (October 2023) show that another item is now causing these three economies to diverge: housing.</p><p>The items that fuelled price inflation in the US, UK and Eurozone headline inflation rates in October 2023. US Bureau of Labor Statistics, Eurostat and UK Office for National Statistics</p><p>The US and the eurozone have similar headline inflation rates. But in the US, inflation is mainly driven by housing costs (which may be partly due to the way housing costs are measured in the US). In the eurozone, however, energy prices are now dragging down the rate of inflation — although that is offset to a large extent by food prices, which have continued to rise.</p><p>On the other hand, the UK has a higher inflation rate and the “all other items” category is now the biggest driver of price rises. So, in the UK, price increases across the board mean that inflationary pressures have spread from a few sectors, like energy or housing, to the broader economy. This makes inflation more sticky and requires more policy tightening to cool down the economy.</p><h3>More interest rate rises to come?</h3><p>All of this shows that, in the US and the eurozone there is little sign of broad-based inflation pressures at the moment. If energy prices remain constant and food prices stabilise, inflation might soon return to close to the 2% target most central banks aim for, even without further action by the US Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank.</p><p>The UK, by contrast, seems to have a more standard inflation problem with price pressures across a wider set of items that still need to be contained. This leaves the Bank of England with a harder job to do to bring inflation under control.</p><p>And so, we can expect inflation to keep slowing in the eurozone and the US without much intervention. In the UK, however, further action might be needed if the Bank of England is to keep price rises under control.</p><p><em>This article is republished from </em><a href="https://theconversation.com/"><em>The Conversation</em></a><em> under a Creative Commons license. Read the </em><a href="https://theconversation.com/inflation-has-affected-the-uk-us-and-europe-differently-heres-what-this-means-for-interest-rates-218561"><em>original article</em></a><em>: </em><a href="https://theconversation.com/inflation-has-affected-the-uk-us-and-europe-differently-heres-what-this-means-for-interest-rates-218561"><em>https://theconversation.com/inflation-has-affected-the-uk-us-and-europe-differently-heres-what-this-means-for-interest-rates-218561</em></a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4aee42ad77ba" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Shockwaves from the Netherlands]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@bocconiuniversity/shockwaves-from-the-netherlands-abb2b6f3556e?source=rss-52ae1adc26c5------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/abb2b6f3556e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[far-right]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[populism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[european-politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[dutch-elections]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[geert-wilders]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Bocconi University]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 24 Nov 2023 08:59:09 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-11-24T09:00:06.804Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Election victory for Party for Freedom fits into a wider picture of European radical-right populism and has sent shockwaves through the political establishment</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/768/1*Es5kdZ1tVLkKkPUf_jYTuQ.jpeg" /></figure><p><em>by Catherine de Vries, Dean of International Affairs and Professor of Political Science, Bocconi University</em></p><p>The results of the Dutch election, in which Geert Wilders’ Party for Freedom emerged as victors, have sent shockwaves through the political establishment.</p><p>For the first time in Dutch history, a party of the extreme right is the largest in the national parliament. Wilders is an eccentric politician known for his inflammatory rhetoric. He advocates the Netherlands leaving the European Union and has called Islam a “fascist” religion. In a 2016 trial, he was found guilty of inciting discrimination (but received no penalty for the crime).</p><p>While polling leading up to the election had suggested that Party for Freedom could become the largest party, it had appeared to be running practically neck and neck with the parties of the mainstream left and right. But the polls were wide of the mark and Wilders ended up taking the most seats by a comfortable margin, even if he will need to seek coalition partners to form a government.</p><p>Rightwing newcomers the New Social Contract also did very well. Like Party for Freedom, this party sees immigration as one of the reasons for problems such as the Netherlands’ congested public services and lack of affordable housing. However, Pieter Omtzigt, the New Social Contract’s leader (and a former member of parliament for the more centre-right Christian Democratic Party), is critical of some of Wilders’ more inflammatory rhetoric.</p><p>Omtzigt would nevertheless seem the most likely candidate to form a coalition with Wilders, together with the former party of the now-departed prime minister, Mark Rutte. But it will be some time before it’s clear if such a partnership is achievable. Coalition in the Netherlands is the work of months rather than weeks.</p><p>These talks will be all the more complex thanks to Wilders’ personal profile. He may hold the greatest number of seats, but the controversy that has surrounded him for so many years may yet rule him out of the role of prime minister, even were he to be part of a governing coalition.</p><p>Should a coalition be formed, questions about the Netherlands’ place in the EU will inevitably come to the fore. Wilders wants a Brexit-style referendum and, even if this doesn’t materialise, we can expect him to bring a more Eurosceptic stance to any government in which he participates.</p><p>This could have considerable consequences for the EU. Even when extreme-right parties in Europe differ on the question of exit, they agree on transforming the EU into a more intergovernmental body, taking power away from Brussels.</p><p>Wilders will be conscious of how the Italian elections played out last year for Italy’s prime minister, Giorgia Meloni, with whom he shares a certain ideological affinity. Meloni’s radical-right Brothers of Italy emerged as the strongest force in the 2022 vote and formed a coalition with other parties of the right and hard right.</p><p>Like Wilders, Meloni was seen as a political outsider and has long put immigration at the heart of political debate. But since coming to power, her strong anti-immigration rhetoric has had to be simmered down. She was quickly confronted with calls from the business community to address Italy’s labour shortage, which meant granting permits for migrant workers.</p><p>In my book Political Entrepreneurs, co-authored with Sara Hobolt from the London School of Economics, we show that governing changes political parties. It is relatively easy to gripe from the sidelines but in government, parties bear responsibility for policy. They have to make decisions, weigh up interests — and can only spend money once. Meloni, like the leaders of so many other populist parties, quickly lost her sharp edge once she became the person in charge.</p><p>Most notably for Wilders, the Brothers of Italy had also campaigned with a Eurosceptic tone during the election, but can now be found walking in lockstep with Brussels even on matters relating to immigration. Meloni has even made a show of her closeness with European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen.</p><p>That said, the Italian experience also offers another example that Wilders may find appealing. In our research, we’ve found that parties that have become popular by opposing existing politics sometimes prefer to keep one foot in the government and one foot out. This is certainly the case for Matteo Salvini, leader of the Lega party and a junior coalition partner to Meloni.</p><p>Salvini never misses an opportunity to boost his own profile, even if it causes his government difficulty. Only a junior coalition partner can get away with such antics, since a prime minister faces far more pressure. Wilders may therefore find it most convenient to follow Salvini’s path rather than Meloni’s.</p><p>Whichever route he takes, if Wilders becomes part of a government, the results of these elections are certain to have consequences for Dutch relations with the rest of Europe.The Conversation</p><p><em>This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article:</em></p><p><a href="https://theconversation.com/geert-wilders-how-election-victory-in-the-netherlands-for-party-for-freedom-fits-into-a-wider-picture-of-european-radical-right-populism-218477"><em>https://theconversation.com/geert-wilders-how-election-victory-in-the-netherlands-for-party-for-freedom-fits-into-a-wider-picture-of-european-radical-right-populism-218477</em></a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=abb2b6f3556e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Commercial funding is vital to future of space exploration]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@bocconiuniversity/commercial-funding-is-vital-to-future-of-space-exploration-2496c763c083?source=rss-52ae1adc26c5------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2496c763c083</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[space]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[space-flight]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[space-economy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[space-agency]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[space-exploration]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Bocconi University]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 08 Nov 2023 09:46:55 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-11-08T09:46:55.356Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The importance of private enterprise and commercial funding to develop and democratize space exploration is highlighted by UK Space Agency’s agreement with Axiom Space company to develop a space mission together</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*GMuOvQH_35pJEPuW" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@mike_kiev?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Photobank Kiev</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p><em>by Simonetta Di Pippo, Director of the Space Economy Evolution Lab, SDA Bocconi</em></p><p>The UK Space Agency has signed an agreement with a US company called Axiom Space to develop a space mission carrying four astronauts from the UK. The flight would most likely use the SpaceX Crew Dragon vehicle and travel to the International Space Station (ISS).</p><p>The crew is expected to include a reserve astronaut recently selected by the European Space Agency (Esa) and two other commercial astronauts. There are also reports it could be commanded by the recently retired Tim Peake.</p><p>By taking this step, the UK is joining other countries on a commercial path to human spaceflight. It’s a very significant one too, because commercial funding is absolutely crucial to the future of space exploration. As a former Esa director of human spaceflight (at the time Peake was hired), I believe this will position the UK to participate in a growing space economy, help democratise space and inspire new generations of students to study science and engineering.</p><p>In 1998, Esa decided it would employ and train its own astronauts. Prior to that, few European countries had astronauts flying under their national banner. Esa’s decision was intended to reinforce its role in spaceflight internationally. At the time, the agency had also decided that it wanted to strengthen the ISS collaboration and also wanted to get the most out of it. Astronauts were one way to do this.</p><p>Prior to 1998, the UK had produced several astronauts and potential astronauts. Michael Foale, born in Lincolnshire, had dual UK-US nationality and flew to space as a Nasa astronaut. Helen Sharman went to orbit in 1991 as part of an arrangement with the Russian government.</p><p>As a result of the European astronaut corps being created in 1998, national astronaut corps in Esa member states were dismantled.</p><p>In those countries, including the UK, the focus shifted to selecting astronauts through the Esa process. However, while the UK participated enthusiastically in other Esa programmes, it did not show a great deal of interest in the agency’s optional human spaceflight programme.</p><p>While UK was not contributing to the Esa human spaceflight programme, other member states were strong supporters. However, selections were open to all European citizens, and correctly so.</p><p>Fast forward to May 20, 2009, when I was Esa’s director of Human Spaceflight. Officials and journalists were crowded into a room on the fourth floor of Esa’s headquarters at Rue Mario Nikis in Paris to hear the announcement of six new astronauts who would join the space agency. I had chaired the committee that had interviewed the group of 22 candidates who remained after a one year long selection process managed by the European Astronaut Center (EAC) in Germany.</p><p>As I announced the six new astronauts, the room exploded at one name in particular: Tim Peake’s. Considering that the UK was not involved in this optional programme, there were no expectations a British astronaut would be announced. But Peake was an exceptional candidate who deserved his selection.</p><p>Immediately afterwards, the UK minister for science and innovation, Lord Drayson, called Esa. As a result of this phone call, I rushed to Gare du Nord, took a train, and arrived in London for an unplanned meeting with the minister. Sometime later, the UK joined Esa’s human spaceflight programme.</p><p>Rapid changes</p><p>A lot has changed since 2009, however. Innovation in the area of spaceflight is increasing exponentially. Just look at the Starship programme managed by Elon Musk’s SpaceX, or Jeff Bezos’ Blue Origin, which is developing new rockets and a new vehicle to land on the Moon.</p><p>The ISS’s lifetime has been extended until 2030 — after which it will be decommissioned, re-entering the Earth’s atmosphere over the Pacific Ocean. However, commercial companies in the US are developing their own private space stations.</p><p>One of those companies is Axiom Space. Based in Houston, Axiom wants to build a space station that will be operational from 2028. In its first phase, it will have two or more modules docked to the ISS. Once they are ready, the Axiom station will be detached so that it can function independently.</p><p>In preparation for their space station’s operations phase, Axiom has begun sending commercially funded missions to the ISS using SpaceX’s Crew Dragon vehicle. These have been commanded by ex-Nasa astronauts but carry non-professionals.</p><p>The recent Ax2 mission, for example, was commanded by ex-Nasa astronaut Peggy Whitson and carried a racing driver and investor, John Schoffner, who paid for his flight, as well as two Saudi Arabian commercial astronauts sponsored by the Saudi Space Commission. An upcoming mission, Ax3, will fly to the ISS in January 2024.</p><p>Ax4, expected to take place mid-2024, could be the target for this all-UK crew — although they might have to wait for a later mission.</p><p>All of this is happening as Esa’s latest astronaut class, chosen in 2022 and the first since Peake’s intake in 2009, is being prepared for missions to low Earth orbit and later, beyond. In this new class are five career astronauts, 11 reserve astronauts reserve and one astronaut with a disability.</p><p>So the rise of the commercial astronaut provides access to space for countries that may not have a longstanding relationship with one of the big space agencies and therefore support the process of democratising space.</p><p>The benefits that come from the use of space-based data and infrastructure are increasingly evident, and more attention from the general public helps put space on the map for policy and decision makers in a virtuous circle.</p><p>Space is indispensable for tackling climate change, in disaster management, global health, in agriculture, education, digital transformation and the green economy.</p><p>Therefore, a commercially funded mission to cost around £200m carrying UK-born commercial astronauts Rosemary Coogan (also selected as an Esa reserve astronaut), John McFall and Meganne Christian could be seen as a good investment. The mission will also undoubtedly produce good outcomes, including scientific results.</p><p>Peake will reportedly come out of retirement to lead this first all-UK astronaut mission, following his last flight back in 2015.</p><p>The space economy is a blooming flower that we must support in order for it to grow. The pay-off will benefit us all.The Conversation</p><p><em>This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article:</em></p><p><a href="https://theconversation.com/all-uk-astronaut-mission-shows-that-private-enterprise-is-vital-to-the-future-of-space-exploration-216762"><em>https://theconversation.com/all-uk-astronaut-mission-shows-that-private-enterprise-is-vital-to-the-future-of-space-exploration-216762</em></a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2496c763c083" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Europe yes, but not too integrated…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@bocconiuniversity/europe-yes-but-not-too-integrated-b280e6c21527?source=rss-52ae1adc26c5------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b280e6c21527</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[brexit]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[single-market]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[european-integration]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[europe]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[european-union]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Bocconi University]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 31 Oct 2023 14:24:39 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-10-31T14:24:39.190Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Europe yes, but not too integrated…</strong></p><p>Among European citizens, support for remaining in the EU is overall higher today than in previous years. However, support for expansion and further political and economic integration remains rather lukewarm</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*Jkk1s3pax9T9DSNx" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@oliver_photographer?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Oliver Cole</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p><em>by Catherine De Vries, Professor of Political Science and Dean for International Affairs, Bocconi University</em></p><p>In 2023, we celebrate the 30th anniversary of the European single market. Established on the 1st of January 1993, the European single market is a cornerstone of European integration securing the European Union’s so-called four freedoms: free movement of goods, capital, services, and people. The single market is clearly one of the EU’s greatest achievements. In fact, based on calculations by the European Commission Europe’s GDP is almost 10% higher because of it. The single market will also be crucial for Europe’s future, especially when it comes to securing the digital and green transitions.</p><p>That said, the single market is also contested. For example, the Bolkestein directive (officially the Services in the Internal Market Directive) that established a single market for services in 2006 was highly controversial. Critics feared that the directive would lead to social dumping, the process whereby employers rely on cheaper labor from other countries, or moving production to a low-wage member state to keep labor costs down. The functioning of the European single market has also come under pressure due to its potential role in increasing inequality within and between member states. While it is difficult to establish what exactly contributed to growing inequality, the ability of EU institutions to combat it is not completely warranted, especially due to the fact that social policy is not an area in which in the EU has much authority.</p><p>The European Commission has focused on proposing steps to complete the single market to improve on its weaknesses in order to increase growth and competitiveness in the EU. A variety of proposals have been discussed, such as the deepening and completing of the capital market and banking union to spur EU-wide investment or accelerating the green and energy transition. What these different proposals have in common is that they would entail steps towards further integration, and require support of member states and their populations. In light of this, it might be important to know where the public stands when it comes to more political and economic integration.</p><p>Together with Isabell Hoffmann of the Bertelsmann Foundation, we have conducted public opinion surveys, eupinions.eu, on a representative survey of EU citizens four times a year since 2015. For the sake of brevity, I will rely on two sets of questions. First, we asked about people’s support for EU membership, especially if there would be a referendum on your country’s EU membership today, would vote for your country to remain or leave. Second, we asked if people would be in favor of more political and economic integration in the future. Let’s start with reviewing public support for EU membership.</p><p>At the start of our survey period in 2015 with the migration crisis and Brexit in 2016, the EU’s trajectory looked very shaky. This was reflected in people’s opinion towards the EU. For example, support for EU membership in Italy dipped under the 50 per cent in March 2017. After another dip during the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, Italian support for EU membership by mid-2023 is now quite high at 68 percent. The Italian developments actually reflect EU-wide trends. Support for remaining in the EU is overall quite high at an average of about 74% across EU member states in June 2023.</p><p>Yet, this support does not necessarily imply that the EU public supports further integrative steps. The survey suggests that within the EU-27 support for further integration actually decreased between July 2015 from 58 per cent to 49 per cent in June 2023.</p><p>Overall, these findings suggest that while public support for EU membership is strong, enthusiasm for “more Europe” is at best lukewarm. What does this mean for further steps to complete the single market? The political path to achieve these will be far from straightforward, but highly uncertain.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b280e6c21527" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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