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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Collin Anderson on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Collin Anderson on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@collina?source=rss-3210b87c804c------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Collin Anderson on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@collina?source=rss-3210b87c804c------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[Bears and Kittens, and Startup Cybersecurity Companies]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@collina/bears-and-kittens-and-startup-cybersecurity-companies-5c8e037ea75c?source=rss-3210b87c804c------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Collin Anderson]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 18 May 2017 19:38:48 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-05-18T19:38:48.223Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>On any other day under normal circumstances, the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/15/technology/web-defenders-detect-russian-hand-in-iranians-hacking-attempt.html">New York Times’ sensational account</a> of collaboration between Russian hackers and the Iranian government would have been the talk of D.C. foreign policy circles. In its Monday article, the NYT writes in the language of trench warfare about attacks conducted against a military contractor (n.b.: in the Executive Summary the victim is described as a “government office installation”) waged by Iranians armed with a “tool set developed by a known Russian hacker-for-hire and sold in underground Russian forums.” Worse yet, the same malware found in attacks against Ukrainian power plants. But on any other day, so too would the focus have also been on the events in Syria, Venezuela, and any number of the controversies of the new administration. And so the article ended up on Page B5, immediately trampled over by that day’s unprecedented and unimaginable action by the Trump Administration.</p><p>In absence of meaningful attention, the assertions made by TrapX Security never received their due scrutiny and linger in the ether, bound to be picked up in the next Congressional sanctions bill or think tank publication on cybersecurity.</p><p>It would not be unimaginable that the two countries cooperate on cyber warfare, after all their defense ties are so close that Russia <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-iran-rouhani-base-idUSKBN16Z0NU">violated</a> a half-century political norm regarding the use of Iranian military bases by foreign powers. Ever since the Iranian Cyber Army defaced the sites of Voice of America, commentators and former government officials have recurrently suggested foreign support from Russia or North Korea. However, in a forthcoming Carnegie Endowment paper on Iranian cyber warfare we argue that every documented case of espionage or destructive attacks is commensurate with the sorts of tactics that we would expect of the country. Even if only a tenth of the diaspora talent that is scattered across Silicon Valley and Europe were to stay in Iran, that’s more than enough to run a sufficient cyber warfare operation. On the other side of the claim, as <a href="https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf">FireEye has documented</a>, Russia — interested in its ally’s foreign policy position and nuclear program — has engaged in its own cyber espionage against Iran. It’s difficult to see the two countries as dependent on each other in the “cyber domain.”</p><p>TrapX’s revelations are timely. Over the past six months, Iran has engaged in offensive cyber attacks against Saudi Arabian institutions, coupled with improved attempts at espionage across and outside the region. There’s reasons to pay attention to Iran’s recent moves in cyber warfare.</p><p>In its 53 page document (thirty of which being appendixes, which are a bit padded for show), the security firm does provide a unique contribution to research on Iranian threats. The actors, dubbed “Oilrig,” that were involved in the intrusion of its client are one of the most professional and prolific groups that appear to be connected to Iran. <a href="http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/05/the-oilrig-campaign-attacks-on-saudi-arabian-organizations-deliver-helminth-backdoor/">Palo Alto Networks</a>, <a href="http://www.clearskysec.com/oilrig/">ClearSky</a> and <a href="https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/05/targeted_attacksaga.html">FireEye</a>, among others, have written several articles on the group over the past year. Taken together these technical publications describe a professionalization and improvement of an ambitious threat actor developing over a short period of time. TrapX meaningfully contributes to this line of work by thoroughly describing the behavior of the group once they are in the network. They are keen to mention that contribution, and its true. In fact, it is as though pages 14 and 15, the origin of all the following problems, were written by a completely different person (although the whole report could have used a copy edit with mistakes like “total virus”). While this is awkwardly documented through the lens of their proprietary network defense equipment, there’s no shame in salesmanship.</p><p>The problem with TrapX’s “Iranian Nation State Interdiction, Threat Actor: OilRig” is everything after, which roughly follows two lines:</p><ol><li>the claimed links with Russian threat groups fail in merit; and,</li><li>the overall analysis itself is problematic and laden with errors.</li></ol><p>Inherent within the disclosure is a self-serving information asymmetry that is an impediment to scrutiny: TrapX can claim it has other more compelling evidence that cannot be disclosed. This arises within the NYT piece and the actual report, where they are often circumspect about certain details. Thus, their ability to evaluate their own technical information is relevant to this critique and whether we should trust more opaquely-sourced claims.</p><h3>The Faulty Foundation</h3><p>To start with the second thematic critique as a framework for scrutiny, let me make some short pedantic points on errors that begin to accrue across the paper. I lead with this not because they are the report’s Achilles Heel, but because they accessible examples of the types of errors that cast a shadow of the overall edifice of the research to any independent reviewer.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/222/1*XxhdBiMWFAKYNgbFcZ1jMw.png" /></figure><p>In its analysis of a malware sample used to remotely control victims’ computers, TrapX provides a list of domain names used to communicate back to the attackers. Most of these active domain are well known based on ClearSky’s previous writings about the group, however, some ‘newly discovered’ domains offered in the report are quite strange. First, bc2.jp has been registered by a Japanese individual since October 2011. Second, the remaining three domains, supposedly using the country-code domains of Venezuela, Republic of Congo, and Benin, are impermissibly short under the rules of those registrars and have registration terms that require presence in the country. They also cost hundreds to thousands of dollars and take weeks to register — not ideal for malware. Although maybe there’s a buddy system for authoritarian countries.</p><p>But more importantly, what has clearly occurred is that TrapX or its partner have done static analysis of the malware to search for meaningful strings of characters. This is common and reasonable, but a first step. These particular strings must have matched a list of existing top-level domains, and were immediately thrown into the report as indicators of compromise. They were searching in a haystack for anything that could conceivably look like a domain, and when they found something, it was put in uncritically. The irregular capitalization in these supposed domains is further indication of that hypothesis these indicators are nothing more than random text. All of this should have been obvious–it’s an extremely basic mistake.</p><p>Where the salesmanship and intent of TrapX’s report starts to surface is in the description of this remote access tool — which they describe as a “weaponized backdoor advanced threat.” Great adjective use, but forgot persistent. The report then goes on to describe the malware as a “enhanced (new) version of the ‘ Flying Kitten RAT’ tool that was leveraged by the Iranian threat actor.” The call back to Flying Kitten, one of the first well-documented Iranian threats groups, is quite compelling on its own because from all indications they have not been active since Summer 2014. For a new version of their old malware, called “Stealer,” to resurface and progress from high-school project quality to “weaponized with an anti-reversing and anti-debugging techniques” would be quite impressive. But this is the first and last appearance of Flying Kitten in the report, with no proof of the connection.</p><p>That, as they note, “antivirus companies recognize this file as malware” is a hint that is strangely acknowledged and then pushed aside by TrapX: their “weaponized backdoor advanced threat” is the agent for the well-known penetration testing software Cobalt Strike. Again, fairly common with Iranian actors, who either use the trial version of the software or pirated copies. Why write your own malware, when excellent toolkits are freely available?</p><h3>The Russia Connection</h3><p>The errors are worth note because they start to show a failure to check basic claims, compounded by tendency to exaggerate their findings. There’s no shame in making mistakes, especially with respect to Iranian campaigns, which are so fluid and chaotic that no one seems to completely understand the ecosystem. This was a fact that I was reminded that same day when I was privately called out on an attribution claim that became weaker over time.</p><p>But, asserting cross-national cooperation is a strong statement that requires strong evidence, and TrapX overall offers us the following:</p><blockquote>This combined with the Russian C&amp;C domain registered to a known for-hire Russian hacker leads us to the conclusion that Russian contractors are supporting the Iranian OilRig attackers.</blockquote><p>TrapX’s evidence is both extremely weak, and technical incorrect, reliant on two pillars: an IP address and an email address.</p><p><strong>The IP Address</strong></p><p>The first hint of Russian involvement arises in the context of the Cobalt Strike sample, to quote TrapX:</p><blockquote>During the TrapX labs investigation, we identified indicators that point to Russian hacker involvement. Once the malicious code is executed and injects itself in to a legitimate process, and then tries to communicate with multiple IPs …[t]his IP is part of the black energy attack that was linked to the Russian government.</blockquote><p>Once the malware is run, it begins to engage in network activity, and TrapX began to look into who owned those Internet resources to find hints of who was behind the campaign. One of the addresses found had also apparently shown up in an evaluation of samples of the BlackEnergy malware agent associated with Russia. With the overlap, TrapX starts to build its case and implies the malware is BlackEnergy.</p><p>Rather uniquely for an Iranian group, the VPN client malware used to target TrapX’s client was signed with a security certificate that is supposed to provide some assurances that the software is trustworthy. This is a particularly helpful resource for attackers to acquire because Windows will not display a warning about the software being untrusted if it is signed. Oilrig had managed to get its hands on the code signing credentials for the Vermont-based company Ai Squared, which — while not Juniper–sufficed to skip the dialogue for fake Juniper software (it’s a weak arrangement). This backstory is crucial because it provides a counter hypothesis.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/296/1*HEc99BfyzddXO63X9fQ0kA.png" /><figcaption>OilRig Code Signing From ClearSky’s Investigation</figcaption></figure><p>When Windows runs signed software it automatically contacts the company responsible for issuing that certificate to make sure that it was still valid (this is called a CRL Request). The company that provided this certificate for the fake Juniper client is Symantec. Symantec, a global company that is dependent on their services being fast and globally accessible, hosts these services with the prominent content distribution network Akamai. Thus, when the client ran the malware, the first thing it did was contact one of Akamai’s servers, specifically one behind the IP address <strong>23.4.187.27</strong>. An example of the same malware sample running in the VirusTotal sandbox confirms this chain of events.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/959/1*AiwfRS_58opFZKR1bVVGfw.png" /><figcaption>This is apparently Russia in action. <a href="https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/40182c3b3c556f89a997a88af72292840a8527fb51beee03edde674cd7abcdd4/analysis/">https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/40182c3b3c556f89a997a88af72292840a8527fb51beee03edde674cd7abcdd4/analysis/</a></figcaption></figure><p>(n.b.: this IP claim does appear in a different section of the report than the signed malware, but if it was not the fakeJuniper client triggering the CRL, it was almost certainly another legitimate request–PCAPs showing it wasn’t a CRL request or it didn’t happen.)</p><p>The Russian IP link is normal Internet background noise. It would not be inconceivable to estimate that almost every computer on the Internet generates a request to Symantec (and thus those Akamai servers) as least once a day. What followed was a comedy of errors: previous investigations into BlackEnergy <a href="https://twitter.com/cherepanov74/status/864373931423272964">mistook this request</a> for malware functions without validating the address, and then TrapX saw the request and mistook it for BlackEnergy without validating the address.</p><p>The Akamai IP is not a Russian government resource.</p><p><strong>The Hacker</strong></p><p>The second piece of evidence is a bit harder to engage because it’s fairly unclear what TrapX is asserting and where it sources its supportive evidence. Essentially the claim is that there is a supposedly a Russian darknet figure that uses an alias “alen,” and on the basis of the domain used in a malware command and control, there’s a direct link to the two:</p><blockquote>The Russian hacker has been observed to use several e-mails with the combination of the name of alen.martin. It was determined that part of the C&amp;C domain used the name alen (e.g. alenupdate.info) and additional C&amp;C domain were registered under this name with corresponding e-mail addresses of martin.alen@mail[.]ru and alen@mail[.]ru.</blockquote><blockquote>Trapx Labs performed extensive research specifc to this threat actor and determined that “alen” uses additional e-mail addresses that correspond to a known Russian hacker that is continuously active within the Russian darknet network.</blockquote><p>The first two sentences of TrapX’s statement are correct and echo ClearSky’s report: the domain used for malware communications was “alenupdate.info” registered to “martin.alen@mail[.]ru” — which had also also registered another fake VPN domain. That’s where the trail stops. Firstly, in none of the indicators provided is there indication of a “alen@mail[.]ru” address — and the extremely useful DomainTools search service does not return any historically registered domain for that address.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/852/1*5KTT1qgZgBX__kL32WP1Ww.png" /><figcaption>I burned my monthly DomainTools search on this.</figcaption></figure><p>TrapX then tosses out a few more addresses without making clear the source: “alen130687@yandex[.]ru”, “ alenbost@yandex[.]ru” and “a10435536@nepwk[.]com,nchity@mail[.]ru” (sic). Again, no domains in DomainTools, and only one shows up on a search — within a list of <a href="http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:BifIzqVZeF4J:evil-hack.us/threads/24038/page-3+&amp;cd=1&amp;hl=en&amp;ct=clnk&amp;gl=us">username and passwords</a> from a site compromise.</p><p>That’s it. That’s the end of the trail.</p><p>To be clear, the use of Russian email services does not stand out beyond what we might expect of someone attempting to avoid scrutiny, such as using a provider that does not require phone numbers to register or does not comply with U.S. law. In fact, Iranian and other Middle Eastern groups have been observed using Russian email accounts, including Yandex and Mail.ru, for years now, so this is within the norm. We will publish something that illustrates this case at length in the coming week or so.</p><p><em>(By the way, are we really to believe that an international conspiracy between Russia and Iran communicates back to a domain with the attacker’s alias?)</em></p><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>So, this is where we stand: the assertion that Iran and Russia are collaborating on cyber warfare in the newspaper of record is build on a false claim and an unsubstantiated one. Detection of the BlackEnergy agent turns into a report of a vaguely similar IP addresses that is core Internet infrastructure with no actual samples of the Russian malware. The authors then say “trust us” and describe a persona is difficult to substantiate. But with so many errors, why should we trust TrapX?</p><p>The types of skepticism offered to the New York Times report are generic issues in attribution that actually don’t relate to the claims in the paper. This even calls into question whether there was any outside scrutiny of the report prior the NYT piece. This is important because the technical barriers to entry on such a report make evaluation of significant claims difficult for all but a select group of professionals. Most people when they read “single vulnerability probing technique searching for a specific Windows XP dll vulnerability” will gloss over this text mildly impressed with the technical language, rather than end up disappointed with the attacker being dependent on old vulnerabilities. And the story persists without critique or accountability. In the end, strange cybersecurity equipment is sold and the public record is distorted.</p><p><em>Deception technology, indeed.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=5c8e037ea75c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Software Truly Does Not Answer a Trump Election (a Case for Politics)]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@collina/software-truly-does-not-answer-a-trump-election-a-case-for-politics-4cc26e58f489?source=rss-3210b87c804c------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[information-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[privacy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[donald-trump]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[surveillance]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Collin Anderson]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 15 Nov 2016 19:18:50 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-11-15T19:32:13.362Z</atom:updated>
            <cc:license>https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/</cc:license>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*CAvKqaOVy7RNWezZzVLn7w.jpeg" /><figcaption>CC: <a href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/susanmelkisethian/">Susan Melkisethian</a></figcaption></figure><p>In the immediate days after the United States presidential election, several media outlets offered articles instructing readers on how to <a href="https://mic.com/articles/158897/android-privacy-tips-8-ways-to-secure-your-smartphone-before-trump-takes-power">“secure your smartphone before Trump takes power.</a>” The appeal of these articles was obvious — they provided audiences with a welcome belief that one could reassert agency in an otherwise twisted and unpredictable situation. However, while digital security can mitigate some forms of surveillance, technology alone cannot protect against the nightmare scenario of an illiberal administration that actively undermines fundamental human rights in the United States, nor is privacy the ends in itself.</p><p>This article’s intent is to briefly reaffirm two points made elsewhere, that:</p><ul><li>Media outlets and civil society need to responsibly communicate the limitations of any technology in mitigating potential abuses of an illiberal presidency; and,</li><li>Software developers need to understand that technology is not an island, and that it must either directly participate in the political process or substantially support those who do so on their behalf.</li></ul><p>There are clear reasons for privacy advocates and human rights defenders to be legitimately terrified about the prospects of a Trump Administration. Trump has promised to at a minimum <a href="http://thehill.com/blogs/ballot-box/presidential-races/261673-trump-sides-with-rubio-over-cruz-in-nsa-surveillance">roll back</a> hard fought checks on surveillance. Enough has been said about this topic, and an excellent illustration can be found in the ACLU’s “<a href="https://action.aclu.org/sites/default/files/pages/trumpmemos.pdf">The Trump Memos</a>,” which includes analysis on his positions on civil liberties as a candidate. Privacy technologies remain dependent on a certain level of “benevolence” on the part of the U.S. Government that will present political and legal challenges to software developers and platforms.</p><h3>Uncertain Context and Uncertain Roles</h3><p>Unfortunately, as is all too common, the hot-take digital security advice offered in the press ranged from terrible to inappropriate. Quite simply, complex passwords and two-factor authentication does not protect against a subpoena to Google (but, people should still enable it). The recommendations do provide a decent level of protection against certain tactics in passive bulk network surveillance and local law enforcement agencies (which Micah Lee <a href="https://twitter.com/micahflee/status/797864090156707844">notes</a>). However, these recommendations were better suited against third-tier state actors, criminals, and domestic violence situations. In response, respected privacy advocates <a href="https://twitter.com/astepanovich/status/796745215872815104">stepped in</a> to offer <em>better</em> solutions.</p><p>In response to the flurry of recommendations, the cryptographer and privacy advocate <a href="https://nadim.computer/">Nadim Kobeissi</a> offered a provocation “<a href="https://nadim.computer/2016/11/13/software-trump.html">Software Does Not Answer a Trump Election</a>,” which challenged the appropriateness of the tools cited in various articles and the state of the ecosystem. While lost amongst condescension against the privacy community, Kobeissi rightly notes that when one’s threat model includes the National Security Agency, or even the Federal Bureau of Investigation, then certain assumptions about the trustworthiness and reliability of systems breaks down. Put another way, it would be hard to credibly argue that Tor — the poster child of the privacy community — is completely safe against the N.S.A., especially if Congress restricts the distribution and development of privacy tools. Or as Kobeissi writes,</p><blockquote>The problem here is that this advice is being peddled as if it is directly relevant to protecting oneself against a Trump election, and without any notion of a threat model or concrete security goals.</blockquote><p>Kobeissi encourages the reader to focus on the 1.) sociopolitical environment that has promoted a potential authoritarian into office, and 2.) to understand the legal repercussions on software vendors and limitations of certain tools. Indeed, tools alone will not address the situation, and defending against a truly malicious N.S.A. will be an improbable task (which was not likely the argument of those subjected to the criticism).</p><p>(It is worth also mentioning that attacking respected lawyers with longstanding histories on digital rights issues is a poor tactic toward common goals.)</p><h3>No App is an Island</h3><p>The broader argument has merit, and warranted much more attention. Much of the information security and privacy community has grown up with the individualistic myth of the maverick hacker unilaterally resisting the state (e.g. War Games, Hackers, Sneakers, etc.). As a result, a common sentiment amongst software developers is political disengagement in favor of designing new systems. This mindset fails in merit, and must be abandoned toward an understanding of the proportional role of technology in social change.</p><p>In order to account for the liabilities of any privacy recommendation and the coming policy fights, consider the encrypted messaging application Signal running on a iPhone — a common and reasonable recommendation. Signal, maintained Open Whisper Systems, is <a href="https://www.opentech.fund/project/open-whisper-systems">financially supported by the Open Technology Fund</a> (OTF), a part of Radio Free Asia (RFA). RFA is primarily funded through Congressional appropriations directed to the Broadcasting Board of Governors, an independent federal agency with an international mandate. This means that Signal is largely dependent on the largesse of the United States government–thus far to the tune of at least $2,255,000 (infrastructure costs meaningful sums of money). Other well-known names that appear in the post-Trump articles are similarly dependent on Internet freedom funds, all intended to promote democracy abroad. One decision by the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations could kneecap such applications.</p><p>More broadly, the long-term viability of any recommendation is vulnerable to legal mandates that could require exceptional access and weakened encryption. Restrictions on the distribution of end-to-end encryption could make it more difficult to a.) develop Signal inside of the United States, b.) include the protocol in commercial applications, and, c.) distribute the application through gatekeeper markets (AppStore, Play Store, etc). These challenges are all the more apparent when it comes to private implementations of the Signal Protocol (e.g. WhatsApp, Facebook Messenger, and Google Allo), which collect more data for commercial purposes and are less inclined to be outright hostile to the United States government than activist developers.</p><p>One’s threat model then must include not only technical design measure but the legal obligations of vendors.</p><p>The potential effects of bad policy can proliferate down to local law enforcement and across borders. For example, mandating that hardware vendors provide backdoor access to locked devices would enable local police departments access to encrypted content stored on devices. Moreover, Signal and iOS will not defend against aggressive government hacking empowered by the resources of the United States intelligence community (threat models). This is a political battle that arose under the Obama administration, and will be more <a href="http://gazette.com/after-trump-win-silicon-valley-reassesses-security/article/1590160">difficult with his successor</a>.</p><p>History has also demonstrated that the counterproposal to this problem is not solely “decentralization and open source”— building usable systems that scale and functionally compete with commercial products requires significant resources. While Signal’s developers have <a href="https://motherboard.vice.com/read/signal-downloads-spiked-after-election-results">expressed optimism</a> about their sustainability outside of U.S. funding based on community development, there’s reason to be skeptical. <a href="https://www.propublica.org/article/the-worlds-email-encryption-software-relies-on-one-guy-who-is-going-broke">Other experiences</a> suggest that rather than open collaboration, privacy tools often turn into a tragedy of the commons. Moreover, the boom and bust cycle of secure messaging applications after the Snowden disclosures vividly describes the optimism of start-ups and privacy advocates facing the crushing burden of funding and maintenance.</p><h3>Forward</h3><p>The structural reform, litigation, socialization, and community organizing required to change the political discourse of the United States will be a maddeningly complex task. Kobeissi takes the easier route in focusing on critiques rather offering specific actions — instead inviting the reader to “focus on the emerging problems” including the “long-term social and institutional decay in the United States.” Personally, it was a disempowering, out-of-college lesson that democratization and civil participation is about education and culture, which is a grueling and slow process that has no sole causal factor nor standard blueprint.</p><p>The primary responsibility of the privacy community will be support change agents within society, rather than to act as the central figure in reform. Secure communications tools can only provide the public the means to affect change in society, and cannot be seen as the vision or end goal itself. In the interest of moving the conversation forward, I offer a few general principles in closing, all of which will be both unsurprising and completely unsatisfactory:</p><ul><li>American technology companies — not solely Fortune 500 companies, but even startups — must be made to understand that international perceptions of their integrity and trustworthiness depends on their successful defense against encroachments on user privacy (<em>Microsoft Corporation v. United States of America</em>, <em>In re Order Requiring Apple Inc. to Assist in the Execution of a Search Warrant Issued by This Court</em>, <em>FISA Court № 08–01</em>).</li><li>Software engineers must account for the fact that the design of systems and the collection of data predefines the opportunities for law enforcement agencies, and subsequently their ability to comply with onerous demands (see <a href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/group/hrpc/charter/">IRTF’s Human Rights Protocol Considerations Research Group</a> and <a href="http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2016/10/fbi-demands-signal-user-data-but-theres-not-much-to-hand-over/">Signal’s inability to comply with user data requests</a>, this does matter even if its shapable by law).</li><li>Interested members of the public should financially contribute to the civil liberties and digital rights organizations that will be the first line of defense against attempts to rollback recent reforms (see <a href="https://docs.google.com/document/d/18Y2OT0z_6lyH2PRZ_SjTnXa8irS1e7YCNR78DhrdQFw/edit">Katherine Maher’s list of organizations</a>, and <em>Bernstein v. United States</em> for why this matters for cryptographers).</li><li>Civil society must vigorously protect U.S. government funding allocated for Internet Freedom, and encourage private foundations and European governments to play a more active role in financially supporting tools that enable secure communications over the Internet.</li><li>Experts in cybersecurity, critical infrastructure, and other topical technical subjects should pursue public service, including Fellowships such as <a href="http://www.techcongress.io/">TechCongress’s Congressional Innovation Fellowship</a>.</li><li>Privacy advocates should understand that Trump != the United States Government; opportunities will still exist within federal agencies (e.g. certain Commissioners on the FCC and FTC), the courts, and in Congress to pursue well-informed technology policy; moreover, on some issues privacy advocates will find common cause with the majority party.</li><li>Researchers and developers should focus on solving the real world problems that manifested themselves uniquely online during this election, such as the trolling and the promotion of fake news that has intimidated critical voices and exacerbates partisanship.</li></ul><p><em>If there’s interest and feedback, I would be happy to amend this list with more recommendations.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4cc26e58f489" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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