<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0" xmlns:cc="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rss/creativeCommonsRssModule.html">
    <channel>
        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Tim Chong on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Tim Chong on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@chong.tim?source=rss-c3aad9dcb266------2</link>
        
        <generator>Medium</generator>
        <lastBuildDate>Mon, 16 Nov 2026 02:29:55 GMT</lastBuildDate>
        <atom:link href="https://medium.com/@chong.tim/feed" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/>
        <webMaster><![CDATA[yourfriends@medium.com]]></webMaster>
        <atom:link href="http://medium.superfeedr.com/" rel="hub"/>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The three stages of start-up building: Building product, then team, then organisation]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@chong.tim/the-three-stages-of-start-up-building-building-product-then-team-then-organisation-167147c15c5b?source=rss-c3aad9dcb266------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/167147c15c5b</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[founders]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tim Chong]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 17 Nov 2024 23:51:20 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-11-17T23:51:20.275Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Every founder has to start by building product. Without a product, a start-up is nothing. But what I’ve noticed is that as start-ups begin to scale, the journey looks like building product, then building a team, then building an organisation. You never stop doing the former, but it ‘layers on’. And the points of leverage changes — meaning, if you want to make a <strong><em>multiplicative</em></strong> impact on the organisation; where you focus your energy and time has to shift.</p><p>It really hit me when I finally relegated control of being a Product Manager within a squad and now essentially float across the organisation, spending time in the areas that I believe are the most important for Yonder’s long-term success (thinking about a 3–5 year horizon now).</p><p>This isn’t unique to founders, it’s unique to any managers or operators scaling an area of a business. What you optimise for at each stage looks different; and so here’s my take on it.</p><h3>From 0 to 1: It’s all about product, everything else is secondary</h3><p><em>Stage: Pre-Seed to Seed — you’re on a search to find product market fit (scaling it doesn’t matter)</em></p><p>In the first 1–2 years of Yonder, we followed the seminal Y-Combinator advice, “Building something that customer’s love”, “Do things that don’t scale”. Whilst we thought deeply about culture and the talent we hired; we shunned process, we consciously didn’t invest too much in processes — we had a simple job, find product market fit.</p><p>I wasn’t worried about building a ‘management team’ — we were a team of less than 15, although I always thought about my early hires as potential future leaders, ideally talent that were at the top of their game as an IC and had some early management experience. We were all very hands-on and I describe this period as rolling a boulder up a vertical hill; if you don’t push, you don’t make progress. Every day is about pushing. There’s a linear impact of my hard work to the results we deliver as a business.</p><p>My job was simple — keep pushing, every day. Every day I didn’t push was a day we wasted on finding potential product market fit. I describe this period as having no momentum, and all my energy was focused on artificially creating the momentum. Alas, we started to find signal of product market fit — people seemed to <strong><em>love</em></strong> what we were building.</p><h3>From 1 to 10: It’s about building a team that builds the business</h3><p><em>Stage: Seed to Series A — you’re on a search to figure out how to start scaling it — you’re figuring out how to scale; I describe it as early scaling days</em></p><p>Having a small crack team of 15 is great in the early days, you can change direction week to week, you can create alignment by essentially just talking loudly in the office. It starts to break when you have no redundancy in your team, someone gets sick and you have no one; or you start to need specialists who can bring domain expertise.</p><p>At this point, my full time job is a recruiter — it’s about finding the right talent <strong><em>myself</em></strong> to help us figure out how to scale what we’ve built. It’s scouring LinkedIn and my network to find the best of the best, to help us figure out <strong><em>how</em></strong> to scale what we’re doing. It’s at this point, I realise that getting leverage is also about building a management team that I can entrust to take each part of the business — I’m still very hands-on but I have someone who can start to take end-to-end accountability for a function.</p><p>I’ve realised, at 30 people, I can create more impact by helping the team be 10% more effective than working 100% harder. It’s about being a force multiplier on the team. Alignment, clarity and culture is even more important.</p><p>We’re still pushing a boulder up a hill, but the hill isn’t as steep, and now other leaders are helping push the boulders. If I don’t push for a day; it still moves; perhaps just not as quick.</p><h3>From 10 to 100: It’s about building an organisation — you’re now managing managers that manage managers that manage teams</h3><p><em>Stage: Series A/B onwards — you’re figuring out how to build systems of scaling; an organisation that starts to take a nature of it’s own</em></p><p>It hit me recently when I realised that there are now up to two layers between me and the team; that all of a sudden I’m no longer personally involved in the outbound recruiting of every person on our team (although a founder is always involved in interview of everyone still). Changing direction week to week is frustrating and my job increasingly becomes about setting context for our leaders to then set direction in their teams.</p><p>It’s a big transition, I describe it as moving from 1:1 management to building management systems. I’m still doing skip levels (1:1 meetings) with everyone in the company, but at 50+ Yonderers, I’m barely getting more than 2x year per person. Leverage looks different for me now, it’s about coaching the team on <strong><em>how</em></strong> we hire; evaluating when we’ve made mistakes on <strong><em>how</em></strong> we hire; coaching the team on <strong><em>how</em></strong> to build a function, <strong><em>how</em></strong> to set OKRs, <strong><em>how</em></strong> to prioritise. All of a sudden, pacing is set by the leaders of our company and the cadences we set through company ceremonies instead of through my own sheer hard work.</p><p>At 50+ people, it’s increasingly about building world class leaders and managers, it’s clarity of context and direction, it’s resource allocation, it’s about setting up the scaffolding for the organisation. But at the same time, it’s sometimes, when needed — getting directly involved when we need a tie breaker, when we need to take a big directional bet, when I feel strongly about a specific decision or judgement-call. It’s a bit paradoxical — it’s letting go; but not abdicating responsibility; it’s creating space; but setting the ‘bowling bumpers’ to keep us on-track; it’s trusting the team’s judgement; but also stepping in when the stakes are high.</p><p>It feels like pushing a boulder on a flat hill; there’s natural momentum in the organisation, and so it’s about keeping the momentum up and making sure we’re facing the right direction.</p><p>A lot of founders I speak to talk about missing the ‘good old days’; I never feel like that. Each stage brings new challenges and new opportunities. I love the feeling of the early days where you put in a unit of work, and can see the impact directly on product and customers. But I also love the feeling of influencing through culture, to see someone in our team impacted by just a couple of words I say and make a big impact directly on product and customers. Both are exciting, it’s just different, and the problems look different.<strong> It’s still building, the building just looks different.</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*z-nU8Cm1B_m4VN-W" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@thejmoore?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Jon Moore</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=167147c15c5b" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[My take on Founder Mode — going beyond the catch phrase]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@chong.tim/my-take-on-founder-mode-going-beyond-the-catch-phrase-cacb7f9d0986?source=rss-c3aad9dcb266------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/cacb7f9d0986</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[founders]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[technology]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tim Chong]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 20 Oct 2024 21:40:28 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-10-21T14:43:43.209Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>My take on Founder Mode — going beyond the catch phrase</h3><p>A couple of weeks ago, I was at Sifted Conference and a journalist asked me about my opinion of ‘Founder Mode’. I gave a fairly unstructured opinion of it but the question made me ponder a lot more about the implications of it — and I wanted to distill my thoughts in an essay here. If you haven’t heard the original essay on Founders Mode — you can find Paul Graham’s essay <a href="https://paulgraham.com/foundermode.html">here</a>; and there’s a <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IodbsQV8dFE">longer-form interview</a> with Brian Chesky on the same theme here.</p><p>Buzzwords are interesting, they’re often misused — the same way Clayton Christensen’s phrase “disruptive innovation” was painfully misused by hundreds of CEOs and management consultants over the past decade. They’re also very polarising — people either (a) treat them like gospel or (b) shun them completely. Like most things in life, I think the answer is somewhere in between. Once you understand them deeply, you realise that term “Founder Mode” put language around a great management paradox for founders.</p><h3>Founder mode doesn’t really apply to seed stage start-ups</h3><p>Right off the bat, I would say that the term “Founder Mode” doesn’t actually apply to seed stage start-ups where you almost certainly don’t have any layers of management. It sounds like a cool term, but it honestly doesn’t apply to you. The very nature of having 10 people means you’re almost certainly going to be very hands-on.</p><h3>The great paradox of scaling an organisation and staying hands-on and close to the detail</h3><p>There are countless stories of founders/CEOs that weren’t able to scale their organisation because they were too hands-on. They disempowered the management team by running all decisions through them and weren’t able to shift from <strong>building product &gt; building team &gt; building organisation</strong>. Generally what happens is the board fires them and replaces them with a ‘professional CEO’.</p><p>And yet — at the same time, we hear that the most legendary companies like Apple or Tesla have very hands-on CEOs which is what ultimately led to some of the most breakthrough products of our generation. So what gives?</p><p>A lot of my leadership and management style is inspired by the “Art of Action” which is a great management book that talks about leading with context, not control. That basically means you’re leading by setting goals, defining the constraints, and letting the team figure out the <strong><em>how</em></strong> — and they ‘backbrief’ (i.e. present back) the <strong><em>how</em></strong>. Now in general these approach I think works really well but there are <strong><em>occasions</em></strong> when it doesn’t. Sometimes it’s important for a founder to step-in to make a judgement call on something that requires instinct or intuition — I often call these ‘founder bets’.</p><p>Why does this need to happen? There are few people in any organisation that (a) thinks about the entire company in a completely integrated way; (b) thinks about the company more than anyone else in the company. That means as a founder, you might see something or have conviction on something that no one else sees. You don’t want to lose this magic — this perspective, this foresight, this vision, this conviction is what in my opinion what creates these generational companies.</p><blockquote><em>Founder mode doesn’t mean micro managing; it means knowing </em><strong>when</strong><em> you need to go deep and be hands-on. This can’t be </em><strong><em>always</em></strong><em>; but it can’t be </em><strong><em>never</em></strong><em>.</em></blockquote><h3>No CEOs ever says we don’t have enough layers — yet we somehow always end up there</h3><p>Every time I read an interview from a CEO complaining that they have too many managers, too much bureaucracy and too many layers — I always think <strong><em>why</em></strong> don’t we ever complain we don’t have enough layers? And more importantly…how do organisations end up like this (i.e. too many layers)?</p><p>I think part of it is because of too many resources — just like work fills time; unnecessary spend fills budgets. I’ve never heard anyone tell me they have enough time; nor do they ever tell me they have enough budget. During the Zirp period, every one had way too much spare cash, and so the best way to spend it, is hire people. I think another part is incentives, very often getting promoted means having a ‘bigger team’ — therefore, the only way to progress is to then hire a bigger team, which drives more cost, more layers, and more bureaucracy.</p><p>How have we tried to solve this? Very imperfectly. But here’s a couple of things I’ve tried to do:</p><ul><li><strong>Never cap career progression based on # of direct reports:</strong> We genuinely believe that our team should be evaluated based on impact, not the size of their team. Part of that equation is that if they have a small team and deliver outsized impact, they are rewarded for it. That means you can progress all the way through the organisation being an IC or having only one direct report.</li><li><strong>Try and force managers to max out their direct reports before another layer is created:</strong> As a general rule, I expect my managers to have a ‘maxed out’ reporting structure before another layer is created. Maxed out is typically around 6–8 (depending on their management capacity).</li><li><strong>Upfront communicate our philosophy so we can ‘repel’ people who want big teams:</strong> We don’t plan on having more than 4–5x PMs (ever), we don’t plan on hiring a huge finance team, we’d rather hire top 1% IC talent than have a big team of average talent. I’m upfront with every manager on this philosophy so they can opt-out if they want a big team.</li></ul><h3>Beware of proxies — they can often hide the gems</h3><p>My first negative experience of proxy information was when I was interning at a large corporate in Australia. My role was literally to create reports, and I remember making a status ‘red’ when I was gently coached: “Don’t make it red, the CxO doesn’t like seeing red, can you make it orange?”. It was my first experience of ‘proxy’ information distorting the truth. It happens everywhere.</p><p>Proxies can hide gem in two ways: (1) data allows you to see patterns — but it doesn’t give you texture or feel; (2) people often want to show you what you want to see as a CEO (even if you fight against it). I’ve realised over time that I have to look do both — read the reports, review the analytics <strong>and</strong> go deep — pick an area, whether it’s customer complaints, a specific user journey, a specific payment issue — and go really really deep on it. Also, skip levels are great — it’s getting harder now that we’re almost 50 people but I try and skip level with the whole company at least twice a year. I learn a <strong><em>lot</em></strong> from everyone I meet.</p><p>Sometimes I find a gem, sometimes I find nothing. But I think you have to go deep if you want to find the gems.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*0DQuJPL15-iksdVx" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@mlapergolaphoto?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Mario La Pergola</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=cacb7f9d0986" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Act like an Owner: a Yonder Principle]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@chong.tim/act-like-an-owner-a-yonder-principle-1b83646e5ce2?source=rss-c3aad9dcb266------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/1b83646e5ce2</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[management]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[leadership]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tim Chong]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 13 Aug 2024 15:19:19 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-08-13T15:19:19.226Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Most company values or principles are generic or obvious that they actually don’t help people do what they’re meant to do, help people behave in a way that is <strong><em>unique</em></strong> to that organisation.</p><p>If it’s a behaviour you’d expect someone to do in <strong><em>any</em></strong> organisation, for example “Respect one another” or “Act honestly”, then it’s actually <strong><em>not useful</em></strong> as an organisational value or principle.</p><p>I started a brief series as part of my monthly writing to the team to unpack each of our principles as a way to bring them to life for our team. James from my team encouraged me to share it publicly, so I hope it helps anyone who’s reading this!</p><p>Here’s a cute dog holding a stick, apparently this is what came up when I seached for “Owner” on Unsplash.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*34CmujaSqx_v5Tl6" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@ageror?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Jan Gustavsson</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p><strong>1. One decision maker, one owner — single threaded ownership</strong><br>At Yonder, we have a simple principle — that every single decision should have a <strong><em>single decision owner. </em></strong>That decision owner is responsible for <strong><em>getting inputs, making the decision,</em> <em>making it happen, and accountable for the results</em></strong>. That means we don’t make decision by consensus, committee, or big meetings with 20 people who don’t want to make a decision (I’ve spent too many hours of my career in these meetings).</p><p>This applies to decisions at all levels of Yonder; whether it’s a process change, a change to FAQ, a policy change, a new product initiative, a new marketing campaign etc.</p><p>But how you practically do that?</p><ol><li>Start with a Notion document (you can either put it in Decision Document or your Team’s Space on Notion).</li><li>Write down the problem statement and context. Write down the decision factors/considerations.</li><li>Ask for input (hint: when asking for input; be clear what you want input on/<strong>don’t want input on</strong> — and also <strong><em>who</em></strong> you want input from<strong>)</strong>.</li><li>Incorporate or ignore the feedback (you <strong><em>do not need</em></strong> to agree with every bit of feedback).</li><li>Make the decision, and then circulate the results (and what you’ve learned). Simple.</li></ol><p>What are some common traps I’m seeing across the team at the moment?</p><ul><li><strong>Deferring decision making:</strong> 99% of decisions don’t need approval at Yonder. You should be making the judgement call. You might want input <strong>and </strong>context<strong> </strong>from your manager, but remember, we want decision making done at the level closest to where the work gets done. It’s no good for me as CEO to be making decisions on for example how we think about automated testing for our Mobile App, I’m too far removed from the context, execution, and results.</li><li><strong>Not setting guard rails on the type of input you want:</strong> We’re getting bigger now, so often if you throw your idea/proposal out to 40+ people, you’ll get a lot of unhelpful feedback and input. I want to encourage us to start to set guard rails on what type of input we want. Specifically (a) who we want input from; (b) what is non-negotiable; what do we want input on?</li><li><strong>Unhelpful input: </strong>When you’re giving input, just a reminder (a) the decision owner can <strong><em>ignore</em></strong> your input — they don’t need your sign-off; (b) orientate towards <strong><em>curiosity and questions</em></strong> vs challenge. It can be really overwhelming and demoralising to put an idea out there and getting 25 comments challenging it.</li><li><strong>Table tennis feedback: </strong>If you’re just going back and forth on a document or Slack; just pick up the phone, find a whiteboard, solve the problem <strong><em>together</em></strong>.</li></ul><p><strong>2. With great ownership, comes great responsibility</strong><br>It’s a double edged sword, with a lot of ownership, it means a lot of responsibility. What does that mean?</p><p><strong>You’re accountable for impacts to other teams:</strong> Single threaded ownership doesn’t mean you don’t have to think about impacts to the other teams. In fact, part of being an owner is <strong><em>making sure</em></strong> you’re thinking about impacts to other teams. That means getting input from other teams, and being <strong><em>kind</em></strong> to other teams as well.</p><p><strong>You’re accountable for outcomes, not outputs: </strong>Most organisations measure performance on outputs, not outcomes. Yonderers are always evaluated on <strong>outcomes</strong> not <strong>outputs:</strong><br>- What are examples of outputs? Tickets closed, # of features shipped, # of policies written, # of fraud alerts created, # of open rate on an email<br>- What are examples of outcomes? Did we resolve the customer problem efficiently? Did we see a measurable change in customer behaviour with a product change? Did we see behaviour change with a policy update? Did we stop fraud and <strong>not</strong> stop legitimate customres with a fraud alert? Did we drive the desired <em>action</em><strong> </strong>with our email?</p><p><strong>You’re accountable for mistakes and learnings: </strong>Sometimes, the decision you make doesn’t result in the desired outcome. That is <strong>okay!</strong> The most important thing is, you evaluate your success/failures on outcomes. I love seeing retros/decision documents where we say “We tried this, we had a hypothesis, people engaged with it, but we didn’t get the desired outcome -&gt; it was a failure”.</p><p><strong>You’re accountable for stepping up when you see a gap: </strong>Lastly — as we get bigger, it gets easy to look for problems, and complain about them (but do nothing about them). I often say, if it’s something you find most frustrating, you’re most likely best placed to <strong>solve it!</strong> If you’re not the Decision Owner, then chat to them and share the idea/work with them to bring it to life (don’t just handball it to them to fix it).</p><p>As Jas wisely wrote:<br>“LEAVING IN 2M. DON’T WAIT FOR PEOPLE TO MOVE. <strong>BE THE CHANGE YOU WANNA SEE”</strong></p><p><strong>3. Act like an Owner ≠ Don’t ask for Help</strong><br>Lastly, you might think — woah this is a lot of responsibility. I need to figure it out on my own. That’s really overwhelming!</p><p>Remember, Act like an Owner doesn’t mean you can’t ask for help! Act like an Owner means you’re responsible for the final decision and the results, but I <strong><em>strongly encourage you</em></strong> to get help! If getting help means a better decision, and a better result — then that’s incredible.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1b83646e5ce2" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Zooming in and Zooming out — Don’t miss the forest for the trees; but don’t miss the spark of a…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@chong.tim/zooming-in-and-zooming-out-dont-miss-the-forest-for-the-trees-but-don-t-miss-the-spark-of-a-5e4b8ef0601f?source=rss-c3aad9dcb266------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/5e4b8ef0601f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[leadership]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[technology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[management]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tim Chong]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 30 Jun 2024 16:25:42 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-06-30T16:53:46.715Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Zooming in and Zooming out — Don’t miss the forest for the trees; but don’t miss the spark of a fire either.</h3><p><strong>Micromanagement is bad.</strong></p><p>It’s common wisdom sprouted on the internet on ‘good management’. But is it true, always?</p><p>I always found it paradoxical that most of us don’t want to get micromanaged, but in the same respect, we had a great deal of respect for managers and leaders that would get into the detail and understand what was really going on. Many of us have had the ‘politician’ managers who you never seem to know what they <strong><em>actually do all day</em></strong>. (And then removing of them doesn’t actually seem to make a difference).</p><p>Legendary consumer products were built because founders and CEOs <strong><em>cared</em></strong> about the detail, whether that’s Apple, Tesla or Airbnb. The founders had an insatiable desire to understand the detail of their products, and continue to push the bar higher for excellence. On the flip side, we also know that micromanaging negatively affects team performance and morale. And that’s not good for teams or performance either.</p><p>Reports can obfuscate what’s really going on, the aggregate data can tell a different story to what’s going on under the surface. I know — because I’ve been caught out by this multiple times at Yonder. I missed things looking at the CSAT and NPS reports when I didn’t speak to customers directly. (I now do both).</p><h3>Zooming out to connect the dots with the wider story</h3><p>As Yonder continues to grow, I’ve begun asking myself — <strong><em>what is my actual job at Yonder?</em></strong> I don’t code, I don’t design, I no longer product manage, I don’t have any functional accountability, and I’m definitely not the smartest person in this company. I remember joining a couple of working sessions with our member support team and somehow, something small I said unlocked a new insight and direction for the team. <strong>That was strange, I thought, I have less subject matter expertise and I’m not the smartest in the room, and yet I unlocked <em>something</em> for the team.</strong></p><p>I realised, my job is to <strong>connect the dots.</strong> The one unique position I’m in is to have a vantage point that cuts across the entire organisation (but also combines that with a market perspective). It’s to connect the dots and make sure they’re all pointing in the right direction.</p><p>That means a lot of my job is to make sure that I’m ‘on it’ and not ‘in it’, meaning I spend a disproportionate amount of time stepping back at the business and trying to figure out whether we have the right pieces in the right places, whether we have the right focus in the right priorities, given where we want to go. All I really do is <strong><em>bring perspective.</em></strong></p><p>You can only do this if you’re <strong>Zoomed Out. </strong>But that’s obvious, duh, most management books tell you to do this. It’s the classic “<strong>don’t miss the forest for the trees</strong>”.</p><h3>Zooming in to understand where the dots aren’t connecting</h3><p>I worked in management consulting for far too long, and I always found it frustrating on why a great beautiful PowerPoint Strategy seemed to really struggle in real life. I heard common issues like, it was an execution issue, the team were weak in execution. But what did that <strong><em>actually</em></strong> mean?</p><p>Well, connecting the dots is great, but sometimes there’s a <strong><em>real reason</em></strong> the dots aren’t connecting. It looks great from a distance, but it’s not connecting in real life.</p><blockquote>It’s really easy to miss things when you’re zoomed out.</blockquote><p>What’s a really practical example? Well, we review our customer support metrics and chat drivers fairly regularly. It’s a great ‘zoomed out’ way to understand how we’re doing overall and the high volume issues we should focus on. But we miss things. We miss the <strong><em>rare</em></strong> but <strong><em>high intensity</em></strong> customer support moments that aren’t frequent but are high stress for our team and our customers. I discovered it myself when I was on a chat myself. <em>(This isn’t the team’s fault by the way, they told me about this — but when we’re prioritising, we’re focused on the highest volume issues).</em></p><p><strong>Zooming in uncovers the blindspots of your strategy: </strong>I’ve found that zooming in, going deep in an area, helps to uncover gaps in our strategy or the challenges in execution, in a way that you don’t get from being zoomed out. You start to realise why this ‘small issue’ has been so persistent and no one seems to be able to solve it — it’s because it was 100x more complex/difficult than you originally thought from afar.</p><p><strong>Zooming in lifts the bar of excellence: </strong>I’ve also found that zooming in lifts the bar of excellence in our team. A deep product design review challenges us to care about the detail, to think about our product cohesively, to rigourously debate the design details that make Yonder…feel magic. (Whenever I haven’t or kept my mouth shut about a tiny design detail that annoys me — I’ve regretted it).</p><p><strong>Zooming in uncovers the early sparks of a fire: </strong>Zooming out means you only see the fire when it’s out of control. Sometimes it’s good to see the <strong>“trees within the forest</strong>”. It’s there you can see the early sparks of something that just doesn’t ‘feel right’, and hopefully get on top of it quickly.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*-L5LiwNQ47cuE1YK" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@worldsbetweenlines?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Patrick Hendry</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><h3>How do I ‘zoom in’ practically?</h3><p>I’m very much no master of this, and we’re still relatively small (albeit a fairly complex business) but I’ve been continuing to work at it. How do I ‘practically’ zoom in?</p><ul><li><strong>Skip levels:</strong> I love skip levels. I get a level of insight that I never get from reports, pulse check surveys or even my managers. You get the <strong><em>texture. </em></strong>You start to get a better <strong><em>feel</em></strong> for how teams are doing. I skip level our entire company once every 1–2 quarters.</li><li><strong>Smaller working sessions with teams: </strong>Since the start of the year, each 1–2 week, I go deep on a function, I don’t want high level reports, I want to understand the ‘nuts and bolts’ of what’s happening and then use these as working sessions with our team to try and help them solve problems.</li><li><strong>Go through the detail myself from time to time: </strong>Lastly, I cut my own data. That might mean going into our own logging or reporting to see what’s really going on. That might be going into our Intercom and reading through customer support queries. It’s only ever a sample, but it’s invaluable nonetheless.</li></ul><p>Does it feel like micromanagement? Sometimes, but usually not. I’m trying to <strong><em>go deep</em></strong> but<strong><em> ask questions and nudge</em></strong> rather than dictate. It’s only when I feel very strongly where I’ll dictate, and I’ll explicitly say that I’m breaking my rules of leading by context because I’m very passionate about this specific issue.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=5e4b8ef0601f" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Management is amongst the noblest of professions]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@chong.tim/management-is-amongst-the-noblest-of-professions-5962d9021c7b?source=rss-c3aad9dcb266------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/5962d9021c7b</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[leadership]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[management]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[fintech]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tim Chong]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 07 Apr 2024 21:12:04 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-04-07T21:12:04.658Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*2FDvdcJRNOCVClQC" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@sigmund?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Sigmund</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><blockquote>“I used to think that if you cared for other people, you need to study sociology or something like it. But….I [have] concluded, if you want to help other people, be a manager. If done well, management is among the most noble of professions. You are in a position where you have eight or ten hours every day from every person who works for you. You have the opportunity to frame each person’s work so that, at the end of every day, your employees will go home feeling like Diana felt on her good day: living a life filled with motivators.”<br>- Clayton Christensen, How Will You Measure Your Life?</blockquote><p>Managers can get a bad reputation. If you picture what a ‘good person’ looks like, you might imagine Mother Teresa, Mahatma Gandhi or perhaps, a doctor, a teacher, a philanthropist or a priest. You certainly didn’t picture a manager.</p><p>Yet, we all have stories of managers, both good and bad. Even in the noblest professions of medicine, there are countless stories of bad managers (and occasional good ones).</p><p>You see — I realised that if you want to make a dent in the universe, <strong>become a great manager.</strong></p><h3>Management impacts at least 40% of someone’s waking hours</h3><p>Most of us will spend more than <strong>40% </strong>of our waking hours working. If you work in a start-up, banking or law, it’s probably more like <strong>50–60%.</strong> Not only that, we bring the experiences from our work <strong><em>outside</em></strong> of work. How many of us have conversations at the pub, at dinner with friends, about work? For most people, work plays a much bigger role in how we feel about life than just the hours we do.</p><p>Managers have a disproportionate impact on people’s work experiences. They help you figure out what’s important vs. not, evaluate your performance, communicate context (or not), develop you professionally and personally—the list goes on. Most people <strong><em>leave their manager, not their company.</em></strong></p><p>Managers have the opportunity to leave you feeling each day with motivation and excitement; or leave you feeling apathetic and lifeless. Managers have the opportunity to frame your work that feels you with ambition and hope, or demoralised and worn out.</p><h3>You have the ability to transform someone for a lifetime</h3><p>When you invest in someone as a manager, you’re not just investing in them for their time working for you, you’re investing in them for a lifetime. The dichotomy between ‘professional’ and ‘personal’ development is false —for example, learning how to have a tough conversation is a lesson that applies to both people’s work life and home life.</p><p>At Yonder, we always say that managers&#39; role is to invest in people and help them reach their full potential, full stop. We know that no one will be at Yonder forever, but for the season they choose to work there, we have an opportunity to invest in them for a lifetime.</p><p>My biggest lessons in life and work came from managers who invested in me 10+ years ago. I don’t work for them anymore, but their fingerprints remain in my life for a lifetime.</p><h3>Most managers are bad — because they don’t actually care about getting good at it</h3><p>One of my observations over the last decade is that, actually, the best predictor of whether someone will become a good manager is, <strong><em>do they want to get better at it?</em></strong></p><p>Some people are naturally better at managing than others, but no one is born a great manager. Managing is weird; it’s completely unnatural. Who has 1:1s in their daily lives? Who has conversations about someone’s performance in their daily lives?</p><p>I’ve never met someone who <strong><em>works hard to become a better manager, end up being a bad manager;</em></strong> conversely — I’ve never met someone who <strong><em>don’t work at being a better manager; end up being a great manager</em></strong>. Of course there’s going to be natural innate differences, but actually, I think you can get 80–90% of the way there by working at it.</p><p>I know not everyone wants to or should be a manager. But if you are; remember, the work you’re doing is among the <strong>noblest of professions</strong>. You have the ability to positively or negatively impact someone’s life for a lifetime. It’s a life long journey.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=5962d9021c7b" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Running a marathon; not a sprint — how I try to work sustainably as a founder]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@chong.tim/running-a-marathon-not-a-sprint-how-i-try-to-work-sustainably-as-a-founder-7722cb5fd7af?source=rss-c3aad9dcb266------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/7722cb5fd7af</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[founders]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[fintech]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[burnout]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[work]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tim Chong]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 16 Mar 2024 12:49:30 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-03-16T12:49:30.908Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Running a marathon; not a sprint — how I try to work sustainably as a founder</h3><blockquote>“How do we help you find a sustainable 55–60 hour work week? Not 40. Not 70.”</blockquote><p>At the end of 2021, we were exhausted. It was the first year of Yonder and with our small team of 10, we took Yonder from an idea to a fully regulated credit card in &lt;11 months. And we crashed.</p><p>We had a founder coaching session in early 2022 and we were stuck. How do we maintain the intensity that we need to have as founders without just burning out every 6–12 months? We knew that a pace where we’re peaking really hard and then crashing just wasn’t sustainable.</p><p>I love the stories of Silicon Valley where founders sleep under their desk and everyone works endless hours to get their dream off the ground — but I couldn’t do it. I wanted to find an answer, how do I deliver results for Yonder with top 0.1% intensity and yet still be a good husband, and a good friend to those around me.</p><h3>53% of founders surveyed by Sifted are burnt out</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*nS_dEDiBPSpMpS-_aSo-Cg.png" /></figure><p>Sifted ran a <a href="https://sifted.eu/articles/founder-mental-health-2024">survey in early 2024</a> and the results were sobering — 49% of founders considering quiting and the results on mental health aren’t any better.</p><p>I’ve been spending the last 3 years trying to find a better way. It’s not perfect, but it’s definitely given me the feeling that I could sustain this for 10+ years (and still be a good husband, and be a good friend to those around me). And so, I thought I’d share my <strong><em>practical ways</em></strong> that have helped me work sustainably as a founder. It’s really important to note — there’s no right or wrong answer, you have to find the approach that works for you (in your circumstance).</p><h3>What a sustainable 55–60 hour work week looks for me</h3><p>We agreed as founders that we still needed to work hard; but we needed to find something sustainable — our coach challenged us to aim for a sustainable 55–60 hour work week. We couldn’t do 40 hours because we were building a fast growth start-up; but we couldn’t do 70–80 because I’m not 20 years old anymore.</p><p><strong>What I don’t do:</strong></p><ul><li>Ice baths or cold showers</li><li>Blood transfusions to stay young — see <a href="https://www.standard.co.uk/lifestyle/wellness/bryan-johnson-anti-aging-biological-age-son-longevity-b1139278.html">this guy</a></li><li>Wake up at 5am and run a 20km run every morning</li></ul><h4>6 days a week is enjoyable; 7 days is a slog</h4><p>I discovered that if I work 7 days a week; I start to loath work — my brain can’t switch off and I have no brainspace for ‘creative magic’. I’ve been experimenting but I try to work hard about 10 -11 hours/day throughout the weekday.</p><p>On weekends, it’s a chance to do more ‘slow paced thinking work’. I’ll go to my local bouldering place, find a cafe or sit outside somewhere and do about 3–4 hours of slow paced thinking work. I love these days, I purposely slow down and think about culture, organisation and long-term strategy.</p><h4>I’m not a morning person — trust me</h4><p>I’m deep down, still a university student; I don’t work well in the mornings — but work really well in the evenings. I tried doing the ‘get up at 6am’ and start strong — it really doesn’t work for me. I hate it. I now just get up at around 8 -8:30am and roll myself out of bed.</p><p>I take it pretty easy in the morning and give myself an hour to eat, pray, and just wander over to work. I try not to have any meetings early in the morning (before 9am) — I’m just not a pleasant person.</p><h4>I ruthlessly structure my day around when I can do my best work</h4><p>I figured out that I struggle with context switching between meetings and focus/IC work. I basically do all my meetings back to back from 9am until around 3:30pm (with nearly always at least 30 mins to eat lunch with the team). I try to be hyper-efficient here which means booking some meetings in 15 minute blocks.</p><p>By 3:30pm my brain is fried and I’m also getting a bit sleepy from lunch; so I usually do one of three ‘circuit breakers’ — it’s either gym for an hour, nap or a quick 10 minute mindfulness. I then do all my focus work from 4:30pm until about 8pm. I love this period, I just put on music and just clear my backlog of emails and Slack mesages and work on IC work.</p><p>Also at the gym — I never bring my phone with me; it’s locked away so I can switch off. Annoyingly for the team, most of my ‘I have an idea’ comes from this time.</p><h4>I avoid founder events, award ceremonies, business dinners unless necessary — my evenings are for me</h4><p>I realise that if I said yes to every single event invitation; I could spend every weeknight out — and that’s tiring! We’re a consumer business so actually there’s not a huge amount of value for me going to all of these events — it also means less time for myself, my spouse and friends.</p><p>I’ve decided to just say no to most of these events and protect this time for myself. I know I need it. Most evenings I have at least 2–3 hours for myself.</p><h4>I sleep 8 hours a night and still take naps whenever I feel like it</h4><p>Some people can survive on 5–6 hours of sleep; I can’t (although I don’t have kids yet…). I nearly always get 8 hours of sleep a night, I know I need this to be a happy person, productive and useful to the team. I also take naps in the afternoon if I know I need it — I’ve never found it productive pushing through if I’m just tired.</p><h4>I take 5 weeks of holiday a year but happily still pick up work throughout holidays</h4><p>We did an exercise with our coach where we mapped out our energy levels across this year; I realised it always slumped after every 3–4 months and at the end of the year; I always felt tired and wanted a break. It’s probably hang-over from the Australian school year where you take a 6 week holiday at the end of the year over sumemr and Christmas.</p><p>I actually still take 5 weeks of holiday per year; I’m generally actually quite happy to pick up bits and bobs of work (but I won’t start new initiatives)— making sure I keep the team ‘unblocked’ when I’m away. It works for me; doesn’t work for everyone. A lot of my great ideas come from sitting on a beach in Australia doing absolutely nothing.</p><h4>I’m fortunate to have a great support network that I continue to lean on</h4><p>Lastly, I’m really fortunate to have very supportive wife (we still schedule weekly date nights), an amazing group of friends — from London, Australia, church and business school; and a great team and co-founders where we can share the load together. I’m also fortunate to have an amazing coach that works with me, co-founders, our management team and company on a quarterly basis.</p><p>Undoubtedly life events happen, you can’t avoid it, and sometimes this whole ‘sustainable working’ falls apart. That’s why you need the support network.</p><h3>It’s all a bit trial and error — but I do believe you can be a great founder and be mentally well</h3><p>I wanted to share this; not because it’s the ‘right way’ — but because I was tired of the unhelpful rhetoric that founders should work 100 hours/week and sleep under their desk — I think it sets people up for failure (if you can’t do this); or burnout (if you do this).</p><p>I fully recognise everyone’s circumstance is different, and I’ll have to adjust things when life changes (e.g. family circumstances or if kids come along!), but the most important thing for me is to keep trying different things, and find a way that works for you. Most importantly, don’t accept that the only way to do well is to push yourself to the limit where you burn out — <strong>that’s actually a disservice to yourself, your team and your start-up.</strong></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=7722cb5fd7af" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Our talent philosophy at Yonder: Why size doesn’t matter, it’s about who.]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@chong.tim/our-talent-philosophy-at-yonder-why-size-doesnt-matter-it-s-about-who-41fbc7112ec9?source=rss-c3aad9dcb266------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/41fbc7112ec9</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[tech]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[team-building]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[fintech]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[founders]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tim Chong]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 15 May 2022 16:30:35 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-05-15T16:30:35.610Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Every time I meet people at start-up events, I inevitably get asked, “So…how big’s Yonder? How big is your team?” It’s a subtle question: “So how successful is Yonder?”. But in this question lies an interesting but broken orthodoxy about building start-ups: <strong>more people = more success.</strong></p><blockquote>At Yonder, we measure success by the impact we make, not the size of our team.</blockquote><p>We built Yonder from a pitch deck to an FCA regulated, beautifully designed (if I say so myself) credit card in 12 months. And we did it with 11 people. Not 50. The size of one product squad at any other tech company.</p><p>So what have we learnt, and what’s our philosophy on talent at Yonder?</p><p><strong>Everything starts with team. <em>Epic</em> teams lead to <em>epic</em> products, which lead to <em>epic</em> Businesses, which lead to an <em>epic</em> impact on the world.</strong></p><p>One of our investors, Remus from LocalGlobe, writes about his <a href="https://medium.com/localglobe-notes/ten-lessons-from-building-and-selling-a-company-to-mckinsey-547a40e2e628">lessons starting Finalta</a>: “Great people working together create great companies regardless of circumstance.”</p><p>During our first four months at Yonder, we did not do much. We didn’t write code, we didn’t ship product, we didn’t do any marketing. We just spent time building the team. And it was the <strong><em>very best investment of our time</em></strong>.</p><p>The funny thing about ‘tech companies’ is that they are made up of <strong><em>people</em></strong>. A company is ultimately the <strong>people on the team</strong>. Markets change and products can change. Great teams can find the right product to build. It always starts with the right team.</p><p><strong>Build the smallest, most talented team possible.</strong></p><p>Many people I’ve spoken to who have been part of fast scale-ups moan about the issue where the company <strong>achieves less</strong><em> with</em><strong><em> </em>more people. </strong>Why? It’s because of diseconomies of scale.</p><p>When things don’t get done, the typical reaction is to add another person — hoping that this would magically solve everything. But that’s not true. For every person you add, you also increase complexity at an <strong><em>exponential </em></strong>rate. Coordination costs go up, diaries get filled with alignment and management meetings, and suddenly you need to start adding more middle management.</p><blockquote>For every person you add to a team, you get diminishing returns in terms of impact.</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*bZyQQsCCDHc5cIDJfvt5kw.png" /></figure><p>And so, our philosophy at Yonder is to build the <strong>smallest possible team</strong> <strong>required to achieve the outcome</strong>. Building the smallest possible team means you need to hire the most talented people, the 10x engineers, the 10x marketers, the 10x financers, and the 10x designers. It means being a <strong>lot more patient</strong> <strong>with</strong> <strong>hiring — </strong>it means we would instead leave a role empty than hire someone who’s just average.</p><p>Building a small but highly talented team means we’re increasing our <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/rules-how-netflix-builds-culture-reinvention-abhijit-bhaduri/">talent density</a>.</p><p>It’s not a perfect approach, though; there’s real trade-offs. We trade-off short term progress as we take much longer to hire. We trade-off having contingency if someone is sick or on leave. We trade-off the ability to brag about how ‘big our team is’ at cocktail parties.</p><p><strong>Create patterns that accelerate the learning of everyone in the team.</strong></p><p>Hiring an epic team is Step 1. Because you want the person you hired a year ago to be remarkably better today than they were a year ago.</p><blockquote>We want everyone at Yonder to be <strong>better today than they were yesterday.</strong></blockquote><p>Reid Hoffman writes: “Starting a company is like jumping off a cliff and assembling a plane on the way down.” Building a start-up means everything is <strong><em>accelerated</em></strong>, and the progress of Yonder is dependent on the growth of our team. Therefore, our team need to grow as individuals<strong><em> faster than the growth of Yonder.</em></strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*4FCLsjpgOlSDHAWuUpyAxg.png" /><figcaption>Source: “How to Operate with Keith Rabois”</figcaption></figure><p>We think that growth as individuals is directly correlated with an individual’s desire to <strong><em>learn, </em></strong>not just learn content, but <strong><em>learning how to learn. </em></strong>I refer to this as second-order learning.</p><p>So what do we do?</p><ul><li><strong>Hire for demonstratable examples of accelerated learning: </strong>We care more about<strong> the rate of change (i.e. trajectory) </strong>over static ability. Everyone we hire at Yonder has to demonstrate a tangible example of accelerated learning in the past. It’s hard to instil a culture of accelerated growth and learning if people don’t care about it in the first place.</li><li><strong>Reflect on learnings. Weekly: </strong>Each week, we believe there’s always a reason to celebrate and always <strong><em>something</em></strong> we’ve learnt. Every week, everyone on the Yonder team has to share what they learned with the team. This isn’t just content, though. It’s an <strong><em>insight</em></strong> that they’ve learnt.</li><li><strong>Create space for quarterly reflections: </strong>We run a process called “Quarterly Reflections” every quarter. Everyone on the team has to give face to face peer feedback to each other, “Peer Perspectives”, and write a reflection paper on their achievements, <strong>learnings</strong> and <strong>how they want to grow</strong> in the next quarter. It’s followed up with a “Manager Conversation” to discuss what’s written and support individuals with their growth. I’ve personally been impressed with the quality of reflection and thinking of everyone on the team. The self-awareness of everyone has been a game-changer for us.</li></ul><p><strong>Treat your talent philosophy like a product. And don’t do it alone.</strong></p><p>When you build a product, it’s never finished. The market changes, your users change and there’s always more you can do. It’s always in “Beta”. And we think about our talent philosophy the same.</p><p>As a team of 15, what works for us won’t work for us when we’re a team of 30. What works for us when we’re a team of 30 won’t work for us when we’re a team of 50. And so, our talent philosophy is constantly evolving.</p><p>Most companies only get external help when things are going <strong><em>bad,</em></strong> and they need an external coach to help sort out the mess. We know co-founder breakups are common and we know that <a href="https://rework.withgoogle.com/print/guides/5721312655835136/">team health directly correlates with the impact they make</a>. So we’ve made a conscious choice to work on it now rather than later.</p><p>Doing pre-marriage counselling with my wife with external coaches <strong><em>before</em></strong> we needed it was the best investment we made. We took the same approach with Yonder, getting an external coach and advice <strong><em>before</em></strong> we needed it.</p><blockquote><em>Get external help</em> <strong><em>before</em></strong> <em>you need it. Investing in a coach for our team was, and still is, one of the best investments we make in Yonder.</em></blockquote><p>We know that we’ll continue to make mistakes, and we know that we still have a lot to learn. Hopefully, we’ll take our own advice and invest in our own learning to build an incredible team at Yonder that makes a tremendous impact on the world.</p><p>And finally, if you’d love to see more about what we’re building at Yonder or interested in joining the team, you can find out more <a href="https://www.yondercard.com/">here</a>!</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*4FI-HHE2iJSvVotWdNpgYw.jpeg" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=41fbc7112ec9" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Lessons on international expansion: 4 things I learnt about finding new product market fit.]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@chong.tim/lessons-on-international-expansion-4-things-i-learnt-about-finding-new-product-market-fit-1dad9454d11c?source=rss-c3aad9dcb266------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/1dad9454d11c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[product-management]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[growth]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[product-development]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[entrepreneurship]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[international-expansion]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tim Chong]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 13 Apr 2020 11:39:36 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-10-19T14:19:03.420Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*U1JkGQNdUPkHr9_0" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@trance?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">TR</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p>In July 2000, Starbucks, the famous American coffee chain founded in Seattle that had resounding success across America, entered the Australian market. In July 30, 2008 —just 8 years later — Starbucks announced the closure of 61 stores in Australia, closing more than 70% of its locations.</p><p><strong>What went wrong, and what can it teach us about trying to find product market in new international markets?</strong></p><p>I’ve noticed that in entrepreneurship, there’s often a lot written about ‘zero to one’ much of it inspired by Peter Thiels’ legendary book “Zero to One”; but what’s often ignored is how to get from ‘one to n’, how to find <strong><em>new</em></strong><em> </em><strong><em>product market fit</em></strong> (a term defined by Reid Hoffman)<strong><em>, </em></strong>how to find product market with an <strong><em>existing product </em></strong>in a <strong><em>new market</em></strong>. In my <a href="https://medium.com/p/4817716ac7f1">previous post</a>, I explored what makes some start-ups easier to scale globally, and some more difficult — and in this one, <strong>I want to explore — how to approach finding new product market fit when you launch into a new international market.</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/633/1*KJkQLKbVxx-iXoT1UM3BSw.png" /></figure><p>In behavioural economics, there’s a term called “Suvivorship Bias”. And it’s a bias that most successful entrepreneurs and management gurus have — it’s an assumption that the decisions they made resulted in their success, rather than <strong><em>in spite of</em></strong>. Did you succeed <strong><em>because; or inspite of</em></strong> the decisions you made<strong><em>?</em></strong></p><blockquote>A stupid decision that works out well becomes a brilliant decision in hindsight.<br><em>— Daniel Kahneman</em></blockquote><p>A common mistake for entrepreneurs or product managers is to assume that the product that works and has PMF in your current market, will automatically have PMF in new markets they enter. And to assume that the strategy — both product and go-to-market that made them successful in their original market, will automatically succeed in the next market they enter.</p><p>The reality is — firstly, did they succeed in their original market <strong><em>because of what they did</em></strong> or <strong><em>in spite of it? </em></strong>And secondly, let’s assume they did make incredibly good decisions — how do you know that this same strategy will work in an entirely new market?</p><h4><strong>1. Product localisation is <em>not</em> just translation — it’s when the world of your user needs (in new international markets) and your product solving it intersects.</strong></h4><p>One of the first topics that come up when you Google “Product localisation” is translation. Translation does not equate to PMF. Product market fit is when your product meets the needs of your users in a new market — and so the first thing you need to think about is, <strong><em>how do the user needs and behaviours in my new international market differ from my current local market?</em></strong></p><p><strong>What structurally exists and is different about the market? </strong>When Starbucks first launched in the US, it was one of the first to bring Italian inspired espresso coffee to the market, a market previously dominated by filter coffee. When they launched in Australia — the Australian market was already awash with Italian style expresso coffee; the Starbucks value proposition of ‘espresso artisinal coffee’ wasn’t novelty in the Australian market (even though it was in the US when it launched there). In the same way, launching ClearScore in a market like Germany with very little credit adoption doesn’t really make sense —it solves a problem that no one really has in Germany — unless we really believe we can be a ‘market maker’ and change the way Germans check their credit score.</p><p><strong>What are the user pain points and desires, and how does it differ? </strong>I remember when I first came to the UK 2.5 years ago and I first came across Monzo and Revolut; one of their main value propositions was no international FX fees. In a market like the UK where there were few zero FX fee accounts or credit cards; and a huge amount of international travel — this was an incredibly valuable feature — and one of the main reasons why I signed up. But does that user need and value proposition scale internationally?</p><p>In Australia, people travel overseas — but definitely not as much as Brits; and we saw Xinja and Volt, Australian based challenger banks, instead launch with a different value proposition — the highest saving rate accounts (far higher than the Big 4 banks) rather than no FX fees. Time will tell whether this will be successful; but my hypothesis is that Revolut’s approach of simply offering a ‘better banking app’ and ‘no FX fees’ in Australia doesn’t address a real pain point for many Australians.</p><p><strong>How could user interaction patterns differ? </strong>A year ago, I ran a user test with some of our users in ClearScore South Africa with the sole purpose of increasing our sign-up funnel conversion. Throughout the user testing, there was one field that a large number of users got stuck on — the password field.</p><p>It turns out, for a reason I still haven’t figured out, that our password complexity rules of requiring an uppercase character, created unnecessary friction for users in South Africa. Given there’s no evidence that forcing uppercases in passwords is actually good security advice, we removed that password complexity rule and saw sign-up funnel conversion increase by 15%.</p><p>We also observed a similar behaviour with our users in India. In UK we were consistently getting incredibly high sign-up conversion — despite a 4 steps sign-up process — but in India, with the same sign-up process, we were seeing just fractions of the conversion we saw in UK.</p><p>Users in India get constant notifications from Apps and SMS’; and have no patience for lengthy sign-up processes — especially with a culture that is used to being bombarded with different free Apps and services. Cutting out the steps and getting it to a simple 1 step form was crucial, and gave us huge step-up in sign-up conversion. UI/UX patterns don’t always scale across borders.</p><h4>2. Customer discovery isn’t dead. Apply lean start-up methods to find PMF in new international markets.</h4><p>I remember speaking to Google’s first UK product manager, and he said to me — “we often don’t put in the same hard work at finding product market fit for new product features we develop; as we do for our first product. We often forget how hard it was to find that initial product market fit”.</p><p>I think this is true for start-ups expanding internationally. They often copy the <strong><em>solution</em></strong> to what made them successful in their current market; rather than copying the <strong><em>thought process and hard work</em></strong>. Nearly all successful start-ups had to work incredibly hard testing, iteratingand learning, course correcting to eventually find product market fit. But it’s naive to think that just because that product worked in your current market, it’ll automatically work in its current form in the next market you enter.</p><blockquote>Don’t copy the solution — copy the <strong>questions you asked about your users</strong>, copy the <strong>process of rapidly testing, learning and iterating</strong>, and copy the <strong>hard work</strong>.</blockquote><p>Our experiences launching ClearScore in Australia have been remarkably different to previous markets. We took a very delibrate approach of truly understanding the users, understanding the market needs and opportunities — and localising the product to meet the needs of the users. We sweated the detail over the sign-up funnel, making sure we got all the nuances of address structures, ID documents and KYC right for the market. We endlessly tested with different users, and then we beta tested with friends and family to make sure we nailed the core product. We worked hard to test different acquisition and distribution channels; making small bets, testing, learning and iterating.</p><p>Even though it’s still early days, the results so far are promising — and a continued reminder that the painstaking attention to detail that you paid to your first product and market; you need to apply when you launch into new markets.</p><p>PS: I still find it infuriating that Revolut were too lazy to update the currency labels (to a dollar sign) on their <a href="https://www.revolut.com/en-AU">landing page</a> content and video.</p><h4>3. The strategic tension: You need to make delibrate trade-off decisions between globalisation and localisation.</h4><p>The problem though with localising your product for a market, and finding product market fit with a ‘lean start-up’ lens is that you then face the problem of having a bespoke product for each market. Having a bespoke product might give you the best chance of finding perfect product market fit, but massively increases your marginal costs for each market. Not only that, when you build a new feature, it makes it incredibly hard to launch the feature in multiple markets.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*0_sWHJVrXGrQnmpcsTQiig.png" /></figure><p>So what’s the solution? Well there is no simple one. It’s up to founders, CEOs, and product leaders to make a delibrate decision on what’s an acceptable level of ‘sub-optimal localisation’. Too sub-optimal and you can’t find product market fit in any market outside your home market; too much localisation and it slows down to your ability to scale quickly into new markets.</p><blockquote>“Strategy is about making choices, trade-offs; it’s about deliberately choosing to be different.”<br> <em>— Michael Porter</em></blockquote><p>We ended up finding a compromise in between, each market now has a team of 6–7, a general manager, marketing manager, commercial manager, data analyst, product manager and a small development team. The team is big enough to be able to build local partnerships with financial service providers, acquire customers in a way that is best for their market and localise the product — but not too big that we end up with a bespoke product in each market. Trust me, trying to build commercial partnerships, API integrations and build a two-sided financial marketplace for South Africa, India and Australia from London does <strong><em>not</em></strong> work.</p><h4><strong>4. Know when to throw in the towel; avoid sunk cost fallicy.</strong></h4><p>About a year ago, when I was studying Venture Capital at Berkeley Haas School of Business, I asked our lecturer — Terry Opendyk (General Partner and Founder at ONSET Ventures) — a question, “How do <strong><em>you know </em></strong>when you’re in start-up vs scale phase?”. His response was simple: “When you know that for every dollar you put in, you know what you’re going to get out” — another way of saying that is: you have positive unit economics.</p><p>In my previous post, I said that it was <strong><em>easy</em></strong> to launch into a new market, but <strong><em>harder</em></strong> to succeed. It’s really hard to not keep investing in a market even though you’re losing endless amounts of money on it (without any sign of payback), and Uber’s investment in China and South East Asia is a great example of it.</p><p>How do you guard yourself against sunk cost fallicy? How do you guard yourself against throwing good money after bad? Be clear on what success looks like, by when — and be ruthless and disciplined about it.</p><p>Eventually, if you can’t make the unit economics work — it might be time to pull out, despite how <a href="https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/uk-fintech-co-clearscore-to-shut-india-ops/articleshow/75089094.cms">painful </a>that might be. Know when to throw in the towel; know when to make that hard call; but know <strong><em>before</em></strong> you go into the market.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1dad9454d11c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[3 lessons from Mr. Worldwide on international expansion for start-ups.]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@chong.tim/3-lessons-from-mr-worldwide-on-international-expansion-for-start-ups-4817716ac7f1?source=rss-c3aad9dcb266------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/4817716ac7f1</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[growth]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[international-expansion]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[product-management]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tech]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tim Chong]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 08 Mar 2020 16:19:47 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-03-08T20:44:57.720Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>3 lessons from Mr. Worldwide: international expansion at start-ups.</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*bxVhQrevMZpgbbr1" /><figcaption>Generic rapper photo because I couldn’t get a royalty free photo of Pitbull. Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@jan_strecha?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Jan Střecha</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p>In August 2016, Uber sold the Uber China business to Didi Chuxing for a reported $35 billion. And in less than two years, March 2018, Uber, the darling of the Valley, a company that pioneered the sharing economy pulled out of South East Asia admitting defeat to rival Grab.</p><p>The story of Uber isn’t unique, there’s countless stories of start-ups that have expanded internationally, with hopes of unlocking future growth — only to admit defeat years later with millions (or billions) wasted. And it was this question, while working on a FinTech’s international expansion myself, that I began to ask a question:</p><blockquote>Why do some start-ups successfully scale internationally? And why do some fail <strong>miserably</strong>?</blockquote><p>The reality is, for many start-ups — staying in one market isn’t good enough; to find new growth, you <strong><em>have</em></strong> to go internationally. Especially for markets that aren’t as colossally large as the US or Chinese market. It’s nearly every month that you hear about another start-up in London entering a new country; and nearly every month you hear about another start-up entering the UK market.</p><p>Over the last two years, I’ve been collecting notes from my own experience as a PM working on international expansion to countless coffees I’ve had with people on this topic from Dropbox, Uber, Facebook, Stripe, Skyscanner, Amazon and Google. And this is the first of three topics that I wanted to write about to give other people insights onto what I’ve learnt. This is definitely not the definitive guide, I’m sure someone way smarter than me can write a book on it — but rather a framework on what you should <em>think</em> about if you want to scale your start-up into new international markets.</p><p>The first post is to help you think about your business model, and how that influences how easy or difficult it is to scale internationally. The second post is to think about how the dynamics of finding product market and channel market fit in new international markets. And finally, the last post is about scaling culture globally.</p><blockquote>What got you here, won’t get you there.</blockquote><h3>Is your start-up <em>really</em> global? Really?</h3><p>The internet is wonderful. 30 years ago, taking a company to a new country meant setting up warehouses, shop fronts, hiring staff, setting up local bank accounts — really painful and expensive stuff.</p><p>Nowadays, it’s incredibly easy. Set-up payments through Stripe, get a website up using Squarespare or Wix, and magic — you’ve got global business.</p><p>The problem is, for many two-sided businesses (think AirBnb which has hosts and travellers) or FinTechs where financial regulations matter a lot, it’s not that easy. Getting drivers is <strong><em>hard</em></strong>; getting a financial license is <strong><em>hard</em></strong>; setting up supply chains is <strong><em>hard; </em></strong>acquiring customers is <strong><em>hard (and expensive).</em></strong></p><p>The question is — how do you <em>think</em> about your business to figure out if it’s truly global. What is it that makes it so easy for companies like Dropbox, Netflix or Google to launch their product to the world — literally at the click of a button; and what makes it so much harder for companies like Uber, AirBnb, Monzo, Skyscanner, Amazon (retail) or TransferWise to launch into a new market?</p><h3><strong>Think on the margin.</strong></h3><p>I remember one of my professors at business school continued to remind me in our Microeconomics class, <strong>think on the margin</strong>.</p><p>Tech companies are often characterised by almost <strong>zero marginal cost</strong>, allowing you to scale infinitely spreading your fixed costs of software development over a large user base. This is mostly true for companies like Google, Dropbox or Facebook where you can switch on your product to everyone in the world at the click of a button.</p><p>But just because you’re a tech company — that <strong><em>doesn’t</em> mean you have zero marginal costs when you scale into a new market</strong>. Just because you call yourself a tech-company, think WeWork, doesn’t mean your business is made-up 100% of tech (WeWork is really a well marketed real estate company). A lot of it comes down to your business model, and how your business creates and captures value.</p><p><strong>Cost of kick-starting the flywheel:</strong> If you’re a two-sided marketplace, think Uber with drivers and riders, you have to solve the chicken and egg problem. If you don’t have enough drivers, you can’t get riders; if you don’t have riders, you can’t get drivers.</p><p>What’s the solution? Simple. Just subsidise one or both sides of the marketplace. This might mean discounts and offers for riders; this might mean a minimum income and attractive deals for drivers. This isn’t free.</p><p>If you’re a company like Skyscanner, you need to set-up commercial deals with enough airlines to make it attractive enough for users to reliably use you to search for the best flight deals. That means paying for business development teams, that means office space now, that means now you need a general manager now to look after the region — these are real costs.</p><p><strong>Cost of customer acquisition:</strong> Unless you have a way of generating viral growth, which isn’t necessarily easy to do across geographic boundaries, you also have to think about your CAC. What does acquiring customers in a new market look like? How do you find channel market fit? What will it cost you to acquire enough customers in that market to get the flywheel going? The days of ‘built it, and they will come’ are pretty much over. Just because you have a great product, doesn’t mean people will know about it — and that means money spent on sales and marketing to acquire users.</p><p><strong>Cost of regulatory permissions: </strong>If you’re in the FinTech sector, getting regulatory permissions can be a nightmare. AML (anti-money laundering) regulation, credit licensing, setting up merchant accounts — all these can be a huge hassle. The cost of paying lawyers, and the paperwork — especially in frontier markets, can be a lot more than you might think.</p><p><strong>Cost of setting up supply chains: </strong>I remember a friend setting up a bubble tea shop in Cambodia, and yes I know it’s not a tech company, but one of his biggest challenges was getting the pearls in bubble tea into Cambodia. If you’re a direct-to-consumer retail tech company like Away luggage; nailing the supply chain from finding the right delivery partners to making the whole returns process work can be a huge undertaking when you expand internationally.</p><p><strong>Cost of distraction: </strong>And finally, the cost of distraction. Strategy is about resource allocation, knowing what to focus on, and what not to — and we often forget that management focus is also a scarce resource. Being in multiple markets mean you’re distracted, you have to focus on both your core business in your home region and also markets abroad. Don’t ignore the cost of distraction.</p><h3><strong>Global vs local network effects.</strong></h3><p>Network effects are incredibly valuable — network effects help explain the incredible growth and competitive moat that companies like Google, Facebook and AirBnb have.</p><blockquote>The network effect is a phenomenon whereby increased numbers of people or participants improve the value of a good or service. Source: Investopedia</blockquote><p>For example, Spotify is incredibly valuable for artists because of the number of Spotify users listening to music on Spotify. As more artists release music on Spotify, this becomes more valuable for users listening to music as there’s more choice of great music, this then attracts more artists and you have a virtuous cycle.</p><p>The problem with network effects are the ‘chicken and egg’ problem. If you don’t have any listeners on Spotify, it’s hard to get artists on-board. If you don’t have any artists or music, it’s hard to get listeners.</p><p>When you expand internationally, you are quite often <strong><em>starting from scratch</em></strong>. For example, if you’re Uber launching in Hong Kong, having drivers who drive for you in London does not help your network. Getting more Uber drivers in London <strong><em>doesn’t</em></strong> benefit riders who are using Uber in Hong Kong — and so therefore the network effects can sometimes be isolated to a given region. It’s why I think peer-to-peer FinTech players such as Venmo in the US find it incredibly difficult to scale into Europe.</p><p>It’s why I think tech companies in the travel sector, think Skyscanner, Booking.com, Expedia, AirBnb have done incredibly well in building valuable ‘multi-sided’ marketplaces. Travel in itself crosses geographic boundaries, and therefore a user in Hong Kong <strong><em>would</em></strong> value more hotel selection in London.</p><p>A good question to ask is, <strong><em>what competitive advantage do I have over a local start-up doing the exact same thing as me</em></strong>? Just because you’ve succeeded in one market, doesn’t guarantee success in another market.</p><h3><strong>So is it all that terrible?</strong></h3><p>So you might be thinking, well this sounds like a bunch of doom and gloom. The reality is, finding new growth internationally is hard, really really hard — but the rewards are huge if you can nail it.</p><p>I’m always skeptical when I hear about start-up XYZ expanding to a new market, or claiming they’re in 6 markets. The question isn’t, are they <strong><em>in </em></strong>a market — it’s whether they are <strong><em>successful in a market </em></strong>(i.e. positive unit economics).</p><p>Whilst many start-ups have failed to scale internationally, many have succeeded and done phenomenally well doing it. There’s no magic recipe to international expansion, like how there’s no magic recipe for finding product market fit — frameworks like lean start-up and customer discovery have helped entrepreneurs and product managers ‘short-cut’ the process, and I hope I can do the same for other people looking to take their start-up to new markets.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4817716ac7f1" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
    </channel>
</rss>