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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Chris Leeson on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Chris Leeson on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Chris Leeson on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[How We Built A Portfolio with a 25.7% CAGR]]></title>
            <link>https://c-leeson.medium.com/how-we-built-a-portfolio-with-a-25-7-cagr-491a2bc42970?source=rss-85575da8ca26------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[investing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[finance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[business]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[business-strategy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Chris Leeson]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 12 Jul 2026 03:44:22 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-07-12T05:48:24.841Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>What started as two pieces of research, one on emerging tech and another on ESG blended to become the <em>Aspen Pine </em>portfolio. Drawing on our expertise in strategy and governance we sought to test an approach that focused on a company’s direction of travel. Rather than exploiting moments of mispricing or dislocations in the market, we focused on the decisions, activities and direction of companies.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/702/1*TtMG5WcqZ9Q7cOyvAGVlTQ.png" /><figcaption>Cumulative returns since 2023</figcaption></figure><h3><strong>The Approach</strong></h3><p>Piketty showed that over the last 500 years capital grows at circa 5% a year. while the ASX 200 averages ~7%. The question soon became; how can <em>Aspen Pine </em><strong>[APC] </strong>sustain outperformance of long run growth rates.</p><p>The answer was simple — by avoiding stagnation, inertia and collapse. The common thread between the outperformance of ESG improvement and emerging technology is movement. These are companies that are going further or faster than peers because. Driving this movement are three elements:</p><ol><li><strong>A clear direction of travel </strong>(ESG improvement)</li><li><strong>A resilient way of traveling</strong> (Intangible assets)</li><li><strong>A high speed of travel</strong> (Mega-trend tailwind)</li></ol><p>Ideally any investment is exposed to all three. The company has a clear direction of travel and is improving ESG through company efficiency and culture, has strong intangible assets like brand, network effects, process, and is support by a mega-trend that lifts all companies in that sector above long run growth rates.</p><p>While this approach is simple, the devil is in the detail. Determining and comparing ESG improvement is not as simple as accepting a sustainability report or seeing a score go from B to B+/BB. Measuring intangible assets like relative brand value, network effects, processes, and human capital is prone to limited information, and asymmetries. And although mega-trends are easy to spot their winners, and timing of impact is hard to gauge. The companies reaping the benefits in Phases 1, 2, and 3 of adoption are nearly always different.</p><p>This is why we lent into what we do best — research and analysis of company strategy and executives. We focused firstly on governance and decision making as we know this is a leading indicator for change and movement. How decisions in the board flow down through the results of the business, impacting experiential and targeted outcomes is key. The role of governance in sensemaking, risk awareness, M&amp;A, growth adjacencies, hiring of management and culture is critical. This focus on governance is, how APC helped Wall Street find its G spot.</p><p>For the nuts and bolts of the fund, it would be long only and high conviction. No more than 45 companies at any given time and no ETF or fund holdings. We would only re-balance twice a year, and avoid moving in and out of positions where possible. Governance takes time and this fund is about enabling companies to move in the right direction, give them time to map the course and get going. This coincidentally provided us time to research new companies, allow for portfolio drift (letting winners run) and avoiding messing returns with too much tinkering.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*8GGbxa4YEWk7Ok3XjWZ66Q.png" /><figcaption>Short term fund statistics</figcaption></figure><h3>Milestone: Three Years</h3><p>We’re approaching three years of the fund and we see continue to see strong links on our core themes. ESG Improvement is closely connected to free cash flow growth, mega-trends continue to drive revenues, and intangible assets have shielded the fund from significant drawdowns.</p><p>Within each of these three pools of diversification we seek out the companies with the highest competitive advantage. Using 34 core metrics, 8 sub frameworks, and over 616 reference class companies we benchmark companies to peers and disruptors. Those with the highest score get short listed for inclusion before a valuation lens is applied. The company doesn’t need to be cheap, but it does have to have sufficient upside.</p><p>If you’re wondering why we’re focused on comparative competitive advantage its because it measures how what you have and what you do compares to peers. At any given time you are either winning in market, losing or maintaining the status quo. To know your position use a Competitive Advantage Stack. The stacks compare your business with competitors across three critical dimensions to determine the strength or weakness of your competitive advantages.</p><p>The three dimensions or wedges of the stack are:</p><ol><li><strong>Market Position:</strong> Brand value, network effects, switching costs</li><li><strong>Strategic Connector: </strong>Risk, sensemaking, capital allocation, leadership</li><li><strong>Execution Engine:</strong> Process, human capital, culture, assets</li></ol><p>A score above 100 means above market/system growth, a score below means you’re losing ground.</p><p>Over three years we started the portfolio with 24 holdings of which 14 remain. 10 have been exited as we’ve added 16 new companies.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/569/1*Qrcb7HswrjHnspKeT6X3CA.png" /><figcaption>Portfolio GICS weights</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*2tN3oPrvSQLLBPhdnjo-RQ.png" /><figcaption>Portfolio holdings by size and style over time</figcaption></figure><h3>What’s next</h3><p>We’re in the process of conducting a re-balancing so I’ll share the holdings as at 30 June. As the LLM theme has played out we’re shifting focus to adoption companies and what we call <em>Physical Intelligence, </em>robotics, quantum and energy. While China looks like the fiercest competitor in these domains there will be some amazing opportunities.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/454/1*UMi-IWT5anu9n9gesDgRfA.png" /><figcaption>Portfolio weights prior to re-balancing</figcaption></figure><p>This is the work of Chris Leeson and Massimo Garbuio, and is information only. Readers are to conduct their own research and act on their own accord and risk. This is sharing the experience of the authors and not instructional or advice.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=491a2bc42970" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Three companies that lost their way]]></title>
            <link>https://c-leeson.medium.com/three-companies-that-lost-their-way-c087c9f7da22?source=rss-85575da8ca26------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[investing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[finance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[business]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[business-strategy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Chris Leeson]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 26 May 2026 10:25:15 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-05-26T10:25:15.933Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*gy74i3q_QfSgvXv0kqvZRA.png" /></figure><h4>Airbnb, Lululemon, and CSL have lost sight of their identity and core offering, leaving them stuck in the strategic doldrums.</h4><p>It’s frustrating to see successful companies waste their competitive advantage and willingly walk off the cliff edge. This earnings season highlighted three global businesses that have done exactly that. They’ve wasted a strong brand or operating business and taken it straight off the edge to land in a strategic nowhere. Lost sight of their identity and grasping at every conceivable growth lever they can. Whether it’s been a complacent board, a head strong CEO/Founder, a hangover from unsustainable growth or simply an evolving operating environment, they’ve all made bad decisions and continue to make more of them.</p><p>The three companies to highlight are of course, Airbnb, Lululemon and CSL. An accommodation and tourism operator, an apparel manufacturer and a vaccine producer.</p><p>Despite their varied industries, they have one thing in common. They are to be avoided by investors and embraced by clear minded strategists.</p><h3>Airbnb — The Community That Was</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/675/1*_zmDJhkHrlXU1XiBch3ovQ.png" /></figure><p>Airbnb has made a huge strategic blunder in its announcement to add hotels and tech services to the platform. It has fundamentally misunderstood its position in market and where its competitive moats are. Last years decision to add experiences could be accepted as a move to integrate local guides and tours into a local focused platform. Now, the proposition to customers and position in market is diluted and confused, everything to everyone.</p><p>Pre-COVID Airbnb was growing at a rapid rate as the platform became increasingly commercialised. More and more properties became full-time short term rentals, applying pressure on local governments and hotels. Post COVID and the friends and family that were strong supporters of Airbnb haven’t touched the platform. Instead they’re opting for Booking.com and/or going direct to hotels. This fall from fan to critic in a few years is anecdotal but still a red flag in strategic waywardness.</p><p>Reviewing the last two years of quarterly results and you see a company that has no clue what it stands for or what it offers. It is chasing growth, and in its chase its reaching out in every direction.</p><p>There is no view on incremental and adjacent opportunities, no core principle or customer in mind, just senseless growth. The current strategy is to grow in these 5 areas:</p><ol><li><strong>Region; </strong>how many new countries and cities can Airbnb enter and create a supply of properties and services.</li><li><strong>Payment options; </strong>Expand the payment options and time frames that customers can pay with. Extend the affordability of a holiday.</li><li><strong>Services; </strong>Add on services to the platform, with core areas including luggage storage, grocery delivery, transportation, local services (makeup, massage, photography), experiences, tours and more.</li><li><strong>Offers; </strong>Promotions and value add items like Delta miles, as well as event based partnership and promotion.</li><li><strong>Product</strong>; Widen the product offering to include Hotels along with rooms, and homes.</li></ol><p>The company claims that enabling these growth areas is AI. Which sounds more marketing pitch to investors and a minimum basis for competing than an actual advantage. While some initiatives like Reserve Now, Pay Later are bright spots, most customers couldn’t care about Delta miles as points partnerships are commoditised, and Instacart is distracting.</p><p>Airbnb’s cash flow is steadily declining. All these growth levers require Capex and marketing. The leadership team has lost sight of their core identity and want to compete against everyone, Booking Holdings, Klook, Expedia, Accor, Hilton, Red Balloon, etc.</p><p>Community and connectedness was the brand. The internet was the channel. Affordability, not hotel equivalent pricing was the hook. Today, in a time where people are feeling the impacts of inflation and cost of living this should be Airbnb’s time to shine, to give people a way to get that extra cash and make ends meet. <strong>Airbnb needs to get back to the why. </strong>Why do they do what they do, and why do people use them?</p><p>Until Airbnb figures out what it is and to who, there’s no point investing.</p><h3><strong>Lululemon — A Premium Price for Yesterday’s Brand and Quality</strong></h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/674/1*QcgApPr7E80mexghndZQXA.png" /></figure><p>Lululemon is doing everything it can to implode. It’s got absurd arguments and in-fighting with board members, executives and shareholders, declining customer satisfaction and intense competition. It feels like their desperate to disappear.</p><p>Tracing back to what coincidentally marked the market top for Lululemon, around March 2024, a fund I advise exited their position. The view was that Lululemon was entering a period of slow growth, potential stagnation as competition intensified and margins were being chased at the cost of quality, leading to brand dilution, and falling off trend. A gentle decline or plateau was expected, not a swift, severe tailspin into oblivion.</p><p>The fund had acquired the stock in mid 2022 when Lululemon appeared to be on-trend, was rationally expanded into menswear and steadily growing the store footprint with a level of service that matched the premium price.</p><p>Now in 2026, there’s more stores, more products, more competitors, cheaper materials, potential forever chemicals, and a premium price point.</p><p>In the hyper competitive environment the company operates in there’s absolutely no basis for the premium price. The quality is so similar to big box grocery retailer Costco that they took them to court.</p><p>Lululemon claims their advantage is product innovation. A capability which has seen them deliver see-through pants, PR disasters and quality complaints. Things that must not happen if you are positioned as a premium brand. Quality has to come first, otherwise the entire value equation breaks, distrust creeps in and you not only fall out of trend but you lose your loyal customer base.</p><p>This claim of product innovation has also led to a dizzying number of products (SKUs) on sale. From yoga pants to puffer jackets, and men’s corporate wear to phone lanyards, the products are everything to everyone. Is Lululemon a yoga brand? an athletics company? lounge wear? casual wear? Target and K-mart competitor?</p><p>It begs to question if they know what their core product is or what their unique selling proposition might be. The rise of their discounting and outlet stores undermines the premium position, and cedes ground to Alo. Even the notoriously boring Economist has noticed that Lululemon has fallen out of fashion. While “athleisure” isn’t entirely a relic of the at home COVID past, the new wave of trend setters is analog and spacious, with baggy clothes in.</p><p>Lululemon doesn’t need to be ‘on-trend’ to be successful. It needs to cut the bickering at the board table and focus its product range. Discounting and poor quality will only be overcome by either getting rid of the inventory and restoring quality or splitting the company into two brands, Lulu and Lemon. A premium and discount brand. Until it has a strategy that’s more concrete than ‘product innovation’ it’s a steer clear.</p><h3>CSL -A Disaster Waiting to Happen</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/667/1*4w64SOPsHIvo61EIjmeSvg.png" /></figure><p>CSL has long been a disaster in waiting. This is a company that has been adored by investors to the point of ignoring all governance failures, accounting practices, and ethical questions.</p><p>We’ve seen board members and executives with multiple decades at the helm escaping challenge or question. Creating the fertile ground and cover for creative accounting in the already complex worlds of acquisitions and biotech.</p><p>Biotechnology, plasma, vaccines are complex not just from a scientific perspective but from an accounting and corporate view. The nature of the assets, research and development result in unique accounting practices, peculiar amortisation profiles, and asset valuation / economic benefit models that are hard to compare or dissect. It was in this type of complexity that people like Elizabeth Holmes were able to thrive, and let’s also not forget that companies like Wirecard have long used acquisitions to confuse cash flows.</p><p>In CSL we have a story of four key individuals. Brian McNamee — CEO from 1990 to 2013, and current Chair, Paul Perreault — CEO from 2013 to 2023, Gordon Naylor — Current CEO, with 33 years in the business, and Paul McKenzie “retired” CEO from 2023–2026.</p><p>McKenzie joins CSL in 2019, four years before he becomes CEO. At this stage Perreault is in full swing and as COVID hits, he looks leave a legacy with a major acquisition. In late 2021 Perreault puts in the bid and secures the acquisition of Vifor AUD$18.8bn. The deal closes in 2022 and he retires in 2023, with McKenzie named as his successor.</p><p>By 2026 the world is looking a little different. The US is losing appetite for vaccinations, GSK and competitors are winning market share and CSL doesn’t complete new acquisitions with McKenzie at the helm. What follows is four profit downgrades and a write down of ~$7bn. McKenzie swiftly retires as the share price tanks and CSL lifer, Gordon Naylor is installed as CEO. The skeptics question remains, was McKenzie the only outsider and CEO not trying to fine tune the books?</p><p>Sure, vaccine rates are declining but there’s developing nations that can be expanded into. Technology is accelerating but a failure to use AI is the company’s problem not the industries. The strategy materials of CSL lack the substance and depth presented by rivals like GSK, Eli Lilly, Novo Nordisk, or Moderna.</p><p>Then there’s the plasma business. The business that sets up shop in low socio-economic neighborhoods to prey on and buy blood and plasma.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Y70Glk68W_BGyGXaH-08PQ.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*OAjifYfiTyRuHuPdelzadA.png" /></figure><p>CSL has no place in a portfolio until it resolves its governance issues, its ethics, and develops a clear and robust strategy for capital allocation and growth. It can not rely on being a historic blue chip stock.</p><p>As investors and strategists it’s important not to be blinded by a stocks historic success. Life changes, the economics shift and so do companies. We all laugh about <em>past performance, is not indicative of future performance </em>but its the reality. Capital allocation matters, vision and understanding of core products and proposition is important. For capital to be preserved, if not grow, then it needs good governance and clear direction.</p><p>Airbnb, Lululemon, and CSL are just three companies that lost their way. There are plenty more out there.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c087c9f7da22" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Australia’s Sprint to Recession]]></title>
            <link>https://c-leeson.medium.com/australias-sprint-to-recession-521be4af34d8?source=rss-85575da8ca26------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/521be4af34d8</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[investing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[stock-market]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[finance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[business]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Chris Leeson]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 23 Mar 2026 07:42:07 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-03-23T07:42:07.342Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>A short note following a significant week in central banking and geopolitics.</em></p><p>The Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) stood out this week as the only bank out of eleven to announce a rate hike. All other banks, including the central banks of the United States, Canada, England, Europe, Sweden, Switzerland, Japan, Indonesia and Taiwan kept rates flat — citing uncertainty, risk and the potential containment of inflation within energy (<a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/global-markets-central-banks-2026-03-19/">Reuters</a>).</p><p>The RBA’s decision was to ignore the wisdom of other bankers and launch an assault on Australian households. Electing to ignore the sources of inflation and simply tackle the problem of rising prices head on, no matter if they arrived from external forces (exogenous) or internal drivers (endogenous). This decision to attack the demand elements of the economy firmly puts Australia in a sprint to recession, drastically raising the risks of +8% unemployment.</p><p>There are five clear factors that connect to create the potential for a severe negative spiral.</p><ol><li>Oil Shock (Prices at the pump, Trucking, Agriculture)</li><li>Interest rate rises</li><li>Fiscal positioning</li><li>Private credit liquidity</li><li>AI acceleration</li></ol><h4><strong>Oil Shock</strong></h4><p>As petrol prices rise from ~$1.50 L to over ~$2.50 L they become a handbrake on domestic consumption. Millions of Australians are dependent on their cars for getting to work, and living their daily lives. To pay for the rapid increase in fuel prices households will find savings from other areas of their lives. The Easter holidays for example, are traditionally full of road trips, camping and family adventures. At ~$2.50 L and a Cadbury chocolate bar at $8 for 180g this Easter could be a challenge.</p><p>That’s before we consider how dependent Australia’s food and goods are on fuel and energy. It seems that nearly everything in the country is trucked from point A to B. What happens when the trucking companies either can’t absorb the rising costs or are forced to pass it on. Then suddenly you either have insolvencies or leaked inflation, and a real problem.</p><p>The same is true of agriculture and farming. Energy is the primary input.</p><h4><strong>Interest Rate Rises</strong></h4><p>Australian households are roughly split into thirds — a third rent, a third have mortgages and a third own their homes. While only a third are directly impacted by the RBA’s rate rises, there will be a portion of renters facing a price squeeze as costs are passed on. Importantly it’s the demographics these households typically make up that drive a large share of consumption. They’re often the people buying lunches at work, going out for dinner, buying kids clothes and toys, spending on services. A hit to their consumption is a hit to the national economy.</p><p>That’s before we consider how rate rises flow through the income statements of businesses. A cursory look at the 2.5m SMEs that form the backbone of the nation suggests this is a meaningful hit to the bottom line.</p><p>At the top end of town, the corporates will be facing carry trade risks and volatility in the system. Increasing the need for hedging and suppressing foreign earnings.</p><p>The rise in the AUD driven by having a comparatively high interest rate has two profound effects. It marginally helps reduce some of the imported (exogenous) inflation while it simultaneously reduces foreign purchases of mining commodities and education.</p><h4><strong>Fiscal Positioning</strong></h4><p>This all comes as Federal and State governments are coming off a period of absurdly high government stimulus. They’ve been pumping cash into the economy and are saddled with extraordinary levels of debt.</p><p>As the Treasurer suggests savings in the upcoming budget, he’s really saying he’ll reduce the support for the economy and create a contractionary fiscal environment. Not only that, but given the huge amounts of debt from COVID the government isn’t equipped to deal with another economic disaster.</p><p>That’s all before we consider the basket case of Victoria, the second largest state by population. The fiscal largesse has crowded out private sector activity, resulting in crony capitalism, record levels of debt and corruption. The numbers here are not ambiguous. Victoria’s net debt reached $133 billion in 2023–24 — a 415% increase since 2014, against economic growth of just 29% over the same period — and is projected to reach $187 billion by 2028. The state now carries the lowest credit rating of any Australian state, having already been downgraded to AA. Its public service expanded by 59% over fifteen years while the population grew by 29%, with employee costs consuming nearly 40% of the state budget. The consequences are measurable: household income per capita in Victoria was 10% below the national average in 2023–24, and the state recorded a net interstate migration loss of 15,847 people in that year alone — the worst result in the country. The Business Council of Australia has named it the worst state in the nation for business. When a state of this size and demographic weight enters a period of fiscal consolidation under duress, the drag on national aggregate demand is material.</p><h4><strong>Private Credit Liquidity</strong></h4><p>In the background of all this mess is a private market liquidity crunch. Confidence is quickly disappearing in the worlds of private credit as funds halt redemptions (stop you from getting your money out) and some enter administration.</p><p>A crisis in confidence can become contagious, and while it’s happening quietly in the background for now there’s every possibility it spreads. Blackstone’s US$48bn private credit fund posted its first loss since COVID. The company also announced US$1.7B in withdrawal requests, representing ~8% of their assets.</p><p>Don’t think for a second that this is an international or American problem. The Australian super funds are estimated to have ~5% in private credit and up to 20% in private markets. All of which are facing major liquidity squeezes as the SaaSpocalypse/SaaSacre kill early stage ventures and software.</p><h4><strong>AI Acceleration</strong></h4><p>The final ingredient to this lethal cocktail is the rise of LLMs (AI). It appears that as soon as a company is failing to deliver top line revenue growth, they announce mass layoffs and the adoption of AI.</p><p>As costs flow into business, and consumption softens, the temptation to announce layoffs and save with AI will intensify. On top of that is the fact that every few months these models improve and unleash new productive potential and adoption. The critical mechanism here is the gap between what AI is currently doing and what it is already capable of doing. Anthropic’s own Economic Index — built from millions of real Claude interactions across professional settings — finds that actual AI adoption is a fraction of what AI tools are feasibly capable of performing, and that Claude can already reduce task-completion times by as much as 80% in certain workflows. When a tool cuts four hours of work to 48 minutes, the economic pressure on headcount becomes difficult to ignore. A recession that forces cost discipline is precisely the condition that closes that gap — fast.</p><p>White collar workers are under serious threat from AI acceleration and a downturn in the economy will accelerate the need for savings. Computer programmers carry 75% task coverage — meaning three-quarters of their daily work is already flagged as automatable — with customer service representatives, data entry keyers and medical record specialists close behind. <strong>The disruption isn’t arriving through mass layoffs. It’s arriving more quietly.</strong> Anthropic finds suggestive evidence that hiring of younger workers — particularly those aged 22 to 25 — has already slowed in exposed occupations, an early signal that employers are adjusting their workforce planning around AI capabilities before the displacement formally registers in unemployment data. Anthropic’s researchers have named the scenario plainly: a “Great Recession for white-collar workers,” noting that during the 2007–2009 financial crisis the U.S. unemployment rate doubled from 5% to 10%, and that a comparable doubling in the most AI-exposed occupations is not only possible but detectable within their framework.</p><p>This is where the sprint to 8% unemployment really kicks off.</p><p>The only hope is that the upcoming mid-term elections inspire an end to this awful conflict. If oil typically takes 4 months to normalise after a shock, let’s hope this is over by July and that the RBA shows caution before it is too late.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=521be4af34d8" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Investing in Vietnam]]></title>
            <link>https://c-leeson.medium.com/investing-in-vietnam-ed41d87156d8?source=rss-85575da8ca26------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ed41d87156d8</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[business]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[investing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[finance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[vietnam]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Chris Leeson]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 21 Feb 2026 07:44:15 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-02-22T01:30:01.527Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*uTSZZLZ79mY9m4q0VfijGA.png" /></figure><h4>The investment case for Vietnam’s high growth market and how to execute before it upgrades from Frontier to Emerging status</h4><p>Every year, Vietnam is different. Not gradually different, but visibly, structurally different. It doesn’t matter if its HCMC or Hanoi, the glass towers, digital advertisements, cars, shops and new metro systems are constantly arriving. In the regions and on the rice fields waves of technology appear.</p><p>Yet, the rich texture underneath this transformation persists. Those plastic red stools, the bun bao megaphones at 6am, scooters finding impossible paths through traffic, Banh Mi. It’s all still there. But there is a sense that <strong><em>this </em>is a country on the move.</strong></p><p>Vietnam’s wealth and economy are expanding. Driven by an educated young base and an older generation embracing a period of peace and prosperity. This energy and optimism is not just atmospheric — <strong>it’s investible</strong>.</p><p>Vietnam closed 2025 as one of the <strong>world’s best-performing stock markets</strong>. The VN-Index rose an enormous 41%, with the US listed VanEck Vietnam ETF gaining 67% (currency and weighting impacts). Despite 11 typhoons battering the country, the market lifted.</p><p>Macro themes like China +1 and Vietnam’s reclassification from Frontier to Emerging market status pushed the market upwards. Incredibly, company valuations remain appealing on comparables and growth expectations — and that’s before factoring the potential inflows from the US$2.2T invested in emerging market ETFs and funds.</p><h3>The Macro Lens</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Q7Q_XC4TOp1Uv8MnFkXw6Q.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*2BiBEkatoIJkv3drc9LVLA.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*SJl-0iY-zEX4HBp5_wL5CA.png" /><figcaption>IMF Regional Maps on GDP Per Capita and GDP on PPP — Rapid growth and a diversified economy supported by a diplomatic market oriented government</figcaption></figure><p>Travel to Vietnam and you’ll be stunned by the free market capitalism. The carts, stalls and shops on street corners and in people’s homes. The volume of business and trade is astounding, these cities hum with more entrepreneurial dynamism than any free market icon like London, Sydney or Los Angeles.</p><p>This activity pushed 2025 GDP up by 8% — marking the nation’s strongest performance since 2011, outpacing India, China and Thailand. All supported by a government’s genuine commitment to shift how it approaches the economy.</p><p>The 5 keys to the Vietnamese macro environment are:<br>1. Reforms<br>2. Demographics<br>3. Industry<br>4. Diplomacy<br>5. Finance</p><h4>1 ) Reforms</h4><p>As Tô Lâm settled into his role as General Secretary he launched a major reform program nicknamed Đổi Mới 2.0. A nickname that expects great changes and traces back to the inspiring 1986 reforms. The original Đổi Mới reforms and innovation program lifted millions out of poverty, taking the nation from a centrally planned economy reliant on foreign aid to the market-oriented high-growth economy we see today. What sets Đổi Mới 2.0 apart from typical government initiatives is the impact of the 2013 Đốt Lò <em>(‘Blazing Furnace’) </em>anti-corruption campaign.</p><p>Initiated in 2013 and accelerating sharply from 2016, Đốt Lò disciplined nearly 200,000 party members and forced the resignation of two state presidents. Prosecutions reached deep into the banking and real estate sectors, and consequences have been far reaching.</p><p>The 2022 collapse of Saigon Commercial Bank (SCB) illustrated the significance and need for the program. Chairwoman Trương Mỹ Lan of the Vạn Thịnh Phát conglomerate, had used the bank as a private lending vehicle. She co-ordinated a scheme that funneled fraudulent funds of US$12.5 billion — roughly 3% of Vietnam’s GDP at the time — through a network of shell companies into real estate that existed only on paper. The case is one of Southeast Asia’s largest financial frauds, the Chairwoman was sentenced to death, and the government raised US$24B to rescue the bank.</p><p>The two other pieces of legislation investors need to appreciate for their impact on the economy and listed businesses are the 2024 Land Laws and 2025 — Resolution 68.</p><p>The Land Laws came into effect in January 2026 and fundamentally changed the pricing and supply of land. Annual market based land valuations will replace the dual pricing system that enabled the SCB fraud, while guidance on utilisation and approvals for development become clearer to enable greater supply of housing.</p><p>Resolution 68<strong> formally made the private sector the <em>“most important driving force”</em> of Vietnam’s economy</strong>. For a one-party state that spent decades treating private enterprise as a useful instrument rather than the engine , this is a huge commitment. Central ministries have already consolidated from 18 to 14, provinces/states from 63 to 34, and there’s a mandated 30% reduction in red-tape.</p><p>For US investors, consider this a successful version of DOGE. Crucially, the goal here isn’t just efficiency, it’s the removal of structural friction that historically made Vietnam expensive to invest in despite being cheap to manufacture in. MUFG called the agenda the most ambitious structural reforms since the 1986 Đổi Mới and the CEBR projects that Vietnam’s GDP will reach $994 billion by 2035, surpassing both Thailand and Singapore in total economic output.</p><h4>2) Demographics</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/950/1*_QIEq5rJqRcuiig56Dk9QA.png" /></figure><p>Powering this growth and entrepreneurial activity is a solid demographic foundation. Vietnam has a large population of ‘prime age’ workers with high levels of education and low unemployment. This is no longer a cheap labour story, the country is an outsourcing receiver and sender.</p><p>Perhaps the most underappreciated driver of Vietnam’s transformation is the diaspora. An estimated 6 million overseas Vietnamese, the Viet Kieu, sent US$16b to Vietnam in 2024 and assisted demand in service industries as thousands of Viet Kieu traveled to Vietnam — for Tết, for business, for holidays, and for moving home.</p><p>The Viet Kieu extend beyond capital and provide critical links to global industries including the transmission of professional knowledge, standards and networks. In the creative domains artists, rappers and musicians connect millions across the globe to their Vietnamese roots, promoting tourism, trade and culture.</p><h4>3) Industry</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/780/0*tRFl3kN56UeatYXc.png" /></figure><p>Vietnam is crafting a diversified economy. Each element of the economic mix is compounding independent of any single trade relationship or commodity cycle. The country is pushing past the image of being a low labour cost destination and is partnering on major scientific and tech efforts such as AI drone spraying with Australia’s CSIRO.</p><p>All the while, natural resources continue to deliver. The country is the third largest exporter of rice, the second largest of coffee and is essential in providing the world’s infrastructure projects with cement minerals.</p><p>Enabling this mix of industry is of course government policy but also the country’s “Four Nos” defence policy. The military approach provides the architecture for free trade across the globe.</p><h4>4) Diplomacy</h4><p>The “Four Nos” are (1) no military alliances, (2) no foreign military bases on Vietnamese soil, (3) no siding with one country against another, (4) no use of force in international affairs. This creates a country that trades freely and deeply, demonstrated by the 17 free trade agreements covering roughly 60% of global GDP. The “Four Nos” further helps reduce the sovereign risk that’s historically attached to emerging markets.</p><p>Vietnam also has ‘Comprehensive Strategic Partnerships’ with both the United States and China simultaneously. A diplomatic achievement allowing Vietnamese firms to secure supply chain investment from Western companies diversifying out of China (China +1) while maintaining Beijing as its largest import partner.</p><p>Tangible examples of this diplomatic success and the growth in China+1 logistics are:</p><ul><li>Samsung investing $23 billion in Vietnam, with operations now producing approximately half the global Galaxy smartphone output.</li><li>Apple’s supply chain followed with Vietnam manufacturing an estimated 65% of global AirPods.</li><li>FPT Corporation exemplifies this move up the value chain and into technology. FPT serves over 130 Fortune 500 clients, growing at 20% annually, and opening Vietnam’s first domestic semiconductor packaging and testing plant in January 2026.</li></ul><h4>5) Finance</h4><p>And then there is the newest piece of infrastructure — one aimed squarely at attracting global capital rather than global manufacturers. In December 2025, the Vietnamese government formally established the <strong>Vietnam International Financial Centre</strong> under National Assembly Resolution 222. The Prime Minister described it plainly — ‘<em>agricultural reform lifted Vietnam out of poverty; industrial FDI made it middle-income; the IFC is the instrument for becoming a high-income economy</em>’.</p><p>The Centre’s in HCMC and Da Nang are structured around the pillars of capital markets, trade finance, digital banking and fintech, and green finance. A regulatory sandbox for fintech has been launched with the expectations Vietnam and its markets will become hubs for ASEAN tech innovation. Analysts at the Institute for Global Financial and Real Estate Market Research estimate the IFC could attract $20 billion in 2026 alone, and $50 billion within three years. This should help Vietnam avoid the ‘Middle Income Trap’ of developing nations.</p><h3>The Equity Market</h3><p>In September 2026 the FTSE Russell will elevate Vietnam to Emerging Market status, assuming it passes the March review. The consequences of this upgrade are massive. Not only does the market plumbing get fixed with legacy caps removed but direct foreign investment gets turned on and the capital will start to flow.</p><p>Any passive funds (ETFs) using the FTSE Russell status will be <strong>required </strong>to buy Vietnamese equities. The World Bank expects this to trigger at least US$6b of inflows in 2026, and over US$25b by 2030. This steady flow of index based buying will combine with the government’s plan to lift total market value from 75% to 120% of GDP, creating a major tailwind and a base load of demand for stocks.</p><p>All this is takes place in a market with a familiar structure and concentration in the largest cap companies. Stripping out major companies like VinGroup and the market continues to produce a healthy 10% gain in 2025 along with appealing forward P/E valuations.</p><p>Across the major Vietnam ETFs and funds, a consistent group of names dominate the holdings.</p><ul><li><strong>Vingroup</strong> is unavoidable. Vietnam’s largest conglomerate includes VinHomes, VinFast, and Vincom Retail. Whether held deliberately or through a passive vehicle, Vingroup is in the portfolio.</li><li><strong>Hoa Phat Group</strong> is Vietnam’s largest steelmaker and its second-largest private enterprise. Revenue grew 17% to the equivalent of $5.6 billion in 2024, with profit after tax rising 77% to $479 million. Its steel supplies the airports, metro lines and highways being built across the country, and its new Dung Quat 2 complex pushes annual capacity to 15 million tonnes. It is a direct proxy for Vietnam’s infrastructure build out and the company’s exports now reach 40 countries.</li><li><strong>Masan Group</strong> is Vietnam’s consumer conglomerate. Fish sauce and noodles through brands like Chin-su and Omachi that reach 98% of Vietnamese households, a 3,828-store modern retail network through WinMart, meat processing, and high-tech materials. Full-year 2024 net revenue reached $3.3 billion, and its international revenues grew 22%.</li><li><strong>Vinamilk</strong> (Vietnam Dairy Products JSC) is what investors call a quality stock — dominant domestic market share, cash-generative, exporting across Southeast Asia and the Middle East, priced with the discipline of a Western consumer staples business at emerging market growth rates.</li><li><strong>FPT Corporation</strong> is the technology story in stock form — growing revenue at 20% annually, serving global enterprise clients, and now building domestic semiconductor capability.</li><li><strong>Techcombank and VPBank</strong> are the primary plays on consumer credit. As Vietnam’s middle class moves its financial life from cash to institutions, both banks sit at the front of that queue. Vietcombank, BIDV and Vietinbank — the state-linked banking trio — appear consistently across all major fund holdings, combining emerging market growth characteristics with implicit sovereign support.</li></ul><h3>What to Watch Out For</h3><p>The currency is managed, not free floating. The State Bank of Vietnam holds the dong within a ±5% band around a daily central rate. MUFG projects USD/VND at 26,900 by end-2026 — gradual and predictable rather than volatile. For international investors, currency hedging is discipline, not speculation.</p><p>Foreign ownership limits remain in place across banking, telecoms and strategic sectors. Several compelling companies are at or near their caps. Removing those limits is the prerequisite for MSCI Emerging Market status — the next upgrade after FTSE, with a substantially larger passive footprint. That is the follow-on trade.</p><p>Vietnam’s Four Nos have held through the South China Sea tensions, the US-China trade war and the Trump tariff era. The economic incentives to maintain them grow stronger as Vietnam’s trade integration deepens — but they require continuous diplomatic skill to sustain, and that is the geopolitical variable worth monitoring.</p><h3>How to Access Vietnamese Markets</h3><p>The VanEck Vietnam ETF (VNM) and Global X’s VNAM are the primary liquid access points for international investors. For active management with genuine country expertise, Dragon Capital’s Vietnam Enterprise Investments Limited (VEIL), listed in London, and VinaCapital’s closed-end vehicles offer decades of on-the-ground research. Vietcap Securities provides direct brokerage access for investors comfortable with local market execution.</p><p>The higher-conviction trade — for those prepared to do the work — is in mid-cap companies whose foreign ownership limits have room to expand. These are the names that re-rate most sharply when MSCI inclusion becomes the next conversation.</p><p>Vietnam is a country that knows its identity. It connects the old with the new, values stability, education, family and legacy. Those plastic red stools are still there. So are the Bánh mì, Phở, and scooters. But alongside them now sits a market about to receive US$25 billion in foreign capital, governed by a reforming state dismantling its own bureaucracy, powered by a young and globally connected workforce, and priced at valuations that haven’t caught up with the story yet.</p><p>September 2026 is the date. The case is now.</p><p><em>For informational purposes only. Not financial advice. Emerging market investments carry currency, liquidity and regulatory risk.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ed41d87156d8" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[A New Way to Measure What Makes Companies Unbeatable]]></title>
            <link>https://c-leeson.medium.com/a-new-way-to-measure-what-makes-companies-unbeatable-c51f494d3e61?source=rss-85575da8ca26------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/c51f494d3e61</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[finance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[investing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[business-strategy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[strategy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Chris Leeson]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 18 Jan 2026 04:24:05 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-01-18T04:24:05.314Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*SMcb7sQBSttlpxzMguz8cw.png" /></figure><h4>How investors can quantify what Warren Buffett calls “the moat” and why Marriott’s loyalty program reveals more about sustainable advantage than a decade of financial statements</h4><p>Warren Buffett has spent sixty years telling investors to buy companies with “economic moats” — durable competitive advantages that protect profits from competition. The problem? He’s never really told anyone how to measure them.</p><p>Ask ten analysts to evaluate competitive advantage and you’ll get ten different answers. Some point to return on invested capital. Others cite brand value, network effects, or switching costs. A few will gesture vaguely at “culture” or “management quality.” All of these matter, but none provides a systematic framework for comparing advantages across companies or predicting which will persist.</p><p>This measurement problem has consequences. Investors routinely misprice companies because they can’t distinguish between temporary profitability and structural advantage. A business with high margins today might be coasting on a depleting brand. Another with compressed margins might be building intangible assets that will compound for decades. Traditional metrics — P/E ratios, revenue growth, profit margins — can’t tell the difference.</p><p>What if competitive advantage could be measured systematically? Not perfectly, but reliably enough to reveal which companies possess advantages that compound.</p><p>That’s what the Competitive Advantage Stack (CAS) does. It breaks competitive advantage into four dimensions that can be scored, compared, and tracked over time. Applied to Marriott International versus its hotel peers, the framework draws out deep insights from a mature hospitality business that’s operating an immensely valuable loyalty program.</p><h3>The Four Dimensions of Competitive Advantage</h3><p>Competitive advantage isn’t a single attribute. It’s a stack of capabilities, relationships, and assets that reinforce each other across four distinct levels:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ocpMFKYymV3VQjafXQKBug.png" /></figure><p><strong>Internal Intangibles (The Foundation):</strong> These are capabilities invisible to outsiders but essential to execution — operational processes, institutional knowledge, staff expertise, cultural norms, proprietary data. Think of Toyota’s production system, Goldman Sachs’s training programs, or Pixar’s creative process. Customers never see these capabilities, but they enable everything visible.</p><p><strong>Internal Executive Function:</strong> This measures leadership quality, governance structure, capital allocation discipline, and strategic decision-making. Strong boards provide oversight. Weak boards rubber-stamp. Exceptional CEOs compound advantages. Mediocre ones coast. This dimension captures how well leadership builds capabilities and allocates resources.</p><p><strong>External Executive Function:</strong> Here we measure how well leadership builds and maintains relationships outside the organization — with customers, suppliers, regulators, communities, partners. Some companies cultivate ecosystems that become competitive advantages. Others extract value until relationships fracture.</p><p><strong>External Intangibles (The Visible Moat):</strong> These are advantages customers and competitors can see — brand value, customer loyalty, network effects, switching costs, regulatory protection. This is what most people think of as “competitive advantage,” but it’s just the top of the stack, built on the three layers below.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*9rCT11BuB7zdALcMWxZ_1Q.png" /><figcaption>The Competitive Advantage Stack (CAS) and the four component wedges</figcaption></figure><p>Each dimension is scored relative to competitors, then stacked.</p><ul><li><strong>Scores of 1.0 represents market average</strong> — a company that will grow at industry rates with no structural advantage</li><li><strong>Scores below 1.0 indicates disadvantages</strong></li><li><strong>Scores above 1.0 reveal compounding advantages</strong> that should generate above-market returns</li></ul><p>The higher the stack, the stronger and more persistent the advantage. Importantly, the <em>composition</em> of the stack reveals the sources of advantage, including whether it depends on exceptional leadership (fragile) or structural assets (durable).</p><h3>The Marriott Case Study</h3><p>Applying the stack framework to Marriott International and we draw out remarkable insights into the value of ‘traditional’ customer engagement.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*tc3gQ6KvJFdTnCWHwW8NRA.png" /></figure><p><strong>Overall Score: 1.21</strong> (indicating moderate — strong competitive advantage)</p><ul><li>External Intangibles: 0.37 (significantly above peers)</li><li>External Executive Function: 0.26 (at peers — industry neutral)</li><li>Internal Executive Function: 0.28 (marginally above peers)</li><li>Internal Intangibles: 0.30 (above peers)</li></ul><p>The gap is structural, not marginal. But here’s what makes the stack composition fascinating: Marriott has an executive team that is neutral with its peers but its internal and external intangibles provide sizeable advantages.</p><p>This reveals something critical: <strong>Marriott’s competitive advantage doesn’t depend on exceptional management</strong>. It’s embedded in structural assets — specifically, a loyalty program that generates advantages competitors can copy but still fail to replicate.</p><h3>How Loyalty Becomes Structural Advantage</h3><p>Marriott Bonvoy has 219 million members generating roughly 60% of room nights. Wall Street sees this and thinks “nice marketing program.” What they’re missing is a compounding machine that creates three distinct advantages simultaneously.</p><p><strong>First, data accumulation that improves with scale.</strong> Every stay generates operational insights — customer preferences, booking patterns, price sensitivity, service expectations. This data makes the next stay more valuable for both parties. A Bonvoy member who always requests a room above the 10th floor, prefers firm pillows, and books weekend leisure travel six weeks in advance gets exactly that experience automatically. The algorithm learns, the customer receives personalized service without asking, and Marriott captures pricing power because the experience is genuinely better than a competitor starting from zero information.</p><p>This is a network effect in reverse. Instead of becoming more valuable as more users join (traditional network effects), Marriott’s loyalty program becomes more valuable as individual customers use it more frequently. Each stay strengthens the relationship, making the next stay more likely regardless of competitors’ pricing.</p><p><strong>Second, switching costs that operate at multiple levels simultaneously.</strong> A customer with Platinum status and 500,000 points doesn’t just lose rewards by switching to Hilton. They lose personalized service protocols, recognized preferences across properties, and the certainty of experience that comes from algorithmic familiarity. They also lose status benefits that took years to earn — lounge access, room upgrades, late checkout, bonus points. The customer could start over with a competitor’s program, but they’d sacrifice accumulated benefits while retraining a new algorithm on their preferences.</p><p><strong>Third, demand visibility that enables superior capital allocation.</strong> Marriott knows which markets will generate occupancy six months ahead of competitors relying on third-party booking data. The company can negotiate better franchise terms, allocate marketing spend more efficiently, and expand in markets where loyalty data indicates durable demand rather than temporary trends.</p><p>This advantage compounds because Marriott operates an asset-light model — mostly franchise and management agreements rather than owned real estate. The company captures loyalty program economics (the high-margin relationship between customer and program) while franchisees bear property-level risk. When loyalty drives occupancy, Marriott earns franchise fees on revenue it didn’t spend capital to generate.</p><p>This is why the External Intangibles score (0.37) carries Marriott’s overall competitive position. Brand value, customer loyalty, and network effects constitute 57% of the company’s structural advantage — built over decades through operational discipline rather than breakthrough innovation.</p><h3>What the Stack Reveals That Financial Metrics Miss And Why This Matters for Investors</h3><p>The Competitive Advantage Stack solves a measurement problem that has plagued fundamental analysis since Benjamin Graham. Investors know competitive advantage drives long-term returns. But without systematic measurement, advantage assessment defaults to qualitative judgment, anchoring bias, and narrative plausibility rather than structural analysis.</p><p>The framework makes three contributions to investment process:</p><p><strong>First, it separates temporary profitability from sustainable advantage.</strong> High returns on capital might indicate structural moats or skilled execution in a commoditized market. The stack reveals which. A company with strong Internal Intangibles but weak External Intangibles is executing well today but hasn’t built lasting advantages. A company with the opposite profile has constructed moats that will protect returns even during mediocre execution.</p><p><strong>Second, it predicts which advantages will persist through leadership transitions.</strong> Companies with high overall scores driven by Internal Executive Function (exceptional leadership) face existential risk when CEOs retire. Companies with high External Intangibles scores possess advantages that outlast management teams. This distinction matters enormously for long-term position sizing and hold periods.</p><p><strong>Third, it can reveal mispricing by showing which companies are building advantages.</strong> Marriott trades at 34x forward earnings — a premium to hotel peers (12–15x), in line AirBnB and Booking Holdings (30–40x). This is priced about right, as it follows a 157% share price increase over the last 5 years and 18% over the last 12 months, despite the ‘fundamentals’ of the score being relatively unchanged in this period.</p><p>Marriott’s advantage is durable, not dependent on exceptional execution. The company scores at or below market average on internal capabilities and leadership quality. This isn’t a criticism — it’s a revelation about advantage structure. Companies that depend on superstar CEOs or proprietary processes face existential risk when leaders leave or competitors catch up. Marriott’s advantages are embedded in customer relationships and brand architecture that persist regardless of leadership transitions.</p><p>Traditional analysis would look at Marriott’s margins, compare them to Hilton’s, and conclude the companies are roughly equivalent with minor differences in brand positioning and geographic exposure.</p><p>The Internal Executive Function score (0.28) reveals Marriott’s governance vulnerabilities — low bandwidth directors, family dominance, and succession risks.</p><p>These weaknesses should concern long-term investors. Yet Marriott still generates superior returns because the loyalty program advantages compound independent of leadership quality. A mediocre CEO can’t quickly destroy what took thirty years to build. This is the definition of a moat.</p><h3>How The Framework Was Built</h3><p>After years working in strategy, and researching competitive advantage, governance and intangible assets, I was inspired by the powerful simplicity of Felix Oberholzer-Gee’s Value Stick. The framework highlights the strategic dilemma businesses face when trying to <strong>capture value</strong> while also <strong>provide value</strong> to their customers.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/750/1*snyAjzTsIY3fyw6MlM_GcQ.jpeg" /><figcaption><strong>The Inspiration</strong> (WTP = Willingness to Pay, WTS = Willingness to Sell)</figcaption></figure><p>The Competitive Advantage Stack works by scoring companies across ten underlying factors, then allocating those scores into the four stack dimensions:</p><ol><li><strong>Financial metrics</strong> <em>(Profit and loss, Balance sheet, Cash flow)</em></li><li><strong>Industry specific metrics</strong> <em>(Rooms, RevPAR, Same store sales etc.)</em></li><li><strong>Capital allocation</strong> <em>(ROIC, Dividends, Innovation etc.)</em></li><li><strong>Strategic focus</strong> <em>(Adjacent markets, Variability in strategy etc.)</em></li><li><strong>Shareholder alignment</strong> <em>(Ownership, Long term incentives, etc.)</em></li><li><strong>Brand value </strong><em>(Brand strength index, Relief from royalty etc.)</em></li><li><strong>M&amp;A capability</strong> <em>(Frequency of transactions, Strategic fit, Discipline etc.)</em></li><li><strong>Superstar and founder execs </strong><em>(Performance history, Succession Planning etc.)</em></li><li><strong>Board scoring </strong><em>(Bandwidth, Oversight, Skills Alignment, Experience etc.)</em></li><li><strong>Human capital factor </strong><em>(Glassdoor, LinkedIn, Education levels etc.)</em></li></ol><p>Each factor is scored relative to competitors, then weighted into the four stack dimensions. The result is a comparable, quantitative measure of competitive advantage that can be tracked over time and compared across industries.</p><p>The hybrid approach of quantitative and qualitative data captures the reality of competitive advantages and moats. It mirrors how experienced investors actually evaluate businesses. It’s achieved by the rapid rise in compute power from LLMs (AI), that enable the incorporation of hundreds of underlying metrics and measures. A reference class is used to ensure consistency, repeatability and robustness of measurement. But the key innovation of the stack is structure.</p><p>Rather than scoring “competitive advantage” as a single number, the stack reveals <em>where</em> advantages come from and whether they’re likely to persist. Two companies might score identically overall (1.0) but show completely different stack compositions — one built on intangibles, another on governance.</p><h3>What Comes Next</h3><p>The Competitive Advantage Stack provides a framework for measuring what Warren Buffett describes but has never quantified. Applied systematically, it reveals companies building structural advantages that financial metrics miss.</p><p>Marriott demonstrates the framework’s power by showing how a “mature hotel business” is actually constructing a durable moat through operational excellence and a loyalty program. Where investors may have expected the demise of the business due to disruptors like Booking Holdings, it highlights how difference can create advantage.</p><p>This framework has and will continue to be used across industries and companies. Enabling research into shareholder returns and business performance, along with supporting executives on critical decisions and investors with stock selection.</p><p>Currently, it’s being tested to identify relative valuation. Identifying where advantage / disadvantage is trading at a discount, where it’s been over sold or bought.</p><p>The market will eventually learn to measure competitive advantage more precisely. Until then, the mispricing creates opportunity.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c51f494d3e61" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Deere & Co: The AI Profit Story Markets Missed]]></title>
            <link>https://c-leeson.medium.com/deere-co-the-ai-profit-story-markets-missed-dc82c0c5b844?source=rss-85575da8ca26------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/dc82c0c5b844</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[strategy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[business]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[investing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[agriculture]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Chris Leeson]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 14 Dec 2025 03:06:10 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-12-14T03:06:10.589Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*0bNvFa_KQcUHcyaiV2rA4g.jpeg" /></figure><h4><strong>While the AI industry burns $300 billion chasing profitability, one 188-year-old industrial is already generating cash flow from the technology — and the market still prices it as a tractor company</strong></h4><p>As OpenAI, Anthropic, and dozens of AI startups burn through hundreds of billions in capital searching for sustainable business models, Deere &amp; Co is doing something the technology industry can’t — generating positive cash flow from artificial intelligence. Real money, right now, from two distinct revenue streams.</p><blockquote>Stream One: Building AI Infrastructure<br>Stream Two: Autonomy</blockquote><p>Despite having clear AI revenue streams the market still sees Deere &amp; Co as a cyclical agricultural equipment manufacturer. Traders can’t shake the image of bucolic John Deere green tractors rolling across fields, vulnerable to commodity prices, farmer sentiment and the weather. This vision totally misses what the company has become — a technology platform and ecosystem. It generates recurring revenue from 600,000+ connected machines, autonomous systems, and precision agriculture with insights from over 329 million “engaged acres,” with plans to expand to 500 million acres by 2026.</p><p>Founded in 1837, the same year as quality peers Hermès, Tiffany &amp; Co, and Procter &amp; Gamble (P&amp;G), Deere &amp; Co has navigated all four industrial revolutions successfully. More than that, it’s compounded innovation over 188 years to be ranked by Prof. Bessembinder as the <strong>13th best performing U.S. stock since 1926</strong>, outperforming 29,065 other companies. It’s machines roll over a third of the earth’s surface every year, and yet, after all that, investors <em>still </em>see it as a tractor company. The market currently prices Deere as a leading industrial but what this fails to recognise is that this is a company that goes beyond downside protection to an AI bubble bursting. This is a company transforming into a business with all the hallmarks of big tech — high margins, sticky revenue and genuine network effects.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/1*2dt3bsUt2e3px9V15vsacg.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/1*Kb_nVMZr-jGqhY_0g6Mhbw.png" /><figcaption>Deere &amp; Co Investor Relations</figcaption></figure><h3><strong>The Two AI Profit Streams</strong></h3><p>Deere generates AI-related revenue through two streams that operate on different time horizons and strategically reinforce each other.</p><h4><strong>Stream One: Building AI Infrastructure</strong></h4><p>Deere’s latest earnings result announced construction and forestry division growth of 27% year-on-year, while agricultural equipment hit cyclical lows. The company ranks fifth globally in construction equipment and is taking market share from Caterpillar (CAT), posting 9% compound annual growth (CAGR) versus CAT’s 3.6%. The driver behind all this growth is straightforward — ‘hyperscalers’ need massive data centers and energy infrastructure to power AI models, and Deere provides the earth-moving equipment to build that physical infrastructure.</p><p>This is the “picks and shovels” play that actually works — Deere sells to companies like Meta, Amazon, and Alphabet that are spending aggressively regardless of profitability concerns. As one construction segment executive noted, planning and approvals for data centers are converting to actual construction demand, creating a multi-year tailwind independent of traditional construction cycles.</p><h4><strong>Stream Two: Autonomy</strong></h4><p>While construction provides near-term adjacent market growth, autonomy represents the structural transformation. Think autonomous tractors, graders, mowers and drones. Deere’s See &amp; Spray technology uses computer vision to identify individual plants, applying herbicides only to weeds rather than blanket-spraying entire fields. The system has saved American farmers over 8 million gallons of herbicide. One Illinois farmer saved $31,000 in chemical costs across 5,500 acres in a single season.</p><p>“That’s not a pilot program,” CEO John May told analysts. “That’s actual return on investment that shows up in P&amp;Ls… We saw, between our Midwest and our Northwest territories, around a 67% savings in chemicals.”</p><p>The company operates 600 autonomous tractors commercially and aims to deliver a complete autonomous farming system for corn and soybeans by 2030 — covering tillage, planting, spraying, and harvesting through AI, computer vision, and GPS integration. Farmers are buying these systems because they demonstrably improve farm economics.</p><p>In construction, autonomous vehicles overcome critical labour shortages and support development in remote and regional locations. With the scale of Deere’s equipment and machine footprint this creates a data footprint competitors can’t match. Deere is rapidly becoming the Apple or Google of the industrial world. A dominant brand that connects users into an ecosystem of hardware and software, creating switching costs and durable moats.</p><p>This is all playing out in real time. The evidence is in the earnings, Deere’s able to capture 2–3x more revenue than competitors from a business that’s more diverse, generating only 40 cents of every dollar from tractors, compared to 60–70 cents for peers. Furthermore, it’s investing over $2b every year in R&amp;D, driving the tech forward. This is a business that has thrived by consistently embracing transformation, adopting cutting-edge technology ahead of competitors and integrating it into products and services that deliver real value to customers. Now, it’s executing one of its most ambitious shifts yet.</p><h3><strong>The SaaS Transformation Nobody Noticed</strong></h3><p>The market has totally missed how autonomy is transforming Deere from episodic equipment sales to continuous software and service revenue. This smooths the cyclical volatility that has historically defined equipment manufacturers and creates the kind of recurring revenue streams that tech companies enjoy.</p><p>Deere has what it calls the ‘Operations Center’, which manages all their engaged acres. This is the land where farmers use and connect to Deere’s integrated technology stack for data-driven decision making. Every connected machine generates operational data: soil conditions, crop health, equipment performance, weather patterns, yield optimization. This data makes the platform more valuable for every participant, creating genuine network effects.</p><p>It also makes customers sticky. Once a farm operation invests in Deere’s technology stack — tractors, combines, planters, sprayers, all integrated through the Operations Center — switching to a competitor means not just replacing equipment but abandoning an entire data infrastructure. Every existing machine converted (retrofitted or new) to autonomy represents an incremental commitment to the Deere ecosystem rather than a competitive evaluation trigger point.</p><p>The economic logic to commit to the Deere ecosystem for farmers and construction managers is compelling. Farmers that can reduce chemical costs by 60–70% and increase yields through precision agriculture will adopt these systems regardless of equipment cycles. The technology delivers measurable ROI that justifies itself independent of commodity prices or farm income. In turn this creates revenue stability for Deere and develops a significant intangible asset.</p><p>Deere’s R&amp;D spending further reinforces this strategy. The company invested $2.29 billion in research and development in FY24. This is ~5% of net sales and roughly <strong>double the R&amp;D spend of its closest peer</strong>. Over the past decade, cumulative R&amp;D investment exceeded $20 billion. In 2024, Deere opened a 134,000 square-foot Intelligent Solutions Group facility dedicated to data science and analytics — this is the infrastructure of a technology company, not a legacy industrial.</p><h3><strong>The Intangibles That Matter</strong></h3><p>There’s three structural advantages insulating Deere’s transformation and help create competitive advantage.</p><p><strong>Scale and Network Effects</strong>: Deere commands approximately 50% of agri and turf market share in North America, capturing an estimated 36% of total industry revenue globally. This dominance is a result of sustaining disciplined growth in dealer and service networks, quality manufacturing, and data.</p><p>Deere’s economies of scale and integration of AI throughout the business is reflected in its ability to expand margins from circa 10% to 18% over the past decade, with its closest competitor currently at 9.5% — the level Deere was at 10 years ago.</p><p>As more machines go autonomous and generate more operational insights, creating better algorithms that drive superior outcomes they’ll attract more customers and create the flywheel tech companies obsess over.</p><p><strong>Brand Pricing Power</strong>: Deere’s brand value sits at approximately $8 billion, comparable to Hilton, HSBC, and Warner Bros. It’s a brand value that is reflected in its market share dominance and in its merchandise sales.</p><p>Analysts estimate between $400–$600m for toys, licensing, merchandise and apparel sales. That puts Deere on track to have a retail sales and presence at approximately half the ‘on trend’ athleisure brand Alo Yoga. Deere doesn’t just have market power, its become a cultural icon.</p><p>It’s icon status is an image built through a commitment to customers (farmers) and performance, as CEO John C. May notes, every 10th tractor goes through rigorous mechanical and practical tests to ensure quality and reliability — ensuring brand trust and durability.</p><p><strong>M&amp;A Capability as Competitive Advantage</strong>: Most companies fail spectacularly at acquisitions. Deere has turned it into a genuine capability through disciplined, technology-focused deals: Blue River Technology for $305 million brought the computer vision powering See &amp; Spray; Bear Flag Robotics added autonomous retrofitting capabilities; SparkAI provided machine learning expertise for handling edge cases in autonomy.</p><p>Recent acquisitions include drone technology for autonomous surveying that integrates directly into existing operations. The company focuses on clear capability gaps adjacent to core competencies, ensuring each acquisition strengthens rather than distracts from the platform, all with appropriate capital discipline.</p><h3><strong>The Risks Nobody Wants to Discuss</strong></h3><p>The bull case has real vulnerabilities that deserve acknowledgment. U.S. trade policy creates immediate risks — tariffs and retaliation could hammer commodity prices, crushing farmer incomes and equipment demand. China remains a critical market; geopolitical tensions could eliminate growth opportunities or worse.</p><p>The autonomous technology advantage may prove temporary. Although unlikely, competitors like CNH Industrial / AGCO or a disruptor could catch up in AI and erode Deere’s premium pricing.</p><p>Cyclicality hasn’t disappeared. Agricultural equipment remains exposed to weather, commodity prices, and farmer sentiment. Construction equipment correlates with broader economic activity. The SaaS transformation reduces but doesn’t eliminate these exposures. A severe recession or agricultural crisis would still damage earnings significantly.</p><p>The technology might not scale as planned. Autonomous systems face edge cases and unexpected conditions that could limit deployment. The path from 600 commercial autonomous tractors to complete farming systems by 2030 requires flawless execution and regulatory cooperation that isn’t guaranteed.</p><p>But here’s why the bull case outweighs these risks — Deere has navigated worse and it has a track record of transformation. The company’s seen all four industrial revolutions, and has evolved from horse drawn plows to autonomous data enabled combustion engine tractors. What makes Deere stand out as a quality investment is it’s capital discipline, commitment to product, and forward looking innovation that extends beyond its long duration assets. For Deere’s SaaS transformation to be a success, it doesn’t have to eliminate cyclicality, it just needs to reduce volatility enough that the share of recurring revenue smacks you in the face.</p><h3>The Art of Valuation</h3><p>Wall Street still analyzes Deere as an agricultural equipment manufacturer with construction exposure — cyclical, commodity-dependent, vulnerable to farmer sentiment. Yet the stock trades at 28.4x forward earnings and 4.1x EV/Sales — a significant premium to both the machinery sector (11.0x P/E) and broader industrials (11.9x P/E).</p><p>Analyst consensus reflects this confusion: 11 buy ratings, 11 holds, zero sells, with a median price target of $520 implying roughly 4% upside from current levels. The recommendation mean sits at 2.3 (between hold and buy), and price targets have been drifting down — from $525 in September to $514 currently. This is the classic profile of a stock the market doesn’t know what to do with — too expensive to love as a cyclical, too industrial to value as technology.</p><p>When searching for company comparisons, it isn’t Caterpillar or CNH Industrial that’s appropriate. It’s Hermès, Costco, Walmart, Fair Isaac, and other <strong>quality compounders with durable brand moats and downside protection</strong>. These all trade at PE ranges between 35–65x. They command premium multiples not because of growth rates but because of quality — predictable cash flows, brand pricing power, and business models that protect capital during downturns.</p><p>Deere at 28x forward earnings isn’t expensive — it’s the cheapest quality compounder available. The headlines aren’t historical trivia, the company ranks as the 13th best performing U.S. stock since 1926, has compounded for 188 years through four industrial revolutions, commands 50% market share with 18% operating margins (double the closest competitor), and generates an $8 billion brand that inspires customer loyalty and enables pricing power and shareholder returns.</p><p>This SaaS transformation isn’t the reason to own Deere at 28x — it’s upside optionality on top of a quality business you’d want to own anyway. If the recurring revenue story plays out and it’s autonomous data becomes the FICO or Palantir of agriculture then the PE multiple expands to match other tech platforms. If it doesn’t, you still own the dominant industrial franchise with a management team that’s navigated far bigger threats.</p><h3><strong>The Bottom Line</strong></h3><p>While technology companies are chasing AI business models that might materialize in years, Deere generates profit from AI today — through construction equipment demand and agricultural technology that delivers measurable ROI for the business and it’s customers.</p><p>The opportunity exists because the story contradicts conventional wisdom about where AI value accrues. Investors assume AI profits flow to model developers, cloud providers, and application layer software. Nobody expects an old equipment manufacturer to generate actual cash flow from the technology while the rest of the world burns it searching for sustainable economics. Deere isn’t you’re fathers industrial company, it’s a business transforming into a technology platform with recurring revenue and network effects, something that would be celebrated if it wore a hoodie instead of overalls.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=dc82c0c5b844" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Boardroom And AI]]></title>
            <link>https://c-leeson.medium.com/the-boardrooms-ai-paradox-7a0c0e5ef538?source=rss-85575da8ca26------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/7a0c0e5ef538</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[governance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[business]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[investing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ai]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[technology]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Chris Leeson]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 09 Nov 2025 03:04:14 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-11-15T02:59:16.761Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*brWVL5x-mMSMVK7LyQhAaA.png" /></figure><h4>Exploring how AI is entering the boardroom and the critical choices facing investors and directors</h4><p>Boardrooms can be emotional places. Walk into a board meeting today and you’ll find directors scattered across an emotional spectrum that didn’t exist five years ago. At one end is the terrified; they’re the directors laying in bed awake, wondering when AI will replace them — if their decades of experience, accumulated judgements, and relationships will be replaced by a bot. The other end, the AI evangelists; endlessly optimistic, they’re the executives who spent weekends experimenting with ChatGPT, forwarding consulting reports on AI transformation, and believe shadow boards and digital twins represent the future of competitive advantage.</p><p>Both extremes are reacting to the same reality — that AI directors already exist.</p><p>This emotional spectrum is critical for investors. Underneath all that terror and enthusiasm is an investment signal that markets are ignoring. How directors respond to AI governance, not whether they adopt it, but <em>how</em> they approach adoption, reveals institutional qualities that predict performance.</p><p>Absurdly, the market is treating AI adoption as binary — you’re either in or out, innovating or dying. Caution is being priced as missing out with any associated directors marked as Luddites and dinosaurs.</p><p>But what if it’s those directors, the ones expressing measured concern, that insist on frameworks first, that want to build capability over years rather than rushing through quarters, that are the ones that are demonstrating <em>precisely </em>the governance quality that sustains value creation and avoids catastrophe.</p><p>That’s the paradox.</p><p>Governance enhancing tools need the <em>caution </em>of good governance to create the governance for those tools. These boards absorb the shareholder and media pressure for AI adoption, trading off potential increases of effectiveness with the certainty of a legal exposure that no-one can properly evaluate. There is no insurance policy, no case law, and no professional standards for this.</p><p>Meanwhile, the AI evangelist executives green light AI deployment knowing that when failures inevitably materialize, the distributed accountability makes individual liability virtually impossible to establish.</p><blockquote>Consider this — when an AI-generated board summary omits a critical risk warning and a director relies on it, who bears liability? The director for not reading full materials? The AI vendor? The implementation consultant? The law has no idea. This scenario has never existed before.</blockquote><p>Traditional governance works because accountability chains are clear. Board oversees management. Management runs operations. When failures occur, you can trace decisions to decision-makers.</p><h4><strong>The Five Degrees of AI Adoption in the Boardroom</strong></h4><p>AI adoption and tools are far more nuanced than disclosed. There are degrees of experience, capability, risk and jurisdictional requirements for human directors. Here are the five core degrees of AI adoption for the boardroom.</p><p>1. <strong>Administrative AI — </strong>the tools that take meeting minutes, summarise 100+ page board packs into briefings, track items, enable data discovery and support the operations of the board. Useful, definitely. Threatening, hardly.</p><p>2. <strong>Augmentation AI — </strong>helping directors take their performance to the next level. Think of coaches that improve decision making, see round blind spots, prep for meetings, help connect patterns of information, etc. This is like having an executive coach or an impossibly well-researched analyst that has read every board paper and research report, never sleeps, can answer all your questions, and occasionally makes things up with absolute confidence.</p><p>3. <strong>Shadow Boards — </strong>represent a genuinely novel development. This takes the concept of junior and shadow boards that are used by organisations incl. Central Banks but rather than using a second group of people, it is a parallel board of AI agents. The shadow board receives identical information as the human board and is used to generate alternative recommendations, challenge assumptions and stress test decisions. The theory is simple and elegant: expose groupthink, provide a dissenting voice without the social impacts, and identify risks outside the immediate spheres of experience. While the theory is simple, the practice is complicated. The shadow boards add yet more information to process already overloaded with information. Imagine receiving a 200-page board pack plus a pack of counter-analysis, alternative scenarios and synthetic objections. All this goes without even considering the legal ramifications.</p><p>4. <strong>Digital Twins </strong>— are like shadow boards but rather than a perfect hypothetical board, the AI agents are modelled on the existing individual directors — trained on their decision-making patterns, experience, and approach. The digital twin simulates how the directors might respond to different emotional context, framing, cognitive biases and information. The goal, better self-awareness and more consistent governance. The risk, a database that maps how to manipulate each director’s judgement or create a path to replace them.</p><p>5. <strong>AI Directors — </strong>the end game for AI evangelists. The AI Director has already found its way onto boards across the globe. Replacing the human director with an agent that has been trained on all the governance theory, analysis and best directors in history. In theory, the perfect director. Here, at stage 5, this is where the boards’ existential dread becomes perfectly rational.</p><p>Each degree higher represents an escalation in the transfer of decision authority from humans to algorithms, a potential roadmap from assistance to obsolescence.</p><h4><strong>Technology that runs before it walks</strong></h4><p>There is absolutely no doubt that today’s AI isn’t ready for high stakes governance decisions. It simply isn’t there. There is no possible way for any current LLM/Agent/Machine Learning program to replicate the years of experience and insight directors have. This so called ‘AI revolution’ fails as it collides with reality, recent reports from Anthropic and OpenAI add further support to MIT’s research that found 95% of AI initiatives fail to create positive value.</p><p>The path toward the safe adoption of any AI for directors is not just better models but fundamental breakthroughs in explainability, consistency and auditability. We need AI systems that can justify their reasoning in ways humans can verify, maintain coherent judgement across contexts, provide audit trails showing exactly how they reached conclusions, and have some consistency. Today — right now, we have to acknowledge that AI is fundamentally lacking and would be hopeless at replicating the three capabilities board decisions require:</p><p><strong>Judgment under genuine uncertainty</strong>: LLMs are great at producing confident outputs — real or hallucinated, but they struggle with truly novel and complex situations where past patterns aren’t obvious.</p><p><strong>Synthesis of conflicting information</strong>: Board decisions often require holding contradictory truths simultaneously e.g. a market looks oversaturated <em>and</em> represents the best growth opportunity. A CEO is underperforming <em>and</em> impossible to replace given transition risks. AI pushes toward resolution and consensus, not productive tension.</p><p><strong>Accountability for outcomes</strong>: Algorithms have no professional reputation to protect, no personal wealth at risk, no license to lose. When AI contributes to a catastrophic decision, it faces no consequences. This misaligns incentives in ways that erode decision quality over time.</p><h4><strong>The Investment Signal Hiding in Plain Sight</strong></h4><p>With technology that’s actually years away there’s key signals investors should look for today. A company’s approach to AI governance brings out their approach to risk, growth and innovation more broadly.</p><p>Using a classic framework that puts <strong><em>speed of adoption </em></strong>and <strong><em>depth of adoption </em></strong>on two axis it’s easy to plot and identify companies. Having run this analysis across the S&amp;P 500, ASX 200, and FTSE 100 we’ve identified just five clear board types.</p><ul><li><strong>Pioneers,</strong> aggressively pursue AI to capture first-mover advantages. They signal high risk tolerance and innovation culture but may sacrifice governance robustness. Their performance will either be spectacular successes or catastrophic failures.</li><li><strong>Fast Followers</strong> deploy proven capabilities using early learnings and customisation to avoid experimentation costs. They signal operational excellence and a willingness to exchange potential upside for execution soundness.</li><li><strong>Compliance Optimisers</strong> narrow deployment to efficiency in meeting regulatory requirements. Basically they exclusively use <em>A</em>dministrative AI. The benefits are real but come at the cost of ever-growing information asymmetries and blind spots as the black box of AI creates barriers between directors and operational reality.</li><li><strong>Patient Adopters</strong> develop internal frameworks first, observing Pioneers and Fast Followers with plans to deploy as the tech matures.</li><li><strong>Dinosaurs</strong> show no engagement with AI at all. This isn’t all bad, it may reflect a cultural commitment to craftsmanship and human judgment (Hermes) or simply stubbornness and complacency. Right now, the market punishes both dinosaurs equally.</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*AuDQpEjYb_XwMxMRjEqe1Q.png" /></figure><p>Those terrified directors are executing a caution on AI that’s a leading indicator for the type of institutional discipline that typically predicts high and sustainable returns.</p><blockquote>Consider this — The CEO is championing an acquisition that will transform the business, with synergies galore. The AI agent rejects the proposal, management insists on proceeding and the human board deliberates. They find AI’s concerns unconvincing and vote to approve the deal. Eighteen months later, the acquisition fails spectacularly, exactly the way AI predicted. What happens next?</blockquote><p>Did the board breach its duties by overruling the AI? Or did it fulfill its duty by exercising independent judgment rather than deferring to an algorithm? If discovery reveals the AI’s recommendation was based on a hallucinated precedent that seemed credible when generated, does that change the analysis? If the board didn’t have technical expertise to evaluate the AI’s reasoning quality, were they negligent in deploying the tool or negligent in overruling it?</p><p>These questions have no answers. The law hasn’t caught up and won’t for years. In the meantime, directors are making decisions in a vacuum where every choice has outsized risk.</p><h4><strong>What Investors Should Look For</strong></h4><p>The next decade represents a test of whether directors can govern the adoption of transformative technology thoughtfully. That fear of replacement properly channeled into frameworks and disciplined deployment, is exactly what we want to look for. It’s about a commitment to governance quality over innovation theatre.</p><p>This looks like cautious optimism, and that’s exactly what we want. An acknowledgement of AI’s potential but an insistence on frameworks, accountability, and measured timelines that build capabilities over time. While those first mover advantages are appealing, shareholders should be seriously concerned about the very real risk of implosion.</p><p>The markets current penalty for cautiousness is a mispricing opportunity that smart investors should exploit. Eventually, the market will have no choice but to re-rate, and as that first AI governance failure hits the courts, the distinction between patient and adopters will be unmistakably clear. The tide will be out and we’ll all see who was swimming naked.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=7a0c0e5ef538" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[LVMH —Melting Its Moat]]></title>
            <link>https://c-leeson.medium.com/lvmh-melting-its-moat-14bca8cfc5f7?source=rss-85575da8ca26------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/14bca8cfc5f7</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[fashion]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[luxury]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[business]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[investing]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Chris Leeson]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 18 Oct 2025 03:23:21 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-11-09T03:11:53.193Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/781/1*BEhmyB6RcS0YMjhGZcoP4A.png" /><figcaption>Image generated by Gemini</figcaption></figure><h4><strong>Why the Conglomerate Is Destroying Long-Term Value Creation</strong></h4><p>Patrice Louvet, CEO of Ralph Lauren, once likened corporate complacency to a frog slowly boiled alive — unaware of danger until it’s too late. This vivid imagery could hardly be more apt for LVMH. Over the past decade, the world’s largest luxury group has inched the temperature higher on every front — prices, brand extensions, acquisitions, and volume of stores. Yet beneath that growth, the slow boil of overreach and strategic hubris is beginning to show.</p><p>Investors have continued to celebrate LVMH as the pinnacle of luxury; a defensive growth stock resistant to inflation with heritage brands, global retail, mass appeal, growing profits and led by a corporate legend in Bernard Arnault. However, these investors have failed to appreciate that scale and brand are not interchangeable with competitive advantage, and family control is not synonymous with patient value creating stewardship. While LVMH’s historical success has been real, its strategic choices and GE conglomerate like approach is corroding the very intangible assets that justified its premium valuation. The result is an empire that sprawls across 75+ brands and is structurally unable to create the long-term value its share price demands.</p><p>At LVMH the governance is insular, pricing power is overplayed, manufacturing discipline slipping, and the once magical acquisition engine is running out of fuel.</p><ul><li>Moet Hennessy is laying of 10% of staff as operating margins have compressed from 31% to 23% and sales have declined</li><li>Organic sales growth has declined from 36% (2021) to ~1% (2025)</li><li>Loro Piana and Dior have both been placed under judicial administration for modern slavery and exploitation</li><li>Estimated price inflation over 5 and 10 year horizons exceeds 2x CPI</li><li>LVMH’s $16 billion purchase of Tiffany &amp; Co has been a disaster with missed sales targets, marketing blunders and Patek Phillipe closing all but one of its Tiffany boutiques after customer outrage over the limited-edition Nautilus 5711 in robin egg blue debacle</li><li>Louis Vuitton’s newly launched make-up line features US$160 lipstick, double rival Hermès at US$80, with pricing stretching beyond aspirational</li></ul><h4>Intangible assets are key to competitive advantage</h4><p>Strategy schools teach us that sustainable competitive advantage is a function of valuable, rare, inimitable, and non-substitutable resources. For luxury businesses like LVMH these typically come in the form of brand equity, creative talent, artisanal skill, process and knowledge, scarcity and customer relationships. LVMH owns and controls world-class brands with an estimated group brand value of US$40bn. Yet the management team continues to weaken these assets. Extending product ranges into knick-knacks affordable to ever broader audiences and engaging in unethical production of goods in factories across Spain, Italy, US and France. The consequences of these decisions are not hypothetical, they are showing up in falling organic growth, margin compression, and a failure to attract younger (Gen Z) customers.</p><p>LVMH turned pricing into an earnings machine. Between 2011 and 2024 Louis Vuitton list prices rose by roughly 76% — more than double US inflation over the same period and significantly outpacing peers Hermes or Chanel. The group executed especially steep hikes during and after COVID, capturing pandemic savings at the cost of their aspirational run of customers, critical to sustaining brand heat and social status. Price increases bought short-term margin at the cost of long-term value, damaging the brand’s elastic layer: the mass and aspirational cohorts that ensure future demand. When scarcity, cache and perceived craft no longer justify the stick shock, imitation and substitution accelerate — even among the wealthy. Social media has become awash with ‘dupes’ include high value replicas with prices ranging from US$500 — $2,000 for near perfect copies.</p><p>From a value appropriation lens, LVMH has been excellent at extracting cash. From a value creation lens, it has been negligent. Firms that over-monetise intangibles today often lose the social and cultural capital that makes those intangibles valuable tomorrow. LVMH is on a path of sustained value destruction for shareholders, customer loyalty scores have been sliding since 2022 and are now more than 13% below Hermes, at a level more aligned to global consumer beauty brand L’Oreal.</p><h4><strong>The conglomerate effect: dilution, not synergy</strong></h4><p>LVMH and Arnault’s historical genius lay in the ability to find under-loved brands and scale them through distribution, marketing, and operational discipline. What once looked like strategic vision now resembles financial engineering — complete with bolt on deals and expansion into adjacent categories designed more to sustain the appearance of momentum than to build durable brand equity. With organic growth stalling, acquisitions have become a necessity, an instrument of diminishing returns, and a problem. To lift group revenue by just two percent would require a target company generating roughly €1.7 billion in annual sales. There are few Tiffany-like targets still available, and the acquisitions that have been made of necessity have so far been failures.</p><p>Through LVMH’s path as a roll-up company it became a conglomerate more akin to GE or Berkshire Hathaway, with subsidiary brands preserving separate stores, ateliers, design teams, manufacturing and distribution. The common overlay is a management team hell bent on acquisitions, price hikes, cash extraction and category extensions.</p><p>This is a formula that produces the worst of both worlds — there’s no genuine operational integration or cost saving scale, and it simultaneously dilutes individual brand identities and intangible assets. The conglomerate structure functions as a tax on brand coherence rather than an engine of synergies and margin. This is more closely aligned to Jack Welch and his belief of GE’s management excellence, a belief that culminated in absolute disaster for shareholders.</p><p>Frustratingly, competitive advantage analysis predicts this outcome. As corporate scope grows without genuine capability transfer (think shared tech platforms, joint distribution, common manufacturing sites, integrated sales etc.), then diversification creates distraction and centralised management saps entrepreneurial dynamism.</p><p>This is not a marginal governance critique — it explains why newly acquired houses like Tiffany have suffered integration shocks that damaged client relationships and staff retention. LVMH excels at folding brands into a financial template, not at nurturing the fragile creative economics and intangible assets those brands require.</p><h4><strong>Channel and geographic vulnerabilities</strong></h4><p>LVMH’s push into direct-to-consumer, ecommerce and category expansion (e.g. standalone cosmetics rather than integrated cosmetics, Sephora) contradicts classic luxury economics, exclusivity is undermined by ubiquity. Attempts to push Dom Perignon into online D2C sales destroyed scarcity and prestige. Meanwhile, geographic concentration risks including China’s cyclical slowdown and changing Gen Z preferences, make the heavy reliance on premium price tiers perilous. Younger cohorts prize authenticity and sustainability — pricing strategies that alienate aspirational consumers reduce brand diffusion and long-term market penetration.</p><p>If governance and strategy reveal intellectual complacency, manufacturing shows operational strain. LVMH’s relentless pursuit of margin has increasingly conflicted and even contradicted with its promise of craftsmanship. In 2025, Loro Piana, the group’s cashmere jewel, was placed under judicial administration after Italian government investigators found subcontracts subjecting workers to exploitative conditions. Similar scrutiny and scandal have dogged Dior, which faced supply chain violations and administration by Italy’s labour inspectorate. Even Louis Vuitton’s much touted Texas leather goods factory — opening in 2019 with fanfare and Presidential endorsement — has faced quality control complaints and chronic difficulty recruiting skilled artisans.</p><p>Luxury is an emotional product anchored in trust. Once consumers suspect that a “Made in Italy” label masks industrial shortcuts or inconsistent quality — perception and trust corrodes rapidly. LVMH’s scale, once a moat, is now a vulnerability, the more it produces, the harder it becomes to maintain artisanal credibility.</p><p>Investors still price LVMH as if it can continue growing high single digits to low double digits indefinitely. That assumption looks fragile. The group trades on a premium multiple justified by scarcity and execution, both are eroding. Organic growth at one percent and declining margins do not sustain a luxury-sector P/E north of 25x without faith that this is a pause, not a plateau. The data suggests the latter.</p><h4><strong>What this means for long-term investors</strong></h4><p>Short term indicators: cash margins, real estate, wealth and spending concentration among the ultra-rich, will continue to prop up LVMH’s earning cycles. Yet structural dynamics point to secular headwinds, eroding brand scarcity, damaged customer relationships, and organisational inertia that prevents the patient, creative investment required for next-generation brand relevance. Market prices often assume the persistence of past growth; LVMH’s record suggests that persistence is the assumption most at risk.</p><p>The strategic prescription is straightforward and urgent: restore decentralized creative autonomy; make scarcity a deliberate policy (not an afterthought); integrate capabilities where real synergies exist (tech, CRM, distribution) and stop using price increases as the principal growth lever. Failure to act will make the only credible value-unlocking event a structural reshaping — spinning off divisions or breaking the group into focused entities that can rebuild intangible assets on their own terms.</p><p>That being said, LVMH is not doomed. Its intangibles still matter. But they are not indestructible. The company’s governance and operating choices have steadily raised the temperature. If management continues to prioritise immediate extraction over stewardship, the luxury empire will find its moat shallower, its competitive advantage eroded, and feeling like a very hot frog in water.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=14bca8cfc5f7" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[A Discussion On Monetary Levers]]></title>
            <description><![CDATA[<div class="medium-feed-item"><p class="medium-feed-image"><a href="https://c-leeson.medium.com/a-discussion-on-monetary-levers-87f5dfdc413c?source=rss-85575da8ca26------2"><img src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1600/0*OfE4dDHsTe4vpLF3.png" width="1600"></a></p><p class="medium-feed-snippet">Why access to credit rather than interest rates should be the primary tool of monetary policy.</p><p class="medium-feed-link"><a href="https://c-leeson.medium.com/a-discussion-on-monetary-levers-87f5dfdc413c?source=rss-85575da8ca26------2">Continue reading on Medium »</a></p></div>]]></description>
            <link>https://c-leeson.medium.com/a-discussion-on-monetary-levers-87f5dfdc413c?source=rss-85575da8ca26------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[academia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[banking]]></category>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Chris Leeson]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 02 Sep 2021 06:54:18 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-09-02T06:54:18.909Z</atom:updated>
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            <title><![CDATA[Inflation, Interest and Investing]]></title>
            <description><![CDATA[<div class="medium-feed-item"><p class="medium-feed-image"><a href="https://c-leeson.medium.com/inflation-interest-and-investing-4c4f597e8057?source=rss-85575da8ca26------2"><img src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1600/1*GVozzkfbLmyzTVKdL_nHFw.png" width="1600"></a></p><p class="medium-feed-snippet">Managing risk, picking stocks and preparing your portfolio for the most talked-about macro thematic.</p><p class="medium-feed-link"><a href="https://c-leeson.medium.com/inflation-interest-and-investing-4c4f597e8057?source=rss-85575da8ca26------2">Continue reading on Medium »</a></p></div>]]></description>
            <link>https://c-leeson.medium.com/inflation-interest-and-investing-4c4f597e8057?source=rss-85575da8ca26------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[business]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[finance]]></category>
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            <category><![CDATA[money]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Chris Leeson]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 12 Jun 2021 06:03:06 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-06-12T06:11:03.997Z</atom:updated>
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