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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Brendan J. Doshi on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Brendan J. Doshi on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Brendan J. Doshi on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@brendanjdoshi?source=rss-d8cea95c3d8d------2</link>
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        <lastBuildDate>Mon, 16 Nov 2026 23:25:12 GMT</lastBuildDate>
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            <title><![CDATA[On the (Infra)Structure of Inevitability]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@brendanjdoshi/on-the-infra-structure-of-inevitability-b8126438bb11?source=rss-d8cea95c3d8d------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[technology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[us-politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ai]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Brendan J. Doshi]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 26 Jun 2026 21:34:42 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-06-29T18:48:30.415Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The Whitehouse unceremoniously produced ‘<a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Americas-AI-Action-Plan.pdf">America’s AI Action Plan</a>’ in July 2025. Donald Trump’s administration has made therein its anxieties succinctly and abundantly clear: ‘Whoever has the largest AI ecosystem will set the global standards and reap broad economic and security benefits…America’s AI Action Plan has three policy pillars — Accelerating Innovation, Building AI Infrastructure, and Leading International Diplomacy and Security.’</p><p>We might recognize the implication of a viscerally threatening inverse: ‘whoever has anything but this will be subject to the global standards [of what?] and will be the victim of extraction for those reaping broad economic and security benefits.’ The threat, while aimed at foreign powers, directs its gaze inwards as well. In a national sense ‘we’ will not own this AI ecosystem. We will consume its products, power its training, and generally act as its uncompensated labor force. This is already a principle critique of things as they stand.</p><p>In an <a href="https://fortune.com/media/99f23b05-42f7-4f6a-a4e9-b4b40987274b/">interview</a> with <em>Fortune Magazine</em>, Wonder CEO Marc Lore announced the development of what he called ‘Wonder Create’, or ‘the infinite kitchen’; a fully automated re-structuring of Wonder’s current organization. One which enunciates, vigorously and decisively, the company’s intent to monopolize what remains of the casual dining landscape. When AI commerce journalist Jason Del Rey pushed back, asking ‘who is the person who wants to do this and why does the end consumer want this?’ he was met with enthusiastic filibustering: ‘OK, who wants this? Wonder Create is an AI prompt’ — enough said. Lore never addresses the question. He elaborates on the mechanism driving Wonder’s new project, but never the market it serves. The end consumer.</p><p>Hadrian CEO Chris Power portended the death of white-collar work in the United States and the looming “hyperinflation of blue-collar salaries” in a recent <a href="https://x.com/MollySOShea/status/2038273861104406971">interview</a> with Molly O’Shea. Of course, even the jobs he encourages (welding, construction, etc.) are in the process of automation as well. ‘Yeah, we are [automating welding]. We already have, actually, [not so] secretly.’ These antagonisms are to me among the most blatant insults to consumers ever pronounced.</p><p>Depraved as they are, it’s not these oligarchs’ multiple and united projects that interests me. It’s the assurance with which they speak of its future. Here is its advance in our “world of signs” which reveal antagonisms which have long been felt. By world of signs, I don’t mean to insist on some jargony, pseudo-intellectual nonsense; I mean to conjure the future’s memories—signs which will have always been apparent only as soon as their origin is unmasked. This is the radical historicism proposed by the Slovene giant Slavoj Žižek in his newest triad of essay collections (<em>Against Progress</em>, <em>Zero Point</em>, and <em>Liberal Fascisms</em>) as not only encouraged, but necessitated if meaningful action is to take place. Our activity is disavowal:</p><p><em>not ‘realistically’ appraising the likelihood of the catastrophe, but accepting it as our fate, as unavoidable, and then, on the basis of this acceptance, mobilize ourselves to perform the act which will change destiny itself and thereby open up new possibilities within the situation…one should accept the catastrophe as inevitable — and then act to undo the destiny which is ‘written in the stars’. (</em>Against Progress<em>, p. 106)</em></p><p>Agents within a far more insidious network (not to diminish their sick malevolence) which marches history along are those companies like Wonder and Hadrian. They propel and are propelled by policy only by their merit of being <em>consumers of AI</em>, dependent on the megalomaniacal development of infrastructure.</p><p>As I write this, Elon Musk has become the world’s first trillionaire (which is underlined in red here on my word processor). In the comment sections of some Instagram posts discussing this new reality, there are not a few thousand individuals defending the technocrat’s past and future pursuits (I’m sure it’s more than my given estimate considering posts I haven’t yet seen); defenses which are directed towards the emergent corporate-feudal structure which, as Henri Bergson put nicely in his <em>Oeuvres </em>of 1991, ‘has always been there.’</p><p>Many online displays of bootlicker posturing tend to rely on the tautological symbiosis of SpaceX and the inevitable future of AI. We need Musk and SpaceX in order to colonize, sooner than other bodies, the moon and Mars. His existence is integral to protecting Americans from America’s AI action plan, which states visibly the prioritization of AI infrastructure in policy. It is from the Capitol that monolithic data centers, such as that proposed by Kevin O’Leary in northern Utah, emerge; they are given ideological foundations meant to serve corporatist interests rather than public. Musk through SpaceX, on the other hand, is working hard to avert the ecological disaster such policy <em>must</em> propel. If AI is an inevitable, permanent feature of the global economy, it is his duty—for us!—to feasibly colonize celestial bodies for the purpose of building and maintaining extraterrestrial data centers.</p><p>Both projects are simultaneously propelled by the same ideological machine. America’s AI action plan claims to respond to the ‘threat’ of Chinese acceleration while simultaneously inciting irreversibly larger American, Chinese, and (with the realization of not-so-new geopolitical tensions between the US and EU) European projects. This would not have materialized on such a scale without the legitimate prospect of space-colonization. The global AI economy relies on Musk, as Musk relies on the ecological side-effects of AI production to secure evidently unnecessary subsidization and <em>consumer investment</em> for SpaceX’s material future.</p><p>The future that awaits us, according to those in power, the evasive feudal masters of today (you might remember last week’s article) is one in which a majority of the workforce is dedicated to supporting the maintenance of these centers. I have no doubt that with his trillion (soon to be trillion<em>s</em> of dollars), Musk will have all the necessary resources to realize his spacefaring vision for humanity, both material and ideological. What we must accept, then, is something like the notion that Olga Ravn’s <a href="https://www.ndbooks.com/book/the-employees/"><em>The Employees</em></a><em> </em>is today far from fiction.</p><h4>The Big (Br)Other</h4><p>Catastrophe and inevitability have always constituted totalitarianisms present in society, from politics to commercialism. They are employed in both retrospective and progressive analyses: the statement ‘of course capitalism emerged, just look at the “natural” developments from the Middle Ages onwards!’ performs the same function as Frederic Jameson’s famous (though dubiously-attributed) quote ‘it’s easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism.’ In both of these short theses, the inevitability of the current, dominating superstructure, is assumed to be the end of all progress. This is where we have come, and this is where it will end.</p><p>Of course, according to the model we’ve adopted here, capitalism—fuck, corporatist-feudalism and the subsumption of everything into the ridiculous AI ‘metaverse’—<em>was</em> inevitable. The current state of things had been inscribed in the past since time immemorial. It is precisely such a fact that immobilizes collective action: because there is an ideological, unarticulated belief in the actualization of the essential catastrophe. It is also an immobility born out of the left’s repression of this belief which disavowal brings to the center of discourse. What is occurring across digital platforms is widespread appraisal and diagnosis with little to show for it beyond measures that disrupt the progress inscribed in our present.</p><p>Accepting that traces of our situation are really ontologically <em>present</em> in past phenomena is a concession by which we play into the progressive-historicist hands of our feudal narrators. Here a young individual overcome with complacency meekly says ‘Yes, your (Musk’s) view is correct. Everything <em>has</em> led to these circumstances, and these circumstances lead indefinitely to your future. You, after all, have the means to inscribe such a future on our present.’ But here is where we gain the advantage. We are not driving towards the future, rather that which is inevitable assumes the form of fantasy (<em>$</em>◇<em>a</em>) on our moment; the location of collective alienation from <em>object petit a</em>, or the Other’s presence on social relations.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*bIVLR43_IeB5tPhn" /></figure><p>What is really happening, then, is a backwards movement along the upper levels of Lacan’s graph of desire<em>, </em>in which fantasy is set in immovability. It answers the famous question “che vuoi?” (what do you want?), its trace is found in the desires (<em>d) </em>and activities of Musk and other agents assuming the place of the barred subject, and does not arise from the Other (O), but is <em>inscribed in the Other</em>. Future-as-fantasy, then, is present in all antecedent operations; and thus it is identifiable.</p><p>What’s more is the notion of fantasy as a screen ‘filling out the lack in the Other’ (<em>The Sublime Object of Ideology</em>, 130). The dominance of AI is the positive manifestation of society as a possibility:</p><p><em>The stake of social-ideological fantasy is to construct…a society that is not split by antagonistc division, a society in which the relation between its parts is organic, complementary. The clearest case is, of course, the corporatist vision of society as an organic Whole, a social Body in which the different classes are like extremities, members each contributing to the Whole according to their function. </em>(<em>142</em>)</p><p>If this is the reality of things, then the inscription of the future, its inevitability, produces a schema wherein the <em>means justify the end</em>. Policy, infrastructure, terror, genocide, injustice, colonization, brutality, militarization, broad antagonism, ecological disaster, indifference, global fascism—all encompassed by the Little Prince’s exclamation “catastrophe!”—<em>must </em>occur for this future to come about. The investments being made into these projects coincide with and justify the fantasy. We return to the classic Marxist critique of state expenditure: to maintain class distinction. Only we now inhabit a space that enforces such maintenance more violently and overtly than ever before.</p><p>In dystopian novels and films from the later 20th century, most notably George Orwell’s <em>1984</em>, the surveillance state and ideological masters there behind were popularly known as “Big Brother.” What if the Other is precisely this figure. Not a person, or organization, but that which the ideological masters project towards. What strikes me about the inevitability of AI and SpaceX’s mission is the radical impersonality of its nature. We might remember that opening excerpt, ‘whoever has the largest AI ecosystem will set the global standards and reap broad economic and security benefits.’ Who? It doesn’t matter. What does matter is that the course has been set and there must be agents responsible for fulfilling the command. The new feudal masters are standing in the shadow of Big Brother.</p><h4>Measures Beyond Disruption</h4><p>If the future of automation and AI is inevitable, we are given a clear picture of what faces us. This is not only true for these projects, although I believe them to be the most prescient. Žižek proposed disavowal in the context of Israeli genocide in Gaza and the “greater Israel” project. We must consider other geopolitical and environmental crises as well: the stripping of environmental protections in the US, neocolonialism and western armament of too many nations in the global south, violent rightist-populism in India, and fundamentalist totalitarianism across the world. We cannot divert our attention away from these issues; this would be the precise anti-logic against which disavowal presents itself as an option. Instead, they are presented now as further agents in the development of manufactured crisis.</p><p>I would like to think of these individual catastrophes as nodes, referring to one another at certain points and in certain directions, springing forth from the future singularity, the object of fantasy. Like the inscription of fantasy upon all preceding phenomena, it is imperative to look for the trace of the hegemonic fantasy-future in everyday events. Rather than reducing these events to such, our identification must be added onto the already extant, although repressed, wave of shock. These are not, as I was tempted to call them, ‘little disasters’, but ‘leading disasters’. What we can do is diagnose what we are expected to do in response to these, and refuse. This is especially the case with civic engagement. In the wake of a DSA (Democratic Socialists of America) sweep in New York congressional primaries, it is apparent as ever that voting may lead to something. We cannot be disillusioned with reform.</p><p>Another act is to dissolve within our own communities class boundaries. Mutual aid programs accomplish precisely this. If the social-ideological fantasy acts to construct, or rather <em>enforce</em> class distinction, we have the means to reject this entirely.</p><p>Among all else it is imperative than unions and labor organizations draft protections from automation. This is perhaps the hardest, seemingly impossible task. Roadmapping may take years and enforcement may be yet within our existing legal frameworks; but in collaboration with civic engagement and hopeful reform, work can begin.</p><h4><strong>Acknowledgements</strong></h4><p>I am incredibly grateful for the invaluable insights offered by my brilliant friend and former classmate Annalise Mitchell (MA, University of Idaho). The final revision of this essay would not be possible without her help.</p><p>My thanks also goes to Brian Patrick (<a href="https://www.instagram.com/pano.dime?utm_source=ig_web_button_share_sheet&amp;igsh=ZDNlZDc0MzIxNw==">@pano.dime</a> on Instagram) whose series, aptly-titled “Posting Something Insane an AI Executive Said Everyday in 2026” was the catalyst of this article. His commitment to this deeply important cataloguing project is an inspiration to myself and, evidently, 183,000 others. Keep archiving!</p><h4>Sources</h4><p>Slavoj Žižek, <em>Liberal Fascisms</em>. Bloomsbury Academic. London, 2026.</p><p>Slavoj Žižek, <em>The Sublime Object of Ideology</em>. Verso. 1989.</p><p>For online sources, hyperlinks can be found throughout the article.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b8126438bb11" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Feudal Collapses]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@brendanjdoshi/feudal-collapses-0878c0821a69?source=rss-d8cea95c3d8d------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[theory]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[culture]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[marxism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[medieval]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[history]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Brendan J. Doshi]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 19 Jun 2026 16:53:14 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-06-19T18:42:44.464Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*QeVOIgj-p-LYbwaX.jpg" /></figure><h4>Short Preface</h4><p>I was writing what will be next week’s article when I remembered this piece. Written as a conference presentation in late April, it is sure to make an important foreword to what’s to come. I promise my future works will not be so heavy on abstraction and history—I’d like to focus more on culture, politics, literature, etc. myself—but this is at the same time a historic geist I am convinced of, and which I believe begins to psychoanalyse our modern culture of labor.</p><p>Because this was written for a historically- rather than theorietically-oriented audience, much of the theory here is somewhat drab and over-explained. My apologies for this.</p><h4>A Lesson from Guigemar</h4><p>When the titular hero of Marie de France’s most popular lais find himself in the otherworld domain of the lord Mariaduc, he offers the lord his homage in exchange for the release of the captive lady. Mariaduc is, unfortunately, ‘not in need of vassals. I’d rather keep her. I was the one who found her and I declare that none shall take her away from me.’ Besides the latent misogyny communicated in these lines (he is our antagonist after all), one more feature of feudal life is revealed here: when security is offered, do not refuse. The short siege by Guigemar’s men that follows this scene is evidence enough of this. Mariaduc is defeated, his domain utterly starved.</p><p>This archaicism of the first feudal age (roughly 800–1100), serves another purpose for Marie de France’s late twelfth-century courtly readership. As the global economy urbanized, a new class of burghers and craftsmen emerged. Separate from the traditional nobility and feudal custom, the nobility’s insecurity was embodied by the urban freeman.</p><h4>Feudal Collapses</h4><p>Analysis of Marie de France will not take us very far from here; it serves, however, as a good foundation for exploring feudal anxieties. My project here is to simply provide a new framework for studying and interpreting the phenomena of feudal society during this transition period. In this way, it is a work of applied theory which I hope will elucidate some historical significances. Much of this stems from encountering the tired Marxian tradition of either borrowing feudal language to describe industrial society or postulating capitalisms’ direct descent from feudalism. Lacan praised Marx for returning to the medieval world that he might ‘look for the origins of the notion of the symptom.’ However, the Korean-German theorist, Byung-Chul Han, who has gained widespread popularity for his 2015 work of cultural criticism <em>The Burnout Society</em>, claims that we inhabit a uniquely <em>post</em>-industrial world characterized not by dominance, but by self-commodification and the desire to <em>achieve</em>. The subject’s relationship to labor and the forms of psychosis which arise therefrom, he prefaces ‘do not follow from the <em>negativity </em>of what is immunologically foreign, but from an excess of <em>positivity</em>.’ Whereas the forms of domination in mid-century industrial society very conveniently assumed feudal ideologies of power, the modern achievement subject finds little of himself in these diagnoses. The symptom has mutated into something <em>same</em> rather than foreign. The Other has utterly disappeared.</p><p>If we are to take Han’s theory at face-value, it would seem that there is a fundamental incongruity in our analysis. It may seem that the ideologies of feudalism bear no significance on our current condition. Postmodernity is non-immunological; the Subject and Other have congealed; the <em>dominus </em>has become his own <em>servus </em>in a complete subversion of feudal stratification. But I am not convinced, as Han is, that achievement and burnout society are necessarily preceded by non-immunological structures. The dominating language of ‘can’ as opposed to ‘should’ does not essentially destroy either the presence or command of the Other. Rather, as Slavoj Žižek has nicely put it, ‘with the establishment of bourgeoise society, the relations of domination and servitude are <em>repressed</em>.’ It is in this schema of ideological repression and obfuscation of domination (per the person of the <em>dominus</em>) that the distinction between masterhood and vassalage are conflated — or outright confused — in the psyche of the achievement subject. One simultaneously feels that he serves a lord and yet feels the anxiety of lacking maintenance despite such. This precisely has given rise to the hyper-activity of our present age that Han excellently diagnoses in later chapters. Far more sinister is the escape and unreachability of the real master in this dynamic.</p><p>Rather than subverting the <em>structure </em>of feudalism, then, burnout society is produced by, and reproduces constantly, a subversion of the structure’s repressed anxieties; those described by Bloch as follows: ‘The weak man felt the need to be sheltered by someone more powerful. The powerful man, in his turn, could not maintain his prestige or his fortune or even ensure his own safety except by securing for himself…the support of subordinates bound to his service.’ What must be implicit in Bloch’s analysis here is a preexistent, aggressive stratification of society. In stratified society, protection and service are the prerequisites for stability. What we are faced with in our project is that which occurs once stability is reached and a rebellion of mentalities seeks to overthrow the class divide. I am not speaking of violent revolution, but an ideological refiguring of mastery and servitude.</p><p>In the second feudal age this occurred with the growth of towns, an emergent burgher class, and the rise of guilds from the late 11th through 13th century. It was almost entirely urban phenomenon; and thus the ideology of rural life, still secured by manorialism and the presence of social and economic elite, remained largely stagnant until the dawn of modernity. In the towns, however, the traditional nobility found themselves challenged by a class of professionals, artisans, and the institutions founded to protect their economic interests and prestige: the guilds. The guilds presented its members, and even apprentices, with the possibility of political participation through mastery of a discipline or craft. Married with the resurgence of a money economy, a new ideology of abstraction and the Marxian notion of fetishism arose.</p><p>The importance of the fetishistic inversion and its relationship to guild participation is of central significance to the new ideology of self-mastery that would grip the burgher class. Žižek again provides a sound definition for us; this time for the fetishistic inversion: ‘During the act of exchange, individuals proceed <em>as if </em>the commodity is not submitted to physical, material exchanges; <em>as if </em>it is excluded from the natural cycle of generation and corruption; although on their level of ‘consciousness’ they ‘know very well’ that this is not the case.’ It is akin to the determinist Marxian concept commodity fetishism. In its most basic form a relationship entered into between people that takes the form of a relationship between things.</p><p>This shift from earlier feudal economies to that of the second age is succinctly remarked on by Bloch as well. ‘The society of [the first feudal age]’ he states, ‘was certainly not unacquainted with buying and selling. But it did not, like our own, live by buying and selling.’ As the new economy in urban centers saw the reemergence of money, abstraction and the submission of payments to non-physical being acted to establish a network of exchange meaning between guilds. That is, whereas goods in kind were valued by their pragmatic value, nutritional, workable, or otherwise, money <em>relies </em>on social networks and thus the goods bought with money are valued not pragmatically, but representationally. This in turn allowed for guilds to assert themselves as more preeminent than others based on notions of traditional hierarchy despite being somewhat liberated from the feudal-manorial base. ‘Think of’ recounts the later <em>Annales </em>historian Jacques LeGoff “the prestige, from the fifth century on, of the blacksmith and the goldsmith, whose magical image is recounted in gests and sagas.’ The historical, mental prestige of these trades were not independent of traditional stratification. Essential to the ritual and duties of the noble as well as religious classes, their reputation upon encountering a money economy carried over, and thus their products and labor, which were essentially inseparable, assumed a representational value surpassing the archaic (in the urban spirit) nobility. The prestige of these guilds, of any guild, would have certainly contributed to feelings of self-determination in political activity in urban centers, which explains the influx of free or unfree tenants into towns.</p><p>As economic activity via the resurgent money economy dominated urban centers, we might even be tempted to propose that in the second feudal age arose the liberal spirit. The spirit that values above all else a notion of freedom, not from labor or the Other, but from an imposed political passivity through which the peasant is alienated from both his labor <em>and </em>the Other. Previously, his labor was an act enclosed by his being what the Italian theorist Giorgio Agamben defines as <em>homo sacer</em>; personhood outside the protection of law. Indeed, as Bloch describes his circumstance, ‘the <em>servus </em>remained, in law, the chattel of the master, who had the unrestricted disposal of his person, his labor, and his property. In consequence, having no <em>legal personality </em>of his own, he appeared as an alien being, outside the ranks of the community.’ For the new burgher class, a non-negligible portion of which being made up of former peasants and freemen alike, Han’s extension of <em>homo sacer </em>is more fitting: ‘the word <em>sacer </em>does not mean “accursed” but “holy”. Now bare, sheer life itself is holy, and so it must be preserved at any cost.’ What arose, ideologically, in the powerful burgher class, then was the notion that in a world determined by social exchange through their products, production of finer quality and greater quantity could influence for better or for worse their social worth. Whether this influenced religious belief during the time is another discussion waiting to be undertaken.</p><p>What is clear is that the burgher class could not escape the dialectic of master and servant, of <em>dominus </em>and <em>servus </em>that was so prevalent in earlier feudal society. On one hand, the master craftsman had become slave to capital; not necessarily for its use-value, but its social. Remember, the burgher found freedom in the prospect of political participation — ‘freedom was lost when free choice could not be exercised at least once in a lifetime.’ The accumulation of capital, the incessant positivity of artisan and merchant life evidences the slip into impersonal servitude. On the other hand, the achievement subject of the second feudal age also felt master over himself. He was responsible for his capital, and thus his social position. However, to be master of oneself and slave of capital presses towards the development of burnout anxiety. One cannot ensure his own safety (whether personal or economic) in this closed system. Capital can turn at any moment and is not bound, like a manorial lord, to its mystical obligations. Here we see the kernel of ‘the notion of the symptom’. There is in the burgher an anxiety of production which appears as wholly self-motivated. The desire to accumulate cache (in the social sense) through wealth perfectly represents Han’s theory that ‘the drive to maximize production inhabits the <em>social unconscious</em>,’ as well as his assertion that the ‘disappearance of domination does not entail freedom. Instead, it makes freedom and constraint coincide.’</p><p>What is interesting is that there was yet in the second feudal age a structure of dominance and interdiction. The commanding s<em>hould </em>had not been wholly repressed under the positive <em>can</em>. Nobility and the urban institutions founded by them encountered directly the new ideology of achievement. Thus, the artisan or burgher was still able to project his alienation onto this class. This may explain why individual economic self-determination and the early forms of capitalism prevailed through modernity with little disillusionment.</p><p>What we can be sure of is that, like the Marxian critics have posited, the origin of the notion of the symptom are indeed found in feudal society; especially the second feudal age. Moreover that the mutated symptom that is felt by post-modern, post-industrial achievement society is kernelly present in the same age. These ideologies, afterall, coexisted especially in the urban landscape.</p><h4>Sources</h4><p>Bloch, Marc. <em>Feudal Society</em>. Translated by L. A. Manyon. Chicago: U. of Chicago Pr, 1961. Foreword by M. M. Postan</p><p>France, Marie de. <em>The Lays of Marie de France</em>. Translated by David R. Slavitt. AU Press, 2013. Han, Byung-Chul. <em>The Burnout Society</em>. Translated by Erik Butler. Stanford, CA: Stanford Briefs, 2015.</p><p>Le Goff, Jacques. <em>Time, Work, and Culture in the Middle Ages</em>. Translated by Arthur Goldhammer. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1980.</p><p>Žižek, Slavoj. <em>The Sublime Object of Ideology</em>. London: Verso, 2019.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=0878c0821a69" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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