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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Chase B on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Chase B on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@chasewb?source=rss-555385955699------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Chase B on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@chasewb?source=rss-555385955699------2</link>
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        <lastBuildDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 09:44:33 GMT</lastBuildDate>
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            <title><![CDATA[We Won’t Have A Job Guarantee Under Capitalism]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@chasewb/we-wont-have-a-job-guarantee-under-capitalism-441cb16ee7cd?source=rss-555385955699------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/441cb16ee7cd</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[marxism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[job-guarantee]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bernie-sanders]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Chase B]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 22 May 2018 16:31:08 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-05-22T16:31:42.699Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*GovqRex-Zojqq1keHXFHXA.png" /></figure><p>You would be hard pressed to find someone happier than me over Sen. Cory Booker signing on to Bernie Sanders proposed job guarantee (JG) bill. The fact that the progressives in the Democratic Party are able to drag a lifelong neoliberal like Booker to the left on this issue is a sign that there is a now an influential social-democratic trend within American politics again.</p><p>However, my happiness has been blunted by the realization over how impossible actually implementing such a policy would be. This impossibility is not just limited to the Sisyphean task of building the kind of political support it would take to pass such legislation through Congress, though that itself is hard to imagine. The reason that such legislation will ultimately fail is that it is impossible to run a sustained full-employment economy in capitalism, without further <em>politically</em> confronting capital and the profit motive. This is a structural feature of capitalist economies that many on the post-Keynesian left who support using state action to run a full employment economy ignore at their peril. I dare say this feature has been the major structural barrier for social-democratic governments the world over.</p><p>Profits are the lifeblood of capital. Without profits, capitalists become vulnerable to one another and economic growth slows as capitalists are unable to reinvest their profits into the economy. One way (and to orthodox Marxists it’s the <em>only </em>way) that capital is able to turn a profit is by extracting surplus labor from their workers. This takes place when workers are reimbursed in wages less than the amount than the labor is worth that it takes to produce the goods and services that the capitalist sells into the market. In order for this process of surplus labor extraction to work, capitalists need to keep labor costs as low as possible to maximize their profitability.</p><p>One of the best tools for keeping labor costs low is the threat of unemployment. When workers risk unemployment they are willing to settle for less than they would otherwise, as after all, some money is better than no money. A JG bill would effectively destroy what Marx referred to as the “reserve army of labor.” But the unemployed serve an important function in a capitalist economy in keeping labor costs low, and therefore keeping profitability high.</p><p>It is worth quoting at length from Michael Kalecki’s 1943 paper <em>Political Aspects of Full Employment. </em>In it, Kalecki points to this dynamic that confronts capital as primarily a <em>social, </em>not economic<em>, </em>class conflict between labor and capital:</p><blockquote>[T]he maintenance of full employment would cause social and political changes which would give a new impetus to the opposition of the business leaders. Indeed, under a regime of permanent full employment, the ‘sack’ would cease to play its role as a disciplinary measure. The social position of the boss would be undermined, and the self-assurance and class-consciousness of the working class would grow. Strikes for wage increases and improvements in conditions of work would create political tension. It is true that profits would be higher under a regime of full employment than they are on the average under laissez-faire; and even the rise in wage rates resulting from the stronger bargaining power of the workers is less likely to reduce profits than to increase prices, and thus adversely affects only the rentier interests. But ‘discipline in the factories’ and ‘political stability’ are more appreciated than profits by business leaders. Their class instinct tells them that lasting full employment is unsound from their point of view, and that unemployment is an integral part of the ‘normal’ capitalist system.</blockquote><p>Kalecki is right about class instincts compelling capitalists to oppose full employment, as well as full employment shifting the politics of the workplace in favor of labor. Where Kalecki is wrong is in assuming that profits will remain higher under federally guaranteed full employment. This is only the case while productivity outpaces the growth in labor’s wages. Destroying capital’s threat of unemployment would drastically increase the labor share of profits, as workers would be able to always fall back on a federally guaranteed job. Capital would lose the threat of unemployment in various sectors of the economy where wages are their lowest, and workers would feel emboldened to demand more from their employers like higher wages, benefits, and greater control over the workplace. This will naturally cut into capital’s profits. All things being equal, when this happens capital will be forced to raise prices on goods as high as they can causing inflation. But there are limits to raising prices to return profitability to a firm. When wages rise, lifted by both the JG bill and the enhanced confidence of labor to demand more because of the bill, economic productivity will slow from the decline in profits and the result will be stagnation, as well as inflation as capital is forced to raise prices to turn a profit. Unemployment in capitalism is a bit like hell in Christianity. If you don’t have it the system doesn’t work.</p><p>This dynamic has played out before in the United States when the Keynesian New Deal order collapsed in the 1970&#39;s into stagflation. Capital was forced to raise prices on goods in order to turn a profit without cutting costs, while their fall in profitability prevented economic growth. Their only recourse was a political backlash in the form of neoliberalism, which broke labor’s capacity to demand high wages and workplace standards, globalized production, and created new markets in previously nationalized sectors of the economy, all while keeping interests rates on the US dollar low. This returned profitability to capital and productivity to the economy, but at the cost of destroying the veneer of social democracy that the United States had during the New Deal era.</p><p>What worries me about the support that people like Cory Booker is giving for a JG bill is that they either are unaware of this fact about capitalist economies and don’t know what they are getting into, or they do understand this and have no intention of actually implementing it, but feel the need to appease the progressive left of the Democratic Party with radical policy. Contrary to what some left critics of the JG bill have said, it is not that the bill is insufficiently radical; It is in fact too radical to be implemented on a sustained basis within a capitalist economy. Actually implementing the bill would mean an eventual political confrontation with capital and a market society built around the profit motive. If it chooses to go this policy route, the newly emerged social-democratic trend in American politics will run into the same stagflation snag that the New Deal order did in the 1970&#39;s, and will be confronted with the same choice: Do we somehow move past capitalism, or do we roll back the humanizing reforms to capitalism in order to keep the whole capitalist system afloat?</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=441cb16ee7cd" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Myth of Conservative Decadence]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@chasewb/the-myth-of-conservative-decadence-d46567899c71?source=rss-555385955699------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d46567899c71</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[fascism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[liberalism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[conservatism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[trump]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Chase B]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 07 Feb 2018 01:21:34 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-03-20T19:48:40.195Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*z4HJTTxZ9L7jZpilod_iLg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Barry Goldwater, Ronald Reagan, and William F. Buckley Jr.</figcaption></figure><p>It seems to me that a couple of fallacious ideas about conservatism are dominant on the left-of-center. The first idea is that conservatives at one point in history were respectable, stately, perhaps even magnanimous to their liberal counterparts. In this Golden Age, while conservatives and liberals disagreed on policy and politics, conservatives and liberals shared a certain set of norms which were necessary for civilized democratic politics to exist, and that conservatives ultimately were committed to preserving those norms. The other idea, which is especially prominent in discussions around the modern Republican Party under Trump, is that conservatives today are now irrational, destructive, and ultimately anti-democratic, and the existential threat that the modern right poses means that extraordinary measures must be taken, unlikely political coalitions must be formed (cue David Frum’s entry into the #Resistance), and more utopian politics must be suspended until this modern right is defeated at the polls. These two ideas, while often being asserted separately, are actually intimately bound up with one another; These two ideas form a single, recurring, narrative that liberals tell about conservatism in the United States. I call this <em>The Myth of Conservative Decadence (TMCD)</em>: the idea that conservatives used to be respectable, but today they are an exceptional, existential, threat. However, just because this narrative is dominant does not mean it is true, or helpful, or even politically expedient for the broad left. In fact, the idea is symptomatic of the inability for modern liberalism to understand conservatism or struggle against it.</p><p>It is important to state that what makes the TMCD a myth isn’t that conservatives are not becoming more right-wing, or that the political spectrum isn’t moving further to the right, or that the extremity of the current right doesn’t call for decisive action against it. I believe all of these to be true. But what makes TMCD a myth is that it imagines a conservative tradition once existed which was uncorrupted by the political pathologies of the right today, and which did not have liberals pining for an older, more sensible, conservatism. If such a conservatism once existed, no one alive today can be said to have witnessed it. For conservatives, Goldwater to Trump, have all engaged in forms of crudeness, erraticness, and extremism that those on the left decried as a radical deviation from the mythical <em>true </em>conservatism of the past.</p><p>TMCD has intellectual roots within liberalism dating back to at least the postwar period and the emergence of the New Right of the 1950s. It is what made a brilliant mind like Richard Hofstadter, an otherwise insightful commentator on the political right, describe the emergence of the insurgent post-war conservatism of the 1950s as “pseudo-conservatism.” Hofstadter described the Goldwater presidential run of 1964, now considered one of the foundational moments in the making of modern US conservatism, in those same terms:</p><blockquote>[The] modern right wing…feels dispossessed: America has been largely taken away from them and their kind, though they are determined to try to repossess it and to prevent the final destructive act of subversion. The old American virtues have already been eaten away by cosmopolitans and intellectuals; the old competitive capitalism has been gradually undermined by socialistic and communistic schemers; the old national security and independence have been destroyed by treasonous plots, having as their most powerful agents not merely outsiders and foreigners as of old but major statesmen who are at the very centers of American power.</blockquote><p>While Hofstadter correctly identified the animating principle of the right-wing insurgency of his day, he could not see continuity between it and the older, supposedly more aristocratic, forms of conservatism. Hofstadter felt like he had to distinguish this burgeoning right-wing movement as a <em>pseudo-</em>conservatism<em> </em>because, as he writes elsewhere:</p><blockquote>[Its] exponents, although they believe themselves to be conservatives and usually employ the rhetoric of conservatism, show signs of a serious and restless dissatisfaction with American life, traditions and institutions. They have little in common with the temperate and compromising spirit of true conservatism in the classical sense of the word.</blockquote><p>This “temperate and compromising spirit” of conservatism is important for the fictitious conservatism of the liberal mind and is an expression of the first tenet of TMCD: that the modern conservative is in some sense a deformation of the conservative tradition. For liberals, the conservative is defined by that “temperate and compromising spirit.” If the conservative diverges from this spirit into politics that are crude, erratic, or caustic they are behaving in a way that is unconservative, and therefore unbecoming of the tradition. This is what allowed for Hillary Clinton to reminisce in a 1996 interview that “I’m very proud that I was a Goldwater Girl …[but I] don’t recognize this new brand of Republicanism that’s afoot now, which I consider to be very reactionary, not conservative in many respects.” For Clinton in 1996, Goldwater was now the standard conservative, and Newt Gingrich and the conservatives of the 90&#39;s were the reactionary anomaly that needed to be explained. TMCD turns yesterday’s reactionary deviations from conservatism into today&#39;s standard-barriers for conservatism.</p><p>A similar dynamic has taken place in the Trump era for former president George W. Bush, a president who the renowned America historian Eric Foner once called “the worst ever” has been rehabilitated by liberals who now give him a positive approval rating because Trump is “far worse.” Writing for CNN, Dean Obeidallah describes the difference between Bush and Trump:</p><blockquote>[During] Trump’s presidential campaign he despicably ginned up hate against Muslims with his comment that he thinks “Islam hates us” and his call for “a total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States.” And as President, he has tried to implement an immigration ban primarily directed at a number of Muslim majority nations.</blockquote><blockquote>What a contrast to Bush and his words only weeks after the 9/11 terror attack committed by Al Qaeda. With the nation watching, Bush didn’t try to stoke hate against Muslims. Instead, he declared: “The enemy of America is not our many Muslim friends.” Bush then added about Islam, “Its teachings are good and peaceful, and those who commit evil in the name of Allah blaspheme the name of Allah.</blockquote><p>What is, of course, left out of this formulation is that Bush ultimately invaded a country that had nothing to do with 9/11, killing hundreds of thousands of Muslims and destabilizing that region to this day, by falsifying a connection between two very different Muslim countries. But that is brushed aside because George Bush’s rationale for war wasn’t <em>overtly</em> racist. It seems that Obeidallah, by focusing on what Bush said and not what he did, is engaging in a particularly vacuous anti-racist politics all too common on the left today, and that the political scientist Adolph Reed Jr. has critiqued as “[emphasizing] the name by which we should call some strains of [injustice]— whether they should be broadly recognized as evidence of “racism” — over specifying the mechanisms that produce them or even the steps that can be taken to combat them.” To Obeidallah, the antiracist <em>social norm</em> is what is important in defining whether George Bush or Donald Trump are bad presidents (and in this case which one is worse) not the racist effects of their policies (like invading and destroying a country.) This is not to say that a colorblind policy with racist outcomes is necessarily better or worse than an overtly racist policy with fewer victims, but the distinction isn’t even being made. This is an important distinction because TMCD is ultimately persuasive to liberals because it does not root itself in actual policies that conservative politicians enact, but in those violations of liberal social norms they may engage in while enacting them.</p><p>Because liberals believe that conservatism is identified by it’s “temperate and compromising spirit” they believe that there is no consistency between conservatism and social transgression. If a conservative is acting politically imprudent, recklessly, or ill-behaved, liberals are forced to think there is some kind of hypocrisy at work. But this inconsistency is only a theoretical one. For conservatism isn’t a politics built on moderation, but as the political theorist Corey Robin writes, is “a meditation on — and theoretical rendition of — the felt experience of having power, seeing it threatened, and trying to win it back.” Conservatives will embrace the norms of civility and temperance if those norms are in defense of the power and privilege that is important to them, be that capitalism, American imperialism, Christianity, white supremacy, etc. Because liberals have mistaken conservative <em>defense of norms</em> with a <em>defense of what some norms represent</em>, they are forever taken aback by conservatism’s erratic and self-contradictory nature. This leads them to pine for a mythical conservatism that defended norms for norm’s sake. What Hofstadter identifies as pseudo-conservatism’s “serious and restless dissatisfaction with American life, traditions and institutions” is not incompatible with the defense of hierarchies of power and privilege, and actually necessitate it when those “traditions and institutions” are egalitarian ones.</p><p>This liberal view that conservatism is ultimately a political philosophy about defending norms-as-such is the foundation for believing yesterday’s conservatives were fundamentally different from today’s, even when yesterday’s liberals decried those conservatives for their bombast and inflexibility. But there is a reason this idea persists. And it connects intimately with the second tenet of TMCD: that today’s conservative is an exceptional threat. He is an authoritarian, or an imperialist, or a fascist. Whatever the substance of the claim, it has become useful for liberals, and in particular the Democratic Party establishment and accompanying media outlets, to claim that today’s conservative is an unprecedented and existential threat which necessitates the closing of the ranks, a demand that ultimately means bringing the left into the Democratic Party without taking on any kind of progressive or social-democratic agenda.</p><p>Nowhere is this more apparent than in the claim that Donald Trump is a fascist, a claim that seems to grow more strange with each day of his administration. In my view, what has been exceptional about the Trump presidency, a president that presides over a political party with majority control over the federal government and most state governments, is how little they have been able to accomplish, and how weak Trump has been at enacting a substantive agenda. To quote from a recent article of Corey Robin’s:</p><blockquote>On 19 January 1934, the 354th day of Hitler’s reign, the Nazi regime closed <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kemna_concentration_camp">the Kemna concentration camp</a>, where anywhere from 2,500 to 5,000 political prisoners — most of them Communists, Socialists, and trade unionists — had been held and tortured (the press spoke obliquely of “<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enhanced_interrogation_techniques">enhanced interrogations</a>”) for months. People could hear the prisoners’ screams from almost a half-mile away. The prisoners were moved to other concentration camps.</blockquote><blockquote>On 9 January 2018, the 354th day of Trump’s reign, the president was <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/the-white-house-struggles-to-silence-talk-of-trumps-mental-fitness/2018/01/08/2a7d4092-f493-11e7-a9e3-ab18ce41436a_story.html?utm_term=.d16856ec7730">anxiously monitoring</a> news of a <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Fire-Fury-Inside-Trump-White/dp/1250158060">best-selling book</a> — filled with leaks from his own top advisers, testifying to the addled state of his mind and rule — hoping against hope to stop any and all discussion of his fitness for office.</blockquote><blockquote>Trump’s lawyers had already tried to force the book’s publisher and author to cease publication, issue a retraction, and apologize. <a href="https://twitter.com/ABC/status/950448707291504640">Their reply</a>? We “do not intend to cease publication, no such retraction will occur, and no apology is warranted.</blockquote><p>What has been so surprising about the Trump presidency (beyond its existence) is that it has the shape of a typical, if scandal-ridden and inept, Republican presidency. But by comparing present-day America to the Weimar Republic, what the critics of Trump unintentionally do is minimize the actual dangers that a conservative government poses. To put it another way: Trump is not bad because his conservative government anticipates a future fascist one. Trump is bad because his government <em>is </em>a conservative one right now. But what TMCD does is force liberals into making the case for the former, and not for the latter. While this moment could provide an opportunity to discredit a bankrupt and vicious conservative political philosophy for a generation, TMCD forces liberals into assuring the public that conservatism was once something more respectable<em>.</em> And so, like a victim of Stockholm Syndrome, liberalism tacitly defends its abuser, assuring onlookers that conservatism is <em>normally not like this. </em>I suspect this is what the socialist Ralph Miliband was warning of when he wrote the following:</p><blockquote>[The] usage of Fascism as a reference point tends to dangerously obscure the less extreme alternatives to it, which do no require the wholesale dismantling of all democratic institutions, the subversion of all liberties, nor certainly the abandonment of a democratic rhetoric.</blockquote><p>I have no doubt that many of these liberals, and many on the left generally, actually believe that the current Republicans pose an existential threat when in power, and one that is necessary to dedicate resources for removing them through elections. I myself believe that, though I don’t think that the current Democrats are up to the task. But what TMCD conceals is how <em>un</em>exceptional the threat that conservatism poses has been over the last half century, and it prevents more strategic thinking on how to defeat conservatism or build a better left capable of transforming this country. Ex-Republican operative and former Reagan advisor Bruce Bartlett diagnosed the issue thus:</p><blockquote>The left seems to me to be totally focused on the short-term — stopping whatever the Republicans are doing today. They’ll worry about building institutions and developing a positive agenda when the crisis is past. But tomorrow is another crisis and no Republican idea ever stays dead no matter how badly it was defeated; it will arise again like a phoenix the next time an opportunity presents itself. This puts Democrats permanently on defense. But as my old boss Jack Kemp, a former pro football player, always told me, “You don’t win games on defense.”</blockquote><p>And that is the tragedy of TMCD: Despite raising the threat perception of present-day conservatives through equating them with something far nastier, it fails to confront what conservatism really is.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d46567899c71" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Birth of Antislavery Politics in Illinois]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@chasewb/the-birth-of-antislavery-politics-in-illinois-62aa5632b2ac?source=rss-555385955699------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/62aa5632b2ac</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[civil-war]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[abolition]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[abraham-lincoln]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[republican-party]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Chase B]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 04 Jan 2018 16:42:49 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-03-24T21:20:31.348Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*BINECwDTRGJyUZJqyADXwA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Abraham Lincoln on the left, Stephen Douglas on the right</figcaption></figure><p>The formation of the Illinois Republican Party offers both a glimpse into the nature of the political realignment of the 1850s, as well as a detailed view into the formation of a powerful antislavery politics that not only changed the trajectory of state politics, but national and global politics as well. The journey of Illinois from an “outlying [province] of the empire of slavery” to becoming the state that propelled Abraham Lincoln to the national stage was not a straightforward one. There were many setbacks in creating an effective antislavery politics in the state, and much like the rest of the country it took decades for an antislavery majority to emerge in the electorate in the form of the Republican Party. This essay is an attempt at examining what the ideological foundations of the Republican Party in Illinois were, why Illinois became a Republican state by 1860, and how Illinois politics related to the national political scene. From 1840 to 1860, Illinois politics would shift as law, economic developments, and social movements pushed the country into debating the question of slavery’s future in the United States. During this time, two of the key figures representing answers to the slavery question emerged on the national stage from Illinois politics: Stephen Douglas and Abraham Lincoln. By examining the primary sources from key individuals of that era in the form of writings, speeches, and memoirs, as well as secondary literature from historians and biographers, and quantitative history of the state, a historical understanding of the political events leading up to the rise of the Republican Party in Illinois emerges. What this shows is that the Illinois Republican Party developed as a result of the competing political and economic systems of early capitalism and slavery, as well as the different and incommensurable definitions of liberty and freedom which were conducive to each of these systems. While Illinois was a free state, it was a state which contained these tensions, as well as had a history of being economically linked with both the capitalist northeast and the slavery south. As the conflict began to break out, Illinois would be a major political battlefield in the war of ideas between proslavery and antislavery partisans.</p><h4>The Irrepressible Conflict</h4><p>Before the conflict over the future of slavery and the emergence of the Republican Party in Illinois can be understood, the ways in which early capitalism and slavery were beginning to come into tension over westward expansion must be understood. In the preceding decades before the Civil War, the American market revolution had completely transformed Illinois’ economy. The landed property owners of Illinois prior to the market revolution were ‘household producers.’ Farmers were able to sustain themselves, but their surplus production could not be easily sold for profit. As one observer put it, an Illinois farmer “can get enough to eat, and that is all.” They did not sustain their daily needs through the market or through wage labor, rather they used direct production of their property, consuming a variety of animals and crops. But after the market revolution began to incorporate Illinois, “north-western rural households…had to engage in successful market-competition in order to survive as property-owning agrarian producers. The result was the ‘agricultural revolution’ of the 1840s and 1850s — the growth in the size and proportion of output produced as commodities, increasing specialization in cash-crops, rising labour-productivity with the introduction of new seeds, fertilizers and improved implements and machinery, and growing social inequality among farm-households.” This led to the expansion of an agrarian capitalism of small petty-commodity producers in the state of Illinois, in which “the line between worker and capitalist was to a large extent blurred.” This was the burgeoning world in the north of dynamic economic growth subordinate to market forces that Illinois Republicans like Lincoln, Yates, and Lovejoy would come to embrace as the future of western territories. It was a world of dynamic and relatively egalitarian capitalism, in which any growing social inequality among northern society could always be relieved by migration westward into new territory. This constant migration of people westward acted as a ‘safety valve’ for northern society, and helped maintain the normative vision of a classless capitalism that Illinois Republicans like Lincoln articulated as “the order of things in a society of equals” But this society of equals depended on the “geographical expansion of petty-commodity social-property relations in agriculture” into western territory whenever capitalist social relations became too unequal in the eastern United States.</p><p>The social-property relations of slavery had a different dynamic, and required a different kind of westward expansion in order to survive. Unlike in early northern capitalism, where the capitalist either worked for themselves or hired the labor-power of a laborer, slave masters purchased their laborers, leading to a capitalization of their labor. The planter was only able to compete in their production of goods by “adding more slaves and more land (preferably more fertile lands) in order to increase output and reduce costs.” This meant that while both the northern capitalist economy and the southern slave economy required the incorporation of new land into their systems in order to survive, the ways in which they had to incorporate new territory were incommensurable. “Put directly, the social-property relations of plantation-slavery and agrarian petty-commodity production could not coexist.”</p><p>Nor could the different visions of modernity each of these economic systems produced coexist. The North developed a “free labor ideology”, which valorized the small farmer, artisan, and petty-commodity producer. This was a vision like Lincoln’s in which “Men, with their families — wives, sons and daughters — work for themselves, on their farms, in their houses and in their shops, taking the whole product to themselves, and asking no favours of capital on the one hand, nor of hirelings or slaves on the other.” The South had developed a very different vision of modernity that could be expanded westward. Many slaveholders came to believe that slavery was demonstrably superior for meeting the “modern task of actively constructing society to meet human needs” Referring to slavery, Senator of Louisiana Judah Benjamin stated, “mankind has solved a single industrial problem.” One pro-slavery partisan wrote in the <em>Charleston Mercury</em> that “There is a higher law than higher law itself….[the] demand for labor.” The need for bounded labor was “a law inherent in the nature of society.” Slavery was seen to slaveholders as a vivacious, dynamic, and ultimately necessary system which was being advanced across the Atlantic world and was being justified through innovations like racist pseudo-science and pro-slavery political and economic theory. This vision of an emerging plantation-elite, with a foundation built on coerced labor, was in direct contradiction to the “society of equals” that many northerners had come to believe in. It was this struggle between egalitarian capitalism and plantation aristocracy that was to define the politics of the country.</p><p>This contestation over economic orders and political ideals came to be fought over the control of the federal government and the expansion of territory westward. The emerging antislavery politics of the 1850s began to increasingly identify a conspiracy of slaveholders as having taken control over the federal government:</p><blockquote>“According to [Salmon P. Chase] and other antislavery spokesmen, the Slave Power consisted of the 350,000 or so slaveholders of the South-about one percent of the nations population and five percent of the South’s. In the words of Charles Sumner, the “animating principle” of the Slave Power was “the perpetuation and extension of slavery and the advancement of Slaveholders.”</blockquote><p>The concept of the <em>Slave Power</em> gave voice to the growing resentment that was starting to emerge from petty-commodity capitalists of the north who rightly believed that southern slaveholders held disproportionate sway in the federal government. In previous decades, the slaveholders had used the federal government to protect and expand slaveholders interests in the United States and in the broader Western Hemisphere. “Slaveholders have had the Secretaryship of the State for two thirds of the time; and…for four fifths of the time have the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy been from the South.” wrote Iowa congressman Josiah Grinnell in 1865. This growing awareness among northerners that the Southern planter elite was the ruling class of the United States helped spurn the north into building an antislavery political project to abate and contain slavery.</p><h4>Illinois as Microcosm</h4><p>1850s Illinois embodied in its regional politics many of the national trends which would lead to the formation of an antislavery Republican Party. Illinois was a state that “boasted a seemingly endless supply of cheap and highly fertile land, which attracted repeated waves of eastern migrants…[a] relentless westward march of a farming population whose economic mobility was largely predicted on the availability of land.” The earliest migrants to Illinois came from the slave-holding south, many of them carrying pro-slavery politics with them. By 1818, about 70% of the population of the new state was from the south. Though Illinois was nominally a free state, this southern majority persisted politically for decades, and shaped the politics of the state dramatically. In the early 1820s, an economic crisis hit Illinois, providing an opportunity for pro-slavery partisans to try and legalize slavery within the state. A constitutional convention was held in the state, but anti-slavery delegates were able to secure a 57% majority to oppose legalizing the practice. While unable to legalize slavery, the southern element among Illinois’ population would remain strong, and would only lose power in the decades prior to the Civil War. As a correspondent in the <em>Liberator</em> reported in 1843, “[Springfield, Illinois] is a bitter pro-slavery … community,” and this fact was as true for “the entire middle and southern portions of this state.” This population could be contrasted with an ever growing and increasingly anti-slavery population in the north and center of the state. Between 1825 and 1835, the state’s population increased from 72,817 to 270,179 people. There were nascent attempts to build an abolitionist movement during the 1830s, particularly through the activities of martyrs like Elijah Lovejoy. But the early advocates for antislavery confronted deep antipathy for politicizing slavery in Illinois. In addition to pro-slavery partisans in the state which were hostile to politicizing slavery, there were many who felt that slavery, while immoral or inefficient, should not be politicized for fear of sectional conflict between the north and the south. Notable among this group were many Whigs. Though many Illinois Whigs were against slavery (routinely voting against pro-slavery measures in the state), most Whigs spoke out against early abolition in Illinois. Whigs generally held a progressive view of history and the burgeoning market society, in which they thought that the inexorable progress of market society and liberal values would naturally constrain and destroy slavery. This confidence in the historical inevitability of a slave-less world, together with their reluctance to jeopardize the political union, ironically led many northern Whigs to act conservatively on the issue of slavery prior to the 1850s. Some northern Democrats in Illinois also carried un-politicized reservations about slavery, but would concede to proslavery measure for the sake of party unity which was built on strong pro-slavery Democrats in the south. Because of this unity, the Democrats would largely make up the basis of pro-slavery support in the north. However, there was also an anti-slavery and free soil element within the Democratic party in northern Illinois, especially in cities like Galena and Chicago where a growing population of Democrats grew weary of slavery and the Democratic Party’s concessions to the Slave Power.</p><p>The market revolution spurred many of the social changes which brought a steady stream of immigrants and capital westward into Illinois from the eastern United States. In early Illinois, many of the petty-commodities produced were sold into markets primarily in the south. Abraham Lincoln famously sold goods in New Orleans, traveling down the Mississippi River by boat. Many producers made trips like this to sell goods along the port cities of the Mississippi River. But in the decades preceding the Civil War, the market structure in and around Illinois began to change. What transpired was an increasing sectional divide within Illinois, tethered to the political-economic divide within the larger country. Northern Illinois was growing reliant on petty-commodity production, with some early industrial production, tied to north-eastern markets. This aided in, and was aided by, the production of canals and railroads penetrating into northern and central Illinois. These forms of transportation shipped commodities from northern and central Illinois out to markets in the north-eastern United States, and in turn shipped commodities and people into northern and central Illinois. These developments were supported by both Whigs and Democrats in the 1840s, effectively blurring the economic differences in the regional political parties.</p><p>While northern Illinois was undergoing a process of north-eastern market integration, southern Illinois remained largely economically integrated into the slavery south. This southern economic integration did not extend the practice of slavery into Illinois, but rather ensured that the cultural and political interests of the south and the slave economy were ventriloquized through southern Illinois’ regional government. But while these southern interests had voice in Illinois, they were now crowded out by abolitionists, free-soilers, and nativists which would became the coalition of the Republican Party. This political dynamic which separated the state into two factions: a northern free labor faction and a southern slave labor faction, was the same dynamic that played out in national politics over the decade of the 1850s.</p><h4>The Death of The Political Center in Illinois</h4><p>The Democratic Party found itself having to balance the politics of an increasingly bellicose proslavery south and an increasingly anti-slavery north in the 1850s. Ultimately, as the sectional differences split the country, the Democrats would come to identify itself with southern slavery more and more, while the emerging Republican Party would come to be the voice of northern antislavery and free labor. In this political realignment, not only did the extremists on both sides of the slavery issue inflame the tensions that led to the formation of the Republican Party and eventually the Civil War, but the political center also played a vital role through its mismanagement of the emerging political conflict. In Illinois, that centrism was embodied in the politics of Stephen Douglas, whose several attempts at solving the slavery issue would inadvertently exacerbate the tensions over slavery within the country.</p><p>In 1854, Stephen Douglas believed he had the answer to the national issue of slavery: <em>popular sovereignty</em>. It was intended to be the kind of high-minded compromise between extreme regional and political differences that both sides could accept. An answer to slavery that conformed to national principles, and that preserved both northern free labor and southern slave labor. Unfortunately for Douglas, his brainchild “ignited a national conflagration over the meaning of freedom”, and acted as a catalyst to the formation of the Republican Party in the north.</p><p>Douglas summarized his popular sovereignty doctrine of the Kansas-Nebraska Act as “not to legislate slavery into any State or Territory, or to exclude it therefrom, but to leave the people thereof perfectly free to form and regulate their domestic institutions in their own way, subject only to the federal constitution.” Though the doctrine seemed like an effective, democratic, and impartial replacement of the 1820 Missouri Compromise, the Act began a firestorm in anti-slavery northern politics. Salmon P. Chase writes in a response to the Kansas-Nebraska Act signed by several prominent northern politicians, “We arraign this bill as a gross violation of a sacred pledge; as a criminal betrayal of precious rights; as part and parcel of an atrocious plot to exclude from a vast unoccupied region immigrants from the Old World and free laborers from our own States, and convert it into a dreary region of despotism, inhabited by masters and slaves.” Douglas had intended to settle the issue of slavery, but now northern politicians were calling for “all protest, earnestly and emphatically, by correspondence, through the press, by memorials, by resolutions of public meetings and legislative bodies, and in whatever other mode may seem expedient, against this enormous crime.” Chase’s manifesto acted as “one of the most effective pieces of political propaganda in [US] history,” serving as a clarion call to all northern politicians, and all northern citizens, to oppose the extension of slavery further west. In Illinois, very few Democratic Party journals supported the bill, as well as virtually no Whig newspapers. In Peoria, Lincoln gave a speech which linked the passage of the bill with a moral and political critique of slavery, declaring “Little by little…we have been giving up the old for the new faith. Nearly eighty years ago we began by declaring that all men are created equal; but now from that beginning we have run down to the other declaration, that for some men to enslave others is a ‘sacred right of self-government.’ These principles cannot stand together.”</p><p>Passing the bill was a profound misreading of northern politics by Douglas, who believed that the sustained outrage over the bill’s passing would eventually subside, and the act would “purify the northern Democracy by ridding it of unreliable antislavery elements.” But the northern public saw the Kansas-Nebraska Act as a betrayal. Illinois abolitionist Owen Lovejoy wrote that the Act was “a complete surrender of all the ground hitherto asserted and by the federal government with respect to the limitation of slavery, [and] is a plain confession of the slaveholder to transfer his human chattels to any part of the public domain, and there hold them as slaves as long as inclination or interest may dictate.” Illinois Whig congressmen Richard Yates saw that the Act would split the country into a “northern party and a southern party.” “Despite Douglas’s denials, thousands of northerners were convinced that the sole purpose of the bill was to ensure that slavery would enter Kansas and Nebraska.” By generating animosity in the north, the Kansas-Nebraska Act, above all other policies, put the Democratic Party down the road to being “inextricably committed to the designs of the slaveholders.”</p><p>An ‘Anti-Nebraska’ movement was formed, which would take several years yet to eventually develop into what Douglas derisively called the “abolition party under the name and disguise of a Republican party.” But the political ramifications of the Kansas-Nebraska Act were felt later that year in the 1854 elections of Illinois. “Anti-Nebraska candidates took five of the state’s nine congressional seats, losing two contests by razor-thin margins, and won control of the state’s House of Representatives.” The Democratic majority in the national congress was wiped out, with the number of Democratic congressmen from the north reduced from seventy-nine to twenty-four. Over the next few years, the political center of the Democratic party would find itself aligning more with southern slavery. Douglas would endorse the controversial Dred Scott decision of the Supreme Court, a decision which in effect made forms of slavery legal across the country. Douglas also increasingly aligned himself with white supremacist and paternalistic arguments in favor of slavery, stating that the peculiar institution had the effect of making blacks “civilized and Christian.” However, while Douglas was driven to pro-slavery politics, pro-slavery politics itself was becoming more extreme, and Douglas was not able to align himself with pro-slavery politics to the degree that slaveholders had been dragging it rightward. When Douglas defended the Dred Scott decision, he did so tepidly, saying “I have no warfare to make upon the Supreme Court because of the Dred Scott decision. I have no complaints to make against that Court, because of that decision. My private opinions on some points of the case may have been one way and on other points of the case another; in some things concurring with the Court and in others dissenting.” Douglas was attempting to defend the right of southern slavery to expand in accordance with popular sovereignty, while allowing for the same for northern free labor. However, this was no longer sufficient for a slaveholder class that grew weary of northern antislavery politics, and was making vocal arguments that southern slave labor was superior to northern free labor. In a speech on the Senate floor, South Carolina Senator James Henry Hammond stated the following:</p><blockquote>“In all social systems there must be a class to do the menial duties, to perform the drudgery of life. That is, a class requiring but a low order of intellect and but little skill. … It constitutes the very mud-sill of society and of political government; and you might as well attempt to build a house in the air, as to build either the one or the other, except on this mud-sill. Fortunately for the South, she found a race adapted to that purpose to her hand. A race inferior to her own, but eminently qualified in temper, in vigor, in docility, in capacity to stand the climate, to answer all her purposes. We use them for our purpose, and call them slaves…The highest proof of what is Nature’s law. We are old-fashioned at the South yet; slave is a word discarded now by “ears polite;” I will not characterize that class at the North by that term; but you have it; it is there; it is everywhere; it is eternal… The difference between us is, that our slaves are hired for life and well compensated; there is no starvation, no begging, no want of employment among our people, and not too much employment either. Yours are hired by the day, not cared for, and scantily compensated, which may be proved in the most painful manner, at any hour in any street in any of your large towns. Why, you meet more beggars in one day, in any single street of the city of New York, than you would meet in a lifetime in the whole South.”</blockquote><p>Douglas’ vision of popular sovereignty for slavery in westward territories was a compromise that neither side would tolerate. When Douglas failed to sign the Lecompton Constitution, enough ill will had been generated towards him and other centrist northern Democrats on behalf of southern slaveholders for them to abandon Douglas’ style of centrist Democratic politics. Thus the Democratic Party had to increasingly become the party representing the interests of southern slaveholders in order to continue winning elections.</p><h4>The Antislavery Party Forms</h4><p>Between the 1854 and 1856, the ‘Anti-Nebraska’ movement coalesced in Illinois without becoming a new party. Internal divisions over nativism, temperance, and the intensity with which slavery should be opposed prevented the Illinois Republican Party from forming with the same speed as its eastern counterparts. But when the Illinois Republican Party did form in 1856, it formed with incredible ease. Lincoln and other early Republicans organized a state central committee and held a state convention in Bloomington. At the convention, the Republicans unambiguously proclaimed the superiority of free society, including its economic dynamism, social liberalism, and burgeoning industry. While Illinois did not vote for the Republicans presidential candidate John Freemont in the 1856 election, the results were encouraging to Illinois Republicans, who saw incredible gains in northern and central Illinois. It was proof that the Republicans were able to develop an anti-slavery politics for northern Illinoisans that appealed to the “egalitarian ethos [of] the [former] Yankee Democrats.”</p><p>The Illinois Republican Party would rise to national prominence with the rise of Abraham Lincoln. Lincoln was a former Whig, and carried many of the Whig positions around economic development and progressive politics. However, it was his novel approach to anti-slavery which made Lincoln such a leading light in the Republican Party. Lincoln was a moderate within the Republican Party. He believed, unlike Douglas, that the United States was divided because of slavery. “I believe this government cannot endure, permanently half slave and half free. I do not expect the Union to be dissolved — I do not expect the house to fall — but I do expect it will cease to be divided. It will become all one thing or all the other.” However, Lincoln was not an abolitionist at the beginning of his Republican career. He instead advocated the non-extension of slavery westward through the powers of the federal government, while using moral and political language to convey that pro-slavery and antislavery politics were fundamentally irreconcilable. While he spoke of slavery as an evil, he “spoke of slaveholders not as reprobates and sinners but as men and women enmeshed in a system from which they could not disentangle themselves.” It was this political moderation on anti-slavery politics which made Lincoln palatable to both radicals and conservatives within the Republican Party, and made him an excellent representative of the Illinois Republican Party in particular which had sought to “keep [itself]…under the control of moderate men, and conservative influences.” Perhaps most important of all, unlike some abolitionists, radicals, or antislavery politicians, Lincoln had framed antislavery politics as a conservative enterprise, which merely sought to impose the non-extension of slavery through the federal government as the founding fathers had originally intended.</p><p>The conflict over the non-extension of slavery would eventually lead to Lincoln becoming the presidential nominee of the Republican Party, his election to the presidency, and a Civil War between northern and southern society that would open to the abolition of slavery and the destruction of the political power of the slaveholders. As historian James McPherson has written, “The Civil War started out as one kind of conflict and ended as something quite different.” What the conflict would eventually become could be described as a second revolution within the United States. Witnessing the conflict from abroad, Karl Marx wrote “never has such a gigantic transformation taken place so rapidly” as the liberation of the slaves. But in the early years of the Republican party, it was not a party of revolution or radical abolition. Those years in the 1850s showed the burgeoning politics of a liberal capitalist society, one which hoped it would have no bourgeoisie or proletariat, but in which the “majority belong to neither class — neither work for others, nor have others working for them.” Those politics would emphasize free labor over slave labor, equality over property, and democracy over aristocracy. In those early years of the Republican Party, farmers, abolitionists, workers, and early industrial capitalists began to articulate a vision of freedom against the worst forms of despotism this country has produced, and tried to find ways to politically realize that vision.</p><h3>Bibliography</h3><p>“Appeal of the Independent Democrats in Congress, to the people of the United States : shall slavery be permitted in Nebraska?” Letter from Salmon P. Chase.</p><p>Clarke, Grace Julian. <em>George W. Julian: some impressions</em>. Indianapolis: Press of C.E. Hollenbeck.</p><p>Douglas, Stephen. <em>Speech at Springfield, Illinois</em>. 1858.</p><p>Foner, Eric. <em>The fiery trial: Abraham Lincoln and American slavery</em>. New York: W.W. Norton, 1220.</p><p>Foner, Eric. <em>Free soil, free labor, free men: the ideology of the Republican Party before the Civil War</em>. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.</p><p>Hammond, James Henry. <em>The Mudsill Theory</em>.</p><p>Huston, James L. “The Illinois Political Realignment of 1844–1860: Revisiting the Analysis.” <em>The Journal of the Civil War Era</em>1, no. 4 (2011): 506–35. doi:10.1353/cwe.2011.0077.</p><p>Karp, Matthew. <em>This vast southern empire slaveholders at the helm of American foreign policy</em>. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016.</p><p>Marx, Karl, and Saul Kussiel Padover. <em>The Karl Marx library</em>. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1972.</p><p>McPherson, James M. <em>Abraham Lincoln and the second American revolution</em>. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2007.</p><p>Neely, Mark E. Jr. 1982. <em>The Abraham Lincoln Encyclopedia</em>. New York: Da Capo Press, Inc.</p><p>“O.H. Browning to Lyman Trumbell.” O. H. Browning to Lyman Trumbell. May 19, 1856.</p><p>Peck, Graham A. <em>Making an antislavery nation: Lincoln, Douglas, and the battle over freedom</em>. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2017.</p><p>Post, Charles. <em>The American road to capitalism: studies in class-structure, economic development, and political conflict, 1620–1877</em>. Chicago, IL: Haymarket Books, 2012.</p><p>Seward, William H., and Charles O’Conor. <em>The irrepressible conflict: a speech</em>. Albany, N.Y.?: Evening Journal, 1860.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=62aa5632b2ac" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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