<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0" xmlns:cc="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rss/creativeCommonsRssModule.html">
    <channel>
        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Christine C. Savino on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Christine C. Savino on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@christinesavino?source=rss-1f0c0a568957------2</link>
        
        <generator>Medium</generator>
        <lastBuildDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 06:32:41 GMT</lastBuildDate>
        <atom:link href="https://medium.com/@christinesavino/feed" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/>
        <webMaster><![CDATA[yourfriends@medium.com]]></webMaster>
        <atom:link href="http://medium.superfeedr.com/" rel="hub"/>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Why Mangione’s Double Jeopardy Motion Will Fail]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@christinesavino/why-mangiones-double-jeopardy-motion-will-fail-7cb702a3f4ca?source=rss-1f0c0a568957------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/7cb702a3f4ca</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[law]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[courts]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Christine C. Savino]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 18 Nov 2026 23:46:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-19T22:45:30.965Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>On December 10, 2026, Judge Carro is scheduled to rule on whether Luigi Mangione’s (“Defendant’s”) murder and weapons state charges should be dismissed. I am a reporter covering this case as well as law student, and I have likewise had a long-held but oddly niche “skill” (?) in predicting criminal case and investigation outcomes. For example, when the UHC CEO suspect was initially on the run, I predicted precisely when he would be caught, within one week, likely mid-late within those 7 days (he was caught on the 5th day).</p><p>To put it simply, both will fail. The weapons charges are certainly not removable under Double Jeopardy, and the second-degree murder charge, although a close call, is also not under the rule of law.</p><p>Here is why.</p><h3>Legal reasoning point one:</h3><p>The state murder prosecution is allowed under CPL § 40.20(2)(b) because federal stalking and New York intentional murder are designed to prevent very different types of harm or evil.</p><h3>A. Kaplan examines statutory purpose rather than specific conduct underlying prosecutions</h3><p><em>Kaplan</em> represents where the defense may lose some ground. New York’s statutory double jeopardy structure generally bars successive prosecutions for offenses derived from the same act or criminal episode — whether undertaken by the same sovereign or a different sovereign. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 40.20(2); <em>Matter of Polito v. Walsh</em>, 8 N.Y.3d 683, 689–90 (2007) (finding New York offers greater statutory protection for double jeopardy than the Federal Constitution.) The Federal Constitution allows for successive federal and state prosecutions under the dual sovereignty doctrine. However, the Legislature has explicitly provided for successive prosecutions where each offense includes an element missing from the other offense and where the legislative provisions establishing the offenses are designed to thwart very disparate types of harm or evil. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 40.20(2)(b). And <em>Polito</em> is a weaker analogue for the DA than attorney commentators’ mentions suggest. Paragraph (f) depends on a federal termination for insufficiency, and Mangione’s federal case ended in a conviction by plea. That is why Bragg is relying on 40.20(2)(b) instead. Albeit the Second Department’s opinion in the same litigation discusses <em>Bokun</em>, which held that 40.20(1) barred a state murder prosecution after a federal RICO conviction resting on the same murder as a predicate act. That cuts toward the defense.</p><p>In determining whether successive prosecutions will be permitted, the Court of Appeals employed a statutory purpose analysis in <em>Matter of Kaplan v. Ritter</em>, 71 N.Y.2d 222 (1987). The issue presented in <em>Kaplan</em> concerned federal RICO charges brought in connection with subsequent New York securities-fraud and larceny offenses. The court explained that the different harms analysis must be based on the broader aims of the legislation rather than the specific actions forming the basis of the prosecution. Id. at 229–30 (noting that the test looks to the larger evils covered by the penal statute.) Although there exists potential for federal RICO charges and state fraud as well as larceny charges to target similar statutory harms, such is possible if the federal racketeering scheme included consideration of underlying fraudulent conduct. Id. at 233 n.4 (observing that differences among statutory elements may not establish differences among harms addressed by offenses.)</p><p>In order to succeed in demonstrating a statutory double jeopardy bar on account of the fact that both prosecutions relate to Mr. Thompson’s murder, Defendant will likely not prevail. While the fact that both prosecutions arose out of the same violent incident places both prosecutions into a general category of “same transaction” prosecutions, the Legislature specifically carved out an exception for offenses directed at preventing very different types of harm. The federal stalking and cyberstalking offenses are directed toward the prohibition of certain conduct relating to interstate travel and electronic communication that places a victim in reasonable apprehension, with a corresponding statutory intent. 18 U.S.C. § 2261A (2018). Conversely, second degree murder under New York law is defined as intentionally causing death. N.Y. Penal Law § 125.25(1). For example, one can commit federal stalking/cyberstalking without ever having caused physical injury/death. But, for second degree murder under New York law, a finding of guilt requires death and an intention to cause death. Although they may apply in a particular case to overlapping conduct, these statutes govern very different categories of wrongdoing.</p><h3>B. Bryant allows successive prosecutions regardless of overlapping violent conduct:</h3><p><em>People v. Bryant</em>, 92 N.Y.2d 216 (1998) provides additional authority supporting continued prosecution for murder in state court. defendants robbed a bank with guns drawn and shot at police officers who were pursuing them. A federal conviction was secured for armed bank robbery, assaultive conduct during the commission of the robbery, firearm violations and conspiracy. Subsequently, New York brought charges against defendants for attempted murder of a police officer and possession of defaced firearms arising from the same violent episode. Id. at 224–225. Although the federal conviction for shooting at pursuing police officers is exactly the same violent behavior that formed the basis for New York’s charges for attempted murder of a police officer, the Court of Appeals ruled that New York could pursue its remaining charges because the statutory provisions prohibiting the two crimes addressed different harms. Id. at 228–30 (comparing federal offenses aimed at protecting banks and regulating gun use during federally-criminal activity to state laws prohibiting attempted murder of police officers and possession of defaced firearms.)</p><p>Although the shooting at police officers occurred simultaneously with the attempted murder of police officers and constituted part-and-parcel of defendants’ overall violent conduct, the Court of Appeals held that overlapping violent conduct did not demonstrate that both federal and state statutes were intended to punish identical harm. Id. at 229–30 (allowing successive prosecutions regardless of factual similarity between federal and state statutes since they were composed of differing elements and targeted different harms.) similarly, the same violent act may serve as the foundation for multiple federal and state prosecutions so long as the federal and state statutes proscribe sufficient different forms of misconduct.</p><p>Similarities exist between this case and <em>People v. Bryant</em>. For instance, just as federal bank robbery did not automatically equate to attempted murder simply because defendants fired at police officers during an armed bank robbery, federal stalking did not automatically equate to murder simply because Mangione’s conduct resulted in Mr. Thompson’s death. Section 2261a prohibits fear generating stalking conduct via means of interstate travel/electronic communication that creates in a victim a reasonable fear, coupled with a corresponding statutory intent. Section 125.25(1) prohibits intentionally causing another person’s death. For example, one can commit federal stalking/cyberstalking without using any force/physical contact whatsoever; similarly, one cannot commit second degree murder without physically killing someone. Moreover, Judge Garnett’s ruling that federal stalking does not categorically include as an element the intentional use of physical force (which would create an automatic bar to committing second degree murder pursuant to section 125.25(1)) limits conduct prohibited by federal stalking law from constituting intentional murder (second degree, no less) under New York state law. <em>Mangione</em>, 818 F. Supp. 3d at 527–37 (finding that predicate stalking offenses did not categorically require intentional/knowledgeable/threatened use of physical force).</p><p>While defendant may differentiate himself from the defendants in <em>People v. Bryant</em> inasmuch as federal bank robbery statutes primarily protect financial institutions whereas stalking statutes directly protect identifiable victims from threats to their safety; nonetheless, this distinction has value. The exception does not mandate that the statutes protect completely dissimilar interests; it mandates that they protect very dissimilar types of harm. Fear-generating conduct is targeted by stalking whereas intentional killing is targeted by murder. Although both implicate personal safety, they represent fundamentally different statutory wrongs.</p><p>Therefore, <em>People v. Bryant</em> supports allowing application of section 40.20(2)(b) even though both prosecutions stem from the same violent criminal transaction. Courts — including appellate courts — first look to legislate intent when interpreting what a law means. Additionally, as noted above, the federal stalking statute that Defendant was convicted of violating was enacted during a historic period in which women’s rights were being expanded to include extending federal law to protect women from stalking, rape and domestic violence which prior to enactment were often able to cross-state lines to continue abusing women whom state lines previously prevented them from doing so. As Judge Garnett alluded to this in her findings in regard to the suppression hearing she conducted with respect to Defendant, an appellate court would give great weight to this point and as such I find it surprising that the prosecution did not reference her comments regarding this point in its written memo responding to defendant’s motion to dismiss the remaining charges pending before the court.</p><p>However, in addition to referencing her comment made in regards to the historical context of when Congress passed legislation expanding women’s rights, including enacting VAWA which included federal crimes against women across state lines including creating new laws concerning interstate domestic violence and then later adding an interstate stalking offense two years later; see H.R. Rep. №104–557 (1996); Pub. L. №103–322, tit.iv; Pub. L. №104–201 § 1069(a) (1996), the prosecution also provided significant information detailing why Congress chose to enact this legislation and why they decided to create these new laws.</p><h3>C. Garcia provides particularly strong authority supporting continued prosecution by way of application of section 40.20(2)(b)</h3><p>Additionally, <em>People v. Garcia</em>, 2025 N.Y. Slip Op. 51180(U) (Sup. Ct. Bronx Cnty. July 14, 2025), provides analogous guidance respecting application of section 40.20(2)(b). In <em>Garcia</em>, defendants pled guilty to federal narcotics charges that included death-resulting penalties after a fentanyl overdose killed one child and injured others at a daycare center where children were left unattended in their care while parents went out at night; defendants were sentenced respectively to forty-five years incarceration in the federal system for their respective roles in supplying fentanyl to this daycare center. Following sentencing in federal court, defendants were charged by New York authorities with homicide, assault and child endangerment charges relating to their participation in selling fentanyl leading to deaths/injuries at this daycare center.</p><p>Although defendants acknowledged prior federal convictions would preclude prosecution by New York authorities for any portion of their narcotics offenses involving death/school age children, New York authorities sought dismissal of those portions of their pending charges that did not involve death-resulting penalties. Ultimately, the court permitted continuing prosecution for homicide/assault/endangerment charges by New York authorities because it found that federal drug offenses prohibited sale/distribution of narcotics and thus represented a wholly different type of harm than those addressed by New York homicide/offenses/child endangerment statutes which proscribed death/serious physical injury/child endangerment arising from narcotics sales/distribution.</p><h3>Point II</h3><p>defendant has failed to establish any constitutional due process violations which would entitle him to relief from the continuing state murder prosecution.</p><h3>A. There exists no violation of Fifth Amendment double jeopardy prohibitions</h3><p>The federal Double Jeopardy Clause ordinarily permits successive federal and state prosecutions arising from the same conduct because the federal government and a state are separate sovereigns. <em>Gamble v. United States</em>, 587 U.S. 678, 682–83 (2019) (reaffirming that prosecutions by separate sovereigns do not constitute successive prosecutions for the same offense under the Fifth Amendment). The relevant limitation on the pending New York prosecution therefore comes primarily from the broader statutory protection of N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 40.20, including its expressly enumerated exceptions, rather than from a rule that federal and state authorities cannot both prosecute the same acts. Furthermore, the dual-sovereignty doctrine permits each sovereign to enforce its own criminal law even after the other has obtained a conviction for conduct arising from the same event. Gamble, 587 U.S. at 682–83.</p><h3>B. The federal guilty plea does not waive or extinguish the right to a jury trial on pending state charges</h3><p>A guilty plea to federal stalking/cyberstalking offenses waives the right to a jury trial on those federal charges; it does not itself waive the right to a jury trial on separate pending state murder charges. See <em>Boykin v. Alabama</em>, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969) (recognizing that a guilty plea entails waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront accusers). Denying dismissal of the state charge does not, without more, deny defendant a jury trial in that prosecution.</p><p><em>Wade v. Hunter</em>, 336 U.S. 684, 688–92 (1949), does not hold otherwise. That case addressed whether the Fifth Amendment permitted a second court-martial after the first proceeding was discontinued because of military circumstances; the Supreme Court held that retrial was permissible in those circumstances. Id. at 691–92 (holding that the first court-martial’s termination did not bar the second under the circumstances). It did not decide that pleading guilty in federal court waives a defendant’s jury-trial rights in a separate state prosecution.</p><p>The importance of Garcia lies in the fact that the federal convictions did not focus on drug trafficking alone, but included the aggravation of death or serious bodily injury. Nonetheless, the court found that the increased seriousness of those additional aggravations did not eliminate the distinct objectives of the original statutes. Id. (court allowed use of the New York “different harms” test to dismiss the federal conviction and allow the state to prosecute defendant for murder because the two statutes were designed to protect against different types of harm.) to reach that conclusion, the court relied upon <em>Bryant</em> and <em>Kaplan</em>, which differentiated between the specific factual harm caused by a crime and the larger purpose of the underlying statute that governed that crime.</p><h3>Applicable rationale</h3><p>This line of reasoning will similarly support the prosecution’s position. defendant’s federal convictions carry harsher penalties because Thompson died as a direct result of defendant’s federal stalking offenses. However, the original federal offenses still consist of stalking and cyber-stalking. In order to assess whether Congress intended for its stalking statute to prohibit the same type of harm prohibited by New York’s intentional murder statute, there is no requirement to determine if defendant intended to cause Thompson’s death. Judge Garnett determined that there is no such requirement. <em>Mangione</em>, 818 F. Supp. 3d at 533–36. Therefore, the application of the federal sentence-enhancement statute does not necessarily equate with Congress intending to prohibit the same essential harm as New York’s intentional murder statute. <em>Garcia</em> has provided a significant legal principle: a prior federal conviction which carries a penalty for death does not preclude a later state homicide prosecution under New York CPL § 40.20(2)(b).</p><h3>D. The federal sentence-enhancement provision does not convert stalking into intentional murder.</h3><p>One of defendant’s strongest arguments based upon statute is that he was convicted of federal stalking offenses, and that these convictions involve a death resulting from the stalking, and thus exposed him to possible life imprisonment, thereby establishing that Congress intended to punish the same type of harm prohibited by New York’s intentional murder statute. However, this argument confuses the punitive measure that is authorized for increased severity with the primary objective of the underlying statute. Moreover, it is at this point that the media and general public have overlooked a key aspect of this puzzle. That is, Congress defined stalking and cyber-stalking in 18 U.S.C. § 2261A, and then created increased penalties when death occurs in 18 U.S.C. § 2261(b)(1). Importantly, 18 U.S.C. § 2261(b)(1) does not require a prosecutor to demonstrate that defendant intentionally killed Thompson. Conversely, an intention to take another person’s life is a necessary element of New York penal law § 125.25(1)’s second degree murder offense.</p><h3>United States v. Mangione:</h3><p>As noted above, Judge Garnett dismissed several of the federal firearm-related counts because she found that stalking was not a “crime of violence” within the applicable federal definition. <em>Mangione</em>, 818 F. Supp. 3d at 537. Specifically, she stated that stalking could result in death without any intent to kill or foreseen killing; accordingly, the death-resulting provision did not convert the original stalking offenses into crimes requiring either an intent to use violent force or violent force to achieve an illegal goal. Id. at 533–36 (finding that death does not need to be intended or foreseeably likely to result from stalking). While the second circuit employs a different categorical approach than does New York in determining what constitutes a crime of violence under federal law, Judge Garnett’s reading of the federal statutes provides some guidance regarding whether federal stalking resulting in death involves conduct that does not constitute intentional murder. As noted above, the critical difference between the most severe federal and state charges relates to whether the killing was an increase in the level of punishment for defendant’s federal stalking offenses, rather than being an inherent part of them.</p><p>Therefore, defendant’s possible exposure to life imprisonment does not establish that the federal stalking statute prohibits the same essential harm as does New York’s intentional-murder statute. As stated many times throughout this motion, the extent of punishment authorized by a statute does not control its purpose. <em>Kaplan</em>, 71 N.Y.2d at 229–30 (“[c]ourts must look to the harms that [the Legislature] intended to prevent”). Rather, determining whether one statute addresses the same harm as another requires examining the substantive wrongdoing that each Legislature sought to prevent through legislation. The federal statutes prohibit stalking and its consequences; conversely, the state statute prohibits intentional homicide itself.</p><h3>Point II</h3><p>The Defendant is incorrect that the same argument he presented to support his motion to dismiss in <em>Wiley</em> also applies here for two reasons. First, because the fact pattern in this case is significantly different than that in <em>Wiley. S</em>econd, because The Court of Appeals Decision in <em>Wiley</em> did not hold that any prior prosecution resulting in conviction involving the death of the same victim as the subject of the current prosecution barred all subsequent homicide charges under CPL § 40.20(2)(b).</p><h3>A. Wiley is distinguishable because it involved a conspiracy specifically targeting murder in Maryland.</h3><p>Defendant’s best counter-authority is <em>Matter of Wiley v. Altman</em>, 52 N.Y.2d 410 (1981). In <em>Wiley</em>, a defendant was acquitted of conspiring to commit murder in Maryland and thereafter charged with murdering the same victim in New York. The Court of Appeals held that the “different harms” exception did not apply because both conspiracy and murder statutes dealt with protecting against the same type of harm: an intentional unlawful taking of a specific human life. Id. at 415 (finding that the prior murder conspiracy prosecution and subsequent murder prosecution both involved substantially similar harm). Defendant can argue that <em>Wiley</em> controls because his federal stalking convictions involved allegations of an intent to kill Thompson and an enhanced sentence because Thompson died. However, as noted previously, defendant’s federal convictions focused on a completely different set of elements and purposes than did those of his conspiracy conviction in <em>Wiley</em>. Specifically, Maryland’s conspiracy offense specifically involved agreements to commit murder, whereas 18 U.S.C. § 2261A deals with much broader conduct involving intent to kill, injure, harass or intimidate. Therefore, like murder under Maryland law, federal stalking offenses do not include any agreement to commit murder, any completed intentional killing or any intent to cause death. Accordingly, federal stalking offenses do not include all of the substantive wrongdoing that includes murder as described in <em>Wiley</em>.</p><p>Furthermore, <em>Wiley</em> did not find that any prior prosecution involving the death of the same victim as the subject Matter of a subsequent homicide charge barred prosecution for the new homicide charge. Instead, <em>Wiley</em> required an analysis of legislative purposes and found those purposes to be substantially overlapping in that case. Id. at 415. Here again we see different legislative purposes — although arising from the same death — as evidenced by Congress prohibiting fear-inducing behavior under federal law and New York prohibiting intentional killings.</p><h3>B. Manafort does not mandate dismissal since it requires significantly greater differences in legislative purpose than exists here.</h3><p><em>People v. Manafort</em>, 187 A.D.3d 612 (1st Dep’t 2020), affirmatively dismissed New York felony fraud charges following defendant’s federal convictions arising from identical schemes to defraud using money laundering techniques. Id. at 612–13 (holding that the federal and state statutes, all directed against fraudulent transactions, were not designed to prevent very different kinds of harm or evil) the New York and federal offenses had differing elements, but both were directed at preventing financial fraud in various ways. Id. at 612–13. The holding in <em>Manafort</em> affirms that mere differences in statutory elements will not satisfy the requirements needed to invoke the “different harms” exception — i.e., differences in legislative purpose must also exist. Although <em>Manafort</em> presents an example where statutes addressed more overlapping forms of conduct than does this case (e.g., financial fraud under both state and federal law), there are important differences between this case and <em>Manafort</em> that make it more easily distinguishable from this case than others cited herein. Specifically, both federal bank fraud and residential mortgage fraud under New York law deal with fraudulent financial transactions using identical means (i.e., false representations concerning property value). Additionally, both involve fraudulent uses of funds obtained through legitimate means, and both deal with related state charges addressing how these fraudulent activities are carried out. See Decision &amp; order at 24–27, <em>People v. Manafort</em>, Indictment №774/2019 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 18, 2019), aff’d, 187 A.D.3d 612 (1st Dep’t 2020). Conversely, stalking can occur absent physical injury or death; whereas intentional murder inherently requires death. These represent mutually exclusive categories of criminal wrongdoing, regardless of commonality in terms of threats to personal safety.</p><h3>Point III</h3><p>These federal firearm-related counts which were dismissed before defendant entered his guilty plea do not independently bars the remaining state firearm offenses.</p><p>Defendant alternatively asserts that even though he entered a guilty plea to some of his federal firearm-related charges — which were dismissed before he entered his guilty plea — he should nonetheless be barred from facing any state firearm-related charges for those offenses. This assertion presents yet another question based upon statute — namely whether any counts dismissed prior to entry of judgment are considered former prosecutions under CPL § 40.30(1). Section 40.30(1) states that a prior prosecution is deemed to be complete only once there is an accusatory instrument filed charging defendant with an offense(s), plus there is one or more qualifying procedural events occurring after such filing including conviction upon a guilty plea or commencement of trial. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 40.30(1). The prosecution posits that neither condition was met relative to defendant’s fired firearm-related counts which were dismissed before his entry into a guilty plea.</p><p>On January 30, 2026 — months before defendant pleaded guilty to federal stalking and cyberstalking offenses — Judge Garnett dismissed defendant’s federal firearm-related counts — see <em>Mangione</em>, 818 F. Supp. 3d at 537 — which were never submitted to trial nor resulted in any form of conviction. Prior decisions by New York courts have recognized that mere filing of charges does not establish jeopardy — cf. <em>Matter of Lockett v. Juviler</em>, 65 N.Y.2d 182, 187 (1985) (“jeopardy attaches when trial commences…only then can double jeopardy issues arise”) — and likewise has held that dismissal of charges prior to submission to a jury will permit further prosecution after such dismissal so long as guilt or innocence was not decided prior thereto — cf. <em>People v. Key</em>, 45 N.Y.2d 111, 117–20 (1978).</p><p>A similar analogy can be seen in <em>People v. Austin</em> supra — wherein an appellate division panel upheld a lower court determination allowing for subsequent state charges following defendant’s guilty plea to federal firearm charges — which resulted from involvement with the very same firearm as that which formed part of defendant’s state charges — see <em>People v. Austin</em>, 14 Misc. 3d 295, 298–301 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 2006) (allowing for state prosecution after federal weapons convictions because both jurisdictions employed different-elements test plus different-harms test which supported successive prosecutions). While <em>Austin</em> does not answer whether previously dismissed federal charges constitute prior prosecutions under CPL § 40.30(1), it illustrates that allegations of firearm-related charges may overlap and still fail to demonstrate automatic bar to state firearm-related charges employing such exceptions.</p><p>However, as noted previously, the defense may contend that since defendant eventually pled guilty to federal stalking offenses — resulting from an investigation into his conduct during which he allegedly possessed and used a firearm in connection with said stalking — that said guilty plea operates as a “previous prosecution” as regards dismissed counts relating to possession and/or use of said firearm months earlier — thereby negating prosecution for dismissed firearm-related counts as “prior prosecution[s]” under CPL § 40.30(1) — blurring lines distinguishing charges prosecuted until judgment is entered from charges dismissed prior to attachment of jeopardy for said charges — since said dismissed firearm-related counts did not result in either conviction or trial — they afford little basis for asserting a bar pursuant to CPL § 40.30(1) — any claim based upon federal stalking convictions shall be evaluated separately applying same-transaction rules and exceptions thereto.</p><h3>Point IV</h3><p>Defendant has not established a separate violation of due process based upon the timing or alleged coordination between the state and federal prosecutions. He alleges that state and federal prosecutors colluded over timing for their respective prosecutions to assure both could secure convictions; and that scheduling caused defendant unreasonable hardship in pursuing an extreme emotional disturbance affirmative defense to the state prosecution. Although due process affords protection to a defendant’s ability to adequately prepare and fairly present a defense — see <em>Washington v. Texas</em>, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) — communications among prosecutors representing different levels of government do not necessarily offend constitutional mandates — see <em>United States v. Aboumoussallem</em>, 726 F.2d 906, 910 n.3 (2d Cir. 1984).</p><p>Defense counsel’s claimed prejudice arises from having been placed in a situation where he must simultaneously develop an affirmative defense available under New York law (extreme emotional disturbance) versus making revelations which could negatively impact his federally-charged offense(s). While defendant may experience significant strategic disadvantage by reason thereof — such does not independently entitle defendant to relief based upon due process violations. And under New York state law generally — particularly in this case given the defense’s failure to timely submit requested discovery documents to the court — there is a high burden on defendant to demonstrate entitlement to relief. See memorandum regarding defense counsel’s motion to dismiss charges for prosecutorial misconduct at page two (“…the district attorney denies any improper prosecutorial agreement and avers that defendant had ample time to research his extreme emotional disturbance defense before withdrawing his notice of intent.”).</p><h3>CONCLUSION</h3><p>While the New York legislature enacted a statute that provides greater protection against double jeopardy under the Statute than does the U.S. Constitution, the Legislature clearly reserved successive prosecutions when there were differences in the offenses based upon different elements, and when those offenses involved very different types of harm or evils. N.Y. C.P.L.R. Sec. 40.20 (2) (b). In determining whether successive prosecutions violate double jeopardy, the New York Court of Appeals has held that such determinations are to be made with regard to legislative purpose, not necessarily the specific conduct which gave rise to the charges. See Kaplan v. Superior Ct., supra 71 NY2d at 230. Moreover, the New York Court of Appeals has also upheld successive state attempts to prosecute defendant for attempted murder and weapons offenses after defendant had been convicted in federal court for crimes arising out of the same violent criminal transaction, where the two state statutes addressed different harms. See Bryant v. New York, supra 92 NY2d at 229–31.</p><p>Additionally, granting defendant’s motion would allow defendant to escape prosecution for murder in New York despite his admissions in federal court that he did kill Thompson; and, additionally, allowing defendant to avoid prosecution under a statute explicitly allowed by the legislature to provide additional means to pursue a prosecution. While courts can never ignore statutory provisions regarding double jeopardy simply because ignoring them would benefit a defendant, nor should courts nullify a provision of law where a provision is explicitly provided for by the legislature and the conditions necessary for the application of the provision are met.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=7cb702a3f4ca" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Open letter to the Prime Minister from judges, barristers, solicitors, and other legal…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@christinesavino/open-letter-to-the-prime-minister-from-judges-barristers-solicitors-and-other-legal-8089a1500f38?source=rss-1f0c0a568957------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/8089a1500f38</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[social-justice]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[law]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[courts]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[justice]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[united-kingdom]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Christine C. Savino]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 06 Apr 2026 16:24:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-04-06T16:24:00.035Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Open letter to the Prime Minister from judges, barristers, solicitors, and other legal professionals on the importance of British juries</h3><p><a href="https://www.barcouncil.org.uk/media-campaigns/campaigns/justice-needs-juries/open-letter-to-pm.html">Open letter to the Prime Minister</a></p><p>Rt Hon Sir Keir Starmer KC MP<br>Prime Minister<br>10 Downing Street, London SW1A 2AA</p><p>cc Rt Hon David Lammy KC MP, Deputy Prime Minister and Lord Chancellor</p><p>March 2026</p><p>Dear Prime Minister,</p><p><strong>Justice needs juries</strong></p><p>We write in our capacity as legal professionals with extensive experience of working in courts across England and Wales at all levels and in all jurisdictions, to request that you rethink proposals to remove jury trials for cases with anticipated sentences of up to three years’ imprisonment.</p><p>We fully support and share the Government’s aim of bringing down the backlog in the criminal courts and reducing delays between alleged offence and completion of the case. We have long warned that the criminal justice system is in crisis. We know the serious impact this has on complainants, witnesses and defendants, as well as all those working in the courts.</p><p><strong>Juries have not caused this crisis.</strong> In Part 2 of the Independent Review of the Criminal Courts (Leveson Review), Sir Brian Leveson states that “the most significant cause is chronic underfunding at every step.” He finds that: “Decades of sustained reductions in funding have left the criminal courts with fewer available courtrooms, a diminished and less experienced workforce and a severely dilapidated court estate.”</p><p>Every day we see and hear of delays in the system caused by court rooms continuing to be unused due to the ongoing cap on sitting days, the late delivery of defendants by the Prisoner Escort and Custody Service (PECS), broken facilities in crumbling court buildings, and shortages of court staff, judges and counsel.</p><p>Our opposition to curtailing jury trials is principled and pragmatic. Practically, the proposals are based on little evidence. <a href="https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/publication/judge-only-trials-court-demand-productivity">Research by the Institute for Government</a> details that the proposal for judge-only trials would save less than 2% of court time, if they are 20% faster, which is itself “highly uncertain” (<a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/686be85d81dd8f70f5de3c1f/35.49_MOJ_Ind_Review_Criminal_Courts_v8b_FINAL_WEB.pdf">Leveson Review Part 1</a>). We do not support the erosion of a deeply entrenched constitutional principle for negligible gain and with substantial risks.</p><p>Further, both the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Courts and Legal Services have stated that the reduction of the jury trial would be pursued irrespective of there being a backlog of cases.</p><p>Instead of draining valuable time and resources attempting to force through an unpopular, untested and poorly evidenced change to our jury system — and one that will only have effect, if any, in 2028/2029 — we urge the Government to focus on the changes we know will make a difference now — many of which are set out in detail in Part 2 of the Leveson review.</p><p>In particular, we support opening all the courts so they can hear cases, intense court listing — such as has been effective in reducing the backlog at Liverpool Crown Court, Woolwich Crown Court and, during Covid, on the Western Circuit — revising the contract with PECS to ensure that defendants are delivered to the dock on time, and better use of technology.</p><p>It is also important to look at delays occurring after the reporting of a crime. Substantial delays are at the pre-court stage: for example, for all rape cases, the median time from offence to completion is 1,056 days (35 months), of which just 365 days (12 months) represents the median court time (from receipt in the Crown Court to completion). (<a href="https://url.uk.m.mimecastprotect.com/s/O5qTCDR6guB4NJvuWf8IjvY-4?domain=assets.publishing.service.gov.uk">See data</a>.)</p><p>We therefore strongly support Sir Brian’s call to future-proof the system with “sustained and strategic investment in services, people, infrastructure and technology.”</p><p>Criminal law professionals continue to stretch themselves to ensure that the voices of complainants, victims and defendants are heard in court. We ask that the Government now listens to our voices, as solicitors, barristers and recently retired judges who have evidenced measures that reduce the backlog of cases without requiring curtailing jury trials.</p><p>Justice should be viewed as a vital public service that deserves investment, just like education and health.</p><p>Signed:</p><p>1. Kirsty Brimelow KC, Chair of the Bar Council of England and Wales<br>2. Heidi Stonecliffe KC, Vice Chair of the Bar Council of England and Wales<br>3. Riel Karmy-Jones KC, Chair of the Criminal Bar Association<br>4. Andrew Thomas KC, Vice Chair of the Criminal Bar Association<br>5. Claire Davies KC, Leader of the South Eastern Circuit<br>6. Caroline Goodwin KC, Leader of the North Eastern Circuit<br>7. Samantha Hillas KC, Leader of the Northern Circuit<br>8. Sarah Jones KC, Leader of the Western Circuit<br>9. Christopher Rees KC, Leader of the Wales and Chester Circuit<br>10. Harpreet Sandhu KC, Leader of the Midland Circuit</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8089a1500f38" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Amal Clooney and Philippa Webb speak to Oxford Law Faculty]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@christinesavino/amal-clooney-and-philippa-webb-speak-to-oxford-law-faculty-33f0de798f02?source=rss-1f0c0a568957------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/33f0de798f02</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[law]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[philippa-webb]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[human-rights]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[amal-clooney]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Christine C. Savino]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 15 Mar 2026 07:52:49 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-03-15T07:52:49.097Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>On 15th May, Amal Clooney and Philippa Webb presented the event, “Waging Justice in an Age of Authoritarianism”, to an audience of Oxford Law faculty, students, and alumni at St. Hugh’s College, Clooney’s alma mater.</p><p>The event focused on Clooney and Webb’s book, <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-right-to-a-fair-trial-in-international-law-9780198808398?cc=us&amp;lang=en&amp;"><em>The Right to a Fair Trial in International Law</em></a>, a comprehensive analysis and collection of jurisprudence relating to the right to a fair trial. It was chaired by Oxford Faculty of Law professor and director of the <a href="https://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/">Oxford Human Rights Hub</a>, Sandra Fredman.</p><p>Clooney and Webb are legal mavens who have made commendable strides in international human rights.</p><p>Clooney is an international human rights lawyer, Adjunct Professor of international human rights law at <a href="https://www.law.columbia.edu/">Columbia Law School</a>, and co-founder of the <a href="https://cfj.org/">Clooney Foundation for Justice</a>.</p><p>Webb is an international public law barrister, Professor of Public International Law at <a href="https://www.kcl.ac.uk/">King’s College London</a>, and board member of the Clooney Foundation for Justice.</p><p>The event began with Clooney thanking St. Hugh’s for welcoming her “back home” to where her professional life began. She then described how her relationship with Webb commenced 20 years ago when they met in the International Court of Justice.</p><p>Many cases and years later, Clooney explained, Webb was the only one she approached to write the 1,000-page book on international human rights law.</p><p>Clooney also announced that the duo have been working on another international human rights book. It will also be published by the Oxford University Press and focus on the freedom of speech, with a release scheduled for January 2024.</p><p>Clooney and Webb then discussed the importance of the right to a fair trial and how all other human rights rest on it. Without it, they explained, such rights can be denied through government overreach.</p><p>The pair’s research uncovered that in a wide range of states, including Japan, Russia, Israel, China, and Georgia, the conviction rate in criminal trials is higher than 99%. It also revealed that a startling number of laws that target expression are criminal in nature.</p><p>More than 160 states have criminal penalties for defamatory speech, and <a href="https://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/Blasphemy%20Laws%20Report.pdf">blasphemy</a> is illicit in over 80 countries. Defamatory speech also carries the death sentence in at least 5 of these countries.</p><p>Clooney also described how she advocates for democracy through her cases, such as that of defending former Maldives President <a href="https://www.doughtystreet.co.uk/news/article/un-working-group-finds-detention-of-mohamed-nasheed-arbitrary-and-urge1">Mohamed Nasheed</a>, also known as the “Mandela of the Maldives”. Nasheed was sentenced to 13 years imprisonment for political dissent.</p><p>Likewise, Clooney also represents <a href="https://www.doughtystreet.co.uk/news/amal-clooney-and-caoilfhionn-gallagher-kc-welcome-acquittal-maria-ressa-spurious-tax-charges">Maria Ressa</a>, Nobel Laureate, journalist, and founder of Filipino news site Rappler. Ressa has been arrested numerous times, and criminally sentenced to decades behind bars for her advocacy of democracy in the Philippines and condemnation of former President Rodrigo Duterte.</p><p>However, Clooney and Webb underscored that, by continuing to pursue the global fight for the right to a fair trial, we can tip the scales towards justice. Speaking to the Oxford Student after the event, Webb remarked that “Amal and I were delighted to share our work on advancing free speech and fair trials…The need for action — for the waging of justice — is urgent. The number of autocracies in the world today exceeds the number of democracies. We believe that international law is part of the solution [and] that there are many scholars and students at Oxford who feel the same way!”</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=33f0de798f02" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Reflections on My Experience as a Fulbright Scholar in Taiwan]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@christinesavino/reflections-on-my-experience-as-a-fulbright-scholar-in-taiwan-3607921602e1?source=rss-1f0c0a568957------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/3607921602e1</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[human-rights]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[taiwan]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[first-generation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[fulbright-scholarship]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[fulbright]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Christine C. Savino]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 04 Jun 2024 10:47:56 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-06-08T09:38:07.220Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>“When people talk, the world shrinks.”</p><p>The <a href="https://us.fulbrightonline.org/">Fulbright Program</a>, the flagship initiative for international exchange, was quite the fit for me, as I love the wonderful diversity of people, cultures, and languages around the world. As such, I believe that humanity does not stop at borders, and the enrichment of intercultural exchange betters us all. As my experience as a Fulbright Scholar in Taiwan comes to an end, I find myself reflecting on the incredible journey that has been both professionally and personally transformative. The <a href="https://us.fulbrightonline.org/">Fulbright Program</a> operates in over 140 countries worldwide and is renowned for fostering mutual understanding and cultural exchange around the globe. My time in Taiwan has certainly lived up to this mission.</p><p><strong>Why Taiwan?</strong></p><p>My decision to pursue a Fulbright Scholarship in Taiwan was largely driven by my admiration of Taiwan and its people. Taiwan’s rich history in international human rights, its commitment to democracy, and its pioneering achievements in social progress were key factors in my decision.</p><p><strong>Human Rights and Social Progress</strong></p><p>For example, Taiwan is the first Asian country to legalize same-sex marriage, a landmark decision made on May 24, 2019, following a 2017 Constitutional Court ruling that the existing marriage laws were unconstitutional. This progressive stance on LGBTQ+ rights exemplifies Taiwan’s commitment to human rights and social equality. Former <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Tsai-Ing-wen">President Tsai Ing-wen</a> (蔡英文, Cài Yīngwén) eloquently <a href="https://english.president.gov.tw/NEWS/6410">stated</a>, “defending human rights is a principled task that resonates with and inspires like-minded international actors to work together to achieve life-changing reforms.”</p><p><strong>Democratic Development</strong></p><p>Taiwan’s transition to democracy was another significant aspect of its appeal. After the lifting of <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/end-martial-law-important-anniversary-taiwan">martial law</a> (戒严, jièyán) in 1987, Taiwan embarked on a path towards democratic governance. The first direct presidential election in 1996 marked a major milestone, with Lee Teng-hui (李登辉, Lǐ Dēnghuī) becoming the first democratically elected president. This shift underscored Taiwan’s dedication to democratic values and political freedom.</p><p>It is also significant to me that Former President Tsai Ing-wen, the first woman to hold the office, was elected in 2016. Tsai is an alumna of my school, <a href="https://www.cornell.edu/">Cornell University</a>, where she earned her Master of Laws degree in 1980.</p><p><strong>International Recognition and Challenges</strong></p><p>Despite Taiwan’s advancements, it faces unique challenges on the international stage. Taiwan was a founding member of the <a href="https://www.un.org/en">United Nations</a> in 1945, representing China. However, in 1971, UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 recognized the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as “the only legitimate representative of China to the United Nations,” resulting in Taiwan’s exclusion from the UN. Taiwan’s ongoing efforts to participate in international organizations, despite these setbacks, highlight its resilience and commitment to global engagement.</p><p><strong>Professional Growth</strong></p><p>One of the most rewarding aspects of my Fulbright Scholarship was the opportunity to immerse myself in Taiwan’s academic community. Collaborating with local scholars, professionals, and students allowed me to gain fresh perspectives and insights. The resources available at Taiwanese institutions, coupled with the enthusiasm and expertise of my colleagues, have been instrumental in advancing my work. Likewise, I have been able to teach my peers and students about American and global culture thus expanding their knowledge base of the vast and wonderful world. By teaching my students English and explaining to them how purposeful it is for international connection, given that it is the lingua franca, I have been able to open new parts of the globe to them.</p><p>Teaching in Taiwan was a unique challenge that pushed me out of my comfort zone. Adapting my teaching methods to better suit Taiwanese students’ learning styles helped me grow. Their eagerness to learn and their respect for education were truly inspiring. The exchange of knowledge was not one-sided; I learned just as much from my students as they did from me.</p><p><strong>Cultural Immersion</strong></p><p>Living in Taiwan provided me with a profound appreciation for its rich culture and history. From the bustling night markets (夜市, yèshì) of Taipei to the serene temples in the countryside of Kinmen, every corner of Taiwan offered a new adventure.</p><p><strong>Celebrating Traditions</strong></p><p>As a Fulbright Scholar in Taiwan, I had the immense privilege of experiencing Taiwan’s vibrant traditions firsthand. Celebrating my first Chinese New Year (春节, Chūnjié) in 2024, the Year of the Dragon (龙年, Lóng Nián), was an unforgettable highlight. The festivities were filled with fireworks, lion dances (舞狮, wǔ shī), and the warmth of family gatherings.</p><p>Attending the Lantern Festival (元宵节, Yuánxiāo Jié) in Pingxi was another magical experience. Writing my wishes on a lantern and releasing it into the night sky among thousands of others was an enriching experience.</p><p>Participating in the Tomb Sweeping Festival (清明节, Qīngmíng Jié), gave me a deeper understanding of Taiwanese reverence for ancestors. It was a humbling experience to join in the rituals of cleaning and offering respects at the gravesites.</p><p><strong>Gaining Linguistic and Cultural Insights</strong></p><p>Gaining linguistic advancement through immersion was a significant part of my journey as a Fulbright Scholar. Coming into my Fulbright, I knew French and Spanish, but was conversational in Chinese. Being fully immersed in Taiwan has allowed me to not only become more proficient in Mandarin (普通话, Pǔtōnghuà) but also deepened my connection to the local culture. Engaging with locals in their native language opened doors to more meaningful interactions and friendships, further appreciating the culture and people of Taiwan.</p><p>我现在甚至可以用中文阅读《<a href="https://cn.nytimes.com/">纽约时报</a>》了。</p><p><strong>Exploring the Region</strong></p><p>During my Fulbright Scholarship, I was also fortunate to travel to and engage in cultural immersion in Japan, Hong Kong, and South Korea. Each of these destinations offered unique insights and broadened my understanding of East Asian cultures.</p><p>- Japan: Visiting historical sites in Kyoto and experiencing the blend of tradition and modernity in Tokyo were highlights. Participating in a tea ceremony and witnessing the meticulous art of sushi-making deepened my appreciation for Japanese culture.<br> <br>- Hong Kong: Exploring the vibrant cityscape and understanding the region’s complex history of British and Chinese influences was enlightening. The bustling markets, serene temples, and stunning skyline provided a rich cultural tapestry.</p><p>- South Korea: Immersing myself in the dynamic culture of Seoul, visiting the ancient palaces, and experiencing the innovative technology and pop culture phenomena were memorable. Participating in traditional Korean festivals and trying diverse Korean cuisine added to the enriching experience.</p><p><strong>Creative Expression</strong></p><p>Inspired by my experiences in Taiwan, I wrote a poem about a panda I saw at the Taipei Zoo. This poem, written in the traditional Taiwanese style with a focus on nature, will be published in a Fulbright Taiwan magazine. Here is an excerpt:</p><p>Panda Bear<br>Christine Savino</p><p><em>I saw a panda bear, he’s so cute, <br>Sitting on the grass, eating a bamboo chute.</em></p><p><em>I saw a panda bear, each ear is a tiny nub, <br>Stacked fruit and bamboo beside him, Taiwan gives him lots of love.</em></p><p><em>In the Taipei Zoo, beneath the sun’s bright ray, <br>Munching happily, in his gentle way.</em></p><p><em>Black and white fur, a sight to behold, <br>In harmony with nature, so pure and bold.</em></p><p><em>From distant lands, people come to see, <br>The panda bear’s cute gaze, bridging you and me.</em></p><p><em>In his panda eyes, a world’s reflection, <br>Cultures united, a global connection.</em></p><p><strong>Community Engagement</strong></p><p>As a Fulbright Scholar, I partnered with <a href="https://www.reachtheworld.org/">Reach the World</a> to organize a cross-cultural <a href="https://www.reachtheworld.org/christines-journey-taiwan">pen pal program</a> between American and Taiwanese students. This initiative fostered mutual understanding and friendships across cultures. The program provided students with the opportunity to share their experiences, learn about each other’s cultures, and develop a deeper appreciation for global diversity.</p><p>Additionally, I engaged in human rights and immigration work in Taiwan. Collaborating with local organizations, I worked on initiatives aimed at supporting migrant workers and advocating for their rights. These experiences were not only fulfilling but also reinforced the importance of cross-cultural understanding and cooperation.</p><p><strong>Personal Growth</strong></p><p>The experience of living in a foreign country taught me resilience and adaptability. Navigating daily life in a new environment, far from the familiar, required me to be resourceful and open-minded. I learned to embrace uncertainty and to see challenges as opportunities for growth.</p><p>My time in Taiwan also underscored the importance of cultural sensitivity and empathy. Understanding and respecting different cultural norms and practices enriched my interactions and helped me build stronger relationships with those around me. This experience has made me more globally minded and appreciative of diversity.</p><p><strong>Community and Connections</strong></p><p>One of the most important aspects of my Fulbright Scholarship journey was the sense of community. The friendships I formed with other Fulbright scholars, local colleagues, and neighbors are among the most valuable takeaways. These connections provided support, camaraderie, and a sense of belonging internationally.</p><p>Participating in community service and outreach programs allowed me to give back to the community that welcomed me so warmly. These experiences were not only fulfilling but also reinforced the importance of cross-cultural understanding and cooperation.</p><p><strong>Looking Ahead</strong></p><p>As I prepare to leave Taiwan, I am filled with gratitude for the experiences and lessons this journey has provided. The <a href="https://us.fulbrightonline.org/">Fulbright Scholarship</a> has not only advanced my academic and professional goals but also enriched my life in countless ways. The memories and friendships I have made will remain with me, influencing my future endeavors and perspectives.</p><p>Looking ahead, I am excited to continue my educational journey by pursuing a J.D. at <a href="https://www.cornell.edu/">Cornell University</a>. The insights and skills I have gained during my Fulbright Scholarship will undoubtedly inform my studies and future career in law.</p><p>I encourage anyone considering applying for a Fulbright Scholarship to submit an application. It is a transformative experience that fosters growth, understanding, and lasting connections.</p><p>Taiwan will always hold a special place in my heart, and I am excited to carry forward the lessons and insights gained during my time here.</p><p><em>谢谢台湾, 下次见 (Xièxiè Táiwān, xià cì jiàn)</em></p><p><em>Merci, Taïwan, à la prochaine</em></p><p><em>Gracias, Taiwán, hasta la próxima</em></p><p><em>If you have any questions about applying, please feel free to contact me at ccs253@cornell.edu.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3607921602e1" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Statement Calling for Humanitarianism in Gaza by 1,800+ Rhodes, Fulbright, Truman, Marshall…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@christinesavino/statement-calling-for-humanitarianism-in-gaza-by-1-800-rhodes-fulbright-truman-marshall-2bf99976f208?source=rss-1f0c0a568957------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2bf99976f208</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[peace]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[human-rights]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[humanitarianism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[human-rights-violations]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Christine C. Savino]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 05 Nov 2023 02:24:07 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-11-05T02:24:07.542Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Statement Calling for Humanitarianism in Gaza by 1,800+ Rhodes, Fulbright, Truman, Marshall, Knight-Hennessy, Schwarzman, Paul and Daisy Soros, Luce, and other Scholars</h3><p><a href="https://medium.com/@scholarscoalition/joint-statement-calling-for-an-end-to-the-siege-and-bombardment-of-gaza-96cd2b5cd690">https://medium.com/@scholarscoalition/joint-statement-calling-for-an-end-to-the-siege-and-bombardment-of-gaza-96cd2b5cd690</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2bf99976f208" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Sudan Genocide Warning Letter]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@christinesavino/sudan-genocide-warning-letter-70507fbc1e6e?source=rss-1f0c0a568957------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/70507fbc1e6e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[genocide]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[human-rights-law]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[international-law]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[law]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[human-rights]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Christine C. Savino]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 24 Jul 2023 17:09:23 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-07-24T17:09:23.134Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect</p><p><a href="https://www.globalr2p.org/publications/sudan-genocide-warning-letter/">https://www.globalr2p.org/publications/sudan-genocide-warning-letter/</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=70507fbc1e6e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
    </channel>
</rss>