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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Capital Tales on Medium]]></title>
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            <title>Stories by Capital Tales on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Private Credit: A Short History of an Asset Class That Never Wanted to Be Alternative]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@capitaltales/private-credit-a-short-history-of-an-asset-class-that-never-wanted-to-be-alternative-ccd9eee0bff3?source=rss-8f1d43886de3------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[banking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[direct-lending]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[basel]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[finance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[private-debt]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Capital Tales]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 23 Jun 2025 19:38:50 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-06-23T19:38:50.503Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Private Credit: A Short History of an Asset Class That Never Wanted to Be Alternative</strong></p><p><em>Ok… let’s start from the top.</em></p><p>Private credit might seem like a relatively new phenomenon, given the surge in headlines and fundraising activity.The truth is, it’s been quietly shaping markets for much longer than most headlines suggest.</p><p><em>It all starts back in the 1980s. New York City, naturally.</em></p><p><em>Insurance companies like </em><strong><em>Prudential</em></strong><em> and </em><strong><em>MetLife</em></strong><em> begin extending loans to small </em><br><em>Not large enough to tap public markets, and often too bespoke or unrated for syndicated bank lending.<br>For insurers, flush with long-term liabilities and seeking yield, it was an elegant match: a private deal, structured on their terms, with limited competition.</em></p><p><em>At the time, it wasn’t called “private credit.”</em></p><p><em>It was just long-dated, illiquid capital chasing yield in overlooked corners of the economy. The deals were bespoke, documentation-heavy, and dependent on deep relationships — but they worked.</em></p><p><em>For decades, this remained a quiet, under-the-radar pocket of institutional finance.</em></p><p>Then came <strong>the global financial crisis</strong> of 2008.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*g-KmQbJRRcCottR4Wl9b7w.png" /></figure><p>Banks, once dominant lenders to the real economy, were forced into retreat. Not by choice — but by <strong>regulatory overhaul</strong>.</p><p>After the crisis, global regulators realized that banks had taken on far too much risk with too little capital to absorb losses. When the system cracked, the ripple effects were devastating — not just for Wall Street, but for the entire world economy.</p><p>In response, regulators introduced a new framework — known as Basel III — that significantly tightened capital rules. Banks were now required to hold more capital against risky assets, making it more expensive and less appealing to lend to corporate borrowers, especially those below investment grade. What had once been routine credit business became capital-intensive and heavily regulated.</p><blockquote><strong><em>This was the inflection point.</em></strong><em><br>Demand for capital didn’t vanish — it shifted. As small and mid-sized businesses resumed their appetite for growth, acquisitions, and refinancing, banks — constrained by regulation — couldn’t keep up. They stepped back. And into that gap stepped private lenders</em>.</blockquote><p>Thus began the <strong>modern era of Direct Lending</strong>.</p><p>While Europe was still negotiating post-crisis banking reforms, a number of U.S. asset managers — many of whom had roots in leveraged finance and distressed debt stepped in where banks were retracting. <strong>Ares</strong>, <strong>Golub Capital</strong>, <strong>HPS</strong>, and <strong>Oaktree</strong>,<strong> </strong>veterans of high-yield and distressed markets, didn’t wait for an invitation. They saw the opening — and stepped in, lending where banks had stepped away.</p><p>Were they fully aware of the scale of what they were building? <strong>Unlikely.</strong></p><p>But they moved fast. At first, much of the activity centred on <strong>mezzanine and subordinated debt</strong> — the traditional tools of non-bank lenders. But as confidence grew and institutional capital poured in, these firms began raising dedicated private credit funds, shifting toward <strong>unitranche and senior secured structures</strong>. Loan sizes ranged from <strong>$25 million to $250 million</strong>, tailored for private equity sponsors hungry for speed, flexibility, and certainty of execution — without the friction of traditional syndication.</p><p>At first, direct lending was seen as a niche within alternatives. But the growth was rapid — and relentless.</p><p>By <strong>2015</strong>, Direct Lending had gone from a $100 billion backwater to one of the fastest-growing private market segments.</p><p>By <strong>2020</strong>, global AUM in private credit surpassed <strong>$850 billion</strong>, with over half of that concentrated in direct lending strategies.</p><p>The appeal was clear: stable cash flows, floating-rate structures, downside protection via covenants and collateral — and for investors, a return profile that sat neatly between high-yield bonds and private equity, but with better visibility.</p><p>What started as a workaround became a playbook — and then a business model <strong>too big to ignore</strong>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*5JUeRHWvMQjlPr1mFJCoYg.png" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ccd9eee0bff3" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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