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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Alexis Bustos on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Alexis Bustos on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Alexis Bustos on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@bustos1648?source=rss-e6e39527ca4f------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[Cybertton Woods: a political trilemma for the digital order]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@bustos1648/cybertton-woods-a-political-trilemma-for-the-digital-order-31f4520afa6e?source=rss-e6e39527ca4f------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[cultural-narratives]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[diplomacy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[digital-governance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cyber]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[internet-regulation]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Alexis Bustos]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 24 Feb 2019 20:32:31 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-02-24T20:32:31.876Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>March, 2018</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/719/1*t4LSjioUXLPJOceaKg_ZNg.png" /></figure><p>Just as the emergence of cyberspace reduced entry barriers for the development of offensive capabilities, it also allowed for public diplomacy to be universalized. What narratives can take advantage of the empty space left by the “<a href="http://www.lavanguardiadigital.com.ar/index.php/2017/12/26/in-dubio-pro-telco/">net neutrality</a>”, the global standard set by the United States on cyber diplomacy since the 90s? What will happen now that the various stories based on “digital cosmopolitanism” are in crisis?</p><p>To simplify such complexity, a political trilemma is proposed, 13 narratives of specific actors of the digital ecosystem are mapped, and the forthcoming international debate, marked by the witness cases of China and the European Union, is investigated. Both cases come to break, although in very different ways, with the “tradition” established and promoted by the United States until yesterday, which supposed to elevate the stories centered on digital cosmopolitanism. Their learning curves, however, are very different. If China has already consolidated the paradigm of “network sovereignty”, the European Union, through certain technical agencies and without a common digital policy, has just begun to explore the contents of its own narrative. However, it is possible to project its contents and explore its compatibility with what we will call here “Cybertton Woods”.</p><p><strong>Digital narratives and world order</strong></p><p>The proposal is to map in a single infographic the diversity of existing digital narratives. To achieve this, we start with an adaptation of the classic political trilemma composed by <a href="http://eltelescopio.com.uy/el-trilema-britanico/">Dani Rodrik</a> in The Paradox of Globalization. The result is our political trilemma of the digital age. (<a href="https://prezi.com/2ox_ylzrlvuq/cybertton-woods-a-political-trilemma-for-the-digital-order/">Here</a>, the infographics can be seen in more detail).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*-HNVuErNUUJNdNUAiXj_ng.png" /></figure><p>Each of the three possible combinations condenses a kind of great narrative. In Rodrik’s version, they are the “embedded liberalism”, a balance between the sovereign state and mass democracy centered on the Bretton Woods institutions, deployed until the 1970s; the “global federalism”, a combination between democracy and hyperglobalization, only rehearsed in the European Union, mere theoretical projection in the world system; and the “golden straitjacket”, the combination between hyperglobalization and the sovereign state that built the Washington Consensus, and which now reigns.</p><p>In our version of the trilemma we also have three great narratives, which will then serve as coordinates to map the digital narratives elaborated by specific actors.</p><p>The first, <em>digital cosmopolitanism</em>, has been the most widespread solution until very recently. During the 80s and 90s, when the Arpanet caterpillar became the Internet butterfly, there were many voices who thought that the end of the odious physical and political <a href="https://books.google.com/ngrams/graph?content=borderless&amp;year_start=1973&amp;year_end=2008&amp;corpus=15&amp;smoothing=3&amp;share=&amp;direct_url=t1%3B%2Cborderless%3B%2Cc0">borders</a> between countries was coming, allowing a new global governance focused on individual sovereignty and a citizenship enhanced by digital technologies. The principles considered here are the universalization of connectivity, the synergy between progress and technological change, the plurality of the public sphere, the transparency of government actions, privacy (via encryption), the decentralization of the network, open software, entrepreneurism, personal sovereignty (over data) and collective action channeled through global civil society organizations.</p><p>The second narrative is network sovereignty, a paradigm of cyberspace governance centered on the tutelary role of the State and its strategic alliance with local and transnational digital platforms. The principles considered here are state sovereignty (over data and critical infrastructure), national security, the confidentiality of state actions, the centralization of networks, the exceptionality of political decision, technological autonomy, the protection of the public sphere and collective action measured by state institutions.</p><p>The third narrative is of our own coinage: “Cybertton woods”. This zone of promises, as singer Gustavo Ceratti would say, values those rules of the game that allow national states to sustain democratic projects, without disarticulating the advantages offered by the digital age, although delaying the hyper-globalization that is presented as intrinsic to the Internet. The pondered principles here are pluralist democracy, the welfare state, the primacy of public interest, digital inclusion, the defense of competition, technological autonomy, territorial development, certain local decentralization of networks, and the balance between sovereignty State and personal sovereignty.</p><p>However, unlike Bretton Woods -the American city where the post-war agreements that founded the world order were signed-, there is no place called Cybertton Woods. In principle, it could take place in the cyberspace itself, almost like a scenario of the mythical <a href="https://frandallfarmer.github.io/neohabitat-doc/docs/">Habitat</a>, although probably nobody would frequent it, since it seems sterile ground for the emergence of successful digital narratives. Or does the latest news from Europe allow us to think about something else?</p><p><strong>The end of digital cosmopolitanism?</strong></p><p>If we map the digital narratives created by concrete political actors on our trilemma, we obtain a sort of transversal cut of a tree, where each narrative assumes the form of a ring (incomplete), with its own partial solution to the trilemma.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/921/1*OvyUI-ySb3oB-yDSzuvd_Q.png" /></figure><p>Of course, each narrative interprets in its own way the principles that make up its offer. In a next article, <a href="http://www.lavanguardiadigital.com.ar/index.php/2018/03/06/trece-narrativas-digitales-y-ninguna-flor/">13 narratives and no flowers</a>, each of the mapped accounts is reviewed with a certain level of detail. In order not to overwhelm the reader, here we will make only a bird’s flight.</p><p>The first datum of the graph is a certain amassing of narratives on the right side of the trilemma: digital cosmopolitanism. Indeed, the historical tendency among digital narratives has been to dispense with the Westphalian state and elevate the other two vertices of the trilemma.</p><p>The diplomacy of the cypherpunks, Wikileaks and Bitcoin, or the discourse on the “digital divide” and the multi-purpose motto “Save the Internet”, are inscribed in this line. In turn, certain narratives here put a firm footing, although their rings are projected “beyond the wall”, embracing to some degree the territorial state form. The latter occurs with the diplomacy of Facebook, with the “multistakeholder” model, with Hillary Clinton’s speech on the freedoms of the Internet, and with the old and beloved neutrality of the network. The localist rematch that we call “Build your own ISP”, instead, involves the state form from below, based on the partnership between communities and local states.</p><p>At least four critical junctures, in which the discussions on the Internet were politicized, badly hurt the great narrative of digital cosmopolitanism, running the ground of all these particular narratives that cemented its hegemony: the Summit of the Information Society (2003–2005 ), which introduced the long struggle between intergovernmentalism and private-public governance of critical Internet resources; the Arab Spring (2010), which alerted emerging powers about the risks generated by the digital era in terms of political order, beyond offering a greater capacity for monitoring collective action and private initiative; the leaks of Edward Snowden (2013), who woke up the rest of the world and finished unraveling the legitimacy of order centered on American informational hegemony; and, finally, the <em>russiagate</em>, which demonstrated the high degree of exposure of the critical infrastructure of any country to cyber-attacks, as well as the fragility of democratic regimes in an era of post-truth, big data and automated disinformation campaigns.</p><p>As a result of these processes, today the <a href="http://www.jurist.org/hotline/2017/01/Courtney-Bowman-data-localization.php">state pillar</a> experiences a revival that has as many people restless as enthusiastic. Something we have already said in an article about <a href="http://panamarevista.com/hegemonia-posverdadera/">the case of China</a>. That greening has not, of course, been to the detriment of the globalizing pillar, but of mass democracy. The left side of the trilemma, that dark side of the moon so central to the origins of the Internet, returns to show off, tired of turning the other cheek.</p><p><strong>Europe, come back, we forgive you</strong></p><p>It seems that another ghost crosses Europe: the phantom of the digital ecosystem revisionism. And although it is too early to be sure, perhaps it can be said that the contents of the first narrative that wants to solve the digital trilemma by delaying the interests of large corporations are being delineated from the old continent. At this height (and depth) of the 21st century, is that even possible? If the reader still did not lose faith, would also believe that the one who has an excellent answer to that question is George Soros?</p><p>Two lines of action allow us to sustain this suspicion: its new competition policy and its new data privacy policy. Two ways to wrap giants like Google.</p><p>A first vector is the anti-monopolistic policy of the European Commissioner for Competition, lead by <a href="https://elpais.com/internacional/2015/04/25/actualidad/1429998173_517038.html">Margrethe Vestager</a>. Thinking about the hypothetical content of a digital narrative of European stamp, the principles outlined by the Commissioner in the document “<a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2014-2019/vestager/announcements/competition-changing-times-0_en">Competence for changing times</a>” provide some interesting elements. And yes, there’s a <a href="https://www.ted.com/talks/margrethe_vestager_the_new_age_of_corporate_monopolies">Ted talk</a> available.</p><p>A second vector is the data protection standards that Europe has been demanding, building and negotiating in the last <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2015-12-14/transatlantic-data-war">couple of years</a>. The process began in October 2015, when the <a href="https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2015-10/cp150117es.pdf">European Court of Justice</a> declared invalid a decision according to which the United States did guarantee an adequate level of protection of personal data. Then came the new agreement with the United States (<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/13/technology/europe-eu-us-privacy-shield.html?_r=0">Privacy Shield</a>); the new data protection regulation (General Data Protection Regulation, or <a href="https://www.eugdpr.org/">GDPR</a>), which will enter into force on May 25, 2018; and, last week, the <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/just/item-detail.cfm?item_id=614254">agreement</a> between the European Commission and Facebook, Google and Twitter to modify their “terms and conditions of service”.</p><p>On the agreement with the platforms, Professor <a href="https://martinbecerra.wordpress.com/2018/02/19/inedito-acuerdo-de-europa-con-facebook-google-y-twitter/">Martín Becerra</a> argues that it is an “unprecedented agreement” that “disrupts the ‘anarcho-capitalist’ preaching that challenges the sovereignty of the states”. Again, that sangria of the great narrative of digital cosmopolitanism.</p><p>Becerra goes further by stating that the new European standard is “the first public recognition of the capacity for regulatory intervention by a political power outside the United States at this level.” It should be added, however, the case of the <a href="https://lawfareblog.com/us-criticism-chinas-cybersecurity-law-and-nexus-data-privacy-and-trade-law?utm_content=buffer7fcde&amp;utm_medium=social&amp;utm_source=twitter.com&amp;utm_campaign=buffer">Chinese cybersecurity law</a>, in force since August 2017. There too the private sector <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-apple-icloud-insight/apple-moves-to-store-icloud-keys-in-china-raising-human-rights-fears-idUSKCN1G8060">had to accept</a> the new rules of the game, a goal for which <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2015-10-12/digital-diplomacy">Chinese cyberdiplomacy</a> has been more than active. If measured with the same yardstick, the European narrative starts from far behind.</p><p>It’s time to close. Does the reader remember the european puzzle behind the neo-developmental expositions of Mariana Mazzucato? Why are there no European unicorns?, she challenged. Why are there no European companies such as Google, Facebook, Tencent or Alibaba? Now that question is resignified in the light of another, made by <a href="https://elpais.com/elpais/2018/02/15/opinion/1518711895_561052.html">George Soros</a>: what if Europe can afford to move in this direction precisely because it does not have its own unicorns? The delay as a strategic advantage, as Alexander Gerschenkron or Alvin Tofler said, then? Nice way to silence the voices that only understand progress as modernization, and regulation as a legacy. Maybe it is no longer enough to be a post-statist to be a cosmopolitan.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=31f4520afa6e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Variedades de capitalismo de vigilancia (o cómo entrenar a tu Dragonfly)]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@bustos1648/variedades-de-capitalismo-de-vigilancia-o-c%C3%B3mo-entrenar-a-tu-dragonfly-75908eb0c404?source=rss-e6e39527ca4f------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[data-driven]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[democracy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[digital-governance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[surveillance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[platform-economy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Alexis Bustos]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 15 Jan 2019 16:43:36 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-01-15T16:43:36.311Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>El frustrado acercamiento entre Google y China a partir del controversial proyecto Dragonfly marcó el 2018 tanto como la investigación sobre el comportamiento de Facebook. Entre las múltiples lecciones que dejó el año pasado en materia de gobernanza digital y ciber-diplomacia, acaso una se destaca sobre el resto: no existe un único “capitalismo de vigilancia”, como lo llama la pensadora Shoshana Zuboff. Pero entonces, además de parecerse cada vez más a las autocracias, ¿qué alternativas existen para las democracias? Y ¿qué está ocurriendo específicamente en la Argentina?</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ha6bZz3JDik5WTDJkI4Wcw.jpeg" /></figure><p><em>(Artículo publicado originalmente en </em><a href="http://www.lavanguardiadigital.com.ar/index.php/2019/01/11/variedades-de-capitalismo-de-vigilancia-o-como-entrenar-a-tu-dragonfly/"><em>La Vanguardia</em></a><em> el 11/1/19)</em></p><p>En tiempos de extrema incertidumbre y aceleración tecnológica, un modo de contribuir al debate sobre políticas digitales es situar la coyuntura, por más urgente que parezca, en procesos históricos de larga duración.</p><p>Pero pensar en clave sistémica, crítica y prospectiva a la economía política de la era digital, sin apelar a una nueva versión del fin de la historia que neutralice a la política, no es algo fácil. Desde la publicación de la <em>Sociedad de la Información</em> de Manuel Castells en 1996, además, la vara ha estado bastante alta.</p><p>En los últimos años se han planteado varias categorías jugosas, con distinta densidad, y desde diversos ámbitos y sectores. “Revolución de plataformas”, la llaman investigadores del MIT como Marshall Van Alstyne. “Capitalismo de plataformas”, aclara el “aceleracionismo” de izquierda representado por Nick Snircek. “Complejo informacional-industrial”, lo denominan Shawn Powers y Michel Jablosnki, pensando en el discurso seminal de Dwight Eisenhower. “Complejo industrial de datos”, simplificó hace poco el CEO de Apple, Tim Cooke. “Cuarta revolución industrial”, propone el director del Foro de Davos, Klaus Schwab.</p><p>“Capitalismo de vigilancia”, corta en seco la investigadora y escritora <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2594754">Shoshana Zuboff</a>. Por las alarmas que enciende y por la simpleza con la que describe a su objeto, hablemos de este <em>surveillance capitalism</em>. En un paper publicado en <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2594754">2015</a> (y en un libro de inminente publicación), la lúcida pensadora norteamericana planteó que la era informacional había evolucionado en la forma de una “nueva y coherente lógica sistémica de acumulación” basada en “la vigilancia unilateral y la modificación del comportamiento humano”.</p><p>Sin embargo, si algo demuestra la intensa controversia que suscitó el proyecto <a href="https://www.elheraldo.co/tecnologia/dragonfly-el-buscador-censurado-con-el-que-google-pretende-volver-china-526164">Dragonfly</a> — que habría permitido el retorno de Google al centro del complejo de datos de China — , es que probablemente no exista un único “capitalismo de vigilancia”. El enfoque de las “variedades de capitalismos” puede ayudarnos a volver a la orilla…</p><p>Seguir leyendo en <a href="https://goo.gl/UBRpr9">https://goo.gl/UBRpr9</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=75908eb0c404" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Algunos apuntes críticos sobre la ciber-diplomacia india]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@bustos1648/algunos-apuntes-cr%C3%ADticos-sobre-la-ciber-diplomacia-india-d720322198bf?source=rss-e6e39527ca4f------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[ciberdiplomacia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[gobernanza-digital]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[india]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[digital-governance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[capitalismo-de-vigilancia]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Alexis Bustos]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 26 Dec 2018 16:54:16 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-12-27T16:20:37.733Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/950/1*dYmGk6tIbLJMKFp3K1Zahw.jpeg" /><figcaption><em>IMAGE: JEFF CHIU/ASSOCIATED PRESS</em></figcaption></figure><p><strong>Algunos apuntes críticos sobre la ciber-diplomacia india</strong></p><p>Un nuevo fantasma del “fin de la historia” recorre el mundo. Esta vez, no se trata de la universalización de las democracias liberales sino, por el contrario, de su desaparición progresiva al calor de lo que <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2594754">Shoshana Zuboff</a> llama “capitalismo de vigilancia”.</p><p>En septiembre de 2018, la Corte Suprema de India confirmó la legalidad del sistema <a href="https://amp.theguardian.com/world/2018/sep/26/indian-court-upholds-legality-of-worlds-largest-biometric-database">Aadhaar</a>, la base de datos biométrica más grande del mundo, con información personal de más de mil millones de indios. En diciembre, su ministerio de Interior emitió una nueva normativa que autoriza <a href="https://twitter.com/javierpallero/status/1076466283607146496">interceptar y desencriptar</a> toda comunicación personal.</p><p>Estas decisiones tomadas por India (o, mejor dicho, por su poder judicial y por su poder ejecutivo, respectivamente), ¿abonan la idea de que está en marcha un proceso de asimilación de las prácticas autocráticas por parte de las democracias?</p><p>Mi humilde opinión -en línea con este excelente <a href="https://twitter.com/bustos1648/status/1076478948534616064">artículo</a> de Samir Saran- es que no sólo sería un error de lectura reducir así la complejidad de las conversaciones sobre derechos digitales, a nivel global y en India en particular, sino también un error estratégico para quienes procuran defender a la democracia como régimen político preferido a nivel local y global.</p><p>Como reflexionamos <a href="https://twitter.com/bustos1648/status/1077057952488534016">aquí</a> con Javier Pallero, activista de Access Now, y con Iván Arce, especialista en seguridad informática -cuyos temores ante el avance sobre la encriptación, tanto en India como en democracias liberales como Australia, comparto plenamente-, India también impulsa interesantes políticas digitales orientadas a desarrollar capacidades productivas endógenas en base al interés público.</p><p>Algunos ejemplos son el <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/02/trai-free-basics-facebook/460428/">freno</a> al programa de Freebasics (con el valor agregado de que tuvo lugar a inicios de 2016, cuando todavía Facebook no había caído del paraíso), la <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/small-biz/startups/newsbuzz/govt-to-give-preference-to-cyber-security-products-by-domestic-firms/articleshow/64996614.cms?mkt_tok=eyJpIjoiWkRZellXSTNOVEpsWmpJdyIsInQiOiJBSFJoOUdHZ0RYQVdLQmxtVWRyczhITmlnRjVkdXpzenhDMVVXQ3NxUHAyZUtZQmN3ZTJoTkh1ZjV3aE4yUDRXa1k4VDM5S0pKUkZaR21YWTlmeTFBcGZrYURZM2lhbUpDQ0pkUHhLMnJTdlcrbjhDclNaZnRpSW8rakFEelY1USJ9">preferencia</a> por empresas de ciberseguridad locales, y la paciencia estratégica en las discusiones sobre comercio electrónico en la <a href="https://twitter.com/bustos1648/status/921375957738455041">OMC</a>. También el caso de las <a href="https://twitter.com/andrespiazza/status/1075561050991411200">redes comunitarias</a> los países de América latina e India tienen mucho espacio para cooperar.</p><p>Es cierto que en estas discusiones India juega más como futura tercera potencia mundial en discordia y menos como la democracia más poblada del mundo. Pero se trata de una democracia que efectivamente está disputando las reglas de la era digital, y eso debemos saber comprenderlo para valorarlo en su justa medida. Como en el caso de la <a href="http://panamarevista.com/hegemonia-posverdadera/">ciber-diplomacia china</a>, no se trata de optar por un paquete de soluciones sino de adaptar cada estándar conveniente según nuestro interés estratégico.</p><p>En resumen, poner en cuestión la densidad democrática de los países con regímenes democráticos que presentan alternativas en materia de ciber-diplomacia enriquece el debate porque visibiliza los intereses en juego y permite valorar aquellos aspectos donde tenemos más para perder; pero no es argumento válido para decir que las democracias han perdido la batalla de las ideas.</p><p>Desde luego, las diferencias con los países latinoamericanos, tanto en términos de escala como de desarrollo histórico, son suficientes como para apostar una curva de aprendizaje propia; probablemente más lenta, pero diferenciada y por lo tanto más sostenible.</p><p>Lo mejor sería definir colectivamente qué estándares son convenientes al interés público y al interés nacional, y cuáles no tanto. Por supuesto, esto implica el desarrollo de una agenda comprehensiva en gobernanza digital, que necesariamente debe tener eje en el Congreso nacional y que idealmente debería reconocer a la seguridad digital como una política de bienestar ciudadano.</p><p>Esperemos que en 2019 esa agenda integral al fin pueda consolidarse en la Argentina, y en los demás países de la región. Mientras tanto, India nos deja varias lecciones para aprender en materia de ciber-diplomacia, pero quizá la principal sea que la historia, aunque se digitalice y se acelere, no se detiene ni se termina.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d720322198bf" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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