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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Chris DeNoia on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Chris DeNoia on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Chris DeNoia on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@chrisdenoia?source=rss-5037d5a4b138------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[The greatest customer discovery interview of the 19th Century]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@chrisdenoia/the-greatest-customer-discovery-interview-of-the-19th-century-78edef90b6b?source=rss-5037d5a4b138------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/78edef90b6b</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Chris DeNoia]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 29 Jul 2016 18:24:46 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-07-29T18:24:46.306Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*VpUPrHnUuA-I4leAmMHZjQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>We’ve all read the quote.</p><p>We’ve seen the quote reposted on LinkedIn many times.</p><p>We’ve even seen similar quotes attributed to Steve Jobs.</p><p>It’s the quote that drives the founders’ ego.</p><p>It’s the quote that says creativity and innovation come from visionaries.</p><p>It’s the quote that says your customer doesn’t know what they want, so don’t ask them.</p><p>It’s the quote I most often used to criticize customer discovery interviews and the Lean Startup.</p><p>It’s also the quote most inappropriately used when applied to innovation.</p><p>Of course you don’t ask a customer what they want. It’s a terrible question.</p><p>How did Henry Ford arrive at the Model T and change the world?</p><p>For starters, Henry Ford did not invent the automobile. Notably names such as Daimler, Diesel, and Benz proceeded the ethanol fueled <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ford_Quadricycle">Ford Quadricycle</a>. The Quadricycle did not change the world.</p><p>During 1896, Ford met his idol, Thomas Edison, whom he worked for at the Edison Illuminating Company. <em>This meeting between Ford and Edison is the greatest customer discovery interview of the 19th century</em>. Edison, it is said, suggests that Ford build a better car than the Quadricycle, make it simpler to drive and more affordable.</p><p>Initially, this proved extremely challenging as Ford first attempt, the Detroit Automobile Company (later to become Cadillac) produced a car that was still too expensive.</p><p>What Henry Ford understood was not to ask the customer what they wanted, but to <strong>understand what job they were trying to do</strong>.</p><p>What he saw was people had a job to do: to get from point A to point B. The current solutions people had to choose from, included:</p><ul><li>walk</li><li>ride a horse</li><li>drive an expensive automobile</li></ul><p>The pain point were numerous and not limited to time, smelling like horse manure and expensive automobiles.</p><p>Ford’s innovation, based on an initial interview with Edison, was the automobile needed to be simple to drive and <em>affordable</em>.</p><p>The relentless focus on affordability led to Ford applying the assembly line to automobile manufacturing.</p><p>The relentless focus on affordability also led another famous quote,</p><blockquote>Any customer can have a car painted any color that he wants so long as it is black.</blockquote><p>If you ask a customer what they want, they may tell you a faster horse.</p><p>If you ask a customer what they want, they may tell you a red car.</p><p>However, if you ask them what job they are trying to do. They <em>will</em> tell you they need to get from point A to point B for a certain price.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=78edef90b6b" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[What tornadoes can teach the lean startup]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@chrisdenoia/what-tornadoes-can-teach-the-lean-startup-7e66351e508f?source=rss-5037d5a4b138------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[lean-startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[saas]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Chris DeNoia]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 21 May 2016 14:33:35 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-05-21T14:33:35.835Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/461/1*tpWv_YTY3U6yPZ7fMt7G2Q.jpeg" /></figure><p>In an previous post, I showed how a lean startup can <a href="https://medium.com/@chrisdenoia/how-to-calculate-the-value-of-a-pivot-5370f0ee3238#.svvs4g972">calculate the value of a pivot</a>. The concept used to calculate the value of a a pivot can be applied to the business model canvas in order to <strong>prioritize</strong> which hypothesis (guesses) will have the biggest impact on the business model.</p><p>There is a simple modeling technique that highlights the risks.</p><p>Enter the tornado</p><p>A tornado chart is a visual representation of which guesses have the biggest impact on the model. The tornado is an output of sensitivity analysis done on the business model canvas. Sensitivity analysis helps answer the question: “what if the guesses are wrong by 10%, 20%, 100% or more?”, or, if our guesses are off by this much, when will we run out of runway (cash).</p><p><strong>A sample tornado</strong></p><p>The sample models 5 elements of a business model: # of customers, price, churn, marketing and sales cost.</p><p>I’ll use a not so fictional use case that <a href="https://medium.com/@chrisdenoia/lean-disrupt-ed-creating-value-vs-capturing-value-84aa6ce4bcf1#.ju421gime">many startups have done for patient registration</a>, i.e.: making a iPad app to replace the clipboard for the doctors’ office checkins.</p><p>The hypothesis (guesses) for the business model canvas are as follows:</p><ul><li>Revenue (Monthly Price): $300/doctor subscription service</li><li>Customer Relationships (MAC): $600 marketing acquisition costs</li><li>Customer Relationships (Churn): 4 years, or ~2% per month</li><li>Channel (New Doctors): 28 doctors a month.</li><li>Channels (Sales Acquisition): $500 per doctor in sales commission, etc.</li></ul><p>To keep the model simple, a flat $2.3 million in “all other” expenses will include engineer, rent, etc. Monthly expenses in this forecast are flat: $223k per month, which includes marketing and sales.</p><p>Make a simple (REALLY SIMPLE), 36 month financial forecast on the baseline guesses, the company should achieving break even/cash flow positive in month 26.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*zj9-K1EM1t9QgArVtfGUNA.png" /></figure><p>The forecast also shows the company cumulative cash burn peaks in month 25 at $2.67 mm.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*9tABTlmBhgm3RRcvQ5MTuQ.png" /></figure><p>The founder may want to allow a 6 month cash cushion above break even and raise a $4 mm capital. Calculated at $2.67 mm cumulative burn plus $1.3m (6 months x $223k per month) cash cushion.</p><p>These are all still guesses, unvalidated hypothesis.</p><blockquote>Which guesses pose the greatest risk to the model?</blockquote><h3>It’s time to show your sensitive side</h3><p>Assume the founder could raise $4 mm on this business model. Using data tables in excel, the founder can perform a sensitivity analysis, modeling impact on the startups cash balance for all five variables being over/under by up to 50%.</p><p>The results of the sensitivity analysis on the cash balance are summarized below.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/635/1*IO3JSEGJYPftUcpZpjavVw.png" /></figure><p>The baseline model reflects the cash position that includes the 6 months of cushion plus the additional cash contributions in month 26–36 after break even/cash flow positive margins.</p><p>The tornado diagram visually shows the variability in the business model for the 50% above/below guesses. It’s a bar chart sorted in descending order to look like, well, a tornado...</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*owHPEBe0X3Nud93zMkpT4g.png" /></figure><p>Two variables jump out, the two guesses that cross the $0 cash line: monthly price and new doctors. Which means, if either of these guesses are under by 50%, the startup will run out of cash.</p><p>A 50% variation in MAC, sales, and churn do not have a meaningful impact on this model for the first 36 months.</p><p>Validating the monthly price and new doctor acquisition will de-risk the startup much more significantly than MAC, sales, or churn.</p><p>The founder can now prioritize two guesses which present the most risk to the business model and need to be validated.</p><p>Tornado diagrams can act like an emergency broadcast system for your startup…</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/636/1*NEQFO_TR51pSoIRkYwngGg.jpeg" /></figure><p>On the upside, the founder may contemplate a pivot and choose between a hypothesis that may decrease marketing acquisition costs by 50% or increase the price by 50%. Again, the tornado clearly shows which hypothesis to prioritize.</p><p>There are <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6UkXYF0tKDA">many online resources</a> which explain how to use excel data tables and create tornado diagrams.</p><p>If you would like a copy of the financial model, feel free to email me: chrisdenoia@gmail.com</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=7e66351e508f" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[2016 (really 2024) Healthcare Predictions]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@chrisdenoia/2016-really-2014-healthcare-predictions-1fe01a5c6b7e?source=rss-5037d5a4b138------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/1fe01a5c6b7e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[insurance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[healthcare]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Chris DeNoia]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 04 Jan 2016 22:10:42 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-01-08T14:59:11.427Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/595/1*te9MBUClfrDcvu3IiJmXhg.png" /><figcaption>8</figcaption></figure><p>It’s time to make 2016 predictions. Here are some good lists from <a href="http://www.fastcompany.com/3055009/5-ways-health-care-will-be-transformed-in-2016">Fast Company</a> and <a href="http://fortune.com/2015/12/03/10-healthcare-predictions-for-2016/">Fortune</a>. Fortune’s #3 prediction, that end of life care will grab headlines, is long overdue — it may have hit it’s inflection point last October with the release of Atul Gawande’s <a href="http://www.amazon.com/Being-Mortal-Medicine-What-Matters/dp/0805095152">Being Mortal:Medicine and What Matters in the End</a> (more on that in another post).</p><p>My experience running the HSA business at Optum taught me to take my projections for when something will “hit” (i.e.: hockey stick) and add five years. Healthcare is a slow moving beast due to the purchasing cycles and complex decision making process.</p><p>With that in mind, here are two predictions for the healthcare industry for 2024. These are seedling stage ideas that may get some funding (or have some) and early adopters, but will not become mainstream for 8–10 years.</p><h4><strong>Prediction #1</strong>: introduction of no-network health insurance</h4><p>Network discounts are the keystone for health plans. By their very nature, network discounts abhor price transparency. For price transparency and consumerism to realize it’s full potential, an insurance plan will have to post all prices for their provider network.</p><p>A simple solution that facilitates price transparency which could effectively eliminate the insurance network, would be to mark prices to the published Medicare rates with a markup, such as Medicare + 30%. For a practical matter, any provider can bill the insurance plan and be reimbursed as “out of network”.</p><p>For consumers, the benefit is simple: see any provider willing to accept the Medicare +30% the insurance plan will reimburse, the balance is the consumer responsibility.</p><p>At the moment, there are significant obstacles to this type of plan, not the least which include network density requirements and balanced billing restrictions. Nevertheless, some enterprising startups can get creative and start small and locally to achieve a true consumer friendly health plan.</p><h4>Prediction #2: providers will hire risk managers for patient attribution</h4><p>As providers take on risk through value based payment contracts, inevitably, they will need to manage their patient risk profiles. This began with care coordinators using <a href="http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/01/24/the-hot-spotters">hot spotting</a> techniques to manage their high risk patients through timely interventions and new reimbursements for chronic care management (<a href="https://medium.com/@chrisdenoia/digital-health-s-chronic-care-management-bloodsport-1affd9100c29#.4ztjmbu87">CCM</a>).</p><p>Other industries that manage risk, such as auto-insurance and home mortgages, realize unacceptable risk (i.e.: patients) will be detrimental to long term sustainability of the business.</p><p>In home mortgages, risk is managed and distributed through securitization (mortgage backed securities) which, in turn, led to the 2008 financial crisis. If you haven’t seen The Big Short (or read the <a href="http://www.amazon.com/The-Big-Short-Doomsday-Machine/dp/0393338827">book</a>), go or read. It’s the most important story to come out in years.</p><p>In auto-insurance, companies have the ability to price for risk or deny coverage.</p><p>Thanks to Obamacare, providers and insurance companies are prohibited from denying coverage for preexisting conditions. However, risk mitigation techniques are not limited to denial of coverage.</p><p>In healthcare, risk is not the same as being sick or having a diagnosed condition. Just as mortgage owners are at risk for an adverse event (default), patients are various levels of risk for an adverse event. For example, Type 2 diabetics are at risk for amputations, however, not all Type 2 diabetics are at the same risk.</p><p>Providers will examine their patient risk profiles and begin to do what all risk-bearing entities have before them: manage risk. A new role will emerge as risk managers will be in the marketing and finance department.</p><p>In addition to using risk profiles to manage their patients, providers will use risk profiles to choose their patients.</p><p>Provider risk managers will user predictive analytics for classic marketing purposes: customer segmentation. The customer segments that are deemed acceptable risk will receive a large portion of the marketing budget. Those segments deemed too risky will not be marketed to and “encouraged” to see another providers.</p><p>This will all be done in an effort to select the patients attributed to them in a value based payment model.</p><p>Similar to end of life care, I predict you’ll see media coverage in these concepts at the inception stage, maybe at Health 2.0 or Health Datapalooza. Maybe someone will discuss them over a cocktail next week at the JP Morgan healthcare conference in San Francisco.</p><p>Wherever it happens, it will take time. It takes years to move the healthcare beast.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1fe01a5c6b7e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[lean Disrupt(Ed): creating value vs. capturing value]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@chrisdenoia/lean-disrupt-ed-creating-value-vs-capturing-value-84aa6ce4bcf1?source=rss-5037d5a4b138------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/84aa6ce4bcf1</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[lean-startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[healthcare]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Chris DeNoia]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 21 Dec 2015 17:24:07 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-12-22T00:33:05.316Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/680/1*ZQqLMzjIflmvE0AjBPs35w.jpeg" /></figure><p>Tell me if you’ve heard this one before:</p><blockquote>Why do we still have to fill out a clipboard to check in at the doctor’s office?</blockquote><blockquote>There’s a better way. At {company name}.ly, we’ve solved that problem.</blockquote><blockquote>There are billions of patient check ins….</blockquote><p>And the pitch goes on…</p><p>I’ve heard this pitch dozens of times at healthcare conference across the country. It’s a good example for the benefits of validating a value proposition through customer discovery before quitting your day job. The case study has been used in the digital health cohort of <a href="https://ita.ucsf.edu/entrepreneurship-center/education/courses/lean-launchpad-life-science-healthcare">Steve Blank’s Lean LaunchPad for Life Science</a> course at UCSF.</p><p>Some companies have tried to address this problem. Most of them have failed, are failing, or have pivoted from this feature as a primary value proposition.</p><p>It’s not that digitizing the check in process is a bad idea, it’s a great idea, huge pain in the ass. There’s no reason why check-ins are not online.</p><p><strong>Digitizing the check process is just a bad business</strong> <strong>because no one wants to pay for it</strong>. There is no value proposition for the doctors.</p><p>Entrepreneurs often start in the same value proposition, “save the doctor’s office time in data entry.” Here’s the calculation:</p><p># of minutes to enter the form: 10 min.</p><p># of patients per day: 25</p><p>Total minutes typing: 250. ~4.1 hours.</p><p>Total time saved: 20 hours per week.</p><p>At $12 per hour hour for a receptionist, total time savings $240 per week ~$1,000 per month.</p><p>{company name}.ly will charge $100 per month in a SaaS model.</p><blockquote><strong>Digitizing the check process is just a bad business</strong> <strong>because no one wants to pay for it</strong>.</blockquote><p>How many doctors purchase this? None.</p><p>What entrepreneurs learn quickly is the doctors cannot capture any of this time savings and it’s all Linda’s fault.</p><p>Linda, the persona of the doctor’s office receptionist, greets patients at the door and doubles at the data entry person. Linda already reads US Weekly for a few hours each day. Linda isn’t going anywhere. An online check in process means Linda can add People or Time to the magazine rack as well.</p><p>Did you ever wonder why doctors office have all these horrible magazines in the waiting room? Thanks Linda! (For the record, I do enjoy an US Weekly, they need a Silicon Valley section for Who Wore it Best: hoodie or colored socks.)</p><p>The original business model would cost the doctors more money. Actually, it’s even worse than that. Doctors offices often run behind schedule. Having a patient fill out the form is perceived as part of the service, i.e.: minimizing the perceived wait time by occupying the patients. Similar to how Disney makes the line part of the experience by having you walk through the forest before getting on the ET ride.</p><p>Lower patient satisfaction and higher costs? Not the product-market fit an entrepreneur is searching for.</p><p>Pivot.</p><p>Entrepreneurs have realized that doctors are not the real customers. So who is? Perhaps pharma companies.</p><p>A few have tried advertising to patients on a tablet check in. As it turns out, displaying an ad to a patient just before they enter the doctor’s office is good timing and commands a premium for the ad.</p><p>Unfortunately, ad revenue is calculated per thousand (RPM) of impressions. A doctor will see a thousand patients every two months. There isn’t enough volume.</p><p>Additionally, patients want to check in at home or through an app on the way to the office. Ad displays at these times do not command the same premiums.</p><p>Pharma will pay a little, but not enough.</p><p>While the online check in process would be appreciated by the patients, it doesn’t create enough value that they are willing to pay for it. It also doesn’t create value for the doctors office that can be captured.</p><p>It’s become evident that online check ins are not a business. Online check ins are not even a product, they are a feature. Possibly as a larger feature set such as collecting up front to patient payments (companies are doing this now).</p><p>I’m confident we’ll all be checking in online within a few years and telling our kids all about the clipboard days.</p><p>I feel better knowing some entrepreneurs didn’t quit their jobs and spend years trying to create a startup around a false value proposition.</p><p>And it only cost them 10 meetings.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=84aa6ce4bcf1" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Do wearables have our behavior wrong?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/dayone-a-new-perspective/do-wearables-have-our-behavior-wrong-816909154046?source=rss-5037d5a4b138------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/816909154046</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[digital-marketing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[simon-sinek]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[wearables]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Chris DeNoia]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 13 Sep 2015 15:15:56 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-09-13T19:10:25.752Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I love this quote from Simon Sinek, author of <a href="http://www.amazon.com/Start-Why-Leaders-Inspire-Everyone/dp/1591846447/ref=asap_bc?ie=UTF8">Start With Why</a>:</p><blockquote>If you hire people just because they can do a job, they’ll work for your money. But if you hire people who believe what you believe, they’ll work for you with blood and sweat and tears. — Simon Sinek</blockquote><p>Sinek presents numerous case studies to support that what you do is the proof of what you believe, such as consumers who wait in line for six hours to be the first to purchase the new iPhone because they believe what Apple believes.</p><p>But what if <em>what you believe</em> is wrong?</p><p>I attended an event earlier this month featuring a number of speakers discussing their products, healthcare, and, as these sessions eventually become, how to solve all the worlds problems. These events are ubiquitous in San Francisco and provide the intellectual crack innovators crave.</p><p>One of the speakers, a product manager at a well known wearables device company, was halfway into his Ignite style presentation when he said, “If you tell someone your goal, you’re more likely to achieve it”.</p><p>The if you tell someone your goal, you’re more likely to achieve it philosophy influenced the company’s app design, user experience, and user interface with the noble goal helping enable people to achieve healthier lifestyles through better diet, exercise and sleep.</p><p>This wearable company certainly believes if you tell someone your goal, you’re more likely to achieve it and this particular product manager certainly believes it. A perfect hire, following Simon Sinek’s advice. I’ll add that the product manager was brilliant, articulate, and affable.</p><p>But what if what they believe is wrong?</p><h3>When Genius Failed</h3><p>In 2000, Roger Lowenstein published <a href="http://www.amazon.com/When-Genius-Failed-Long-Term-Management/dp/0375758259">When Genius Failed: The Rise and Fall of Long-Term Capital Management</a>. It is widely considered one of the best pieces of financial journalism written and has become required reading in business schools across the country.</p><p><strong>Note</strong>: I do not have an Amazon affiliate program, so there is no <em>Roger and Me </em>going on, in addition to the other links to Amazon in this post, perhaps I should…</p><p>For students of finance, the geniuses John Meriwether, Robert Merton, and Myron Scholes of LTCM will be familiar. John Meriwether has the distinction of being featured in two of the most popular financial books, the second being Michael Lewis <a href="http://www.amazon.com/Liars-Poker-Norton-Paperback-Michael/dp/039333869X">Liars Poker</a>.</p><p>The short summary of When Genius Fails, LTCM created a pricing model for their investments that <em>incorrectly</em> believed variations in stock prices followed a normal distribution.</p><p>According to Eugene Fama, Schole’s thesis advisor:</p><blockquote>If the population of price changes is strictly normal, on the average for any stock… an observation more than five standard deviations from the mean should be observed about once every 7,000 years. In fact, such observations seem to occur about once every three to four years.</blockquote><p>What LTCM believed about the financial markets was wrong.</p><p>The result of being wrong, the Fed organized a $3.6 billion bailout to avoid a financial market collapse.</p><p>The partners lost $2 billion.</p><h3>The Social Reality</h3><p>The wearable company normal distribution equivalent is “if you tell someone your goal, you’re <em>more</em> likely to achieve it”.</p><p>But what if tell someone your goal, you’re <em>less</em> likely to achieve it”</p><p>Derek Sivers’ short, interesting and very watchable Ted Talk: <em>Keep Your Goals To Yourself</em> addresses this possibility.</p><p><a href="https://embed-ssl.ted.com/talks/derek_sivers_keep_your_goals_to_yourself.html">TED: Ideas worth spreading</a></p><p>Sivers explains that if you want to achieve something, you should’t tell anyone. Telling someone what you want to achieve feels good, and that good feeling will make you less likely to do it.</p><p>He backs this up with numerous studies about this social reality: telling someone feels good thus makes you less motivated to actually do the work. The studies were conducted in 1926, 1933, 1982, and 2009.</p><blockquote>The mind mistakes the talking for the doing. — Derek Sivers</blockquote><p>Could this be true for wearables?</p><p>Rock Health published <a href="http://www.slideshare.net/RockHealth/the-future-of-biosensing-wearables-by-rockhealth">The Future of BioSensing Wearables</a>. Within this detailed analysis of the industry as a whole, Slide 13 has the key insight regarding user behavior.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.slideshare.net%2Fslideshow%2Fembed_code%2Fkey%2FI0qgaZ0LhUhUaN&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.slideshare.net%2FRockHealth%2Fthe-future-of-biosensing-wearables-by-rockhealth&amp;image=http%3A%2F%2Fcdn.slidesharecdn.com%2Fss_thumbnails%2Frockhealthbiosensingwearablesrockreport201406-140609000141-phpapp02-thumbnail.jpg%3Fcb%3D1420050533&amp;key=d04bfffea46d4aeda930ec88cc64b87c&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=slideshare" width="425" height="355" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/7dd9d336fc6c5432b53e3d79d87f5417/href">https://medium.com/media/7dd9d336fc6c5432b53e3d79d87f5417/href</a></iframe><blockquote>Despite such advancement, wearable products today fail to engage users over meaningful periods of time. — Rock Health published <a href="http://www.slideshare.net/RockHealth/the-future-of-biosensing-wearables-by-rockhealth">The Future of BioSensing Wearables</a></blockquote><p>I would go further and posit the failure to engage is also reflected in the choice of pricing model for the wearable devices. With engagement and value, there <em>could</em> be a SaaS model for ongoing recurring revenue. The Rock Health data suggests the SaaS model would have a limited lifetime value, thus it’s better to optimize revenue up front, at the point of sale.</p><p>What if the “gamification” or social sharing of the data, e.g.: steps walked, is actually counter productive. What if sharing your data, or saying you will share your data, provides the gratification already, so you don’t feel the need to walk the steps at all, or, after some time, wear the device at all?</p><p>What if by telling someone your goal, you’re <em>more</em> likely to achieve it, is wrong?</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=816909154046" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/dayone-a-new-perspective/do-wearables-have-our-behavior-wrong-816909154046">Do wearables have our behavior wrong?</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/dayone-a-new-perspective">DAYONE — A new perspective.</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[What about HIPAA? and other dumb questions…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@chrisdenoia/what-about-hipaa-and-other-dumb-questions-89fc6e06d78?source=rss-5037d5a4b138------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/89fc6e06d78</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hipaa]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[healthcare]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Chris DeNoia]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 03 Sep 2015 14:52:25 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-09-03T17:44:03.700Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Next time you see me at a healthcare event, let’s play a game.</p><p>Here are the rules:</p><ol><li>Scout the audience</li><li>Choose an audience member that is most likely to ask the question, “What about HIPAA?” during the Q&amp;A period</li><li>Winner gets a free drink</li></ol><p>I would like to lose this game every time. In fact, I would prefer if we stopped playing eventually, but someone always loses. Asking, “what about HIPAA?” has become ubiquitous at healthcare events.</p><p>Imagine going to the pitch competition at Techcrunch Disrupt where, after a five minute App pitch, one of the judge asks, “that’s all very interesting, but you didn’t show us how to log in? Do you have passwords?”.</p><p>The founder/CEO of that App would then be forced to answer, “yes, we take your personal information very seriously, without it, we would not have a business, so we have passwords. Rest assured, even though I clearly demonstrated the value of sharing pictures of your cats, we are password compliant.”</p><p>What she would really be thinking, “this person wasted valuable time from the entire audience on a table stake question, depriving someone else from the opportunity to ask a meaningful or insightful one.”</p><p>The “what about HIPAA?” signals to the audience you are the dumbest person in the room. If this offends you, maybe you’ll stop asking it.</p><p>There are three reasons</p><p>First, customer segments in healthcare with products which include PHI have a technical approver within the decision making process responsible for evaluating HIPAA compliance. This responsibility may fall with a compliance office, security officer, CTO, CIO, or some other title.</p><p>This person never asks “what about HIPAA?” at an event because they know it is a table stake. However, if you know of organizations that do not have this person, please send me the names, there are many startups that would love to sell them products.</p><p>Second, the P stands for portability. HIPAA was designed to provide the framework to securely move information, not create the barriers to prevent access.</p><p>Third, this question exposes you, it’s a tell, like a tick in poker. The person who asks this question inside an organization plays one of two rolls. Either you are the sabateur or the politician. The sabateur is looking for reasons not to do something, i.e.: throwing up roadblocks.</p><p>The politician tries to appear smart. They can also be identified by one of the other <a href="https://medium.com/conquering-corporate-america/10-tricks-to-appear-smart-during-meetings-27b489a39d1a">10 Tricks To Appear Smarter at Meeting</a>. Thanks @sarahcpr for those brilliant observations.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=89fc6e06d78" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Disrupt(Ed): How to calculate the value of a pivot]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@chrisdenoia/how-to-calculate-the-value-of-a-pivot-5370f0ee3238?source=rss-5037d5a4b138------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/5370f0ee3238</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[pivoting]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[lean-startup]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Chris DeNoia]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 11 Aug 2015 14:01:25 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-12-23T19:27:01.331Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>We often discuss how to measure success of teaching “lean startup” techniques. The proverbial <em>we,</em> in this case, includes the teaching teams I’ve been associated with in the <a href="https://ita.ucsf.edu/entrepreneurship-center/education/courses/lean-launchpad-life-science-healthcare">UCSF Lean LaunchPad</a> for Life Science and the National Science Foundation Innovation Corps (<a href="http://www.nsf.gov/news/special_reports/i-corps/">NSF I-Corps</a>) programs.</p><p>Measuring success can be challenging for a number of reasons, not the least of which, teams are applauded for a “No Go” decision. When entrepreneurs get out of the building, test their hypothesis and learn that no one is interested in their solution, the “No Go” decision not only saves investors potential losses of millions of dollars but also saves entrepreneurs and early employees years of their lives pursuing a solution not validated by through customer discovery.</p><p>How does a startup measure the successful application of lean principles?</p><p>From Steve Blank, we know that a business plan does not survive first contact with customers. Therefore, successful entrepreneurs who get out of the building and search for a business model using customer discovery will iterate their business model through a series of pivots.</p><p><a href="http://steveblank.com/2014/01/14/whats-a-pivot/">According to Steve Blank</a>, “A<em> pivot is a substantive change to one or more of the 9 business model canvas</em> <em>components</em>.”</p><p>Therefore, one method to measure success of a “lean startup” is to quantify the pivot.</p><p>Figure 1 is a typical, successful startup company lifecycle. The startup begins their search for a scalable, repeatable business model, at some point, the startup begins to earn revenue, achieves break-even cash flow and earns a profit.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/586/1*QdwCGDhZ-ZCsrm6yt2HUIA.png" /></figure><p>The lean product/market fit accelerates the company lifecycle through two value propositions for entrepreneurs’ and enterprises’ customer segments:</p><ul><li>reducing the cost of innovation</li><li>reducing the time to innovation.</li></ul><p>Therefore, the lean startup shifts the company lifecycle curve up and to the left, resulting in lower cost of innovation, reduced time to innovation, or both.</p><p>Figure 2 represents a successful startup company lifecycle that follows lean principles through customer discovery. The shift in the company lifecycle is the result of the pivots.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/620/1*QLHIzHsoP7hqTtsglLh26Q.png" /></figure><p>Consequently<strong>, the value of a pivot is the area between the original company lifecycle projection and the new company lifecycle</strong>. i.e.: the area between the curves.</p><p>It’s been a long time since I did calculous, but my professors at <a href="http://www1.lehigh.edu/">Lehigh University</a> will be happy to know I do recall how to calculate the value of the area between the lines, but we won’t be getting into derivatives today.</p><p><strong>Lean Startup Lifecycles</strong></p><p>The startup lifecycle J-curves is a function F(x) = ax2 + bx + c</p><p>C, conveniently where the company starts, is the cash at hand or available. At inception, C (cash) can be drawn from credit cards, savings, friends and family, angel rounds, etc.</p><p>The initial downward slope of the curve is the burn rate. When cash equal zero, game over.</p><p>The slope of the curve changes over time as the startup validates hypothesis and matures based on the <a href="http://steveblank.com/2013/11/25/its-time-to-play-moneyball-the-investment-readiness-level/">Investment Readiness Level</a> (IRL). The maturity may be reflected in the steepness of the slope or reduction of their burn.</p><p>In this case, an IRL-9 would be achieved at or near the relative minimum of the lifecycle, where the startup has validated the hypothesis on the business model canvas.</p><p>At the point of the relative minimum, the bottom of the curve, the startup is moving from search and validation, into customer creation.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/597/1*DPoH7Je8Uxm9Y5pr9ZvTdw.png" /></figure><p><strong>Case Study: Revenue pivot</strong></p><p>This is a real case study of a revenue pivot that changes the future of the company shifting the company trajectory significantly from company lifecycle R1 to lifecycle R2.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/597/1*5J7bY9GFZm5XrxdLm6CXFg.png" /></figure><p>In the original revenue mode (R1), the startup revenue hypothesis included a high implementation fee and lower monthly recurring revenue (MRR) over time. This was a complex sale because the implementation fees typically were paid from the capital budget which required approval from a procurement office and various internal stakeholders and departments.</p><p>At R1, the sales cycle was 180 days with an average annual revenue $80k. Given the complex nature of the sale, each salesperson had capacity to close 4 sales per year, roughly $320k average annual revenue per sales person. Lifetime value of a customer was projected at over $1 mm, however, that data was still being collected. Profitable, but slow.</p><p>With the new pricing strategy (R2), the company waived the implementation fee and greatly increased the monthly recurring revenue (MRR). Under the new hypothesis, this was a simple sale with a single internal stakeholder and paid from an operating budget. The sales cycle dramatically reduced from 180 days to 30 days. The salesperson now had capacity to close 24 sales per year. Additionally, the average annual revenue increased from $80k to $100k.</p><p>The revenue hypothesis, validated through customer discovery, shifted the trajectory of the company lifecycle significantly.</p><p>The revenue pivot was $2,080,000 additional annual revenue per salesperson!</p><p>That is an oversimplified calculation. In reality, we would model the net present value of the long term value (LTV) of all future sales to determine this pivot is worth substantially more than the simple calculation.</p><p>The calculus only works when the startup has great command of the numbers. If the startup knows their sales cycle, cost to acquire a customer (CAC), cost of key activities and resources, they will be able to calculate the value of a pivot.</p><p>This was a great example of lean representing the scientific method of entrepreneurship. Having data and hypothesis to test.</p><p>Now we can calculate the value of a pivot in in terms metrics of value and time by computing the area between company lifecycle functions.</p><p>The French composer Claude Debussy said, “Music is the space between the notes.”</p><p>In lean, success is the space between the curves.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=5370f0ee3238" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Warning: Beware of Strategic Investors]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@chrisdenoia/warning-beware-of-strategic-investors-60fd672fda51?source=rss-5037d5a4b138------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/60fd672fda51</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[steve-blank]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[strategic-investor]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[lean-launchpad]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Chris DeNoia]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 24 Jul 2015 01:11:15 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-07-24T01:12:14.214Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>A startup in one of Steve Blank’s <a href="http://steveblank.com/category/lean-launchpad/">Lean LaunchPad</a> classes called me last fall to discuss their business model canvas and their customer discovery interviews. They were very excited when we met having secured a strategic investment from one of their customers that promised both volume and revenue growth.</p><p>This is a big day for a startup. A steady stream of business, i.e.: revenue, an investment, and a chance to show proof of concept with a high fidelity product is worthy of celebration. Pop the champagne corks and celebrate this fantastic milestone in the companies growth, right?</p><p>A more seasoned executives often shake their head in sadness, realizing that the startup may be better off taking a bullet to the head now, saving themselves years of effort and disappointment. This strategic partnership may be the beginning of the end of the startup.</p><p>The startup is dead; it just doesn’t know it yet.</p><p>But how can this be? Don’t you want this a big strategic partner and accelerated revenue growth?</p><p>In the Lean Launchpad, we talk about the need for strategic partnerships where the partnership needs to be a two way street. The classic startup mistake is understanding why you need them, but not being able to articulate why they need you.</p><p>Failing to understand the partners’ motivation can be a critical mistake. I have seen startups that have entered into strategic partnerships with an investment from large organizations that can best be described as predatory.</p><h3><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Here_be_dragons"><em>Hic Sunt Dracones</em></a></h3><p><em>A not so fictional story…</em></p><p>A startup enters into negotiations with a strategic investor, such as a health insurance company with over $50 billion in market capital and many millions of patients. They are 800 pound gorilla in the market, they are big and slow, they can’t do what the startup does, everyone knows it, the startups pitch their value prop and the strategic agrees. They want to invest, share in the value creation, provide expert advice and inform product direction. The allure is fantastic.</p><p>The startup founders looks at the projections. If they can only get 10% of the insurers members on the platform in the first 4 years, ~2 million members, they’ll have $10 million in annual revenue or better, a significant milestone toward the road to a successful exit.</p><p>Even better, the founders have successfully negotiated a non-exclusive agreement.</p><p>For the next three years, revenue is pouring in and growth is at a frenetic pace. The strategic loves the product and request more features, adding more revenue for custom development. They co-market and drive adoption as promised. The startup is hitting their milestones, $10 million in revenue, $2 million in EBITDA, early employees are vesting and everyone is happy, all according to plan.</p><p>Back in the strategics office, they are wringing their hands while celebrating all according to plan.</p><p>The darkest day comes when the strategic makes an acquisition offer. This is the exit the founders have been waiting for, excitedly, some multiple of revenue, perhaps $40–50 million range. When the anticipation reaches its’ zenith, reality crashes down when the term sheet comes in at $4 million dollars.</p><p>After checking the date to make sure it’s not April 1st, the startup reviews their financials and wonder how strategic investor arrived at the number. In a frantic pace to keep up with growth, the startup made the unfortunate mistake of allowing the strategic partner to become 80% of their revenue. The exclusivity didn’t matter as the startup did everything they could to add new features, keep and grow their most valuable customer.</p><p>The strategic kindly explains that they don’t buy their own business. While other companies may have valued the company based on $10 million in revenue, the strategic removes the 80% of revenue that represent their members and values the company now at $2 million in revenue. The startup can try to shop the deal, but, the strategic warns, be sure to communicate to the potential acquirer the company will lose it’s largest customer.</p><p>The startup now has a choice, sell to the insurer at the low valuation, or potentially go out of business. The board, consisting of other potential venture capitalist and angels looks at the offer and quickly concludes they can get their money back or lose it all.</p><p>The final kicker, as the strategic owns a portion of the startups preferred stock with preferences, they actual purchase price is even lower.</p><p>Unwittingly, the startup has been a vendor, really a custom development shop for four years.</p><p>This is a playbook used by innovation and corporate development functions with startups healthcare and every other industry.</p><p>Sometimes, when a strategic acquires a startup it has invested in without disclosing the terms of the acquisition offer and without the price leaking to the press, this represents a low offer, a face saving acquisition hire for the founders.</p><p>The founders resume includes a successful exit on paper while being a financially disappointment.</p><p>By definition, the first paying customer will be 100% of the startups revenue. Startups must keep their early customer satisfied while working relentlessly to diversify their revenue stream. A key milestone for startups must include revenue diversification.</p><p>One suggestion involves allocating only a small percentage of resources, such as 20% of development, to serving any single customer. This can be a challenge as the strategic request new features and places increasing demands on the startup.</p><p>Of course, that’s part of the strategics’ playbook too.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=60fd672fda51" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The REAL GOP War on Obamacare]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@chrisdenoia/the-real-gop-war-on-obamacare-601a0a8ff9fb?source=rss-5037d5a4b138------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/601a0a8ff9fb</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[obamacare]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[healthcare]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Chris DeNoia]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 29 Jun 2015 06:30:03 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-06-29T06:41:17.759Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The Supreme Court ruling in favor of Obamacare barely had a chance to register during the 24 hour news cycle between states rapidly taking down Confederate flags and the legalization of same sex marriage. Naturally, Democrats claim victory and consider the issue closed, while Republicans vowed to fight on to repeal Obamacare with future administrations. The long game being played is not over the Obama legacy on his signature healthcare bill. The long game between the GOP and Obamacare is a war over the future and demise of employer based health care.</p><p>Over <a href="http://kff.org/other/state-indicator/total-population/">150 million Americans</a> receive health insurance through their employer as a fringe benefit, nearly half (48%) of the population. Less than 20 million Americans purchase insurance individually, (6%) of the population. The origins of this system are well documented, the short version summarizes the employer sponsored health insurance as a legacy carried over from benefits provided to employees during the World War II wage freezes, i.e.: health insurance was a means to increase total compensation for workers in lieu of raising their salary. Total compensation equals wages plus benefits.</p><p>The IRS tax code allows employers to deduct health insurance as an expense. An employer which pays ~$5,000 to cover an individual health insurance policy today pays an effective ~$3,500 total after deductions.</p><p>On the other hand, an individual must purchase individual health plans using after tax dollars. An identical ~$5,000 plan to an individual on an exchange is paid from after tax money. An individual will need to earn ~$8,000 pre-tax to afford the same plan.</p><p>Employers enjoy a significant financial comparative advantage purchasing group insurance: $3,500 for employers verse. $8,000 for individuals for similar policies. Since Citizens United, employers are considered people, apparently, they also have better tax deductions than real people!</p><p>The current system is designed poorly. Linking healthcare benefits to employment reduces the mobility of the labor force and reduces the ability of entrepreneurs to start companies. Additionally, the employer sponsored system introduces religious doctrine into plan design. Within the past year, the Supreme Court has ruled on contraception issues in key cases involving Hobby Lobby and the University of Notre Dame.</p><p>Employers are taking different approaches to Obamacare. A number of healthcare IT startups. including <a href="http://www.benefitter.com/">Benefitter</a> and <a href="https://www.wellthie.com/">Wellthie</a> are helping employers navigate the decision process of whether to keep insurance or dump employees onto the public market. Other employers, particularly with low wage, high turnover workforces are utilizing private exchanges run by companies such as <a href="http://www.liazon.com/">Liazon</a> and <a href="http://www.gobloomhealth.com/">Bloom Health</a> as a means to continue providing employer sponsored health insurance, albeit with an individual marketplace look and feel.</p><h4>Why do we persist in this employer sponsored health insurance system?</h4><p>In a perfect, market driven, competitive world; health care is purchased from private insurers by individuals with full information and price transparency. There is no government intervention or subsidies. However, we don’t live in a perfectly competitive world. Government intervention exists where the markets have failed, such as Medicare, when elderly people could not purchase health insurance because, well, they are higher risk for getting sick.</p><p>Given the lack of comparative advantage for individuals, it should come as no surprise that the largest demographic enrolling onthe insurance exchanges are by Medicaid patients who receive a federal subsidy to purchase insurance. The subsidy is creating an an active market for individual insurance.</p><p>For individuals without subsidies, the playing field should be balanced, at least from a tax perspective. But it’s not.</p><p>Theoretically, the GOP should be willing to change the tax code to allow health insurance deductions for individuals. This position would be congruent with lower taxes, competitive free markets, and a belief in personal responsibility based on high deductible health plans coupled with health savings accounts (HSAs), which are the most purchased plans on the individual exchanges.</p><p>In fact, the Obama administration frequently points out insurance exchanges were a GOP idea. Utah, a state Obama lost by 28% in 2008, passed the <a href="http://le.utah.gov/~2008/bills/hbillenr/hb0133.pdf">first bill to create</a> an exchange in 2008, before Obama was elected.</p><p>Given their original support for individual exchanges, the GOP could remove the employers comparative advantage from the tax code with a simple change extending the deductions to individuals and resist the temptation to bundle this change with a comprehensive package that includes other tax amendments such as banning the estate tax which has no chance of being signed by the President.</p><p>But the GOP will not entertain that solution.</p><p>Many article have been written about the fear of employers dumping employees to the exchanges and that may still happen. Removing the comparative advantage from employers would increase the velocity of that change. Most of the article have been written as if this would be an unintended consequence of Obamacare, a bug in the original law.</p><p>However, it’s not a bug, but rather a feature.</p><p>Obamacare will eventually mean an end to employer sponsored health care. This may take decades to realize. The impact would be not only a thriving individual marketplace, increase labor mobility, and allowing individuals to make their own healthcare decisions congruent with their religious beliefs.</p><p>It’s a rare case where both the Democrats and the GOP appear to philosophically agree on an outcome that shifts healthcare from employer sponsored to individual plans. And it may be agreeable if there was some understand that this shift would end there, with a fully functioning individual market.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/399/1*K302B_uERNvTj8raHYqd3w.jpeg" /></figure><h4>The Long Game</h4><p>The war being waged in the courts now is part of the long game. In this long game, the end game is a single payer healthcare system.</p><p>While a thriving individual market may be agreeable to the GOP, an employer sponsored healthcare system, with 150 million Americans, is the largest obstacle standing between a private health insurance market and a single payer system. The comparative advantage employers have over individuals purchasing health insurance is the keystone holding the current system together.</p><p>There are almost 75,000 pages in the IRS tax code. One additional deduction, a deduction currently offered to corporations, extended to individuals would have an monumental impact. Removing the small keystone would bring the entire employer sponsored system crumbling to the ground, paving the way for a single payer system.</p><p>The first step would be welcome, even by conservatives. If only William F. Buckley Jr. stood between the private insurance markets and the a single payer yelling, “STOP!”.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=601a0a8ff9fb" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Finding Zebras: Type 1 diabetes and #thedress]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@chrisdenoia/finding-zebras-type-1-diabetes-and-thedress-485c5bff1cc?source=rss-5037d5a4b138------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/485c5bff1cc</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Chris DeNoia]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 14 May 2015 00:06:02 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-05-15T23:10:04.784Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I lost a good friend last week. She was very talented, ambitious, and far too young to part this world. She was 27. My friend passed away due to complications of Type 1 diabetes. An autoimmune diseases that attacks the pancreas causing it to cease producing insulin.</p><p>Due to my volunteer work, I know many people with T1D. We’ve had a number of conversations about our dearly departed, mourning in our own way, including where we all met, favorite memories, and funny stories. People living with T1D have unique stories about their diabetes anniversary or their diagnosis day. It sparked a conversation on how we approach the diagnosis of rare diseases.</p><p><strong>“When you hear hooves, think horses, not zebras”</strong></p><p>This is a common heuristic frequently used to train doctors. Start with horses and continue through the diagnosis elimination game from the highest probability to the lowest. This makes sense as when dealing with any issue, it’s most efficient to go from highest to lowest. Unless, of course, you practice medicine on the plains of Africa, in which case thinking zebras may be more appropriate.</p><p>An anecdote of when this works, a friend did his residency in Newark, NJ. Patients would come in showing symptoms of low blood pressure and slow heart rates, often diagnosed as dehydration, but in Newark, this is often a heroine overdose, so the ER doc starts with Narcan to treat an overdose, waits, if that doesn’t work, they proceed to dehydration and other diagnoses.</p><p>When it comes to diagnosing an adult with Type 1 diabetes, these are classic zebras. Type 1 is rare, accounting for less than 5% of all new diabetes diagnosis and an even smaller fraction of adults. Type 1 has a reputation of being a juvenile’s disease even though roughly half of newly diagnosed are adults. <a href="http://jdrf.org/">JDRF</a>, the leading non-profit for Type 1 Diabetes research, recently rebranded from Juvenile Diabetes Research Foundation to remove the “juvenile” to reflect this reality. Even a healthcare non-profit will KFC it’s brand when required.</p><p><strong>Note to young readers</strong>: Kentucky Fried Chicken rebranded to KFC back in 1991. There are some entertaining articles on whether they rebranded to remove the unhealthy sounding “fried” label, avoiding paying royalties to the state of Kentucky, or even accusations the meat is not real “chicken”. Google away, I don’t know the real reason, but tend to believe the “fried” one. But I digress.</p><p>Here’s a common encounter with a doctor that results in a horse diagnosis instead of a zebra.</p><p><em>Doctor</em>: what seems to be the problem?</p><p><em>Patient (young adult male)</em>: I wake up frequently during the night, very thirsty, I pee a lot, and have lost a lot of weight.</p><p><em>Doctor</em>: Okay, let’s do an A1C test, I’ll measure your blood sugar here (it’s high), diagnoses: Type 2 Diabetes.</p><p>The doctor in this case will hear even more horses if the patient is African American or Native American, demographics with a much higher rate of Type 2 diabetes.</p><p>There is a major difference between Type 1 and Type 2 diabetes. I’ll oversimplify, but in Type 1 diabetes, your body stops producing insulin, in Type 2 diabetes, your blood does not absorb the insulin your pancreas produces. (My friends at <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hfU2pubzUfg">Tidepool</a> do a good job explaining it <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hfU2pubzUfg">here</a>.)</p><p>When someone is given pills that helps them absorb insulin that their body is not producing, nothing happens, their Type 1 symptoms get worse, more often than not, ending up in the ER. Shockingly, it is not a surprise than most diagnoses of Type 1 diabetes happen in the ER.</p><p>This method seems inadequate, especially with zebras among us. The diffusion through the elimination game, in some cases, not only risks people’s lives, but also creates, in this instance, an ER diagnoses that is much more expensive than the an additional test.</p><p>This is not limited to Type 1 Diabetes. Do you know anyone with celiac? Ask them what their experience leading to a celiac diagnosis is like. Terrifying.</p><p>This makes spotting zebras the diagnostic meme of <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_dress_%28viral_phenomenon%29">#thedress</a>, the viral phenomenon, not the Lewinsky dress.</p><p><strong>A better way to diagnose</strong></p><p>Less you start to think I’m blaming doctors for the misdiagnosis, that is not the case. The doctors are practicing medicine exactly the way they have been trained. It would be unrealistic to expect doctors to be aware of all the rare diseases out there.</p><p>Another approach would be to automate the process with computers. In a 2012 <a href="http://techcrunch.com/2012/01/10/doctors-or-algorithms/">Wired</a> article, Vinod Khosla famously quoted computers will replace 80% of doctors. IBM’s Watson has been tasked with this solution in cancer and other areas. A number of other startups seek to provide more accurate and timely diagnoses through specialized diagnoses.</p><p>These home diagnostics still require engagement from the largest untapped healthcare resource available, the patients themselves. The majority, albeit small sample size, of cases I have encountered where a friend has been correctly diagnosed with Type 1 diabetes and other rare conditions before an ER visit, the catalyst was a well informed patient or family member.</p><p>Take my niece, for instance, 12 years ago she frequently awoke at night and was drinking excessive amounts of water. My mother, who can play the role of hypochondriac, as grandmothers are want to do, had the appropriate home testing kits (i.e.: pee sticks) necessary to give a preliminary diagnosis of diabetes. One of the instances where a child’s diagnosis did not happen in an ER.</p><p>Or my friend, who received the above Type 2 diagnosis, but refused to accept it until finding the correct specialist and appropriate diagnosis.</p><p>As we learn more about the complexities of specific diseases, and learn more about the long tale of diagnosis, which appears to be getting longer rather than shorter, I suspect we’ll see many more zebras and fewer horses.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=485c5bff1cc" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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