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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Bryan Frances on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Bryan Frances on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@bryanfrances?source=rss-decdcb95433------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Bryan Frances on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Why Probabilities Are Crazy]]></title>
            <link>https://bryanfrances.medium.com/why-probabilities-are-crazy-3f563d2ef1d9?source=rss-decdcb95433------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/3f563d2ef1d9</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[base-rate-fallacy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[probability-theory]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[probability]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[counterintuitive]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[paradox]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Bryan Frances]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 31 Mar 2021 13:40:13 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-03-31T13:40:13.912Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>1. The Terrible Medical Test</h3><p>Fred thinks he might have disease D. He goes to Dr. Incompetent, who administers a medical test meant to determine whether or not Fred has D. Dr. Incompetent tells Fred, <em>correctly</em>, three relevant facts about the test and the disease:</p><p>· FACT 1: If someone <strong><em>does</em></strong> have D and takes the test, the test will correctly say “You have D” a whopping 99 percent of the time and it will incorrectly say “You don’t have D” a measly 1 percent of the time</p><p>· FACT 2: If someone <strong><em>doesn’t</em></strong> have D and takes the test, the test will correctly say “You don’t have D” 99 percent of the time and it will incorrectly say “You have D” 1 percent of the time.</p><p>· FACT 3: Only 1 out of 100,000 people have D. D is a very rare disease.</p><p>Fred is impressed with these facts and comes to have belief B:</p><p><strong>Belief B</strong>: if the test says “You have D”, then there’s a <strong><em>high probability</em></strong> you have D.</p><p>The reason I chose the insulting name for the doctor is that the medical test he or she is using is actually <strong><em>terrible</em></strong> for testing for D. If the test says “You don’t have D,” there is indeed an excellent chance you don’t have D; so in <em>that</em> respect the test is great. But what about Fred’s belief B that if the test says “You have D,” then there is an excellent chance (“high probability”) you have D?</p><p>If you know probability theory, then you can figure out that Fred’s belief B is utterly and completely false! Instead, the reality is this:</p><p><strong>Belief B*</strong>: if the test says “You have D,” then there is a <strong><em>very low probability</em></strong> you have D.</p><p>That is, belief B is totally false and belief B* is totally true!</p><p>The truth is that almost every time the test says “You have D” the test is wrong, because the person doesn’t have D. That’s surprising, but that’s the way the math works. There is all the difference in the world between these two:</p><p>· If you have D, then it’s highly probable the test will say “You have D”</p><p>· If the test says “You have D”, then it’s highly probable you have D</p><p>The former bullet point is true because the test is 99 percent accurate, as FACT 1 said. The latter bullet point is false. But <strong><em>why</em></strong> is it false? And just as importantly, what does that really mean? I’ll answer those questions next.</p><h3>2. Why the Test is Terrible</h3><p>Let’s see why B is false and B* is true. Suppose a million people take the medical test for the disease. Remember FACT 3: about 1 in 100,000 people actually have disease D. So, if a million people take the test, then about ten of them have the disease to begin with (because 1,000,000 x 1/100,000 = 10).</p><p>So, we have one million people taking the medical test, and about ten of them actually have the disease the test is meant to indicate. When those ten people who really have the disease take the test, the odds are very high that the test will say “You have D” all ten times. That is because of FACT 1: if someone <strong><em>does</em></strong> have D and takes the test (as our ten people do), the test will correctly say “You have D” 99 percent of the time and it will incorrectly say “You don’t have D” 1 percent of the time.</p><p>Hence, we know that it’s all but certain that when the million people take the test, about ten of them have the disease <em>and</em> the test will correctly say “You have D” for each of those ten people. The medical test looks pretty good so far.</p><p>But now consider the remaining people, the 999,990 folks who <strong><em>don’t</em></strong> have D and take the medical test. What happens when they take the test?</p><p>Recall FACT 2: if someone <strong><em>doesn’t</em></strong> have D and takes the test, then two things follow:</p><p>(a) The test will correctly say “You don’t have D” 99 percent of the time</p><p>(b) The test will incorrectly say “You have D” 1 percent of the time.</p><p>I want to focus your attention on (b). It is saying that if a group of people take the test and none of them have the disease, then the test will <em>incorrectly</em> say “You have D” in 1 percent of those cases. 1 percent of 999,990 people is about 10,000. So, when those 999,990 people who don’t have D take the test, it will incorrectly say “You have D” about 10,000 times.</p><p>So all told, when those one million people take the test, the test will say “You have D” about 10,010 times total: that’s the first 10 (who really do have D) plus the next 10,000 (who don’t have D). So, when the test says “You have D”, it’s right 10 times and wrong 10,000 times. Oh no.</p><p>Therefore, for only 10 of those 10,010 people is the test <strong><em>correct</em></strong> in saying “You have D.” The other 10,000 were misdiagnosed. When the test says “You have D,” which is about 10,010 times, the test is wrong 10,000 out of 10,010 times! That is, when the test gives a positive verdict, saying “You have D”, it’s virtually always wrong! In fact, when the test says “You have D”, it is wrong <strong><em>99.9 percent of the time</em></strong> (since 10,000 is 99.9 percent of 10,010). This proves that belief B,</p><p><strong>Belief B</strong>: if the test says “You have D”, then there’s a <strong><em>high probability</em></strong> you have D.</p><p>is totally false and belief B* is totally true:</p><p><strong>Belief B*</strong>: if the test says “You have D,” then there is a <strong><em>very low probability</em></strong> you have D.</p><p>To be exact: if the test says “You have D”, then it is right just <strong><em>1 out of every 1001</em></strong> times (since that’s equal to 10 out of 10,010 times).</p><h3>3. Why the Test Is Not Worthless</h3><p>That’s a very surprising result. One thing that it proves is that our intuitive judgments about probabilities aren’t very good!</p><p>Does this mean that the medical test for D is <strong><em>utterly worthless</em></strong>? If so, how can that be when the test is 99 percent accurate, as FACT 1 and FACT 2 say when put together?! That’s crazy!</p><p>Well, no: the test is not worthless, despite the truth of B*. Not at all! We can prove it:</p><p>Before you got the test result you knew that the odds of your having D were 1 in 100,000. That’s because you had no evidence that you were out of the ordinary, and the probability for the general population is 1 in 100,000. But after you get the test result “You have D”, the odds you have D are now 1 in 1001. Sure, that is still tiny. But it’s nearly <strong><em>100 times more likely than before</em></strong>, when you didn’t have the test result! That is, you went from “1 out of 100,000” to “1 out of 1001”, which is a <strong><em>huge</em></strong> change. Hence, the positive test result does change things dramatically: you are now much, much more likely to have the disease.</p><p>So, is the medical test for D good or not? Answer: yes and no.</p><ul><li>The reason for ‘no’: if the test says “You have D”, it’s right only 1 out of 1001 times.</li><li>The reason for ‘yes’: if the test says “You have D”, you are much, much more likely than before to have D.</li></ul><p>The oddity is this: although the positive test result (i.e. “You have D”) shows you are now <strong><em>much, much more likely</em></strong> to have the disease, you are still <strong><em>very unlikely</em></strong> to have the disease. It is tricky to see that there is no inconsistency there.</p><p>You are actually familiar with related situations. For instance, the odds that you are going to get hit by lightning in the United Arab Emirates are very, very small. If you go to the US, the odds increase dramatically, since the US has lot of thunderstorms. Even so, the odds of you getting hit by lightning in the US are still tiny. They are much bigger than in the UAE but they are still small. You can see how the two situations are similar:</p><ul><li>After you get “You have X”, you are now <strong><em>much, much more likely</em></strong> to have the disease, even though you are still <strong><em>very unlikely</em></strong> to have the disease.</li><li>After you move to the US, you are now <strong><em>much, much more likely</em></strong> to get hit by lightning, even though you are still <strong><em>very unlikely</em></strong> to get hit by lightning.</li></ul><h3>4. Changing the Numbers</h3><p>The fact that B is false and B* is true is surprising for almost all of us. The source of the surprise is our underestimating the significance of FACT 3: only 1 out of 100,000 people have disease D. In order to see how important that number is, let’s suppose that 1 out of 100 people have D, so D is much more common. Is B true then? Let’s go through the reasoning from before, except this time we will pretend that the disease D is had by 1 out of 100 people instead of 1 out of 100,000:</p><p>Just like before, suppose a million people take the test for the disease. Here is our new FACT 3*: about 1 in 100 people actually have D. So, if a million people take the test, then about 10,000 of them have the disease to begin with (1,000,000 x 1/100 = 10,000), and the remainder, about 990,000, do not actually have the disease.</p><p>So, we have one million people taking the medical test, and about 10,000 of them actually have the disease the test is meant to indicate. What happens when those 10,000 people who really have the disease take the test?</p><p>FACT 1 gives the answer: if someone <strong><em>does</em></strong> have D and takes the test, the test will correctly say “You have D” 99 percent of the time and it will incorrectly say “You don’t have D” 1 percent of the time. Hence, when those 10,000 people who really have D take the test, about 99 percent, or 9,900, will get the <strong><em>correct</em></strong> result “You have D” and 1 percent, or 100, will get the <strong><em>incorrect </em></strong>result “You don’t have D”.</p><p>In sum: when the 10,000 who do have D take the test,</p><ol><li>9,900 get “You have D” correctly</li><li>100 get “You don’t have D” incorrectly</li></ol><p>Now consider the remaining people, the 990,000 folks who <strong><em>don’t</em></strong> have D and take the medical test. What happens when they take the test?</p><p>Recall FACT 2: if someone <strong><em>doesn’t</em></strong> have D and takes the test, then two things follow: (a) the test will correctly say “You don’t have D” 99 percent of the time and (b) the test will incorrectly say “You have D” 1 percent of the time. Point (a) says that 99 percent of the 990,000 people will get “You don’t have D”. 99 percent of 990,000 is 980,100. And point (b) says that 1 percent of the 990,000 people will get “You do have D”. 1 percent of 990,000 is 9,900.</p><p>In sum: when the 990,000 who don’t have D take the test,</p><p>3. 980,100 get “You don’t have D” correctly</p><p>4. 9,900 get “You have D” incorrectly</p><p>So when we put (1)-(4) together, we get this result: when those one million people take the test,</p><ul><li>Of those who got “You don’t have D”: 980,100 right and 100 wrong (that’s (2) &amp; (3))</li><li>Of those who got “You do have D”: 9,900 right and 9,900 wrong (that’s (1) &amp; (4))</li></ul><p>Clearly, the test is great for people who get “You don’t have D”: it’s almost always right! But the test is pretty poor for people who get “You have D”: it’s right only 50% of the time!</p><p>Now, what happens when the disease D is pretty common? Let’s suppose that D is had by 1 in 10 people instead of 1 in a 100 or 1 in 100,000.</p><p>Just like before, suppose a million people take the test for the disease. Here is our new FACT 3**: about 1 in 10 people actually have the disease D. So, if a million people take the test, then about 100,000 of them have the disease to begin with (1,000,000 x 1/10 = 100,000), and the remainder, about 900,000, do not actually have the disease.</p><p>So, we have one million people taking the medical test, and about 100,000 of them actually have the disease the test is meant to indicate. What happens when those 100,000 people who really have the disease take the test?</p><p>FACT 1 gives the answer: if someone <strong><em>does</em></strong> have D and takes the test, the test will correctly say “You have D” 99 percent of the time and it will incorrectly say “You don’t have D” 1 percent of the time. Hence, when those 100,000 people who really have D take the test, about 99 percent, or 99,000, will get the <strong><em>correct</em></strong> result “You have D” and 1 percent, or 1,000, will get the <strong><em>incorrect </em></strong>result “You don’t have D”.</p><p>In sum: when the 100,000 who do have D take the test,</p><p>5. 99,000 get “You have D” correctly</p><p>6. 1,000 get “You don’t have D” incorrectly</p><p>Now consider the remaining people, the 900,000 folks who <strong><em>don’t</em></strong> have D and take the medical test. What happens when they take the test?</p><p>Recall FACT 2: if someone <strong><em>doesn’t</em></strong> have D and takes the test, then two things follow: (a) the test will correctly say “You don’t have D” 99 percent of the time and (b) the test will incorrectly say “You have D” 1 percent of the time. Point (a) says that 99 percent of the 900,000 people will get “You don’t have D”. 99 percent of 900,000 is 891,000. And point (b) says that 1 percent of the 900,000 people will get “You have D”. 1 percent of 900,000 is 9,000.</p><p>In sum: when the 900,000 who don’t have D take the test,</p><p>7. 891,000 get “You don’t have D” correctly</p><p>8. 9,000 get “You have D” incorrectly</p><p>So when we put (5)-(8) together, we get this result: when those one million people take the test,</p><ul><li>Of those who get “You don’t have D”: 891,000 right and 1,000 wrong (that’s (6) &amp; (7))</li><li>Of those who get “You have D”: 99,000 right and 9,000 wrong (that’s (5) &amp; (8))</li></ul><p>Now the test looks pretty good but not exactly perfect. If you get “You don’t have D”, it’s right virtually always, and if you get “You have D”, then it’s right about 90% of the time (99,000 right and 9,000 wrong).</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3f563d2ef1d9" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[There is No Homogeneous Group “The Protesters”]]></title>
            <link>https://bryanfrances.medium.com/there-is-no-homogeneous-group-the-protesters-ba38c3f10e3a?source=rss-decdcb95433------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ba38c3f10e3a</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[riots]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[protest]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[police-brutality]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[protesters]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[rebellion]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Bryan Frances]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 02 Jun 2020 12:08:41 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-06-02T12:08:41.289Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/460/1*Mh6bgGXqVxrsZodkW_mQSA.jpeg" /><figcaption>From CNN.com</figcaption></figure><p>It’s naïve to think so. The people out protesting have almost nothing interesting in common. They are like the group of people between 5’4’’ and 5’10’’: there isn’t much of anything that unites them. And as I’ll show below, this fact turns out to be crucial when understanding the basics of the debates about the protests.</p><p>Here are the main factions out on the streets:</p><p>1. There are the people who have been shit on by cops, or have a family member or other loved one who has been shit on by the cops, and they are protesting because they are fed up with police brutality. By ‘shit on’ I mean that the police have been violent toward them, have terrified them, or have intentionally humiliated them. These protesters are not out for violence of any kind.</p><p>2. There are the people who are fed up with police brutality who also think that only violence will diminish such brutality, so they are looking for violence in these protests. They aren’t looking to loot for personal gain.</p><p>3. There are the people who are like immature angry young men who are dying to blow off steam and itching for a fight.</p><p>4. There are the people who are out to loot for selfish reasons.</p><p>5. There are the white supremacists who are out on the streets for various goals associated with that group (e.g. start a civil race war).</p><p>So, it makes no sense to search for generalizations regarding “the protesters”. They are too heterogeneous. The only interesting thing they have in common is that they are ordinary people out in the streets at the same time.</p><p>I’m pretty confident that roughly 90% of “the protesters” fall into group 1. I don’t suppose I surprise anyone in saying that I think these people are admirable for what they’re doing.</p><p>Groups 4 and 5 can fuck off.</p><p>I understand group 3 people, at least a bit. After all, their anger and desperation might be caused, in part, by how horribly our country treats the working class. They have shitty jobs with shitty pay and shitty health care, they see how incredibly rich many other people are in this country, and they see how politicians almost never do anything to address any of their problems but cater only to the rich. So, they are out for anger and revenge. But other people in group 3 are just violent losers. They aren’t white supremacists or ideologically driven or mad at being victimized by people in power. So, maybe group 3 is made up of two subgroups that should be distinguished.</p><p>I understand group 2 people. I would need to do research to try to determine if their assumption — that only violence will diminish police brutality — is really true. It’s easy to give arguments for their assumption, arguments that are hardly stupid. But it’s also easy to give reasonable arguments against their views. I’m inclined to think their assumption is wrong, but I’m prepared to be proven wrong about that. MLK led protests that were generally peaceful until the police got violent. And the protests eventually helped us achieve legitimately good national legislation. So that is a case in which peaceful protest (on the part of the protesters) was successful. But the group 2 people could say in response to me that (a) that’s the exception that proves the rule, and (b) even though it worked in the past, that’s only because the protesters had such an amazing and charismatic leader, MLK. There is no such leader today, so violence is the answer we are left with. The only way anyone will pay attention to them, because they don’t have a great leader, is if they are violent. Or so they will argue.</p><p>Here’s one reason why I think this 5-group distinction matters. Someone people say this is the beginning of the debate:</p><p>Protester: <em>it’s wrong for the police to kill George Floyd.</em></p><p>Anti-protester: <em>you are right about that, but you are wrong to loot businesses and set fires</em>.</p><p>Protester: <em>but without doing stuff like that, no one will listen to us and nothing will ever change.</em></p><p>But notice the key mistakes here:</p><p>First, the first protester is from either group 1 or 2 while the second protester is from group 2 alone. We are mixing apples and oranges here. The group 1 people aren’t looting and setting fires; the people in group 2 are. But in dialogues like that one, we apply the arguments against the group 2 people to the group 1 people, which is totally not fair.</p><p>But it’s even more misleading than that!</p><p>The anti-protester is putting groups 2–4 together with group 1, which is totally unfair. Again, the group 1 people, who are insisting on ethical reasons for protesting, are being classified with the looters and arsonists, from groups 2–4.</p><p>In fact, it’s unfair to put the group 2 people in with the people from groups 3 and 4. The group 2 people aren’t looting; they are not protesting for material gain. But that’s what the looters from 3 and 4 are doing. Using phrases like ‘the protesters are setting fires and looting’ is misleading because it’s putting people from groups 2–4 together, which is foolish.</p><p>When the anti-protester says this:</p><p><em>You are right about that, but you are wrong to loot businesses and set fires</em></p><p>the first ‘you’ is referring to the people in groups 1 and 2, but the second is referring to groups 2–4. The looters and arsonists are mainly from groups 3 and 5; so it is highly unfair to make a statement that puts them into the same category as the people in groups 1 and 2.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ba38c3f10e3a" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Philosophy Is Fucked . . . And It’s not Fucked]]></title>
            <link>https://bryanfrances.medium.com/philosophy-is-fucked-and-its-not-fucked-3b02209e6652?source=rss-decdcb95433------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/3b02209e6652</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[controversy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[disagreement]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[expert]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[progress]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Bryan Frances]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 11 May 2020 22:48:35 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-05-18T12:34:19.864Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><strong>Philosophy Is Screwed. . . And It’s not Screwed</strong></h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*NY-1-rXXKGexAi_IFsP1-g.jpeg" /></figure><p>From a personal perspective, from the standpoint of one’s own life — the rest of the world be damned — philosophy is a hopeless endeavor. But at the community level it’s kicking ass.</p><p>Philosophy is enormously successful. In fact, it’s the most successful enterprise ever. Think about it: philosophy gave us science, and science gave us engineering and medicine. Some of the sciences weren’t generated directly from philosophy, but their ancestry starts with philosophy. Virtually the only thing that didn’t come from philosophy, either directly or indirectly, is mathematics. Here I set aside the arts and political systems, of which I will be silent, even though the ties with philosophy are extensive.</p><p>Philosophers have been successful at pointing out that there are certain <em>notions</em> that are of fundamental importance to our own lives, how we interact with each other, how we interact with the world, and the world itself: justice, freedom, consciousness, perception, reason, beauty, truth, evidence, time, inference, causality, knowledge, intentionality, suffering, change, moral goodness, etc. We are also superb at generating fascinating <em>questions</em>, ones that are central to understanding the notions just mentioned. We are excellent at discovering certain <em>problems</em> or even paradoxes involving those notions. We are probably too good at crafting potential <em>answers</em> to the questions. We are creative and profligate at making a great many highly sophisticated <em>arguments</em> for and against those answers. Finally, as noted above over the millennia we have been good at generating new <em>fields of investigation</em>, such as the individual sciences. That’s an impressive list: notions, questions, problems, answers, arguments, and fields.</p><p>And look: I’m not talking about the distant past alone. Even over the last century philosophy has continued to churn out new fields or subfields.</p><p>But never mind all that. In my life, as a professional philosopher, what kinds of success can I reasonably hope for?</p><p>There are many kinds of achievable successes for a philosopher, such as positively influencing the field of philosophy and improving the reasoning abilities and moral compass of students. But the game is set up in such a way that promotes failure. To get a sense of this doom, imagine that professional runners were constantly asked to take a shot at running a three-minute mile, tennis players were asked to win a match without losing even one point, or baseball pitchers were constantly directed to the goal of pitching a game in which they not only throw a perfect game but strike out 27 batters in a nine-inning game. Imagine that students studying engineering were asked to convert water into wine using nothing but ordinary kitchen supplies. Think of what would happen if students of psychology were constantly directed towards the goal of curing all forms of mental illness.</p><p>None of them would ever succeed, of course. There is no chance whatsoever. Despite that failure, they could succeed in many tangential ways. The engineers could come up with startling discoveries regarding the things that could be done with ordinary kitchen supplies. Baseball pitchers could devise many new kinds of pitches and pitching deliveries, perhaps so many that no batter would face the same pitch or delivery from one plate appearance to the next.</p><p>This is what philosophy is like. Students are directed towards attempts to solve the liar paradox, to find the true relation between free will and determinism, to prove that God exists (or doesn’t exist), etc. Now, no philosophy teacher actually <em>says </em>to a student, ‘Solve the problem of God’s existence’. The influence is more subtle than that. Students are fed a diet of the big questions, they study the big answers to the big questions, and then are encouraged to do more or less the same thing in their writings. No medical student is directed towards curing cancer; nearly every philosophy student is subtly directed towards solving some big philosophy problem. What chance does she have at success?</p><p>Suppose you come home, use your keys to unlock your door, get inside, put your keys somewhere, and then have dinner. Later you’re looking for your keys. An hour of searching goes by. No keys. A day of searching goes by. No keys. 37 years of searching later it’s high time to think you’re not going to find them by looking further. That’s what it’s like with the community of philosophers chasing the big, traditional philosophical problems, except that centuries or even millennia have gone by. Hence, philosophers are socialized to fail.</p><p>However, one need not accept the pessimistic line expressed above. Instead, one might reasonably think that things are different now, philosophy has improved considerably in the last few decades compared to all the past millennia. It’s not that philosophers have more intellectual power than in the past. Instead, there are several factors that collectively suggest that we are at the beginning of a <em>golden age of philosophy</em>: hence, we should be optimists, not pessimists. Here are some of the factors that distinguish us from our predecessors:</p><p>· Much greater knowledge of the individual empirical sciences plus the attempt to use them in approaching philosophical issues (partly because there is so much more to learn and use).</p><p>· Much greater knowledge and use of formal sciences such as math, logic, formal semantics, and decision theory (same parenthetical point here).</p><p>· Much larger community of professionally trained philosophers.</p><p>· Much greater philosophical communication among the members of the philosophical community.</p><p>· Adoption of the group approach to philosophical topics (as in science).</p><p>· A commitment to “plainer” philosophizing: use of straightforwardly valid arguments, elimination of disambiguations, better explanations of jargon, less use of jargon, etc. (this holds for some subfields more than others).</p><p>· Much greater access to philosophical works, historical and contemporary.</p><p>· More tolerance for a great diversity of views.</p><p>Each of these is relatively new, historically considered (e.g., none existed before 1950). I think we have already made good and significant use of all of them, but the key point here is that we’re only <em>beginning</em> to take advantage of them. So they are at least in the running for factors that may make us reasonable in thinking that future philosophical thinking might succeed where the past has failed — even when the relevant past period is measured in thousands of years. We might be at the beginning of a golden age of philosophy.</p><p>Of course, this doesn’t mean that there are no lone philosophical geniuses working in isolation, or that philosophy is going to become a branch of science, or that philosophers didn’t use scientific results and ideas prior to 1950, or that the eight factors mean that there is a significantly greater chance at success in <em>every</em> subfield of philosophy.</p><p>It should go without saying that there is no guarantee of future success in philosophy. Moreover, there is nothing here that suggests significant success any time soon (on the order of a few decades or even a century). More depressing still, there is nothing here that will give hope to the idea that you, the individual professional or amateur philosopher, are going to solve any of the big problems in your life. Of course, you might stumble on the right answer: you might get on the right side of the truth. But that hardly means that you have anything like the reason why the philosophical thesis is true, or even excellent overall evidence backing up the thesis. Even so, perhaps there is reason for optimism for the hardest, most intractable philosophical issues.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3b02209e6652" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Basics of Epistemology]]></title>
            <link>https://bryanfrances.medium.com/the-basics-of-epistemology-f860ab7b5a4c?source=rss-decdcb95433------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f860ab7b5a4c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[epistemology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[evidence]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[truth]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[reason]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Bryan Frances]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 11 May 2020 09:16:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-05-11T09:16:01.578Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>The Basics of Knowledge, Evidence, and Truth</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/200/1*sCt1vLoORL9EJgtlxEp7fg.jpeg" /></figure><p><strong>The Basics of the Basics</strong></p><p>The goal of this essay is to reveal some of the most important <em>connections</em> among the most important <em>concepts</em> of epistemology: truth, belief, disbelief, suspension of judgment, degrees of confidence, evidence, rationality, and others.</p><p>We begin with what may be the most central notion: <strong><em>belief</em></strong>. A belief is an opinion about things, a view of how things are. But what does it mean to believe something is true, for instance, to believe that God exists or that bees make honey? Answer:</p><p>· you <em>accept</em> those ideas (on some cognitive level)</p><p>· you would bet on them as being very likely true</p><p>· you have enough evidence so that additional evidence is unnecessary as far as you are concerned</p><p>· you have made up your mind and consider the case closed.</p><p>Beliefs can be <em>positive</em> or <em>negative</em>: the belief that I have a laptop is positive while the belief that God doesn’t exist is negative. Beliefs can be utterly <em>trivial</em>: we all believe that 2 + 2 = 4 and that red is a color. Others can be <em>controversial</em>: the belief that God exists. They can be <em>serious</em>: some of us think the capital punishment system in the USA has caused great moral harm. Some are <em>silly</em>: we all believe that Winston Churchill was not a church on a hill and that Earth is more than five minutes old. Some beliefs are held for just a couple seconds and then discarded: while walking down a hallway at work you come to think that someone moved the trash can in the hallway at work since yesterday; this belief leaves your mind pretty quickly provided you don’t have occasion to think about it again. Other beliefs you have almost your entire life: I believe that my name is ‘Bryan’. Some beliefs come from religion (the belief that heaven exists), sports (the belief that the New York Yankees were the best team in baseball in the 1950s), ethics (the belief that third trimester abortion is wrong), politics (the belief that third trimester abortion is legal in the USA), entertainment (the belief that Lady Gaga plays the trumpet), philosophy (the belief that we don’t have free will), science (the belief that Venus is about the same size as Earth), art (the belief that Michelangelo’s statue <em>David </em>is much better than almost all other statues), and just about every other walk of life. Each of us has countless beliefs, many true and many false.</p><p>A belief, in the strict sense used in this essay, is something that is expressed by a <em>complete declarative sentence</em>: it’s a <em>claim</em>, something that’s true or false, that someone thinks is true. If Kia says that one of her beliefs is abortion, well she hasn’t really told you much of anything. Maybe she believes abortion should be legal. Maybe she believes it is morally acceptable. Maybe she believes both claims. In any case, we need a <em>full</em> claim before we have a genuine belief, and saying ‘one of my beliefs is abortion’ isn’t a full claim; all it does is tell you a topic. Throughout this essay, whenever I talk of a belief I mean something that is expressed by a complete declarative sentence.</p><p>Often I will use the letter ‘B’ to indicate an arbitrary belief. So when Jack believes bees make honey, and I say ‘Jack believes B’, ‘B’ stands for the claim expressed by the declarative sentence ‘Bees make honey’. If Jill believes that bees don’t make honey, then I would say ‘Jill believes not-B’, where in this context ‘not-B’ means the same as ‘Bees don’t make honey’.</p><p>Usually, it’s easy to determine if someone has a belief. Often all you have to do is find the right opportunity to ask them. But other times it’s quite difficult. If Caucasian Chris is racist against African people, does that mean he <em>believes </em>African people are inferior to Caucasians? He certainly <em>acts</em> that way, virtually all the time, but if you ask him he may well vehemently deny that he is racist against Africans or that he thinks they are inferior to Caucasians. Not all racists are aware of their own racism. When it comes to human behavior, we want to say that he believes that African people are inferior to Caucasians; but when it comes to ideas that he will explicitly agree with, we want to say he doesn’t <em>believe</em> it although he <em>acts</em> it, so to speak. In this essay we will focus only on beliefs that people will admit that they have.</p><p>On some occasions you hear someone contrast knowledge with “mere opinion”. When we say that a belief is a “mere opinion” or “just someone’s opinion” usually we mean that the belief doesn’t amount to knowledge and doesn’t have much evidence backing it up. In this essay, I use ‘belief’ in such a way that I leave open whether the belief amounts to knowledge. So some beliefs have so much backing evidence that they count as knowledge (e.g., we know that Jane Austen wrote <em>Emma</em>) whereas others have no supporting evidence whatsoever (those are two extremes).</p><p>Here are some qualities we like our beliefs to have:</p><p>True: it accurately reflects the way things really are</p><p>Justified: there’s something backing it up sufficiently</p><p>Knowing: we don’t merely <em>believe</em> something but <em>know</em> it</p><p>Productive: they lead to new ideas, inventions, discoveries, and other useful things</p><p>We will be mainly concerned with the first three.</p><p>Here is a story that reveals some key connections among central epistemic concepts. There will be lots<em> </em>of stories in this essay.</p><p><strong><em>The Jury I</em></strong>. Jo is on a jury, deliberating on whether the defendant, the butler, murdered the maid. The prosecutor’s presentations have been totally convincing. The evidence that he’s guilty is overwhelming: he is videotaped in the room holding the bloody knife which is firmly embedded in the body, he had written in his diary that he was planning to kill her, there was a love triangle to his detriment, etc. (Fill in the details as you like, using your novelist skills.) So, Jo the juror patiently and competently considers the evidence and quite reasonably concludes that the butler’s guilty (so B = the claim that the butler is guilty). But in truth he’s innocent: although he did indeed want to kill the maid, and he had even planned on doing it, someone else murdered her and very cleverly framed him. This kind of thing happens all the time. Only three people knew the truth: the butler himself, the murderer who framed him, and the maid — who is no longer around to tell the truth. Suppose Mo is another jury member. He has come to the opposite conclusion from Jo: he thinks that butler did not murder the maid (the belief not-B). There are lots of potential explanations for why he came to the opposite belief not-B: he didn’t listen to any of the prosecutor’s evidence, he has some irrational bias in favor of butlers, he hates the prosecutor, etc. Let us suppose that he heard and understood all the excellent evidence of the butler’s guilt but thinks the butler’s innocent because he loves butlers, he hates the prosecutor, and he can’t control how his emotions affect his opinions.</p><p>Jo has a false belief — it’s false because the butler didn’t do it while she thinks he did do it — but her belief is entirely reasonable <em>given the evidence she had</em>. The evidence she has, supplied by the prosecutor, is misleading in the sense that it leads one to disbelieve the truth — but it’s still <em>powerful</em> evidence, the kind that’s strong enough to make one completely rational in coming to a false belief. Hence, <strong><em>a false belief can be entirely rational</em></strong>.</p><p>Now notice that although Mo has come to believe the <em>truth</em>, he is definitely <em>irrational</em> in doing so. In this situation, Mo, the butler, and the murderer all have the very same belief — the belief that the butler didn’t kill the maid — but Mo has lousy overall evidence for it while the butler and the murderer have excellent evidence for it. Hence, <strong><em>a true belief can be entirely irrational</em></strong>.</p><p>Notice also that this case shows that two people can have the same belief but one person is much more <em>confident</em> in the belief’s truth than the other person: although Mo is reasonably confident the butler didn’t kill the maid, the real murderer is much more confident that the butler didn’t kill the maid. We typically express this fact by saying that Mo’s <strong><em>level of confidence</em></strong> in ‘The butler is innocent’ is lower than the level of confidence the murderer has in that very same belief. (These levels of confidence are often called ‘credences’.) Another example: I might be 90% confident that Mark Twain was left-handed whereas you might be only 70% confident. These are not levels or degrees of <em>truth</em>. It has nothing to do with truth. Twain was either left-handed or he wasn’t. (We will consider the objectivity of truth later in this essay.) When someone says that she is about 90% confident that claim C is true, she isn’t saying that C is 90% true. Instead, she’s saying that by her lights the odds that C is true are about 90 to 10 in C’s favor.</p><p>That’s the first version of the murder-jury story. Now change the story a bit.</p><p><strong><em>The Jury II.</em></strong> Although the prosecutor’s case is exactly as before, the butler’s defense attorney presented excellent evidence that the butler was innocent. For instance, the butler was right-handed, had a broken right arm, had a weak left arm, and yet the murder was clearly committed via a very strong stab with a very big knife requiring quite a bit of strength. So how could he have been the one to stab the maid? Sure, he was found leaning over the body with his hand on the knife, but perhaps he was going to try to remove it; or maybe he just needed to feel it. In addition, his diary suggests, although it doesn’t prove, that he was planning to kill her <em>next week</em>, not on the day she was actually killed. Finally, he had noted in his diary that he recently purchased not a knife but a potent poison that can dissolve in water and remain tasteless.</p><p>In this second scenario, with the competent defense attorney presenting good evidence that the butler didn’t do it, the ever attentive Jo and the other jury members have a difficult case before them. After all, they have been presented with excellent evidence <em>for </em>his guilt and excellent evidence <em>against </em>his guilt. This case illustrates that there can be both <strong><em>positive</em></strong><em> </em>and <strong><em>negative</em></strong> evidence regarding a belief: the former is evidence for a belief while the latter is<em> </em>evidence against that same belief, where the belief is ‘The butler killed the maid’. Sometimes negative evidence regarding a belief is called <strong><em>counterevidence</em></strong>. What you’re supposed to do when faced with a case where there is positive and negative evidence is “weigh” them to see which side is stronger. If the two sides are roughly equal in quality — so the evidence for ‘The butler did it’ is about as good as the evidence against ‘The butler did it’ — then you should <strong><em>suspend judgment</em></strong>, which means ‘Do not believe that it’s true and do not believe it’s false’. Being a paradigm of rationality, in this second version of the story Jo suspends judgment on the butler’s guilt.</p><p>Thus, it’s not true that if you give up your belief, then you <em>adopt the other person’s view</em>. If you start out believing B but then suspend judgment (also called “withhold belief”), then that means you do not endorse B and you do not endorse not-B. If you start out believing B but then adopt the other person’s view, then that means you do not endorse B but you do endorse not-B. Thus, suspending judgment is importantly different from adopting the other person’s view.</p><p>In addition, suspending judgment does not mean “make my decision for me”. I’m agnostic with regard to whether God exists, but the last thing I’m going to do is believe what some person tells me to do in deciding whether God exists.</p><p>There are two common kinds of case in which we should suspend judgment. In one kind of case, we are faced with the question ‘Is claim C true?’ (e.g., ‘Did the butler kill the maid?’) and we have significant evidence both for and against C that more or less cancel each other out and we are forced to admit that the total, overall evidence doesn’t really point towards C’s truth or C’s falsehood. The second jury case with the impressive defense as well as prosecution is an example of such a situation. In the other kind of case in which we should suspend judgment, we are again faced with the question ‘Is claim C true?’ but we have no good evidence either way: we have no decent evidence for or against C. For instance, faced with the question ‘Did the planet Venus ever have living bacteria on it?’ I haven’t the faintest idea what the answer is. I know very little about Venus other than it’s about the same size as Earth, it’s hotter, and it’s covered in gases. This information tells me next to nothing regarding whether it ever had living bacteria on it. (I could find out a lot more with a few minutes of research, but then I’d ruin the example!) Other people may have excellent evidence either way (e.g., they might be astronomers), but that would just mean that they have evidence that I don’t have.</p><p>Suspending judgment is often a temporary thing, as this story shows.</p><p><strong><em>The Fork in the Road</em></strong>. You are walking through the woods on a path and come to a fork in the path. There are no signs or other indications as to which path goes where. You have to make a decision about what to do. What you would like is to know whether ‘The right path leads to our destination’ is true. (If you knew it was true, you’d pick the right path; if you knew it was false, you’d pick the left path.)</p><p>You might reasonably <em>choose</em> the left path but you’d be foolish to <em>believe</em> that you have chosen the path to your destination. You simply don’t know which path is the right one, and you have to live with some uncertainty for a while. Only a fool has an opinion as to which path is the right one — even though you will have to make a choice. Wisdom often requires us to say ‘The evidence we have is not good’. You are forced to make a choice as to <em>action</em> — you have to pick a path — but you are not forced to make a choice as to <em>belief</em> — as you can suspend judgment. In that respect action is very different from belief. Despite all that, eventually you will get evidence as to whether you took the right path (e.g., after you have followed the path right to your destination); so the suspension of judgment was temporary.</p><p>Other times the suspension of judgment might never end. For instance, astronomers might start out thinking that Venus could never have had living bacteria on it. But then they discover a way that it might have had bacteria on it but only a billion years ago. So, they suspend judgment. And this suspension might last forever because they are well aware that there is no way to figure out whether Venus actually had bacteria on it a billion years ago.</p><p>Suspending judgment doesn’t mean giving up and sitting on your hands. For instance, a doctor needs to figure out how to treat a specific patient. She can either operate or use medications. She might decide that the two options are equally good, all things considered (cost, pain, etc.). So if a colleague asked her ‘Which option is best?’ she would have to say that she doesn’t know. She has suspended judgment on both ‘Operating is best in this particular case’ and ‘Medications are best in this particular case’. But that doesn’t mean she isn’t going to do anything. She still has to treat the patient. So, she will probably choose somewhat arbitrarily which option to take. And when she has chosen (e.g., the meds) that doesn’t mean that she has stopped suspending judgment. She’s made a choice on what to <em>do</em>, but not on what to <em>believe</em>. <strong><em>Suspending judgment ≠ not acting</em></strong>.</p><p>The stories we have just seen illustrate several key epistemological facts, ones that are absolutely indispensible:</p><p>1. Beliefs can be positive, negative, trivial, controversial, silly, serious, short-term, long-term, and concern just about any topic.</p><p>2. Some beliefs are <strong><em>true</em></strong> while others are <strong><em>false</em></strong>. ‘The butler did it’ was false while ‘The butler didn’t do it’ was true.</p><p>3. Evidence can be <strong><em>positive</em></strong> or <strong><em>negative</em></strong>. Positive evidence for a belief B is evidence that suggests B is true; negative evidence regarding B is evidence that suggests B is false. In the second version of the murder story Jo had both strong positive <em>and</em> strong negative evidence regarding the belief that the butler did it.</p><p>4. One’s <strong><em>overall </em></strong>evidence is the combination of all one’s evidence regarding that belief.</p><p>5. Two people could have the same belief but one person’s belief is irrational while the other’s is rational, due to the fact that the first person has <strong><em>weak overall evidence</em></strong> for the belief and the second person has <strong><em>strong overall evidence</em></strong> for the belief. Hence, evidence can be weak or strong (or somewhere in between). Mo’s belief that the butler is innocent is based on weak evidence while the butler’s belief that the butler is innocent is based on strong evidence.</p><p>6. A belief is <strong><em>irrational</em></strong> and <strong><em>unreasonable</em></strong> and <strong><em>unjustified</em></strong> (we will use these three terms as synonyms) when the believer’s overall evidence is not even close to being strongly supportive of the belief; her belief is <strong><em>rational</em></strong> and <strong><em>reasonable</em></strong> and <strong><em>justified </em></strong>when her overall evidence is strongly supportive of the belief. In the first version of the story Jo’s belief was rational and Mo’s was irrational.</p><p>7. A belief can be entirely <strong><em>reasonable but false </em></strong>provided the person with the belief has excellent overall evidence that supports that false belief. In the first version of the butler story Jo’s belief in the butler’s guilt was reasonable but false. In that case, the evidence will be <strong><em>misleading</em></strong> — as it leads one away from the truth — but it can still be quite powerful in supporting one’s false belief.</p><p>8. A belief can be entirely <strong><em>unreasonable but true</em></strong> provided the person with the true belief has very poor evidence that she is basing her belief on. In the first jury story Mo’s belief in the butler’s innocence was irrational but true.</p><p>9. There are three basic cognitive attitudes one can take to a claim: <strong><em>believe</em></strong> it, <strong><em>disbelieve</em></strong> it, or <strong><em>suspend judgment </em></strong>on it. In the first version of the story Jo believed while Mo disbelieved ‘The butler did it’; in the second version of the story Jo suspended judgment on ‘The butler did it’. Moreover, one can believe or disbelieve it to different <strong><em>degrees</em></strong>, as when one person is extremely confident it’s true while another person agrees it’s true but isn’t as confident as the first person that it’s true. Those differing degrees are different <strong><em>levels of confidence</em></strong>. Both Mo and the murderer believed in the butler’s innocence, but the murderer was much more confident of it than Mo was.</p><p>10. Suspension of judgment ≠ adopting the other person’s view.</p><p>11. In some cases suspension of judgment is temporary; other times it is permanent.</p><p>12. Just because you have to suspend judgment on some claim (so you don’t believe it or disbelieve it) doesn’t mean that you can’t act on it (think of the doctor or fork-in-the-road stories).</p><p><strong>Evidence</strong></p><p>We already went over positive evidence, negative evidence (also known as counterevidence), and total evidence. But what kinds of positive and negative evidence are there?</p><p>There are lots of kinds of evidence. Without attempting to list every category or have the categories be mutually exclusive, or worry about whether one kind of evidence “boils down to” another kind of evidence, there are some common categories of evidence below.</p><p><strong><em>Physical</em></strong>. This is a very common type of evidence — the kind we hear about when watching television shows about detectives. “I would like to introduce a key piece of evidence in the case, a bloody knife.” It’s easy to imagine Sherlock Holmes saying something like that. But there are very different kinds of physical evidence. For instance, storm clouds are good evidence that a storm is coming; tree rings can be excellent evidence that a fallen tree was over a two centuries old.</p><p><strong><em>Testimony</em></strong>. When you meet someone and she tells you she has two brothers, she has “given testimony” for the claim that she has two brothers. Clearly, this is not a <em>formal</em> case of someone giving testimony — as is the case when she is in a court of law. But when you meet someone and she tells you about herself, and you come to believe her (under normal circumstances), you come to know things about her. You know, for instance, that she has two brothers. And you know this because she told you so; that’s what testimony is. Another case: you’re in Manhattan and ask a stranger for directions to the Empire State Building. She will typically know where it is, she’ll tell you how to get there, and as a consequence you now know how to get there, provided you understood what she said. You acquired knowledge via the testimony of the stranger. If challenged with something like ‘How do you know she’s got two brothers?’ or ‘How do you know that that’s the way to the Empire State building?’ you would probably reply with something like ‘She told me so’. Your evidence is the fact that she told you so, in the context of a conversation in which you had no reason to doubt her.</p><p>It’s amazing how many of our beliefs are based on testimony. You know that you’re a Fordham student. How do you know this? Answer: because people have told you so, usually in writing. And how do you know that human babies don’t hatch out of eggs or grow on trees? Answer: testimony.</p><p><strong><em>Expert Testimony</em></strong>. As you might guess, this category is not terribly different from the former one. You can learn things from testimony from people who aren’t experts. For instance, I can answer lots of questions about astronomy that a child might ask me even though I’m not an expert in astronomy. Really, I’m just a competent <em>conduit</em> from the experts to the child (and like real conduits I can transfer only some things successfully). When you want a reliable source of information about a topic, the natural thing to do is ask a genuine expert, whether the topic is astronomy, history, chemistry, botany, or whatever.</p><p>However, the ‘whatever’ leads to difficulties; I’ll go over four of them here.</p><p>First, there is the obvious issue of domain specificity: if you know that Sara is an astronomer, then you know that she is an expert on astronomy, but this implies nothing regarding her expertise in other areas. That’s pretty obvious: just because she is an expert on things like stars and galaxies hardly means she will be an expert in Mediterranean history or baseball or economics. However, there are tricky cases as well. For instance, will she be an expert on Einstein’s theory of relativity? What about Quantum theory? Suppose Katlin is an expert in botany: will she be an expert on evolution? If you don’t know much about those fields, then you won’t know how to answer those questions.</p><p>Second, there are political difficulties. For instance, it’s pretty obvious who one should consult when it comes to the scientific status of theories of our solar system, or plate tectonics, or the health-tobacco connection: in each case one should ask the relevant scientists. And yet, for some <em>culturally sensitive</em> topics non-experts can be fooled into not asking the relevant experts. Centuries ago religious people were told by their religious leaders to ignore what the relevant astronomers were saying about the layout of our solar system: the religious leaders insisted that the Earth was at the center while the astronomers said it was the Sun. And just a few decades ago the tobacco companies expended tremendous efforts in trying to hide or distort the scientific consensus that smoking tobacco is unhealthy. Today we are going through the same old deception, with many oil companies trying to confuse people about the massive consensus about the existence, causes, and threat of global warming. No doubt, fifty years from now almost everyone will know that these companies are full of selfish liars, just like in the tobacco case, but right now that knowledge is much less common, thanks to the impressive disinformation campaign funded by the companies.</p><p>Something similar holds for the theory of evolution: although experts will tell you that the odds that that theory is false are about as good as the odds that the New York Yankees baseball team will have a 160–2 won-loss record next season, people in the US (especially, compared to almost all other “first world” countries) are continually deceived about it. For thirty years now Gallup polls have shown that around 45% of people in the US believe God created humans in the present form in the last 10,000 years or so, and yet much of science’s success is utterly dependent on that very claim being completely false: if the creationist claim were true, there’s virtually no way that science could be so successful. This case of deception is different from the tobacco and global warming cases: it’s not as though a few religious organizations know the truth but are <em>intentionally</em> deceiving the public. Instead, by and large what is happening is that there is an unhealthy ideological source to the <em>unintentional</em> deception. It’s not always obvious who to turn to as a legitimate expert, since dishonesty and trickery are real threats.</p><p>Third, there are lots of cases where there is <em>genuine</em> difficulty — independently of deception — in figuring who, if anyone, is an expert. Who is an expert on God, or morality, or beauty? Or even movies? Over the last forty years or so Roger Ebert was the most influential movie critic in the USA. But was he a better judge of movie quality than you are? Well, it depends. If we are looking to him to tell us whether we will <em>enjoy</em> a movie, then he might be completely unreliable, provided we have very different tastes. In that case, he would not count as an expert. If we are looking to him to be a good judge of the <em>artistic merit</em> of a movie, then maybe he was an expert. It will depend on whether there are experts regarding artistic merit! Are there?</p><p>That’s a hard question, one beyond the scope of this essay. Clearly, Roger Ebert knew a lot more about the artistic genre of movies: its history, its categories, etc. That knowledge might have given him the potential to be a better judge of artistic merit than me, who knows little about movies. But I suppose that one could have all that knowledge he had and still be almost blind to the humor and emotional qualities of movies, which would make one a poor judge of artistic merit.</p><p>Analogous remarks hold for moral judgments. It’s hardly clear who counts as an expert in morality. Should it be a philosopher, as the subject of morality has been always been the province of philosophy? Or, if morality comes from God, should religious experts be the experts on morality? And how on earth are we to tell who is a religious expert? Just like in the movie case, there are going to be plenty of people who are experts in the sense that they know a great deal about the history, practices, and beliefs of many religions. That’s real expertise, no doubt about it. But that’s not to say that any of them are experts about God, for instance. It might be the case that God exists but almost all religions are just horribly wrong about God. Alternatively, maybe there is no God, which again would mean that religions are horribly wrong.</p><p>We will consider the special issues that come up with regard to religion, morality, and aesthetics in the next section.</p><p>Fourth and finally, experts often disagree with one another on the very topics they are experts on. One group says B; another says not-B. Some contemporary physicists say that electrons and other particles come from the dynamics of tiny strings; others say they don’t. Now, this is probably a disagreement that will never bother you, as you don’t have any deep convictions regarding the nature of electrons. But take an issue such as theism: the thesis that God really exists. The people who have examined the putative evidence the longest and with the most care are philosophers. The results of their investigation are particularly interesting: on the one hand, among philosophers there are plenty of theists, atheists, and agnostics (the latter consists of those who suspend judgment on the thesis that God really exists); but on the other hand a clear majority of philosophers are not theists. I don’t have any significant polls to appeal to here, but I’ve been a philosopher for about twenty years and this is my impression, for what it’s worth.<a href="#_ftn1">[1]</a> So, no matter what camp you fall into — theist, atheist, or agnostic — you can congratulate yourself by repeatedly reminding yourself ‘There are lots of genuine experts who agree with me!!’ But are you going to conveniently “forget” that there are plenty of experts that don’t agree with you? In other words, are you going to deceive yourself?</p><p><strong><em>Memory</em></strong>. Although nearly everyone complains about the unreliability of memory, for the vast majority of us it works amazingly well almost all the time. You may well misremember where you left your basketball, but you probably recall where you were born, what year it is, whether spring follows winter, whether Hitler had anything to do with World War II, whether you were born in Saudi Arabia, etc. We rely on memory, both short-term and long-term virtually every minute of every day, and it almost never fails us. Do you recall where you live, or how to get some food, or where to take a piss? Thank your memory every time. We complain about our memory only because the millions of times it works are largely invisible to us, as we rely on it as a matter of course and no problems arise.</p><p><strong><em>Mathematical Proof</em></strong>. Here are the prime numbers from 0 to 30:</p><p>2, 3, 5, 7, 11, 13, 17, 19, 23, 29</p><p>Here are the ones from another 30-point interval 1000 to 1030:</p><p>1009, 1013, 1019, 1021</p><p>You’ll notice that there are far fewer primes in the second interval compared to the first interval (4 compared to 10). There are fewer and fewer of them the higher the numbers get. Mathematicians of old used to wonder: in the sequence of prime numbers, beginning with 2, is there a <em>last</em> prime number, the one that is greater than all the other primes? The Greek mathematician Euclid proved that there is no such number: the primes go on forever. He proved this with a bit of abstract reasoning. Everyone came to agree with him. And their <em>evidence</em> was his <em>proof</em>.</p><p>It would be nice if in ordinary life we often had evidence as strong as Euclid’s proof. His was airtight. Does it ever get that good outside of mathematics? Maybe, but not for the things we tend to fight over in our disagreements.</p><p><strong><em>Sensory</em></strong>. Many people think sensory evidence is incredibly good, even though it’s not perfect. When Karla pocketed the jewelry, and you saw it happen, you thereby acquired fantastically powerful evidence that she pocketed the jewelry. How do you know she did it? You <em>saw</em> it happen. Vision, hearing, smelling, touching, and tasting are the cognitive powers we have that generate our <em>best</em> evidence, setting mathematical proof aside. In fact, many philosophers throughout history have argued that sensory evidence is the kind of evidence that all, or virtually all, other evidence comes from.</p><p><strong><em>Reasoning</em></strong>. Jan knows the cat is either in the bedroom or the den. She looks in the bedroom and doesn’t see the cat; she concludes the cat is in the den. That’s a very common and incredibly simple piece of reasoning. Jan took two pieces of evidence and saw where they lead: what conclusion they justify. It’s not enough to merely <em>have </em>evidence; usually one has to take that evidence and reason with it to figure out what it comes to. Evidence is similar to data; and reason is similar to the processing of data.</p><p>So put, reasoning doesn’t fit nicely with the other categories: in many cases, it’s not so much a category of evidence but something one <em>does</em> with evidence. But since it’s so important I had to put it in here somewhere.</p><p>One more thing about reasoning that we need to get clear on is how ‘premise’ and ‘conclusion’ work. In the cat argument there were two premises in Jan’s argument:</p><p>1. The cat is either in the bedroom or the den.</p><p>2. She’s not in the bedroom.</p><p>3. So, she’s in the den.</p><p>Claims (1) and (2) are the <strong><em>premises</em></strong>; (3) is the <strong><em>conclusion</em></strong>; (1)-(3) is the <strong><em>argument</em></strong>. The premises are the parts of the argument meant to support the conclusion; the conclusion is the “point” of the argument, the thing the arguer is trying to establish. There’s more on these matters near the end of this essay.</p><p><strong><em>Internal experience</em></strong>. When I was in graduate school studying philosophy I recall waking up one day with a strange sensation in my chest. It was so odd that I couldn’t even classify it as painful or merely odd. It wasn’t serious as far as I could tell so I went to the university as I usually did. But by the time I got there the sensation was growing and I was getting very worried. Again, I still could not tell if it was a pain or not! My friend Martha Flynn was a nurse and she helped me go to the hospital. While I was there the medical folks asked me lots of questions, just as you would expect. And I gave them answers. Amazingly enough, they actually <em>believed</em> me while I was telling them what I thought about my medical condition! Me! A complete novice when it comes to anatomy was telling the distinguished doctors what was going on! But they are the experts on anatomy and disease, not me, so why were they taking <em>my</em> word for it?</p><p>Obviously, these questions are silly. They took my word for it because they trusted me to have knowledge of what I was talking about. And I was expert on what I was feeling because, of course, we are all pretty good judges about our own internal sensory feelings such as aches and pains. This doesn’t mean that we are experts on their causes. In fact, I was at the hospital in order to ask the medical experts about what is causing the internal sensation, how serious it was, and what to do about it. (It turned out to be pericarditis, which eventually “went away”.)</p><p>I had internal sensory experiences that indicated that there was something physically wrong with me. I had good evidence that there was something wrong with me, where the evidence was the sensory feelings. The sensory feelings were just like physical evidence: a video of the butler holding the knife that is plunged into the maid’s chest — the physical video itself — is evidence for the claim that he murdered her; the internal feelings I was experiencing were good evidence that there was something wrong with something in my chest. In that respect, internal feelings can count as evidence.</p><p>Please don’t get carried away with that slogan ‘internal feeling can count as evidence’. None of what I have said above gives the slightest credibility to “feelings” like ‘I just knew he had had an accident; I could feel it in my soul’ or ‘I knew the Yankees were going to win! I could feel it in the air!’ Whether or not a person can have internal feelings that count as powerful evidence for various religious or moral claims is an issue we will return to below.</p><h4><strong>The Objectivity of Truth</strong></h4><p>In order to introduce some further epistemological facts, consider another story.</p><p><strong><em>Left Hand/Right Hand.</em></strong> Carl thinks the brilliant 17th century scientist Issac Newton and the great 20th century inventor Thomas Edison were left-handed. He thinks this because he knows that both of them were geniuses (like most of us he heard this through his elementary school teachers) and he thinks <em>all geniuses are left-handed</em>. But that latter idea is false: there have been plenty of geniuses who weren’t left-handed. Now, no one has ever <em>said</em> to Carl ‘All the geniuses are left-handed’. But he has heard over the years that lots of geniuses are left-handed — more than those who aren’t so intellectually gifted. This bit of information is <em>true</em>: the percentage of geniuses who are left-handed is greater than the percentage of other folk who are left-handed. So although Carl learned some true information about geniuses and left-handedness, he extrapolated incorrectly in coming to think that <em>all</em> geniuses are left-handed.</p><p>Carl has made a mistake in reasoning. It happens. He started with ‘Lots of geniuses are left-handed’, which is true, but he made a mistake when that belief “morphed” into ‘All geniuses are left-handed’. That’s where his mistake in reasoning happened. It would be going too far to say he did something <em>stupid</em>; that would be too harsh a charge to level at him. But he did make a mistake. Note that later, when he concluded ‘Newton and Edison were left-handed’, he didn’t make a mistake in <em>reasoning</em>. Given that he believed that all geniuses are left-handed and Newton and Edison were geniuses, it was quite reasonable for him to conclude that Newton and Edison were left-handed. That latter bit of reasoning was <em>good</em>, even though it was based on a mistaken starting point (the starting point being the idea that all geniuses are left-handed).</p><p>So here are some of Carl’s beliefs:</p><p>1. Lots of geniuses are left-handed — a greater percentage than those who aren’t geniuses.</p><p>2. All geniuses are left-handed.</p><p>3. Newton was a genius.</p><p>4. Edison was a genius.</p><p>5. Newton was left-handed.</p><p>6. Edison was left-handed.</p><p>He obtained belief 1 over the years, most likely in school as a child. Eventually, he came to have belief 2, which more or less came from belief 1: belief 1 morphed into belief 2, and that was his prime error. Belief 1 is true; we know this because people have done investigations to find out the rough percentages of left-handed people there are in the general population as well as in the group of people who are geniuses. Belief 2 is false, as there have been a great many geniuses who were right-handed (not to mention the geniuses who were ambidextrous). Beliefs 3 and 4 are clearly true, as history shows (although they were geniuses in very different ways). What about beliefs 5 and 6?</p><p>Well, in order to figure out whether 5 or 6 were true we would have to stop considering Carl and start considering Newton and Edison. When trying to figure out whether Carl’s beliefs 5 and 6 are true it does not matter one bit what Carl thinks, what his reasons are, what his history or experiences are, what his gut instincts are, or anything else of the sort. Carl is <em>utterly irrelevant</em> to the truth or falsity of his beliefs 5 and 6.</p><p>In that sense, truth is<strong><em> objective</em></strong>: whether or not beliefs 5 and 6 are true isn’t affected by anyone’s opinion about how Newton or Edison wrote. It’s not even dependent on what Newton or Edison happened to think! Whether or not Edison was left-handed has to do with <em>how he used his hands</em>; it doesn’t matter what he <em>thought about</em> his hands.</p><p>Suppose Edison always wrote with his right hand, never used his left, and used his right hand in an entirely natural and easy way starting from when he first picked up a pencil or crayon as a child. But imagine that he always <em>told</em> everyone he was left-handed. Pretend that he never wrote anything in public, but always had one of his assistants write things on blackboards for him when he gave presentations. Finally, imagine that somehow, through some cognitive quirk, he had actually convinced himself that he was left-handed despite the fact when he was alone he always wrote with his right hand. (Delusions can be quite powerful, even in smart people.) In that scenario, would he have <em>really</em> been left-handed?</p><p>Obviously not. It would mean that he’s right-handed but has fooled everyone, including himself, into thinking he’s left-handed. Again, it doesn’t matter what people <em>think</em> about how he used his hands; what matters is how he actually used his hands. <strong><em>Truth is objective</em></strong>. When trying to answer the question ‘Is X true or not?’ the answer to the other question ‘Do people think X is true?’ won’t matter.</p><p>When I say that truth is objective, I’m not saying that all objectives truths are known, or even knowable. An objective truth, in the sense we are using ‘objective’, is not a truth that has been proven true. All that is meant by ‘X is objectively true’ is that whether people <em>think</em> X is true doesn’t matter as to whether X is <em>actually</em> true.</p><p>I think that’s right, truth is indeed objective, but there are tricky cases that force us to be careful when thinking about the objectivity of truth. Lady Gaga is famous in the USA. That’s just a fact about how things are in 2012. In 2001 she wasn’t famous and in 2099 almost no one will remember who she was, but right now, as I write this book, she’s famous. She’s not famous in some parts of the world (say, Ethiopia), but in the USA she is famous. But now here’s the key thing: the truth that she’s famous <em>is</em> affected by what people think. Not only that: the truth that she’s famous is <em>entirely</em> determined by what people think. She’s famous because so many people, in the USA in 2012, are aware of her, and of course awareness has to do with thinking. This is very different from the Edison/Newton case, in which the fact that Edison was right-handed isn’t affected in any way, shape, or form by what anyone thinks about anything.</p><p>Really, though, the two cases are the same despite the contrary appearances. Whether or not Lady Gaga is famous doesn’t depend on whether anyone thinks she’s famous. Instead, it depends on whether people are aware of her. They don’t have to be aware of her fame; they need to be aware of her. If almost everyone in the USA in 2012 knew who she was, but mistakenly thought that not many people knew of her, then she’d be famous even though almost no one <em>thought</em> she was famous. So the truth that she’s famous is still objective: whether it’s true that she’s famous doesn’t depend on whether people <em>think</em> it’s true, even though whether it’s true does depend on what <em>other</em> thoughts people have — namely, whether enough people know who she is.</p><p><strong>Religion, Morality, and Objectivity</strong></p><p>Thus, the Lady Gaga story doesn’t show that truth isn’t objective. But what other truths? Are <em>any</em> truths subjective? For instance, what about religious truths?</p><p>Most Christians think Jesus rose from the dead; that’s obviously a religious belief. But this hardly seems like a subjective matter. Either a certain guy, Jesus, rose from the dead around 2000 years ago or not. What people happen to <em>think</em> about his life hardly matters to whether he <em>really did</em> rise from the dead. Whether or not he rose from the dead is as objective as whether he was left-handed, whether he ever had insomnia, or whether he knew how to wiggle his ears.</p><p>The same holds for the prime theistic belief: whether God exists. Again, whether people <em>think</em> God exists is hardly relevant to whether or not he <em>really does </em>exist. Now, if you put a strange interpretation on ‘God’, for instance thinking that God is just a concept or other idea that gives people meaning in their lives, then whether “God” exists obviously is dependent on what people happen to think. But few people think of ‘God’ that way.</p><p>So I’ve just argued that religious beliefs are objective. And yet, people are constantly saying that religious beliefs are subjective — and it certainly appears as though they are saying something that has a lot of truth to it. The key here is that the term ‘subjective’ gets used with several meanings. Often when we say that religious views are subjective we mean things like the following, each of which is a reasonable thing to say:</p><p>· The beliefs have no solid, knock down proof.</p><p>· We tend to be tolerant of the beliefs: if you say that there are tigers that roam Canada, people will ask you for evidence; but if you say that Jesus rose from the dead almost no one will give you a hard time about it.</p><p>· Whether or not people accept a certain religious belief depends not so much on the evidence but on what kind of person they are and what kind of life they have lived: what experiences they have had, what culture they come from, etc.</p><p>· Many religious beliefs are actually value judgments such as ‘Abortion is morally wrong’, which are subjective in the sense that whether they are true depends on what people think and do and feel.</p><p>None of those ideas is inconsistent with what I wrote above about the objectivity of the truth of religious claims. I’m suggesting that most religious beliefs are objective <em>when it comes to truth</em>; the four bullet points are consistent with that thesis: my thesis can be true even if all four bullet points are true too.</p><p>So perhaps a great number of our religious beliefs are either objectively true or objectively false. What about moral judgments (as in the fourth bullet point)? Are they objectively true or objectively false or are they just subjective?</p><p>Here things get really complicated, deserving of a whole book instead of a few paragraphs. For starters, many but not all people will say that moral judgments are like the Lady Gaga case: whether or not a moral judgment like ‘Third trimester abortion is morally acceptable in most cases’ is true depends on what people think and feel — how instances of abortion affect us, over both the short-term and the long-term — but it doesn’t depend on what people think or feel about the question ‘Is third trimester abortion morally acceptable in most cases?’ That is, whether or not third trimester abortion is morally acceptable depends on <em>objective facts</em> <em>about how it affects us</em> — just like how whether or not Lady Gaga is famous depends on <em>objective facts </em>about what people know about her. Even if almost everyone in the USA in 2013 said ‘Lady Gaga isn’t famous’, they could be wrong provided unbeknownst to them almost everyone in the USA in 2013 did indeed know about Lady Gaga; to that extent ‘Lady Gaga is famous’ is perfectly objective, as it can be true regardless of whether we believe it’s true. Analogously, even if almost everyone in the USA in 2013 said ‘Third trimester abortion is morally acceptable in most cases’, they could be wrong provided that unbeknownst to them such abortion cases affected us very negatively; to that extent ‘Third trimester abortion is morally unacceptable in most cases’ is perfectly objective, as it can be true regardless of whether we believe it’s true.</p><p>In that paragraph I assumed that whether something is morally acceptable depends on how it affects us: whether it makes us happy or helps us flourish or increases our well-being. But many people have thought that whether something is moral depends on what God commands, or on some rules such as the Golden Rule of “treat others as you would want to be treated”. I’m not going to say anything regarding who is right about the ultimate nature of morality! However, when it comes to the objectivity of morality, many of these alternative theories say that moral judgments are objective in the same sense as before. For instance, if everyone thought doing X was immoral but God had actually made a commandment that we do X (and we had misunderstood his rule), then we would all be wrong about what is moral to do; morality is objective in the sense that it’s not up to us at all.</p><p>Despite all that, there are still <em>other </em>theories about the nature of morality that suggest that whether a moral judgment such as ‘Third trimester abortions are morally acceptable in most cases’ is true does depend explicitly on whether people think it’s true. This is a kind of moral subjectivism. But most people cringe at such theories. They object ‘But if that were true, then if a community was severely brainwashed into thinking it’s morally okay to torture kids for fun then it would morally okay to do so in that community!’ And then they say that since it’s never morally okay to torture kids for fun, moral subjectivism is false. I won’t be delving into any moral philosophy in this course.</p><p><strong>Evidence, Objectivity, and Explanation</strong></p><p>What counts as evidence is a tricky matter. Specifically, it is easy to find yourself pulled in opposite directions regarding the objectivity of evidence. A story will illustrate the tension.</p><p><strong><em>Forearm Hair.</em></strong> Bubba thinks men with long hair on their forearms are highly intelligent. He believes this because as a kid the two men he admired most had long forearm hair. Neither of these men was intelligent, but Bubba didn’t know that and he admired them anyway. Bubba is not very bright. Now he meets Bartholomew, who has long forearm hair in addition to his long name. Naturally, Bubba comes to think Bart is highly intelligent. And if you challenged him, Bubba would point to Bart’s forearm hair as <em>evidence</em> that supports his belief.</p><p>But does Bart’s long forearm hair count as good evidence for Bubba’s belief? In one sense, <em>no</em>. The reason: there is no real connection between long forearm hair and high intelligence: people with long forearm hair are not more intelligent than people who don’t have long forearm hair (no matter how you interpret ‘long’ or ‘intelligent’!). Bubba <em>thinks</em> there is a connection, he <em>thinks</em> he’s got real evidence, but he’s wrong about that.</p><p>Consider an analogous case. It’s 7am and we are getting ready to go to work. We are wondering whether it’s going to rain today. You look outside and see storm clouds. Well, that’s decent evidence that it’s going to rain that day. It’s not <em>conclusive </em>evidence, but it’s pretty good evidence. It’s pretty good because of this fact: the odds that it’s going to rain are considerably higher if there are storm clouds in the sky than if there are no such clouds in the sky. So the fact of storm clouds is good evidence because it <em>increases the likelihood</em> that our belief that it’s going to rain is true. But in Bubba’s case, the fact of long forearm hair is not good evidence because it does not <em>increase the likelihood</em> that Bubba’s belief in Bart’s intelligence is true. In general, it’s pretty rare that thinking you have X (e.g., good evidence) automatically means you really do have X!</p><p>So in one sense of ‘evidence’, an <strong><em>objective</em></strong> one tied to the idea that evidence increases the likelihood of (objective) truth, Bubba has no evidence that Bart is highly intelligent.</p><p>On the other hand, doesn’t it seem that Bubba is doing something <em>right</em> when he concludes that Bart is intelligent? Even if forearm hair has nothing whatsoever to do with intelligence, it seems like Bubba is doing something correct in coming to think Bart is intelligent. Well, what is that something that’s correct?</p><p>Here’s one thing he’s doing right: given that Bubba thinks long forearm hair is good evidence for intelligence, he would be irrational if he didn’t come to think Bart was intelligent! After all, (a) he thinks anyone with long forearm hair is intelligent, and (b) the only thing he knows about Bart is that he has long forearm hair. Given (a) and (b) Bubba would have to be pretty foolish <em>not </em>to come to think Bart is intelligent. He is doing the reasonable thing given his initial beliefs.</p><p>Moreover, maybe when he was a kid he was reasonable in coming to think that long forearm hair meant high intelligence. Sure, that sound odd, but stranger things have happened. Maybe he was young and really thought that X and Y were the two smartest people he knew and both had really long forearm hair. Maybe he never had occasion to rethink his belief in the tie between forearm hair and intelligence, even though a moment’s reflection would tip him off: ‘Wait a minute: does long forearm hair really mean high intelligence? Where did I get <em>that </em>idea?’</p><p>Thus, just because Bubba fails to have good evidence for his belief doesn’t mean that his coming to have that belief is epistemically horrible all the way through.</p><p>The Bubba story is somewhat silly, as no one thinks forearm hair indicates intelligence — although it’s worth noting that some people still mistakenly if implicitly think that being tall or rich or a white male is a good indicator. But the lesson is serious. Consider the fact that many people think their <em>gut feelings</em> count as good evidence for some of their beliefs, especially their moral and religious ones. Many people also think that their own life <em>experiences</em> count as powerful evidence for those beliefs. But even though people <em>say</em> this, that doesn’t mean that what they’re saying is really <em>true</em>. It might be the case that gut feelings and experiences count for next to nothing when it comes to evidence for or against religious beliefs: the feelings and experiences are about as good evidence as the long forearm hair — namely, not good at all. On the other hand, perhaps they count as quite strong evidence.</p><p>We must distinguish objective evidence from <strong><em>explanation</em></strong>. Another story will help.</p><p><strong><em>Wasps Make Honey.</em></strong> Jerry thinks that wasps make honey. He also thinks that bees make honey, which of course is a very common belief, but he thinks wasps make honey as well. There is a good explanation of why he came to have this odd belief, an explanation that goes as follows. As a child he learned that bees make honey. Then he learned that wasps were like bees in that both can sting you. He figured that wasps must make honey just like bees, as bees and wasps are pretty much the same thing. That’s all there is to it: that’s the whole explanation of how he came to think that wasps make honey.</p><p>There you have it: an accurate explanation of how Jerry came to have a certain belief. But just because we now understand <em>why</em> he has that belief, this does not mean that we have learned what <em>evidence</em> he has for his belief. As things stand, he has nothing even approaching decent evidence for his belief that wasps make honey. Just because he has reasons that he bases his belief on — if you asked him for his reasons, he would say ‘Well, bees make honey and wasps are just like bees; so wasps must make honey too’ — doesn’t mean that those reasons count as evidence. Reasons why someone has a belief <em>can</em> be evidence, but they need not be. Reasons can be good and they can be bad; Jerry’s are bad. The Forearm story also illustrates this: we have an informative explanation of why Bubba came to think Bart was highly intelligent, but that didn’t mean he had objectively good evidence for his view.</p><p>This explanation/evidence distinction is important. After all, someone might have religious or philosophical beliefs because he interpreted some tea leaves in a certain way, or because in his favorite fantasy book (that he worships) that belief is true, or because he desperately wants it to be true, but that hardly means that he has evidence for his belief. If his tea leaves tell him that he has an immortal soul, that hardly means that he has evidence that he has an immortal soul. Of course, we all may <em>in fact</em> have immortal souls, and <em>some</em> people may have genuine evidence that we have immortal souls, but just because there is an <em>explanation</em> of why so-and-so thinks he has an immortal soul doesn’t, all by itself, mean that he has any <em>evidence</em> for that belief: again, explanations need not amount to evidence.</p><p>Therefore, an explanation of why so-and-so has a belief need not, although sometimes it does, appeal to any evidence she has for that belief: she may have no evidence for it.</p><p><strong>Knowledge and Justification</strong></p><p>Knowledge is probably the most important notion in epistemology; justification (or rationality, or reasonableness) comes second. How they relate to belief, evidence, and other epistemic notions (and one another) is one of the perennial topics in philosophy. In this section I go over the basics of knowledge; justification is treated in the next section.</p><p>I know how to throw a curve ball. I also know Minneapolis, as I once lived there for ten years. I know where the island of Cyprus is, since I spent a summer there. I know what’s on my bedside table: epic fantasy and horror books. I know when Henry Aaron broke Babe Ruth’s home run record: 1974. I know that water contains hydrogen. I know why she left him: she found out he really didn’t love her. I know who fed the cat: Alec.</p><p>Paying attention to grammar, we can see from the previous paragraph that there is knowing-how, knowing-an-object, knowing-where, knowing-when, knowing-that, knowing-why, and knowing-who. These are not <em>kinds </em>of knowledge, but something like different grammatical categories, or differing grammatical indicators of the general category of knowledge.</p><p>Over the centuries, philosophers have spent most of their energy investigating knowing-that. We will do so as well. The reason for this historical emphasis, I suspect, is that philosophers think knowing-that is both the foundation of many of the other categories (e.g., knowing-that is somehow the foundation of knowing-who) and is tied to <em>truth</em>, which is another key philosophical notion.</p><p>Let’s return to Carl in the Left Hand/Right Hand story, who you’ll recall thinks both Newton and Edison were left-handed, and he thinks this because he thinks that all geniuses are left-handed. As a matter of fact, Newton was left-handed and Edison was right-handed. So his Edison belief was false (that’s belief 6) while his Newton belief was true (that’s belief 5). Some beliefs are true while others are false.</p><p>How is belief related to knowledge? For instance, does either of Carl’s beliefs amount to knowledge? That is, does he <em>know</em> that Newton was left-handed or that Edison was left-handed?</p><p>Most people would answer both questions negatively, but for different reasons. Take the Edison case first. No one can <em>know </em>that Edison was left-handed because he was not left-handed. You can’t know something that’s false. You can’t know that Barack Obama is a baseball player, or that Lady Gaga was in the rock group Led Zeppelin, or that the Moon is larger than the Earth: you can’t know them because they aren’t true. <strong><em>Knowledge requires truth</em></strong>.</p><p>Someone might object to this idea that knowledge requires truth. She might think that if <em>virtually</em> <em>everyone</em> thought that X was true, <em>and</em> this belief was totally reasonable because they had no way of knowing that it was false, <em>then</em> they could know it even if it’s really false. For instance, a long time ago almost everyone thought the earth was stationary and the sun went around it once a day. Not only that, but this belief of theirs was entirely reasonable, as it was based on perfectly intelligent observation and there was no evidence at all that it was wrong. Given their lack of technology, they had no chance to discover the truth. We now know that they were wrong, as the sun does not go around the earth once a day and the earth is not stationary, but back then before astronomy kicked in everyone knew that the sun went around the earth once a day. Knowledge is something like a belief that is entirely reasonable and is such that the believer had no way to discover that it’s false, if it really happens to be false.</p><p>Almost all epistemologists think that although that idea is reasonable it is usually based on a subtle confusion: mixing up reasonable belief with knowledge. People <em>thought</em> they knew that the sun went around the earth. And their belief was entirely <em>reasonable</em>, as they had genuinely good observational <em>evidence</em> backing up their belief. But they didn’t really know it. There is a big and crucially important difference between <em>knowing</em> something and having <em>excellent overall evidence</em> for it. Knowledge isn’t merely being completely diligent, intelligent, careful, and doing one’s best to find the truth; one has to <em>get the right answer </em>as well. In that sense, knowledge doesn’t just have to do with the believer but with the aspect of the world that her belief is about. When Kiara knows that Tyrone aced the exam, this says something about Kiara — she has a certain kind of awareness — but it also says something about Tyrone: he really did ace the exam. Thus, <strong><em>knowledge isn’t justified belief</em></strong>.</p><p>Therefore, epistemologists have almost always thought that knowledge requires truth and hence justified belief isn’t the same thing as knowledge (since knowledge has to be true while justified belief need not be true).</p><p>Most of them also think that knowledge requires <em>good overall evidence</em>. Earlier we saw that a person could have a true belief that is <em>irrational</em> because it’s based on poor evidence (that was Mo thinking the butler was innocent); analogously, one can have a true belief that <em>fails to amount to knowledge</em> because it’s based on poor evidence. So Carl, who managed to obtain a true belief — the belief that Newton was left-handed — did not have knowledge, as Carl’s evidence wasn’t good. We would say that in a certain sense Carl got <em>lucky</em> in coming to a true belief about Newton. He had no real way of knowing that Newton was left-handed, right? He believes Newton was left-handed, and that belief is objective true, but he <em>believes it for the wrong reasons</em>, which means it doesn’t count as knowledge. In order to know something two conditions have to be met: the belief has got to be true (as we saw above), and you have to believe it for good reasons. If you believe it for bad reasons — for instance, because your horoscope said so — then you don’t really know it. Knowledge is something like “getting things right because one has genuinely seen the truth”. And in order to “genuinely see the truth” one has to believe it for the right reasons. <strong><em>Knowledge requires justification</em></strong>.</p><p>Epistemologists, like almost all philosophers and other intellectuals, love a good fight (especially when there is no blood or physical pain involved). They want to <em>convince</em> you that knowledge really does require truth and good overall evidence. Although I have offered a quick explanation of why they think knowledge requires truth and justification, I have definitely not proven it. An intelligent person could quite reasonably be thinking to herself ‘Well, Professor Frances <em>says </em>knowledge requires truth and belief, and what he says isn’t stupid, but I sure as hell am not convinced’. That’s the beginning of the fight. But for our purposes in this course, we can avoid the fight entirely. It’s easy to see that there are several different categories:</p><p>Believing something.</p><p>Believing something true.</p><p>Believing something on the basis of good overall reasons.</p><p>Believing something true on the basis of good overall reasons.</p><p>For our purposes, we will reserve ‘belief’ for the first category; ‘true belief’ for the second category; ‘justified belief’, ‘rational belief’ and ‘reasonable belief’ for the third category; and ‘knowledge’ for the fourth category.<a href="#_ftn2">[2]</a> We won’t spend time arguing that ‘justified’ and ‘knowledge’, as they are used in contemporary English, really do, as a matter of linguistic fact, pick out those categories.</p><p>Given our notion of knowledge, it must be objective: just because someone <em>thinks</em> she knows something doesn’t mean that she <em>really does</em> know it. She might have excellent overall evidence for her belief, and she might be as rational as anyone ever gets, and maybe no one had any way of doing better than she did in coming to her belief, but for all that her belief might be false anyway. And that would mean that she doesn’t know what she thinks she knows. In that sense, knowledge is objective.</p><p>Some results about knowledge, continuing our list of results from earlier in this essay:</p><p>13. <strong><em>Knowledge</em></strong> requires <strong><em>truth</em></strong>: you can’t know something unless it’s true.</p><p>14. <strong><em>Knowledge</em></strong> requires <strong><em>good evidence</em></strong>: you can’t know something unless your belief is based on good evidence.</p><p>15. <strong><em>Knowledge</em></strong> is <strong><em>objective</em></strong>: just because you or other people <em>think</em> you have knowledge doesn’t mean that you <em>really do</em> have knowledge.</p><p>16. One can have a <strong><em>true belief</em></strong> <strong><em>without knowledge</em></strong>. Carl’s true belief that Newton was left-handed doesn’t amount to knowledge (since it wasn’t based on good evidence).</p><p>17. One can have a belief backed up by excellent overall evidence that doesn’t amount to knowledge: <strong><em>justified belief without knowledge</em></strong>. Jo’s completely rational belief that the butler did it doesn’t amount to knowledge because it’s false.</p><p><strong>Evidential and Prudential Rationality</strong></p><p>The notion of rationality is ambiguous. Two stories will show this; here is the first.</p><p><strong><em>The Tennis Player.</em></strong> Suppose Cat is an athlete who is getting “psyched up” for a game. Her coach and other supporters are being as emotionally persuasive as possible to get Cat convinced that she is invincible, will play her very best, and will defeat her opponent. Cat is playing in her first Wimbledon tennis match against the top player in the game, who has won Wimbledon three times in the last six years whereas Cat is ranked about 62nd in the world.</p><p>On the one hand, this is pure nonsense, right? She is far from invincible, there isn’t the slightest reason she is going to play her best (what are the odds of <em>that</em>?), and she is almost certainly going to lose, since her opponent has a much, much better track record in these games. Sure, there always is a <em>chance</em> that Cat’s going to defeat the champion, but that truth does nothing to justify any of these claims, each of which she believes at the start of her tennis match:</p><p>a. I’m going to play my very best.</p><p>b. I am invincible.</p><p>c. I will win.</p><p>Going by the cool light of reason, her beliefs are baseless and irrational — especially beliefs (b) and ©.</p><p>That’s all true, and it’s important for any serious spectator of the game who is interested in knowing who is going to win, but it’s only half the story. In order for Cat to play well today, she <em>needs</em> to be in the right frame of mind. Frankly, unless she is deceived about her own prospects, she won’t play well! Oddly enough, being irrational is exceedingly <em>helpful</em> to her: without it she won’t play nearly as well.</p><p>Given those psychological facts about Cat, it’s rational — in a certain sense — for her to think she is going to win. In a real sense, the right thing for her to do is convince herself she’s going to win. This is not rational when it comes to evidence, but it’s rational when it comes to her goals: having the belief that she’s going to win is <em>more beneficial</em> to her than not having the belief (at least in the short-run; we don’t even try to consider the benefits or costs over decades). In one sense, the evidential one, she <em>should not</em> think she’s going to win (she shouldn’t have belief ©); but in another sense tied to goal achievement she <em>should</em> think she’s going to win. We call this latter kind of rationality <em>prudential</em>. Her belief © is <strong><em>prudentially rational but not epistemically rational</em></strong>. In the prudential sense of ‘should’, she should believe she’s going to win; but in the epistemic sense of ‘should’, she should not believe she’s going to win.</p><p>The reverse case is common as well: beliefs that are epistemically rational but not prudentially rational. Our second story illustrates this fact.</p><p><strong><em>The Tobacco Community</em></strong>. Harriet lives in a place in the 1960s where tobacco is the source of almost everyone’s livelihood — including her own. She is the only one in her community who becomes aware of the strong causal connection between tobacco and cancer. Her coming to believe in that connection causes her life to be filled with painful doubts, tensions, and eventually misery when she voices her opinion to others, but the belief is supported by tons of evidence.</p><p>Her belief is epistemically rational — based on excellent overall evidence — but not prudentially rational, as it is going to lead to all sorts of heartache for her. Hence, her belief is <strong><em>epistemically rational but not prudentially rational</em></strong>, the reverse of the tennis case.</p><p>So, there are two quite different notions of rationality that apply to beliefs and actions. Let’s say that a belief is <strong><em>prudentially rational</em></strong> when having it significantly contributes to the well-being of the believer. A belief is <strong><em>epistemically rational</em> </strong>when it’s based on excellent overall evidence.</p><p>Hence, we have a couple more results to keep in mind:</p><ol><li>A belief is prudentially rational when it will be highly beneficial for that person to have; a belief is epistemically rational when it is based on strong overall evidence.</li><li>A belief can be prudentially rational but not epistemically rational (tennis story); a belief can be epistemically rational but not prudentially rational (tobacco story).</li></ol><p>Theories, Arguments, Premises, Conclusions</p><p>We need to understand some crucial vocabulary.</p><p>Here’s a <strong><em>theory</em></strong> T1 regarding the question of who killed the maid:</p><p>The cook did it; the butler had nothing to do with it. She killed the maid in the drawing room with a knife because the maid had spurned her romantic advances.</p><p>Notice that the theory consists of several <strong><em>claims</em></strong>: (i) the cook killed the maid, (ii) she killed her in the drawing room, (iii) she killed her with a knife, (iv) she killed her because she had spurned her romantic advances, and (v) the butler had nothing to do with the killing.</p><p>Here’s another <strong><em>theory</em></strong>, T2, regarding the killing:</p><p>The butler did it; the cook had nothing to do with it. He killed the maid with a knife in the kitchen and deposited the body in the drawing room. He killed her because the maid was blackmailing him.</p><p>This theory consists of multiple <strong><em>claims</em></strong> as well: (vi) the butler killed the maid, (vii) he killed her in the kitchen and deposited the body in the drawing room, (viii) he killed her because she was blackmailing him, and (ix) the cook had nothing to do with the killing.</p><p>Here’s an argument for some main parts of T1, the theory that the cook killed the maid:</p><p>a. The cook was seen hitting on the maid on several occasions by several witnesses. In each case the maid rejected her.</p><p>b. The cook’s diary has multiple entries regarding the maid. They start off positive, with descriptions of how much she loves her. But then they devolve into rants about the maid, saying all sorts of awful things about her. Two days before her death, there is an entry about how she’d ‘like to kill her’.</p><p>c. The maid was killed with a long knife.</p><p>d. The cook but not the butler had access to the long kitchen knives.</p><p>e. The butler hated the maid but had a very weak left arm.</p><p>f. The coroner testified that the murderer was left-handed and used a large knife to make a huge fatal wound. Only a strong left-hander could have done it.</p><p>g. The cook was very strong and left-handed.</p><p>That’s an <strong><em>argument</em></strong> for three <strong><em>conclusions</em></strong>: (i), (iv), and (v). The argument has seven <strong><em>premises</em></strong>, (a)-(g), which are claims intended by the person giving the argument to supply strong support for the conclusions.</p><p>Here’s an argument for some main parts of T2:</p><p>1. The butler had stolen several valuable items from the house. He had also billed the house for several expensive items that he never bought.</p><p>2. The maid’s diary talks about how she found about and confronted the butler about this matter. The maid admits, in the diary, to getting the butler to give her $5000 in hush money. And she writes about how gleeful she is that she can continue to squeeze the butler for more money in the future.</p><p>3. The butler has a history of breaking the law: two arrests for disorderly conduct at pubs.</p><p>4. The butler is an alcoholic who was drunk at the time of each arrest.</p><p>5. Although the butler has been a member of Alcoholics Anonymous, he has recently returned to drinking, as several witnesses testify.</p><p>6. Although the cook did hate the maid for spurning her, the cook has no history of violence and was well known to “talk big” and boast but never confront anyone in a manner that is anywhere near violent. Several witnesses testified about how she has always been quite gentle.</p><p>That’s an <strong><em>argument</em></strong> for three <strong><em>conclusions</em></strong> as well: (vi), (viii), and (ix). The argument has six <strong><em>premises</em></strong>, (1)-(6), which are claims that are intended by the person giving the argument to offer strong support for the conclusions.</p><p>Thus, there are theories, arguments, premises, and conclusions:</p><p><em>A </em><strong><em>theory</em></strong><em> is a collection of </em><strong><em>claims</em></strong><em>, and those claims are meant to be supported by </em><strong><em>arguments</em></strong><em> that consist of </em><strong><em>premises</em></strong><em> offered in support of </em><strong><em>conclusions</em></strong><em>, where the conclusions are the claims of the theory</em>.</p><p>In addition, there is the <strong><em>strength</em></strong> of an argument: the amount of support it gives to its conclusion(s). Some arguments are <em>good</em> ones, as they give strong support to their conclusions; while other arguments are <em>bad</em> ones, in that they give little or no reason to believe their conclusions.</p><p>Some arguments are perfect in this specific sense: if the premises are true, then the conclusion has simply <em>got</em> to be true: there is <em>no way at all</em> for the conclusion to be false if the premises are true. This argument has that feature:</p><p>P1: Either Tom is in the garden or he’s in the kitchen.</p><p>P2: Tom is not in the garden.</p><p>C: Thus, Tom is in the kitchen.</p><p>Arguments with that feature are called <strong><em>deductively valid</em></strong>. The two arguments above, regarding the cook and the butler, were not deductively valid: one can imagine that the premises are true but the conclusions are false. The argument about Tom isn’t like that: you can’t coherently imagine the two premises being true while, at the same time, the conclusion is false.</p><p>So we have come up with some more results — and I’ve added a few we haven’t gone over:</p><p>20. A <strong><em>claim </em></strong>is either a truth or a falsehood. Claims are expressed with full declarative sentences.</p><p>21. A <strong><em>thesis</em></strong> is a particularly important claim. It’s one that is one of the highlights of an essay or article, for instance, and is typically defended with arguments.</p><p>22. An <strong><em>argument</em></strong> is a series of claims, one of which is the conclusion and the others are premises. An argument is not a claim. It is not true and it is not false, ever. An argument can be good or bad, but it’s never true or false. An argument is intended to show that its conclusion is true; that is the purpose of an argument.</p><p>23. A <strong><em>conclusion</em></strong> is the part of the argument that the argument is intended to support. The argument is intended to show that the conclusion is true. A conclusion is a claim. If it’s important enough, then it might be a thesis.</p><p>24. A <strong><em>premise</em></strong> is a part of an argument that is supposed to help support the argument’s conclusion. A premise is a claim. Premises are intended to work together to show that the conclusion is true.</p><p>25. A <strong><em>theory</em></strong> is a collection of claims that are intended to give a more or less complete account of something. A theory is like an individual claim in that it can be either true or false: it’s true when almost all of its individual claims are true, and it’s false when almost all of its individual claims are false. Some theories are known to be true, others are known to be false, and still others are not known to be true and are not known to be false (e.g., the theory that head lice jump from head to head is known to be false; the theory that human skin is made of cells is known to be true; the theory that the universe had a beginning is neither known to be true nor known to be false). When someone says that something is a “mere theory” usually that means that it is a theory that is not known to be true and not known to be false. When someone says that something is a “fact instead of a mere theory”, usually that means that it is a theory that is known to be true.</p><p>26. A <strong><em>DEDUCTIVELY Valid</em></strong> argument is one that has this feature: if the premises are true, then the conclusion <em>must </em>be true as well. The truth of the premises <em>guarantees</em> the truth of the conclusion. There is <em>no way whatsoever </em>that the conclusion can be false provided that the premises are true. This is not to say that the premises or conclusion are true in a deductively valid argument! It’s just to say that <em>if </em>the premises are true, <em>then</em> the conclusion must be true too. Notice that only <em>arguments</em> can be deductively valid. In particular, no claim can be deductively valid! No premise can be valid. No conclusion can be deductively valid. No theory is deductively valid. Don’t use ‘deductively valid’ as a synonym for either ‘true’ or ‘reasonable’. To say that an argument is deductively valid is to say that it has one particularly important and good feature; but just being deductively valid doesn’t make an argument good in an <em>overall</em> sense of being good.</p><p>27. A <strong><em>refutation</em></strong> is an argument that proves that something really is false. Thus, a refutation is by definition something that <em>succeeds</em> in showing that something is false. Thus, no one can refute a true claim. One can disagree with a true claim, or dispute a true claim, or argue against a true claim, but one can’t refute a true claim because to refute something is to <em>successfully</em> show that it’s false — which would mean that it really is false. Note that a refutation is not a claim; it’s an argument. Often, though, we can convey a whole argument with just one sentence; so the connection between refutations, arguments, and claims is pretty tight.</p><p>28. What it means to <strong><em>EVALUATE </em></strong>a view (either a single claim or an entire theory) is almost always this: one looks at reasons for thinking that the view is true, one looks at reasons for thinking that the view is false, and then one tries to figure out which side is strongest. So when you’re asked to evaluate a view (like in a philosophy essay), tell the reader the good reasons (if there are any) for thinking that the view is true, tell the reader the good reasons (if there are any) for thinking that the view is false, and then explain to the reader which side is the strongest — and give the reader your reasons for thinking that you have chosen the strongest side.</p><p>29. A belief is <strong><em>relative</em></strong> when it is true with regard to one thing but false with regard to something else. That’s not informative, but a bunch of examples should help. For instance, my belief “Crème brûlée is the best dessert” is relative because although it’s true relative to my taste buds it’s false relative to my son’s taste buds. My belief “Pennsylvania is about a 100 miles away” is true relative to my present geographical position but false relative to many other geographical positions. My belief “Fred is standing to the right of George” is true relative to my present spatial orientation but false relative to many other spatial orientations. The belief “Rudy Giuliani is famous” is true relative to some communities (e.g., the current community of New Yorkers) but false relative to other communities (e.g., any community from the 18th century, the current community of people in South Africa, any community of toddlers at a daycare center). The belief “Three strikes is an out” is true relative to the rules of professional baseball but might be false relative to a modified children’s game in which a child gets four strikes before he or she is out. The belief “One should drive on the right” is true relative to the traffic laws in the USA but false relative to the traffic laws in England. Note that these examples show that the things that a belief might be relative to are diverse: people’s taste buds, geographical locations, spatial orientations, communities, sets of rules, laws, etc.</p><p>30. A belief is <strong><em>subjective</em></strong> when its truth is relative to the believer in question. For instance, my belief “Crème brûlée is the best dessert” is subjective because although the belief is true, it’s only true relative to <em>my</em> taste buds. Thus, <em>subjective beliefs are a special subclass of relative beliefs</em>: they are the relative beliefs whose relativity comes from a <em>subject</em>, the believer. One must be quite careful here! My belief “Crème brûlée is the best dessert” is subjective but the belief “Crème brûlée is the best dessert for Bryan” is not subjective but objective. Whether crème brûlée is the best dessert is a subjective matter; whether it’s the best dessert for Bryan is objective: it’s an objective fact about Bryan that he finds crème brûlée to be the best — just like it’s an objective fact about him that he has ten toes and knows a lot of baseball statistics. Sometimes a belief is called ‘subjective’ outside of philosophical discourse when it’s thought that no one knows whether the belief is true. But to avoid confusion I suggest that we reserve ‘belief that doesn’t amount to knowledge’ or ‘mere belief’ for such a belief, and let’s keep ‘subjective belief’ as explained above. In philosophy essays it’s <strong><em>almost always</em></strong> a bad idea to even try using ‘subjective’!</p><p><a href="#_ftnref1">[1]</a> One poll: <a href="http://philpapers.org/surveys/results.pl?affil=Philosophy+faculty+or+PhD&amp;areas0=0&amp;areas_max=1&amp;grain=coarse">http://philpapers.org/surveys/results.pl?affil=Philosophy+faculty+or+PhD&amp;areas0=0&amp;areas_max=1&amp;grain=coarse</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref2">[2]</a> There is controversy regarding the equation of justified true belief and knowledge. For many centuries many philosophers thought that every justified true belief amounted to knowledge and every instance of knowledge was a justified true belief: justified true belief = knowledge. But in the 20th century philosophers came up with some cases in which people seem to have justified true beliefs that do not amount to knowledge. From roughly 1970 to 2010 people were generally convinced that those cases were genuine. As I write this, philosophers are somewhat less confident. In any case, we will not have much occasion to address that controversy, as it won’t matter to our real-life concerns.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f860ab7b5a4c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[How Experts Sabotage Knowledge]]></title>
            <link>https://bryanfrances.medium.com/how-experts-sabotage-knowledge-b187c78296a5?source=rss-decdcb95433------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b187c78296a5</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ignorance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[controversy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[disagreement]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[expert]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Bryan Frances]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 10 May 2020 07:12:49 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-05-10T07:34:52.855Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/542/1*FtK59SNJ4QkrUmwR0rN_GQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>We get a good portion of our knowledge from experts, especially scientific ones. On the plus side, they have given us the knowledge that we are the result of a natural evolutionary process and that the Earth is billions of years old. They have figured out how to protect us from an amazing number of diseases and formerly fatal injuries. More humbly, they have taught us how to make machines that clean dishes well. On the negative side, they have bestowed us with the knowledge of how to kill one another efficiently and in large numbers. Overall, though, it’s clear that we should be thankful to those experts for the knowledge they give us. But when the scientific experts can’t make up their mind, we actually <em>lose</em> knowledge. Even huge portions of knowledge.</p><p>Most of us think that a meteor wiped out the dinosaurs about 65 million years ago. But now pretend for a moment that although many scientists accepted the meteor theory, many others thought that it wasn’t a meteor but a nasty series of supervolcanos — volcanic eruptions that make the 1982 Mt. Saint Helens explosion look like a mere geyser. In fact, suppose that the scientific experts were about evenly divided among the meteor theorists and the supervolcano theorists.</p><p>Now suppose that Jack and Jill had seen the television programs and online science articles that give popularized accounts of those two theories, so they are somewhat familiar with them. Jack thinks the supervolcano theory is right; Jill says it’s the meteor theory.</p><p>Even if one of the two theories is right, that doesn’t mean that its advocates <em>know </em>that it’s right. Even if Jill’s guess is right, she doesn’t really know that the meteor story is correct. Her opinion isn’t much different from mere guesswork, as she could just have easily ended up plumping for the supervolcano theory like poor Jack did. Both theories have good supporting evidence, and she just got lucky in choosing the right one. Lucky guesses don’t count as knowledge. Think of the person who wins the lottery: she certainly didn’t <em>know</em> she would win. Or think of the arrogant amateur card player who “just knew” the next card from the dealer would be the queen of hearts: he turned out to be right, but he didn’t know it, as he hardly had decent evidence for his guess.</p><p>The lesson seems to be this: <em>if the scientific experts are sharply divided on some issue, then even if we laypeople guess right as to which of the competing theories is true, our guess doesn’t amount to knowledge, since it’s too lucky</em>. This result seems pretty reasonable, but if it’s right then expert disagreement has stunning consequences.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/166/1*Ty6xD9yf-xGD3NBQ__kccw.jpeg" /></figure><p>If that principle is right, then expert opinion has the power to take away enormous portions of our knowledge, and not merely generate knowledge. I suppose many of you won’t believe me, but right now many <em>scientific experts</em> think that fire engines aren’t red, for they believe that color is just in the mind, not out there in the real world. Sophisticated versions of this theory have been around for hundreds of years, and recent developments have done nothing to undermine its well-respected position in the scientific community. Jack and Jill have read about competing accounts of color. Jack guesses that fire engines really are red; Jill guesses that they aren’t red because color is just in the mind. Even if Jack is right, as we saw above he doesn’t <em>know </em>that fire engines are red. Let’s emphasize the point: Jack believes that fire engines are red, and we’re supposing he’s <em>right</em>, but he lacks knowledge because the scientific experts can’t make up their minds about color.</p><p>But if Jack doesn’t know that fire engines are red, how can little Suzy, his 5-year-old daughter? Surely Jack is more familiar with color than she is, and more sophisticated as well, since he has read a little about the science of color. How could little Suzy know while Jack is ignorant? Can reading about science <em>take away</em> one’s knowledge? Or should we conclude that even little Suzy doesn’t know that fire engines are red — even supposing that they are red?</p><p>It’s even worse: scientists disagree about many issues that most laypeople would never dream there is disagreement about. Some scientists think that there are no character traits, such as honesty and vanity. They reason that the notion of a character trait belongs to a primitive psychological theory that is false but peculiarly handy in part because we all act as though it’s true and its defects don’t show up in the ordinary course of life.</p><p>Other scientists insist that there are no beliefs, for reasons similar to that given against character traits. Many scientists also think that strictly speaking there are no chest pains, for instance, because in reality all pain is located in the brain. Applying our lesson from above, even if these scientists are all wrong, and you’re a level-headed layperson who believes that Honest Abe Lincoln was really honest, that your mother believes that motorcycles are a menace to society, that fire engines are red, and that you have a pain in your knee, your true beliefs are mere lucky guesses that don’t amount to knowledge.</p><p>When it comes to knowledge it appears that scientific experts not only giveth but taketh away. So be careful what popular science you read: it could be harmful to your cognitive status.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b187c78296a5" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[You Are Underestimating the Liar Paradox]]></title>
            <link>https://bryanfrances.medium.com/you-are-underestimating-the-liar-paradox-be4be9fc16d?source=rss-decdcb95433------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/be4be9fc16d</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[logical-thinking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[contradictions]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[logic]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[liar-paradox]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[paradox]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Bryan Frances]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 10 May 2020 06:56:56 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-06-02T12:13:17.011Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/204/1*dSPB2vUyhXVMgO7nKzksfw.jpeg" /></figure><p>Many people who don’t work in the philosophy of logic think the Liar Paradox isn’t terribly important. Call these people the <em>Confidents</em>. They think that the philosophers who continue to work on the paradox are excellent philosophers but are making some false assumption that they are either blind to or not evaluating properly — an assumption that the Confidents have spotted and that generates virtually the whole contemporary debate about the paradox. Moreover, the Confidents usually endorse some variant of a particular solution to the paradox, one that is in accord with common sense. In my experience, just about every smart person thinks of and endorses some version of this solution at some point in their thinking about the paradox. Let us call this solution the <em>Commonsensical Solution</em>, CS. This paper addresses not philosophers of logic but Confidents. I will prove that CS has grave difficulties that should prevent anyone from thinking that it shows that the paradox is not too hard to solve.</p><p><strong><em>1. The Paradox</em></strong></p><p>As we all know, the following string of symbols, call it ‘A’, presents a problem.</p><p>A isn’t true</p><p>Assuming A is true leads to a contradiction. That contradiction is not true. So, the assumption is not true. A isn’t true. Oops.</p><p>Of course, if the linguistic strong of symbols A refers to anything at all, it refers to itself. As we all know, self-reference is often not a problem. For instance, the last sentence of the only paragraph in §1 of this paper that starts with ‘Of course’ contains more than five words.</p><p>What makes the Liar Paradox prima facie stunning is the apparent absence of reasonable responses to it. Consider the following five L (for ‘liar’) claims:</p><ul><li>A = ‘A isn’t true’. (True in virtue of a linguistic stipulation for the proper name ‘A’. Alternatively, we could use a self-referring definite description such as one of the form ‘The first indented sentence on such-and-such page’.)</li><li>If A = ‘A isn’t true’ and A is true, then ‘A isn’t true’ is true. (Cf. if D = ‘Dogs bark’ and D is true, then ‘Dogs bark’ is true.)</li><li>If A = ‘A isn’t true’ and ‘A isn’t true’ is true, then A is true. (Cf. if D = ‘Dogs bark’ and ‘Dogs bark’ is true, then D is true.)</li><li>If ‘A isn’t true’ is true, then A isn’t true. (Cf. if ‘Dogs bark’ is true, then dogs bark.)</li><li>If A isn’t true, then ‘A isn’t true’ is true. (Cf. if dogs bark, then ‘Dogs bark’ is true.)</li></ul><p>What makes the Liar Paradox stunning is the apparent lack of even remotely plausible commonsensical responses to it. For starters, it painfully obvious that there exists an interpretation W such that: from just the W-interpreted liar Ls there is a derivation of a contradiction using just familiar elementary rules of inference from sentential logic, and those elementary inference rules are truth-preserving when applied to the W-interpreted liar Ls. (In admitting this claim, we can be generous and accept that there are alternative “literal” meanings of the Ls such that there is no such derivation. Hence, the claim that W exists is quite accommodating!) Interpretation W will have the four conditionals be material conditionals and avoid equivocation. And yet, under that interpretation, the liar Ls all seem obviously true. The first W-interpreted L is true via successful linguistic stipulation — and as noted above we needn’t use linguistic stipulation to generate the first L, as we could use a definite description instead. The second and third look to be elementary truths of first-order predicate logic with identity. And the fourth and fifth are instances of the two halves of the T-schema which, as the ‘dogs bark’ illustrations show, are awfully intuitive when applied to simple sentences of the form ‘X is not true’ or ‘The first indented sentence on such-and-such page is not true’.</p><p>It seems that we are faced with a stark choice: either say W doesn’t exist (so there is no way to interpret the Ls in order to derive a contradiction from them), say that the simplest rules of sentential logic aren’t truth-preserving, or say that one of the Ls is not true. How can one possibly find a commonsensical solution to this predicament?</p><p><strong><em>2. The Commonsensical Solution, CS</em></strong></p><p>CS doesn’t answer that question directly. It doesn’t even address the above reasoning. Instead, it says that the reasoning in the previous section equivocates because it wasn’t decided whether ‘A’ is the name of a sentence token, a sentence type, or a proposition.</p><p>For instance, if we take ‘A’ from the previous section to name a sentence token, then CS says it’s not true. Suppose I produce another token of that sentence type in order to say something about token A:</p><p>A is not true</p><p>According to CS this new token, B, is true since it correctly remarks that the first token, A, wasn’t true. A and B refer to the very same sentence token but only one succeeds in being true. Hence the sentence type had by A and B has some true tokens and some untrue tokens. Alternatively, for friends of propositions: some tokens of the same sentence type express a true proposition while others do not.</p><p><strong><em>3. The Other-Token Problem</em></strong></p><p>CS holds that token B is true and token A is not true. But how could that be? (Alternatively: how can B express a truth while A does not?) After all, token B is <em>exactly</em> like token A: the same words, the same meanings (no matter how you construe ‘meaning’), the same order, the same sentential structure, etc. How on earth could one be true while the other is not true?</p><p>Of course, A is self-referential while B is not, but that hardly means there is any difference in truth conditions. For instance, tokens S1 and S2,</p><p>S1 is less than fifty words long</p><p>S1 is less than fifty words long</p><p>have the same truth conditions despite only S1 being self-referential. And self-reference plus occurrences of ‘is true’ can’t be a bar to being true, as the true sentence ‘All English sentences that are true are true’ demonstrates: it is self-referential, contains ‘is true’, and is true. This is the <em>Other-Token Problem</em> for CS: since A and B are linguistically the same, there is no way that B can be true while A isn’t true, as CS claims.</p><p><strong><em>4. Can CS Be Saved from the Other-Token Problem?</em></strong></p><p>The advocate of CS responds to the Other-Token Problem by claiming that since token B is true while A is not true (and it’s not the case that either B isn’t true or A is true; she accepts the law of non-contradiction), A and B must have different truth conditions <em>due to some hidden linguistic properties</em>. Sure, there is nothing <em>in</em> A or B that signals any truth-conditional difference, but any decent philosopher of language should be accustomed to subtle contextual factors that make a difference to truth conditions.</p><p>For instance, two tokens of ‘Jo is tall’ may differ in truth conditions due to subtle contextual factors. More to the point, a token of that sentence type fails to have <em>any</em> truth condition absent the contextual factors. ‘Jo is tall’ has no truth condition until it <em>links up with</em> something like a contrast class (Jo is tall in comparison to what class of objects?). Similarly, and roughly put, perhaps a sentence token that includes a use of ‘true’ has no truth condition until it <em>links up with</em> something Z — and token B but not A has the required link, which is why B ends up true even though A does not.</p><p>Hence, the advocate of CS is saying that there will be two apparently contextually unproblematic tokens that are of the same sentence type but that do not have the same truth condition. If that upsets current thoughts about context dependence, so be it. Or so she says.</p><p>In order to make the task faced by the advocate of CS vivid, consider these four sentence tokens, S1-S4:</p><p>S1 is not true.</p><p>S2 is longer than fifty words in length.</p><p>S3 is in English.</p><p>S1 is not true.</p><p>CS says that the self-referential S3 and non-self-referential S4 are true, S2 is self-referential and false, and S1 has no truth condition. The task the advocate of CS faces is to find out why S1 fails to have a truth condition while S2-S4 do. Her provisional hypothesis, arrived at through thinking about how ‘tall’ works, is that the words in S1 have their usual meanings, but its occurrence of ‘true’ reaches out to the world to get the sentence’s meaning completed, so to speak, and since the completion never happens, it doesn’t get to have a truth condition. It’s easy to note that the S1/S2-S4 difference in truth condition possession must come from the use of ‘true’ in S1, but that is to merely <em>locate</em> the solution, not reveal it.</p><p><strong><em>5. The Revenge Problem</em></strong></p><p>Unfortunately, like many attempted solutions to the Liar Paradox, CS appears to completely fail for some clever paradoxical sentences. Hence, <em>even if we found some way around the Other-Token Problem</em>, CS appears to be in big trouble.</p><p>Consider sentence token X immediately below:</p><p>No token of X’s type is true.</p><p>If X is true then what it says is true: <em>no token of X’s type</em> <em>is true</em>. But X itself is a token of that type and it is true. Contradiction. Hence, X is untrue.</p><p>If you like CS, then this reasoning probably strikes you as right: X is another bizarre sentence token, so it’s no surprise that it’s not true.</p><p>Now consider token Y immediately below and bear with me while I repeat some of the above reasoning:</p><p>No token of X’s type is true.</p><p>Suppose for a moment that token Y is true. Since Y is true, what it says is true: <em>no token of X’s type is true</em>. And yet, Y is true and is a token of X’s type. Hence, it’s not the case that <em>no</em> token of X’s type is true, as we just found one (i.e., Y) that is true. We have reached a contradiction, based on the assumption that Y is true. Thus, Y is untrue.</p><p>Things get interesting when we realize that Y is an <em>entirely arbitrary</em> token of X’s type. And we proved, in the immediately preceding paragraph — call it the <em>proof paragraph</em> — that Y is untrue. In fact, we could use that paragraph-proof for <em>any</em> token of X’s type, any one at all! That is, whenever you give me a token T of X’s type, I can just slap down the proof paragraph to show that T is untrue (all I have to do is replace ‘Y’ with a name for T in the paragraph-proof). Hence, we have an important result: <em>for any token of X’s type, there is a proof that it isn’t true.</em></p><p>In other words, we can conclude from all these proofs that <em>no token of X’s type is true</em> — since for each token there is a corresponding proof that it is untrue. As a consequence, we have just proved that</p><p>No token of X’s type is true.</p><p>Call that immediately preceding token string S. S is true, as was just proven. But S is a token of X’s type. Thus, at least one token of X’s type — namely, S — is true. But that contradicts S, which we proved to be true! This is the <em>Revenge Problem</em>.</p><p>Here is a way to make the reasoning explicit, pretending Z is a completely arbitrary token of X’s type:</p><p>1. Z is true. (Assumption for reductio.)</p><p>2. If Z is true, then Z says that <em>no token of X’s type is true</em>. (There is no assumption that this is <em>all </em>that Z says. In other words, we are allowing that token Z may have multiple truth conditions.)</p><p>3. From (1), (2), and modus ponens: Z says that <em>no token of X’s type is true</em>.</p><p>4. From (1), (3), and conjunction-introduction: Z is true and Z says that no token of X’s type is true.</p><p>5. If Z is true and Z says that <em>no token of X’s type is true</em>, then <em>no token of X’s type is true</em>. (This is an instance of the schema ‘If token P is true and says that ____, then _____’.)</p><p>6. From (4) (5), and modus ponens: no token of X’s type is true.</p><p>7. Z is a token of X’s type (empirical fact).</p><p>8. From (1) &amp; (7): it’s not the case that no token of X’s type is true.</p><p>9. Hence, the assumption in (1) has led to the contradiction found in (6) and (8).</p><p>10. The contradiction found in (6) and (8) isn’t true. (At least that particular contradiction isn’t true.)</p><p>11. From (1), (9), &amp; (10): Z is not true.</p><p>12. A generalization of (1)-(11): for <em>any</em> token of X’s type, there is a proof (modelled on (1)-(11)) that that token is not true. (All we have to do is take (1)-(11) and interchange for the occurrences of ‘Z’ occurrences of a name for the new token.)</p><p>13. If for any token of X’s type, there is a proof that that token isn’t true, then no token of X’s type is true. (Hopefully this principle is obviously correct — although I suppose nothing is really obvious here.)</p><p>14. From (12), (13), and modus ponens: no token of X’s type is true.</p><p>15. From (1)-(14): the sentence token after the colon in (14) has been proven.</p><p>16. If the sentence token after the colon in (14) has been proven, then it is true. (This is an instance of the general principle ‘For any sentence token, if that sentence token has been proven, then it is true’.)</p><p>17. By (15), (16), and modus ponens: the sentence token after the colon in (14) is true.</p><p>18. The sentence token after the colon in (14) is a token of X’s type (empirical fact).</p><p>19. From (17) &amp; (18) it’s not the case that no token of X’s type is true.</p><p>(14) contradicts (19). It isn’t obvious how the advocate of CS can respond to this argument. Since CS doesn’t embrace true contradictions, the only premises it can challenge are (2), (5), (7), (12), (13), (16), and (18). Can it do so reasonably (see Gaifman 2010 and Simmons 2015 for extended treatment)?</p><p>It’s difficult to see how CS could reject either (7) or (18). Perhaps there is a way of precisifying ‘sentence type’ so that one of those is not true, but all we need for the proof to go through is a precisification that makes them true.</p><p>In order for (2) to not be true, Z has to be true even though it doesn’t say that <em>no token of X’s type is true</em>. But if Z is true, how could it not say that? That sounds miraculous.</p><p>In order for (5) to not be true, Z has to be true <em>and</em> say that no token of X’s type is true, but for some reason it’s not the case that no token of X’s type is true. This would be bizarre: if token P is true and says that blah, then surely blah. However, maybe we’re supposed to believe that although Z’s being true has something to do with its saying something true, that true thing it says is not that no token of X’s type is true. That is, perhaps it says multiple things, at least one of them is true — which is why Z is true — but the true thing it says is not the thing we were thinking of, saying that no token of X’s type is true. But what on earth would that other thing be?</p><p>In order for (12) to not be true, there has to be a token of X for which we cannot use (1)-(11) to show it’s not true. But if we can give this token a name, why can’t we plug that name into the (1)-(11) template?</p><p>In order for (13) to not be true, this has to happen: for any token T of X’s type, there is a proof that T isn’t true, but even so some token of X’s type is true. That just can’t happen: if there is a proof that T isn’t true, then it’s not the case that T is true.</p><p>In order for (16) to not be true, there has to be a sentence token T such that T has been proven but it isn’t true. That just can’t happen: if there is a proof that T is true, then it’s not the case that T isn’t true.</p><p>Of course, unless there are true contradictions there has to be a mistake somewhere in (1)-(19) since (14) contradicts (19). Even if one rejects CS one is confronted with finding the error in that “proof”. Hence, (1)-(19) presents a problem for more than the advocate of CS. That’s fine, but my point here is that it presents a serious problem for CS.</p><p>Let me be clear. I’m not arguing that CS is false or that the problems above don’t apply to any other approaches to the paradox. All I’ve proven is this: CS has grave difficulties that should prevent anyone from thinking that it shows that the paradox is not too hard to solve. That is, the Confidents are wrong.</p><p><strong><em>6. References</em></strong></p><p>Gaifman, Haim 2010. “Vagueness, Tolerance and Contextual Logic”, <em>Synthese</em> 174 (1): 5–46.</p><p>Simmons, Keith 2015. “Paradox, Repetition, Revenge”, <em>Topoi</em> 34 (1): 121–131.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=be4be9fc16d" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Beauty of Philosophy]]></title>
            <link>https://bryanfrances.medium.com/the-beauty-of-philosophy-7f786fdd0b97?source=rss-decdcb95433------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/7f786fdd0b97</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[absurdity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[humor]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[parody]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Bryan Frances]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 10 May 2020 06:45:02 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-05-10T06:50:23.816Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/267/1*tEkQBfxUyIeV-PydxfHTlg.jpeg" /></figure><p>NONPHIL: So, what research topics are you thinking about these days?</p><p>PHIL: I’m working on impossibilia.</p><p>NONPHIL: Really? I don’t think I’ve ever even heard of it (or them; whatever). Where do they show up?</p><p>PHIL: Well, there aren’t any.</p><p>NONPHIL: Huh?</p><p>PHIL: There are no impossibilia. Zero.</p><p>NONPHIL: Oh, I’m so sorry. It must be frustrating to start out trying to study something and then discover they don’t exist.</p><p>PHIL: No, no. I knew all along that there weren’t any impossibilia. By ‘impossibilia’ I mean things like round squares and the like: you know, things that couldn’t possibly exist.</p><p>NONPHIL: What?! Why on earth would you try to study something you already know doesn’t even exist?</p><p>PHIL: Because they are fascinating!</p><p>NONPHIL: I’m having a bit of trouble understanding you. Are you just saying that even though there are no impossibilia, there could have been such things, and that <em>possibility</em> is fascinating? I guess I could understand that . . . maybe.</p><p>PHIL: Sorry, no. I’ve known all along that it was literally impossible for there to be any impossibilia at all.</p><p>NONPHIL: You’re messed up.</p><p>PHIL: Yeah, that’s what my mom said. And for the record, I didn’t really “know” there are no impossibilia.</p><p>NONPHIL: Then why’d you say so for goodness sake?!</p><p>PHIL: Well, sometimes it’s a lot more convenient, so conversation goes better.</p><p>NONPHIL: Oh, right: like this conversation is going so well. So, why don’t you know there are no impossibilia? Do you think there’s a chance some exist? So you’ve got some doubts about the matter?</p><p>PHIL: Hell no. It’s perfectly obvious that there are no impossibilia: just look at the freakin’ <em>name</em>. I’m saying that I don’t know there are no impossibilia because I’m saying that I don’t know <em>anything</em>.</p><p>NONPHIL: So . . . you’re admitting that you’re a know-nothing loser.</p><p>PHIL: Yes, but so are you and everyone else. Knowledge is an illusion. The concept of knowledge is akin to the concept of a naked person with a shirt on. The arguments for radical scepticism are correct: there is no knowledge, of impossibilia or anything else.</p><p>NONPHIL: I’ll just ignore that. Let me try again to figure out why you think it’s fascinating to study something you say couldn’t even exist. Are you saying that even though there are no impossibilia, it’s fascinating to study the <em>beliefs</em> people have about them? Even without knowing what impossibilia are supposed to be, I can kinda understand why someone might be interested in our attitudes about them. After all, there are no witches, but it’s cool to study how people have thought about them over the centuries. Please tell me I’m on the right track.</p><p>PHIL: Definitely not; my apologies. I couldn’t care less what people think about them. In fact, I don’t think anyone has any beliefs about them anyway.</p><p>NONPHIL: Oh. Do people not have beliefs about them because they haven’t heard of them? Like quarks or dark matter? That makes sense; I hadn’t heard about them until you mentioned them.</p><p>PHIL: Not exactly. I hold that no one has any beliefs about anything.</p><p>NONPHIL: Huh? What do you mean no one has any beliefs? I believe lots of things!</p><p>PHIL: Nope. On my view, beliefs are no more real than witches and fairies — or impossibilia or knowledge. There are loads of interesting cognitive processes and states, but none of them are beliefs. I’ve had this conviction for years now upon reading Willard Quine, Paul Feyerabend, and the two Churchlands, Paul and Patricia.</p><p>NONPHIL: Wait! <em>Conviction</em>, you say? Do you mean <em>belief</em>? Surely you must! ‘Conviction’ and ‘belief’ are just about synonymous. You just contradicted yourself! You’re saying that you believe there are no beliefs!</p><p>PHIL: No again. When I say things like ‘I believe’, I am just speaking with the vulgar. I don’t really mean it, any more than I mean it when I say that people know things.</p><p>NONPHIL: Oh, I see. So when you say things like ‘I believe’, you are putting a kind of skewed interpretation on those words.</p><p>PHIL: Well, almost but not quite. I don’t think there are any interpretations (or impossibilia, knowledge, witches, fairies, or beliefs). Saul Kripke’s interpretation of Wittgenstein’s work convinced me of the non-existence of interpretations. And yes, I realize that I just said that Kripke had an <em>interpretation</em>; it’s tough to not speak with the vulgar.</p><p>NONPHIL: No interpretations! You mean we don’t interpret . . . anything? Like <em>ever</em>?</p><p>PHIL: Right. There is no interpretation or meaning. Live with it.</p><p>NONPHIL: You really are nuts.</p><p>PHIL: That’s what my sister said.</p><p>NONPHIL: I’ll bet almost all people think you’re nuts.</p><p>PHIL: Sure. If there were people.</p><p>NONPHIL: Excuse me?</p><p>PHIL: Strictly speaking, there are no people.</p><p>NONPHIL: I have no idea what you’re saying.</p><p>PHIL: That’s about right since ideas require interpretations. Ha ha.</p><p>NONPHIL: You’re saying you don’t exist. Seriously.</p><p>PHIL: Yep. Ever since I thought hard about parthood, vagueness, and the paradoxes of material composition, I came to the view that there are no composite objects, including people.</p><p>NONPHIL: You’re quite the character. I have to admit that you’re pretty brave in your philosophizing.</p><p>PHIL: Thanks, but strictly speaking I wouldn’t be brave even if I existed.</p><p>NONPHIL: Oh really? Are you saying that most other philosophers are braver than you?</p><p>PHIL: No, no. No philosopher is brave. In fact, no non-philosophers are brave either.</p><p>NONPHIL: (Sigh.) Please explain.</p><p>PHIL: Well, when predicated of a person, bravery is a character trait, right? But there are no character traits. John Doris and others in both philosophy and social psychology convinced me.</p><p>NONPHIL: Never mind any of that rubbish. What else are you (“you”) working on these days?</p><p>PHIL: Holes, cracks, shadows, absences, and omissions. You know: other things that don’t exist.</p><p>NONPHIL: Well, of course. I should have known (or “known”). So you’re saying that although there is a chunk of Swiss cheese with lots of holes and cracks in it, and the Sun is making it cast a shadow on the table, strictly speaking the holes, cracks, and shadow don’t exist. I will omit any comment on omissions; and my remarks will similarly be absent of any remarks on absences. I can joke too.</p><p>PHIL: Funny! But I have to correct you a bit, since I don’t think the cheese, Sun, or table exist either.</p><p>NONPHIL: Oh, right. How silly of me to forget that you reject normal objects. Umm . . . “you” reject normal objects.</p><p>PHIL: Yeah. And by the way, even if the Sun existed, it wouldn’t be yellow.</p><p>NONPHIL: Wait. The Sun isn’t yellow? Is it like orange or something?</p><p>PHIL: No. It’s no colour at all. But that’s not because the sun is weird or our photos are screwed up. Bananas aren’t yellow either. Nothing is coloured.</p><p>NONPHIL: Oh please. I open my eyes and see colour. That’s just a fact. You mean that colour is just in our minds, right? Now <em>that </em>I can understand!</p><p>PHIL: Sorry, but no. Colour is nowhere, either in the world or in our minds. Colours are like witches, fairies, beliefs, impossibilia, knowledge, interpretations, composite objects, character traits, holes, cracks, shadows, absences, and omissions. And keep in mind that there are no minds, as minds would be brains and there are no brains.</p><p>NONPHIL: Idiot.</p><p>PHIL: That’s what my kids say.</p><p>NONPHIL: Any other new research topics?</p><p>PHIL: Mere possiblilia.</p><p>NONPHIL: Sigh. Okay. Please tell me that some of them exist.</p><p>PHIL: Well, about zero percent of them exist. Or maybe 100%. Or maybe it’s undefined. Kinda hard to say.</p><p>NONPHIL: Oh man. I don’t understand but I’m getting used to this state of confusion.</p><p>PHIL: In one sense there are infinitely many of them but none exist; so, zero percent exist. In another sense, there are infinitely many of them and they all exist; so, 100% exist. In yet another sense, there are none of them and none of them exist; so the percentage is undefined (zero divided by zero is undefined). Like I said, the logic is confusing. And don’t forget that there are no “senses” (interpretations), despite what I just said.</p><p>NONPHIL: I never suspected you would be so bad with numbers.</p><p>PHIL: Thanks for that. But in any case, there are no numbers. I’m a total eliminativist about them.</p><p>NONPHIL: Of course! All of mathematics is bullshit! Why the hell not?!</p><p>PHIL: Not quite. Math is fine the way it is, used instrumentally. It’s just that there are no numbers, strictly speaking.</p><p>NONPHIL: I’m not sure I get you. Are you saying math claims are true but don’t need numbers to exist in order to be true? I think I might be able to understand that! Thank God! We’re making progress!</p><p>PHIL: Almost, but not quite! I understand the idea you’re articulating, but my position is that no math claims are true.</p><p>NONPHIL: Oh please. Twice two is four, in case you don’t know. Moron.</p><p>PHIL: After I studied the semantic paradoxes I realized that there is no truth: truth is an inconsistent concept. There are no more truths than there are naked people with shirts on. That’s why no math claims are true.</p><p>NONPHIL: Hang on: no truths at all? So you’re saying that your own beliefs aren’t true?</p><p>PHIL: That’s just about right. If I had beliefs, that is. And if I existed in the first place. And if there were interpretations. Then yeah. But when I say ‘yeah’ I am not saying ‘yeah, it’s <em>true</em>’.</p><p>NONPHIL: So you’re admitting that your own view (which you don’t believe, but whatever) isn’t true.</p><p>PHIL: Yes. But like I said, that’s true of everything: no claim at all is true. Well, it’s not <em>true </em>of everything, but you know what I mean (if there were meaning, that is).</p><p>NONPHIL: My God. So what do you do research on that definitely, totally exists?</p><p>PHIL: Harry Potter.</p><p>NONPHIL: Uh, I got news for you: those books were fiction.</p><p>PHIL: Oh, I know that: the books were fiction, of course. I mean: if there were any books. And if there were any interpretations. And if there was any knowledge. And if I existed.</p><p>NONPHIL: You’re saying Harry Potter exists. Truly.</p><p>PHIL: Well, not <em>truly</em> of course, as there are no truths. But sure: he exists. Now, don’t get me wrong. He’s not flesh and blood or located in England. He exists nowhere and nowhen. And he was not created by J.K. Rowling either, since she doesn’t exist. He’s like a number, if there were any numbers.</p><p>NONPHIL: You make no sense.</p><p>PHIL: Well of course! The only way I could <em>make sense </em>is if there were senses, which are interpretations. But as I said earlier, there are no interpretations. But of course I really <em>said</em> no such thing, as I don’t exist and there are no sayings. You see how difficult it is to not speak with the vulgar. Language is designed for the four ‘F’s: fighting, fleeing, feeding, and . . . you know. It’s ill-equipped for truth, if there were any truths.</p><p>NONPHIL: Well, sometimes certain things <em>seem</em> to make sense, as even you have to admit.</p><p>PHIL: Admit the truth of? Please. As for “seemings”, I see no reason to accept their existence either.</p><p>NONPHIL: You know, it’s not right to mess with someone’s mind like this. It’s immoral.</p><p>PHIL: No it’s not. Nothing is immoral.</p><p>NONPHIL: Excuse me? So torturing cute kittens for fun isn’t wrong? Seriously?</p><p>PHIL: Yep. John Mackie and the other error theorists about morality convinced me: roughly put, there are no positive moral truths (even if there were truths). Pretending that those philosophers existed, that is. And I existed. And I had beliefs. And there were interpretations. Etc.</p><p>NONPHIL: You are just plain evil.</p><p>PHIL: No I’m not. In fact, no one is evil. Evil is just a certain kind of lack or absence, so it doesn’t really exist either. Yes, even Hitler and Stalin weren’t evil, not literally (and of course there is no literal anything, as that would require interpretations).</p><p>NONPHIL: Screw you.</p><p>PHIL: Yeah, that’s what God said. If there was a god. And if there were interpretations.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=7f786fdd0b97" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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