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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Paddy Carter on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Paddy Carter on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Paddy Carter on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[The price is wrong: a review]]></title>
            <link>https://carterpaddy.medium.com/the-price-is-wrong-a-review-2d039fc637d7?source=rss-98a1710c0aee------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[renewable-energy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[power-market]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[capitalism]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Paddy Carter]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 08 Dec 2024 16:28:07 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-12-11T15:26:11.376Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>The price is wrong: a book review</h3><p>The premise of <a href="https://www.versobooks.com/en-gb/products/3069-the-price-is-wrong?srsltid=AfmBOoreIEgSV4GVd-SLAW90xR_PvHrOUdLcGZNyaf7yxzAct6rsrNZl">Brett Christophers’ book</a> is that renewables are now cheaper than fossils, so we should be seeing huge investments in renewables, but we are not. The central idea of the book is that this situation is explained by the fact that investments are not determined by what things cost, but by how profitable they are, and that the market for renewables works in such a way as to make them insufficiently profitable. The problem is relying on markets.</p><p>I disagree with the premise. A useful way of looking at costs is to see power systems as consisting of different elements that perform different roles, and to ask what the cost-minimising system looks like. At today’s costs, in most countries, costs are minimised with a mix of renewables and fossils. That’s because of the familiar costs involved with transporting and storing renewable energy so that it is available to meet demand patterns.</p><p>Moreover, if you really want markets to deliver a renewables boom and displace fossils rapidly, then the cost comparison you are looking at is not that of comparing renewables against fossils for a potential greenfield investment, but whether building renewables will save money relative to continuing to operate incumbent fossil generators, where construction costs have long since been amortised and renewables are competing against fuel and maintenance costs.</p><p>Christophers understands all this, and a great deal of the book is spent explaining all the above, and the shortcomings of narrow cost metrics. But for some reason I cannot fathom, he does not recognise that all these arguments undermine his premise and imply there is no puzzle to explain: the costs of renewables are not yet low enough to sweep the board in a free market. <a href="#_ftn3">[1]</a></p><p>Christophers also documents various investors complaining about the lack of profitability, especially the oil majors for whom the returns on investing in renewables compare very poorly to profits from their oil oligopoly. He correctly attributes this to the renewables market being very competitive. But for some reason he does not recognise that blaming this for slow renewables adoption amounts to arguing we don’t have enough investment in renewables because there are too many people willing to invest in renewables. As some else observed, this resembles Yogi Berra’s famous quip: “No-one ever goes there anymore — it’s too crowded.”<a href="#_ftn4">[2]</a></p><p>One of the problems with renewables markets he describes is investor reluctance to take “merchant risk”, which involves selling power into a market where prices reflect supply and demand conditions on that day (as opposed to selling power at prices pre-defined by a contract). <a href="#_ftn2">[3]</a> Christophers points to price volatility, but to my mind it’s not so much volatility that is the problem (a variable can be volatile but also predictable over time) as it is the fear that power systems are already reaching the point where they have all the renewable power they can absorb, with the result that prices hit zero just at those times when you have renewable power to sell. This is a great example of where costs matter for what can be done profitably. If prices are low when renewables are generating and high when they are not, that means battery operators could turn a profit by charging when prices are low and discharging when prices are high. But only if the cost of batteries is low enough! <a href="#_ftn5">[4]</a></p><p>Christophers demonstrates that government subsidies are still very important to the renewables industry and argues this supports his thesis. But if you accept that renewables are competitive in some places and for some purposes, but still more expensive than fossils in others, then the need for subsidies to tip that balance is obvious, and that includes subsidies in a form that makes it easier for developers to profit. Because nobody denies that private sector actors are motivated by profits.</p><p>In chapter 5, Christophers moves from description to explanation. He writes “Let us start with theory. The view that the relative prices of different sources of energy will determine [… what happens] is very much a view from within the economics mainstream” and he introduces readers to an alternative approach, “political economy”, which tell us the production of goods and services “is always initiated on the basic of prospective profit” and “even if they are confident about demand conditions, firms will be reluctant to invest if they think the return on investment is too low”. He continues, rather to my amazement, “this way of thinking brooks no space for orthodox economics.”</p><p>I wish critics would be slower to believe mainstream economists are blind to the bleeding obvious. Despite much economic modelling abstracting away from profits, the mainstream treatment of investment decisions very much does look at expected profitability. <a href="#_ftn6">[5]</a> Christophers goes on “the question nobody — not economists and not McKibben — ever ask is, why, unless externally forced would the electricity industry accept, let along embrace, a highly disruptive transition that lowered production costs but saw little, if any, of the resulting efficiency gains accruing to industry actors.” This is the sort of thing you can only write if you have not paid much attention to what questions economists ask. <a href="#_ftn7">[6]</a> One of the reasons why we might want market forces to be at work in energy systems it to create incentives for some actors to invest in cheaper generation technology and put other generators out of business.</p><p>Later, Christophers discusses the UK power market and describes how it “stacks” generators’ bids from least to most expensive and then dispatches power from the cheapest up until demand is met, with “the price set by the bid offered by the highest-bid generator amongst those dispatched”. He asks: “why does the most expensive generator set the prices received by all?” rather than everyone being paid what they bid, and writes that question elicited “much head scratching”. He then worries that “if bids reflect costs, then might not lower generating costs mean lower bids, lower wholesale prices and lower revenues?” thereby undermining profitability of cheaper generation technology. But that’s why the market is designed so the most expensive generator that sets the market price! That way, the cheaper generators make more money, so there is a greater incentive to be the cheapest than there would be if everyone was paid what they bid.</p><p>There is more to say — the book has various examples I would like to discuss. [7] But this is long enough already. Christophers concludes by suggesting state-owned utilities would do a better job of decarbonising power systems than markets. I work for a DFI that invests in private power generation and transmission, but I do not presume the private route is always better. Power markets with private actors (generators, traders, distributors) certainly have their problems and state-owned enterprises might be more effective. But state-run systems have their own problems, and often poor track records, which Christophers does not delve into. Which system generates the best results is a question that would benefit from some empirical answers. It was a shame the book did not attempt to show in the data whether greater “marketisation” is associated with slower renewables build-out.</p><p>The full title of the book is “The price is wrong: Why capitalism won’t save the planet”. It might be possible to envisage a market in which power companies are left to their own devices. I would certainly agree that capitalism won’t save us, if that’s what we mean by capitalism. But as Christophers points out, power markets designed by regulators are hardly “free markets.” My view is dull and conventional — we need government interventions in markets because of all the usual reasons (externalities and market failures), but that combined with tools such as subsidies and regulations, markets can be designed to create the right incentives to ride the wave of green technological progress and drive out fossil fuels. How fast that happens will depend on the force with which the state puts its thumb on the scales. I think it needs to push harder.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref3">[1]</a> Christophers also recognises “the legion bureaucratic barriers relating, for instance, to permitting and grid connection” that add to the costs of renewables, but again does not see these as undermining the premise that renewables are now cheaper.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref4">[2]</a> I got this from <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/posts/edcrooks_energytransition-activity-7203544144718295040--c52/">Ed Crooks on LinkedIn</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref2">[3]</a> The problem of marginal cost pricing in the presence of fixed costs is very well-known — <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/0047272780900213">here</a> is Geoffrey Heal writing about the general problem in 1980, and here he applies it to the <a href="https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w27766/w27766.pdf">Economics aspects of energy transition</a> in 2020. I think Christophers is quite wrong about the relative costs of different technologies not being the underlying driver of what gets built, but the problems of designing power markets so that the various actors can do what we want them to, and turn a profit, are of course very real. Gallons of ink have been spilt by mainstream economists on the topic of how power market design should change to encourage decarbonisation — more than I could cite here — but for a taster <a href="https://pesd.fsi.stanford.edu/research/electricity-market-design">here’s a summary page</a> from Stanfords’ energy program. And countries, such as the UK, that want to use market mechanisms to decarbonise their power systems, also publish <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/review-of-electricity-market-arrangements-rema-technical-research-supporting-consultation">mountains of research</a> on the topic.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref5">[4]</a> Once batteries are cheap enough to get built, and they start buying low and selling high, that will bid up prices when renewables are generating and reduce prices when they are not, thereby reducing price volatility until it is no longer profitable to add more batteries. People will then complain about how the battery business is not profitable.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref6">[5]</a> By abstracting away from profits, I mean reducing investment decisions to the marginal return on capital. <a href="https://www.dropbox.com/scl/fi/2m0tg3utm6lhutvbdejzz/w31029.pdf?rlkey=8i7kevvtjeu6hgxw0l1f43oow&amp;e=1&amp;dl=0">Here</a> is an example of a (imo, good) paper that derives demand for power investments but does not worry about whether power companies have a profitable business model. I am not sure what to cite to show that less simplified mainstream treatments of investment are based on expected profits. It comes up in hundreds of papers. Maybe <a href="https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w1654/w1654.pdf">this one</a> from 1985 by Majd and Pindyck. First year students are taught how to calculate the net present value (a.k.a. profitability) of investments. I gave all my old economics textbooks to charity, <a href="http://kimoon.co.kr/mi/pindyck-8/im/Ch15.pdf">this</a> document has review questions from the relevant chapter of the micro textbook I had, asking, for example, whether it would be profitable to build a factory. There are whole subfields of corporate finance and industrial organisation that dig into the details of how investment decisions are taken and what explains profits.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref7">[6]</a> Again, I am not sure what is best to cite here. Perhaps Nordhaus “<a href="https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w10433/w10433.pdf">Schumpeterian profits in the American economy: theory and measurement</a> or maybe Griffith and Van Reenen “<a href="https://eprints.lse.ac.uk/113816/1/dp1818.pdf">Product market competition, creative destruction and innovation</a>.” Those are about incentives for disruptive innovation in general — when it comes to electricity there are hundreds of a papers on power market design that study the incentives they create within the industry.</p><p>[7] For instance, he recounts research showing that steam power was adopted in England’s factories despite water power being cheaper, because the mobile nature of steam gave capitalists more bargaining power against labour and hence was more profitable. I don’t dispute that those dynamics influenced decisions, but that example does not overturn the idea that costs drive decisions. Products have different costs, they also have different attributes. A power source that you can only use if you have access to a suitable site is not the same thing as a power source that is more flexible. My belief that relative costs are ultimately what drives energy investments does not imply I’d choose a technology that generates electricity for $0.01, but only at midnight during a leap year, over one that costs $0.05 any time, any place.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2d039fc637d7" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Impact and duration]]></title>
            <link>https://carterpaddy.medium.com/impact-and-duration-3283ac6ed159?source=rss-98a1710c0aee------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/3283ac6ed159</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[development]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[impact-investing]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Paddy Carter]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 13 Apr 2023 19:01:55 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-04-18T09:20:34.617Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I have been thinking about the relationship between impact and the duration of investments. When should an impact investor tie their money up for many years, as opposed to recycling their capital more quickly and making more (impactful) investments over time?</p><p>This is a complicated question. We might want to get into the difference between social returns (impact) and private returns, and ask whether some projects with high social returns might be long-term in nature.</p><p>But here, I think, is one aspect of the question. It has to do with the distinction between the time that the underlying real investment (“project”) takes to generate returns and survive, and the tenor of the investment instruments. A long term project can be financed by short term instruments. I am sorry if this is perfectly obvious, but it’s only just struck me!</p><p>Start with the simplest possible example in which there is no difference between private and social returns, cash flows generated by the underlying real investment are constant, and “impact” equals the lifetime returns of the project.</p><p>Consider a real investment that takes 10 years to pay for itself. You could finance that with one 10-year loan, or five 2-year loans, one after another.</p><p>So here the question of whether the long or short term debt has more impact is really a question of attribution. The 10 year loan is responsible for the whole project, and its whole impact. The 2 year loan is only responsible for one fifth of it, so it has less impact.</p><p>Our objective is to maximise impact. In this case moving to shorter tenor instruments so we can recycle our capital more quickly and deploy more each year would do nothing to raise our impact. We could deploy 5 times more, but each dollar deployed has 1/5th of the impact.</p><p>If short terms loans actually had underlying investments that paid for themselves quickly, you’d choose them over 10-year loans all day long. But that option is usually not on the table - investment projects that pay for themselves in a few years are very rare, because that’s a very high return project.</p><p>I suspect this could hold more generally. Short-term instruments might often be responsible, in an attribution sense, for only part of the impact of underlying project, whereas longer-tenor instruments are more often likely to be responsible for the lot (or at least, more of it). Of course you can split attribution up between multiple investors co-investing at the same point in time too, but that’s is true regardless of the duration of the instrument. The point here is that sometimes attribution between different investors needs to happen over time too.</p><p>Trade finance is a short term instrument that needs to be refreshed or its impact stops. Other investors might take up the baton if you exit, but if they do, they get credit for subsequent impact. Short term working capital loans are similar. They need to be rolled over to sustain the impact. Some short term investments imply that other investors would be subsequently needed if you exit to sustain the impact of the impact-generating activity. If you don’t exit, you are really make a long-term investment via a series of short-term investments.</p><p>But this attribution of impact between investors over time contradicts how I think about equity (by which I mean primary fund raising or growth capital) — or anything else where it seems intuitive that the impact is created by those who are in at the beginning. With equity we might say the impact is created by the initial ticket that pays for the underlying real investment, and if you can sell your equity two months later then you can swan off taking credit for the lifetime impact of the thing. At BII, we don’t give ourselves credit for impact when we buy equity in a secondary transaction, unless we are doing something else too, to change the impact of the underlying enterprise. With project finance, we might say the impact is created when you originate and close the project, and if the long-term debt you provide is refinanced once the construction phase is over and you exit, your impact is not diminished.</p><p>In these cases, the attribution of impact across investors looks like giving all the credit to the lender who supplied the first two-year loan in the original example, and gives no credit to whomever supplies the next four 2-year loans. So which approach is right — if many investors are involved over time, is the impact created by the first mover or should it be divided up between the initial and subsequent investors?</p><p>Perhaps the answer is to look at things from the project’s point of view. With equity, for example, it is the initial growth capital that does the work, and who owns the equity subsequently is immaterial (ignoring potential non-financial contributions of shareholders). But a 10-year payback project cannot happen with just one 2-year loan. It needs those subsequent 2-year loans.</p><p>Sometimes you may hold an investment for only a short period, but the impact was created at the start and whether you exit or stay invested does not affect impact. Sometimes an instrument might be short-term, and it’s one of a series of investments that are necessary to sustain the activity.</p><p>At least, in theory. This post has been something of a thought experiment to make the point that with some instruments the attribution of impact might need to be split between different investors over time. Hence switching from long duration instruments to short duration can diminish your impact per transaction. But that’s not necessarily what’s actually happening when DFIs shorten the duration of their investments. Because sometimes that could mean exiting equity or debt positions sooner, in secondary transactions that do not leave the project needing to raise more money to survive.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3283ac6ed159" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Nominal interest rates and the cost of electricity (continued)]]></title>
            <link>https://carterpaddy.medium.com/nominal-interest-rates-and-the-cost-of-electricity-continued-f81bb592ab85?source=rss-98a1710c0aee------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f81bb592ab85</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Paddy Carter]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 20 Dec 2022 11:13:12 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-01-04T14:12:21.084Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I wrote<a href="https://www.bii.co.uk/en/news-insight/research/structuring-investments-to-adapt-to-high-nominal-rates-and-inflation/"> a blog</a> about how higher nominal interest rates won’t necessarily result in higher real electricity tariffs from renewables projects. I got this response:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/602/1*e2_qiEmuAOEZFbMf7iOV0A.jpeg" /></figure><p>Which is a good question. I am going to try to answer it using simple numerical examples, but in what follows you are likely to discover that either I don’t understand how the “levelized cost of electricity” (LCOE) is calculated, or I don’t understand how project finance works, or possibly both.</p><p>If you are thinking “this guy works at DFI that invests in renewables, why doesn’t he go talk to the project finance team” you are correct, and I shall.</p><p>My initial response was to model a simple project where capital is the only cost, and the “tariff” is the interest charged on the outstanding principal plus a principal repayment. This is modelling a solar plant as if it was a loan, and the tariff you pay for electricity is the similar to a loan repayment (and the project developer is the same as a lender). In this very simple model the cost of supplying electricity is the same as the cost of repaying the loan that paid for the solar plant to be built, with interest.</p><p>Obviously, this excludes a lot, but I think it’s enough to illustrate the point. People are concerned that higher interest rates will hurt investment in renewables because they are capital intensive compared to fossil generation, meaning that all the costs come from initial construction and very little from operations and maintenance (unlike fossil generators, which must pay for fuel). In this example, the project is so capital intensive, there is nothing else.</p><p>Here’s what that looks like. This is the “low interest rates, low inflation” regime — the tariff is calculated by adding together a principal repayment and interest rate charge. I then divide the tariff by the economy’s “price level” to get a real cost. The numbers here are arbitrary — you can think of the real cost of the tariff as being measured in quantities of goods instead of dollars. If your economy consisted only of apples and electricity, this is how many apples you are giving up paying for your electricity. The tariff is in dollars — the “real cost” those dollars represent something like an index which tells you what those dollars can buy [1].</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/575/1*e2DfrEZUPmYJD3elMdcUag.jpeg" /></figure><p>Now, what happens if we move to a high interest rate, high inflation environment?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/569/1*HYkRebOyXq6YbQjOGujucg.jpeg" /></figure><p>What you can see here is that the interest charge doubles, but the tariff only goes up by about 15% and the total real cost over four years — which is the number in the green rectangle—is unchanged. But notice how the timing has changed — the real cost is now higher in early years and lower in later years. I think that means if you are impatient (if you discount the future) then you are worse off. That is a point I omitted from my initial blog.</p><p>But why does my little model suggest such a small change in tariff, when LCOE calculators imply such a large change, when interest rates double?</p><p>My first thought was that because I modelled the debt as being repaid over only four years, principal repayments make up most of the tariff and interest payments little. What if the power purchase agreement / loan is over 20 years?</p><p>Yes, that changes things. It does not change the fact that moving from a low interest, low inflation environment to a high interest, low inflation environment leaves the total real cost unchanged, but it does imply a much larger initial change in the dollar tariff. In these examples, I have hidden the years 3- 18 to make things legible. Ignore the inflation-linked tarriff shown in the bottom three rows for now. Here is a 20-year PPA with low interest and inflation:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/611/1*EGOrAuRZVqqTi-Sq10-h3Q.jpeg" /></figure><p>And here is it is with high interest and inflation:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/604/1*qfxZY5PExOlVJmhxnGE_XA.jpeg" /></figure><p>You can see the tariff jumps from 10 dollars in the first year, in the first case, to 15 in the first year, in the second case — a 50% increase. If you add up the total dollar cost over the 20 years, it’s 147.3 under the low interest and inflation regime and 199.5 under the high interest and inflation regime — a 35% increase.</p><p>Now for those new rows showing an “inflation-linked” tariff. These represent an alternative pricing scheme. There is no need to structure tariffs like a loan, with regular principal repayments and interest charged on the principal outstanding [2]. What you could do instead, for example, is charge an inflation-linked tariff, so that the dollar tariff rises over time but stays constant in real terms, rather than shrinking in both nominal and real term like payments under a loan-like structure do.</p><p>To make a like-for-like comparison, I keep the lifetime real cost of this alternative inflation-linked tariff unchanged from the original “loan” tariff, by setting its initial level equal to the original lifetime real cost divided by 20, and then increase the tariff by inflation each year. Important caveat: I don’t know how developers actually calculate inflation-linked tariffs! That results in a tariff with a annual fixed real cost, and the same total real cost over 20 years as the loan-like structure. It is shown in the examples above in the row labelled “constant real tariff”.</p><p>This results in a tariff that is initially lower — looking at the example above, the tariff in the first year with a loan-like structure is 15 dollars and it’s just 5.5 dollars for the inflation-linked tariff. But looking ahead to year 20, the original loan-like tariff has shrunk to 5.5 in <em>nominal</em> (dollar) terms whereas the inflation-linked tariff has risen to 33.6 dollars, which is what it takes to keep up with inflation.</p><p>Now, comparing the low interest and inflation regime against the high interest and inflation regime, looking at the “constant real tariff”, the initial dollar change is very small — from 5.3 to 5.5 in the first year — but the difference between the two regimes grows over time. By year 20, the inflation linked tariff is 13.3 dollars in the low inflation regime and 33.6 in the high. If you add up the dollar cost over the 20 years, it’s 160.3 in the low inflation regime and 281.4 in the high inflation regime (although, of course, the real cost is the same under the two regimes.</p><p>This gets us closer to the large percentage increase in dollar costs that LCOE calculators imply when interest rates rise, although the point that real costs don’t change of course remains. What I want to do next is understand how LCOE calculations work in more detail, to understand how they compare to these tariff structures.</p><p>[1] If it is not obvious to you why project developers and governments buying electricity would care about real income and real costs, think about how inflation is said to erode the value of savings.</p><p>[2] In earlier drafts I described this as similar to a mortgage, but repayment mortgages are designed to keep your monthly payments constant, rather than having them shrink over time as the principal is paid down. When monthly payments are fixed, what happens is that the proportion of the payment that is going towards interest charges shrinks over time, and the proportion that is repaying the principal rises. This would be another possible tariff structure — a fixed nominal (dollar) payment each year.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f81bb592ab85" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Is investment low because private return requirem]]></title>
            <link>https://carterpaddy.medium.com/is-investment-low-because-private-return-requirem-9b457e93a6e1?source=rss-98a1710c0aee------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/9b457e93a6e1</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Paddy Carter]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 16 Nov 2022 12:43:45 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-11-26T13:30:14.963Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Is investment low because private return requirements are high?</h3><p>One of the things I learnt when writing the paper <a href="https://www.bii.co.uk/en/news-insight/insight/articles/risk-return-and-impact/">Risk, Return and Impact</a> was how private equity investors think about required returns. I come from an economics background so presumed that equity investors would think in terms of “expected returns” — which are the product of potential outcomes and their respective probabilities (when you roll a dice the expected value is 3.5). If you were writing down an economic model of investment, that is what decisions would be based on.</p><p>It turns out that private equity investors often price deals by primarily looking at returns under a baseline scenario. I say “primarily” because they may also consider upside and downside scenarios, and discuss their likelihood, but they tend not to assign probabilities and compute an expected return.</p><p>This is rather like the interest rate on a loan, which is also what lenders receive if things go to plan (although debt is low risk and things go wrong far less often). But equity investors cannot “require” returns in the same way as lenders can, by specifying interest payments. What they can do is price equity — which amounts to valuing a business — so that if things go to plan, they will get the return they are looking for. But if things do not go to plan, that’s their tough luck. They cannot place a company in default and start legal proceedings, like a lender can.</p><p>This gap between “required” and “expected” returns is at its most extreme for venture capitalists, who might price deals to at least treble their money under whatever they consider a reasonable success scenario to look like, but then they may also expect <a href="https://www.hbs.edu/news/Pages/item.aspx?num=487">three-quarters of their investments to fail</a> and return nothing.</p><p>I think this misunderstanding (muddling up expected and required returns) — which I laboured under myself — really matters for how we think about private finance for development.</p><p>Imagine that you have $100 to invest and you want your money back. You have two options — Safeville, where you get your money back for sure, and Riskland, where half the time the project blows up, and you get nothing. That means if projects in Riskland return $200 when they succeed, the expected return in both places is $100. But you are “requiring” returns that will double your money in Riskland when things go to plan. Now if we observe that Riskland is not attracting much investment, is the problem here that private investors have unreasonably high “required” return expectations, or is the problem that projects blow up half the time? If you knew the private sector minimum return <em>expectation</em> was to double their money in Riskland, which would imply “required” returns of $400, that would be a completely different story — and a reason to blame low investment on high private risk premia — which is why this distinction matters.</p><p>Here is a table from the <a href="https://www.lse.ac.uk/granthaminstitute/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/IHLEG-Finance-for-Climate-Action.pdf">Finance for Climate Action</a> report by the Independent High-Level Expert Group on Climate Finance, published at COP.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/602/1*cgTM50ai7TYBtgfon6WawA.png" /></figure><p>I presume this table is mislabelled and these are not required returns on solar projects, which are mostly financed by debt with much lower interest rates, but are rather the required returns of the equity investors in solar projects. If you want convincing on that point, try putting a 20% plus cost of capital into a “<a href="https://ens.dk/en/our-responsibilities/global-cooperation/levelized-cost-energy-calculator">levelized cost of electricity” calculator</a> and see how close you can get to the low single digit cent tariffs per kilowatt hour that are now routine in solar PV auctions (things have moved on since then, but the <a href="https://www.ebrd.com/news/2022/how-the-ebrd-became-egypts-leading-partner-for-renewable-energy-.html">Kom Ombo solar project in Egypt</a> hit a tariff of 2.5 cents/kWh).</p><p>Equity is the risk-bearing portion of solar project finance. When regulatory problems delay operations, it comes out of equity returns. Or when construction costs are higher than anticipated, or currency depreciation and FX shortage result in the project going into arrears, and so forth. I think these required returns numbers will reflect how projects are priced based on some reasonable base case scenario. I don’t think are expected returns. If you really think that you can make a 20% plus return <em>on average</em> from putting equity into solar PV in Africa, I suggest you pick up the phone to your pension fund manager [1]. As the authors of the Finance for Climate Action reports are at pains to point out, the main problem here is how often projects run into trouble, not unreasonable returns expectations.</p><p>What does this mean about the choice between public and private finance? If you are a government, in the absence of externalities, you also should not be putting $100 into projects that blow up half the time, unless they return $200 when they succeed [2]. The public sector expected return on investment need not be exactly the same as private — the risk premium should arguably be lower, for example. But the basic point remains — projects that fail are bad news when financed publicly too, and a higher return when things go to plan should be required from things that often fail.</p><p>If the argument is that a reliance on private finance is resulting in too few investments going ahead in risky countries because private required return hurdle rates are too high, the first point is that they are not as high as they appear (if they are “required” returns for equity) and the second point is, I think, that public sector required return hurdle rates ought to be high in those place too [3].</p><p>If there are positive externalities and the social returns on investment are higher than financial returns, then you have a case for subsidising the investment, and investing even if expected financial returns are negative. But that case for a subsidy is there whether the project is publicly or privately financed. Whether public or private finance is the most efficient choice is a complicated question that depends on a lot of factors — one of them could be unreasonable risk premia required by private investors. But you must look at expected returns to see risk premia, not returns required under a baseline scenario. High “required” returns from equity investors in risky environments are not enough to conclude that public investment would be the better choice, because public investment should also require more from riskier projects. If you want to subsidise green investments in low-income countries and think that cheap sovereign debt from multilateral banks for publicly financed projects is a more promising way to go about that than putting concessional blended finance into private projects, that’s a legitimate but different argument. The risks that are made visible in market required returns do not go away when publicly financed, and the costs of project failure must be paid either way.</p><p>[1] The IMF report <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Departmental-Papers-Policy-Papers/Issues/2021/05/14/Private-Finance-for-Development-50157">Private Finance for Development: wishful thinking or thinking out of the box?</a> (pp 26–29) reports that <em>average</em> realised returns in African private equity funds and returns on equity reported by firms in Africa, in most recent years, have been close to 5%.</p><p>[2] There is a whole set of interesting questions here about how the choice of structure (public or private finance, ownership and operation) affects how often projects blow up and what happens when they do … which are going to have to wait for another day.</p><p>[3] I am betraying my ignorance of how publicly financed projects are structured here, but I don’t imagine that public investment necessarily portions project finance into a risk-bearing equity-like component with a different return hurdle to a lower risk debt component. So the return financial hurdle on a public project may look more like the “weighted average cost of capital” (i.e. the combination of debt and equity) in a private project.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9b457e93a6e1" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[A framework for investing with altruism, by Jonathan Harris.]]></title>
            <link>https://carterpaddy.medium.com/a-framework-for-investing-with-altruism-by-jonathan-harris-816ed6c0f445?source=rss-98a1710c0aee------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/816ed6c0f445</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[impact-investing]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Paddy Carter]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 05 Jun 2022 16:32:06 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-06-17T10:03:24.119Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[<a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3934090">link to paper</a>]</p><p>(This is the second in a series of hopefully accessible discussions of academic papers about impact investing. The first is <a href="https://carterpaddy.medium.com/impact-investing-a-theory-of-social-enterprises-by-ben-roth-76fc6aa71a81">here</a>)</p><p>This is a paper about how investors should think about their impact, and what they are trying to maximise when they construct a portfolio. A lot of this resonates very strongly with how we think about these questions at British International Investment, to the extent that there are passages that are almost identical to our internal guidelines and training material.</p><p>There are also some new ideas, although some of these are — I think — hard to apply in practice. And there is an attempt to capture everything formally in mathematical notation. Harris says this brings precision and coherence which “makes it suitable for both practical and academic applications.” I fear the formality might be more appealing to academics than practitioners.</p><p>This is a working paper that will be revised, and some of what I write here is informed by conversations with the author about that. It covers (at least) three topics: how to define what investors are trying to optimise and how to conceptualise total returns; how to think about the impact of investors and the firms they invest in; how to think about the question of impact relative to a counterfactual. I’ll take each of these in turn, starting with that probabilistic approach.</p><h3>The counterfactual: what are the chances this wouldn’t have happened without us?</h3><p>Harris insists that impact must be defined relative to a counterfactual.<a href="#_ftn1">[1]</a> His view is that you are not an impact investor unless you are genuinely altruistic and “genuine altruists gain utility from genuine impact.” He notes “some believe it is too hard to think carefully about the counterfactual. The simple solution is just to invest in ‘great’ companies and attribute a proportion of the enterprise impact to oneself.” Harris is not having that. He also notes that “economists already naturally think in terms of welfare improvement and counterfactual impact” and may be surprised to learn some impact investors do not.</p><p>However, if a large number of impact investors are competing for the same investment opportunities, it’s hard for any one of them to believe they are making any difference with their individual investment, relative to the counterfactual of them not investing. If investors took that seriously, perhaps nobody would invest because everyone would believe they wouldn’t make a difference! He likens this to the ‘irrationality’ of voting “despite the astronomically small odds of being the swing vote.” His solution is to think probabilistically.</p><p>This is music to my ears. In my paper <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0305750X2100005X">The Elusive Quest for Additionality</a> (with Nicolas Van de Sijpe and Raphael Calel) we suggest a probabilistic approach, and at BII we regard additionality as something in which we can have varying degrees of confidence, but we can never know. As Harris puts it “decision-relevant impact is always an assessment of expected impact never a measurement, because the counterfactual is never measurable.” That’s little too strong — but the point that you usually cannot know (and hence measure) both what will happen if you do and what will happen if you don’t, is right.</p><p>Harris suggests that altruistic investors should adopt what game theorists call a “mixed strategy”. That means instead of adopting a rule “in these circumstances, I will take this action”, players introduce some randomness: “in these circumstances, I will take this action with some probability”. He writes “if all investors choose a low, but non-zero probability that they will make an investment, then the number of investors who invest will be low on average” which means there is more chance that your investment will be the “swing vote” that makes a difference. In terms of expected impact, some chance of making a difference is enough to justify action.</p><p>I think the word “adopt” is misplaced here. Nobody is going to introduce randomness to their investment decisions. Investment is already uncertain. As Harris puts it: “one shouldn’t think in binary terms of others investing or not, but in terms of the probability that others will invest.” From our point of view, the uncertainty comes from the chance we will end up rejecting a prospective investment, or that the project sponsor will reject us. Our strategy is: “if the deal is mutually agreeable, we are in”.<a href="#_ftn2">[2]</a></p><p>I think there is another way to think about the probability of impact — but rather than asking “what are the chances this investment would not go ahead without me” private impact investors can ask “what are the chances the overall quantity of impactful investment is higher because of me?”</p><p>BII is a public DFI, so the counterfactual that concerns us is what private investors might have done if we decline to invest — we want to have an impact relative to that. That makes less sense if you are a private investor, where your job entails competing with other private investors to win deals.<a href="#_ftn3">[3]</a></p><p>Here’s a mental model that might be more useful, although it is still only applicable in less liquid markets. It is based on what economists call a “search and matching” model.</p><p>Firms search for investors and investors search for firms. This takes time and money. Sometimes one side finds a potential match but decides to keep searching for something better. There is competition for matches — firms meet multiple investors before finding a mutually agreeable match. Sometimes firms or investors stop searching after having failed to find a match. Firms and investors think about how likely they are to find a good match, and how much time and money it will take, before they decide whether to embark on a search.</p><p>When an impact investor enters and starts financing firms (“matching” with them) in a particular market segment where capital is relatively scarce, there is some probability those firms would not have made a match otherwise. There is also some probability that other investors in that market segment, beaten to those deals, will now make other matches they would not have otherwise. In that case the total volume of investment in the market will rise. The entrance of new investors should also push down required returns (making firms more likely to accept matches) and speed up the matching process, so more firms will embark on a search for external capital and the total volume of investment will rise for those reasons too.</p><p>This is still a probabilistic approach. When you invest, it is not certain the overall quantity of investment in the market will rise as a result. We may presume the probability is higher in market segments where capital is scarcer, required returns are higher, and firms’ demand for capital is more responsive to market conditions. When an impact investor comes to think about their total impact return, they could weight the impact of investment by an assessment of this probability. That would imply an understanding of impact that is more about market segments, and less about individual deal characteristics.</p><p>The atomistic approach to rationality taken by economists is not the only way to think about reasonable behaviour. If we think collectively rather than individually, then we are better off, for example, if many of us vote to choose our government, relative to an undemocratic counterfactual. Personally, I think it is reasonable to be a team player, despite my individual vote almost certainly not changing the outcome. Likewise, we may be better off if many investors take decisions that incorporate altruistic considerations, relative to the counterfactual of few investors doing that, and its reasonable to want to join the team that collectively make a difference. Elsewhere in the paper Harris says it’s a mistake to treat impact as a “rival good” (if I have more of it, you have less of it). The “irrationality” of wanting to have impact when you are so unlikely to be “the investor that makes the difference”, which Harris seeks to overcome by pointing out there is still some probability of that, seems to assume rivalry — wanting impact to be cleanly attributable to an individual rather than a team.</p><h3>What are we trying to maximise?</h3><p>This part of the paper (Section 2 starting on page 6) is hard going for the uninitiated, and I am very grateful to the author for walking me through it. Those steeped in financial economics should (I am told) recognise that it follows the logic behind the equations of modern portfolio theory and the intertemporal capital asset pricing model, due to Harry Markowitz and Robert Merton. But rather than only caring about wealth the investor now also cares about altruistic variables.</p><p>The investor has a “utility function”, based on the state of the world, as described by variables of different sorts, denoted by X. Some of these variables have intrinsic altruistic value (the number of malaria infections). Other things are only proxies for intrinsically valuable things (the number of bed nets distributed). Harris also discusses “warm glow” or “holding based variables”, such as what percentage of your investments qualify as climate finance, and “strategic variables”, which are things that will indirectly raise your long-term impact, if you continue to invest.<a href="#_ftn4">[4]</a></p><p>Because the investor is altruistic, their utility can be read as an impact-oriented assessment of the state of the world. The investor chooses actions to maximise a “value function”, which is based on contemporary and expected future variables — this amounts to maximising your expected utility. The use of expectations here, which implies uncertainty, fits with the ‘probabilistic’ conception of investor impact described above, but otherwise there is no explicit connection between these two parts of the paper — the mathematical notation does not include any expression to capture the probability that the investor is making something happen that would not otherwise.</p><p>An action has a positive impact when it <em>changes</em> the state of the world (variables in X) to increase the investor’s expected utility. One of these variables is your wealth, W. The value function combines variables you care about (such as malaria infections) with your present and expected wealth, because wealth affects how many impactful investments you will be able to make in the future.</p><p>If it was possible to write down this value function mathematically, it would be something fearsomely complicated. Harris applies several steps that result in the following approximation to your expected utility:<a href="#_ftn5">[5]</a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/439/1*ewVZcMjkCtRda1lRdZWLDw.png" /></figure><p>This approximation to your expected utility consists of three components:</p><p>1. Expected wealth</p><p>2. Monetised expected impact-relevant outcomes</p><p>3. A monetised outcome risk-adjustment</p><p>The terms in that approximation are defined as follows:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/210/1*g5UBfkqew0mFV_t_9uW3_g.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*TligweCq14QnTwZtO7XTlg.png" /></figure><p>The terms with μ are expectations of future variables given their current state, the σ term captures variance (or risk) and the γ terms are how these things are monetised. Σ means adding it all up.</p><p>If this was standard investing, your expected utility would consist of two terms: expected wealth and a monetised adjustment for the risk in your future wealth.</p><p>Accounting for other, non-wealth, variables introduces the second term and expands the third term beyond financial risk (variation in your wealth) to include what might be called impact risk — the variation (risks) that arise from uncertainties and correlations between all the variables you care about.</p><p>These variables are not impact — impact arises when the investor takes actions to change them. Harris uses an operator ∆_A to express such changes. The impact of an action A on your expected utility is then:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/756/1*ZPplj42egcKot57AHSLleA.png" /></figure><p>Hence there are three ways in which your actions can raise your utility:</p><p>1. Increase your expected wealth</p><p>2. Improve the monetised expected outcomes</p><p>3. Reduce your monetised risk</p><p>An action has an ‘impact’ if it changes the value of the second term in the expected utility equation. This expression contains the term “μ_X” which represents expected outcomes X and “γ_X” represents how impact can be monetised by using an “exchange rate” based on how your utility U changes when “μ_X” changes, compared to how much your utility changes when your wealth changes.</p><p>Harris then divides the expression above by the investment required to carry out action A, to get the total return on an investment. Harris calls this ‘total portfolio returns’ because it represents the totality of what you care about (the returns you seek), not just your financial wealth. It’s a confusing choice of words — at first, I thought it meant the return on your whole (total) portfolio.</p><p>Harris breaks down the ‘total portfolio return’ into four components:</p><p>1. Excess financial returns</p><p>2. ‘impact returns’</p><p>3. ‘mission-correlated premia’</p><p>4. ‘altruistic uncertainty premia’</p><p>Excess financial returns are just the risk-adjusted improvement in returns you get from making an investment. ‘Impact returns’ are the monetized returns that you can view yourself as generating via your investor impact. These are somewhat like an “social return on investment”, but Harris’ expression differs from typical SROI formulations in two ways.</p><p>First, it emphasizes that what should be included in the calculation is only your investor impact (based on your probabilistic assessment of investor contribution). Second, Harris argues your monetised impact μ_X should equal the cost-effectiveness of the marginal dollar in your aid budget. This is quite different from traditional monetization practice. Many SROI calculations use things like statistical evaluations of the ‘value of a life’. That fits with what<a href="https://www.cgdev.org/publication/are-development-finance-institutions-good-value-money"> I have argued here</a> — the optimal allocation of capital between DFIs and traditional aid should equalize marginal impact returns.</p><p>‘Mission-correlated premia’ come from the correlation between an investment’s financial returns and those strategic variables mentioned earlier. The essence of the idea is that its more valuable to have wealth when the conditions are ripe for you to carry out your mission. At a strategic level, governments might choose to give more money into DFIs when these premia are higher. From the author, I understand this concept has origins in a ‘mission hedging’ paper by <a href="https://rothtran.wordpress.com/research/">Brigitte Roth Tran</a>.</p><p>Finally, by considering ‘altruistic uncertainty premia’, Harris brings up the question of whether impact investors ought to be averse to uncertainty (impact risk) in a similar fashion to financial risk aversion. The justification for financial risk aversion comes from “diminishing returns” so that people tend to dislike minus $10 somewhat more than they like plus $10. Of course, we may often regard negative impacts (doing harm) as in a different moral category than positive impact (unlike positive and negative variation in wealth). But should we assume “diminishing returns” in positive impacts?</p><p>Take two positive things — cataract operations and clean cook stoves. Are the first 500 cataract operations more impactful than the second 500? It’s not obvious, if the profile of the people benefiting is unchanged. But if impact returns are diminishing, then we might prefer a diversified impact portfolio of cataract operations and cook stoves over going “all in” on cataracts. I have <a href="https://www.cgdev.org/publication/are-development-finance-institutions-good-value-money">argued elsewhere</a> that because there is uncertainty about which interventions will ultimately prove more effective at delivering on development goals, development interventions should be diversified.</p><p>I not sure practitioners will ever be in a position to write down equations that resemble these with real variables. But having a clear concept of how you should be thinking can be useful when it comes to trying to devise simpler, more practical, methods for assessing impact (and for seeing the flaws in easy answers). For example, these equations remind us that impact is about changing thing<em>s</em> out there in the world <em>from where they started</em>, so the impact of increasing someone’s income by $100 per year depends on their initial income and variables such as “farmers reached” really don’t cut it, in isolation. The formalisation also tells us that really impact investors should be explicit about how they would trade improvements in impact off against increases in wealth (those γ_X terms).</p><h3>Enterprise impact and investor impact.</h3><p>The third chunk of the paper concerns how to think about the ways in which enterprises and investors can have an impact.</p><p>The easiest way to think about the <em>impact</em> of an enterprise is to compare the scenario where it operates to the scenario where it ceases operations. Harris takes pains to emphasise that enterprise <em>output</em> is not the same as enterprise impact, despite the former being what most impact reporting consists of.</p><p>Enterprise impact gets complicated quickly once you start to think about how other firms might behave differently, in the enterprise’s absence. So, Harris suggests breaking it down into “simple enterprise impact” (SEI) and “dynamic enterprise impact” (DEI). SEI assumes that if the firm did not exist, then its activities would simply not be carried out, and Harris suggests using linear approximation based on marginal impact at the firm’s currently level of activity. If you know the hospital has 500 beds, and the impact of adding another bed would be Z, then your SEI is 500*Z.</p><p>We use these terms slightly differently at BII — we use “enterprise impact” to refer to the overall impact of the enterprise and “the impact of the investment” to refer to how that will change, as a result of the transcation we are participating in. Those two things are the same only when we are investing in greenfield projects. We care about the impact of the investment. If the investment will expand a 500-bed hospital to 1000 beds, we disregard the existing 500 beds.</p><p>But, as Harris would put it, we usually take the ‘simple’ approach of assessing that impact as if the activities resulting from the investment would not take place without it. We do that because if we are going to decide whether to participate in an investment to expand a hospital to 1000 beds, we want to understand everything that entails, not just the parts that we think might be attributable to us.</p><p>DEI can be broken down into what Harris calls “peer enterprise impact” (the effects of the enterprise on related firms) and “miscellaneous enterprise impact”, for indirect effects on the economy through mechanisms such as tax revenues, interest rates, FX availability and exchange rates.</p><p>Many of our investments (in the financial sector, transportation, power generation and other activities that we call “economic enablers”) are motivated by the indirect impact on firms across the economy. I presume these indirect effects are part of SEI, and the “peer enterprise impact” of an investment in a port, for example, would consist of its effect via other port operators, not via the firms that import and export. Peer effects are especially important for what DFIs call creating or catalysing markets, where the intention is to change the behaviour of other firms, often by prompting a competitive response.<a href="#_ftn6">[6]</a></p><p>Some elements of DEI are probably too difficult to evaluate for practical purposes. Investments reduce poverty when they push up prevailing real wages across a market, for example. Trying to capture that would probably not be helpful for decision-making purposes (it might be possible to estimate for reporting purposes). We don’t tend to get into questions such as “if this hospital was not expanding, perhaps other hospitals would” either.</p><p>Turning to investor impacts, the distinction Harris makes between “investment impacts” and “engagement impacts” maps easily onto the categories of financial and non-financial additionality, used by DFIs. His definition of “simple investor impact” is “how much new capital will increase impact” multiplied by your share of the capital raised (equation 12). This resembles proposed methods for impact investors to attribute development outcomes amongst themselves.<a href="#_ftn7">[7]</a> The counterfactual seems to be that no capital is raised at all, and not “somebody else might supply the capital”, and hence this is not really a claim of investor impact in the sense that motivated Harris’ discussion of a probabilistic approach. This is where an expression to capture the probability of being additional — at the transaction or market level — should enter.</p><p>Harris then introduces two variants of dynamic investor impact. “System investor impact” captures impact created by the actions of other investors in other firms. Some of the dynamic (or indirect) aspects of enterprise impact presumably involve firms raising capital from other investors, so there is overlap here. Some of the investments we make are about trying to get certain segments of financial markets moving, so the behaviour of other investors is very much part of our thinking. The other category of dynamic investor impact “portfolio investor impact” left me scratching my head. It is the “sum of the simple investment impacts that the action induces in other enterprises.” This is explained with “If the investor moves capital into one enterprise it must come from somewhere. Even if it comes from short-term cash this will ultimately have some effect on how they allocate capital going forward”. As best I can make it out, that seems to be the opportunity cost of not investing elsewhere. If so, I would ignore it. I don’t see how thinking about what other enterprises might have done with our money helps in decision-making or impact reporting.</p><p>These categories of enterprise and investor impact may be useful in their own right, but they are not integrated into part of the paper about total returns, which is based on changes to the bundle of variables X, resulting from the investor’s actions, without regard for how.</p><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>This the first academic paper that I have seen that tries to break down everything an impact investor should be thinking about. At BII we have tried to translate a clear understanding of how what we do translates into the impact objectives we ultimately care about, and how everything fits together, into a set of tools that we use to manage impact. It is heartening to see so much of that thinking reflected in this paper. But our impact management tools often amount to asking the correct questions, and providing verbal answers (although we do use numerical rating systems in some places, we do not suppose they quantify impact). Some of the conceptual clarity introduced in this paper could serve to sharpen the questions that impact investors ask of themselves, but there is an enormous gulf to cross before we get anything that resembles a credible monetised impact return measure. I don’t know how to take the formal expressions Harris derives and translate them into a measure of total portfolio return that practitioners might use in practice. But hopefully others (and Harris in follow-up work) will explain how that can be done. Presumably it will involve trying to get the big things right, and setting aside a ton of detail.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref1">[1]</a> The “factual” is what happens after you do something; the “counterfactual” is what would have happened if you had not done something.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref2">[2]</a> Investment committee decisions are not just about objective criteria being met — group dynamics and subjective decisions no doubt display randomness for all sorts of reasons.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref3">[3]</a> Although some impact investors do think about what other less impact-oriented investors would have done. The approach BII takes to assessing additionality is <a href="https://assets.bii.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/19141040/Our-approach-to-investor-contribution.pdf">described here</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref4">[4]</a> An investment that creates a useful relationship with a company or other investors that will generate future investment opportunities but makes no other immediate difference to things you care about, is an example of a strategic asset. Strategic assets can also raise the impact of other investors. At BII we may try to demonstrate that independent power projects are the best way of building renewable power generation quickly and inexpensively, for example. That would make it easier for investors to have a positive impact from financing IPPs in the future and ‘market creation’ has found its way into DFIs’ impact scoring tools (including ours). What matters here is the impact of more, cheaper renewable power, regardless of who the investors are.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref5">[5]</a> In the preamble the variables X and Y are defined in specific ways, but in these equations, they represent any pair of things among the many you care about</p><p><a href="#_ftnref6">[6]</a> The BII approach to managing impact is explained here: <a href="https://www.bii.co.uk/en/our-impact/what-impact-means-to-us/">https://www.bii.co.uk/en/our-impact/what-impact-means-to-us/</a> Our impact framework requires us to articulate “how” impact will come about, and has three categories: direct impacts on workers and customers; indirect impacts via economic outputs (such as electricity or foreign exchange earnings) and catalysing market (indirect effects via behavioural changes). If I am reading Harris correctly, SEI covers direct and indirect via outputs, DEI covers catalysing markets, and we ignore some aspects of DEI.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref7">[7]</a> See my blog <a href="https://carterpaddy.medium.com/attribution-not-contribution-a77aada8932c">Attribution (not contribution)</a>v for an explanation.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=816ed6c0f445" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The economics of investment subsidies — draft terms of reference.]]></title>
            <link>https://carterpaddy.medium.com/the-economics-of-investment-subsidies-draft-terms-of-reference-bdd3b85a00ba?source=rss-98a1710c0aee------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/bdd3b85a00ba</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[blended-finance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[impact-investing]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Paddy Carter]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 27 Apr 2022 10:51:48 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-11-09T12:51:50.947Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>The economics of investment subsidies — draft terms of reference.</h3><p>I am looking for an academic economist (or economists) who:</p><p>1. Has a deep understanding of the theory of microeconomics and welfare economics</p><p>2. Is comfortable with moving from theory to messy reality, keeping in mind how policy recommendations could be affected by features of reality that are absent from tractable economic models</p><p>3. Can communicate the implications of theory to non-technical readers.</p><p>4. Wants to influence practice</p><p>This would be paid consulting project. Contracting terms etc. remain to be determined. At this stage I am just trying to gauge interest. If you are interested contact me at pcarter at bii co uk.</p><h3>Background.</h3><p>Guidelines that govern the allocation of blended concessional finance (investment subsides) by development finance institutions specify that the investment must, in some way, be a response to a market failure. Market failures create the possibility of social returns that exceed private returns and hence justify a subsidy.<a href="#_ftn1">[1]</a></p><p>More generally, impact investors (some of whom do not regard themselves as providing finance on concessional terms) seek to make investments that are beneficial to society, in some sense. Impact is often described with reference to the UN sustainable development goals. The idea that impact investing is something meaningfully different from purely profit-seeking behaviour could be seen as implicitly resting on the existence of market failures.</p><p>The development finance community is already familiar with externalities such as carbon emissions and learning from innovation, but other potential justifications for allocating subsidies may exist. In particular, market failures are about efficiency, but the SDGs and other impact objectives typically incorporate distributional concerns.</p><p>This project will present practitioners (people who decide the allocation of subsidies) with an accessible discussion of the justifications for subsidies, that expands on existing practice which is based on a small set of textbook market failures. The goal is to improve capital allocation decisions by sharpening our understanding of the rationale for subsidising investments.</p><p>Outline of the project.</p><p>1. A review of theory of socially optimal investment in the absence of market failures.</p><p>2. Extension to incorporate the objective of maximising a social welfare function in which distribution matters</p><p>3. Examination of externalities that are less commonly used as justification for subsidies: job creation in the presence of surplus labour and (potentially) complementarities in production networks and competitive behaviour (e.g. new entrants in markets where incumbents extract rents)</p><h3>Socially optimal investment in absence of market failures.</h3><p>Before looking at a case for subsidies based on externalities and distributional objectives, it would be helpful to review what “impact investing” might mean in their absence. Is there a case for impact investing, and potentially subsidies, that does not rest on the existence of market failures?</p><p>A half-remembered version of econ 101 probably goes something like this: profit maximising firms incur costs to increase production (including costs categorised as investments) until the marginal cost of increasing output equals marginal revenue. The marginal consumer’s willingness to pay results from their equalisation of marginal utility across the goods and services available to them in the market. Suppose we define “impact” per dollar of investment as change in welfare, or perhaps change in consumer surplus. Does a market equilibrium in the absence of market failures mean that the marginal social benefits of all investments equals their marginal costs, and it makes no sense to say one investment is more “impactful” than any other? Or, in the absence of externalities and so forth, might we still expect some variation in the impact return to investment across firms and entrepreneurs? Why?</p><p>Of course ability to pay varies across individuals, so in what sense is a market equilibrium socially optimal? Does it mean that social welfare is maximised? If not, could “impact” be defined as taking us closer to maximal social welfare? If, in the absence of market failures, the “impact” per dollar of investment varies across investment opportunties, then how can we achieve socially optimal investment without varying the cost of capital for those opportunities? In other words, in the absence of market failures, is there a case for “impact investing”, where that is understood to mean tolerating lower financial returns on selected investments, to have greater social impact?</p><p>It seems intuitively unlikely that the market works so that the impact of a dollar of investment in luxury fashion will be equal to impact of an investment in innovative basic healthcare. Models of investment often contain the feature that all investments that offer (risk adjusted) returns above a certain hurdle rate will be undertaken [citation needed]. If we only consider the individual private benefits of investments, does that necessarily achieve socially optimal allocation of capital? Does it matter that the return on the marginal dollar of investment (capital) is not quite the same thing as marginal cost, which is what firms set equal to marginal revenue? Why should we expect the available private expected financial return per marginal dollar of investment in new eye care technology and garden furniture, for example, to bring about the socially optimal levels of investment in their production?</p><p>Intuitions about impact probably involve distributional concerns, and ideas about a hierarchy of needs, that are absent from the concept of efficiency in a simple economic model. We might imagine a model with two types of consumer (rich and poor) and firms that produce two types of good (basic needs and luxuries) in which the market equilibrium is efficient, and the “social returns” on marginal investment in both types of firm are equalised, but it would be useful to explain what that does — and doesn&#39;t — mean.</p><p>Whether or not impact investing turns out to be a meaningful concept in a market equilibrium in the absence of externalities, why should we presume to be in equilibrium? There are many potential reasons (so called “frictions” such as transaction costs, “lumpiness”, market power, incomplete markets, information deficiencies, behavioural quirks etc.) why private costs and social benefits might be misaligned in reality. There is a view (expressed here for example<a href="#_ftn2">[2]</a>) that if DFIs see their role as compensating for market failures, then they should know what the specific market failure is that an investment targets. Frictions could be labelled market failures, but social and private returns on investment could diverge because of the cumulation of frictions, and subsidies could be justified when social returns significantly exceed private, without appealing to a specific externality or market failure. But if so, how could those social returns be identified (how would they be modelled, what would they consist of)?</p><h3>Distributional concerns.</h3><p>If we want to maximise a social welfare function that incorporates distributional aspects, then (I presume) in theory if we have arbitrary distributional objectives, we could justify arbitrary investment subsidies on that basis. But we do not have arbitrary distributional objectives. The SDGs call for the eradication of poverty and universal access to health, education, water etc. To what extent should investment subsidies be justified on distributional grounds — how should subsidy allocation decisions be taken in practice?</p><p>There is a view that capital subsidies are not the right response to the desire to permanently change prices for distributional reasons. If we want everyone to be able to afford rail travel, the government should subsidise rail tickets, not give train operating companies cheap loans. Existing guidance on the allocation of blended finance emphasises the time-bound nature of subsidies — firms or markets might need help from cheap capital getting off the ground, but the objective is to create something that will not require ongoing subsidies (at least, not in the form of delivering sub-market returns on capital in perpetuity). DFIs have traditionally been reluctant to subsidise power investments, for example, purely to achieve lower power prices for consumers, because of concerns that establishing price points below that which unsubsidised suppliers could sustain would be ruinous to market development. Instead, subsidies are justified on the basis that once certain barriers are overcome (knowledge is generated, demand is established, economies of scale are achieved etc.) private markets will be able to operate.</p><p>If DFIs are going to start allocating concessional finance based on distributional concerns, without appeal to efficiency (externalities) then first they will need convincing that is the right thing to do and secondly they will need guidance in taking allocation decisions. What are the right and wrong ways of doing it?</p><h3>Less commonly cited externalities</h3><p>Here are a few potential externalities that could form a rationale for subsidising investment, if a convincing case was made.</p><p>1. Job creation. The idea that the creation of decent jobs can be an externality is not new (see Acemoglu, Rodrik). Most models of externalities assume full factor utilisation and do not incorporate unemployment and underemployment. Cost-benefit analysis of investments usually assumes that the wage represents the marginal opportunity cost of taking a worker away from an alternative occupation, and the benefits flow from goods and service produced. In reality there is under employment in low-income countries, and there are social benefits from having an economy that provides many decent jobs (as opposed to a polarised labour market with many poor jobs). How should subsidies for job creation be allocated in practice? Subsidies for firms with low output labour ratios, or higher labour shares of income?</p><p>2. Complementarities in production networks. We would like to understand whether the social benefit of investments that raise productivity are internalised in prices when there are strong complementarities in production networks. Do the prices faced by producers of intermediate goods fully capture the ultimate social benefits, and if not, why not? References here include Jones (weak links in chain) and Liu (industrial policy in production networks). If there is a positive externality to investments that raise productivity in “central nodes” of production networks in the presence of complementarities, what should DFIs look for when deciding how to allocate scarce concessional finance?</p><p>3. Dynamic effects. Thinking in terms of externalities can mean projects are appraised in terms of comparative statics — the outcome after the subsidy is more efficient. How do things change if we think about investments that are likely to initiate more dynamic processes? Perhaps development requires the creation of firms that have the capabilities to expand the scope of their activities, evolve and grow, without knowing in advance what investment opportunities these firms will identify and execute. We may observe that successful examples of development have involved the creation of such firms, and that these firms are absent in stagnant economies and hence wish to subsidies attempts at their creation, without appealing to a specific market failure. Does that make sense? How could such allocation decisions be taken?</p><p>4. Competition. Many markets in lower income countries are uncompetitive and new entrants that intended to take market share by innovating or cutting prices could have a large impact. Is that an externality? If the private financial returns from such behaviour do not fully reflect the social returns, is that is reason to subsidise new entrants that are expected to behave more competitively?</p><p><a href="#_ftnref1">[1]</a> DFI Enhanced Principles: <a href="https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/a8398ed6-55d0-4cc4-95aa-bcbabe39f79f/DFI+Blended+Concessional+Finance+for+Private+Sector+Operations_Summary+R....pdf?MOD=AJPERES&amp;CVID=npes1Dq">https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/a8398ed6-55d0-4cc4-95aa-bcbabe39f79f/DFI+Blended+Concessional+Finance+for+Private+Sector+Operations_Summary+R....pdf?MOD=AJPERES&amp;CVID=npes1Dq</a> IFC using blended concessional finance <a href="https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/1decef29-1fe6-43c3-86c7-842d11398859/IFC-BlendedFinanceReport_Feb+2021_web.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&amp;CVID=ntFHkEh">https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/1decef29-1fe6-43c3-86c7-842d11398859/IFC-BlendedFinanceReport_Feb+2021_web.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&amp;CVID=ntFHkEh</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref2">[2]</a> <a href="https://publications.iadb.org/en/smart-development-banks">https://publications.iadb.org/en/smart-development-banks</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=bdd3b85a00ba" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Attribution (not contribution)]]></title>
            <link>https://carterpaddy.medium.com/attribution-not-contribution-a77aada8932c?source=rss-98a1710c0aee------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a77aada8932c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[attribution]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[impact-investin]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Paddy Carter]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 03 Feb 2022 16:29:48 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-05-06T10:30:19.518Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Private businesses are usually financed by more than one investor, each of which may want to attribute some share of what those businesses achieve to themselves. For example, if two investors equally share the financing of a new factory that employs 500 workers, they may each report 250 jobs created.</p><p>That sounds simple enough, but it’s easier said than done. Attribution also tends to get muddled up with other claims of impact. One might even say attributed outcomes are not claims of impact at all. I’m going to try to clear that up, and discuss some of the complications that arise when trying to do this in practice.</p><h4>Reporting the development outcomes resulting from investments.</h4><p>Before getting started, it’s probably worth recognising that the credit (or blame) for the development outcomes created by private enterprises lies with their founders and employees at all levels, and numerous external influences. Whilst financing is necessary, and investors have some influence, when an investor reports that they created 250 jobs, that should not be interpreted as taking sole credit.</p><p>That said, statements such as “we helped financed the construction of a factory that now employs 500 people” are an indispensable part of investors’ impact reporting, and the remainder of this article is concerned only with attribution among investors.</p><p>Unattributed impact data (e.g. the total number of workers employed by portfolio companies) is unproblematic when interpreted correctly as portfolio descriptive statistics but it can be liable to misinterpretation as one investor taking credit for outcomes that other investors also contributed towards, and these numbers can verge on the ridiculous when a portfolio contains very small stakes in very large companies.</p><h3>Attributed outcomes are usually not claims of impact</h3><p>The word impact means different things in different contexts.<a href="#_ftn1">[1]</a> If many banks would be willing to finance the construction of a factory, the bank which actually supplies the loan can claim its money was used to build a factory but cannot claim the factory would not have existed without it. The correct way for a bank to describe its impact depends on the question being answered.</p><p>Sometimes the question is: what difference did my intervention make? The answer should consist of the difference between what happened after the intervention, compared to what would have happened without it.<a href="#_ftn2">[2]</a> In the context of investment, if one investor does not invest then another might. Development finance institutions (DFIs) exist to do things that private investors are not, so the possibility that a private investor might undertake a project is especially important. Money allocated by governments to DFIs cannot be counted as Official Development Assistance unless investments are delivering something that would not have happened otherwise. This is often referred to as additionality, but impact investors use the term <em>contribution</em> to combine the questions of whether they are doing anything others would not have (additionality) with the question of what difference that makes to development outcomes.</p><p>Sometimes the question is: what resulted from the investment? Attributed development outcomes answer this question. A bank can report what its money was used for, without making any claim about what would have happened under an alternative scenario. That entails taking responsibility for having financed a factory and everything that follows from that, including the good (such as jobs created) and bad (such as greenhouse gases emitted). We would not accept an investor claiming zero responsibility for carbon emissions because another investor would have made the same investment in its place.<a href="#_ftn3">[3]</a></p><p>The answers to these two questions (“what difference did our intervention make?” and “what resulted from the investment?”) only coincide when nothing would have happened without your investment.</p><p>Attributed outcomes are not claims about the impact of an intervention. Investors usually cannot report what difference their intervention as an investor makes, because whilst the companies they invest in can report how many workers they employ, for example, they cannot report how many they would have employed under an alternative history. The causal impact of interventions can sometimes be estimated from a dedicated research effort, but it is not always possible to distinguish causation from correlation.<a href="#_ftn4">[4]</a></p><h3>Attribution based on the share of total investment</h3><p>The most natural basis for attributing development outcomes is the proportion that an investment represents in the total amount of capital being raised, or the total capital base of an enterprise. If you only provided 10% of the money needed to build a factory, your attributed job creation should be 10% of the total.</p><p>The <a href="https://thegiin.org/assets/Methodology%20for%20Standardizing%20and%20Comparing%20Impact%20Performance_webfile.pdf">methodology proposed for by the GIIN</a> is to attribute an enterprise’s development outcomes to individual investors by multiplying them by:<a href="#_ftn5">[5]</a></p><p>Investment amount outstanding / enterprise value.</p><p><a href="https://carbonaccountingfinancials.com/">PCAF</a> also specifies that a financial institution’s share of emissions is proportional to the size of its exposure to the borrower’s or investee’s total (company or project) value. The method varies somewhat according to asset class and whether the instrument of investment is listed or private.<a href="#_ftn6">[6]</a></p><p>There are flaws with these approaches, but the absence of a perfect solution should not prevent the adoption of a reasonable solution. Especially if the method is easily understood and its limitations are visible.</p><p>There are arguments that more risk-bearing capital should take proportionately more credit (and blame) for enterprise outcomes. This principle is evident in the agreed MDB/DFI methodology for recognising mobilization, for example, where mobilization is based on which party is taking the commercial risk, not on which party is disbursing funds (liquidity).<a href="#_ftn7">[7]</a> If an MDB guarantees 50% of a loan provided by a commercial bank, it is considered to have provided 50% of the finance itself and to have mobilized only the other 50%. Enterprise financing involves a spectrum of risk exposures from equity through to the most senior of loans. An attribution method that weights development outcomes in proportion to risk exposure would be complicated, and difficult to agree between investors.</p><p>Methods based on enterprise value priced to market suffer from the problem that when market valuations rise and fall, the valuation of equity changes while the quantity of debt does not. Most people would probably not accept that the owners of a business (equity investors) bear less responsibility for a company’s carbon emissions as its share price falls.</p><p>The value of total assets (or total liabilities), as recorded in the enterprise’s balance sheet, could also be used at the denominator in an attribution calculation, in which case the value of each investment in the attribution formula must also be at book value not market value. This method also suffers from the problem that the book value of equity relative to debt moves around as accountants revalue assets.</p><p>In principle attribution could be based on the historical value of each investor’s contribution to primary fund raisings, which is not affected by subsequent changes in valuations either by the market or by accountants, but the historical information required to do that will often not be available and the method breaks down for investors that have acquired equity at market prices in secondary transactions.</p><p>Methods based on total enterprise value or total assets are also better suited to attributing the level of a development outcome among investors, not changes. Suppose a business employs 1000 people and has an enterprise value of £5m. An investor that holds 10% of the EV might report an attributed “jobs footprint” of 100. But now suppose that the business raises £2m from two new investors and creates 200 new jobs and the enterprise value rises to £7m. The level of employment is now 1200 and the change is 200. Each of the two new investors could reasonably claim to have financed the creation of 100 jobs. Their share of enterprise value is 1/7 each. Applying that to the change in employment would attribute 28 jobs created to each (and applying that to the new level of employment would attribute a jobs footprint of 171 to each).</p><h3>Incremental impact</h3><p>When new capital is being raised to finance the expansion of a firm, the obvious solution to the problem of attributing changes (job creation), is to consider each investor’s share of the sum raised against the incremental outcomes associated with it, and not apply the new investors’ share of the total enterprise value to the incremental outcomes. That is how to get the correct answer of two investors having 100 jobs created attributed to each of them, in the example above.</p><p>Firms do many things at once and raise money from different sources at different times so enterprise-level outcomes such as employment growth often cannot be neatly separated into distinct increments associated with separate capital injections. Firms can create jobs without raising fresh capital — how should that attributed be to investors?</p><p>Even in relatively simple cases, without multiple rounds of capital raising, attributing changes in development outcomes often requires some modelling. If an investment is made in a business that currently employs 1000 people and the investor assumes that it would employ 1100 people in a year’s time in the absence of their investment, then when it reports 1500 employees in a year’s time, after receiving investment, the investor can infer it created 400 jobs. That is an estimate based on comparing reported data against a modelled baseline trend. If more than one investor participated, then they can attribute those 400 jobs in proportion to the share of the capital raised.</p><p>Such exercises are only possible for a subset of investments and often require subjective judgements. This makes hard to use for annual impact reporting at the portfolio level (although understanding incremental impact is of course essential for informing investment decisions and setting monitoring plans).</p><h3>What next</h3><p>As things stand, DFIs are starting to adopt the PCAF methodology for carbon accounting, but in the absence of consensus about how to attribute other outcomes, most report unattributed portfolio impact data. An easy step forward would be to agree a rough and ready method for attributing the <em>levels</em> of enterprise outcomes based on investments as a share of portfolio companies’ capital, as the GIIN propose. Standardising an approach to reporting estimated incremental impact is going to be much harder.</p><h4>Addendum: Jobs Supported.</h4><p>One of the unattributed development outcomes that DFIs sometimes report is the number of jobs supported by their portfolio companies. This term is liable to be misunderstood.</p><p>Jobs supported is a static concept, best understood as the job “footprint” or “reach” of a company, which describes something about a portfolio of investments. It should not be confused with job creation. Even if the total quantity of employment in an economy does not change, who supports those jobs will change as firms grow (and others shrink), assets change hands, and suppliers and customers move between businesses. It is also a concept that inherently double counts. For example, the jobs at a factory are “supported” three times, by its investors, its suppliers, and its customers.</p><p>Despite these conceptual shortcomings, there are reasonable demands on investors to describe the economic significance of their portfolios. Models, such as the Joint Impact Model, can estimate the number of jobs that operating companies support in their supply chains and the wages they pay; that electricity suppliers support; and that bank loans support. These numbers should be interpreted as saying something about the reach of these types of business, keeping in mind that each job is reached in many ways.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref1">[1]</a> For more detailed definitions see Vosmer and de Bruijn (2017) Attribution in Results Measurement: Rationale and Hurdles for Impact Investors. DCED.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref2">[2]</a> In the language of empirical economics, what would have happened is called the “unobserved counterfactual”.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref3">[3]</a> To complicated matters, investors may sometimes estimate a counterfactual to compute more meaningful attributed development outcomes. This is discussed below in the section “incremental impact”. The crucial point about such estimates is that the counterfactual is “no investment takes place” and not “we do not invest, but somebody else might”.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref4">[4]</a> More or less the entire field of empirical development economics is concerned with the problem of identifying the causal effects of interventions or policies. Randomised control trials offer a neat way of comparing what happens when something is done to what happens when it is not done, but they are only feasible in certain circumstances, and very rarely in the context of development finance. Carter, Van de Sijpe and Callel (2021) “The Elusive Quest for Additionality” World Development, explains the difficulties of estimating additionality.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref5">[5]</a> Global Impact Investing Network (2020). Methodology for standardizing and comparing impact performance.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref6">[6]</a> PCAF (2020). The Global GHG Accounting and Reporting Standard for the Financial Industry. First edition.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref7">[7]</a> MDB methodology for private investment mobilization: reference guide</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a77aada8932c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Carbon taxes]]></title>
            <link>https://carterpaddy.medium.com/carbon-taxes-b0a52711f8b5?source=rss-98a1710c0aee------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b0a52711f8b5</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[carbon-tax]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[decarbonisation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[externalities]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Paddy Carter]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 10 Jan 2022 11:52:57 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-01-18T15:20:30.037Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This is a response to a Twitter <a href="https://twitter.com/ericlonners/status/1480259859656417283">thread</a> with <a href="https://twitter.com/ericlonners">Eric Lonergan</a> and <a href="https://twitter.com/MaxJerneck">Max Jerneck</a> about climate policy and the economics of externalities, which I am putting here because I am too lazy to write a Twitter thread in response.</p><p>I wrote that I couldn’t get my head around Max’s statement that “the externality frame may be true in some abstract philosophical sense but it’s hardly a useful guide to policy” and I still cannot. I think Max is wrong and “make things with negative externalities more expensive and things with positive externalities cheaper” is an important and useful guide to policy.</p><p>But what about <a href="https://www.philosophyofmoney.net/the-wrong-chapter-of-the-textbook/">Eric and Corine Sawers’ argument</a> that externalities are the wrong place to start with climate policy? I reckon their arguments that the priority is to create green substitutes for dirty technologies is spot on, and that regulations will be needed to decarbonise electricity generation quickly enough, are true and important (and from what I can see in public debates the regulation argument is too often overlooked, although I don’t think the ‘create substitutes’ one is —everyone likes to subsidise green R&amp;D). But I can’t follow their argument that concludes using taxes and subsidies to price externalities is the wrong thing to do today.</p><p>Eric and Corine write: “What is crystal clear is that you do not start with a carbon tax. It can play a role, but late in the game.”</p><p>I reckon the world would be in a better position today if we’d been taxing carbon emissions and subsidising green alternatives for decades. And I think the sooner we start, the better. Right now, for example, we need to replace gas-fired domestic boilers with electric heat pumps. I think that would happen quicker if taxes on gas (and gas appliances) went up and taxes on electricity (and heat pumps) went down. The same goes for bunker fuels for shipping, coke-fuelled steel furnaces, and so on and so forth.</p><p>Eric and Corine point out that demand for fuel is insensitive to prices, at least in the short run, which is true and important and an argument that we need more than carbon taxes. Fine by me, but I don’t think it’s an argument that carbon taxes are unhelpful. They write “carbon taxes have typically come at considerable political cost and little gain.” Kate Raworth is cited claiming taxes are “indeed leverage points … but they are low points of leverage”. I am not sure that’s correct. <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069621001285">Here is some evidence</a> that the UK’s carbon taxes have already helped accelerate the decarbonisation of electricity generation. <a href="https://etrr.springeropen.com/articles/10.1186/s12544-020-00454-2">Here is a paper</a> that estimates a cross-price elasticity of demand for electric cars, with respect to the price of petrol, at 0.62 (in Norway, the authors caution estimates are market-specific).</p><p>Simple theory might apply taxes and subsides to the prices of goods and services, but the same idea can, and should, be applied to pricing the externalities of innovations (and there are other ways of increasing costs than taxes). We should subsidise innovations that create positive externalities and penalise those that create negative. If we’d started doing that decades ago, I think we’d be in a better position today. If we start doing more of it today, I think we will be in a better position tomorrow.</p><p>To my mind, changing the prices of green and brown goods and services complements policies to create green substitutes, and I don’t understand why Eric and Corine oppose it.</p><p>Eric and Corine write:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/805/1*XQJqhIQRFqNKje7C6_rJXQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>I’m with Gates on this one. I think the development of synthetic green aviation fuels would be accelerated if fuel producers and consumers faced higher taxes on fossil fuels and benefited from subsidies on green fuels. That is not a claim that taxes alone will decarbonise aviation fast enough.</p><p>I don’t know what to make of the claim Gates is “100% wrong in practice”, unless Gates is trying to claim taxing fuel is the only thing that needs to happen … but that’s not evident in the cited excerpt. I absolutely agree that, in the context of electric cars, charging infrastructure and other measures (regulations) to decommission the existing stock of petrol engines are crucial to decarbonising road transport, and the same doubtless goes for aviation fuelling infrastructure and decommissioning existing planes.</p><p>Eric and Corine describe how oil companies now face duel costs of capital, in part because of the expectation of future carbon taxes. They write: “But contingent taxes embed sequencing — they incentivise the creation of substitutes without cutting off the funding. Taxes are useful — indeed essential — but not in the context of correctly pricing externalities.” I don’t see how they arrive at that conclusion. Would higher taxes on oil today be a bad thing because it “cuts off the funding?”. I don’t see it. Why is “the future” always the right time for carbon taxes and not today? I can see how applying “correct” carbon taxes immediately could do more harm than good, if that’s too disruptive, but that’s just an argument for applying whatever level of carbon tax we think that economy can swallow without undue harm today and committing to an escalator. It’s adding adjustment costs to the theory of pricing externalities, not fundamentally altering it.</p><p>They conclude:</p><p>“There is a role for smart taxes, but the purpose is very different. They are not aimed at correctly pricing an externality. Taxes, exemptions and credit guarantees, should serve one purpose — accelerating the depreciation of carbon-intensive assets, financing the creation of carbon free alternatives, creating substitutes at scale, and targeting the relative price of substitutes.”</p><p>I fail to understand how this is “very different” to using taxes and subsidies to internalise externalities, especially the last part about targeting the relative prices of substitutes. We wouldn’t need to accelerate the depreciation of carbon-intensive assets if they weren’t generating negative externalities [1]. We wouldn’t need to subsidise the creation of carbon free alternatives if that didn’t generate positive externalities.</p><p>I find it baffling how so many people who want to accelerate decarbonisation and see the need for more than tax carbon taxes, somehow end up arguing against making emitting carbon more expensive, today (or at least, appear to).</p><h3>Addendum!</h3><p>What all this makes me wonder is how standard economic theory, which says that pricing externalities will result in socially optimal outcomes, deals with demand elasticities and innovation.</p><p>I would have thought the simple theory of pricing externalities ought to come from a model with multiple goods, which are substitutes to varying degrees. As far as I know, the prescription to price externalities is not conditional in theory on own-price and cross-price demand elasticises, which, if so, suggests they are unimportant (in theory). Of course, those elasticities will determine how the consumption of various goods changes after externalities are priced in, but if pricing externalities is sufficient to yield a socially optimal allocation than that simply means whatever those elasticities are, and whatever the resulting pattern of demand looks like, it’s socially optimal (in theory).</p><p>If that’s right, I’d like to understand why. For example, if demand for petrol is price-inelastic, that could be because people bloody love driving and don’t have any good substitutes, so if they keep driving after carbon taxes include the cost of externalities in petrol prices and the world subsequently burns, that is optimal because people evidently value driving more than an unburnt world. Whereas if demand for petrol is price-elastic, and people have good substitutes, so they stop driving after carbon is taxed and the world does not burns, that is also optimal. Because what’s optimal depends on 1. how much people like stuff and 2. what substitutes exist. And if you don’t like these conclusions, you must revisit how you’ve priced externalities (or introduce the idea that people aren’t rational, or anything else that breaks the theory). Is that how it works?</p><p>(I am interpreting “socially optimal” to be equivalent to “will decarbonise the economy quickly enough to keep the harms of global heating within acceptable limits” and if that’s not correct I have questions about the concept of social optimality being invoked in theory. The concept of “acceptable” must include some idea of how to aggregate preferences across people).</p><p>As you have probably realised, this raises the question of whether standard theory takes the existence of substitutes to be exogenous, or whether the result that pricing externalities is optimal extends to a setting in which substitutes are endogenous and must be created by innovations that incur upfront costs. I would guess that in such a model, with no “frictions” and rational forward-looking agents, then pricing externalities into existing and any future goods might be sufficient to steer innovation in socially optimal directions, but I don’t know. Perhaps even standard theory agrees with the need for policies to influence innovation, in addition to the pricing of externalities? Or perhaps standard theory would agree with that need only after frictions, such as entrepreneurs’ uncertainty around future taxes and subsidies, are incorporated. And what happens if the theory is extended to include durable capital goods in a dynamic setting?</p><p>What you should infer from this is that I don’t know enough about the standard economics of externalities to be pontificating on the topic. And I should go read a textbook.</p><p>[1] I having been telling anyone who will listen, in my development finance circles, that promoting green substitutes in “hard to decarbonise” sectors is not enough, we also need to persuade people to replace carbon intensive fixed capital before the end of its useful economic life, and that development finance institutions, such as my employer, should be thinking about how we can help there.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b0a52711f8b5" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Impact Investing: a theory of social enterprises, by Ben Roth.]]></title>
            <link>https://carterpaddy.medium.com/impact-investing-a-theory-of-social-enterprises-by-ben-roth-76fc6aa71a81?source=rss-98a1710c0aee------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/76fc6aa71a81</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[impact-investing]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Paddy Carter]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 15 Dec 2021 19:54:36 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-01-08T14:49:24.106Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[<a href="https://www.hbs.edu/ris/Publication%20Files/20-078rev6-25-21_fe526a07-6ddc-4522-bbf3-2b3d6055cc1e.pdf">link to paper</a>]</p><p>This paper answers a very interesting question: when would a philanthropist choose to invest in a social enterprise rather than give it a grant? This question is important for “blended finance” practitioners who can, in theory, allocate capital with required returns that range anywhere from -100% (a grant) up to market rates of return. My employer CDC Group (soon to be British International Investment) is piloting a facility which can allocate pure grants in a few cases (although only in a minority of cases because the facility is required to make some overall return).</p><p>The paper starts by saying it will examine two propositions:</p><p>1. Impact investors can help social enterprises reach financial sustainability and no longer rely on a constant stream of philanthropic subsidies.</p><p>2. Impact investors can help social enterprises reach a larger scale and increase their impact.</p><p>It arrives at two conclusions that, at least on my first reading, seemed to miss the primary function of impact investing. But it turns out that reflects the direction that Roth has chosen to come at the problem from, and seen from another direction his model fits perfectly well with how impact investors intuitively think about what they do.</p><p>Roth approaches the problem by considering a philanthropist who wishes to support a social enterprise, and asks when an investment is preferable to a grant. His first point is that because investing comes with the ability to require returns, impact investors are able to extract money from social enterprises, which is superior to a grant when recycling that money into something new would be more impactful than leaving it where it is, for the enterprise to ‘spend’ it on cutting prices [1].</p><p>The second result is harder to swallow. Because investors are able to extract and reallocate money in impactful ways, this gives enterprises a reason to generate profits to return to the investor, even if doing so is detrimental to their mission as judged by the people they intend to benefit. In this way impact investors “empower the entrepreneur to exploit a profitable opportunity” in way that grant givers would not encourage. An example, Husk Power, is used to show how impact investors might encourage Husk to expand and increase profits to the detriment of Husk’s mission, and Roth describes that “improving” upon a donation.</p><p>I expect impact investors do not think of themselves as creating value by reducing the positive impact of social enterprises but that’s because most investors are not comparing the positive impact of the businesses that they invest in against a hypothetical grant-financed alternative, whereas Roth’s model does. In his model investors can achieve an overall improvement by reducing the impact of enterprise A <em>relative to a grant financed counterfactual</em> by generating more profit, which can then be reallocated to enterprise B (or to some other worthy purpose).</p><p>These two advantages of investments over grants omit what is, to my mind, the more obvious function of impact investing in helping social enterprises reach a larger scale and increase their impact, which is to provide the upfront financing needed to create a socially beneficial and commercially sustainable enterprise, where that social benefit is large enough to justify the “cost” of a sub-commerical investment but not large enough to justify grant financing.</p><p>So what’s going on? We need to dig into the model behind these conclusions.</p><h3>The model.</h3><p>A firm needs some start-up investment (normalised to 1). Over its lifetime it generates revenues, pays costs (which are solely a function of the quantity of output sold) and either receives or returns money to the investor (denoted as ‘R’ in the model, either positive or negative). An impact investor can choose to either extract returns or provide more money (in addition to the initial 1), but a grant-giver effectively denies themselves the ability to extract returns.</p><p>The model hinges on something that I think does not get enough attention in debates about impact investing and public subsidies for private investment (blended finance): passthrough from required returns and grants to prices. One objection to policies aimed at “mobilizing private finance” is that the capitalists are suspected to benefit from that and not consumers.</p><p>In Roth’s model the less is extracted (or the more granted) the more the enterprise can afford to reduce its prices. We can interpret “cutting prices” in this model as a stand in for anything that both reduces profits and increases customers’ welfare, such as improving quality or accessibility. Because we are talking about a social enterprise not a profit maximiser, its managers are assumed to be mission oriented (like the philanthropist) and care about the welfare of customers, and reducing prices increases welfare.</p><p>A digression: how realistic is that? There are some parallels with what I know of DFI investing — for example, when DFIs invest in infrastructure projects and can influence pricing, they will price the services so that revenues only cover a low return requirement and if there are opportunities to make more money they will not take them. Otherwise pricing is delegated to the managers of firms, some of whom might be mission-oriented and trying to keep prices low. I don’t know how often we see a passthrough from the interest rate we charge on debt to the pricing of goods and services sold. Some examples might be providing cheap or local currency credit to banks for on-lending to SMEs, and perhaps off-grid solar vendors. If we are equity investors alongside the project sponsor, then presumably sometimes we both might receive lower returns because the business is forgoing opportunities to increase profits but I would be surprised if that’s often an explicit part of the investment thesis and business plan. More often I think we expect the firms we invest in to have a positive social impact as profit maximisers, but to require our finance because local capital markets are not willing to provide finance on the terms they need, for various reasons (risk appetite, return requirements etc.)</p><p>Back to the model: a parameter captures the investor’s cost of capital, which because we are talking about a mission-oriented philanthropist should be interpreted as their valuation of whatever other good things they can do with the money they extract from their investments. Combine this with the idea that there is a direct line between the nature of an enterprise’s financing and its social benefits, via prices, and it’s straightforward to see why a philanthropist will prefer an investment to a grant only when their “cost of capital” exceeds the social impact generated by not requiring returns [2].</p><h3>So, what is going on?</h3><p>Roth’s paper reaches conclusions which, in my view, miss the primary function of impact investing because (I think) its analysis concerns whether (and when) investments are better than grants <em>taking upfront financing as given</em>. The paper does not dwell on the question of whether to provide upfront financing in the first place.</p><p>Some firms need many millions in upfront financing before they reach commerical sustainability. It would be daft to grant finance a <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benban_Solar_Park">$4bn solar park</a>. If there are projects like that, which cannot obtain finance on suitable terms from commerical investors, impact investors can help social enterprises reach a larger scale and increase their impact by providing finance on terms and in quantities not available from commerical investors, where grant financing would not be justified.</p><p>This is entirely consistent with Roth’s results — those enterprises where a philanthropist would be prepared to meet upfront financing needs if they can make some sort of a return, but would not want to finance upfront costs with a grant, are precisely those identified as better suited to investment in his model [3]. Some of those enterprises might generate profits in ways that are somewhat detrimental, seen from a purely altruistic mission-oriented point of view, in line with Roth’s second result.</p><p>If Roth’s model was used to analyse the decision of whether to meet the upfront financing needs of a set of enterprises, that differ both in terms of the sums they require and the positive social impact they could generate, it would reveal the existence of socially beneficial enterprises that require impact investors because their social benefits are not large enough, relative to upfront financing needs, to justify a grant. Roth normalises the size of upfront financing to 1, but this set of enterprises might be easier to see if upfront financing requirements were allowed to vary [4]. The model has everything needed to explain the fact that impact investments in private enterprises tend to be much larger than grants given to private enterprises. It is also consistent with the point I make in the paper <a href="https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/are-development-finance-institutions-good-value-money.pdf">Are Development Finance Institutions Good Value for Money?</a> that the “impact per dollar” required for an investment to represent a cost-effective use of aid budgets is a fraction of that required from a grant. In fact the approach I take there, comparing investments against a cash transfer, is remarkably similar to Roth’s comparison of extracting returns versus giving a grant that enables the enterprise to reduce prices (which amounts to the same thing as a cash transfer).</p><h3>Summing up</h3><p>Some of those most profound and powerful mechanisms in economics sound rather banal when stated in plain language (externalities, transcation costs etc.) and Roth’s insight that investments are better than grants when the money you extract from an enterprise is worth more to you than the outcomes of leaving it there, risks sounding like a truism. But I think Roth really has put his finger on the fundamental reason why someone who wants to do good might sometimes want to require financial returns.</p><p>I found the paper very hard to digest at first because I found it so hard to square with my prior understanding of what impact investing is all about. But once I spotted that I had been focused on how impact investors achieve good things by providing finance to enterprises that both commerical investors and grant-givers would not, whereas Roth puts that initial decision in the background, everything fell into place. To my mind, I think as presently written Roth’s paper overlooks an important function of impact investors and should therefore moderate its language in some places, but it would be a relatively simple thing to rejig the presentation to bring the “extensive margin” of projects that need impact investment to the forefront.</p><p>Roth’s paper left me really wanting to read some empirical investigations into the connection between financing and pricing. Is there evidence that social enterprises (or perhaps profit maximising firms in competitive markets) use concessional finance to reduce prices (or improve quality and accessibility)? When is that more or less likely? How can concessional finance be designed to avoid capture in excess private returns? These are absolutely crucial questions in debates around subsidising (or “de-risking”) private investment — who benefits? The capitalists or the customers?</p><h3>Some questions</h3><p>There are a few things I’d like to understand better about how the results rest on assumptions made in the model:</p><p>1. The firm has increasing marginal costs. It might be more natural to think of firms with some fixed cost and then constant marginal variable costs, at least over some range. This seems important because in Roth’s model the firm sometimes chooses to set a low price at which it breaks even, leaving unsatisfied demand so that it must ration output. The firm chooses not to raise prices to cover the cost of expanding output, when marginal costs are increasing, because the reduction in consumer surplus across customers outweighs the benefit of additional customers being able to purchase the output. But I am still not sure I really understand <em>why</em> the costs outweigh the benefits so that it’s not socially optimal to raise prices and serve more customers if the demand is there. Are there negative externalities or something? Does this mean standard profit maximising firms in competitive markets with increasing marginal costs are not socially optimal, once we place more weight on the welfare of their customers than their investors, and society would be better off if firms cut prices and reduced volumes and rationed output?</p><p>2. At one point Roth describes how it is trivial that the financier must value money in their bank account more highly than money in the enterprise’s customers’ pockets at the margin, otherwise they would give away all their money to the firm to reduce its prices put money in those pockets. But what about longevity? A financier could give away all their money to reduce prices and make people better off, but their funds will be quickly exhausted. Plus, if all your philanthropic money is doing is a straight pass through to consumers, why not fund actual cash transfers rather than muck about with social enterprises? The philanthropist’s decision in Roth’s model is fairly static — would the results change if duration was introduced? The first proposition Roth sets out to examine talks of a reliance on “constant stream of philanthropic subsidies.”</p><p>3. More of a comment than a question. I would guess that most investors would presume that receiving grant financing will affect the effort managers will put into generating sales and cutting costs. I think Roth notes that possibility but that’s not in the model. If included, it would introduce another potential reason to prefer investments to grants.</p><p>4. In an extension to the model, Roth considers the differences between equity and debt. I would like to know if “debt … does not change the entrepreneur’s incentive to pursue profit on the margin. In contrast, equity depresses the entrepreneur’s incentive to pursue profit and results in him placing a relatively higher weight on the firm’s mission” (page 24) is true in reality? Does that give us another reason to invest more equity and less debt? The usual reason is that debt makes entrepreneurs risk averse, equity absorbs risk.</p><p>5. Another extension that might be interesting would be to explore the implications of stochastic outcomes. In Roth’s model, returns for investors come at the cost of higher prices and lower welfare. But impact investors sometimes structure concessional finance as repayable grants, where repayments are conditioned on commerical performance. Does that mean prices are chosen first then uncertain revenues are realised, second? That sequence might imply that repayments come at the expense of the entrepreneur’s retained profits, not higher prices and lower welfare. It would be interesting to explore whether conditionally repayable grants avoid giving the enterprise a reason to raise profits in socially detrimental ways, as happens in Roth’s model.</p><p><em>Note: This post was greatly improved by personal correspondence with Ben Roth, who very kindly responded to an early draft. This does not imply he agrees with everything in this later draft. Ben has a bunch of other papers that are relevant to people in the impact investing / development finance business, and I strongly recommend you </em><a href="https://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Pages/profile.aspx?facId=1028680"><em>check them out here</em></a><em>.</em></p><p>[1] The owners and managers of social enterprises might also use a grant to increase their own incomes, which could be mitigated by an investor extracting returns from the enterprise.</p><p>[2] In practice, it is not at all easy for would-be investors or grant-givers to gauge the relative magnitudes of social impact to take these decisions. We have some guidelines at CDC to help us decide when potential social benefits are large enough to justify more concessional finance. More generally, I suspect that investments tend to be chosen as soon as there perceived to be a sufficiently high chance of the enterprise reaching profitability.</p><p>[3] I am using the phrase “upfront financing needs” to avoid confusion created by the unfortunate twin meanings of the word “investment” (real and financial) otherwise I would be writing these enterprises need investments to finance upfront investments.</p><p>[4] More generally, rather than just looking at variation in financing needs and potential impact across enterprises, we might also consider variation <em>within </em>enterprises as the managers of each enterprise possess a set of feasible business models with differing impact and upfront cost profiles, some of which might be supported by purely commercial investors, some by returns-seeking but impact-oriented investors, and some by DFIs and others willing to deviate significantly from market net return requirements (possibly including some grant element). DFIs are often additional because their finance allows enterprises to do something different to what commerical investors would have supported. Having different potential business models is captured in Roth’s model, in an abstract way, by being able to set different prices.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=76fc6aa71a81" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Indirect effects of investment on poverty are not trickledown economics.]]></title>
            <link>https://carterpaddy.medium.com/indirect-effects-of-investment-on-poverty-are-not-trickledown-economics-833f83beafd4?source=rss-98a1710c0aee------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/833f83beafd4</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[development]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[investment]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[poverty-reduction]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[trickle-down-economics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Paddy Carter]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 13 Apr 2021 09:21:24 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-04-17T10:09:48.998Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>CDC is sometimes accused of practicing trickledown economics, because we talk about the indirect effects of investments and we want to help create economic growth in the expectation this will help eradicate poverty. Sometimes our investments have a direct impact on poverty, by improving the livelihoods or meeting the needs of low-income sections of society. At other times the direct impact may be felt by the relatively better-off and we are looking for an indirect impact on poverty. How does relying on indirect effects differ from trickledown economics?</p><p>[What exactly do I mean by direct or indirect impact and relatively better-off? See end of article].</p><p>Trickledown economics is the discredited idea that if you want to help the poor, your best bet is to increase the income of the rich –perhaps by <a href="https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20130098">cutting taxes on dividends</a> — who will then invest and create wealth. The rich will also do things like buy yachts, and that will create jobs for everyone else.¹ It’s nonsense. If you have the power to affect the income of different groups and you want to help the poor, your best bet is to increase <em>their</em> incomes and then they will also buy things (just not yachts), which creates jobs and pushes up wages. Low income people can also be wealth creators, and raising their incomes puts resources into the hands of would-be entrepreneurs, whose potential is then more likely to be realised (including some “<a href="http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/cp522.pdf">lost Einsteins</a>” and “<a href="https://economics.mit.edu/files/17932">gung-ho entrepreneurs</a>”).</p><p>The evidence that investments indirectly help people escape poverty, however, is overwhelming. We know it from historical examples of poverty eradication. As Yuen Yuen Ang, the author of <a href="https://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/9781501700200/how-china-escaped-the-poverty-trap/#bookTabs=1">How China Escaped the Poverty Trap</a>, argues, China moved 850 million people out of extreme poverty in a matter of decades by <a href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/china-poverty-reduction-reinforces-rct-doubts-by-yuen-yuen-ang-2019-11?barrier=accesspay">encouraging all manner of private investment</a>. China only recently started directing spending poverty alleviation — for decades the focus was on growth above all else. We also know it from looking at the data: as the economist Lant Pritchett puts it, the facts show that overall economic growth is <a href="https://lantpritchett.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/RCTs-and-the-big-questions_10000words_june30.pdf">empirically necessary</a> for poverty eradication.</p><p>Evidence of indirect linkages and spillovers is all around us. Everyone understands that when a mill closes in a steel town, the <a href="https://academic.oup.com/jeea/article/18/1/427/5247011">impact extends beyond the steel workers</a>. Careful research finds that for every new job created by foreign direct investment in Mozambique, for example, <a href="https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/rest_a_00999">another 4.4 other jobs were created</a>, that in Costa Rica the entry of multinational corporations that pay higher wages <a href="https://3768255e-bb38-4e95-9575-269a322cc0d4.filesusr.com/ugd/c7b5dd_fc5af1a507ff4132a8d04d6299bb3ded.pdf">also pushes up wages in domestic firms</a>. There are many more examples.² We should not be surprised by these findings. Markets are integrated, so one firm’s wages and prices affects others. Poverty falls when investment accumulates and drives up real wages across society.³</p><p>When CDC considers an investment, we look at the backward linkages (what’s involved in production — direct employees and workers in the supply chain) and forward linkages (what the goods and services produced are used for). We prioritise investments that we think will increase the affordability and availability of goods and services that low-income people buy; goods and services that are important inputs to production (such as electricity or fertiliser); and investments that will create better jobs for people who need them. That’s not everything we care about — there is the environment and climate change too — but it covers the economic side of it.</p><p>We <em>might</em> invest in a yacht builder if we thought it would create enough decent jobs for people that need them, perhaps also help workers acquire new skills that they can take elsewhere, and perhaps if would be an export industry that generates much-needed foreign exchange earnings. We would not be interested in the reducing the price of yachts for rich people. This is the difference between trickledown economics and the sort of indirect effects of investments that we target: the rich getting richer is <em>on</em> the ‘impact pathway’ of trickledown economics; for the indirect effects of investments that we look for, the rich getting richer is <em>off</em> the impact pathway. This is trickledown:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/825/1*2pPlSjBEkeKLupnaUgauyA.png" /></figure><p>And here are indirect effects of an investment, with the rich getting richer happening on the side:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/488/1*Wra8Xs2ScFxpGxhgwecCsA.png" /></figure><p>With trickledown, the rich getting richer is <em>how</em> impact happens. Whereas for non-trickledown indirect effects on poverty, investments may involve making the well-off better-off, but that’s not where the impact comes from.</p><p>Successful private businesses also usually enrich their owners. That’s true whether the business serves the wealthy or not. A successful business selling low cost clean cookstoves for low income households would create returns for investors too. When we assess the expected development impact of an investment, we never rely on the investment creating more income for the already well-off to trickledown to others.</p><p>The reality is that all businesses have some indirect impacts via goods and labour markets. That is not enough to make them a priority for CDC’s direct investments. When the ‘impact thesis’ for an investment is indirect, meaning that the impact we are targeting will arise through the actions of other firms than the one we have invested in, we are looking for something more powerful than simply adding some demand to the local labour market, for example. As I wrote <a href="https://www.cdcgroup.com/en/news-insight/insight/articles/whats-the-expected-impact-of-investment-on-poverty-reduction/">here</a>, the fact that higher rates of private investment are strongly associated with faster poverty reduction in Africa and South Asia does not imply that any investment is a good investment for CDC. We must be better than the average private investor. Sometimes, however, we invest to improve access to finance at the market level and that does entail supporting some businesses, via intermediaries, that are not particularly pro-poor, but which will contribute something towards the overall level of rate of investment, economic growth and poverty reduction. There is <a href="https://www.cdcgroup.com/en/news-insight/insight/articles/the-impact-of-investing-in-financial-systems-reviewing-the-evidence/">ample evidence</a> that underdeveloped financial sectors in Africa and South Asia are a constraint on growth, and that <a href="https://watermark.silverchair.com/120104.pdf?token=AQECAHi208BE49Ooan9kkhW_Ercy7Dm3ZL_9Cf3qfKAc485ysgAAAsYwggLCBgkqhkiG9w0BBwagggKzMIICrwIBADCCAqgGCSqGSIb3DQEHATAeBglghkgBZQMEAS4wEQQMNVSgkPUm0yCt00jiAgEQgIICeST5_pQ-4qXyUBFdBbESPRiKSjZNzWTg_5ASxFu3u3fgpH3-roVNzeqiXAtC3oKWv-fmO3gOsEuK0ESusQuGZgvQJBhl89yABWji4xqVt1_XNBC7UE6Bx3l9GE-LJCKXPN_E0yc6sAYCSu1d1afRSL1_ZFKutUFJPqqqlRu48cg7PHsTCzOXmSNPwEAW1sqjCLOh3H7mJX861SYv99AAjXLAMYRDnSLP-ofVVeek8lZGCZ3_vYJNHCR7foEseWYR0BHIO8Pyb4jYpXVdg9rVydDy5_q916OqRUWGG6McoM0t3h0fTRBr7lTFWWVfQAXATHG2HOVp65un3JcoYGZRwQHyML9vYURGAZ4EChA4RDB7t_y8PQbgxITR4Us5xB-wB26mPc9M8YTwx3u5WRDzqRHiNYUCOQBWaqQb6slkt_doiIB0_sDPpSmuqclkUhei-9-Q-3d9T-tW-wRLehsOi9iyxRCa4RQqcdTFGXKJqRmxAhk0Cfz6kamgRgkPPsCotWg1xzZ3L5EKkT-sRag2t1nf7KXYJEZn-wuyczm0uJZE7HbVDG8Mble6lWtKSZzvtnAwtz73raiSLivZdObQGV9FRBe08w5D53cpIjj2CGqQeFr3fmqXl1SgLqCwrYy_hR3C7JSdNtMdB_JFbT0M_F317AxaidUHVnKa8zIMxXrxSmUjcJRpzwYPNubmfaZ5NPEqLosq28Ow8ezWp_rNpP_8a82fFhSnt4iM-ZZGRhQoHE_ZOtmB1g0OuN_mb4ArSIgFcIe9p13CXMRzd6vy8Oln_q_ZozkHFD9IKa2sJT16VOHBnK44BsY2qQx6BuqFauKD0R-EX5uxPg">many firms struggle to access the finance</a> they need to grow. Firms may simply be credit constrained, but they may also struggle to raise more risk-bearing forms of capital, such as equity, which can be particularly important for high growth enterprises. Firms that can only access debt are likely to choose safer less ambitious business plans.⁴</p><p>That is why CDC has supported pioneering private equity investors to enter new markets, and why we support banks and other providers of finance to expand their lending to firms. In more mature markets we will take a more selective approach with intermediaries and direct our capital, through them, towards higher impact sectors, but in less-developed markets we would usually place fewer constraints on the types of business that intermediaries can invest in. We want them to succeed, and for others to follow them. When we support an African bank to expand lending to SMEs, for example, our capital will find its way into some businesses that primarily serve better-off sections of society. The same could be said when invest in an electricity generator, or a logistics and warehousing group, or an internet service supplier: the businesses that benefit from these things will also come in all shapes and sizes.</p><p>This is all is perfectly consistent with the mandate of the 2002 International Development Act, which requires foreign aid to be likely to contribute to a reduction in poverty. Investing in the local financial sector to promote broad-based economic growth is an important part of what DFIs like CDC should be doing, alongside direct investments in more obviously developmental businesses. The impact on poverty from some of the resulting investments may be indirect, but it’s not trickledown economics.</p><h3><strong>Direct or indirect impact, and “relatively better-off”</strong></h3><p>We use “direct impact” to describe the impact that an investment in a business has on its employees, suppliers and customers. If we invest in the electricity grid, however, impact is created by firms that use electricity. If we invest in a financial services provider, impact is created by the firms that borrow from it. We call those indirect impacts — they are at least one step removed from our investment. And those firms will themselves create second-round impacts beyond their employees and customers, through spillovers in markets, and so forth.</p><p>Many lower income countries have vast informal sectors and very few salaried workers. So although <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/dpr.12689">industrialisation is often the path to reducing extreme poverty</a> that does not mean that when you invest in a formal manufacturing business that it will employ many people straight out of extreme poverty. Its workers will more often come from somewhat higher up the income distribution — perhaps people who were living on $5 or $10 per day. That’s what I mean by “relatively better-off” — poor, but not extremely poor. It’s because we believe those investments will also indirectly benefit people who are even less well off, we get accused of practicing “trickledown”. Creating a better job for someone who was living on $5 or $10 per day is a very different thing from cutting taxes for wealthy business owners, which is the sort of thing I think the term should preserved for.</p><p>There are various indirect mechanisms via which the growth of more productive formal sector firms can eradicate extreme poverty, despite those firms usually not reaching people in extreme poverty directly. One is by generating taxes to fund government anti-poverty programs. Another is that adding demand for labour in the formal sector helps others <a href="https://www.wider.unu.edu/node/240167">move onto lower rungs of the jobs ladder.</a> Extreme poverty is primarily a rural phenomenon, and when people move out of agriculture and into jobs in cities, that also raises demand for food and incomes for those farmers who remain.</p><p>Note: this is a longer version of a <a href="https://www.cdcgroup.com/en/news-insight/insight/articles/how-investment-can-have-an-indirect-impact-on-poverty-and-why-thats-not-the-same-as-trickledown-economics/">blog published by my employer CDC Group</a>. Additional material reflects my personal opinions.</p><h3>Footnotes:</h3><p>[1] The <a href="http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/107919/1/Hope_economic_consequences_of_major_tax_cuts_published.pdf">evidence from OECD</a> countries suggests that tax cuts for the rich do not boost growth or reduce unemployment. It perhaps more plausible that raising the incomes of the better-off might lead to higher investment early in the development process. <a href="https://benjaminmoll.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/ODP.pdf">This paper presents theory and evidence for that argument</a>.</p><p>[2] Some examples: <a href="https://eml.berkeley.edu/~moretti/tfp.pdf">who benefits from local productivity growth</a>; <a href="https://voxdev.org/topic/energy-environment/electricity-grid-expansion-and-firm-turnover-indonesia">electricity expansion and firm entry</a>; <a href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/m19j5e6xd3js5iq/Bau_Matray_July2020.pdf?dl=0">Improved access to finance</a>, productivity growth and price cuts; <a href="https://academic.oup.com/qje/article/135/2/1037/5695764">agricultural growth spilling over to manufacturing</a>; <a href="https://econweb.ucsd.edu/~pniehaus/papers/cash_transfers_ge.pdf">cash transfers have a multiplier effect on the local economy</a>.</p><p>[3] An emphasis on the importance of investment and economic growth for poverty reduction has become associated with the political right, but it was not always so. The famed left-wing economist Joan Robinson, for example, criticised Sri Lanka for attempting redistributive policies before it had sufficiently grown its economy — as recounted by Amartya Sen on <a href="https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/pdf/10.1146/annurev-economics-020520-020136">page 7</a> of this interview. The existence of spillovers in <a href="https://academic.oup.com/qje/article-abstract/134/4/1883/5549850?redirectedFrom=fulltext">production networks</a> from investments to other areas of the economy is often the justification for policies traditionally associated with the political left, such as active industrial policy, which is often credited with the success of Asian economies. The UK Labour Party <a href="https://labourlist.org/2018/08/watch-labour-video-explains-why-austerity-doesnt-work/">released a video</a> to explain demand multipliers (in this case negative). The <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10887-017-9150-2">most recent evidence</a> suggests that redistribution is good for growth, in which case pro-poor policies and the pursuit of economic growth can be seen as complementary.</p><p>[4] Here are a few papers about the importance of risk-bearing capital: <a href="https://baxter-robinson.github.io/Robinson_JMP.pdf">Entrepreneurial risk under incomplete markets</a>; <a href="https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/mac.20160298">Radical versus incremental innovation</a>; <a href="https://academic.oup.com/rof/article/24/5/961/5736146">raising capital under asymmetric information</a>; <a href="https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/31494">micro-equity for microenterprises</a>; <a href="https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev-economics-080614-115348">macro development perspective on financial frictions </a>; <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13691066.2020.1801141?journalCode=tvec20">venture debt</a> ; <a href="https://bfi.uchicago.edu/working-paper/synergizing-ventures/">synergising ventures</a>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=833f83beafd4" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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