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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Boris Gloger on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Boris Gloger on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Boris Gloger on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@borisgloger?source=rss-c772e32f35e5------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[Requirements Engineering Is Finally Dead — and AI Killed What Agile Couldn’t]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@borisgloger/requirements-engineering-is-finally-dead-and-ai-killed-what-agile-couldnt-65c8dc219953?source=rss-c772e32f35e5------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[ai]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[product-management]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[software-engineering]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[agile]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Boris Gloger]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 16 Jun 2026 06:36:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-06-16T06:36:00.584Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Frankfurt, 1999. I was a business analyst at Electronic Data Systems. My job: gather requirements, design data schemas, draw entity-relationship diagrams. Everything had to be fully specified before a single line of code was written. I learned the Rational Unified Process. I learned how to write use cases, structure requirements documents, distill stakeholder interviews into specifications.</p><p>All of it built on one belief: if I can just specify precisely enough, if I can just document thoroughly enough — then I will capture the right requirements and we will build the right system.</p><p>Requirements Engineering was the priesthood of that faith. Requirements engineers were translators between an unclear “business” world and a supposedly stupid technical one. They were supposed to turn the fuzzy into the precise, the living into the documented. And it never worked. Not once.</p><h3>The hierarchy wasn’t competence. It was power.</h3><p>Over twenty years I’ve watched a social hierarchy that holds everywhere — in banks in London, insurers in Munich, telcos in Dubai, payers in Houston. At the top: the business — the people who say what they want. Then the requirements engineering department — the translators. Then the system architects. Then the software engineers. At the bottom: the operations team keeping the whole thing alive.</p><p>That wasn’t a description of competence. It was a description of power. The further up you sat, the more you got to dictate what should be built. The further down, the less you got to ask whether it made any sense at all. Requirements Engineering institutionalised this power relationship. It was functional — not for the software, but for the organisation.</p><p>Niklas Luhmann would say: Requirements Engineering was a type of communication that hid the problem of non-communication. Two people from different social systems — a business person and a technical person — fundamentally don’t understand each other. They have different codes, different truths, different urgencies. The long meetings, the documentation, the user-story workshops — all of it gave everyone the feeling that communication had occurred. It had not.</p><h3>Twenty years of arguing against writing it down</h3><p>Vienna, 2002. I found Scrum. I was one of the first to try to rebuild Sprint Planning into a hardcore requirements-engineering session — except this time the whole team brought its knowledge to the table. The team wrote its own requirements. The team understood what to build. The team became the requirements engineer. An emergent architecture, no translators between will and work.</p><p>The architects didn’t want this. The business analysts didn’t want it. The managers didn’t want it. They didn’t give up requirements engineering — they renamed it. User stories. Acceptance criteria. Definition of Done. It survived because even agile teams needed the belief that, with enough structure and communication, you would build the right thing.</p><p>But I always knew: you can’t write it down. Not really. Not completely. Wittgenstein showed in the Philosophical Investigations that every linguistic utterance is at home in a practice. Meaning doesn’t arise through depiction — it arises through use. When a business analyst writes “the system shall allow the user to retrieve their account balance”, that is not a picture of reality. It is a move in a language game called Requirements Engineering. It follows the rules of that game. But it says nothing reliable about what the user actually needs.</p><h3>2026: disposable software</h3><p>Now something has happened that changes everything. Not philosophically. Practically.</p><p>I’ve been working with Cursor, Claude Code, Codex for months. You open the IDE. You write what you want in natural language. The system builds it. In minutes, not months. You immediately see whether your idea works or is nonsense. You change it. The system rebuilds. You change again. In four minutes you’ve done three iterations — what used to take you four weeks.</p><p>The critical thing: if it doesn’t fit, you throw it away. Disposable software. You rebuild it. From scratch. Differently. The cost of a wrong decision is no longer six lost months of development. It’s ten minutes.</p><p>That doesn’t just make Requirements Engineering redundant. It makes the entire mindset that Requirements Engineering rested on obsolete: that you have to know what you want before you start.</p><p>You don’t have to know it. You learn it by starting.</p><h3>What the machine needs is not specification. It is domain.</h3><p>Take a better insulin pump. In the old model I would spend months gathering requirements. Stakeholder interviews. Use cases. Non-functional requirements. System architecture reviews. With an AI I do something different. I feed it science — how blood works, the physics of insulin delivery — and constraints — FDA rules, ISO norms, MDR in Europe, DHA in the Emirates. Then I say: Build me a better insulin pump than anything currently on the market — and make it more pleasant for the people who have to wear it.</p><p>That is not a requirement in the classical sense. It is a space of possibilities, bounded by constraints and informed by science. The AI explores. I see results and say: no, not like that. Or: yes, more of this.</p><p>No requirements engineer sits between me and what gets built. The power structure — business says, engineering builds — dissolves. Not because of a better methodology. Because of a different technology.</p><h3>What remains: domain intelligence</h3><p>Gartner says 80% of the engineering workforce will need to be upskilled by 2027. Andrey Karpathy is sharper: Software is changing again. You no longer write code. You orchestrate agents that write code. And what do I see? Conference titles like “Requirements Engineering Meets AI”. Seminars on “Prompt Engineering for Business Analysts”.</p><p>That is not reinvention. That is better carriage design in the age of the automobile. The honest sentence would be: we now teach domain expertise and AI collaboration. But that would mean abandoning requirements engineering as a discipline.</p><p>Domain expertise becomes more important, not less. But it becomes different. The question is no longer what should the system do? — an AI can explore that faster than any requirements engineer ever could. The question is: what must it not do? What are the constraints? What is the science behind it? What are the regulations that actually apply in your market — Frankfurt, London, Dubai, Houston?</p><p>That isn’t requirements engineering. It’s something else. It doesn’t have a clean name yet. Maybe domain intelligence. Maybe constraint thinking. It needs more thinking and less process. More understanding and less documentation.</p><p>Sometimes I imagine what a software team at the end of 2026 would say if someone uttered the phrase “requirements engineering”. They’d probably ask: What is that?</p><p>And that is not tragic. The world has moved on. We can finally start to actually build.</p><p><em>Boris Gloger introduced Scrum to the German-speaking world in 2003. He now writes about leadership in the AI era from Vienna.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=65c8dc219953" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Stop Starting, Start Finishing — Why Focus Is the Operating System of AI-Era Engineering]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@borisgloger/stop-starting-start-finishing-why-focus-is-the-operating-system-of-ai-era-engineering-b9823ab66650?source=rss-c772e32f35e5------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[agile]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[product-management]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[leadership]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ai]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Boris Gloger]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 09 Jun 2026 08:36:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-06-09T08:36:00.679Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>On a conference stage in Vienna years ago, the Dutch consultant Arne Roock projected four words onto the slide that have stuck with me ever since: “Stop starting, start finishing.” Four words. A whole management philosophy.</p><p>And yet — in most engineering organisations I visit, from Vienna to Munich to Zurich to London to Dubai, the opposite happens. Things get started. Things get started. Things get started. And two-thirds of them sit there, half-built, forever.</p><h3>Why starting is so easy</h3><p>Starting a new project costs a leader nothing. An email, a slide in the quarterly review, a new epic in Jira — done. It looks decisive, energetic, modern. I’ve watched it happen in board meetings many times: the CEO under pressure announces three new initiatives. The CTO nods. The audience claps. Three months later, all three exist — on slides. None of them is live. Nobody has stopped anything.</p><p>Finishing a project costs courage. Finishing means either done — and you now own what happens in the market — or killed — and you’ve admitted the original decision is no longer defensible. Both are uncomfortable. Starting is always easier than shipping.</p><p>The consequence is visible everywhere: engineering teams working on 17 initiatives in parallel, none shipped in months. CFOs starting to ask why engineering costs are rising while time-to-market collapses. Boards — understandably — starting to believe in “AI Transformation”, because at least that sounds like motion.</p><h3>The math of the multi-tasking trap</h3><p>Eli Goldratt proved it in the Theory of Constraints: load a system’s bottleneck beyond 100% and the queue grows exponentially. Translated to software: if a team works on five initiatives at once, each one sits idle 80% of the time on average — waiting for code review, for stakeholder feedback, for a decision. Flow efficiency — time-on-value divided by total time — collapses below 20%.</p><p>DORA, Forsgren and the entire lean camp have been preaching the same sentence for two decades: Reduce work-in-progress. Limit parallel work. Finish before you start. This is not Kanban folklore. It’s queuing math.</p><h3>AI makes the focus lever bigger, not smaller</h3><p>In the Cursor era, the reflex to start more things sounds plausible. We can build faster now — so we can build more! Wrong. AI moves the bottleneck somewhere else. Writing code is no longer the bottleneck. The new bottleneck is: deciding what not to build. Reviewing whether what the machine produced is actually the right thing. Having the nerve to kill a feature that is technically elegant but solves no customer problem.</p><p>More parallel initiatives now mean: more reviews without depth. More “looks good, ship it” without judgment. More machine-built code that helps no one — produced in half the time, waiting in a full backlog.</p><p>Tobi Lütke at Shopify has described the inverse leverage: if AI triples the engineers, then product judgment has to triple — not output. Stripe has worked with hard WIP limits per squad for years. Klarna shrank engineering significantly in 2023/24 before rolling out AI broadly. The logic is always the same: fewer things in flight, more things shipped.</p><h3>What engineering leadership now means</h3><p>Leadership in the AI age is no longer about announcing new initiatives. It is about ending old ones. The question every quarterly review should ask first is: What did we stop last quarter? Not: What did we start?</p><p>In a bank in Frankfurt, I watched a new CIO request a list of every running IT initiative on day one. 247 of them. She killed 180. The remaining 67 were shipped within two quarters — with fewer engineers, at more pace. The line that stayed with me was hers: “Who else doesn’t dare to do this?”</p><p>WIP limits are not an engineering mechanic. They are a trust mechanic. They say: we trust our judgment about what not to build more than we trust our list of what could be built. In a world where AI cheapens the building, that is the core leadership skill that’s left.</p><p>Stop starting. Start finishing. Four words. The antidote to the AI-era plague of the infinite backlog.</p><p><em>Boris Gloger introduced Scrum to the German-speaking world in 2003. He now writes about leadership in the AI era from Vienna.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b9823ab66650" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Meetings Aren’t the Problem. Team Size Is.]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@borisgloger/meetings-arent-the-problem-team-size-is-4a75a2eb43d7?source=rss-c772e32f35e5------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[future-of-work]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[engineering-leadership]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ai]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[organizational-design]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[productivity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Boris Gloger]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 02 Jun 2026 06:26:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-06-02T06:26:00.688Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>A few years ago I worked with a large bank. The CEO was obsessed with making meetings more effective. Another attempt — I thought — to make meetings we don’t need slightly less painful. Scrum was, among other things, an attempt to reduce meetings. We didn’t fully succeed. But the logic was clear: if highly-paid people are going to sit in rooms together, at least make the format cheaper.</p><p>The industry reacts to this the way it always does. In the 1980s it was facilitation techniques — companies got rich selling pinboards and markers. Then Post-its. Then PowerPoint. Then Bezos’s “six-pager” and silent reading. We in the agile world tried mob working. Today it’s Fireflies, Otter, Fathom, Zoom AI Companion — all selling the same promise: you don’t have to listen anymore; the AI will summarise it for you.</p><p>None of it works. An entire industry lives off the fact that it doesn’t work.</p><h3>The symptom: 252% more meeting time</h3><p>Microsoft measured this, didn’t estimate it — across millions of Teams users: since February 2020, meeting time has tripled. 252% more time in meetings. And it was already absurd before. Before the pandemic, leaders averaged 23 hours per week in meetings. Twice what their counterparts spent in the 1960s.</p><p>The right question isn’t how to document meetings better. The right question is why we need so many of them. A perfect AI-generated summary of a useless meeting is still a summary of a useless meeting.</p><h3>The math nobody wants to look at</h3><p>In every Scrum training I run, I explain this over and over, and the response is always the same: We need project teams of 20 or 100 people, we have to coordinate, small teams only work in theory.</p><p>The formula is simple: n(n−1)/2. That’s how many communication paths a group has. With 5 people: 10 paths. Manageable. With 10: 45. With 20: 190. Each extra person doesn’t mean more capacity — it means more coordination. And coordination happens in meetings.</p><p>Robin Dunbar showed that our brains have a limit for close collaboration: five. Not ten. Five. Above that, we simplify relationships and communication becomes superficial. Fred Brooks made the same observation from software practice in 1975: “Adding manpower to a late software project makes it later.” Fifty years old. Still true. Organisations don’t learn it.</p><p>A 5-person Scrum team meets for its daily: 15 minutes, three questions, done. Everyone knows what the others are working on. Decisions get made immediately because context is shared and 10 communication paths are manageable. The same format with 12 people: 45 minutes, nobody listens, half are on their phones. No decision. Follow-up required. Same format — but 12 people have 66 communication paths. It doesn’t feel like six times worse. It feels like twenty times worse.</p><h3>Tiny teams are no longer a theory</h3><p>Some organisations get this. Lovable: $5M ARR, 11 employees. Midjourney: $200M ARR, around 30 people. Linear ran with under 30 engineers for years while attacking Jira head-on. Anduril builds defence software in pods of fewer than ten. The Austrian developer Peter Steinberger built OpenClaw alone, with his AI agents.</p><p>These organisations don’t have better meeting tools. They have fewer meetings because they have fewer people who need to coordinate. Tobi Lütke calls this “founder mode” at Shopify — the founder keeps working directly with small teams, not through ten layers of hierarchy. Paul Graham sharpened it into a category in 2024: the “manager mode” school, where scale means delegation and process, produces exactly the meeting layers we can no longer tolerate.</p><h3>Why 14 people still sit in the meeting</h3><p>I’ve often watched why: because it feels safe. Because nobody wants to be excluded. Because the organisation is built so that decisions only happen if everyone was there. That’s not a meeting problem. That’s a structural problem.</p><p>I’ve seen the cure work, multiple times. At a financial services company we split a 16-person project team into three groups of five. Weekly meeting hours fell from 32 to 12. Not because we cancelled meetings — but because the groups were small enough that everyone knew what everyone else was doing.</p><p>It sounds simple. But it requires something most organisations don’t have: the courage to take people out of meetings. Which means telling them: you’re not needed here. In a bank in Frankfurt, an insurer in Munich, an agency in London, a holding in Dubai — nobody says that easily.</p><h3>In the age of augmentation, the old logic collapses</h3><p>If an individual employee becomes three times more effective with AI, every redundant meeting isn’t an annoyance anymore. It’s a profit killer. One augmented person now does the work of three — but if they still have to synchronise with twelve other people, the leverage is gone.</p><p>The agile scaling frameworks (SAFe and friends) got this exactly wrong. They tried to translate the old idea — many people, many layers, much coordination — into agile language. They are even less sensible now than they were ten years ago. What we need is small teams, assembled differently.</p><p>I have to take the blame myself. I spent years moderating meetings with too many people in them. We were proud of using Open Space and Lean Coffee to get groups of 50 “effective”. The trick was always shrinking. Consultants also make good money on large rooms. We can manage these structures with expensive facilitation — knowing all along that we have failed to convince organisations to actually shrink the teams.</p><p>Meetings aren’t the problem. Team size is. And team size isn’t a technical problem. It’s a leadership problem. In the AI-agent era this only becomes more visible.</p><p>The uncomfortable question isn’t “How do we make our meetings better?” It’s: Why are 14 people sitting here? And who has the courage to change it?</p><p><em>Boris Gloger introduced Scrum to the German-speaking world in 2003. He now writes about leadership in the AI era from Vienna.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4a75a2eb43d7" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Unsichtbarkeit als Methode]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@borisgloger/unsichtbarkeit-als-methode-e67f21d9a8ce?source=rss-c772e32f35e5------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[feminismus]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politik]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[künstliche-intelligenz]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[gewalt-gegen-frauen]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[deepfakes]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Boris Gloger]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 29 May 2026 08:09:08 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-05-29T08:09:08.649Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>98,6 Prozent. Fast jeden Tag ein Femizid. Eine ganze Generation Mädchen. Was ein Staat täte, der das ernst nähme — und warum wir Männer das Problem sind.</em></p><p>Es war spät, ich fuhr mit dem Rad vom Flughafen durch die Nacht nach Hause, einen Vortrag im Ohr. Rainer Mühlhoff, Professor für Ethik der Künstlichen Intelligenz, sprach über „KI und den neuen Faschismus” — darüber, wie Gewalt gegen die Schwächeren zum prägenden Prinzip einer Gesellschaft werden kann. Leise, in Stufen, bis niemand mehr hinsieht. Ich hörte zu und hörte zu. Dann wurde er konkret: KI-Werkzeuge, mit denen sich jeder Mensch in eine diffamierende, sexualisierte Pose zwingen lässt. Diese Gewalt, sagte er, sei längst strukturell, und sie treffe vor allem Frauen.</p><p>Eine Zahl fiel. Am Morgen habe ich nachgesehen, wie bei jeder Zahl, die mich nachts nicht mehr loslässt. Sie stimmte nicht ganz. Was stimmte, war schlimmer.</p><p>Man muss es nicht zuspitzen. Es genügt, die Zahlen nebeneinanderzulegen. Der Vortrag war der Anlass. Das hier ist, was er ausgelöst hat.</p><h3>I. Die Tat, die jeder begehen kann</h3><p>Früher war das eine Sache für Spezialisten: Können, Rechenleistung, Datenmengen. Es traf fast nur Prominente. Vorbei. Heute genügt ein Foto aus den sozialen Medien — das Profilbild einer Kollegin, der Schnappschuss einer Mitschülerin. Gesicht plus fremder, nackter Körper, in Sekunden, täuschend echt. Jede Frau kann zum Material werden, ohne es je zu erfahren. Oder sie erfährt es, wenn das Bild längst geteilt ist.</p><p>Wie groß das ist, lässt sich nur schätzen. HateAid geht davon aus, dass neun von zehn solcher Deepfakes nicht-einvernehmliche Pornografie sind und sich fast ebenso viele gegen Frauen richten. Eine internationale Analyse fand zehntausende eigens trainierter Modelle — die überwältigende Mehrheit auf identifizierbare Frauen, viele auf Grundlage gewöhnlicher Profile aus dem Netz. In den Schlagzeilen kam das spätestens mit einem prominenten Fall an. Aber es geht nicht um den einen Fall. Es geht um das Muster.</p><h3>II. Was wir wissen — und seit wann</h3><p>Im Februar 2026 stellte das Bundeskriminalamt die Dunkelfeldstudie LeSuBiA vor, eine der größten ihrer Art. Über sechzig Prozent der sechzehn- und siebzehnjährigen Mädchen in Deutschland haben in fünf Jahren digitale Gewalt erlebt. Über die Hälfte einer Generation, bevor sie volljährig ist. Weniger als ein Zehntel der Taten wird angezeigt. Der Staat weiß das genau — er hat es selbst zählen lassen.</p><p>Wer das für ein Online-Phänomen hält, lege die Kriminalstatistik daneben. Bei schweren Sexualdelikten sind 98,6 Prozent der Tatverdächtigen Männer. In drei von vier Fällen kennt das Opfer den Täter: der Partner, der Vater, der Nachbar, der Vorgesetzte. Der Fremde im Park ist die Ausnahme; die Gefahr sitzt am eigenen Tisch. Fast jeden Tag stirbt eine Frau durch den Mann, mit dem sie lebt. Und die Grundzahl bewegt sich seit zwanzig Jahren kaum — global wie europäisch rund jede dritte Frau, Jahr für Jahr, fast unverändert.</p><p>98,6 Prozent ist eine Zahl über Männer, nicht über Pässe. Wer daraus ein Ausländerthema macht, will den Spiegel nicht halten.</p><h3>III. Was der Staat nicht tut</h3><p>Bei der Recherche stieß ich auf einen Satz, den ich zweimal lesen musste: Bis vor wenigen Wochen war es in Deutschland kein Verbrechen, eine Frau nackt zu erfinden. Strafbar war, das Bild weiterzugeben — und auch das nur unter Bedingungen. Das Herstellen selbst: frei. Für die Demütigung von Millionen Frauen hatte das Strafrecht keinen Paragraphen.</p><p>Erst am 17. April 2026 legte Justizministerin Hubig den Entwurf eines „Digitalen Gewaltschutzgesetzes” vor. Künftig soll auch das Herstellen strafbar sein, bis zu zwei Jahre; ein neuer Paragraf 201b soll persönlichkeitsverletzende Fälschungen erfassen; Plattformen sollen die Täter herausgeben müssen. Der Entwurf ist gut. Er ist überfällig. Im Bundestag fragt man die Ministerin, ob sie eine Ankündigungsministerin werden wolle.</p><p>Das ist die Pointe. Der Staat weiß es. Er hat die Studie beauftragt. Er hat den Entwurf. Und trotzdem vergeht Jahr um Jahr zwischen Erkenntnis und Handeln.</p><h3>IV. Unsichtbarkeit als Methode</h3><p>Man nennt so etwas Trägheit. Es ist Methode. Der Mechanismus ist einfach und deshalb wirksam: Kein Gesetz, keine Verfahren. Keine Verfahren, keine Statistik. Keine Statistik, kein Druck. Kein Druck, keine Änderung. Die Tat verschwindet nicht — sie wird nicht gezählt. Das Dunkelfeld ist kein Messfehler, es ist das Ergebnis. Was unsichtbar bleibt, kostet niemanden etwas.</p><p>Ich habe das schon an einem anderen Gegenstand beschrieben: einen Staat, der die Armen bis auf den Cent durchleuchtet und sein reichstes Prozent nicht einmal schätzen kann, weil ihm seit Abschaffung der Vermögenssteuer die Daten fehlen. Knappheit als Methode hieß das. Hier heißt es Unsichtbarkeit. Dasselbe Verfahren, anderer Schauplatz: Etwas bleibt im Dunkeln, weil das Dunkel jemandem nützt.</p><p>Und es bleibt die Frage, die Mühlhoffs Vortrag stellt: In wessen Händen liegt die Technik, wer sitzt an den Schaltern? Eine Industrie, deren Werkzeug zu neun Zehnteln der Erniedrigung von Frauen dient, nennt das einen Nebeneffekt. Die Stühle, an denen darüber entschieden wird, sind überwiegend von Männern besetzt, die es nicht eilig haben. Die Unsichtbarkeit ist kein Versehen. Sie ist eingebaut.</p><h3>V. Der sorgende Staat</h3><p>Was täte ein Staat, der das ernst nähme? Nicht der paternalistische Apparat, der Frauen vorschreibt, wie sie sich zu schützen haben. Der sorgende Staat — jene Instanz, die begreift, dass Plattformen auf Reichweite und Profit optimieren und überall dort versagen, wo es um Schutz und Würde geht.</p><p>Er bestrafte das Herstellen, nicht erst das Verbreiten; die Demütigung beginnt mit dem Bild, nicht mit dem Versand. Er zwänge die Plattformen, den Täter zu zeigen, statt ihn hinter Anonymität zu parken. Er gäbe den Gerichten Personal — Gesetze ohne Hände laufen ins Leere. Er baute Frauenhäuser, bis keine Frau mehr abgewiesen wird. Und vor allem: Er gestaltete vor, statt nachzubessern. Mariana Mazzucato nennt das <em>market shaping</em>. Eine Industrie, die weiß, dass ihre „Nudify”-Werkzeuge fast nur der Erniedrigung von Frauen dienen, gehört nicht gebeten, sich zu bessern. Sie gehört reguliert. Das ist nicht autoritär. Das ist das Mindeste.</p><h3>VI. Und wir Männer</h3><p>Vor dreißig Jahren saß ich an der TU Darmstadt in einem Seminar über Christoph Türckes <em>Sexus und Geist</em>; wir stritten über Feminismus in der Philosophie. Den Zivildienst davor hatte ich in einem Kindergarten geleistet. Und mit dem, wovon dieser Text handelt, kam ich früh in Berührung — nicht aus Büchern, sondern als meine damalige Partnerin mir erzählte, was ihr widerfahren war.</p><p>Ich dachte damals, wir wären auf dem Weg. Der Feminismus hatte begonnen, ich habe ihn als junger Mann mit ausgearbeitet, und ich nahm an, dreißig Jahre später sei das Schlimmste Geschichte. Die Zahlen sagen etwas anderes. Wir sind fast noch am Anfang.</p><p>Denn 98,6 Prozent — das ist keine Zahl über die anderen, nicht über zugewanderte Männer, nicht über eine kranke Minderheit. Das ist eine Zahl über uns. Über Männer in Beziehungen, in Familien, in Abhängigkeiten. Die digitalen Medien haben dem nichts genommen, sie haben nur ein neues, lautloses Instrument hinzugefügt.</p><p>Ich habe eine Tochter. Sie ist neun. Mein erster Reflex war: Ich muss sie beschützen. Es ist der falsche Reflex. Er misst die Sicherheit eines Mädchens an ihrer Beziehung zu einem Mann — sie ist meine Tochter, also schütze ich sie. Genau diese Besitzlogik ist Teil des Problems. Ich will meine Tochter nicht beschützen müssen. Ich will, dass Männer aufhören, der Grund zu sein, vor dem man sie beschützen müsste.</p><p>Und weil dreißig Jahre Einsicht nicht gereicht haben, bleibt am Ende vielleicht nur einer, der es ändern kann: der Staat. Indem er Frauen die Mittel gibt, sich zu wehren. Indem er genug Frauenhäuser baut. Indem er Gesetze macht, die wirken, statt zu wirken zu versprechen. Nicht damit jeder Mann seine Tochter beschützt — sondern damit keine Frau auf den Schutz eines Mannes angewiesen ist.</p><p>Das ist kein Frauenthema, das man den Frauen überlassen könnte. Es ist unseres.</p><h3>Was bleibt</h3><p>Mühlhoff endet mit drei Forderungen: Technik regulieren, sich auf die Grundrechte besinnen, den Rechtsstaat wiederbeleben. Ich füge eine hinzu. Sicherheit ist keine Gunst, die ein Vater gewährt. Sie ist das, was ein Staat herstellt — wenn er hinsieht.</p><p>Bisher sieht er nicht aus Unwissen weg. Er hat die Zahlen selbst erhoben. Er hat nur beschlossen, sie nicht zu sehen.</p><p><strong>Quellen und Belege:</strong></p><ul><li>Rainer Mühlhoff, Vortrag „KI und der neue Faschismus”, re:publica 2026; Buch <em>Künstliche Intelligenz und der neue Faschismus</em>, Reclam 2025. Professor für Ethik der Künstlichen Intelligenz, Universität Osnabrück.</li><li>Bundeskriminalamt, Dunkelfeldstudie „Lebenssituation, Sicherheit und Belastung im Alltag” (LeSuBiA), 10. Februar 2026: über 60 % der 16- bis 17-jährigen Frauen erlebten in fünf Jahren digitale Gewalt; weniger als zehn Prozent der Taten werden angezeigt. <a href="https://www.bka.de/DE/Presse/Listenseite_Pressemitteilungen/2026/Presse2026/260210_LeSuBiA.html">bka.de</a></li><li>Polizeiliche Kriminalstatistik 2025 (April 2026): bei schweren Sexualdelikten 98,6 % männliche Tatverdächtige; in rund drei von vier Fällen kannten sich Opfer und Täter. <a href="https://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/pressemitteilungen/DE/2026/04/pks2025-pm.html">bmi.bund.de</a></li><li>BKA, Bundeslagebilder „Häusliche Gewalt” und „Geschlechtsspezifisch gegen Frauen gerichtete Straftaten” 2024 (November 2025): 265.942 Opfer häuslicher Gewalt, 70,4 % weiblich; 132 durch Partnerschaftsgewalt getötete Frauen; fast täglich ein Femizid. <a href="https://www.bka.de/DE/Presse/Listenseite_Pressemitteilungen/2025/Presse2025/251121_PM_BLB_HG_StraftatengegenFrauen2024.html">bka.de</a></li><li>EU Gender-Based Violence Survey (Eurostat, FRA, EIGE), 25. November 2024: rund 1 von 3 Frauen erlebte körperliche/sexuelle Gewalt oder Drohungen; Grundrate seit 2014 nahezu unverändert (31,4 % → 30,7 %). <a href="https://fra.europa.eu/en/content/eu-gender-based-violence-survey">fra.europa.eu</a></li><li>WHO / UN Women / UNFPA, November 2025: fast 1 von 3 Frauen weltweit hat im Leben Partner- oder sexuelle Gewalt erlebt; seit 2000 kaum verändert. <a href="https://www.unfpa.org/press/lifetime-toll-840-million-women-faced-partner-or-sexual-violence">unfpa.org</a></li><li>HateAid, Themenseite Deepfakes: Schätzung, dass 90–95 % der Deepfakes nicht-einvernehmliche Pornografie sind, etwa 90 % gegen Frauen gerichtet (Werte aus ersten Studien). <a href="https://hateaid.org/deepfakes/">hateaid.org</a></li><li>Referentenentwurf „Digitales Gewaltschutzgesetz” des Bundesjustizministeriums (Hubig), 17. April 2026: Strafbarkeit auch des Herstellens pornografischer Deepfakes (bis zu zwei Jahre), neuer § 201b StGB, zivilrechtliche Auskunftspflichten der Plattformen. Parallele Bundesrats-Initiative § 201b StGB, BT-Drs. 21/1383.</li><li>Bezug: Boris Gloger, <em>Knappheit als Methode</em> und <em>Penthouse und Permakultur</em>, borisgloger.at; Mariana Mazzucato, <em>The Entrepreneurial State</em> (market shaping).</li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e67f21d9a8ce" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Velocity Was Never the Right Metric — and AI Just Made That Obvious]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@borisgloger/velocity-was-never-the-right-metric-and-ai-just-made-that-obvious-635573b2a1d3?source=rss-c772e32f35e5------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/635573b2a1d3</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[agile]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[future-of-work]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[engineering-leadership]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[leadership]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ai]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Boris Gloger]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 26 May 2026 08:26:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-05-26T08:26:00.649Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In 2010 I promised to double the velocity of any development team in six weeks. I put it on my website, said it on conference stages, and I delivered on it. Regularly.</p><p>Today I wonder whether that was one of my bigger mistakes.</p><p>Not because it wasn’t true. Teams really did get faster. More story points per sprint. Burndown charts going down, velocity going up, managers happy. All the numbers were moving in the right direction.</p><p>It’s just that nobody asked whether the right thing was moving.</p><h3>A number that calms boards</h3><p>Velocity was the perfect offer to a certain kind of management. A KPI that goes up. Visible. Comparable. Quarterly-friendly. You could drop it into a board deck and the CFO would nod: Engineering is shipping.</p><p>But velocity was never meant to be a planning instrument. It was a result. Charles Goodhart formulated the principle in 1975; Marilyn Strathern later distilled it to one line: When a measure becomes a target, it ceases to be a good measure. Goodhart was writing about British monetary policy. He could have been writing about sprint reviews.</p><p>Once velocity became the target, the predictable distortions kicked in. Teams estimated higher to keep the curve steady. Product owners sliced stories smaller so more would fit into a sprint. Managers compared teams — Team A delivers 60, Team B only 35, why? — without understanding that story points are a team-specific unit and not comparable. The whole industry measured speed and forgot direction.</p><p>The academic record proved the point a long time ago. Accelerate (Forsgren, Humble, Kim, 2018) showed that the best software organisations don’t define themselves through output metrics. They use DORA: Deployment Frequency, Lead Time for Changes, Change Failure Rate, Mean Time to Recovery. Four metrics — none of them measures how much a team produces. All four measure how fast a system learns.</p><h3>Then came the machine</h3><p>It’s here now. While you’re reading this, hundreds of thousands of engineers are writing code with Cursor, Claude Code, Codex. Lovable: eleven people, five million dollars in annual revenue. Midjourney: thirty people, two hundred million. Tobi Lütke now requires every Shopify employee to justify why they need a human for a task instead of AI. Productivity per head is exploding. This is not hype. It’s happening.</p><p>But this is exactly where the velocity reflex becomes dangerous. A 2023 controlled study found developers using GitHub Copilot solved an isolated task 55% faster. In a lab. One well-defined task. On complex real projects the effect shrank to under 10%. An Uplevel study in 2024 found the opposite: developers using AI tools took 19% longer — and at the same time believed they had been 20% faster.</p><p>The machine produces the feeling of speed. And humans confuse the feeling with reality. Exactly like with velocity.</p><p>What’s becoming scarce is not output. Output is abundant — the machine produces it almost for free. What’s becoming scarce is judgment. Nate B. Jones calls it “judgment density”: how much relevant pattern-recognition a human carries inside them. Not how much they produce, but how well they evaluate what was produced. His most extraordinary people, Jones says, operate at 25% of their capacity in most organisations. Not because they can’t do more. Because they are stuck in alignment loops and approval chains.</p><h3>The real problem is epistemic</h3><p>The obvious reflex: let the AI do the judging too. Code review by the machine. Architecture by the machine. Prioritisation by the machine. Jeff Sutherland — co-inventor of Scrum — is now marketing exactly that on scrum-ai.com.</p><p>I’ve tried it. Anyone working seriously with these tools has tried it. And yes — the machine can judge. Sometimes better than I can. But then I’m standing there with the machine’s judgment and I have to decide: Is this judgment any good?</p><p>Gregory Bateson called this deutero-learning in the 1970s. The observer observing the observer. Not “what is the right answer?” but “is the way I arrived at this answer the right way?” If I ask the machine whether my code is good, and it says yes — then I have to evaluate whether its yes is worth anything. That’s not a technical competence. That’s an epistemic problem.</p><h3>What engineering leaders have to change now</h3><p>Even DORA is no longer enough. DORA measures the team. What we’d actually need to measure — if we could — is the quality of decisions. How often does someone say no and turn out to be right? How often is a feature killed that was already fully implemented, because shipping it wouldn’t have made the product better? How often does someone notice that the machine has built an elegant solution to the wrong problem?</p><p>You can’t express that in story points. You can’t really express it in anything. And that is exactly what scares leaders. Because the implication is uncomfortable: Trust people. Not numbers.</p><p>I sold velocity for years so I could get permission to introduce Scrum at all. I made teams faster and got paid for it. They didn’t get faster because I was a brilliant consultant — they got faster because they started talking to each other. They estimated together because they wanted to understand. They shipped more often because shorter cycles produced faster feedback. Velocity went up because everything else got better.</p><p>But what I sold was the number. Not the understanding. Not the feedback. The curve going up — because that’s what the market wanted. Acceleration sounded good.</p><p>Now I’m watching the same mechanism, one generation later. “55% faster code” — in a lab. “20–45% cost savings” — on a consulting slide presented to boards in Frankfurt, London, Riyadh. The numbers move up. The managers are happy.</p><p>What the slides don’t say: people who don’t have to fix bugs for hours anymore. People who don’t spend days building features nobody asked for. We’re looking at a different opportunity. But apparently it can only be sold the old way — faster, higher, more.</p><p>Juvenal asked it sharper two thousand years ago: Quis custodiet ipsos custodes? Who watches the watchmen? That is the real engineering leadership question of the next few years. Not how fast. Not how much. But: Who is willing to judge — and who can withstand the judgment when it says, “That was wrong, even though it was fast”?</p><p><em>Boris Gloger introduced Scrum to the German-speaking world in 2003. He now writes about leadership in the AI era from Vienna.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=635573b2a1d3" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Einfach Marie / Kap 5]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@borisgloger/einfach-marie-kap-5-e1b71d2a0cbf?source=rss-c772e32f35e5------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e1b71d2a0cbf</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Boris Gloger]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 22 Feb 2026 15:56:32 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-02-22T15:56:32.197Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Das ist die Fortsetzung von Kap. 4. <a href="https://medium.com/@borisgloger/einfach-marie-kapitel-4-battle-c766f5658223">https://medium.com/@borisgloger/einfach-marie-kapitel-4-battle-c766f5658223</a></p><h3>Kapitel 4: Battle</h3><p>Die große Pause hatte gerade angefangen, aber niemand rannte zum Kiosk. Niemand spielte Fangen. Niemand saß auf den Bänken und scrollte durch TikTok.</p><p>Alle standen im Kreis.</p><p>In der Mitte: zwei Gruppen. Zwei Fronten.</p><p>Auf der einen Seite Paula. Hinter ihr mindestens zehn Mädchen. Alle mit verschränkten Armen. Alle mit diesem Blick, der sagte: <em>Wir sind mehr. Wir gewinnen.</em></p><p>Auf der anderen Seite Marie. Hinter ihr sechs. Nur sechs.</p><p>Rosi. Helene. Alina. Lina. Louise. Runa.</p><p>Aber diese sechs standen wie eine Mauer.</p><p>„Ihr habt doch keine Chance”, rief Paula. Ihre Stimme war laut genug, dass der ganze Schulhof es hörte. „Sechs gegen zehn? Ernsthaft?”</p><p>„Qualität schlägt Quantität”, sagte Rosi trocken.</p><p>Ein paar Leute im Kreis lachten. Paula wurde rot.</p><p>„Okay.” Sie zog ihr Handy aus der Tasche. „Dann zeigt mal, was ihr könnt. Clear My Mind. Wer’s besser bringt, gewinnt.”</p><p>Sie tippte auf den Bildschirm. Die ersten Beats von REBIs Song dröhnten aus dem Lautsprecher. Jemand hatte eine Bluetooth-Box mitgebracht. Natürlich.</p><p>Marie spürte, wie ihr Herz schneller schlug. Clear My Mind. Der Song ihrer Mutter. Den sie hundertmal gehört hatte. Tausendmal. Den sie mitsingen konnte, ohne nachzudenken.</p><p>Aber das wusste Paula nicht. Für Paula war es einfach ein REBI-Song. Ein Song, zu dem man cool aussehen konnte.</p><p>Paula machte den ersten Move.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*QRgpVJx4Y1Qtu35tL0FulA.png" /></figure><p>Sie trat vor, ihre Crew hinter ihr. Sie rappte die erste Strophe, bewegte sich zum Beat.</p><p><em>„Clear my mind, find my way…”</em></p><p>Ihre Moves waren okay. Einstudiert. Sauber. Aber steif. Wie aus einem Tutorial. Wie kopiert.</p><p>Ihre Mädchen machten synchron die gleichen Bewegungen. Arme hoch. Arme runter. Kopf zur Seite. Alles perfekt getimed.</p><p>Und trotzdem — es fehlte etwas.</p><p>Der Kreis klatschte höflich. Ein paar von Paulas Leuten jubelten laut.</p><p>Paula grinste und trat zurück. „Eure Runde.”</p><p>Marie atmete tief ein.</p><p>Rosi stupste sie von hinten an. „Du schaffst das.”</p><p>Am Rand des Schulhofs stand Frau Kemper, die Musiklehrerin. Eigentlich sollte sie Pausenaufsicht machen. Eigentlich sollte sie den Kreis auflösen.</p><p>Aber sie blieb stehen. Und schaute.</p><p>Marie trat vor.</p><p>Der Beat lief weiter. Sie wartete. Einen Takt. Zwei.</p><p>Dann fing sie an.</p><p><em>„Clear my mind, by the way, to the picture of a new day…”</em></p><p>Nicht wie Paula. Nicht einstudiert. Nicht kopiert.</p><p>Sie rappte, als wäre der Text für sie geschrieben. Die Worte kamen aus ihr heraus, als hätte sie sie selbst erfunden.</p><p>„Eh!”, riefen ihre Freundinnen hinter ihr. Genau auf den Beat.</p><p><em>„I see the light of the world, and around me…”</em></p><p>„Yeah!” Rosi und Helene gleichzeitig.</p><p>Maries Körper bewegte sich, ohne dass sie darüber nachdachte. Freeze. Flow. Freeze.</p><p>Hinter ihr bewegten sich ihre Freundinnen. Nicht synchron wie Roboter. Sondern miteinander. Wie eine Welle. Helene machte einen Spin. Alina und Lina spiegelten sich. Louise hielt den Rhythmus. Runa machte diesen irren Freeze, den nur sie konnte. Rosi hielt Marie den Rücken frei.</p><p>„Eh! Eh!” Die Backs kamen perfekt.</p><p>Marie rappte die Bridge. Ihre Stimme wurde lauter.</p><p><em>„Clear my mind, clear my mind, gotta leave the noise behind…”</em></p><p>Der Schulhof war still. Alle starrten.</p><p>Und dann kam der Drop.</p><p>Marie ging runter. Beine. Boden. Sie machte einen Spin, den sie seit Wochen geübt hatte. Kam wieder hoch. Landete genau auf dem Beat.</p><p>„YEAH!” Alle sechs Freundinnen zusammen.</p><p>Der Kreis explodierte.</p><p>Frau Kemper stand immer noch am Rand. Ihre Kaffeetasse in der Hand, vergessen. Sie hatte schon viele Schüler gesehen. Viele, die gut waren. Viele, die dachten, sie wären gut.</p><p>Aber das hier war anders.</p><p>Das war nicht REBIs Tochter, die den Song ihrer Mutter nachmachte.</p><p>Das war ein Mädchen, das den Song zu ihrem eigenen machte. Das besser war, als sie es mit elf Jahren hätte sein dürfen.</p><p>Frau Kemper lächelte. Und dachte nach.</p><p>„MARIE!”</p><p>Der Ruf kam aus dem Kreis.</p><p>„Marie! MARIE!”</p><p>Andere stimmten ein. Lauter. Leiser. Wieder lauter.</p><p>„MARIE! Marie! ^marie!^”</p><p>Ein Chor aus verschiedenen Stimmen. Hohe und tiefe. Laut und flüsternd. Wie eine Welle, die immer wieder kam.</p><p>Paula stand da. Ihr Mund war ein schmaler Strich.</p><p>„Das war…”, fing jemand aus ihrem Team an.</p><p>„Halt die Klappe”, zischte Paula.</p><p>Der Song endete. Die Box verstummte.</p><p>Stille.</p><p>Dann wieder: „MARIE! Marie! Marie!”</p><p>Paula drehte sich um und marschierte davon. Ihre Crew folgte ihr. Aber nicht alle. Ein paar blieben stehen. Sahen zu Marie rüber. Mit anderen Augen.</p><p>Rosi schlug Marie auf die Schulter. „Das war der Hammer!”</p><p>„Ich hab fast einen Herzinfarkt gekriegt”, sagte Marie.</p><p>„Aber du hast’s durchgezogen.” Rosi grinste. „Wie ein Nilpferd. Stoisch.”</p><p>„Du mit deinen Nilpferden.”</p><p>Helene, Alina, Lina, Louise und Runa kamen dazu. Gruppenumarmung. Sechs Mädchen, die schrien und lachten und durcheinander redeten.</p><p>„Hast du Paulas Gesicht gesehen?”</p><p>„Die war so fertig!”</p><p>„Dein Spin! Wie hast du das gemacht?”</p><p>„Und die Backs! Wir waren so tight!”</p><p>Marie stand mittendrin. Und zum ersten Mal seit langem fühlte sie sich nicht wie ein Schatten.</p><p>Sie fühlte sich wie Marie.</p><p>Am Rand des Schulhofs drehte Frau Kemper sich um und ging zurück ins Gebäude. Sie hatte eine Idee.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e1b71d2a0cbf" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Einfach Marie / Kapitel 4: Battle]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@borisgloger/einfach-marie-kapitel-4-battle-c766f5658223?source=rss-c772e32f35e5------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/c766f5658223</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[roman]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[kinder]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Boris Gloger]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 21 Feb 2026 13:54:41 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-02-21T13:54:41.462Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Das ist die Fortsetzung von Einfach Marie, von Laura Gloger: </em><a href="https://medium.com/@borisgloger/einfach-marie-kap-2-und-3-b91cf9d19f14">https://medium.com/@borisgloger/einfach-marie-kap-2-und-3-b91cf9d19f14</a></p><p>Die große Pause hatte gerade angefangen, aber niemand rannte zum Kiosk. Niemand spielte Fangen. Niemand saß auf den Bänken, oder scrollte durch TikTok.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*36rJ80vstxy_MhoejrI4rw.png" /></figure><p>Alle standen im Kreis.</p><p>In der Mitte: zwei Gruppen. Zwei Fronten.</p><p>Auf der einen Seite Paula. Hinter ihr mindestens zehn Mädchen. Alle mit verschränkten Armen. Alle mit diesem Blick, der sagte: <em>Wir sind mehr. Wir gewinnen.</em></p><p>Auf der anderen Seite Marie. Hinter ihr sechs. Nur sechs.</p><p>Rosi. Helene. Alina. Lina. Louise. Runa.</p><p>Aber diese sechs standen wie eine Mauer.</p><p>„Ihr habt doch keine Chance”, rief Paula. Ihre Stimme war laut genug, dass der ganze Schulhof es hörte. „Sechs gegen zehn? Ernsthaft?”</p><p>„Qualität schlägt Quantität”, sagte Rosi trocken.</p><p>Ein paar Leute im Kreis lachten. Paula wurde rot.</p><p>„Okay.” Sie zog ihr Handy aus der Tasche. „Dann zeigt mal, was ihr könnt. Clear My Mind. Wer’s besser bringt, gewinnt.”</p><p>Sie tippte auf den Bildschirm. Die ersten Beats von REBIs Song dröhnten aus dem Lautsprecher. Jemand hatte eine Bluetooth-Box mitgebracht. Natürlich.</p><p>Marie spürte, wie ihr Herz schneller schlug. Clear My Mind. Der Song ihrer Mutter. Den sie hundertmal gehört hatte. Tausendmal. Den sie mitsingen konnte, ohne nachzudenken.</p><p>Aber das wusste Paula nicht. Für Paula war es einfach ein REBI-Song. Ein Song, zu dem man cool aussehen konnte.</p><p>Paula machte den ersten Move.</p><p>Sie trat vor, ihre Crew hinter ihr. Sie rappte die erste Strophe, bewegte sich zum Beat.</p><p><em>„Clear my mind, find my way…”</em></p><p>Ihre Moves waren okay. Einstudiert. Sauber. Aber steif. Wie aus einem Tutorial. Wie kopiert.</p><p>Ihre Mädchen machten synchron die gleichen Bewegungen. Arme hoch. Arme runter. Kopf zur Seite. Alles perfekt getimed.</p><p>Und trotzdem — es fehlte etwas.</p><p>Der Kreis klatschte höflich. Ein paar von Paulas Leuten jubelten laut.</p><p>Paula grinste und trat zurück. „Eure Runde.”</p><p>Marie atmete tief ein.</p><p>Rosi stupste sie von hinten an. „Du schaffst das.”</p><p>Am Rand des Schulhofs stand Frau Kemper, die Musiklehrerin. Eigentlich sollte sie Pausenaufsicht machen. Eigentlich sollte sie den Kreis auflösen.</p><p>Aber sie blieb stehen. Und schaute.</p><p>Marie trat vor.</p><p>Der Beat lief weiter. Sie wartete. Einen Takt. Zwei.</p><p>Dann fing sie an.</p><p><em>„Clear my mind, by the way, to the picture of a new day…”</em></p><p>Nicht wie Paula. Nicht einstudiert. Nicht kopiert.</p><p>Sie rappte, als wäre der Text für sie geschrieben. Die Worte kamen aus ihr heraus, als hätte sie sie selbst erfunden.</p><p>„Eh!”, riefen ihre Freundinnen hinter ihr. Genau auf den Beat.</p><p><em>„I see the light of the world, and around me…”</em></p><p>„Yeah!” Rosi und Helene gleichzeitig.</p><p>Maries Körper bewegte sich, ohne dass sie darüber nachdachte. Freeze. Flow. Freeze.</p><p>Hinter ihr bewegten sich ihre Freundinnen. Nicht synchron wie Roboter. Sondern miteinander. Wie eine Welle. Helene machte einen Spin. Alina und Lina spiegelten sich. Louise hielt den Rhythmus. Runa machte diesen irren Freeze, den nur sie konnte. Rosi hielt Marie den Rücken frei.</p><p>„Eh! Eh!” Die Backs kamen perfekt.</p><p>Marie rappte die Bridge. Ihre Stimme wurde lauter.</p><p><em>„Clear my mind, clear my mind, gotta leave the noise behind…”</em></p><p>Der Schulhof war still. Alle starrten.</p><p>Und dann kam der Drop.</p><p>Marie ging runter. Beine. Boden. Sie machte einen Spin, den sie seit Wochen geübt hatte. Kam wieder hoch. Landete genau auf dem Beat.</p><p>„YEAH!” Alle sechs Freundinnen zusammen.</p><p>Der Kreis explodierte.</p><p>Frau Kemper stand immer noch am Rand. Ihre Kaffeetasse in der Hand, vergessen. Sie hatte schon viele Schüler gesehen. Viele, die gut waren. Viele, die dachten, sie wären gut.</p><p>Aber das hier war anders.</p><p>Das war nicht REBIs Tochter, die den Song ihrer Mutter nachmachte.</p><p>Das war ein Mädchen, das den Song zu ihrem eigenen machte. Das besser war, als sie es mit elf Jahren hätte sein dürfen.</p><p>Frau Kemper lächelte. Und dachte nach.</p><p>„MARIE!”</p><p>Der Ruf kam aus dem Kreis.</p><p>„Marie! MARIE!”</p><p>Andere stimmten ein. Lauter. Leiser. Wieder lauter.</p><p>„MARIE! Marie! ^marie!^”</p><p>Ein Chor aus verschiedenen Stimmen. Hohe und tiefe. Laut und flüsternd. Wie eine Welle, die immer wieder kam.</p><p>Paula stand da. Ihr Mund war ein schmaler Strich.</p><p>„Das war…”, fing jemand aus ihrem Team an.</p><p>„Halt die Klappe”, zischte Paula.</p><p>Der Song endete. Die Box verstummte.</p><p>Stille.</p><p>Dann wieder: „MARIE! Marie! Marie!”</p><p>Paula drehte sich um und marschierte davon. Ihre Crew folgte ihr. Aber nicht alle. Ein paar blieben stehen. Sahen zu Marie rüber. Mit anderen Augen.</p><p>Rosi schlug Marie auf die Schulter. „Das war der Hammer!”</p><p>„Ich hab fast einen Herzinfarkt gekriegt”, sagte Marie.</p><p>„Aber du hast’s durchgezogen.” Rosi grinste. „Wie ein Nilpferd. Stoisch.”</p><p>„Du mit deinen Nilpferden.”</p><p>Helene, Alina, Lina, Louise und Runa kamen dazu. Gruppenumarmung. Sechs Mädchen, die schrien und lachten und durcheinander redeten.</p><p>„Hast du Paulas Gesicht gesehen?”</p><p>„Die war so fertig!”</p><p>„Dein Spin! Wie hast du das gemacht?”</p><p>„Und die Backs! Wir waren so tight!”</p><p>Marie stand mittendrin. Und zum ersten Mal seit langem fühlte sie sich nicht wie ein Schatten.</p><p>Sie fühlte sich wie Marie.</p><p>Am Rand des Schulhofs drehte Frau Kemper sich um und ging zurück ins Gebäude. Sie hatte eine Idee.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c766f5658223" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Connecting the Dots — Why Success Is Not a Character Trait]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@borisgloger/connecting-the-dots-why-success-is-not-a-character-trait-7d550aa26614?source=rss-c772e32f35e5------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/7d550aa26614</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[sociology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[humanity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[unjustice]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Boris Gloger]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 21 Feb 2026 12:26:34 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-02-21T12:26:34.084Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Boris Gloger — February 2026 <br>Translation of the Article — </em><a href="https://borisgloger.at/connection-the-dots-warum-der-erfolg-kein-charakter-ist/"><strong>Connecting the Dots — Warum der Erfolg kein Charakter ist.</strong></a><strong> <br></strong>It was well recieved, and so I created this translation to make it readable for a wider audience.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*13AP5tbPKhLLjYLWoyu5VA.png" /></figure><p>I was six when my father left. He never paid child support. Not once. My mother was a hotel maid, then an unlicensed nurse. We were simply poor. Buying new potatoes was a luxury.</p><p>I worked my way out — university, consulting, my own company, a degree from the University of St. Gallen at 47. Today I advise corporations. I benefit from the system. The explanation that I made it because I was disciplined is, at best, half the truth. I got lucky. I am a statistical outlier.</p><p>I’m writing this essay because I’m starting to connect the dots. The dots of my own biography. The dots of the research I’ve read. The dots of Professor Jiang’s lectures on success and inequality, which stayed with me for weeks. And the dots of Hanno Sauer’s book <em>Klasse</em> (<em>Class</em>), which I’ve already written about.</p><p>When you connect the dots, the picture that emerges is uncomfortable: <strong>What we mistake for individual strength — self-discipline, resilience, a growth mindset — is usually the consequence of success. Not its cause.</strong></p><p>When I was first invited to friends’ homes in Vienna two decades ago, everyone took their shoes off. I found that strange. In the movies I knew — the ones depicting high society — nobody took their shoes off. They showed off their shoes. And here in Vienna, people removed them? Hanno Sauer would say: That’s exactly the class difference. Working class: shoes off. Upper class: shoes on. A detail, but one that inscribes itself into the body — into the naturalness with which you enter a room, or don’t (cf. Sauer, 2025).</p><p>The question of who rises and who stays where they are leads not just into sociology. It leads into psychology, economics, and macropolitics. Most people who start where I started don’t end up here. And entrepreneurship itself — that supposedly universal opportunity — requires a capital cushion that most people don’t have. Only those who can survive the fall can afford to take the risk.</p><p>What I’m doing here is not voicing an opinion. It’s an attempt at enlightenment — in the tradition of Kant. Only this isn’t about emerging from self-imposed ignorance. It’s about emerging from <em>undeserved structural violence</em>. Sociology as enlightenment. Connecting the dots means making visible what structures do to us — and why the sense of powerlessness that so many people in this society feel is not a sign of weakness. Not a sign of incompetence. But the rational response to a system that makes us suffer while teaching us to believe the wrong narratives.</p><p>This essay is an attempt to make those dots visible. I observe. I document. I question — the research of others, but also my own convictions. Because I fall for these narratives myself. Again and again.</p><h3>The Three Theories of Success — and Why They Don’t Deliver What They Promise</h3><p>There are three stories that psychology tells us about success. Each one sounds compelling on its own. Together they form the foundation of the meritocratic narrative: if you have the right traits, you rise. If you don’t, you stay at the bottom. And if you stay at the bottom, it’s somehow your own fault.</p><p><strong>The first story</strong> comes from Walter Mischel and his famous marshmallow test. A child sits in front of a marshmallow and receives a promise: wait until I come back, and you’ll get two. Mischel followed the children for decades and found something remarkable (Mischel, Shoda &amp; Rodriguez, 1989): those who waited had better grades, more stable relationships, fewer drug problems. The message was clear — self-control is the key to success. Delayed gratification. Those who can hold it together win the game.</p><p><strong>The second story</strong> comes from Carol Dweck at Stanford. Successful people have a growth mindset (cf. Dweck, 2006) — they believe they can improve. Those who fail and say <em>that was a chance to learn</em> get back up. Those who say <em>I’m just not good enough</em> give up.</p><p><strong>The third story</strong> is told by K. Anders Ericsson, the Swedish psychologist. Elite musicians and athletes don’t just practice more — they practice strategically. Ten thousand hours of deliberate practice (cf. Ericsson, Krampe &amp; Tesch-Römer, 1993), and you can master anything.</p><p>Three beautiful stories. Self-control, resilience, strategic practice. Each one feels true. I know them all — and I fell into the trap myself. Because even though I’m a sociologist, I believed in the growth mindset narrative and in delayed gratification. I even claim to have mastered these things. I optimized myself, read the books, listened to the talks. I even doubted whether my own children would make it. My son would probably have eaten the marshmallow immediately. Well — as Jiang puts it, I confused correlation with causation.</p><p>There was a television series I watched as a boy — <em>Ein Mann will nach oben</em> (<em>A Man Wants to Rise</em>), 1978, based on Hans Fallada’s novel. Karl Siebrecht arrives in Berlin as a young orphan, around 1909. He has nothing but a suitcase and ten gold coins. He hauls luggage, scrapes by, works his way up, and marries into wealthy society. I was glued to the screen for thirteen episodes.</p><p>I was that kind of boy too. I wanted to rise. And I searched for narratives that would take me there. Work hard, optimize yourself, never give up — that landed. These three ideas were like a promise made just for me.</p><p>But it’s not true. These stories don’t actually explain why I made it. What they explain: why 99 percent of society believes it’s their own fault when they don’t make it to the top.</p><p>And each of these three stories is — as the research itself shows — at best a small piece of the truth.</p><p>Let me be clear: it’s not me claiming that self-control, mindset, and strategic practice don’t explain success. <em>The data say it.</em> Watts’ replication. Sisk’s meta-analyses. Macnamara’s variance decomposition. The empirical record has dismantled the individualization thesis — quietly, thoroughly, irrefutably. What remains is the question: why do we cling to it anyway?</p><p>And that’s exactly why we need to critically examine the <strong>self-optimization thesis</strong>. Not as opinion. But because the research demands it. Where do these narratives come from? Which of the researchers’ own beliefs were actually tested — and which were merely confirmed? Is it possible that we keep falling for the self-optimization lie — because it feels so good?</p><p>Let’s begin with the <strong>marshmallow test</strong> — and the man who made it famous.</p><h3>Walter Mischel: When the Researcher Confirms His Own Story</h3><p><strong>Walter Mischel</strong> was born in 1930 in Vienna, into a Jewish family. His father was a businessman. In 1938, after the Anschluss, the family fled the Nazis to Brooklyn. His father, once an entrepreneur, spent the rest of his life working as a clerk in a discount store — a broken man, as Mischel later said. His mother became a waitress and held the family together. Mischel himself worked as a delivery boy and elevator operator, graduated at the top of his class, and earned a scholarship.</p><p>An upward climber. Like me.</p><p>And that’s exactly where the bias lies. Mischel first conducted his test in Trinidad — not with marshmallows, but with chocolate. He expected ethnicity to explain the difference. It didn’t. Socioeconomic background explained everything (Mischel, 1958). He had the data showing that it was class, not character. But the narrative that emerged from the later Stanford experiment focused on individual self-control anyway. Mischel — the immigrant who had made it on his own — confirmed his own survival story with his most famous experiment. His survivorship bias, scientifically packaged. And incidentally: the man who declared self-control the key to success was a chain smoker who struggled for years to quit.</p><p>But let’s look at the data. In 2018, Tyler Watts, Greg Duncan, and Haonan Quan published a <em>replication study with 918 children — nearly twenty times the size of Mischel’s original sample</em>. The link between wait time and later success was <strong>only half as strong</strong>. After controlling for socioeconomic status, the effect shrank by <strong>two-thirds</strong> (Watts, Duncan &amp; Quan, 2018). Even more striking was a 2013 study by Celeste Kidd at the University of Rochester: she repeated the test with a twist. Before the marshmallow, children experienced either an adult who kept their promises — or one who lied.</p><p><strong>Result: children in the reliable condition waited twelve minutes. Children who had been lied to waited three (Kidd, Palmeri &amp; Aslin, 2013).</strong></p><p><strong>The marshmallow test doesn’t measure self-control. It measures trust in the environment.</strong> And trust is not a character trait — it’s the product of experience. I know this. I grew up in an environment where promises weren’t always kept. Why wait for a second marshmallow when the world teaches you that promises are empty?</p><h3>Carol Dweck: Doing Research from Row 1, Seat 1</h3><p>The <strong>growth mindset</strong> story is equally sobering. Victoria Sisk and her colleagues published two meta-analyses in 2018–273 studies, over 365,000 participants. The correlation between growth mindset and academic achievement is r = 0.10. That’s about one percent of explained variance. The effect of mindset interventions? d = 0.08 — barely measurable (Sisk et al., 2018).</p><p>And here, too, the researcher’s biography matters. Carol Dweck was born in 1946 in Brooklyn. In sixth grade, her teacher Mrs. Wilson seated students by IQ test score — Row 1, Seat 1 was the smartest student. Dweck sat in Row 1, Seat 1 (Dweck, 2006, preface). From there: Barnard College, PhD at Yale, professorship at Stanford. <em>A gifted child identified by a system designed to identify gifted children.</em>And who then researched why some thrive in such systems and others don’t — <strong>without asking who never gets into the system in the first place.</strong></p><p>The more recent research shows: <strong>Growth mindset works primarily for children who are already privileged.</strong> For disadvantaged children, it explains at most nine percent of the socioeconomic achievement gap. <strong>Dweck confirmed what she herself had experienced — that attitude makes the difference.</strong> But she did her research from Row 1, Seat 1.</p><h3>K. Anders Ericsson: The Survivors’ Study</h3><p>And <strong>deliberate practice?</strong> Brooke Macnamara, David Hambrick, and Frederick Oswald analyzed 88 studies. Deliberate practice explains 26 percent of performance variance in games, 21 percent in music — but only four percent in education and less than one percent in professional contexts (Macnamara, Hambrick &amp; Oswald, 2014). <strong>In the domains that matter most for professional success, strategic practice plays almost no role.</strong></p><p>K. Anders Ericsson was born in 1947 in Västerås, Sweden. His father was an engineer. Postwar Sweden — welfare state, excellent public education, cultural access. Ericsson studied the best violinists at the Berlin University of the Arts and found: the best ones practice more. Ten thousand hours. Malcolm Gladwell turned this into a rule that Ericsson himself called a distortion (cf. Ericsson, 2016) — the Beatles, according to more recent research, had played roughly eleven hundred hours (cf. Lewisohn, 2013) before they broke through, not ten thousand. But the real problem goes deeper: <strong>Ericsson studied only the survivors.</strong> Only those who had already made it into the elite academy. He didn’t ask about the thousands who practiced just as much but never got there — because they lacked access to good teachers, couldn’t afford an instrument, or were born in the wrong place. <strong>Duncan Watts’ MusicLab experiment (Salganik, Dodds &amp; Watts, 2006) showed that even the popularity of songs depends significantly on chance</strong> — on early momentum, network effects, timing. In music, deliberate practice explains 21 percent of the variance. It doesn’t explain 79 percent. In that 79 percent are luck, origin, access, and chance.</p><p><strong>What matters instead? Genetics, starting conditions, access, networks. And luck.</strong></p><h3>The Dunning-Kruger Effect: When the Wrong People Are in Power</h3><p>Even the <strong>Dunning-Kruger effect</strong> stands on shaky ground. Gilles Gignac and Marcin Zajenkowski showed in 2020: the classic finding is largely a statistical artifact — a combination of regression to the mean and the better-than-average effect (Gignac &amp; Zajenkowski, 2020).</p><p>And here again: the sample. David Dunning and Justin Kruger tested their hypothesis in 1999 at Cornell University (Kruger &amp; Dunning, 1999) — Ivy League. Their subjects were Cornell students. <em>A cognitive elite surveying other cognitive elites for overconfidence.</em> The question of whether overconfidence works differently among working people without college degrees — whether it might even be the opposite, namely systematic under-confidence — was never asked. <em>The Dunning-Kruger effect implicitly pathologizes the self-confidence of those without the right credentials. And it normalizes the insecurity of the educated as “competence.”</em></p><p>This matters because the Dunning-Kruger effect is often used to explain why “the wrong people” are in power.</p><p><strong>But if the effect is an artifact, then the wrong people aren’t in power because of their overconfidence. They’re in power because of the structures that carried them there.</strong></p><p>What remains when you run these three success stories through the filter of evidence? Broer, Bai, and Fonseca summarized for the OECD in 2019 what the data show:</p><p><strong>The effects of non-cognitive skills like mindset or perseverance on educational outcomes are small to negligible once you control for socioeconomic factors (cf. Broer, Bai &amp; Fonseca, 2019).</strong></p><p>The authors put diplomatically what the data show brutally: We’re investing in programs that treat symptoms. The causes remain untouched.</p><h3>Science as Accomplice: Why Research Serves the Wrong Narrative</h3><p>And here it’s worth stepping back to see the pattern.</p><p>Because the problem isn’t just that the marshmallow test, growth mindset, deliberate practice, and Dunning-Kruger explain less than claimed. The problem goes deeper: <strong>These concepts individualize.</strong> They place responsibility for success and failure in the hands of the individual. You’re poor? You lack self-discipline. You’re stuck? You lack the right mindset. You haven’t mastered your craft? You didn’t practice strategically enough.</p><p><strong>That’s not coincidence. That’s function.</strong></p><p>A society that explains poverty as individual failure doesn’t have to change its structures. It just has to offer the right programs — a resilience workshop here, a mindset seminar there — and can then lean back and say: we did everything we could. Anyone who still fails has only themselves to blame.</p><p>Richard Murphy, Emeritus Professor of Economics at the University of Sheffield and one of Britain’s most influential tax experts, made this point for economics: economists are not neutral observers. They come from the power elite. They had to afford a university, didn’t need to work to study. Their theories carry hope and fear — the hope of the ruling class for stability and the fear of change. Almost the entirety of economic theory over the past 250 years was written to represent the interests of those in power. Very little was written to represent the interests of those without it (cf. Murphy, 2025, <em>The History of Economic Thought</em>, Episode 1).</p><p>What holds for economists holds equally for psychologists.</p><p>Adorno and Horkheimer knew this as early as 1944, when they described the culture industry in <em>Dialectic of Enlightenment</em>: a machinery that produces pseudo-individuality — the illusion that anyone can make it, as long as they’re unique enough. The culture industry generates the belief in individual ascent — and thereby obscures the fact that the system structurally prevents what it promises. Marcuse called this <em>repressive desublimation</em> in 1964’s <em>One-Dimensional Man</em> (cf. Marcuse, 1964): the system offers false freedoms — consumption, entertainment, the illusion of choice — that relieve just enough pressure to keep anyone from questioning the structure itself.</p><p>Science provides the vocabulary for this shift of responsibility. Not out of malice — but with devastating effect. Every study that measures self-control as a predictor of success without controlling for background implicitly confirms the narrative: it’s the individual’s fault. Every intervention that teaches children to “believe in themselves” without changing the conditions they live in is, at best, a Band-Aid on a bullet wound.</p><p>This isn’t an abstract accusation. It’s measurable. Broer, Bai, and Fonseca show it in the OECD data in black and white: <strong>Once you control for socioeconomic conditions, the effects of individual traits nearly vanish.</strong> Science has known this — for years. <em>And yet self-optimization concepts still dominate education policy, management literature, and public debate. Because they’re convenient. Because they don’t hurt anyone who holds power.</em></p><h3>The Myth of Meritocratic Elites</h3><p>German elite research has known this for decades as well. Michael Hartmann, Germany’s foremost elite researcher, has demonstrated through years of empirical work: nearly 80 percent of the CEOs of Germany’s hundred largest companies come from the upper and upper-middle bourgeoisie — the top three to five percent of society — and this pattern has been stable since 1970 (cf. Hartmann, 2002; 2018). Roughly 80 percent of Germany’s wealthiest owe their fortune not to achievement, but to inheritance. Hartmann calls what we mistake for meritocracy the “myth of meritocratic elites.”</p><p><strong>The entire American Dream rests on this social lie.</strong> And countless stories in literature and film keep it alive: Fallada’s <em>A Man Wants to Rise</em>, Dickens’ <em>Great Expectations</em>, <em>Rocky</em>, <em>The Pursuit of Happyness</em> with Will Smith, working his way from homelessness to becoming a stockbroker. The message is always the same: you can make it if you just want it badly enough. This narrative is so powerful because it turns individual cases into universal laws — even though the data tell a different story. In the United States, only 7.5 percent of children from the bottom income quintile make it to the top quintile (Chetty, Hendren, Kline &amp; Saez, 2014) — as shown by Chetty’s analysis of millions of tax records. And the history of social mobility in Germany reads like a parable of disappointment.</p><p>The knowledge is there. It’s always been there. But the narrative persists. It persists because it serves the powerful. And because it flatters the climbers — including me.</p><h3>Six Generations: The History of Social Mobility in Germany</h3><p>In the early 20th century, under the German Empire — the era in which <em>A Man Wants to Rise</em> is set — upward mobility reached a historical maximum, a figure that was never repeated. During the economic miracle of the 1950s and ’60s, social permeability rose again — Schelsky’s “leveled middle-class society” seemed real, purchasing power grew by 73 percent in a decade. In 1963, working-class children made up six percent of university students. By 1970, five percent of working-class sons had moved into higher professional positions; by 1979, it was eleven percent. In 1982, the share of working-class children at universities reached its historical peak — 18 percent (Hochschulbildungsreport, 2020). Then it stagnated. By 2009, it was 15 percent. Despite the expansion of education, despite reforms — the elevator stopped.</p><p>DIW data make it even more brutal: absolute income mobility for birth cohorts from 1962 to 1988 fell from 81 to 59 percent (Bönke, Harnack-Eber &amp; Lüthen, 2024, DIW Discussion Paper 2068). And the OECD has calculated how long it takes in Germany for a child from the bottom ten percent of the income distribution to reach the median: six generations. Six. The OECD average is four and a half. In Denmark, it’s two (OECD, 2018, <em>A Broken Social Elevator?</em>).</p><p><strong>The statistical climber is the exception, not the rule. And I am one of those exceptions.</strong></p><p>The idea that anyone can make it if they just work hard enough is not just a myth — it’s an instrument of control. As we’ll see below. Because if everyone <em>can</em>make it, then everyone who doesn’t make it is a personal failure. Not a systems failure. Not a policy failure. <em>Your</em> failure.</p><h3>Hormozi, Gary Vee, and the Modern Prophets of Personal Responsibility</h3><p>And the narrative has its modern prophets. Alex Hormozi and Gary Vaynerchuk — Gary Vee, as his millions of followers call him — preach the gospel of personal responsibility on social media every single day. “You just need to work harder.” “You just need to use social media.” “You just need to start.” They package it in sneakers and hoodies, in frenetically edited reels and motivational quotes — but the message is as old as Calvinism: wealth is a sign of being chosen. Those who stay poor just didn’t want it badly enough.</p><p>Hormozi and Gary Vee are themselves part of the one percent. Hormozi made his fortune with Gym Launch — a model that ran on the backs of thousands of small gym owners, many of whom failed. Gary Vee is the son of an immigrant who already owned a million-dollar business when Gary took it over. Their starting conditions were anything but average. And yet they generalize their exception into a rule, telling the 99 percent they just need to do the same.</p><p>What they don’t do: use their enormous reach to name the structural conditions that block advancement for most people. Not a word about the education system that sorts children before they turn ten. Not a word about fiscal policy that concentrates wealth. Not a word about parenting practices tied to the class you’re born into. Instead: “Grind harder.” “Execute.” “No excuses.”</p><p>That’s not inspiration. That’s obfuscation. And the science that produces marshmallow tests and growth mindset interventions provides the academic scaffolding.</p><p>The central insight is this: correlation is not causation. Successful people have self-control and resilience — yes. But not because these traits produce success. Rather, because success produces these traits. Those who grow up in a stable, affluent environment develop trust and composure — not because they have better character, but because their environment allows it.</p><h3>The Architecture of Unfree Choice: Why the Poor Blame Themselves</h3><p>But there’s an even deeper layer to the individualization machine. It lies not in flawed theories or false narratives. It lies in the structure of choice itself.</p><p>Imagine you’re poor. You need money now. You can choose between three jobs — all pay badly, all require long commutes, all barely let you breathe. You pick one. It’s a rational decision. You have to choose, and you pick the best available option. But it’s a choice among bad options.</p><p>Now imagine you’re wealthy. You do the same thing: choose between three jobs. All pay well, all offer advancement, all leave you time for professional development. You choose. It’s also a rational decision. But it’s a choice among good options.</p><p>When we both make “a personal decision,” we’re talking about two fundamentally different things. Thaler and Sunstein call this choice architecture — the structure within which decisions take place (cf. Thaler &amp; Sunstein, 2008). They’ve shown that it’s not the decision that matters, but the options you can choose from. The option set is everything. And the option set is not randomly distributed.</p><p>The poor person who repeatedly takes steps that are rational in the short term but damaging in the long run learns something about themselves: that they’re impulsive. That they don’t think far enough ahead. That they lack discipline. That’s the criminal part. Not that they make these decisions — but that they come to see themselves as <em>the kind of person</em> who makes such decisions.</p><h3>Poverty Costs 13 IQ Points</h3><p>Mullainathan and Shafir measured this. In a study published in <em>Science</em> in 2013, they showed, together with Anandi Mani and Jiaying Zhao: financial scarcity reduces cognitive capacity by 13 IQ points (Mani, Mullainathan, Shafir &amp; Zhao, 2013). That’s more than a sleepless night. That’s like a 40-hour weekend without sleep hardwired into your permanent cognitive system. <strong>Poverty is a cognitive stressor. It doesn’t make you dumber — it makes you cognitively exhausted.</strong> A person who wakes up every morning worrying about how to pay the rent has fewer mental resources for everything else. That’s why poverty makes it harder to think. Not because poor people have inferior brains. But because brains think poorly when they’re fighting to survive.</p><p>What follows? The poor person is forced by their situation into decisions that worsen their situation. And then they’re told — by science, by social media, by Alex Hormozi and Gary Vaynerchuk — that the fault lies with them.</p><p>That’s the architecture of unfree choice. It works like this: the structure forces me into decisions that worsen my situation. These decisions appear to be my personal choices. But they are the choices that the situation demands of me. Kuran called this preference falsification (cf. Kuran, 1995) — I live as though I want these things until I start believing I actually do. Elster called it sour grapes (cf. Elster, 1983) — I convince myself that I don’t want what I can’t have, and then believe it’s my genuine preference. Sen called it adaptive preferences (cf. Sen, 2005) — I adjust my desires to what’s possible, and then consider myself a person of modest ambition. This is the final labor of the individualization machine: it turns structural constraints into subjective traits.</p><p>I’m an example of this myself. My mother was a hotel maid. She taught us vocabulary words — tools for a world she herself would never enter. She didn’t say, “You’ll see a different world.” She taught me codes I didn’t know. Later, in high school, I had the luck of teachers who showed me the world could be different. A single elementary school teacher opened a window to aspiration. But a million children don’t have that one teacher. For them, the window stays closed.</p><p>And why does the poor person believe it’s their fault they didn’t rise? Because the poor person who <em>did</em> rise claims the opposite. Because we have survivorship bias. We see the successful and believe that success comes from what those people did — even though they are statistically completely atypical. There’s a psychological reason for this. Lerner measured it (cf. Lerner, 1980): people need to believe the world is fair. When confronted with unjustified poverty, something strange happens: instead of criticizing the system, they criticize the poor. That’s not a lack of empathy. It’s rational psychology. Benabou and Tirole showed that this just-world bias determines redistribution policy — more than the actual income of those involved (Benabou &amp; Tirole, 2006). People who believe poverty is self-inflicted don’t want to help others. The structure uses our psychology against us.</p><p>That’s the deepest level of individualization. Science individualizes through flawed measurements — marshmallow, mindset. Social media individualizes through grind narratives — <em>no excuses</em>, <em>just execute</em>. But the architecture of choice individualizes through something deeper: it makes people accomplices to their own oppression. It forces them into decisions that reproduce the system, and then convinces them that those decisions are their true character. It’s brilliantly designed — and it’s merciless.</p><h3>How Parenting Reproduces Class — and Why Parents Act Rationally</h3><p>If individual traits aren’t the cause of success — then what is?</p><p>The answer is as simple as it is painful: origin. More precisely: the parenting practices that accompany origin. And these practices aren’t irrational. On the contrary — they’re rational. Just for different games.</p><p>Annette Lareau, a sociologist at the University of Pennsylvania, documented this meticulously in <em>Unequal Childhoods</em> (2003, updated 2011). She followed 88 families across social classes through their daily lives — not with questionnaires, but through direct observation: at dinner, at the doctor’s office, during homework. What she found were two fundamentally different parenting logics.</p><p>Middle-class parents practice <em>concerted cultivation</em>: they actively organize their children’s lives. Piano lessons, soccer practice, debates at the dinner table. They encourage their children to question authority, negotiate, argue. The child learns: the world is a place I can shape.</p><p>Working-class parents practice the <em>accomplishment of natural growth</em>. Children play freely, without packed schedules. Communication is shorter, more direct, more frequently imperative: “Don’t touch that.” “Stop it.” This isn’t indifference. It’s a rational response to a world where obedience is essential for survival — with the police, the boss, the school. A child who learns to challenge authority has an advantage in a middle-class career. In an environment where pushback is punished, it’s a liability.</p><p>I experienced this firsthand. At home, we didn’t debate. My mother said something, and that was that. Period. Or there were consequences.</p><p>But I was in the academic-track high school. And there I learned to think differently. I had the luck of teachers who were partly trained in the tradition of the Frankfurt School. That opened something in me that was closed at home.</p><p>When, years later, I sat in meetings and watched how naturally colleagues from academic families disagreed with the boss, I finally understood what I lacked. Not courage. But the habitus of experiencing dissent as normal. I did push back — always, when I wanted to. But it was always the underdog rebelling. I never felt equal.</p><h3>Language as Status Symbol</h3><p>Linguistics supports this picture. Betty Hart and Todd Risley documented the famous 30 Million Word Gap in 1995: children from professional families heard roughly 45 million words by age four; children from poor families only 13 million (Hart &amp; Risley, 1995). The exact figure is debated — Sperry, Sperry, and Miller showed in 2019 that the gap shrinks when you count ambient conversations. But the basic direction holds.</p><p><strong>And language, as Hanno Sauer puts it, is probably the most important status symbol we have.</strong></p><p>Sauer systematized in <em>Klasse</em> (2025) what Bourdieu described decades ago as habitus: class membership inscribed in the body. It’s not just about money. It’s about codes — language, gesture, politeness, taste, the way you enter a room. Sauer goes beyond Bourdieu: <strong>Classes sustain themselves through costly signals — status symbols that only those socialized into them can emit.</strong>Educational climbers try to copy these codes. But the habitus runs deeper than any degree.</p><p>Bourdieu distinguished three forms of capital (cf. Bourdieu, 1982/1979): economic (money, property), social (networks, relationships), and cultural (education, knowledge, embodied dispositions).</p><p><strong>You can buy the tailored suit. But not the ease with which you wear it.</strong></p><p>Cultural capital exists in three states: embodied (habitus — the way you speak, think, feel), objectified (books, art, music in the household), and institutionalized (degrees, titles, certifications). The crucial point: embodied cultural capital can’t be bought. You have to have lived it. That’s why the nouveau riche, in Sauer’s analysis, never fully arrive — they have the money but not the body that goes with it.</p><p>I know the fracture. From my twenties to my fifties, I played the status games: the tailored suit, the right watch, the Porsche, the St. Gallen degree. Today I recognize: that was less vanity than self-reassurance. A sign system that was supposed to say: you belong here.</p><p>My mother was a hotel maid. She taught us vocabulary words — tools for a world she herself never entered. Her greatest pride was a Brockhaus encyclopedia, an old edition in blackletter script where the long <em>s</em> looks like an <em>f</em> and makes you lisp every time you read it. She never opened it. But the complete set stood on the only bookshelf — next to the Angélique romance novels. Cultural capital as furniture. A sign that said: we belong somewhere we aren’t yet.</p><h3>The Zip Code as Destiny</h3><p>Raj Chetty and his team at Opportunity Insights at Harvard have given all of this a brutal empirical foundation. Their analysis of millions of tax records shows: <strong>The zip code where a child grows up (Chetty et al., 2014) is one of the strongest predictors of their later income.</strong> Not intelligence, not effort, not mindset — place. The Great Gatsby Curve illustrates the relationship: the more unequal a society, the more strongly parental income determines the children’s income. The United States, once synonymous with upward mobility through merit, sits far to the right on this curve — high inequality, low mobility.</p><p>James Heckman, Nobel laureate in economics, calculated that early childhood education investments yield an annual return of 13 percent (Heckman, 2006) — more than most stock market returns. But his own finding is also an indictment: if the highest returns come in the first years of life, the school system arrives systematically too late.</p><p>Here lies the uncomfortable core. Parents don’t raise their children wrong. They raise them rationally — for the game they’re playing. A poor mother who teaches her child not to talk back to authority gives them the tool they need in her world. The problem isn’t parenting. The problem is: different parenting styles are optimized for different worlds — and the world of the affluent happens to be the one that schools, universities, and corporations were built for.</p><h3>The Naturalization of Class: Hanno Sauer and the View from Above</h3><p>But here it gets tricky. Because Sauer doesn’t just describe — he explains. And his explanation ventures into dangerous territory. He commits the one cardinal sin a sociologist isn’t supposed to commit. Sociology should describe and illuminate, not become political. And he can’t hide his bias.</p><p>You have to know who Sauer is. Born in 1983, raised in Wiesbaden, both parents with doctoral degrees. Vacations in luxury hotels. Dinner conversations about Kafka. He says it himself in an interview: “I don’t think I’m from anywhere near the bottom.” (Sauer, SRF interview, 2025) He’s coy about it — and then closes with a thesis that fits his exact position: <em>class is an anthropological constant.</em> <strong>A structural feature that can’t be dissolved.</strong> And it’s getting worse. And capitalist societies are, following Rawls, the best for the poorest.</p><p>Yes, it’s getting worse. But not because nature is at play. Not because class is an anthropological fate. Rather because — as Jiang Xueqin puts it from his research on China’s elite schools — the elite wants to stay in the elite. Because the wealthy want to stay wealthy and stay in power. And because they have the means to shape the rules so that’s exactly what happens. That’s not a law of nature. That’s politics of interest.</p><p>I was also born and raised in Wiesbaden. In 1968. But in a different city.</p><p>Wiesbaden is the elite city of the German state of Hesse. State capital, civil servants’ town, spa town — a city that lives off wealth without producing it. Almost no industry. Around the turn of the 20th century, more millionaires lived here per capita than in any other German city. The Wilhelmstraße is the grand boulevard — 900 meters of promenade with the State Theater, the Kurhaus, and the casino with the highest roulette limits in Germany. In the villa districts of Sonnenberg and Nerotal, wealth isn’t earned — it’s inherited.</p><p>Until I was six, I lived in the Nerotal. In a basement apartment, between the villas. I swam in the Nerotal pool, ran past the tennis club into the woods, played among the wealthy without knowing they were wealthy. Then we moved. Rheinstraße 15, top-floor garret apartment. The corner of Wilhelmstraße — but the address was Rheinstraße, and that no longer counted as the boulevard. If you lived on the Wilhelmstraße, you belonged. If you lived around the corner, you didn’t.</p><p>No car. Single mother. Meat was a luxury, asparagus was gold. Downtown became my territory — and the public library my refuge.</p><p>That I made it into the academic-track high school was luck. I had B’s in fourth grade. Not A’s like the kids from other neighborhoods — I have no idea why. But my elementary school teacher believed in me. That was enough. The Elly-Heuss School downtown — a public school, not an elite institution. Same city, same time, two planets.</p><p>Sauer and I, raised in the same city. He with Kafka at the dinner table and vacations in luxury hotels. Me with a Brockhaus encyclopedia in blackletter that no one ever read, and a mother who cleaned hotel rooms. And then he tells me class is nature.</p><p>When Sauer says class just is what it is, he says it from the perspective of someone sitting on top, looking down. I look up. And I see something different.</p><p>In the later chapters of <em>Klasse</em>, Sauer argues that class differences have an evolutionary function. That they <em>must</em> be this way. That the signaling games — Louis Vuitton, quiet luxury, the right language — are biologically anchored, similar to the peacock’s tail, which Amotz Zahavi explained with his handicap principle: costly signals that prove fitness.</p><p>He knows how this sounds. In the interview, he admits it’s “extraordinarily convenient” when someone comes along and says the social structures that benefit him unfortunately can’t be changed. He calls it a fair suspicion. And then he does exactly that: declares inequality inevitable. “A classless society will never emerge.” (Sauer, SRF interview, 2025) “Don’t shoot the messenger” — as if he were a neutral observer and not himself part of what he describes.</p><p>The magazine <em>Jacobin</em> called his book “a classism theory from the right” (Nehring, 2025). The sociologist Fabian Nehring criticized: the book delivers no explanation for the emergence of upper and lower classes, as it promises — it naturalizes them. Sauer depoliticizes class by removing it from economics and relocating it to evolutionary biology. The blind spot is the economic system — despite verbal acknowledgments.</p><p>Richard David Precht dismantled this in an episode of <em>Lanz &amp; Precht</em>. Precht shows: the handicap principle is contested even within biology itself. The ruff — a bird whose males display wildly different appearances — contradicts the thesis that costly signals are universally necessary. And even if the handicap principle holds in nature: reasoning from biology to society is the oldest trick in the book for justifying inequality. It’s the same logical fallacy that has legitimized racism, colonialism, and caste systems for centuries.</p><p>Precht’s verdict is devastating: a book that started well collapses, in the end, into a very simple, plain, and in this form false apotheosis of inequality.</p><p>That’s the core. Sauer sees the mechanisms — better than most. But he’s trapped in the bias of his own position. An upper-class child who brilliantly describes inequality and then declares it inevitable. A philosopher who coyly admits his thesis is convenient for him — and advances it anyway. Not because the data compel him. But because his origin gives him the luxury of reading inequality as natural law rather than political failure.</p><p>And that’s exactly the pattern running through this entire essay: the research identifies the structures — and then veers into individualization or naturalization. Mischel measures class and sells it as self-control. Dweck does research from Row 1, Seat 1 and overlooks who isn’t even in the room. Ericsson studies only the survivors and ignores the 79 percent that deliberate practice doesn’t explain. Dunning and Kruger test Cornell students and pathologize the confidence of those without credentials. And Sauer describes class precisely, only to declare it natural in the end.</p><p>Each of these researchers is a product of their background. Each confirms their own biography with their most famous work. That’s not an accusation — it’s an observation. And it’s the reason we need to critically examine the self-optimization thesis. Not as opinion. But because the research itself demands it.</p><h3>Why Schools Don’t Change — Institutionalized Inertia</h3><p>If parenting reproduces class and early interventions bump up against family systems — then at least schools should compensate. That’s the promise, anyway: equal opportunity through education. Advancement through merit.</p><p>The data tell a different story.</p><p>PISA 2022 shows a finding for Germany and Austria that couldn’t be more sobering: parental socioeconomic status explains 19 percent of the performance variance in mathematics (OECD, 2023, PISA 2022 Results) — well above the OECD average of 15 percent. The performance gap between the top and bottom social quartiles is 111 points in Germany, 106 in Austria (OECD, 2023). That’s more than three school years of advantage — and this advantage isn’t the result of individual talent, but of social origin.</p><p>The tracking school system in German-speaking countries is no accident. It’s the institutionalized form of reproduction. The academic track is the school of concerted cultivation: discursive, argumentative, built for negotiation and critical thinking — exactly the skills middle-class children bring from home. The vocational track is more rule-oriented, less discursive, with clear instructions and narrow expectations. Working-class children find an environment that fits their habitus — but no elevator upward.</p><p><strong>That’s not a conspiracy theory. It’s structural analysis.</strong></p><p>Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis articulated this as early as 1976 in <em>Schooling in Capitalist America</em>: schools don’t reflect the hierarchy — they produce it. The <em>hidden curriculum</em> doesn’t teach knowledge — it teaches position: Who gets to ask questions? Who obeys? Who gets freedom, who gets discipline? Bourdieu distilled this insight into reproduction theory: the education system converts inherited advantage into apparent merit — and makes inequality invisible by disguising it as talent.</p><p>Bowles and Gintis revisited their work in 2011. The basic mechanics hadn’t changed. The schools of the wealthy foster autonomy and creativity. The schools of the poor foster obedience and punctuality. Both prepare students precisely for the positions that correspond to their class of origin.</p><p>You might object: Finland shows it can be done differently. Finland doesn’t track students until age 16. The PISA results confirm: high performance with low social selection. But in German-speaking countries, comprehensive school models fail because of resistance from middle-class parents. That’s no accident — it’s rational behavior: those with a structural advantage want to keep it. The argument sounds like “quality assurance” and “differentiation by talent.” In reality, it protects privilege.</p><p>The system’s resistance to reform is itself evidence of its function. Decades of education research, hundreds of studies, dozens of reform attempts — and the correlation between parental income and student achievement remains stable. Not because we don’t know the solution. But because the solution threatens interests.</p><p>When parents in Vienna or Munich fight to get their children into the “right” school, they’re not fighting for education. They’re fighting for reproduction.</p><p>But the resistance doesn’t come only from above.</p><p>I experienced this myself. With Scrum4Schools, I tried to bring the ideas of the agile movement into schools: that everyone on a team has something to contribute. That children naturally want to learn. That personal responsibility isn’t a risk — it’s a resource. The teachers were enthusiastic — I documented this in <em>From Teaching to Learning</em>. And the schools were more open than I expected.</p><p>But then I hit the resistance I hadn’t anticipated. Not from institutions. From parents. And precisely from parents in the lower classes.</p><p>When children suddenly start debating at home, demanding autonomy, defending their own opinions — for middle-class families, that’s normal. Concerted cultivation, as Lareau described it: that’s exactly what these children are raised for. But for families in precarious conditions, it’s a threat. The social pressure — <em>you have to make something of yourself</em> — is so intense that rote learning is demanded. What the parents themselves experienced. Discipline, obedience, compliance. Not because they don’t love their children, but because their experience tells them: those who stand out lose. Those who conform survive.</p><p>Jiang Xueqin confirmed exactly this from his work in Chinese schools: lower-class parents can’t relate to progressive pedagogy. Not out of ignorance — out of experience. Their class has taught them that autonomy is a luxury they can’t afford. Thomas Gorman described this mechanism in his research on class-based educational attitudes as <em>the hidden injuries of class</em> (cf. Gorman, 1998): the wounds that the class system inflicts shape expectations of education. Those from families where education is the only tool for advancement don’t want experiments. They want grades.</p><p>That’s the double trap. The upper class blocks structural reform to protect its lead. And the lower class resists pedagogical reform because their class position has taught them to distrust exactly the kind of education that would help their children most. The game reproduces itself not only through those who sit on top. It reproduces itself through everyone caught within it.</p><h3>The Macroeconomics of Inequality: Debt as System</h3><p>So far we’ve moved through psychology, sociology, and education research. But the story of inequality has yet another layer that’s rarely connected to this discussion: economics. This is where it gets really uncomfortable.</p><p>Maurice Höfgen (cf. Höfgen, 2020), the young German economist and proponent of Modern Monetary Theory, argues: our financial system is not neutral. It systematically generates debt in the lower classes — not as a bug, but as a feature. When the state cuts public spending through austerity, it reduces private sector incomes. Poorer households must take on debt to maintain their living standards. Wealthier households accumulate assets — because every debt on one side is a credit on the other.</p><p><strong>That’s not a conspiracy theory. It’s accounting logic.</strong></p><p>You don’t have to be an MMT adherent to see it — mainstream criticism of fiscal austerity now comes from the IMF and Germany’s own Council of Economic Experts. But Höfgen goes further: austerity doesn’t just distribute inefficiently. It actively redistributes — from bottom to top. Cuts fall where dependence on the state is greatest: education, healthcare, infrastructure.</p><p>And this dynamic has a history that David Graeber traced with brilliant scholarship in <em>Debt: The First 5,000 Years</em> (2011). Graeber’s core thesis: debt has been the central instrument for maintaining hierarchies for millennia. Before there were coins, there was debt. Before barter, there were credit relationships. Money itself emerged from debt relationships — and these were asymmetric from the start.</p><p><strong>The creditor has power over the debtor.</strong></p><p>In agrarian societies, the debt spiral from interest led through land loss to debt bondage — a form of slavery. Debt, landlessness, servitude: a pattern that runs through human history. And the oldest known political acts in history were debt jubilees — the <em>clean slates</em> of Sumerian kings, who periodically canceled all debts to prevent social revolts.</p><p>Professor Jiang — a political scientist whose lectures on success and inequality inspired this essay — distills this historical pattern into a blunt formula: the three universal problems of every society are debt, landlessness, and slavery. And every revolution in history was, at its core, a promise to solve these three problems: cancel debts, redistribute land, end bondage.</p><p>Höfgen’s argument adds a modern punch line: <strong>The state could actively combat inequality through fiscal policy.</strong> But it doesn’t. Not because it’s economically impossible. But because those who profit from the existing order shape the rules in their favor.</p><p>Jiang would call it: game rigging.</p><h3>Bullshit Jobs and the Question of Why We Don’t Work Less</h3><p>And Graeber has a second, lesser-known point. In <em>Bullshit Jobs</em> (2018), he asks a question that’s more uncomfortable than anything the productivity debate offers: why hasn’t technological progress — automation, digitization, robotics — led to us working less? The answer Graeber gives is political: we invented meaningless work instead. Entire industries — financial services, human resources, compliance, management consulting, corporate law — exist because a society that equips its workers with free time and purpose is, for the ruling class, more dangerous than a society that keeps them busy with bullshit. Graeber puts it with a sharpness rarely seen in print: <strong>“The ruling class has figured out that a happy and productive population with free time on their hands is a mortal danger” (Graeber, 2018).</strong> In his surveys, a third of American workers said their job was pointless — and would be missed by no one if it disappeared.</p><p>This isn’t a new observation. John Maynard Keynes predicted in 1930 that his grandchildren would work only fifteen hours a week — because technological progress would raise living standards so high that more wouldn’t be necessary (Keynes, 1930). He gave humanity a hundred years. 2030. We’re almost there. And we don’t work fifteen hours. We work more than ever — while simultaneously debating whether artificial intelligence will finally free us from labor. The same hope, the same prediction, the same naivety. Because the question was never whether technology makes it possible. The question is who captures the productivity gains.</p><p>And here the circle closes with Markovits. Because at the top, people don’t work less. On the contrary. The elite sends its children to Yale and Oxford, to Harvard and MIT — and the work there is more intense than anywhere else. Fifteen thousand dollars a year for tutoring. Premium tutors at six hundred dollars an hour. It’s not about working less. It’s about mastering the code of each class. The right language, the right networks, the right credentials. The upper class doesn’t work less — it works on something different: the reproduction of its position. And instead of using productivity gains so that everyone can enjoy life — including the lower classes — the gains are invested in securing those who are already at the top.</p><h3>The German Narrative: Work More!</h3><p>And right now, we’re seeing exactly this narrative dominate in Germany. The German government, led by Chancellor Merz, declares: people aren’t working enough, they’re sick too often, they don’t work long enough, they don’t contribute enough to Germany. The socially disadvantaged are lazy and don’t want to work. Moritz Schularik, one of the country’s leading economists, demands ten percent more labor output. Söder demands one more hour per day. Reinhold Würth, the legendary screw tycoon, complains that after the period of prosperity, appetites for more money and less work have grown. The same narrative, over and over.</p><p>And the media picks it up — even where you’d expect resistance. Lanz and Precht, for example, dedicate an entire podcast episode to the topic. You might expect two of Germany’s most prominent intellectuals to immediately expose the narrative for what it is: an individualization of a structural problem. But they don’t. Instead, they spend 45 minutes discussing <em>within</em> the narrative. Should Germans work more? Do we have a mentality problem? Is the young generation too entitled? They do arrive at smart counterarguments — parents in the 1970s worked 2,000 hours a year, today it’s 1,300, and yet prosperity is incomparably higher. The garbage collector doesn’t have more trash cans because he works longer hours. The nurse is already running on fumes. Precht makes the right observation that we have a cultural mismatch, not an economic one — the younger generation already has the mentality of a meaning-oriented society, but automation hasn’t yet created the material foundation for it. And Lanz cites Graeber and his bullshit jobs thesis.</p><p>But the framing stays intact. The question remains: are we working enough? And the question itself is already the answer — the wrong one. Because it individualizes. The right question would be: why does the system distribute productivity gains in a way that makes the majority feel it’s never enough? Why do nurses work to the point of collapse while a third of American workers — according to Graeber’s surveys — consider their own job pointless? Why do we invent bullshit jobs instead of reducing working hours?</p><p>This is exactly the mechanism I’ve been describing throughout this essay. “Work more” isn’t an economic solution. It’s a moral imperative — and one that serves the same individualization mechanism as the marshmallow test, as the growth mindset, as the Hormozi reels. If the economy isn’t growing, it’s <em>your</em>fault — you’re not working enough, not hard enough, not long enough. The structure remains untouched. And even the critics reproduce the narrative by debating it rather than dismantling it.</p><h3>The Meritocracy Trap: Why It’s Getting Even Worse</h3><p>And there’s one more mechanism that completes the picture — and darkens it.</p><p>Daniel Markovits, a law professor at Yale, showed in <em>The Meritocracy Trap</em> (2019) that meritocracy itself has become the problem. Not because it fails. But because it works — in a way its inventors never intended.</p><p>In the 1950s and ’60s, meritocracy was a tool of openness. The old hereditary aristocracy sent its children to elite schools, but they didn’t learn much there. When admissions shifted to merit-based criteria, suddenly the best students came from public schools. The private schools were, as Markovits writes, full of privileged, lazy children.</p><p>That has reversed. Today, wealthy families in the United States invest up to $15,000 annually in tutoring. Premium tutors in Manhattan charge $600 an hour. By the time an upper-class child finishes college, the cumulative investment gap compared to a middle-class child amounts to roughly ten million dollars (Markovits, 2019, p. 128). That’s not inheritance in the traditional sense — it’s human capital dressed up as merit.</p><p>The result: meritocracy has become exactly what it was meant to prevent — in Markovits’ words, “a mechanism for the concentration and dynastic transmission of wealth, privilege, and caste across generations” (Markovits, 2019). The test score advantage of rich over poor students has grown by 40 to 50 percent over the last 25 years (Reardon, 2011; Markovits, 2019). The academic gap between the wealthy and the middle class is now larger than the gap between the middle class and the poor.</p><p>Markovits’ key point: the upper class isn’t fighting the lower class. It’s fighting the middle class. Through an income-security industry of elite education, networks, and credentialism that systematically narrows access to the top. Inequality isn’t driven by the poorest, but by those who have a lot — just not as much as the 0.01 percent at the very top. It’s a fight of the <em>have some</em> against the <em>have a lot</em>, fought through educational investments disguised as merit.</p><p>What Markovits describes confirms Turchin’s model on another level: meritocracy produces more qualified aspirants than elite positions exist. And it gives those already at the top the tools to defend their position — not through walls, but through credentials.</p><p>What Markovits describes economically has political consequences. When the elevator stalls — not just for the poorest, but for the middle — the frustrated seek other paths.</p><h3>The Promise of a Game Reset: Trump, AfD, FPÖ</h3><p>If social mobility is the best form of governance — and on this, historians, economists, and political scientists agree to a surprising degree — then blocking social mobility is the most dangerous form of destabilization. Poverty alone doesn’t produce revolts. The perception that the game is rigged does.</p><p>Peter Turchin, the Russian-American complexity researcher, quantified this in <em>End Times</em> (2023) using the tools of cliodynamics. His central variable: elite overproduction. When a society produces more highly educated, ambitious people than positions at the top exist, it creates a surplus of frustrated aspirants — counter-elites who don’t want to reform the system, but to overthrow it.</p><p>Turchin has documented this pattern across dozens of historical societies. And in 2010, he published a forecast in <em>Nature</em>: around the year 2020, political instability in the United States would peak. You can think what you want about cliodynamics — the prediction was accurate.</p><p>What Turchin describes is precisely the mechanism Jiang articulates in his lectures: societies are stable as long as advancement is possible. Once all positions are filled and the queue grows too long, consensus collapses. A camp of the <em>have a lot</em> emerges — the establishment that has secured the system. And a camp of the <em>have some</em> — the ambitious middle class that discovers the ladder has been pulled up.</p><p>Helmut Schelsky called West Germany in the 1950s a “leveled middle-class society” (Schelsky, 1953). Society was shaped like an onion — broad middle, thin edges. For decades, that image was the promise: work, and you’ll join the middle. The middle holds. But the onion has become an hourglass. The middle thins out. Wealth concentrates at the top, precarity grows at the bottom. The prosperity promise that held Germany together is broken.</p><p>And these <em>have some</em>, not the poorest, form the core of every revolution.</p><p>Donald Trump is the most obvious example. A billionaire who positions himself as the voice of the forgotten — and serves the narrative that Jiang identifies at the core of every revolution: debt relief and the disempowerment of elites. Jiang explicitly compares Trump to Caesar — and the parallel is strikingly concrete. Caesar was no man of the people. He came from one of Rome’s oldest patrician families. But he recognized the blockage: a Senate admitting fewer and fewer newcomers. A mass of frustrated Romans seeking an offer.</p><p>Caesar’s offer: land distribution, debt reduction, citizenship for the provinces. His method: the performance of friendship with the people against the corrupt elite. Trump operates on the same playbook. He’s not popular despite his wealth. He’s popular because he cultivates the gesture of betraying his own class — <em>Drain the Swamp</em> as the modern version of Caesar’s populist politics. That Caesar destroyed the Republic and Trump has damaged the institutional norms of American democracy is part of the pattern: the game reset is never gentle.</p><p>In Germany, the AfD plays a similar role. Its voters are disproportionately skilled workers and the lower middle class. Not the poorest vote AfD. It’s the <em>have some</em>: people with training, with jobs, with modest lives — who discover that the next step is blocked. The AfD has displaced the SPD as the party with the largest share of working-class voters. And paradoxically, only ten percent of AfD voters say they’re worried about their own financial situation.</p><p>It’s not about actual poverty. It’s about relative deprivation — the feeling that the system only works for others.</p><p>In Austria, Herbert Kickl and his “People’s Chancellor” narrative serve the same pattern. The FPÖ won first place for the first time in the 2024 election — with 28.8 percent. Its base: skilled workers, lower middle class, people who feel the rules weren’t made for them.</p><p>The irony in all three cases is identical: those promising the game reset are themselves part of the elite. Trump is a billionaire. Kickl has been a career politician for decades. The AfD leadership consists of academics. They promise to destroy the game they themselves play — and if they win, they’ll reset it in their own favor.</p><h3>The Screwed Generation</h3><p>But there’s a third group often overlooked in populism analysis: the young generation that neither fights nor votes — but refuses. Mirai Kaliskan, a young author at Germany’s <em>Tagesspiegel</em>, put it pointedly in early 2025 under the headline “Generation Screwed”: “Mr. Merz, what prosperity am I supposed to work myself to death for, exactly?” Her argument is sharp: homeownership has become an urban fairy tale, a one-week vacation an annual event you save up for all year. A broken kitchen appliance is bought on a 30-day PayPal credit. And then this generation is told to please work one more hour.</p><p>Precht makes an observation on <em>Lanz &amp; Precht</em> that cuts deeper than most economic analyses: the real mismatch isn’t economic, it’s cultural. The younger generation already has the mentality of a meaning-oriented society — a society where the purpose of one’s existence matters more than GDP growth. But the economic reality, automation, digitization, hasn’t yet produced the material conditions for that. The expectations are there. The material foundation isn’t. And — this is Precht’s crucial point — the young people can’t help it. We delivered this mentality to them. The boomers created the cultural capitalism in which maximum happiness, maximum meaning, maximum self-actualization is the promise. And now we’re outraged that the next generation takes that promise seriously.</p><p>The hoteliers’ children in South Tyrol won’t take over the business — because they saw what it cost their parents. The small-business owners in the Swabian Alps can’t find successors — because their children know the price: heart attacks, broken families, permanent absence. That’s not laziness. That’s a rational conclusion drawn from observed evidence.</p><p>And here the circle closes with the opening of this essay. The younger generation is doing exactly what poor children do in the marshmallow test: responding rationally to their observed environment. When promises aren’t kept — the promise of advancement, the promise of prosperity, the promise of retirement — you don’t wait for the second marshmallow. You take what’s there. And call it self-preservation.</p><p>Jiang would say: that’s the universal pattern. Every revolution is led by counter-elites. They promise the poor debt relief, land, and freedom. And after the revolution, they fill the positions at the top themselves — until the next generation of frustrated aspirants arrives. But the younger generation’s quiet refusal may be more dangerous than any revolution. A revolution replaces elites. A generation that stops believing replaces nothing. It lets the system run empty.</p><h3>What Follows? — Synthesis and Uncomfortable Options</h3><p>Individual interventions — training self-control, preaching growth mindset, teaching deliberate practice — have minimal effects because they treat symptoms, not causes. Science itself has spent decades propping up the narrative that success is a matter of individual disposition — giving society a convenient excuse not to touch its structures. School reforms fail because of institutional inertia. Early childhood programs hit family structures. The social media prophets of personal responsibility preach hustle instead of systemic critique. And the macroeconomic order systematically produces the inequality that blocks social mobility.</p><p>What’s left?</p><p>You can read the situation cynically: inequality is inevitable, populism is the predictable consequence, and every game reset only produces new elites. History as a hamster wheel.</p><p>But before we accept pessimism, the opposing view deserves a serious hearing. Steven Pinker argues in <em>Enlightenment Now</em> (2018) that global poverty has dropped drastically in recent decades — from over 60 percent in the 1960s to under ten percent today. Child mortality is falling. Life expectancy is rising. And Branko Milanovic’s elephant curve shows: the largest income gains of the last thirty years went to the global middle class — primarily in Asia. Hundreds of millions of people have risen out of extreme poverty. That’s real. It would be intellectually dishonest to suppress that.</p><p>And yet this perspective falls short — for three reasons.</p><p>First: I’ll never forget a car ad campaign by an automaker: <em>Shock Your Neighbor</em>. It played with exactly this theme: status. <strong>Absolute improvement doesn’t satisfy the need for relative position.</strong> People measure their status against their neighbors, not against history. When the top ten percent capture the lion’s share, the rest feels cheated — not because they’re worse off, but because the promise of meritocracy is broken.</p><p>Second: <strong>Milanovic’s elephant curve also shows who lost — the lower middle class of Western nations.</strong> Exactly the group that forms the core of populist movements.</p><p>Third: <strong>Pinker’s argument assumes progress continues automatically.</strong>Turchin shows: stability cycles break.</p><p>The real question, therefore, is not: can inequality be abolished? It is: <strong>Can you organize a controlled game reset — without revolution?</strong></p><p>The research points to structural levers that would be more effective than anything we’ve tried in schools and mindset seminars.</p><p><strong>First lever: Fiscal policy.</strong> Höfgen and the MMT proponents argue that states with their own currency have fiscal room they’re not using. Public investment in infrastructure, education, and healthcare reduces inequality — not as charity, but as productivity growth. The debt brake, from this perspective, is not a sign of responsibility. It’s an instrument of wealth preservation.</p><p>And here the same question always comes to me: why not? Why don’t the elites let the lower and middle classes have the public swimming pools? The free healthcare? The better schools? The better roads? It would be so simple. Pay better wages. Hire lifeguards for swimming pools instead of closing them. Pay nurses so the profession doesn’t bleed people dry. Equip teachers so they can teach instead of doing paperwork. This isn’t about redistribution from top to bottom — it’s about investing in a country’s infrastructure that benefits everyone. Including the elites. Their children swim in the same cities. Their parents lie in the same hospitals. Their cars drive on the same roads.</p><p>But that’s precisely the point Graeber and Jiang hit from different directions: it’s not about efficiency. It’s about control. A society in which the lower class is well provided for is a society in which they make demands. In which they debate, organize, demand. In which the children from the working-class neighborhood start asking the same questions as the children from the villa district. And that, as Graeber put it, is more dangerous to the ruling class than any inefficiency.</p><p><strong>Second lever: Progressive wealth taxation.</strong> Germany taxes labor at up to 47 percent (BMF, 2024) — and wealth almost not at all. The wealth tax has been suspended since 1997. Inheritances are shielded by exemptions and business asset privileges. The result: those who work, pay. Those who own, inherit. Chetty’s data show that wealth concentration is the strongest driver of declining mobility (cf. Chetty et al., 2014). An inheritance tax worthy of the name, and a wealth tax that limits accumulation, wouldn’t flip the table — but they’d reshuffle the cards.</p><p>And again: the elite manages to convince non-wealthy citizens that a wealth tax would be bad for them. Jobs would be lost. Family businesses destroyed. Germany’s competitiveness endangered. In reality, a progressive wealth tax would only meaningfully affect the top one percent — those roughly 300,000 households that hold about 35 percent of total private wealth in Germany. The German Institute for Economic Research (DIW) calculated that such a tax could generate up to 100 billion euros per year (Bach, DIW, 2020). A hundred billion. For schools, hospitals, swimming pools, roads. For the infrastructure currently crumbling because there’s supposedly no money.</p><p>And whether a multi-billionaire pays two percent annually while their wealth has doubled over the last decade, according to Oxfam? Billionaire wealth grew by two trillion dollars in 2024 — three times faster than the year before (Oxfam, 2025). A two percent wealth tax on wealth growing at seven to ten percent annually is not expropriation. It’s a rounding error. Yet 62 percent of Germans support a wealth tax — and politicians won’t defend their right to it. They defend the right of those who don’t need it not to pay it.</p><p><strong>Third lever: Universal educational access from year one.</strong> Heckman’s research shows: the highest ROI comes in the earliest years. Free, high-quality early childhood education for all — not as childcare, but as an educational program — would be the single most effective measure against the reproduction of inequality.</p><p>And again the same question: how can it be that the world’s third-richest country can’t produce the best-educated children — of whom it already has too few? Stefan Schulz documented this in <em>Die Kinderwüste</em> (<em>The Children’s Desert</em>, 2022): Germany systematically fails at family policy. Not from a lack of knowledge, but from a lack of will. Early childhood educators earn on average between €2,900 and €3,500 gross per month (TVöD SuE, 2025) — for a profession that, by Heckman’s own calculation, delivers the highest societal return on investment of any profession. If we paid them more, we’d raise GDP. That’s not a left-wing utopia. That’s economics.</p><p>And why can’t we simply double the child benefit? €259 per month — that’s what Germany considers adequate per child. Let’s do the math: 18 million children receive child benefits. Doubling to €518 would cost roughly 56 billion euros per year. That sounds like a lot. But it’s almost exactly half of the defense budget of 108 billion euros in 2026. There’s money for Leopard tanks, Eurofighters, and Boxer armored vehicles. Not for children. That’s not fiscal necessity. That’s a political choice. And it says everything about which children this country values.</p><p><strong>Fourth lever: A universal basic income or a negative income tax.</strong> It would reduce the volatility of poor families — the instability that, as Kidd showed, forms the basis for mistrust. Stability is a resource. And it can be funded.</p><p>Child poverty is a scandal. In Ethiopia, in Sri Lanka, maybe in Kenya — I can understand that. But here? In a country that exports tanks and builds highways? Right now, at my children’s school, a one-euro craft supply fee is being collected. One euro. The collection costs more than the euro itself. Printing letters, labeling envelopes, reminding parents, maintaining lists — bureaucratic overhead that costs three times the amount. What’s the point? It would be cheaper to simply give children the best schools than to administer the poverty.</p><p>And why can’t we feed children in all-day schools the best food there is? While farmers this year had to throw away their potatoes — too much harvested, no market, off to the compost heap. In a country where children in the school cafeteria eat noodles with ketchup because the catering budget is €3.50 per meal. That’s not a resource problem. That’s a distribution problem. And a dignity problem. We treat children as if they were a cost factor — instead of what they are: the only future we have.</p><p><strong>Fifth lever: Transparency of reproduction mechanisms.</strong> This sounds abstract but may be the most important point. As long as we as a society believe success is a matter of character, we’ll dismiss structural reform as unnecessary. The first step is correcting the narrative — in schools, in the media, in research funding. We need fewer marshmallow tests and more studies like Chetty’s that make visible how zip codes shape destinies. We need fewer growth mindset interventions and more research on the effects of transfer payments, educational infrastructure, and early childhood support.</p><p><strong>Sixth lever: Changing corporate culture.</strong> I say this as someone who has consulted with companies for 25 years. Most hiring processes select for habitus — for the way you speak, present yourself, argue. That’s not conscious classism, but it is classism. Companies that anonymize their recruiting, make their promotion pathways more transparent, and consciously hire people without the “right” résumé do more for social mobility than any mindset seminar.</p><p>But companies must do one thing above all: invest. In people. Yes, of course we want the best graduates. But we don’t hire them. Right now, Germany is witnessing a debate so absurd you’d have to invent it if it didn’t exist: university graduates can’t find jobs. The unemployment rate among academics rose 19 percent in 2024. In the natural sciences, it stands at 8.3 percent. At the same time, there are labor shortages in 163 occupations. How does that add up?</p><p>It adds up when you understand what Jiang explains: we’re closing off advancement for the best and brightest. We told them for fifteen to twenty years: push yourself. Study yourself to death. Bulimic learning, tests, exams, constant stress. Bachelor’s, master’s, internships, semesters abroad — and then we give them no jobs. Companies demand three years of experience for entry-level positions. They want ready-made workers but won’t invest in developing them. Over 30 percent of German companies plan to cut jobs. 100,000 industrial jobs were eliminated in 2024. New apprenticeship contracts are roughly seven percent below 2019 levels.</p><p>And at the same time? DAX companies posted record profits of 52.4 billion euros in operating results in the first quarter of 2022 alone (EY, 2022). SAP launched a 10-billion-euro share buyback program. Deutsche Bank bought back 750 million euros of its own shares. The granaries are being filled, the shares bought back — and the generation that was given the promise of merit stands before locked doors. DAX CEO median compensation is 6.1 million euros per year (DSW/HBS, 2024) — forty times the average employee’s salary. At Adidas, the ratio exceeds 80 to 1.</p><p>This is exactly the mechanism Markovits describes: the upper class invests in securing its position — and pulls up the ladder. German companies nearly doubled their investments in the United States to $15.7 billion in 2023 (GTAI, 2024). Record sums of 7.3 billion euros flowed to China in the first half of 2024. But in their own graduates, in their own skilled workers, in their own infrastructure? Supposedly there’s no money for that.</p><p><strong>Seventh lever: Reclaiming public discourse.</strong> As long as Hormozi and Gary Vee dominate the narrative of advancement — “You just have to want it harder” — the individualization narrative remains intact. The counter-story — that structures explain more than willpower — needs equally charismatic storytellers, equally compelling formats, and equally wide reach. That’s not just a task for academia. It’s a task for everyone with a platform.</p><p>I don’t exclude myself.</p><p>None of these levers is revolutionary. None requires toppling a system. All require political will — and that means: they require those who benefit from the status quo to be willing to give up advantages. History shows that this rarely happens voluntarily.</p><p>And that’s the tragedy. Populism — Trump, AfD, FPÖ — is an understandable reaction to a real blockage. People sense the game is rigged. Their diagnosis is often correct. But the therapy populism offers is no therapy. It’s another move in the same game — played by counter-elites who want to reach the top.</p><p>The question that remains isn’t political. It’s existential: are we capable of implementing structural reform before the pressure turns to revolution?</p><p>I don’t know.</p><p>But I know the answer isn’t in marshmallow tests. And not in Instagram reels telling us we just need to grind harder.</p><h3>Self-Examination</h3><p>And I know something else: I’m a beneficiary of the system I’ve described here. I learned the codes. I used the openings. I had the luck that brought me here. But I am the exception. Not the rule. The statistics say: a child like me, born to a single working-class mother in Wiesbaden, makes it to my current position in six out of a hundred cases. I’m not proof that the system works. I’m proof of how improbable it is to escape it.</p><p>And of course I’ll send my children to the best school I can afford. That’s not a contradiction. That’s the tragedy. I know the mechanisms — and use them anyway. Because I know what happens when you don’t. The alternative isn’t to surrender my children to the system I’m criticizing. The alternative is to simultaneously want the best for your own children — and to fight for the system to change. For the school in the working-class neighborhood to be as good as the one in the villa district. For no child in this country to face a different future because their parents have the wrong zip code.</p><p>This essay, therefore, is also a self-examination.</p><p>The question of whether we as a society can manage the controlled game reset before someone forces the uncontrolled one, I can’t answer. But the question of whether I’m willing to give up advantages in small ways — in my work, in my willingness to give people a chance who don’t know the right codes — that question I can answer. And must answer.</p><p><strong>Every day.</strong></p><h3>Epilogue: Enlightenment from Undeserved Structural Violence</h3><p>I have deliberately not voiced an opinion in this essay. I have observed. Documented. Gathered the research and critically examined it — the research of others, but also my own convictions. I have taken the trouble to back every claim with research, to verify every source, to check every number. Not to be right. But to be honest.</p><p>I have done this because I believe sociology is enlightenment. Not enlightenment from self-imposed ignorance, as Kant articulated it in 1784. But enlightenment from <em>undeserved structural violence</em>. That sounds academic. But it means something simple: the structures this essay describes — the false success narratives, the architecture of unfree choice, the reproduction of class through parenting, education, and fiscal policy — these structures cause people to suffer. Not because these people are ignorant. Not because they lack discipline or mindset. But because the structures are built to produce suffering while simultaneously providing the narratives that explain that suffering as personal failure.</p><p>The sense of powerlessness that so many people in our society feel — that dull awareness that something is wrong, that the game isn’t fair, that the rules were made for others — is not a sign of weakness. It’s not a sign of incompetence. It’s the rational perception of a reality that this essay has traced, point by point.</p><p>And I fall for these narratives myself. Again and again. The climber in me wants to believe that he made it on his own. The consultant in me wants to believe that mindset and discipline make the difference. The father in me wants to believe that his children will be fine if he just does everything right. But the sociologist in me knows: that’s not true. Not quite. Not entirely. And exactly that tension — between what I want to feel and what the data show — is the reason I wrote this essay.</p><p>This essay is long. Deliberately long. Because the connections are complex and I didn’t want to simplify what shouldn’t be simplified. From psychology to sociology to economics, from Mischel’s marshmallows to Turchin’s cliodynamics, from the elementary school teacher in Wiesbaden to the fiscal policy of the Federal Republic — the dots are far apart. But when you connect them, the picture that emerges is uncomfortable. And impossible to unsee.</p><p><strong>If you’ve read this far, I invite you to join the conversation.</strong> Push back. Add what’s missing. Tell your own story — as a comment, an email, a conversation. Because the dots I’ve connected here are not all the dots. They’re mine. Yours may produce a different picture — or the same one, just from a different angle. And perhaps that’s where the opportunity lies: that we have this conversation together. Openly, honestly, with the courage to ask the uncomfortable questions too.</p><p>The question that remains at the end isn’t whether the system is unjust. The research has answered that. The question is: what do we do about it?</p><p><strong>Every day.</strong></p><h3>References</h3><p>Appadurai, A. (2004). The capacity to aspire. In V. Rao &amp; M. Walton (Eds.), <em>Culture and Public Action</em>. Stanford University Press.</p><p>Bach, S. (2020). Vermögenssteuer: Ein Beitrag zur Verringerung der Ungleichheit. <em>DIW Wochenbericht</em>, 87(4). German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin).</p><p>Benabou, R. &amp; Tirole, J. (2006). Belief in a just world and redistributive politics. <em>Quarterly Journal of Economics</em>, 121(2), 699–746.</p><p>BMF (2024). Tax burden and tax rates in Germany. Federal Ministry of Finance.</p><p>Bönke, T., Harnack-Eber, A. &amp; Lüthen, H. (2024). The Broken Elevator: Declining Absolute Mobility of Living Standards in Germany. <em>DIW Discussion Paper 2068</em>. German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin).</p><p>Bourdieu, P. (1984). <em>Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste</em>. Harvard University Press. (Original: <em>La distinction</em>, 1979.)</p><p>Bowles, S. &amp; Gintis, H. (1976/2011). <em>Schooling in Capitalist America: Educational Reform and the Contradictions of Economic Life</em>. Haymarket Books.</p><p>Broer, M., Bai, Y. &amp; Fonseca, F. (2019). <em>Socioeconomic Inequality and Educational Outcomes: Evidence from Twenty Years of TIMSS</em>. Springer/IEA Research for Education, Vol. 5.</p><p>Chetty, R., Hendren, N., Kline, P. &amp; Saez, E. (2014). Where is the Land of Opportunity? The Geography of Intergenerational Mobility in the United States. <em>Quarterly Journal of Economics</em>, 129(4), 1553–1623.</p><p>Claro, S., Paunesku, D. &amp; Dweck, C. S. (2016). Growth mindset tempers the effects of poverty on academic achievement. <em>PNAS</em>, 113(31), 8664–8668.</p><p>Dweck, C. S. (2006). <em>Mindset: The New Psychology of Success</em>. Random House.</p><p>Elster, J. (1983). <em>Sour Grapes: Studies in the Subversion of Rationality</em>. Cambridge University Press.</p><p>Ericsson, K. A. (2016). <em>Peak: Secrets from the New Science of Expertise</em>. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.</p><p>Ericsson, K. A., Krampe, R. T. &amp; Tesch-Römer, C. (1993). The Role of Deliberate Practice in the Acquisition of Expert Performance. <em>Psychological Review</em>, 100(3), 363–406.</p><p>Fallada, H. (1943). <em>Ein Mann will nach oben</em> (<em>A Man Wants to Rise</em>). Aufbau-Verlag. (Television adaptation: ZDF, 1978, 13 episodes, directed by Herbert Ballmann.)</p><p>Gignac, G. E. &amp; Zajenkowski, M. (2020). The Dunning-Kruger effect is (mostly) a statistical artefact: Valid approaches to testing the hypothesis with individual differences data. <em>Intelligence</em>, 80, 101449.</p><p>Gladwell, M. (2008). <em>Outliers: The Story of Success</em>. Little, Brown and Company.</p><p>Gloger, B. (2025). <em>From Teaching to Learning: Bridging Learning and Teaching with Scrum4Schools</em>. Carl Hanser Verlag.</p><p>Gorman, T. J. (1998). Social Class and Parental Attitudes toward Education: Resistance and Conformity to Schooling in the Family. <em>Journal of Contemporary Ethnography</em>, 27(1), 10–44.</p><p>Graeber, D. (2011). <em>Debt: The First 5,000 Years</em>. Melville House.</p><p>Graeber, D. (2018). <em>Bullshit Jobs: A Theory</em>. Simon &amp; Schuster.</p><p>Hartmann, M. (2002). <em>Der Mythos von den Leistungseliten</em> (<em>The Myth of Meritocratic Elites</em>). Campus Verlag.</p><p>Hartmann, M. (2018). <em>Die Abgehobenen: Wie die Eliten die Demokratie gefährden</em> (<em>The Detached: How Elites Endanger Democracy</em>). Campus Verlag.</p><p>Hart, B. &amp; Risley, T. R. (1995). <em>Meaningful Differences in the Everyday Experience of Young American Children</em>. Brookes.</p><p>Haushofer, J. &amp; Fehr, E. (2014). On the psychology of poverty. <em>Science</em>, 344(6186), 862–867.</p><p>Heckman, J. J. (2006). Skill Formation and the Economics of Investing in Disadvantaged Children. <em>Science</em>, 312(5782), 1900–1902.</p><p>Hochschulbildungsreport (2020). <em>Higher Education in Transition: Data and Analyses on the Participation of Working-Class Children</em>. Germany.</p><p>Höfgen, M. (2020). <em>Mythos Geldknappheit</em> (<em>The Myth of Scarce Money</em>). Schäffer-Poeschel.</p><p>Horkheimer, M. &amp; Adorno, T. W. (1944/2002). <em>Dialectic of Enlightenment</em>. Stanford University Press. (Original German edition: Fischer, 1969.)</p><p>Jiang (2025/2026). Lecture: <em>Success, Inequality, and Game Theory</em>. Unpublished lecture transcript. [The lecture referenced in this essay served as a starting point and source of inspiration; the empirical claims were verified through independent research.]</p><p>Kaliskan, M. (2025). Generation Arschkarte: Herr Merz, für welchen Wohlstand soll ich mich eigentlich kaputt arbeiten? (<em>Generation Screwed: Mr. Merz, what prosperity am I supposed to work myself to death for?</em>) <em>Der Tagesspiegel</em>, February 2025.</p><p>Keynes, J. M. (1930). Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren. In: <em>Essays in Persuasion</em> (1963), 358–373. W. W. Norton &amp; Co.</p><p>Kidd, C., Palmeri, H. &amp; Aslin, R. N. (2013). Rational snacking: Young children’s decision-making on the marshmallow task is moderated by beliefs about environmental reliability. <em>Cognition</em>, 126(1), 109–114.</p><p>Kruger, J. &amp; Dunning, D. (1999). Unskilled and Unaware of It: How Difficulties in Recognizing One’s Own Incompetence Lead to Inflated Self-Assessments. <em>Journal of Personality and Social Psychology</em>, 77(6), 1121–1134.</p><p>Kuran, T. (1995). <em>Private Truths, Public Lies: The Social Consequences of Preference Falsification</em>. Harvard University Press.</p><p>Lareau, A. (2003/2011). <em>Unequal Childhoods: Class, Race, and Family Life</em>. University of California Press.</p><p>Lerner, M. J. (1980). <em>The Belief in a Just World: A Fundamental Delusion</em>. Plenum Press.</p><p>Lewisohn, M. (2013). <em>Tune In: The Beatles — All These Years</em>. Crown Archetype.</p><p>Macnamara, B. N., Hambrick, D. Z. &amp; Oswald, F. L. (2014). Deliberate Practice and Performance in Music, Games, Sports, Education, and Professions: A Meta-Analysis. <em>Psychological Science</em>, 25(8), 1608–1618.</p><p>Mani, A., Mullainathan, S., Shafir, E. &amp; Zhao, J. (2013). Poverty Impedes Cognitive Function. <em>Science</em>, 341(6149), 976–980.</p><p>Marcuse, H. (1964). <em>One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society</em>. Beacon Press.</p><p>Markovits, D. (2019). <em>The Meritocracy Trap: How America’s Foundational Myth Feeds Inequality, Dismantles the Middle Class, and Devours the Elite</em>. Penguin Press.</p><p>Milanovic, B. (2016). <em>Global Inequality: A New Approach for the Age of Globalization</em>. Harvard University Press.</p><p>Mischel, W. (1958). Preference for delayed reinforcement: An experimental study of a cultural observation. <em>Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology</em>, 56(1), 57–61.</p><p>Mischel, W., Shoda, Y. &amp; Rodriguez, M. I. (1989). Delay of gratification in children. <em>Science</em>, 244(4907), 933–938.</p><p>Mullainathan, S. &amp; Shafir, E. (2013). <em>Scarcity: Why Having Too Little Means So Much</em>. Macmillan.</p><p>Murphy, R. (2025/2026). <em>The History of Economic Thought</em>. YouTube series. Tax Research UK.</p><p>Nehring, F. (2025). Klassismustheorie von rechts (<em>Classism Theory from the Right</em>). <em>Jacobin Magazin</em>. Review of Hanno Sauer’s <em>Klasse</em>.</p><p>OECD (2018). <em>A Broken Social Elevator? How to Promote Social Mobility</em>. OECD Publishing.</p><p>OECD (2023). <em>PISA 2022 Results</em>. Vol. I–II. OECD Publishing.</p><p>Oxfam (2025). <em>Takers, Not Makers: How Billionaire Wealth Has Grown</em>. Oxfam International Briefing Paper.</p><p>Pinker, S. (2018). <em>Enlightenment Now: The Case for Reason, Science, Humanism, and Progress</em>. Viking.</p><p>Precht, R. D. &amp; Lanz, M. (2025/2026). <em>Lanz &amp; Precht</em> — Episode on Hanno Sauer’s <em>Klasse</em>; episode on work, productivity, and bullshit jobs. ZDF Podcast.</p><p>Ray, D. (2006). Aspirations, poverty, and economic change. <em>Oxford Economic Papers</em>, 58(3), 393–416.</p><p>Reardon, S. F. (2011). The Widening Academic Achievement Gap Between the Rich and the Poor. In <em>Whither Opportunity?</em> Russell Sage Foundation.</p><p>Reeves, R. V. (2017). <em>Dream Hoarders</em>. Brookings Institution Press.</p><p>Salganik, M. J., Dodds, P. S. &amp; Watts, D. J. (2006). Experimental Study of Inequality and Unpredictability in an Artificial Cultural Market. <em>Science</em>, 311(5762), 854–856.</p><p>Sauer, H. (2025). <em>Klasse. Die Entstehung von Oben und Unten</em> (<em>Class: The Emergence of Upper and Lower</em>). Piper.</p><p>Schelsky, H. (1953). <em>Wandlungen der deutschen Familie in der Gegenwart</em>(<em>Transformations of the German Family in the Present</em>). Enke.</p><p>Schulz, S. (2022). <em>Die Kinderwüste</em> (<em>The Children’s Desert</em>). Hoffmann und Campe.</p><p>Sen, A. (2005). Adaptive preferences and capabilities. <em>Review of Social Economy</em>, 63(2), 229–247.</p><p>Sisk, V. F., Burgoyne, A. P., Sun, J., Butler, J. L. &amp; Macnamara, B. N. (2018). To What Extent and Under Which Circumstances Are Growth Mind-Sets Important to Academic Achievement? Two Meta-Analyses. <em>Psychological Science</em>, 29(4), 549–571.</p><p>Sperry, D. E., Sperry, L. L. &amp; Miller, P. J. (2019). Reexamining the Verbal Environments of Children From Different Socioeconomic Backgrounds. <em>Child Development</em>, 90(4), 1303–1318.</p><p>Thaler, R. H. &amp; Sunstein, C. R. (2008). <em>Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness</em>. Yale University Press.</p><p>Tilly, C. (1998). <em>Durable Inequality</em>. University of California Press.</p><p>Turchin, P. (2010). Political instability may be a contributor in the coming decade. <em>Nature</em>, 463, 608.</p><p>Turchin, P. (2023). <em>End Times: Elites, Counter-Elites, and the Path of Political Disintegration</em>. Penguin Press.</p><p>Watts, T. W., Duncan, G. J. &amp; Quan, H. (2018). Revisiting the Marshmallow Test: A Conceptual Replication Investigating Links Between Early Delay of Gratification and Later Outcomes. <em>Psychological Science</em>, 29(7), 1159–1177.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=7d550aa26614" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Einfach Marie / Kap. 2 und 3.]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@borisgloger/einfach-marie-kap-2-und-3-b91cf9d19f14?source=rss-c772e32f35e5------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b91cf9d19f14</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[kinderbuch]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Boris Gloger]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 04 Jan 2026 16:03:39 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-01-04T16:03:39.469Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Nach einer Idee von Laura Gloger, umgesetzt von Boris Gloger, Bilder Gemini. Kap. 1 findet sich hier: <a href="https://medium.com/@borisgloger/einfach-marie-1ad41cbc59ac">https://medium.com/@borisgloger/einfach-marie-1ad41cbc59ac</a></p><h3>Kapitel 2: Pasta und Wahrheit</h3><p>Der Duft von Knoblauch und Tomaten hing in der Küche wie eine warme Umarmung. Thomas stand am Herd und rührte in einem riesigen Topf. Er trug sein altes Hemd — das mit den Farbflecken, die er nie rausbekam. Blau und Orange von der letzten Ausstellung in Wien.</p><p>„Die Königin ist da!”, rief er, als Marie die Küche betrat.</p><p>„Falsche Königin.” Mama saß schon am Tisch, die Füße auf einem zweiten Stuhl, ein Glas Wasser in der Hand. Ohne Schminke. Im Schlabberpulli. So anders als REBI auf der Bühne. „Ich bin die Königin. Marie ist die Prinzessin.”</p><p>„Stimmt.” Thomas zwinkerte Marie zu. „Pardon, Eure Hoheit.”</p><p>Marie versuchte zu lächeln. Es gelang ihr halb.</p><p>Sie setzte sich an ihren Platz. Den Stuhl am Fenster, von dem aus man den Garten sehen konnte. Im Sommer zumindest. Jetzt war es draußen dunkel und die Scheibe spiegelte nur die Küche zurück.</p><p>Und ihr Gesicht. Müde. Genervt. Traurig.</p><p>Sie schaute schnell weg.</p><p>— -</p><p>„So.” Thomas stellte die dampfende Schüssel auf den Tisch. „Penne all’arrabbiata. Scharf, wie das Leben.”</p><p>„Philosophisch heute”, sagte Mama und griff nach der Schüssel.</p><p>„Ich bin Künstler. Philosophie gehört dazu.”</p><p>„Du bist Koch. Zumindest heute Abend.”</p><p>„Ein Koch mit Seele. Wie Hockney, nur ohne Pool.”</p><p>Marie schaufelte sich Pasta auf den Teller. Das Geplänkel ihrer Eltern war wie Hintergrundmusik. Normalerweise mochte sie es. Heute hörte sie es kaum.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*w8QmqMhmD2e7CV1-Rk98mg.jpeg" /></figure><p>*Du bist nur der Schatten.*</p><p>Paulas Stimme. Immer noch in ihrem Kopf.</p><p>„Und?” Mama sah sie an. „Wie war das Training?”</p><p>„Gut.”</p><p>„Gut-gut oder gut-ich-will-nicht-reden?”</p><p>Marie zuckte die Schultern. Sie schob eine Penne von einer Seite des Tellers auf die andere.</p><p>Die beiden Eltern wechselten diesen vielsagenden Eltern-Blick. Diese hochgezogenen Augenbrauen, ein wenig genervt, nicht wissend, was zu sagen.</p><p>— -</p><p>Eine Weile aßen sie schweigend. Nur das Klappern der Gabeln. Das Ticken der alten Wanduhr.</p><p>Dann lehnte Mama sich zurück. „Ich hab heute einen neuen Song angefangen.”</p><p>Marie sah nicht auf.</p><p>„Er handelt von einem Mädchen, das unsichtbar sein will. Aber nicht, weil sie Angst hat.” Mama machte eine Pause. „Sondern weil sie es leid ist, dass alle nur das Offensichtliche sehen.”</p><p>Stille.</p><p>Marie hörte auf zu kauen.</p><p>„Das klingt gut”, sagte Thomas sanft. Er verstand.</p><p>„Ist noch nicht fertig.” Mama nippte an ihrem Wasser. „Ich weiß noch nicht, wie es endet. Ob das Mädchen unsichtbar bleibt. Oder ob sie irgendwann sagt: Seht mich richtig an. Oder ich verschwinde wirklich.”</p><p>„Vielleicht…” Marie legte die Gabel ab. Ihre Stimme war leiser als sonst. „Vielleicht ist sie gar nicht unsichtbar. Vielleicht ist sie ein Schatten.”</p><p>Mama hörte auf zu kauen. Nickte langsam.</p><p>„Ein Schatten von jemand anderem”, sagte Marie. „Und egal wie hell sie selbst ist… alle sehen nur die Person, die den Schatten wirft.”</p><p>„Schatten”, wiederholte Mama. Sie legte den Kopf schief, so wie immer, wenn sie nachdachte. „Das ist gut. Das probier ich nachher aus.”</p><p>Thomas sah zwischen den beiden hin und her. Er legte seine Gabel ab.</p><p>„Marie.” Seine Stimme war ruhig. „Hat heute jemand etwas zu dir gesagt?”</p><p>„Papa, es ist nichts.”</p><p>„Das klang nicht nach nichts.”</p><p>„Ich hab nur über den Song nachgedacht.” Marie schob ihren Teller weg. „Darf ich aufstehen? Ich hab Hausaufgaben.”</p><p>Sie stand auf, bevor jemand antworten konnte.</p><p>„Marie…” Thomas streckte die Hand aus.</p><p>„Es ist *gut*, Papa. Wirklich.”</p><p>Es war nicht gut. Das wussten alle drei. Aber manchmal wollte man einfach nicht darüber reden. Nicht mit den Eltern.</p><p>Mama sagte nichts. Sie sah Marie nur an.</p><p>Marie blieb einen Moment in der Tür stehen.</p><p>„Die Pasta war gut”, sagte sie leise.</p><p>Thomas lächelte. „Danke, Lockenkopf.”</p><p>Sie ging nach oben in ihr Zimmer und machte die Tür hinter sich zu. Dann ließ sie sich aufs Bett fallen und starrte an die Decke.</p><p>Blöde Paula. Blöde Schule. Blöder Tag.</p><p>Aber irgendwie war der Knoten in ihrem Bauch jetzt kleiner.</p><h3>Kapitel 3: Zuversicht</h3><p>„Hi, hast du morgen Nachmittag Zeit? Ich muss reden”, schrieb Marie in den Chat.</p><p>Sie war viel zu spät aufgewacht und hatte unruhig geschlafen. Paulas Gesicht war die halbe Nacht durch ihre Träume gegeistert. *Du bist nur der Schatten.* Immer wieder.</p><p>Drei Punkte erschienen. Rosi tippte.</p><p>„Klar. Nach der Schule bei mir?”</p><p>Marie schickte ein Daumen-hoch-Emoji und ließ das Handy aufs Bett fallen.</p><p>Rosalia. Rosi. Ihre beste Freundin seit der zweiten Klasse. Damals hatte Rosi ihr in der Pause einfach die Hälfte ihres Schokoriegels gegeben. Ohne zu fragen. Ohne irgendwas. Einfach so.</p><p>Rosi hatte damals nicht gewusst, wer Maries Mutter war. Und als sie es irgendwann erfuhr, hatte sie nur die Schultern gezuckt und gesagt: „Cool. Magst du trotzdem Schokoriegel?”</p><p>Das war Rosi.</p><p>— -</p><p>Am nächsten Nachmittag stand Marie vor Rosis Haustür. Sie klingelte zweimal kurz — ihr Geheimzeichen seit Jahren.</p><p>Die Tür flog auf.</p><p>„Hey!” Rosi strahlte. Ihre aschblonden Haare fielen ihr in leichten Wellen über die Schultern. Sie trug ihr weißes Langarm-Shirt, das mit dem Aufdruck „You can do anything”. Dazu ihre übliche graue Jeans mit den Löchern an den Knien.</p><p>„Hey”, sagte Marie.</p><p>Rosi musterte sie. Das Muttermal an ihrer rechten Lippe bewegte sich, als sie die Stirn runzelte.</p><p>„Du siehst aus wie drei Tage Regenwetter.”</p><p>„Danke.”</p><p>„Komm rein. Mama hat Kakao gemacht.”</p><p>— -</p><p>Rosis Zimmer war weiß, grau und schwarz. Die Wände weiß. Der Teppich grau. Die Vorhänge schwarz. Alles hatte seinen Platz. Die Bücher auf dem Regal standen nach Größe sortiert. Die Schuhe unter dem Bett in einer perfekten Reihe. Kein Staubkorn traute sich hierher.</p><p>Der Schreibtisch war riesig. Musste er auch sein, denn dort standen sie, der bunte Farbfleck im Zimmer: Legami-Stifte wie Soldaten in Formation. Der Panda. Die Wasser-Edition. Die Oster-Edition mit den Häschen. Die Weihnachts-Edition. Die *neue* Weihnachts-Edition. Die Halloween-Edition mit den kleinen Geistern. Alle nach Farben sortiert, alle in exakt gleichem Abstand.</p><p>An der Wand hingen Poster. REBI auf der Bühne. REBI im Studio. REBI mit Mikrofon. REBI mit Marie. Alle in exakt gleichem Abstand zueinander.</p><p>Marie hatte sich längst daran gewöhnt. Rosi war der größte REBI-Fan, den sie kannte. Aber wenn Marie hier war, redete Rosi nie über REBI. Hier war Marie einfach Marie.</p><p>„Setz dich.” Rosi deutete aufs Bett.</p><p>Marie ließ sich auf die Decke fallen. *Sleep well* stand darauf in grauen Buchstaben. Perfekt glattgezogen, ohne eine einzige Falte.</p><p>Sie umklammerte die warme Kakaotasse.</p><p>Rosi setzte sich neben sie. „Also. Raus damit.”</p><p>„Paula.”</p><p>Gemini_Generated_Image_r7walor7walor7wa.png</p><p>„Oh nein.” Rosi verdrehte die Augen. „Was hat die Glitzer-Queen jetzt wieder gemacht?”</p><p>Marie erzählte. Von der Umkleide. Von dem Wort. *Schatten.* Von Paulas Augen, die so gemein geworden waren.</p><p>Rosi hörte zu. Sie unterbrach nicht. Sie sagte nicht „Das ist doch nicht so schlimm” oder „Ignorier sie einfach”. Sie hörte einfach nur zu.</p><p>Als Marie fertig war, war ihr Kakao kalt.</p><p>„Die ist so eine…”, Rosi suchte nach dem richtigen Wort, „…Zimtzicke.”</p><p>Marie schnaubte. Fast ein Lachen.</p><p>„Hey.” Rosi stupste sie an. „Hör mir zu. Du bist gut. Richtig gut. Nicht wegen deiner Mum. Wegen dir.”</p><p>„Rosi…”</p><p>„Nee, im Ernst. Ich tanze auch, okay? Ich weiß, wie schwer das ist. Und du bist besser als alle anderen im Kurs. Das hat nichts mit REBI zu tun. Das bist du.”</p><p>Marie starrte in ihren kalten Kakao.</p><p>„Paula ist doch nur neidisch”, sagte Rosi. „Die will so sein wie du, aber sie kann nicht. Also macht sie dich runter. Das ist alles.”</p><p>„Es ist nur…”, Marie zögerte. „Alle sehen immer nur meine Mum. Selbst wenn sie mich loben. Sogar die Lehrer.”</p><p>„Ja, das nervt.” Rosi nickte. „Aber weißt du was? Mach weiter. Tanz weiter. Sei weiter gut. Irgendwann sehen sie dich.”</p><p>„Und wenn nicht?”</p><p>„Dann ist das deren Problem. Nicht deins.”</p><p>Rosi stand auf und holte einen Legami-Stift vom Schreibtisch. Das blaue Nilpferd mit den Gänseblümchen und dem freundlichen Lächeln.</p><p>„Hier.” Sie drückte ihn Marie in die Hand. „Für dich.”</p><p>„Was? Nein, das ist deiner.”</p><p>„Ich hab noch drei andere Nilpferde. Die normale Edition, die Halloween-Edition und die Wasser-Edition.” Rosi grinste. „Ich glaub, ich komm klar.”</p><p>Marie drehte den Stift in der Hand.</p><p>„Nilpferde sind stoisch und bleiben ruhig. „So wie du.”</p><p>„Das ist kitschig.”</p><p>„Stimmt trotzdem.”</p><p>Marie steckte den Stift in ihre Tasche. „Danke.”</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*58lKOdtWoVvydcU3vI8BGg.png" /></figure><p>„Und jetzt zeig ich dir Paulas letztes TikTok.” Rosi schnappte sich ihr Handy. „Sie hat einen Tanz gepostet. Du wirst sterben.”</p><p>„So schlimm?”</p><p>„Schlimmer. Sie macht diesen Move, weißt du, so…” Rosi versuchte, es vorzumachen, und sah dabei aus wie ein Pinguin mit Rückenschmerzen.</p><p>Marie lachte. Richtig lachte. Zum ersten Mal seit zwei Tagen.</p><p>„Siehst du?” Rosi ließ sich neben sie fallen. „Du kannst alles schaffen. Steht auf meinem Shirt. Muss also stimmen.”</p><p>Marie sah sie an. Ihre beste Freundin. Die mit den perfekt sortierten Stiften und den REBI-Postern und dem Zimmer ohne Staubkorn.</p><p>„Danke, Rosi.”</p><p>„Wofür?”</p><p>„Dass du einfach… du bist.”</p><p>Rosi zuckte die Schultern. „Bin ich immer. Ist nicht schwer.”</p><p>Sie saßen nebeneinander auf dem perfekt glatten Bett und schauten Paulas TikToks. Und mit jedem Video wurde der Knoten in Maries Bauch kleiner.</p><p>Vielleicht hatte Rosi recht. Vielleicht musste sie einfach weitermachen.</p><p>tbc.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b91cf9d19f14" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Einfach Marie]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@borisgloger/einfach-marie-1ad41cbc59ac?source=rss-c772e32f35e5------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/1ad41cbc59ac</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[tanzen]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[kinderbuch]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[teenagers]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Boris Gloger]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 20 Dec 2025 09:32:22 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-01-04T16:04:59.215Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Ein Buch nach der Idee von Laura Gloger, in Zusammenarbeit mit Boris Gloger</p><h3>Kapitel 1: Schatten</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*4SVOnDVKFeUnG4XXUuNEXA.png" /><figcaption>Idee für das Bild Laura Gloger / Ausführung Gemini</figcaption></figure><p>Die Bässe wummerten durch den Boden. Marie spürte jeden Beat in ihren Füßen, in ihrem Bauch, in ihrem Herzen. Sie liebte diesen Moment kurz bevor die Musik richtig losging — wenn alles still wurde und gleichzeitig alles vibrierte.</p><p>„Und fünf, sechs, sieben, acht!”</p><p>Marie schoss nach vorne. Ihr Körper wusste, was er zu tun hatte. Freeze. Drop. Spin. Sie dachte nicht nach. Sie tanzte einfach.</p><p>Als der Song endete, klatschten ein paar Mädchen aus dem Kurs. Frau Berger, die Trainerin, nickte knapp.</p><p>„Ganz ordentlich, Marie.”</p><p><em>Ordentlich.</em> Marie biss sich auf die Lippe. Sie hatte jeden Move perfekt getroffen. Das wusste sie. Frau Berger wusste es auch.</p><p>„Bei deinen Möglichkeiten”, fügte Frau Berger hinzu und wandte sich ab, „sollte das ja wohl das Mindeste sein.”</p><p>Da war er wieder. Der Satz, der nicht ausgesprochen wurde, aber trotzdem im Raum hing wie schlechte Luft: <em>Deine Mutter ist REBI. Du hast es leicht.</em></p><p>Marie ging zur Bank und griff nach ihrer Wasserflasche. Ihre Locken klebten an der Stirn. Sie trank und versuchte, das Brennen in ihrer Brust zu ignorieren.</p><p>„Hey, Marie!”</p><p>Jasmin, ein Mädchen aus der Parallelklasse, kam zu ihr. Großes Lächeln. Zu groß.</p><p>„Kann deine Mum vielleicht bei meiner Geburtstagsparty auftreten? Wäre mega cool. Meine Eltern würden auch bezahlen. Also, wahrscheinlich. Ich meine, für REBI…”</p><p>„Ich frag sie”, sagte Marie. Sie sagte das immer. Es war einfacher als zu erklären, dass ihre Mutter keine Kindergeburtstage spielte. Dass ihre Mutter eine echte Künstlerin war und kein Partyclown.</p><p>Aber das verstand ja keiner.</p><p>Die Umkleide leerte sich langsam. Marie wartete absichtlich. Sie mochte es nicht, sich umzuziehen, während alle anderen tuschelten und auf ihre Handys starrten und so taten, als würden sie nicht zu ihr rüberschauen.</p><p>Als sie dachte, sie wäre allein, zog sie ihre graue Weste über das Tanktop.</p><p>„Na, Lockenköpfchen?”</p><p>Maries Magen zog sich zusammen. Sie musste sich nicht umdrehen.</p><p>Paula.</p><p>„Was willst du jetzt schon wieder von mir?” Marie klang müder, als sie wollte.</p><p>Paula lehnte am Türrahmen. Ihre aschbraunen Haare glänzten wie aus einer Shampoo-Werbung. Der rosa Lipgloss. Die glitzernden Winterstiefel. Alles perfekt. Alles inszeniert. In ihrer Hand hielt sie ihr Handy — wie immer.</p><p>„Ich wollte mich mit dir befreunden”, sagte Paula und lächelte in die Kamera.</p><p>Sie filmte. Natürlich filmte sie.</p><p>„Sicher.” Marie stopfte ihre Sachen in den Rucksack. „Und was willst du wirklich?”</p><p>Paula ließ das Handy sinken. Das Lächeln verschwand. Ihre Augen wurden schmal wie bei einer Katze vor dem Sprung.</p><p>„Dir zeigen, dass du nichts Besonderes bist. Gar nichts.”</p><p>Marie richtete sich auf. Sie war kleiner als Paula, aber sie wich nicht zurück. „Hab ich nie behauptet.”</p><p>„Dein ganzes Leben behauptet das!” Paulas Stimme wurde schrill. „Du kommst hier rein mit deinen dreckigen Nikes und deinen komischen Haaren und tust so, als wärst du wie wir. Aber du bist nicht wie wir. Deine Mommy ist berühmt. Du bist nur der Schatten.”</p><p><em>Schatten.</em></p><p>Das Wort traf. Härter, als Marie zugeben wollte.</p><p>Weil es stimmte. Nicht so, wie Paula es meinte. Aber es stimmte trotzdem. Sie WAR ein Schatten. Aber nicht, weil sie weniger war als ihre Mutter. Sondern weil alle anderen sie so sahen.</p><p>„Weißt du was, Paula?” Marie schulterte ihren Rucksack. „Du hast recht. Ich bin ein Schatten.”</p><p>Paula blinzelte überrascht. Damit hatte sie nicht gerechnet.</p><p>„Aber weißt du, was das Gute an Schatten ist?” Marie ging an ihr vorbei zur Tür. „Sie verschwinden nicht. Egal wie sehr du sie anschreist.”</p><p>Sie ließ Paula stehen.</p><p>Draußen war es kalt. Dezemberluft. Marie atmete tief ein. Ihre Hände zitterten. Nicht vor Kälte.</p><p>Ihr Handy summte. Eine Nachricht von Mama:</p><p><em>Papa macht Pasta. Beeil dich, Lockenkopf. ❤️</em></p><p>Marie lächelte. Zum ersten Mal seit Stunden.</p><p>Zuhause wartete niemand, der sie für ihre Mutter hielt.</p><p>Zuhause war sie einfach Marie.</p><p>Hier geht die Geschichte weiter: <a href="https://medium.com/@borisgloger/einfach-marie-kap-2-und-3-b91cf9d19f14">https://medium.com/@borisgloger/einfach-marie-kap-2-und-3-b91cf9d19f14</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1ad41cbc59ac" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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