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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Chanya Chanyanuch on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Chanya Chanyanuch on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Chanya Chanyanuch on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@chanyachanyanuch?source=rss-a569eccea58a------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[China’s Digital Authoritarianism: Pioneer of the AI Surveillance State]]></title>
            <link>https://chanyachanyanuch.medium.com/chinas-digital-authoritarianism-pioneer-of-the-ai-surveillance-state-591700bd5586?source=rss-a569eccea58a------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[china]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[surveillance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tech]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[asian-studies]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[authoritarianism]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Chanya Chanyanuch]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 07 Jul 2025 21:32:17 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-07-07T21:32:17.331Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>China’s AI-powered surveillance state foreshadows how tech can reinforce authoritarian control rather than promote freedom. By integrating facial recognition, smart policing, and mass data collection, the CCP has built a digital apparatus to suppress dissent and sustain its rule. Ones that many regimes, democratic and non-democratic alike, are eyeing to replicate.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*oWIsmLIyST65a_ur" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/08/business/china-surveillance-technology.html">https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/08/business/china-surveillance-technology.html</a></figcaption></figure><p>The West has long believed that China’s transition to a market economy would inevitably lead to democratic reform. The logic followed that as Chinese citizens grew wealthier under capitalism, they would come to desire democratic freedoms, human rights, and the rule of law (Mitter and Johnson 2018). Democracy, in this view, was an innate outgrowth of capitalism. Once China became economically advanced, it was expected to evolve naturally into a market-driven liberal democracy. However, this belief has proven incorrect — or at least, has yet to materialize. Despite becoming the world’s second-largest economy by 2021 (The World Bank 2021) and approaching technological parity with the United States, China’s political system remains unchanged: an authoritarian regime under the rule of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).</p><p>Ironically, China’s capitalist economic development has not fueled democratic resistance but instead strengthened the authoritarian state. An increasingly educated population has not sparked a mass democratic revolution. Rather, economic and technological growth have reinforced one another to produce new tools for authoritarian control. In other words, capitalism’s technological advancements have been harnessed to reinforce, not challenge, China’s authoritarian political structure. The key technology in this context is Artificial Intelligence (AI). While AI has countless applications, this paper focuses on its use in surveillance — specifically, how the CCP deploys AI to consolidate power and suppress dissent, thereby preserving the authoritarian status quo.</p><h3>Rivalry of Ideologies: China and the West</h3><p>China’s rivalry with the West, particularly the United States, is rooted in opposing political ideologies. The US champions market-driven liberal democracy, while China claims to adhere to communism. In practice, however, the CCP governs through authoritarianism, exercising power without popular consent. As Wright (2019c) notes, authoritarian regimes prioritize authority over individual liberty. In China, political power is centralized in the CCP’s inner circle, and all 31 provinces and autonomous regions are subject to Beijing’s directives.</p><p>The CCP faces threats both externally and internally. External challenges include the ideological opposition of the West and territorial disputes. Notably, internal threats are more critical. Beijing allocates significantly more military resources to domestic security than to external defense (Roberts et al. 2021). Key internal threats include terrorism from separatist movements in Xinjiang and Tibet, the Hong Kong independence movement, and the potential for domestic unrest fueled by an increasingly informed, economically empowered, and digitally connected populace.</p><p>Traditional methods of control — police forces and censorship — are insufficient for managing a population of 1.4 billion people in the digital age. The rapid spread of information online poses a contemporary challenge to authoritarian rule. The CCP has thus turned to technological solutions to maintain control and prevent dissent.</p><h3>Centralized Tech Development and State Control</h3><p>China’s tech sector is not immune to state influence. Major Chinese tech companies — such as Alibaba, Tencent, Baidu, and ByteDance — have been repeatedly implicated in providing user data to the government (Khalil 2020; Roberts et al. 2021; Feldstein 2019). For example, Beijing’s alleged connection to ByteDance, the parent company of TikTok, which became the most downloaded app in 2022 (Whalen 2021). The CCP not only compels existing tech giants to comply but also incentivizes new tech start-ups through soft loans and subsidies to align their innovations with government objectives (Feldstein 2019). Thus, China’s tech industry operates within a state-directed framework, balancing market forces with strict political oversight.</p><p>Key policies reflect this strategic vision. The 2017 New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan (AIDP) and the 2014 Outline for the Establishment of a Social Credit System illustrate China’s efforts to centralize and regulate technology development. The AIDP sets ambitious goals for China’s AI sector. By 2020, China aimed for its AI industry to be worth over $21 billion, with further growth targeting $58 billion and eventually $147 billion by 2030. The plan emphasizes ethical guidelines, regulatory frameworks, and the fostering of innovation to position China as the global AI leader (Roberts et al. 2021). The Social Credit System, introduced in 2014, initially mirrored Western financial credit scoring but quickly evolved into a tool for regulating citizen behavior under the guise of moral governance. In this system, the state — not individuals — defines what constitutes moral behavior (Roberts et al. 2021).</p><h3>AI Surveillance: Technologies and Practices</h3><p>Wright (2019c) describes AI as systems that model and predict real-world events using data. Machine learning, a core AI capability, enables computers to learn from data and adapt to new information without explicit programming. Big data — massive volumes of organized information — fuels these algorithms, enabling predictive analysis. China’s advantage in the global AI race lies in its unparalleled data collection. Unlike democratic countries with stringent privacy laws, China’s state-driven surveillance gathers vast, detailed datasets, allowing for more sophisticated machine learning. China’s AI-enabled governance reflects Leninist social management principles, repackaged through modern technology (Wright 2019b; Hoffman 2019). Surveillance technologies have become automated extensions of traditional authoritarian tactics.</p><p>Three key AI surveillance tools illustrate China’s approach (Feldstein 2019):</p><ol><li><strong>Smart Cities</strong>: Urban areas equipped with interconnected devices, such as CCTV cameras and sensors, which collect real-time data to optimize city management — and monitor citizens.</li><li><strong>Facial Recognition Systems</strong>: Biometric tools that identify individuals or assess demographic trends in crowds, aiding in protest detection.</li><li><strong>Smart Policing</strong>: Algorithms that analyze location data, arrest records, biometric information, and social media footprints to prevent or respond to crime preemptively. Predictive policing has been heavily applied in Xinjiang.</li></ol><h3>Case Studies: Xinjiang and the Zero-COVID Protests</h3><p>Two key case studies highlight the real-world application of AI surveillance in China:</p><h3>Xinjiang</h3><p>In Xinjiang, the CCP has built a near-total surveillance state to suppress Uyghur Muslims and other Turkic minorities. Since 2016, at least one million people have been detained in political re-education camps (Wang 2019). The Integrated Joint Operations Platform (IJOP) aggregates data from facial recognition, CCTV, Wi-Fi sniffers, and personal records to flag “suspicious” individuals (Human Rights Watch 2019; Qian et al. 2022). Iris scans and DNA databases further deepen this surveillance net.</p><h3>The Zero-COVID Protests</h3><p>The COVID-19 pandemic initially showcased the “positive” side of AI surveillance, enabling efficient tracking of infections and quarantine enforcement (Khalil 2020). However, as lockdowns dragged on and the economy stalled, discontent grew.</p><p>In late 2022, widespread protests — most notably the White Paper Protest — broke out in cities like Shanghai and Beijing, on a scale unseen since Tiananmen Square in 1989 (Teh 2022). The CCP swiftly deployed AI surveillance tools to identify protestors despite face masks and pseudonymous social media posts. Protestors were tracked using CCTV and phone metadata, with some detained at home based on their digital footprints (Mozur, Fu, and Chien 2022).</p><p>Unlike the military crackdown in Tiananmen, today’s suppression relies on immediate digital detection and intimidation rather than overt violence. The omnipresence of AI surveillance deters resistance through fear.</p><h3>Implications: The Rise of Digital Authoritarianism</h3><p>AI surveillance offers two significant advantages to authoritarian regimes:</p><ol><li>It automates surveillance tasks, reducing costs and human resource needs.</li><li>It vastly expands the state’s monitoring capacity, creating an environment where citizens believe they are constantly watched.</li></ol><p>This state of perpetual surveillance fosters sustained fear, a centerpiece of authoritarian rule.</p><p>Contrary to Western expectations, capitalism has not democratized China. Instead, AI surveillance has fortified the CCP’s grip on power. China’s digital authoritarianism serves as a model for other regimes seeking to blend economic modernization with political repression.</p><p>China is not merely adapting to the technological era — it is pioneering the world’s first AI surveillance state.</p><p><strong>Originally Written: January 26, 2023 <br>Edited: July 7, 2025</strong></p><h4>Bibliography</h4><p>Feldstein, Steven. 2019. “The Global Expansion of AI Surveillance.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep20995.">https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep20995.</a></p><p>Hoffman, Samantha. 2019. “Managing the State: Social Credit, Surveillance, and the Chinese Communist Party’s Plan for China.” Artificial Intelligence, China, Russia, and the Global Order. Air University Press. <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep19585.12.">https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep19585.12.</a></p><p>Khalil, Lydia. 2020. “Digital Authoritarianism, China and C0VID.” Lowy Institute for International Policy. <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep27665.">https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep27665.</a></p><p>Mitter, Rana, and Elsbeth Johnson. 2018. “How the West Got China Wrong.” <em>The Economist</em>, January 3, 2018. <a href="https://www.economist.com/leaders/2018/03/01/how-the-west-got-china-wrong.">https://www.economist.com/leaders/2018/03/01/how-the-west-got-china-wrong.</a></p><p>Mozur, Paul, Claire Fu, and Amy Chang Chien. 2022. “How China’s Police Used Phones and Faces to Track Protesters.” <em>The New York Times</em>, December 2, 2022, sec. Business. <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/12/02/business/china-protests-surveillance.html.">https://www.nytimes.com/2022/12/02/business/china-protests-surveillance.html.</a></p><p>Qian, Isabelle, Muyi Xiao, Paul Mozur, and Alexander Cardia. 2022. “Four Takeaways From a Times Investigation Into China’s Expanding Surveillance State.” <em>The New York Times</em>, June 21, 2022, sec. World. <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/21/world/asia/china-surveillance-investigation.html.">https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/21/world/asia/china-surveillance-investigation.html.</a></p><p>Roberts, Huw, Josh Cowls, Jessica Morley, Mariarosaria Taddeo, Vincent Wang, and Luciano Floridi. 2021. “The Chinese Approach to Artificial Intelligence: An Analysis of Policy, Ethics, and Regulation.” <em>AI &amp; SOCIETY</em> 36 (1): 59–77. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-020-00992-2.">https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-020-00992-2.</a></p><p>Teh, Cheryl. 2022. “People Are Holding up Blank White Sheets of Paper in China to Protest COVID Lockdowns. It’s Become a Symbol of Defiance against the Communist Party.” Insider. November 27, 2022. <a href="https://www.insider.com/blank-paper-china-new-symbol-of-defiance-2022-11.">https://www.insider.com/blank-paper-china-new-symbol-of-defiance-2022-11.</a></p><p>The World Bank. 2021. “GDP (Current US$).” 2021. <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD.">https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD.</a></p><p>Wang, Maya. 2019. <em>China’s Algorithms of Repression: Reverse Engineering a Xinjiang Police Mass Surveillance App</em>. New York: Human Rights Watch.</p><p>Whalen, Jeanne. 2021. “Chinese Government Acquires Stake in ByteDance Subsidiary,” August 17, 2021. <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/08/17/chinese-government-bytedance-tiktok/">https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/08/17/chinese-government-bytedance-tiktok/.</a></p><p>Wright, Nicholas D. 2019a. “Artificial Intelligence and Domestic Political Regimes: Digital Authoritarian, Digital Hybrid, and Digital Democracy.” Artificial Intelligence, China, Russia, and the Global Order. Air University Press. <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep19585.9.">https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep19585.9.</a></p><p>— — — . 2019b. “Artificial Intelligence’s Three Bundles of Challenges for the Global Order.” Artificial Intelligence, China, Russia, and the Global Order. Air University Press. <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep19585.8.">https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep19585.8.</a></p><p>— — — . 2019c. “The Technologies: What Specifically Is New?” Artificial Intelligence, China, Russia, and the Global Order. Air University Press. <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep19585.7.">https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep19585.7.</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=591700bd5586" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Laundering the Global Chain of Slave-Produced Seafood from Southeast Asia to the United States]]></title>
            <link>https://chanyachanyanuch.medium.com/laundering-the-global-chain-of-slave-produced-seafood-from-southeast-asia-to-the-united-states-9b162d00b61c?source=rss-a569eccea58a------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[human-rights]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[global-supply-chain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[thailand]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[clm]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[fisheries]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Chanya Chanyanuch]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 06 Jul 2025 20:06:15 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-07-06T20:06:15.049Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Behind Thailand’s seafood exports lies a hidden network of forced labor, where migrant fishers endure brutal conditions to supply affordable seafood to global demands amidst degrading ocean environment.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*eT1NgntBy7kNR1M6.jpg" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="https://ejfoundation.org/reports/thailands-seafood-slaves">https://ejfoundation.org/reports/thailands-seafood-slaves</a></figcaption></figure><h3>Introduction</h3><p>Seafood may not be the cheapest choice, yet it remains affordable in the US even in the landlocked areas. Grocery chains offer a range of frozen seafood options, from fish and prawns to processed shrimp and squid. Beyond frozen options, canned seafood — such as sardines for human consumption or tuna for pets — makes up another major segment. These products are among Thailand’s key seafood exports to the US, which purchases about 20 percent of Thailand’s $7 billion annual seafood exports (McDowell, Mason, and Mendoza n.d.). Globally, Thailand ranks among the top ten fish producers and is the third-largest seafood exporter. In 2005, fish accounted for 26% of Thailand’s total agricultural exports, valued at US$ 4.5 billion (Derks 2010, 919). American groceries stock seafood sourced from the Andaman Sea, the Gulf of Thailand, and beyond. This trade involves a highly complex global supply chain, making it logistically challenging to bring seafood caught in Thai waters to American stores at relatively affordable prices. This article explores the journey of seafood from the Gulf of Thailand to American shelves, focusing not only on the products and business processes but more importantly on the labor behind Thailand’s fishery industry — the forgotten backbone of this multibillion-dollar trade. This paper argues that Thailand’s seafood industry exemplifies how global supply chains and weak governance enable the persistence of modern slavery, as migrant fishers from neighboring Southeast Asian countries are systematically exploited to meet global market demands.</p><h3>Global Supply Chains and the Invisible Labor of the Thai Seafood Industry</h3><p>The seafood supply chain generally unfolds as follows. First, commercial fishing fleets and small-scale boats harvest seafood, sometimes remaining at sea for months or even years, transporting fish stocks to tour boats or larger “motherships” (Urbina 2015). Tour boats shuttle seafood back to the docks without the fishing vessels leaving the area, and they also deliver essentials such as fuel and food to the crews. After docking, seafood is either auctioned by middlemen or sent directly to factories for processing. For example, raw shrimp may be sent to farms or processed by hand-peeling and freezing (Mason et al. n.d.). Lower-grade fish, like sardines used for pet food, are sorted and processed before being shipped to foreign suppliers. At this stage, sales and processing are typically controlled by Thai-owned companies operating in Thailand. Finished products are then sold to exporters and wholesalers, with major retailers — such as Walmart, Kroger, Whole Foods, Dollar General, and Petco — purchasing seafood from global wholesalers. Other notable buyers include Nestle, Mars Inc., Red Lobster, and Olive Garden (Mason et al. n.d.; Mendoza n.d.). Kara’s book <em>Modern Slavery</em>, based on field research, illustrates this supply chain (Kara 2017). His conclusions echo those of other scholars and journalists: Thailand’s fishery industry is one of the most egregious cases of modern slavery (Fischman 2017; Derks 2010; Welch 2022; Leschin-Hoar 2018).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*2anNH-xLnZsc__hP" /><figcaption>Source: Kara, Siddharth. 2017. “GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAINS: Blood and the Sea.” In Modern Slavery, 223–53.</figcaption></figure><p>Globalization facilitates the movement of goods, services, investments, businesses, and labor. Neoliberal theorists argue that globalization leads to economic gains and improved living standards through increased interdependence and free trade. However, some countries fare worse in global trade. In the Thai seafood industry, trade openness has fueled modern slavery. Extreme labor exploitation amplifies inequality, and citizens from poorer, weaker states are most vulnerable. Rising global seafood demand, coupled with environmental degradation from decades of overfishing (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2011, 15), perpetuates slavery in the industry. Without acknowledging their role in supporting slave-produced seafood, major consumer countries allow multinational companies to prioritize profit over ethics. Most fishers are men and children from Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar or CLM (Derks 2010). The story of affordable seafood in American grocery stores begins in these diplomatically marginalized Southeast Asian nations. Migrants from CLM are the ones peeling shrimp, catching sardines, and sorting fish — often without even knowing how to swim. One former enslaved worker, Mr. Long, had never seen the ocean before being sold into debt bondage to a Thai captain (Urbina 2015).</p><h3>Structural Vulnerabilities and Labor Exploitation in Thai Fisheries</h3><p>Thailand and the CLM countries, all ASEAN members, frequently address migrant labor at regional summits. Thailand, with a higher GDP per capita and relative political stability, has long relied on migrants from its neighbors to fill low-paid jobs. All four nations share authoritarian regimes, post-colonial conflicts, and histories of economic instability, prompting constant migration into Thailand. Weak law enforcement in Thailand and the CLM countries creates fertile ground for human trafficking, labor exploitation, and undocumented migration.</p><p>The Pulitzer Prize-winning 2016 AP investigative series, <em>Seafood from Slaves</em>, chronicled the harrowing stories of thousands of former enslaved fishermen stranded in Benjina, an Indonesian island village. These testimonies reveal the journey of trafficked CLM workers through Thailand’s fishing industry. However, such exploitation is not unique to Southeast Asia. Weak governance and lack of human rights enforcement across the global seafood industry make it a breeding ground for slavery. On Benjina, most men were Burmese trafficked through Thailand. Survivors described being forced to drink dirty water, work 20 to 22-hour shifts without rest days, and suffering brutal beatings for minor infractions. “They were paid little or nothing, as they hauled in heavy nets with squid, shrimp, snapper, grouper, and other fish” (McDowell, Mason, and Mendoza n.d.).</p><p>Hlaing Min, a 30-year-old Burmese man, fled his captors but remains haunted by his experiences. He witnessed friends commit suicide or be killed trying to escape. “There must be a mountain of bones under the sea… The bones of the people could be an island, it’s that many.” Bodies were often stored with the catch in freezers until dumped on Benjina. Sixty crude graves have been found there. These cases involved at least three states: Thailand, Myanmar, and Indonesia. Thai-owned vessels operated with Indonesian permits and Burmese workers. Corruption was rampant: immigration officers accepted bribes to overlook undocumented migrants; coast guards ignored abuses; and fishing permit administrators allowed illegal vessels to operate unchecked. This demonstrates how states sacrificed human rights for economic gains. The free movement of labor has primarily benefited corporations, leaving migrant workers trapped in cycles of exploitation — whether by force, by false promises, or by necessity.</p><h3>Global Governance, Corporate Responsibility, and Ongoing Challenges</h3><p>An open economy demands cheap products, which in turn requires cheap labor. Seafood prices remain competitive due to fierce market competition. To keep costs low, companies cut corners wherever possible (Fischman 2017, 232). Seafood stocks, once considered abundant natural resources, are now dangerously depleted. Though some states have raised fishing permit fees, policing vast ocean areas is nearly impossible. As a result, companies exploit marine resources with little accountability while maintaining low labor costs. Unsustainable fishing, labor slavery, and weak governance are the hidden costs of the seafood on our plates.</p><p>Complicating the problem further is the complexity of global supply chains. Nestle admits that the seafood it purchases comes from multiple ports and vessels in international waters, making traceability difficult. Mars Inc. has cited “real traceability issues” as a barrier to ensuring ethical sourcing (Urbina 2015; Mendoza n.d.). After mounting public pressure, some governments and companies have taken steps toward accountability. The US Congress passed the Business Supply Chain Transparency on Trafficking and Slavery Act of 2015 (BSCT) to require companies to report on their supply chains (Fischman 2017, 234). While some scholars doubt its effectiveness (Fischman 2017, 243; Welch 2022), it represents an important first step toward eradicating slavery. Ultimately, global trade disproportionately benefits corporations, retailers, consumers, and governments in wealthy nations. Workers — especially the most vulnerable migrants at the bottom of the supply chain — bear the costs. Migrants from CLM countries pursue better lives for their families but instead fall prey to exploitation. As one former enslaved fisherman lamented in Kara’s book, “The fish are treated better than these men.” In this global system, the lives of men, women, and children are valued less than the seafood they catch.</p><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>The Thai seafood industry illustrates how global economic integration can be beneficial while perpetuating labor exploitation. As global supply chains stretch across national borders, the demand for affordable seafood in Western markets has fueled exploitative labor practices in Southeast Asia–unintentional consumers but intentionally overlooked corporations. Migrant workers from Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar form the backbone of the Thai fishing industry but remain trapped in cycles of debt bondage, physical abuse, and legal invisibility (Derks 2010, 920; Kara 2017, 242). Despite increased global scrutiny, including the Pulitzer Prize-winning Seafood from Slaves investigation and legislative efforts like the United States’ Business Supply Chain Transparency on Trafficking and Slavery Act of 2015, significant challenges persist. Companies such as Nestlé and Mars Inc. continue to face alleged “traceability” problems that prevent full transparency in their supply chains. Structural corruption, weak law enforcement, and the fragmented nature of maritime regulation allow these human rights abuses to continue largely unchecked. While international efforts have brought attention to these abuses, labor protections are often undermined by economic incentives that favor corporate profits over workers’ rights.</p><p>Addressing modern slavery in the Thai seafood industry requires a coordinated global response that extends beyond voluntary corporate social responsibility initiatives. Stronger legal enforcement, worker protections, and meaningful participation of civil society actors are essential to dismantling the systemic exploitation embedded in global seafood trade. Until such changes occur, the Thai seafood industry will remain a powerful example of how globalization, when left unregulated, perpetuates severe human rights abuses in the pursuit of economic gain.</p><p><strong>Originally Submitted: Feb 22, 2023</strong></p><p><strong>Re-written: July 5, 2025</strong></p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2Fbo35uvxPXPw%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;display_name=YouTube&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3Dbo35uvxPXPw&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2Fbo35uvxPXPw%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="854" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/50d55b0fda8b5580389ebd1f8493e428/href">https://medium.com/media/50d55b0fda8b5580389ebd1f8493e428/href</a></iframe><h3>Bibliography</h3><p>Derks, Annuska. 2010. “Migrant Labour and the Politics of Immobilisation: Cambodian Fishermen in Thailand.” <em>Asian Journal of Social Science</em> 38 (6): 915–32.</p><p>Fischman, Katharine. 2017. “Adrift in the Sea: The Impact of the Business Supply Chain Transparency on Trafficking and Slavery Act of 2015 on Forced Labor in the Thai Fishing Industry.” <em>Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies</em> 24 (1): 227–52. <a href="https://doi.org/10.2979/indjglolegstu.24.1.0227.">https://doi.org/10.2979/indjglolegstu.24.1.0227.</a></p><p>Kara, Siddharth. 2017. “GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAINS: Blood and the Sea.” In <em>Modern Slavery</em>, 223–53. A Global Perspective. Columbia University Press. <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7312/kara15846.11.">https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7312/kara15846.11.</a></p><p>Leschin-Hoar, Clare. 2018. “Was Your Seafood Caught With Slave Labor? New Database Helps Retailers Combat Abuse.” <em>NPR</em>, February 1, 2018, sec. The Salt. <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2018/02/01/582214032/was-your-seafood-caught-with-slave-labor-new-database-helps-retailers-combat-abu.">https://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2018/02/01/582214032/was-your-seafood-caught-with-slave-labor-new-database-helps-retailers-combat-abu.</a></p><p>Mason, Margie, Robin McDowell, Martha Mendoza, and Esther Htusan. n.d. “Global Supermarkets Selling Shrimp Peeled by Slaves.” AP Explore: Seafood from Slaves. Accessed February 21, 2023. <a href="http://www.ap.org/explore/seafood-from-slaves/global-supermarkets-selling-shrimp-peeled-by-slaves.html.">http://www.ap.org/explore/seafood-from-slaves/global-supermarkets-selling-shrimp-peeled-by-slaves.html.</a></p><p>McDowell, Robin, Margie Mason, and Martha Mendoza. n.d. “AP Investigation: Slaves May Have Caught the Fish You Bought.” AP Explore: Seafood from Slaves. Accessed February 17, 2023. <a href="http://www.ap.org/explore/seafood-from-slaves/ap-investigation-slaves-may-have-caught-the-fish-you-bought.html.">http://www.ap.org/explore/seafood-from-slaves/ap-investigation-slaves-may-have-caught-the-fish-you-bought.html.</a></p><p>Mendoza, Martha. n.d. “Nestle Confirms Labor Abuse among Its Thai Seafood Suppliers.” AP Explore: Seafood from Slaves. Accessed February 21, 2023. <a href="http://www.ap.org/explore/seafood-from-slaves/nestle-confirms-labor-abuse-among-its-thai-seafood-suppliers.html.">http://www.ap.org/explore/seafood-from-slaves/nestle-confirms-labor-abuse-among-its-thai-seafood-suppliers.html.</a></p><p>United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. 2011. “Transnational Organized Crime in the Fishing Industry.” In <em>United Nations : Office on Drugs and Crime</em>. //www.unodc.org/unodc/en/human-trafficking/2011/issue-paper-transnational-organized-crime-in-the-fishing-industry.html.</p><p>Urbina, Ian. 2015. “‘Sea Slaves’: The Human Misery That Feeds Pets and Livestock.” <em>The New York Times</em>, July 27, 2015, sec. World. <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/27/world/outlaw-ocean-thailand-fishing-sea-slaves-pets.html.">https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/27/world/outlaw-ocean-thailand-fishing-sea-slaves-pets.html.</a></p><p>Welch, Heather. 2022. “When Fishing Boats Go Dark at Sea, They’re Often Committing Crimes — We Mapped Where It Happens.” The Conversation. December 21, 2022. <a href="http://theconversation.com/when-fishing-boats-go-dark-at-sea-theyre-often-committing-crimes-we-mapped-where-it-happens-196694.">http://theconversation.com/when-fishing-boats-go-dark-at-sea-theyre-often-committing-crimes-we-mapped-where-it-happens-196694.</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9b162d00b61c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The #MilkTeaAlliance: A Case Study of Transnational Digital Resistance and Authoritarian Backlash…]]></title>
            <link>https://chanyachanyanuch.medium.com/the-milkteaalliance-a-case-study-of-transnational-digital-resistance-and-authoritarian-backlash-82903d422c4f?source=rss-a569eccea58a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/82903d422c4f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[activism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[asia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[authoritarianism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[milkteaalliance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[southeast-asia]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Chanya Chanyanuch]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 05 Jul 2025 18:46:17 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-07-05T20:54:32.965Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>The #MilkTeaAlliance: A Case Study of Transnational Digital Resistance and Authoritarian Backlash in Asia</h3><p>The MTA is a digital-driven, transnational movement uniting pro-democracy activists across Asia in their resistance against authoritarian regimes.</p><p><a href="https://drive.google.com/file/d/195IHv7XR329qWDdYzdiJ3JoDl56iOTJC/view?usp=sharing">Read full article</a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*HgUCAxoF-0gQMnYHx2qvYA.png" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="https://casebook-static.pages.dev/case-studies/milk-tea-alliance-meme-war-transnational-activism/">https://casebook-static.pages.dev/case-studies/milk-tea-alliance-meme-war-transnational-activism/</a></figcaption></figure><h3>Introduction</h3><p>The #MilkTeaAlliance (MTA) emerged as a powerful transnational pro-democracy movement in Asia, starting with the viral spread of the hashtag in mid-2020. Catalyzed by social media platforms, MTA has grown into a regional solidarity movement that unites pro-democracy activists, students, netizens, and even politicians from countries affected by authoritarian regimes (Schaffar &amp; Wongratanawin, 2021, p. 5). The movement originally took root in countries such as Thailand, Hong Kong, and Myanmar, regions where the struggle for democratic reforms is met with increasing state repression. This article explores MTA as a case study to understand the intersection of digital activism and authoritarian responses in Asia.</p><p>Once celebrated as a tool for democratic promotion, digital space has increasingly become a battleground for both advancing democracy and suppressing dissent. While citizens have utilized digital tools to challenge oppressive regimes, authoritarian governments have also adapted to digital spaces, employing sophisticated strategies to combat opposition (Morgenbesser, 2020, p. 56). This paper will examine the origins and evolution of MTA, its digital strategies, and how authoritarian governments in Asia respond to these grassroots efforts.</p><h3>The Pro-Democracy Movement: #MilkTeaAlliance</h3><p>The #MilkTeaAlliance gained momentum through a combination of social media strategies and grassroots activism across Southeast Asia and Hong Kong. These regions, despite their diverse political contexts, share common challenges: shrinking political freedoms, deepening authoritarianism, and the pushback against rising regional influence of China. MTA became a platform where local grievances transcended national boundaries and evolved into a unified call for democratic change (Huang &amp; Svetanant, 2022, p. 130).</p><p>Hong Kong, a Special Administrative Region (SAR) of China, serves as an outlier in this analysis. Unlike Thailand and Myanmar, where authoritarianism exists largely due to domestic political structures, Hong Kong’s situation is directly shaped by the increasing influence of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) (Bünte, 2020, p. 199). The unique political circumstances in Hong Kong make it a critical case for understanding the dynamics of digital activism under Chinese influence. The inclusion of Hong Kong in the MTA narrative allows for a fuller understanding of the movement’s significance within the broader context of autocracy and democracy in Asia.</p><h3>Emergence and Evolution of MTA</h3><p>The Milk Tea Alliance (MTA) was born out of a seemingly trivial online quarrel between Thai actor Vachirawit Chivaaree and Chinese netizens in April 2020. This dispute, which initially revolved around comments made by Chivaaree’s unintentional mention of Hong Kong as a “country”, quickly escalated into a wider political debate. The hashtag #MilkTeaAlliance was coined as a symbol of solidarity between Thai, Taiwanese, and Hong Kong netizens, initially in response to online harassment from Chinese nationalists (Schaffar &amp; Wongratanawin, 2021, p. 10). It marked the beginning of a transnational movement fueled by anti-authoritarian sentiment.</p><p>Although the dispute began as a pop culture feud, it rapidly became political. The hashtag resonated with netizens in Hong Kong, Thailand, and Taiwan, all of whom faced varying degrees of repression under their respective governments. Hong Kong’s struggle against increasing CCP control over its political system and the subsequent 2019 Anti-Extradition Bill (Anti-ELAB) movement was a key precursor to MTA. Similarly, Thailand’s ongoing struggle with military dictatorship, as well as Myanmar’s military coup in February 2021, provided fertile ground for MTA’s expansion (Dedman &amp; Lai, 2021, p. 115).</p><p>The viral spread of the hashtag allowed MTA to evolve into a regional movement, galvanizing protests in Hong Kong, Thailand, and Myanmar, where local grievances were transformed into a unified regional sentiment. By the end of 2021, the hashtag had been mentioned over 25 million times on Twitter, showcasing the power of digital tools in fostering transnational solidarity (Khor, 2024, p. 124).</p><h3>Digital Activism and MTA</h3><p>Digital platforms played a pivotal role in the rise of MTA. The movement capitalized on the accessibility and immediacy of social media, particularly Twitter (now X), which became the primary space for organizing and disseminating information (Sinpeng, 2020, p. 32). Digital activism in MTA was fueled by the participation of younger generations, particularly Generation Z, who were well-versed in social media and internet culture. This demographic, often referred to as “<em>digital natives</em>,” used memes, hashtags, and other digital strategies to amplify their message (Sastramidjaja, 2023, p. 45).</p><p>MTA’s success was also driven by the involvement of pop culture fan communities, especially those related to Thai Boy Love (BL) series and K-pop. These fan communities, which were initially focused on entertainment and celebrity culture, became a powerful force in driving political activism. The use of memes and satirical content helped to bypass censorship and connect with a wide audience. By blending pop culture references with political messages, MTA was able to attract a diverse and transnational group of supporters (Khor, 2024, p. 123).</p><h3>MTA’s Digital Tactics</h3><p>The use of memes, hashtags, and other forms of digital expression allowed MTA to transcend national boundaries and reach a global audience. This tactic of “affordance,” in which users mobilize social media’s inherent features to create political content, made MTA’s message both concise and impactful (Cheng, Lui, &amp; Fu, 2024, p. 6425). Digital natives, familiar with the “<em>algorithmic biases</em> (Lim, 2025)” of platforms like Twitter, leveraged these platforms to spread emotionally provocative content that could go viral quickly.</p><p>One of the key tactics was the use of memes and viral content that appealed to shared generational experiences. For example, memes mocking Chinese nationalists, particularly the “Little Pink” trolls, were used as a form of political expression. These memes resonated with Thai and Hong Kong activists, who were similarly frustrated with Chinese interference in their countries’ political affairs. The viral nature of these memes allowed MTA to spread rapidly, gaining traction especially where the digital landscape was less politically constrained.</p><h3>The Backlash: Authoritarian Responses to MTA</h3><p>In response to the growing influence of MTA, authoritarian regimes in the region began to employ digital strategies to suppress dissent. As MTA gained momentum, these governments implemented various forms of digital repression, including online surveillance, censorship, and the deployment of “cyber troops” to flood social media with pro-government content. In Thailand, the military government utilized laws such as lèse-majesté to criminalize criticism of the monarchy, while in Myanmar, the military junta employed brutal tactics to suppress online dissent (Morgenbesser, 2020, p. 58).</p><p>China’s role in this digital crackdown cannot be overstated. As the world’s leading example of digital authoritarianism, China has been accused of supporting regimes in Southeast Asia by exporting its strategies for controlling online discourse. Chinese companies, such as Huawei, have provided technological assistance to governments seeking to bolster their digital surveillance capabilities. Furthermore, China’s own experience with censorship and control over digital spaces has been closely mirrored by regimes in Myanmar, Thailand, and Hong Kong, who have adapted similar tactics to silence political opposition (Bünte, 2020, p. 202). However, contrary to public perception and alerts from Washington, there has not been concrete evidence that the CCP intentionally exports digital authoritarian tools to support autocratic regimes’ suppression. Experts suggest that the more authoritarian a government is, the more likely it is to rely on digital repression techniques to reinforce political control, regardless of regime type (Dimitrov, 2024; Feldstein, 2019).</p><h3>Transnational Solidarity and the “Imagined Digital Political Community”</h3><p>MTA’s success in fostering transnational solidarity among activists can be understood through the concept of the “<em>imagined digital political community.</em>” Drawing on Benedict Anderson’s theory of imagined communities, Huang (2022) applies this framework to MTA to explain how activists from different countries, despite never meeting in person, can form a collective identity through shared grievances and goals. This digital community was born out of the realization that political struggles in one country are deeply connected to those in others, creating a shared sense of solidarity (Huang &amp; Svetanant, 2022, p. 131).</p><p>The idea of an imagined community was reinforced by the widespread use of digital platforms, where activists could exchange ideas, strategies, and resources. This digital space became a refuge for those facing repression in their home countries, allowing them to connect with others who shared their aspirations for democracy and freedom. Despite geographical distance, the digital space allowed for the formation of a collective identity centered around anti-authoritarian resistance (Schaffar &amp; Wongratanawin, 2021, p. 11).</p><h3>The Impact and Limitations of MTA</h3><p>While MTA succeeded in raising awareness and generating global solidarity, it faced significant challenges in translating its digital momentum into real-world action. Critics argue that the movement struggled to maintain sustained offline engagement, with most protests remaining confined to digital spaces. The movement’s reliance on memes and online platforms, while effective in raising awareness, did not always translate into tangible political change on the ground. Furthermore, the movement’s focus on anti-China sentiment alienated potential allies within the domestic politics, particularly in countries where China’s economic influence is more pronounced.</p><p>Another limitation of MTA is the tendency to reinforce echo chambers. As online communities fell into <em>algorithmic enclaves</em>, there was a risk that the movement would become confined to like-minded individuals, rather than reaching broader segments of the population. This was particularly evident in Thailand, where anti-China sentiments were a core feature of MTA’s message. In a country where economic ties with China are growing, the movement’s anti-China rhetoric sometimes hindered its ability to build cross-party or cross-national alliances (Sombatpoonsiri, 2021, p. 8).</p><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>The #MilkTeaAlliance represents a new wave of digital activism in Asia, one that transcends national boundaries and challenges authoritarian regimes through shared grievances and digital tools. While the movement’s digital tactics have empowered activists and fostered transnational solidarity, they have also exposed the vulnerabilities of online activism in the face of sophisticated digital repression by authoritarian regimes. Despite its limitations, MTA has created a lasting impact on the political landscape of Asia by raising awareness of democratic struggles and highlighting the growing role of digital technology in shaping the future of democracy in the region. The struggle between democratization and authoritarianism in Asia is far from over. As regimes continue to adapt to the digital age, activists will need to find new ways to navigate and resist digital repression. In this ongoing battle, the #MilkTeaAlliance serves as a powerful reminder of the potential of digital tools to mobilize people across borders, even in the face of overwhelming state power.</p><h3><strong>Bibliography</strong></h3><p>Bünte, Marco. 2020. “Democratic Backsliding and Authoritarian Resilience in Southeast Asia: The Role of Social Media.” In <em>From Grassroots Activism to Disinformation: Social Media in Southeast Asia</em>, by Aim Sinpeng and Ross Tapsell, 192–213. Singapore, SINGAPORE: ISEAS — Yusof Ishak Institute.<a href="http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/luthercollege-ebooks/detail.action?docID=6403491"> http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/luthercollege-ebooks/detail.action?docID=6403491</a>.</p><p>Cheng, Edmund W, Elizabeth Lui, and King-wa Fu. 2024. “The Power of Digital Activism for Transnational Advocacy: Leadership, Engagement, and Affordance.” <em>New Media &amp; Society</em> 26 (11): 6416–39.<a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/14614448231155376"> https://doi.org/10.1177/14614448231155376</a>.</p><p>Chiam, Jason Chiah Sern, and Tai Wei Lim. 2021. “Coping with Unrest in the Periphery of China: Comparative Case Studies of Thailand, Myanmar and HKSAR.” <em>China and the World</em> 04 (03): 2150008.<a href="https://doi.org/10.1142/S2591729321500085"> https://doi.org/10.1142/S2591729321500085</a>.</p><p>Dedman, Adam K., and Autumn Lai. 2021. “Digitally Dismantling Asian Authoritarianism: Activist Reflections from the #MilkTeaAlliance.” <em>Contention</em> 9 (1): 97–132.<a href="https://doi.org/10.3167/cont.2021.090105"> https://doi.org/10.3167/cont.2021.090105</a>.</p><p>Dimitrov, Martin K. 2024. “Exporting Chinese Digital Authoritarianism.” In <em>Routledge Handbook on Global China</em>, by Maximilian Mayer, Emilian Kavalski, Marina Rudyak, and Xin Zhang, 1st ed., 170–81. London: Routledge.<a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003044710-14"> https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003044710-14</a>.</p><p>Feldstein, Steven. 2019. “The Road to Digital Unfreedom: How Artificial Intelligence Is Reshaping Repression.” <em>Journal of Democracy</em> 30 (1): 40–52.</p><p>Huang, Roger Lee, and Chavalin Svetanant. 2022. “Challenging Digital Authoritarianism.” In <em>Activism and Authoritarian Governance in Asia</em>, by Amy Barrow and Sara Fuller, 1st ed., 130–42. London: Routledge.<a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003243106-12"> https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003243106-12</a>.</p><p>Janjira Sombatpoonsiri, and Dien Luong. 2023. <em>Justifying Digital Repression Via “Fighting Fake News”: A Study of Four Southeast Asian Autocracies</em>. Trends in Southeast Asia, issue 11. Singapore: ISEAS Publishing.</p><p>Khor, Yu Leng. 2024. “Mapping the Transnationalisation of Social Movements Through Online Media: The Case of the Milk Tea Alliance.” In <em>The Palgrave Handbook of Political Norms in Southeast Asia</em>, edited by Gabriel Facal, Elsa Lafaye De Micheaux, and Astrid Norén-Nilsson, 121–36. Singapore: Springer Nature Singapore.<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-9655-1_7"> https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-9655-1_7</a>.</p><p>Lim, Merlyna. 2023. “From Activist Media to Algorithmic Politics.” In <em>Routledge Handbook of Civil and Uncivil Society in Southeast Asia</em>, by Eva Hansson and Meredith L. Weiss, 1st ed., 25–44. London: Routledge.<a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780367422080-3"> https://doi.org/10.4324/9780367422080-3</a>.</p><p>Morgenbesser, Lee. 2020. <em>The Rise of Sophisticated Authoritarianism in Southeast Asia</em>. 1st ed. Cambridge University Press.<a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108630061"> https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108630061</a>.</p><p>Narins, Thomas P. 2024. “Southeast Asian Civil Society Organizations and Digital Rights in the Age of China’s Digital Silk Road.” <em>Asian Perspective</em> 48 (3): 479–99.<a href="https://doi.org/10.1353/apr.2024.a935487"> https://doi.org/10.1353/apr.2024.a935487</a>.</p><p>Sastramidjaja, Yatun. 2024. “Rhizomatic Protest, Generational Affinity and Digital Refuge: Southeast Asia’s New Youth Movements.” In <em>The Palgrave Handbook of Political Norms in Southeast Asia</em>, edited by Gabriel Facal, Elsa Lafaye De Micheaux, and Astrid Norén-Nilsson, 501–20. Singapore: Springer Nature Singapore.<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-9655-1_29"> https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-9655-1_29</a>.</p><p>Sastramidjaja, Yatun L. M. 2023. <em>Rhizome vs Regime: Southeast Asia’s Digitally Mediated Youth Movements</em>. Trends in Southeast Asia 2023, issue 6. Singapore: ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute.</p><p>Schaffar, Wolfram, and Praphakorn Wongratanawin. 2021. “The #MilkTeaAlliance: A New Transnational Pro-Democracy Movement Against Chinese-Centered Globalization?” <em>Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies</em>, June, 5–36 Pages.<a href="https://doi.org/10.14764/10.ASEAS-0052"> https://doi.org/10.14764/10.ASEAS-0052</a>.</p><p>Sinpeng, Aim. 2020. “Digital Media, Political Authoritarianism, and Internet Controls in Southeast Asia.” <em>Media, Culture &amp; Society</em> 42 (1): 25–39.<a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0163443719884052"> https://doi.org/10.1177/0163443719884052</a>.</p><p>Sombatpoonsiri, Janjira. 2021. “From Repression to Revolt: Thailand’s 2020 Protests and the Regional Implications.” <em>German Institute for Global and Area Studies (GIGA)</em>, GIGA Focus Asien, 1 (1): 1–11.</p><p>Suk-Ki, Kong. 2024. “Digital Globalization and Emerging Transnational Social Movements in Asia.” In <em>Asianization of Asia</em>, by Chang Kyung-Sup, Kim Taekyoon, and Lee Joonkoo, 1st ed., 139–53. London: Routledge.<a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003274230-9"> https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003274230-9</a>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=82903d422c4f" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Book Review丨Behind the Façade: Elections Under Authoritarianism in Southeast Asia by Morgenbesser]]></title>
            <link>https://chanyachanyanuch.medium.com/book-review%E4%B8%A8behind-the-fa%C3%A7ade-elections-under-authoritarianism-in-southeast-asia-by-morgenbesser-1b19d4ef83eb?source=rss-a569eccea58a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/1b19d4ef83eb</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Chanya Chanyanuch]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 05 Jul 2025 05:36:19 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-07-05T05:36:19.597Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*4Af3yxV6QzZLjTNcMMOJdg.jpeg" /></figure><p>Morgenbesser, Lee. <em>Behind the Façade: Elections Under Authoritarianism in Southeast Asia</em>. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2016. 292 pp. ISBN: 9781438462875.</p><p>Elections are a hallmark of democratization, serving as a participatory tool that functions differently across regime types. Morgenbesser argues that elections under authoritarianism have been adapted to prolong the survival of authoritarian regimes rather than advancing democratization. Myanmar, Cambodia, and Singapore, neighboring countries located in mainland Southeast Asia, exemplify strong authoritarian regimes that consistently organize elections to solidify their rule. These cases illustrate how elections function in varying circumstances under authoritarian rulers. Behind the Façade outlines the main functions of elections under authoritarianism as information accumulation, a source of legitimation, regime management, and neopatrimonialism (19). The author contributes to the international conversation on democratization by elaborating on the nuances of election organization, distinguishing what makes some elections more or less meaningful, and examining how autocrats use elections to strengthen their regimes’ longevity.</p><p>Under authoritarianism, elections serve four key functions. First, elections act as tools for information accumulation, allowing regimes to identify allies and adversaries. They help assess the efficiency of established organizational networks while monitoring the opposition’s popularity. Second, elections serve as sources of legitimation, both domestically and internationally. Even restricted elections can create the appearance of reflecting the “will of the people” (25), legitimizing unchecked powers and preventing citizens and international actors from fully dismissing the regime as dictatorial. Third, elections play a role in regime management, shaping institutional structures. Morgenbesser identifies four tactical approaches — clientelism, co-optation, solidarity, and succession — that explain how regimes use elections to manage political elites. Lastly, elections reinforce neopatrimonialism, a practice rooted in pre-colonial patrimonial traditions. Modern regimes retain features of patron-client relationships while integrating nation-state values. Neopatrimonialism now encompasses dual mechanisms: inclusive patrimonialism redistributes resources to maintain broad support, while exclusive patrimonialism assigns key roles to political elites (31). This combination reconstitutes traditional distributive mechanisms, turning elections into contests over patronage distribution.</p><p>In the introduction, Morgenbesser highlights the need to study authoritarian elections by addressing gaps in previous understandings of democratization. If elections are essential to democracy, why do countries that hold elections often fail to democratize, with regimes instead growing stronger? This global trend is best illustrated through the historical and contemporary case studies of Myanmar, Cambodia, and Singapore. Chapter 1 introduces the book’s theoretical framework and thesis, focusing on the four functions of elections in explaining authoritarian regime performance. Chapter 2 examines Cambodia’s rise of personalistic authoritarianism, closely tied to neopatrimonialism. Elections in Cambodia serve as mechanisms for redistributing resources to maintain patronage networks under a single dominant party, CPP, from top leaders like Hun Sen to local village heads. Chapter 3 delves into Myanmar’s contestation between the military and civilian government. Elections consistently produced extreme results favoring the civilian NLD party, yet the military maintained power by embedding itself within state institutions. Chapter 4 focuses on Singapore, a case significantly different from the first two. Wealthy and stable, Singapore operates like a corporate city-state. Its authoritarian survival lies in a strong bureaucracy and government efficiency. Its founder father, Lee Kuan Yew, dismissed Western liberal democracy as non-universal and prioritized mandate over legitimacy, deriving legitimacy from economic success. Elections in Singapore emphasize meritocracy, but the system is designed to ensure the survival of the People’s Action Party’s (PAP) single-party rule.</p><p><em>Behind the Façade</em>, published in 2016, does not address three crucial developments (42). First, Myanmar experienced a reversal of its regime type, following the 2021 military coup, transitioning from a competitive to a closed regime under direct military rule. Second, Cambodia saw a power succession with Hun Manet inheriting leadership from long-time ruler Hun Sen. Third, Singapore experienced a leadership transition as Lee Hsien Loong stepped down as prime minister, pausing the dependency on the legacy of his father, Lee Kuan Yew. These developments do not disprove Morgenbesser’s thesis. Elections continue to be held under authoritarian regimes, except in war-torn Myanmar. Cambodia and Singapore remain under single-party rule, although Singapore’s PAP has become less personalistic, contrasting with Cambodia’s trajectory. The cases affirm that elections under authoritarian regimes serve to consolidate power and ensure regime survival, adapting to changing conditions without advancing democratization.</p><p>Today, Singapore remains a competitive authoritarian regime with single-party rule under the PAP. Cambodia has shifted toward hegemonic authoritarianism, with Hun Sen consolidating absolute power and becoming the de facto ruler behind his son, Hun Manet. Meanwhile, Myanmar has reverted to a closed authoritarian regime under military control, making it the only case study among the three that no longer relies on elections for governance. The cases of Singapore, Cambodia, and Myanmar reveal the adaptability of authoritarian regimes in Southeast Asia. While Singapore and Cambodia continue to use elections as strategic tools for regime survival, Myanmar’s abandonment of elections highlights the limits of such mechanisms in the face of deep political instability.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1b19d4ef83eb" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Book Review丨From Development to Democracy: The Transformations of Modern Asia by Slater and Wong]]></title>
            <link>https://chanyachanyanuch.medium.com/book-review%E4%B8%A8from-development-to-democracy-the-transformations-of-modern-asia-by-slater-and-wong-32d4b054e6f2?source=rss-a569eccea58a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/32d4b054e6f2</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[asian-studies]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[southeast-asian-studies]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[book-review]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[academia]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Chanya Chanyanuch]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 05 Jul 2025 05:30:52 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-07-05T05:30:52.543Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*BN49ix5bcTBZlcL6gmmLnw.jpeg" /></figure><p>Slater, Dan, and Joseph Wong. <em>From Development to Democracy: The Transformations of Modern Asia</em>. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2022. 368 pp. ISBN: 9780691167602.</p><p>There are two common understandings in political economy and the development of democracy: first, that democracy emerges after the collapse of authoritarian regimes; and second, that economic development eventually leads to democracy. <em>From Development to Democracy </em>offers comparative explanations drawn from Developmental Asia — a region characterized by an intense focus on economic growth and diverse political regime styles (28) — challenging the conventional modernization theory that development inherently fosters democratization.</p><p>Instead, the authors propose two key observations drawing from twelve Asian countries. First, they argue that the type of economic development is the most significant determinant of democratization success. The developmental clusters they identify — Statism (Japan, Taiwan, Korea), Britannia (Singapore, Malaysia, Hong Kong), Militarism (Indonesia, Thailand, Myanmar), and Socialism (China, Vietnam, Cambodia) — provide a more nuanced framework for understanding democratization patterns and the likelihood of successful democratic transitions. In other words, a membership in a certain cluster strongly determines the likelihood of democratic reforms. Meanwhile, the spectrum of authoritarian strength profoundly shapes the smoothness of democratization. This smoothness pre and post democratization is intrinsically linked (29) as strong authoritarian incumbent regimes followed by more successful democracies. Conversely, weak authoritarians are more likely to face rockier and sometimes reversal pathways. Highlighted in Developmental Militarism with intermediate to weak regimes at the time of democratization, civilian-military cohabitations and less impressive economic output (178) followed by unstable democracy in Indonesia and eventual authoritarian reversal in Thailand and Myanmar.</p><p>Second, the authors emphasize the importance of “<em>democracy through strength</em>” in ensuring the long-term stability of both democracy and development. This concept suggests that authoritarian regimes do not necessarily need to be dismantled for democratization to occur (299). Instead, such regimes may comply with democratization when they maintain a position of strength, allowing for a peaceful transition. This process also ensures that the future political playing field remains unrestricted, as these regimes are confident in their popularity post-transition. Among the identified clusters, the Developmental Statism cluster achieves the highest levels of wealth and the strongest democracies. However, “democracy through strength” is not explained solely by the presence of strong regimes (13). For instance, strong regimes that achieve capitalism-led wealth can also sustain authoritarianism, as demonstrated in the Developmental Britannia cluster. This duality supports Slater and Wong’s argument that both developmental clustering and the degree of regime strength are critical for assessing a country’s political economy — its regime types and developmental trajectory.</p><p>The book is divided into nine chapters, followed by a conclusion. Chapters 1 and 2 introduce the book’s central theses and key definitions. Contrary to the common understanding that democracy emerges from the collapse of authoritarian regimes (“<em>democracy through weakness</em>”), the authors argue that enduring democracies arise when authoritarian regimes willingly transition, provided they can retain much of their strength within a new democratic framework (7). This pattern is exemplified by the Developmental Statism cluster, where Japan serves as the prototype that inspired South Korea and Taiwan to follow a similar trajectory. The authors also note the significant role of external forces, particularly U.S. involvement, in shaping this cluster.</p><p>In addition to regime strength, the region’s developmental clustering is essential for understanding democratization patterns. Chapters 3 through 5 examine cases of “<em>democracy through strength</em>” in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Chapter 6 shifts focus to <em>democracy avoidance</em>, using China as the primary example. China, as the leading case within the Developmental Socialist cluster, arguably inspires similar paths in Vietnam and Cambodia. Chapter 7 returns to “<em>democracy through strength</em>” but explores instances of failure. The Developmental Militarist cluster, characterized by weak or fragmented authoritarian elites, is particularly vulnerable to authoritarian reversals and political instability. Myanmar and Thailand are repeatedly disrupted by military coups, whereas Indonesia stands out with its more stable single-party rule, leading to a relatively successful case of “<em>democracy through strength</em>” within the same cluster.</p><p>Chapters 8 and 9 discuss six Asian political economies that pursue <em>democracy avoidance </em>within the Developmental Britannia and Socialist clusters. The Britannia cluster is marked by strong regimes and significant wealth accumulation, underpinned by strong bureaucratic systems developed during British colonial rule. Contrary to modernization theory, these cases illustrate that economic success does not necessarily lead to democracy but can instead sustain authoritarianism. The authors introduce the concept of the “<em>bittersweet spot</em> (221),” the optimal period for democratization. Missing this window leads to regime weakening over time, entering a stage of <em>embittered authoritarianism</em>. The strongest examples of <em>democracy avoidance</em>, where authoritarianism is entrenched, are found in China, Vietnam, and Cambodia.</p><p>In their conclusion, the authors propose that while democracy might be a <em>universal </em>aspiration for those it governs, it is not an <em>ultimate </em>value to both the governors and the governed. People prioritize peace, stability, and prosperity, which explains the democratic recession observed in recent decades following the Third Wave of democratization in the latter half of the 20th century.</p><p><em>From Development to Democracy</em> offers a fresh perspective on understanding the political economies of the Asia region. Its most novel contribution lies in the concept of “<em>democracy through strength</em>.” The six countries in the Developmental Statist and Military clusters provide comparative cases of the successes and failures of democratization via strength. The ongoing global democratic degradation and economic recession compels regimes to reconsider reforms, either to ensure their survival or to maintain public satisfaction with existing economic conditions. While the book advocates democratization, its insights can also be applied to reforms in non-democratic countries — measures aimed at strengthening regimes without resorting to conventional authoritarian coercion. In the Britannia cluster, where regime power has declined and the ideal transitional window has passed, reform may be the most viable option to avoid a tipping point of public resentment that could lead to regime collapse. It is widely considered that regime survival is often the ultimate goal for elites in non-democratic systems, with the population’s interests coming second. In contrast, competing interests in democracies better serve the majority’s needs.</p><p>The Developmental Statist cluster demonstrates that external pressures, economic growth, and middle-class demands can force authoritarian regimes to adapt to survive. Rather than prolonging a period of declining absolute power, regimes under favorable conditions can achieve both wealth and liberal democracy. However, the Military cluster illustrates the challenges of democratization. Here, the interplay between elite power consolidation and economic development is hindered by ineffectiveness due to the non-competitive nature of an authoritarian environment. This dynamic fosters resentment among the middle class, exacerbates inequality, and traps countries in the middle-income stage, as seen in Indonesia and Thailand. Myanmar serves as a cautionary tale of elite fragmentation. The conflict between the military and the National League for Democracy (NLD) has plunged the country into civil war and widespread insurgencies. This lesson underscores the importance of addressing elite fragmentation in neighboring regimes–non-democracies and democracies alike. For the Britannia cluster, this means considering democratic transitions, while the Socialist cluster may benefit from regime reforms to prevent further fragmentation and ineffective governance.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=32d4b054e6f2" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Youth, Tech, and Tyranny: Repression and Resistance in Southeast Asia’s Digital Age]]></title>
            <link>https://chanyachanyanuch.medium.com/youth-tech-and-tyranny-repression-and-resistance-in-southeast-asias-digital-age-2e8a9cea507d?source=rss-a569eccea58a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2e8a9cea507d</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[literature-review]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[authoritarianism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[southeast-asia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[asian-studies]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[digital-activism]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Chanya Chanyanuch]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 03 Jul 2025 05:28:15 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-07-06T22:30:49.135Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>A Literature Review on Digital Activism, Authoritarianism, and Civil Society (2021–2025)</p><h3>Digital Repression in Southeast Asia</h3><p>Scholars have documented a growing trend in governments’ use of digital tools to monitor dissent and institutionalize control. Feldstein outlines the global rise of digital repression, identifying four strategies: surveillance, internet shutdowns, disinformation, and censorship. Southeast Asia exemplifies this trend, as all governments in the region are increasingly implementing a mix of these tactics to combat dissenting voices. With the world becoming more authoritarian-leaning — as the 2025 Freedom House reported the 19th consecutive year decline in global freedom — Southeast Asia acts as a microcosm of digital space under the backdrop of growing authoritarianism. Rodan’s structural analysis on civil society and Mietzner’s work on democratic deconsolidation provide critical context for understanding why digital movements face such formidable obstacles in the region. The erosion of democratic norms, coupled with deep-seated inequality and political disillusionment, constrains the capacity of civil society to challenge authoritarian regimes effectively. Sombatpoonsiri and Luong, for instance, shows how governments in Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand, and Myanmar frame “fake news” as a national threat to justify draconian laws and online policing. Similarly, Lim’s study reveals a troubling pattern in which the rhetoric of information integrity is exploited to legitimize authoritarian control of digital spaces in the wider region. While Sombatpoonsiri focuses on regimes’ justifications for autocratic practices over fake news claims, Lim scrutinizes how algorithmic politics are used by politicians to deepen polarization for political gains. In other words, autocratic-leaning countries, such as Vietnam and Cambodia, justify digital oppression with fake news claims. More democratic-leaning countries, like the Philippines, however, engage in more overt digital abuses — namely disinformation and emotionally charged content for campaign purposes. In this case, instead of hampering criticism with state authority, politicians engage in divisive language to garner political support from “the masses,” often via a “populist communication style”.</p><h3>Foreign Corporate Intervention: Western Big Tech and China’s Tech Firms</h3><p>A newly emerging power on the ground is tech companies, previously glorified as champions of digital political rights, especially after Facebook-mediated activism helped ignite the Arab Spring. With a developing body of scholarship, scholars are becoming more concerned with Big Tech’s complicity in autocratic regimes’ digital abuse on their platforms. Facing state power and threats of profit loss, platforms have bent to state pressures, leaving activists with structural limitations. Tran et al. reinforce this by demonstrating how Southeast Asian activists struggle against Big Tech’s compliance with authoritarian demands, such as Facebook’s content restrictions in Vietnam and content takedown requests from Cambodian authorities. This supports Feldstein’s thesis that digital technologies are not inherently liberatory but rather sites of contestation over power. Platforms are commercial in nature, reflective of the concept of platform capitalism, and the only power that significantly impacts their decisions originates from the West, making pro-democracy online advocacy disproportionately more powerful when based in the West.</p><p>In contrast to Western-based tech firms, Chinese firms are perceived as tied to the CCP. Western-originated Big Tech firms are generally seen as private entities, free from direct government control. Public interest in pressuring Big Tech is usually directed at civil entities in the West, which then pressure their respective governments. However, Chinese tech firms are viewed as extensions of the CCP’s growing regional influence. The general public does not question Chinese firms’ accountability as much as they do Western counterparts because complicity with authoritarianism is already expected from the CCP. Dimitrov identifies three key components of Chinese digital authoritarianism: surveillance hardware, advanced software, and human intelligence capacity. While hardware and software can be exported, the effectiveness of these tools depends on the recipient country’s pre-existing intelligence infrastructure. Using Rwanda as a comparative case, Dimitrov suggests that Southeast Asian regimes with entrenched surveillance bureaucracies are more likely to successfully replicate the Chinese model. Contrary to public perception and alerts from Washington, there has not been concrete evidence that the CCP intentionally exports digital authoritarian tools to support autocratic regimes’ abuses. This finding resonates with Feldstein’s assertion that the more authoritarian a government is, the more likely it is to rely on digital repression techniques to reinforce political control, regardless of regime type.</p><p>Local adaptations of repressive strategies are further elaborated in Narins, who focuses on civil society responses to digital repression in the context of China’s Digital Silk Road (DSR). While Chinese technologies provide the tools, Southeast Asian regimes actively implement repression. Narins’ work in Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines reveals that civil society groups are more concerned with domestic governments’ misuse of digital tools than with Beijing’s influence per se, which aligns with Dimitrov’s and Feldstein’s claim that a country’s import of surveillance tools is not limited by regime type. The repression of online speech, manipulation of public discourse, and deployment of surveillance tools are thus both externally enabled and domestically enforced. While Narins and Dimitrov’s findings suggest that Chinese firms are simply suppliers and that a country’s likelihood to adopt China-style digital authoritarianism is case-specific, accountability is out of the question. Such accountability, however, is expected from Western tech firms, civil society, and governments.</p><h3>China Tightens Regional Autocratic Web and Civil Society Anxieties</h3><p>The technical dimension of Chinese influence is only part of a bigger story. A growing body of ideological resistance — such as that represented by the Milk Tea Alliance — pushes back against China’s rising regional dominance, especially in the context of its closeness with domestic regimes. Formed as a loose digital coalition of youth activists from Hong Kong, Thailand, and Myanmar, the alliance uses memes, pop culture, and international solidarity to resist both domestic authoritarianism and perceived Chinese imperialism. The transnational coordination seen in Milk Tea Alliance movements reflects broader regional anxieties about China’s influence. While Beijing may not always directly dictate repression, its presence has shaped the digital infrastructure and strategic alignments of Southeast Asian states. Expanding from Dimitrov, Narins, and Tran, the real danger lies not in overt Chinese control or Big Tech complicity, but in the normalization of surveillance and censorship practices.</p><p>Regional resistance is mainly caused by domestically driven resentment. China is seen as a supporter of regimes and, to a lesser extent, an ideological enemy of democratic youth resistance. China pays special attention to autocratic countries compared to democratic ones and increases Chinese official visits accordingly. China and Southeast Asian autocratic regimes have shown their reciprocal repressive relations on multiple occasions. For instance, Thailand deported a key Hong Kong activist at the request of the Chinese Embassy in Bangkok, and China has maintained long-standing support for multiple factions, including the Tatmadaw military, in Myanmar’s ongoing civil war. From an ideological standpoint, resistance in the early 2020s has been particularly youth-led. Youth affinity is the defining characteristic of both the 2020s protests across Southeast Asia and the Milk Tea Alliance phenomenon. Resonating with Mietzner’s account of democratic consolidation peaking in the 2000s, Generation Z grew up during a period of blooming democracy and hopeful economic prospects. The Hong Kong 2019 Anti-extradition Law Amendment Bill (Anti-ELAB), Thailand’s 2014 coup, and Myanmar’s 2021 military coup triggered waves of protests, culminating in COVID-19-induced resentment. Despite China’s vaccine diplomacy that helped the region access vaccines, anti-China sentiment intensified during the pandemic and broke out in digital clashes between Chinese netizens and users from Thailand, Hong Kong, and Taiwan.</p><h3>Civil Society, Youth Protest, and Political Space</h3><p>Despite tightening restrictions, Southeast Asian civil society is not passive. Rodan argues that rather than shrinking, civil society is transforming in response to changes in the political economy. The political space is shaped by interactions between various groups — regardless of ideology — and the state, with capitalism playing a central role in either enabling or constraining activism. Rodan illustrates how variations in capitalist development across Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand affect civil society’s structure and capacity. In tightly controlled states like Singapore, civil society is more fragmented and technocratic, whereas pluralistic economies like the Philippines foster more grassroots mobilization. Complementing Rodan, Lim introduces the idea of new political subjectivities formed through social media. Instead of formal associations, many activists now organize as decentralized collectives, utilizing viral content and peer networks. While a scale-free network, which degree distribution follows popularity, offers flexibility and reach, it is also hard to sustain. Sastramidjaja builds on this by describing Hong Kong-inspired youth movements in Indonesia, Myanmar, and Thailand as rhizomatic — leaderless, adaptive, and resilient. Though difficult to suppress, these movements face challenges in coherence, long-term strategy, and survival amid increasing cyber repression.</p><p>However, empirical data from Saat urges caution in overestimating youth ideological fervor. A large survey of 3,081 undergraduates across six countries found that top concerns were unemployment and recession, with “freedom of expression” ranked among the lowest. Most respondents expressed some willingness to join socio-political organizations, but few engaged in visible activism. Fear of state retaliation and economic insecurity were key reasons for limited participation. These findings support Rodan’s argument that civil society actors operate within constrained political spaces shaped by surveillance, inequality, and resource competition. Mietzner’s work on democratic deconsolidation complements this view by showing that democratic regression in the region is partly due to the middle class’s willingness to endorse authoritarian alternatives in exchange for stability. The survey also found that youth in countries like Thailand and Singapore showed relatively high acceptance of autocratic leadership if it ensured effective governance. This further complicates the assumption that youth are inherently democratic or activist. Instead, as the literature shows, activism must be understood in its socio-political and economic context.</p><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>The reviewed literature reveals a dynamic relationship between digital activism and repression in Southeast Asia. On one hand, digital platforms have enabled new forms of civic expression, transnational solidarity, and political mobilization. On the other hand, they have also become tools for regimes to extend surveillance, censorship, and propaganda. Scholars such as Lim and Sastramidjaja underscore the potential of youth-led, digitally enabled movements, while Feldstein, Dimitrov, and Narins caution against technological determinism by highlighting how regimes adapt and exploit these same tools. The influence of external actors, particularly China and Western tech firms, adds another layer of complexity. While China provides the infrastructure and ideological backdrop for digital authoritarianism, domestic regimes customize and implement these systems according to local contexts. Big Tech’s selective compliance with state repression further limits civic space, especially when platforms prioritize profit or political favor over established regiments. Rodan and Mietzner offer critical structural insights, showing that civil society’s effectiveness depends not only on digital tools but also on broader economic and political conditions. Meanwhile, empirical data from Saat tempers assumptions about youth radicalism, reminding scholars that even digitally connected generations are shaped by fear, pragmatism, and socio-economic concerns.</p><p>Ultimately, the literature paints a picture of a region where digital activism and repression are mutually constitutive. Civic actors continue to innovate under constraint, but their success will depend on broader institutional reforms, regional solidarity, and greater accountability from both domestic governments and international tech companies. The future of Southeast Asia’s political landscape will be shaped as much by the resilience of its civic movements as by the adaptability of its authoritarian regimes.</p><h3>Bibliography</h3><p>Dimitrov, Martin K. “Exporting Chinese Digital Authoritarianism.” In Routledge Handbook on Global China, by Maximilian Mayer, Emilian Kavalski, Marina Rudyak, and Xin Zhang, 170–81, 1st ed. London: Routledge, 2024. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003044710-14">https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003044710-14</a>.<br>Feldstein, Steven. The Rise of Digital Repression: How Technology Is Reshaping Power, Politics, and Resistance. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2021.<br>Gorokhovskaia, Yana, and Cathryn Grothe. “The Uphill Battle to Safeguard Rights.” Freedom House, February 26, 2025. <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2025/uphill-battle-to-safeguard-rights">https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2025/uphill-battle-to-safeguard-rights</a>.<br>Lim, Merlyna. Social Media and Politics in Southeast Asia. 1st ed. Cambridge University Press, 2025. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108750745">https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108750745</a>.<br>Mietzner, Marcus. Democratic Deconsolidation in Southeast Asia. 1st ed. Cambridge University Press, 2021. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108677080">https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108677080</a>.<br>Narins, Thomas P. “Southeast Asian Civil Society Organizations and Digital Rights in the Age of China’s Digital Silk Road.” Asian Perspective 48, no. 3 (June 2024): 479–99. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1353/apr.2024.a935487">https://doi.org/10.1353/apr.2024.a935487</a>.<br>Rodan, Garry. Civil Society in Southeast Asia: Power Struggles and Political Regimes. 1st ed. Cambridge University Press, 2022. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108757423">https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108757423</a>.<br>Saat, Norshahril. Youth and Civic Engagement in Southeast Asia: A Survey of Undergraduates in Six Countries. 1st ed. Singapore: ISEAS — Yusof Ishak Institute, 2025.<br>Sastramidjaja, Yatun. Rhizome vs Regime: Southeast Asia’s Digitally Mediated Youth Movements. Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2023.<br>Schaffar, Wolfram. “New Social Media and Politics in Thailand: The Emergence of Fascist Vigilante Groups on Facebook.” Advances in Southeast Asian Studies 9, no. 2 (December 30, 2016): 215–34. <a href="https://doi.org/10.14764/10.ASEAS-2016.2-3">https://doi.org/10.14764/10.ASEAS-2016.2-3</a>.<br>Schaffar, Wolfram, and Praphakorn Wongratanawin. “The #MilkTeaAlliance: A New Transnational Pro-Democracy Movement Against Chinese-Centered Globalization?” Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies, June 28, 2021, 5–36 Pages. <a href="https://doi.org/10.14764/10.ASEAS-0052">https://doi.org/10.14764/10.ASEAS-0052</a>.<br>Sombatpoonsiri, Janjira, and Dien Luong. Justifying Digital Repression Via “Fighting Fake News”: A Study of Four Southeast Asian Autocracies. Trends in Southeast Asia, issue 11. Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2023. <a href="https://bookshop.iseas.edu.sg/publication/7811">https://bookshop.iseas.edu.sg/publication/7811</a>.<br>Tran, Mai Van, Tuwanont Phattharathanasut, Haymarn Soe Nyunt, Nalinthip Ekapong, and Lewis Young. “Pro-Democracy Platform Advocacy: Resisting Big Tech-Mediated Authoritarianism in Southeast Asia.” Open Research Europe 5 (January 20, 2025): 10. <a href="https://doi.org/10.12688/openreseurope.18820.1">https://doi.org/10.12688/openreseurope.18820.1</a>.<br>Wasserstrom, Jeffrey N. The Milk Tea Alliance: Inside Asia’s Struggle Against Autocracy and Beijing. New York: Columbia Global Reports, 2025.<br>Yang, Yujeong, Sanghoon Kim-Leffingwell, Shuyuan Shen, and Do Young Gong. “Killing Protests with Kindness: Anti-China Protests and China’s Public Diplomacy.” International Studies Quarterly 67, no. 4 (September 11, 2023): sqad087. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqad087">https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqad087</a>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2e8a9cea507d" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Indonesia’s Nickel Dilemma: The High Price of Powering the World’s Green Transition]]></title>
            <link>https://chanyachanyanuch.medium.com/indonesias-nickel-dilemma-the-high-price-of-powering-the-world-s-green-transition-35c6f819d208?source=rss-a569eccea58a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/35c6f819d208</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Chanya Chanyanuch]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 30 Jun 2025 21:15:05 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-06-30T21:15:05.156Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Your next electric car could be a big win for the climate. But the nickel inside its battery might come with a hidden cost — one paid by communities and ecosystems in Indonesia. The Southeast Asian nation, home to over half of the world’s nickel reserves, is making a bold play to transform its economy and challenge a global trade system it sees as historically unfair. By banning raw nickel exports, Indonesia is forcing the world to build processing plants on its soil, aiming to capture the wealth it has long seen flow to richer nations.</p><p>This strategy, however, pits the urgent global push for green energy against the principles of a just transition, raising a critical question: must the shift away from fossil fuels be built on the same kind of exploitation it’s meant to solve?</p><h3>A Bold Stand Against an Old System</h3><p>For decades, Indonesia has been at the bottom of a global value chain, exporting raw nickel ore for much less. Industrialized nations in the Global North would then process it into high-value products, reaping the vast majority of the profits. For example, <a href="http://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/record/9161036">from 2017–2021, the U.S., U.K., and EU exported nickel products worth over $100,000 USD, while top producer Indonesia’s average trade value was only around $11,100 USD.</a></p><p>Recognizing this gap, Indonesia’s government decided to change the rules of the game. In 2020, it fully enacted a controversial ban on exporting unprocessed nickel ore. The message was clear: if you want our nickel, you have to build your smelters here.</p><p>The move sent shockwaves through the global market. The European Union, heavily reliant on Indonesian nickel, called the ban an unfair trade practice and won a ruling against it at the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2020. But Indonesia has held firm, arguing it has the sovereign right to manage its resources for the “<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/23311886.2024.2400222">greatest prosperity of the people</a>,” a principle enshrined in its constitution.</p><h3>A New Partner, A Similar Pattern?</h3><p>While the West pushed back, China, a leader in the green energy supply chain, leaned in. Chinese companies have poured billions into Indonesia, funding the very smelter infrastructure the country needs to process its nickel domestically. <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2023/04/how-indonesia-used-chinese-industrial-investments-to-turn-nickel-into-the-new-gold?lang=en.">This flood of investment marked a historic high for foreign investment in 2022 and has allowed Indonesia to dramatically increase its production of processed nickel. By 2030, the country is projected to surpass China as the world’s largest producer of processed nickel.</a></p><p>This partnership represents a major shift in global power dynamics, a form of “South-South” cooperation that challenges the traditional dominance of the Global North. However, while the flow of wealth may be shifting, critics argue that the underlying model of extraction remains troublingly familiar.</p><h3>“Green Sacrificial Zones”</h3><p>This national ambition for “green developmentalism” has come at a steep price, especially for communities in regions like Sulawesi, the heart of Indonesia’s nickel operations. The rapid industrialization has created what some call “<a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2023.102997.">green sacrificial zones</a>” — areas that bear the immense environmental and social costs of the world’s green transition.</p><p>While nickel revenues have surged, the prosperity is not being shared equally. The wealth is concentrated among foreign investors and politically connected Indonesian elites, creating “<a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2024.101564">nationalist enclaves</a>” of industry that operate in isolation from the local population. In the Morowali Industrial Park, a major nickel processing hub, GDP has skyrocketed, but poverty reduction has been slow, and local communities are often marginalized.</p><figure><img alt="Source: https://cri.org/reports/nickel-unearthed/" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1010/0*StGT-wZwjUlCDQCd" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="https://cri.org/reports/nickel-unearthed/">https://cri.org/reports/nickel-unearthed/</a></figcaption></figure><p>The human and environmental tolls are stark:</p><ul><li><strong>Environmental Degradation:</strong> Pollution from mining and smelting operations has led to significant environmental harm and health problems for local residents.</li><li><strong>Labor Exploitation:</strong> The industry has been plagued by poor safety standards. A fire at a Chinese-owned smelter in 2023 tragically claimed 18 lives, highlighting systemic risks.</li><li><strong>Displacement and Inequality:</strong> Frontier communities face displacement and social disruption without seeing the promised economic benefits.</li></ul><h3>Is a Just Transition Possible?</h3><p>Indonesia’s government has framed this extractivism as a necessary evil to achieve economic growth and contribute to global climate goals. However, this approach overlooks the core tenets of a just transition, which demand that green growth be equitable and protect the rights of vulnerable communities.</p><p>The country’s journey highlights a central conflict of the 21st century. The urgent need to decarbonize is undeniable, but if the green economy simply replicates the exploitative patterns of the fossil fuel era, true progress will remain elusive. As Indonesia forges ahead, its path serves as a critical, and cautionary, tale for the world: a green transition that isn’t fair may not be truly sustainable at all.</p><p><a href="https://drive.google.com/file/d/1gmi1nMvdLvvagb32lIzJc5bjb72iEkDl/view?usp=sharing">Read the full article</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=35c6f819d208" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Historical Timeline of South China Sea: The Dispute the U.S.]]></title>
            <link>https://chanyachanyanuch.medium.com/historical-timeline-of-south-china-sea-the-dispute-the-u-s-fc974cea7702?source=rss-a569eccea58a------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[conflict-resolution]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[philippines]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[us-china-relations]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[southeast-asia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[south-china-sea]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Chanya Chanyanuch]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 18 Jun 2025 02:55:52 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-07-05T21:02:49.003Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><strong>Historical Timeline of South China Sea: The Dispute the U.S. Helped Shape but Remain Out of the Picture</strong></h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*UxBJzkMrNVXkvj_9ghD3Gg.png" /><figcaption>Source: Baviera, Aileen S.P., and Jay Batongbacal. 2013. “The West Philippine Sea: The<br>Territorial and Maritime Jurisdiction Disputes from a Filipino Perspective.” April 15, 2013.</figcaption></figure><p>When headlines today flash warnings about Chinese patrols near the Spratlys or escalating tensions in the South China Sea, one name rarely surfaces: the United States. Yet for more than six decades — from the colonial period of the 1930s to the renewed alliance in the late 1990s — Washington played a central, if carefully obscured, role in shaping the very nature of this sprawling maritime dispute.</p><p>The U.S. may never have claimed rocks or reefs in the South China Sea, but its military installations, legal hedging, and geopolitical maneuvering laid the groundwork for much of today’s instability. For the Philippines, a key claimant in the region, American influence created both a shield and a sovereignty trap.</p><h3>Pre-Claim Tensions: The Making of the Dispute (1933–1951)</h3><p>Well before the South China Sea became a geopolitical flashpoint, Filipino leaders had begun asserting claims to islands like the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) — a strategic cluster within the Spratlys. But their push for sovereignty was impeded by their ally and former colonizer: the United States. As early as 1937, Elpidio Quirino, then Interior Secretary, sought Washington’s support for Philippine jurisdiction over parts of the KIG, citing proximity and national security (Baviera and Batongbacal 2013, 3). Washington dismissed the effort, arguing the Spratlys weren’t included in the 1898 Treaty of Paris (Poling 2022, 30). This legal distancing set the tone for decades. While Japan’s occupation of some features in 1939 heightened Filipino concerns, Washington maintained its stance: <em>strategic ambiguity</em> rather than support.</p><h3>Post-Independence Neutrality: Ambiguity as Strategy (1951–1974)</h3><p>In 1951, the U.S. signed the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) with the newly independent Philippines. Though hailed as a security guarantee, the treaty included caveats that proved critical. The MDT notably granted authority to the U.S., establishing concerns about extraterritoriality breaching Philippine sovereignty, and allowing U.S. control over specific areas that are American bases. Its language never explicitly extended protection to disputed maritime territories — leaving islands like the Spratlys in a legal gray zone. Some critics even called the deal a bad bargain as it puts the Philippines on the spot of global contestation (McCoy 2016, 991). As Cold War alliances solidified, Washington worked to contain Soviet influence without provoking confrontation among its allies. That meant avoiding overt positions on overlapping claims in the South China Sea — even as the Philippines, Vietnam, and China contested for territory.</p><p>The MDT comprised two disclaimers: firstly, restricting the US from building new bases — only fortifying those constructed before 1932. Secondly, the ambiguous language in Articles IV and V of the MDT regarding US protection over the Philippines fueled heated debates at a later stage. This period was primarily stressed by the looming Soviet threat.</p><blockquote><strong>Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of the Philippines (1951)</strong></blockquote><blockquote><em>Article IV</em></blockquote><blockquote>Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common dangers in accordance with its constitutional processes.</blockquote><blockquote>Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.</blockquote><blockquote><em>Article V</em></blockquote><blockquote>For the purpose of Article IV, an armed attack on either of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the metropolitan territory of either of the Parties, or on the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific or on its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific.</blockquote><p>(Avalon Project 2008)</p><p>When a Filipino civilian unilaterally claimed part of the Spratlys in 1955 as “Freedomland,” the U.S. dismissed it, stating the island belonged to no one — including the Philippines (Poling 2022, 84). By 1956, Washington codified this ambiguity in a classified report that declined to define the scope of the Spratly Islands, reinforcing Washington’s non-position.</p><blockquote>There is no internationally agreed definition of precisely what is referred to by the term “Spratly Islands.” It was used in the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty to apply to an undefined group of islands west of the island of Palawan (Philippines) in the South China Sea, held by Japan during the war.</blockquote><p>(U.S. Department of State 1956)</p><h3>Marcos’s Assertion Meets Evasion (1970s–1980s)</h3><p>After the violent standoff in 1973, Washington instructed Sullivan to keep the problematic MDT Articles IV and V ambiguous. As Filipinos became more impatient with the presence of American bases, Marcos was forced to present a satisfying answer before an upcoming election. Marcos must convince his country that the presence of American bases was essential. Washington, having Kissinger as Secretary of State under the Ford administration, was firm on their long-standing no-guarantee on defense commitment beyond American bases:</p><blockquote>MR. ROBINSON: Politically, he doesn’t have anyone in that country that can open his mouth about one Goddamn thing.</blockquote><blockquote>SECRETARY KISSINGER: Don’t be an idiot. The guy is sitting out there, with Viet Nam having gone down the drain, having the only U.S. bases there. He needs something to justify our being there. The fact that he doesn’t have any opposition doesn’t prove a bloody thing.</blockquote><blockquote>MR. HABIB: If he goes too far and pushes us, he will get into trouble in his own country. We don’t have to knuckle under on anything with this guy.</blockquote><blockquote>SECRETARY KISSINGER: That is not the point. It is spectacularly not the point. It is that mentality that has gotten us into difficulty.</blockquote><blockquote>MR. HABIB: This fellow has been playing games on certain things. He will say one thing one month, and something else another month. It is not that Sullivan hasn’t tried. I am not trying to defend everything Sullivan has done.</blockquote><blockquote>SECRETARY KISSINGER: He has missed the point of what concerns the Philippines sitting out there with an American base. Therefore, he kept raising a whole series of objections, since he never got the principal point, which is a political one. Once we have answered that, then we can see whether he is playing games. Before that, we can’t know whether he is playing games because we have studiously avoided what bothers him.</blockquote><p>(U.S. Department of State 1976)</p><p>The Marcos regime took a more aggressive stance. In 1971, the Philippines began occupying parts of the Spratlys, citing national security and interest in untapped energy resources — especially following reports of possible oil deposits (Baviera and Batongbacal 2013, 21–22). But when conflict broke out between China and South Vietnam over the Paracels in 1974, U.S. documents reveal just how unprepared — or unwilling — Washington was to intervene. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger could barely distinguish between the Paracels and Spratlys on a map during a top-level meeting. American neutrality wasn’t just strategic — it was, at times, unimportant.</p><blockquote>Secretary Kissinger: Think of the psychological impact throughout Southeast Asia. It would be disastrous. What have been the repercussions in South Vietnam to the Paracels (Islands) thing?</blockquote><blockquote>Adm. Moorer: We (the U.S.) have stayed far clear of the matter.</blockquote><blockquote>Secretary Kissinger: We have never supported their (South Vietnam’s) claim?</blockquote><blockquote>Adm. Moorer: That whole area is a problem. The Spratly Islands and the others in that area all have the same kind of problem — it’s disputed territory. We have given orders to stay clear of the area. That’s our policy, right?</blockquote><blockquote>Secretary Kissinger: What are those, the Spratly’s? (Pointing to the map.)</blockquote><blockquote>Adm. Moorer: No, the Spratly’s are south of the Paracels.</blockquote><blockquote>Mr. Colby: The problem is that the Spratly’s are claimed by everybody.</blockquote><blockquote>Secretary Kissinger: We have never taken a position on these islands?</blockquote><blockquote>Mr. Rush: Are they occupied?</blockquote><blockquote>Mr. Stearns: Yes, we think there is a garrison on them.</blockquote><p>(U.S. Department of State 1976)</p><p>Ambassador William Sullivan in Manila pleaded for direction, asking whether the U.S. would defend Filipino troops if attacked in the Spratlys. He was told to remain vague. Washington’s stance: <em>keep Philippine claims alive, but don’t promise to defend them. </em>Below is part of telegram from Sullivan to State Department:</p><blockquote>5. Action requested: I repeat my previous requests for (a) authoritative interpretation of U.S. Obligations to “Act” if PHI forces are attacked in Spradley’s; (b) assurances that U.S. conducts adequate surveillance to guard against surprise attack; and © demarche to Peking to warn Chinese that military action against Philippine forces would engage U.S. Obligations under our mutual defense treaty. In addition to these actions, I request authority to consult with Philippine officials within the context mutual defense treaty to determine more precisely what PHI intentions are and to advise PHI of action being taken by U.S.</blockquote><blockquote>6. It is now three days since I sent previous cable and I have yet to receive any indication that action addressees have turned attention to this issue. If completed action impossible at this time, kindly send up a flare so that I will have the impression someone is thinking of us back there.</blockquote><p>(U.S. Department of State 1974)</p><h3>Withdrawal and Return (1991–1997)</h3><p>The ambiguity would reach a breaking point in 1991. With Cold War priorities fading and Philippine lawmakers rejecting base extensions, U.S. forces withdrew. The MDT remained, but without American troops on the ground, its deterrent effect diminished (Poling 2022, 207).</p><p>Then came China.</p><p>In 1995, China seized Mischief Reef — just 130 nautical miles from Palawan — and built structures there. The Philippine Navy could do little. The U.S. condemned the action but did not act. Once again, the MDT’s ambiguity prevailed: the reef wasn’t recognized U.S.-protected territory. Still, this was a turning point. Both countries now saw renewed strategic value in cooperation. In 1997, they signed the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA), an evolved form of the MDT that clarified U.S. obligations in cases of unprovoked attacks against Filipino troops or vessels (Poling 2022, 226–27). Yet even this document stopped short of covering disputed maritime zones.</p><h3>A Dispute Shaped from the Shadows</h3><p>While the U.S. never directly claimed territory in the South China Sea, its legal framing, military priorities, and strategic evasions shaped the very character of the dispute. For decades, it discouraged clear Philippine claims, avoided confrontation with China, and positioned itself as a “neutral” power — despite deeply embedding itself in the region’s defense architecture. This history matters today. As the Philippines again faces Chinese incursions, it turns to the same old treaty for support. But that treaty — like much of the U.S.’s role in the South China Sea — is built on ambiguity. And as history shows, ambiguity may serve empires, but it rarely protects allies.</p><p><strong>Originally Submitted on December 8, 2023</strong></p><p><strong>Re-Written on June 17, 2025</strong></p><h3>Bibliography</h3><p>Avalon Project. “Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of the Philippines; August 30, 1951.” Yale Law School, Lillian Goldman Law Library. 2008.<a href="https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/phil001.asp#1"> https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/phil001.asp#1</a>.</p><p>Baviera, Aileen S. P., and Jay Batongbacal. <em>The West Philippine Sea: The Territorial and Maritime Jurisdiction Disputes from a Filipino Perspective</em>. Quezon City: University of the Philippines, 2013.<a href="https://ac.upd.edu.ph/index.php/resources/books-and-monographs/1352-the-west-philippine-sea-the-territorial-and-maritime-jurisdiction-disputes-from-a-filipino-perspective"> https://ac.upd.edu.ph/index.php/resources/books-and-monographs/1352-the-west-philippine-sea-the-territorial-and-maritime-jurisdiction-disputes-from-a-filipino-perspective</a>.</p><p>Bernaldez, Pedro B. “The State in Compromise: The U.S. Military Bases in the Philippines.” <em>Asian Perspective</em> 13, no. 2 (1989): 89–109.</p><p>Buszynski, Leszek, and Christopher B. Roberts, eds. <em>The South China Sea Maritime Dispute: Political, Legal, and Regional Perspectives</em>. Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY: Routledge, 2015.</p><p>Feeney, William R. “The United States and the Philippines: The Bases Dilemma.” <em>Asian Affairs</em> 10, no. 4 (1984): 63–85.</p><p>Immerwahr, Daniel. “The Greater United States: Territory and Empire in U.S. History.” <em>Diplomatic History</em> 40, no. 3 (2016): 373–91.</p><p>MacDonald, Paul K. “Those Who Forget Historiography Are Doomed to Republish It: Empire, Imperialism and Contemporary Debates about American Power.” <em>Review of International Studies</em> 35, no. 1 (2009): 45–67.</p><p>McCoy, Alfred W. “Circles of Steel, Castles of Vanity: The Geopolitics of Military Bases on the South China Sea.” <em>The Journal of Asian Studies</em> 75, no. 4 (2016): 975–1017.</p><p>Poling, Gregory B. <em>On Dangerous Ground: America’s Century in the South China Sea</em>. New York: Oxford University Press, 2022.<a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197633984.001.0001"> https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197633984.001.0001</a>.</p><p>Salamanca, Bonifacio S. “Quezon, Osmeña and Roxas and the American Military Presence in the Philippines.” <em>Philippine Studies</em> 37, no. 3 (1989): 301–16.</p><p>Shaffer, Robert. “‘Partly Disguised Imperialism’: American Critical Internationalists and Philippine Independence.” <em>The Journal of American-East Asian Relations</em> 19, no. 3/4 (2012): 235–62.</p><p>Steinmetz, George. “Return to Empire: The New U.S. Imperialism in Comparative Historical Perspective.” <em>Sociological Theory</em> 23, no. 4 (2005): 339–67.</p><p>U.S. Department of State. “Islands of the South China Sea.” Declassified Report, 1956.<a href="https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP08C01297R000300180019-2.pdf"> https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP08C01297R000300180019-2.pdf</a>.</p><p>— — — . “Philippine Position with Respect to Spratley [sic] Islands №0998.” Telegram from Ambassador William Sullivan (Manila) to State Department, 1974.<a href="https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=1380&amp;dt=2474&amp;dl=1345"> https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=1380&amp;dt=2474&amp;dl=1345</a>.</p><p>— — — . “Minutes of the Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting.” Transcript, 1976.<a href="https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve12/d350"> https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve12/d350</a>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=fc974cea7702" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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