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            <title><![CDATA[Hegel And The Mirror I]]></title>
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            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[history-of-philosophy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hegel]]></category>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Collwyn Redslob]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 04 Nov 2026 05:27:15 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-04T05:27:15.416Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Hegel’s Three Types of History</h3><p><em>This article is the start of a new series originally published on Substack at this address: </em><a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i"><em>https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i</em></a></p><p><strong>Synopsis of the new series.</strong></p><p>This new series will focus on Hegel’s philosophy of history, based on the German original, and its relevance in today’s world.</p><p><strong>Outline of the new series.</strong></p><p>(1) The first parts will focus on exposing and restituting Hegel’s understanding of history, by exposing all his key concepts and their respective connections. I am also intending to <em>take Hegel at his word</em>: this is indispensable as many recensions and appropriations of Hegel (materialistic, atheistic or even decolonial) have, in my view, muddled his thinking and intentions somewhat; I will offer these expositions in a bite-sized manner, so the reader has time to integrate Hegel’s successive concepts, which are all interlinked.</p><p>(2) The middle parts will engage with selected critics from the recent secondary literature, shedding light on Hegel’s contemporary relevance in the wider intellectual debates.</p><p>(3) A personal reflection in the final part will be provided, essentially asking if Hegel’s systematic approach of history has survived the historical developments of the last two hundred years following his passing.</p><p><strong>Method.</strong></p><p>This work relies on the German original at the latest Suhrkamp edition (see details in bibliography) and the verbatim notes will be provided. Translations into English for the most important quotes are mine, although standard academic ones are widely available in the English-speaking world for further reference. Charts and graphs will be included to facilitate the understanding and visualization of Hegel’s concepts (see summary chart at the bottom of this part I).</p><p><strong>Introduction.</strong></p><p>This first article provides the <em>frame</em> for Hegel’s historical thinking, namely what he calls the three types of history, i.e. the three ways of thinking about history.</p><p>Hegel essentially distinguishes between original (narrative), reflective and philosophical history.</p><p>This will serve as a first foundation to the series.</p><p><strong>I. The first type of history:</strong> <strong>the original one (<em>ursprünglich</em>).</strong></p><p><strong>A. The original historians: who they were.</strong></p><p>Hegel thinks here of the original or earliest known historians, like Herodotus or Thucydides<a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i#footnote-1">1</a>, whom we have come to call classics in our days, as well as subsequent pre-modern continuators such as monk chroniclers in medieval times or early modern historians like Guicciardini<a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i#footnote-2">2</a>, Frederick the Great<a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i#footnote-3">3</a> or the Cardinal de Retz<a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i#footnote-4">4</a>.</p><p><strong>B. Historical material and approach.</strong></p><p>The original historians essentially described the world <em>they lived in</em>, including events, personalities and mores. This historical writing was characterized by its relative <em>immediacy</em>:</p><p>(1) <em>A limited historical spectrum</em>: ancient writers mostly made contemporary accounts of the world they lived in, bar a few historical asides. Original historians evolved in and wrote within a relatively limited space-time horizon: “<em>These are short time spans, individual portrayals of men and events.</em>”<a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i#footnote-5">5</a> The material original historians worked on was, essentially, their immediate environment: “<em>what is contemporary and alive in their environment is what their historical material is about.</em>”<a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i#footnote-6">6</a></p><p>(2) <em>A personal view</em>: ancient historians talked about which they themselves lived through, or what had been directly reported to them. The personalist dimension could not be overstated. This pertains to the <em>function </em>these historians often fulfilled in their times: men of state or senior military officers (Caesar, Xenophon etc.).<a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i#footnote-7">7</a> In other words, most original historians were the actors as much as the story-tellers.</p><p>Hegel makes a qualified exception for the more recent historians, such as Frederick the Great and the Cardinal de Retz, noting their horizons were broader<a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i#footnote-8">8</a>, however such histories are still classified by Hegel as original, as the writers took parts in the related events.</p><p><strong>C. Implication for original history: a lack of reflexivity.</strong></p><p>While Hegel is fully aware of the historiographical relevance of such original narratives and their deserving praise<a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i#footnote-9">9</a> , Hegel swiftly points out their limitations.</p><p>The most important implication for Hegel is the lack of <em>reflexivity</em> of this type of historical writing. While the study of such authors can be useful to restitute the then experienced reality, such accounts are not reflective history per se, only descriptive, and, therefore, of limited wider relevance for a more objective, wider-ranging historical understanding.<a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i#footnote-10">10</a></p><p>In Hegelian parlance, these historians live in the thick of things (<em>im Geist der Sache</em><a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i#footnote-11">11</a>) and have not elevated their gaze to a more reflective (i.e., distance-taking) standpoint. In other words, there is no distinction between the spirit which inspires the historian and the spirit of the events themselves.<a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i#footnote-12">12</a></p><p><strong>II. The second type of history:</strong> <strong>reflective history.</strong></p><p><em>“In this respect, nothing is more vapid than the oft-repeated appeal to Greek and Roman examples, as happened so often with the French during the Revolution.”</em><a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i#footnote-13">13</a></p><p><strong>A.</strong> <strong>Primer.</strong></p><p>Reflective history is very different, because its content is not merged within the contemporary immediacy, but rather reflects the perspective of the historian writing about it: there is a distance between the historian (subject) and history (object), and, as a result, the spirit which informs such historical writing transcends the spirit of the time which is being written about.<a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i#footnote-14">14</a></p><p>Hegel distinguishes the following sub-types of reflective history.</p><p><strong>B. General or wide-ranging history (<em>allgemeine Geschichte</em>).</strong></p><p>These are the histories of an entire people or of the world, as related, for example, by Livy for Rome.<a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i#footnote-15">15</a> The distinction with original historians is that the historical narrative is informed by the perspective of the historian, including his own judgment, or even spirit, per Hegel’s<a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i#footnote-16">16</a>.</p><p>Such histories require a higher level of abstraction, being temporally and psychologically detached from what they describe. In other words, events as described are not given per se, but integrated within a wider narrative, which, in turn, reflects the idiosyncratic perspective of its historian.</p><p>Hegel judged that, in his times, French and English general historians tended to have a more established method than their German counterparts: while all were perspectivists, the French and English relied more on a collective method drawn from their national culture, while German general historians were more idiosyncratic in their approach, leading to a great variety of perspectives.<a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i#footnote-17">17</a></p><p>Another salient point about general history is its frequent <em>transposition</em> of past events and people to fit contemporary mores or thinking: Hegel notes Livy’s recension of the discourses of the old kings of Rome would better befit an advocate of Livy’s era than the tone that would have been used back then, as preserved in the ancient texts themselves.<a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i#footnote-18">18</a> Hegel seems to perceive a risk of inadequacy or dissonance in terms of historical authenticity with this type of writing. While not automatic in itself, the fact the historian of today brings his own spirit into past events necessarily bears some risk of anachronisms, a historiographical issue well known by contemporary historians.</p><p>The last consideration about broad or general history is standing at odds with the original one in the following respect, too: because it is so wide-ranging, some major events, such as large battles, can at times be reduced to a short, almost clinical description, as opposed to the richer tapestry provided by the original historians who lived through such events.<a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i#footnote-19">19</a></p><p><strong>C. Pragmatic history.</strong></p><p>The second sub-type of reflective history identified by Hegel is the <em>pragmatic</em> one. <em>Such histories are assessing historical events within the perspective of what they can tell us today, </em>in what one could call a moral transposition.</p><p>While such histories vary widely in quality<a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i#footnote-20">20</a>, the main point for Hegel is that such histories serve an <em>edificatory purpose</em><a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i#footnote-21">21</a>, for instance the education of children<a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i#footnote-22">22</a> when looking for moral models or some reflection on historical and personal dilemmas.</p><p>However, Hegel is overall fundamentally skeptical about the relevance of such history, for three reasons:</p><p>(i) For Hegel, <em>history does not repeat itself</em>. This is because each historical period presents such an absolutely unique (and non-repeated) set of circumstances (<em>eigentümliche Umstände</em>), which makes drawing lessons from it at best illusory. This conviction is rooted in Hegel’s conception of the very texture of history and reality, which we will expose in subsequent articles.</p><p>(ii) Hegel also contends that people have never drawn lessons from the past, and, when they have considered them, have never acted upon it.<a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i#footnote-23">23</a></p><p>(iii) In addition, and in my view logically resulting from both (i) and (ii) above, Hegel notes that the present is always pressuring men, who are thrown amidst the crush of world events (<em>Im Gedränge der Weltbegebenheiten</em>), which resists any attempt at being wielded with historical-reflective tools (my translation): “<em>Every epoch has such unique circumstances, is such an idiosyncratic state of things, that everything must be decided in and from it, and can only be decided that way. In the crush of world events, a general conception does not help, nor the recalling of similar events [in the past], because a pale memory is powerless against the liveliness and the freedom of the present day”.</em><a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i#footnote-24">24</a></p><p><strong>The latter is a very important consideration if one is to understand Hegel’s understanding of history: nothing resists the reality of the present, i.e. its “unpredictability” (to be fleshed out in subsequent articles)</strong>.</p><p>Accordingly, echoing the quote at the beginning of this section, Hegel is severely critical of contemporaries trying to draw relevant models and inspiration for action from say, the ancient Greeks or the ancient Romans, as many French revolutionaries were then prone to do (my translation): “<em>from this perspective, there is nothing more vapid than the oft-repeated appeal to Greek and Roman examples, as happened so often with the French during the Revolution.</em>”</p><p><strong>D. Critical history.</strong></p><p>This one one might nowadays call meta-history, what Hegel calls a <em>history of history</em>. It is essentially the historical discipline which consists in evaluating the different types of history and their scientific relevance (my translation): “<em>This is not history itself, which would be presented as such, only a history of history and a judgment of the historical narratives and an investigation regarding their truth and credibility</em>.”<a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i#footnote-25">25</a> Hegel is referring to the then nascent historiographical science in France then Germany, among others.</p><p>The success of such historical writing depends on the perspicacity or precision (<em>Scharfsinn</em>) of the author, and Hegel notes that, in his times, French historians had made good inroads in the field<a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i#footnote-26">26</a>, albeit not applying these teachings to history per se but in larger critical treatises, while the contemporary German historiography focused on philology.</p><p>Hegel is rather severe about it, noting that philological claims have often given rise to excessively bold claims reposing on thing ground and against well established historical realities.<a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i#footnote-27">27</a> Hegel seems to take aim at a form of intellectualism of his times, and particularly the latter’s lack of anchoring in empirical reality, an important point of Hegel’s wider critique to which we will come back later.</p><p><strong>E. Conceptual history</strong>.</p><p>The fourth sub-type of reflective history is conceptual history (<em>Begriffsgeschichte</em>, verbatim in the <em>Vorlesungen</em><a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i#footnote-28">28</a>, not to be confused with Reinhart Koselleck’s later concept of the same name) which, while abstracting (<em>abstrahierend</em>), adopts a general point of view — by way of an history of art, or of law, or of religion — and therefore offers the bridge towards the third main type of historical thinking, the philosophical one (see just below).<a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i#footnote-29">29</a></p><p>Note that Hegel says that while conceptual history is abstract, it is getting closer to philosophical history because of its adoption of a “general” standpoint (i.e. thinking history in categories such as art, law etc.), hinting at Hegel’s distinction between philosophy and pure abstraction, a point I will return to later.</p><p>The above rapprochement — or bridge, per Hegel’s — of conceptual history to philosophical history per se, gets stronger when conceptual history adopts a more truthful (<em>wahrhaft</em>) point of view, i.e. when this point of view is not anymore a distant observation of facts, but identifies with the very soul (<em>Seele</em>) which informs such categories (art, law, etc.).<a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i#footnote-30">30</a></p><p><strong>III. The third type of history:</strong> <strong>the philosophical one.</strong></p><p>This, in other words, is the philosophy of history per se, which Hegel is working to establish.</p><p><strong>A. The paradox of philosophical history: history as reasonable.</strong></p><p>Hegel first disambiguates what distinguishes the philosophy of history from the other types of history. And this distinction is highly <em>paradoxical</em>: <strong>while traditional history looks to stick as closely to the factuality of events as possible, thereby gaining in historical quality, the philosophy of history stands in apparent contradiction to this </strong>(and this requires a justification against the suspicion of excessive speculation)<a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i#footnote-31">31</a> .</p><p>The reason for the above is that philosophy does not stop at the seemingly erratic unfolding of peoples, wars, events, kingdoms and so on, but ponders on the <em>rational</em> character of its evolution, <strong>and this conviction is borne by the fundamental philosophical premise that Reason governs the world, and that, in turn, world history is <em>reasonable</em> as a result.</strong><a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i#footnote-32">32</a></p><p>But while reason can be a presupposition for historical science, it needs to be demonstrated by philosophy.<a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i#footnote-33">33</a> Hegel views reason as an all-encompassing whole, which he sums up into <em>substance, infinite power and infinite content </em>(the latter understood as raw material for use) in addition to the activity (<em>Betätigung</em>) of this content:</p><ul><li><strong>Substance (<em>Substanz</em>)</strong> is through and in which all reality has its own being and existence;<a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i#footnote-34">34</a></li><li><strong>Infinite power (<em>unendliche Macht</em>): </strong>because reason is not limited to the realm of ideas or the “ought” of the world, or only existing in the minds of a few individuals (Hegelian great men, a point which will be exposed in subsequent articles);<a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i#footnote-35">35</a></li><li><strong>Infinite content (<em>unendlicher Inhalt</em>): </strong>the material it is <em>and which it processes in the meantime</em><strong>.</strong><a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i#footnote-36">36</a></li></ul><p>This Hegelian conception of reason is complex and somewhat counterintuitive and requires clarification if one is tounderstand Hegel’s broader philosophical-historical framework.</p><p><strong>B. Reason as real, not abstraction.</strong></p><p><strong>For Hegel, reason is everything but an abstraction.</strong></p><p>Reason should not be understood as or limited to a lifeless concept, for its very content includes the Real (including physical matter). Hegel illustrates this, among others, with physical laws which govern the world in a rational way<a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i#footnote-37">37</a> while directly participating and ordering it.</p><p>The other fundamental point of Hegel’s understanding of reason is that it literally works itself out, i.e. acts upon itself. This is why reason is not a Platonic type of concept, <em>in abstracto</em>, but <em>the</em> reality, and a reality <em>in action</em> (my translation): “<em>It [reason] lives off itself, but is itself also the material which it processes.</em>”<a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i#footnote-38">38</a></p><p><strong>Reason, for Hegel, must therefore be understood as <em>form, content and action.</em></strong></p><p>The role of reason in history illustrates this. Reason, in history, is the activity and the appearance or production (<em>Hervorbringung</em>, that is more literally to bring to the front, to appear, to break forth) from the interiority into a world historical appearance.<a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i#footnote-39">39</a> But this “appearance” (one might think of it as a phenomenon or event) does not only happen in the physical universe (<em>des natürlichen Universums</em>) but also the spiritual one.</p><p><strong>There is therefore with Hegel a complex movement of Reason unfolding:</strong> reason is working through the material of history <em>and through itself</em>, and appears or emerges into a visible, “physical” form but also a spiritual one. And, consequently, this is why history appears in retrospect as a most rational form.<a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i#footnote-40">40</a></p><p>As a short aside, Hegel notes that the Ancient Greeks (Anaxagoras) had first affirmed the possibility of a rational universe and rational history from their empirical observations such as astronomical regularities. The key difference with Hegel though is that the organizing principle (which the Greeks called the νοῦς, intellect) resides at the center, while Anaxogaras left the ultimate causes the remit of material elements, not the intellect itself, to Socrates’s great disappointment.<a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i#footnote-41">41</a> In other words, Anaxagoras left the intellect as abstract principle, rather than seeing nature as self-development informed by the workings of reason.<a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i#footnote-42">42</a></p><p><strong>C. The task of the philosophy of history.</strong></p><p>Once Hegel’s premises are accepted, i.e. that reason governs the world and that world history is <em>reasonable</em>, it falls to the philosopher of history to uncover its mechanisms and actualization.</p><p>And to do this, Hegel is adamant that one needs to take history <em>as it is</em>, for the rationality of history cannot be assumed. Methodologically, this means to root philosophical-historical thinking in empirical analysis, and secondly, to avoid the traditional historian trap, that of aprioristic fabrication (<em>a priori Erdichtung</em>).<a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i#footnote-43">43</a> Rather, the philosopher must approach historical truthfully.<a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i#footnote-44">44</a> Hegel believes that even well-intended historians can still err, because they bring their own categories into historical thinking<a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i#footnote-45">45</a>, while the philosopher avoids this pitfall: for, according to Hegel, for the one who sees the world and history as reasonable, is in return seen rationally by it, in a movement of reciprocal determination (<em>Wechselbestimmung</em>).<a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i#footnote-46">46</a> Hegel to conclude on this task (my translation): “<em>What we have to do seriously, consists in recognizing the ways of providence, the instruments and phenomena of history, and relate them to an overarching principle.</em>”<a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i#footnote-47">47</a></p><p><strong>IV. Conclusion and bridge to part II: a leap of faith?</strong></p><p>As should be clear from the above, Hegel’s main concern resides with the philosophy of history: making philosophical sense of history requires a different or radically newer form of understanding and perspective, harnessing reason to elucidate the paths of history.</p><p>Hegel’s most notable contribution is a definition of the philosophy of history, by clarifying its premises, principles, mechanisms and how it distinguishes itself from historical thinking per se, and, more generally, the different perspectives one can take on a discipline, hereby history.</p><p>The above presentation, particularly the section on the philosophy of history, may leave the attentive reader with a remaining doubt: is Hegel’s core affirmation, that the world is governed by reason, fully convincing? And why would reason be what Hegel says it is, and, even assuming so, why, in the end, should history assumed to be so reasonable?</p><p>This question bridges to the next article (part II), where we will tackle Hegel’s philosophical keystone and overarching premise: the existence of God as ultimate principle and end.</p><p><strong>© 2026 Collwyn Redslob. All rights reserved.</strong></p><p><strong>Do not reproduce without permission. For citations, please credit Collwyn Redslob and link to this Substack.</strong></p><p><strong>Appendix — Hegel’s summary table about historical types</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*oj_M5ckRuNzUIW1m.png" /></figure><p><strong>Bibliography</strong></p><p><strong>Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich.</strong> <em>Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte</em>. Werke in 20 Bänden, Band 12. Edited by Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel. 14th ed. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2021.</p><p><a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i#footnote-anchor-1">1</a></p><p><strong>Vorlesungen Uber die Philosophie der Geschichte, Suhrkamp Verlag. Frankfurt Am Main. 14, Auflage, 2021.</strong> p. 11: “Was die erste [Geschichte] betrifft, so meine ich dabei, um durch Nennung von Namen sogleich ein bestimmtes Bild zu geben, z. B. <em>Herodot, Thukydides </em>und andere ähnliche Geschichtschreiber,…”</p><p><a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i#footnote-anchor-2">2</a></p><p>VPG p.12: “man betrachte <em>Herodot, Thukydides, Guicciardini</em>)”</p><p><a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i#footnote-anchor-3">3</a></p><p>VPG p.14: “Friedrich der Große (<em>histoire de mon temps</em>) macht hiervon eine rühmliche Ausnahme.”</p><p><a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i#footnote-anchor-4">4</a></p><p>VPG 14: “aber oft sind es auch wahre historische Meisterwerke, wie die des Kardinals von Retz;”</p><p><a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i#footnote-anchor-5">5</a></p><p>VPG, p.12: “Es sind kurze Zeiträume, individuelle Gestaltungen von Menschen und Begebenheiten.”</p><p><a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i#footnote-anchor-6">6</a></p><p>VPG, p.12: “was gegenwärtig und lebendig in ihrer Umgebung ist, ist ihr wesentlicher Stoff…”</p><p><a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i#footnote-anchor-7">7</a></p><p>VPG, p.13: “Im Altertum waren diese Geschichtschreiber notwendig große Kapitäne und Staatsmänner;”</p><p><a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i#footnote-anchor-8">8</a></p><p>VPG, p.14: “diese zeigen ein größeres geschichtliches Feld”</p><p><a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i#footnote-anchor-9">9</a></p><p>VPG., p.14: “Hoch gestellt müssen eigentlich solche Männer sein.”</p><p><a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i#footnote-anchor-10">10</a></p><p>VPG, p.12: “Der Inhalt solcher Geschichten kann daher nicht von großem äußeren Umfange sein.”</p><p><a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i#footnote-anchor-11">11</a></p><p>VPG, p.12: “Er hat es nicht mit Reflexionen zu tun, denn er lebt im Geiste der Sache und ist noch nicht über sie hinaus.”</p><p><a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i#footnote-anchor-12">12</a></p><p>VPG, p.12: “der Geist des Verfassers und der Geist der Handlungen, von denen er erzählt, ist <em>einer </em>und <em>derselbe.”</em></p><p><a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i#footnote-anchor-13">13</a></p><p>VPG, p.17: “Nichts ist in dieser Rücksicht schaler als die oft wiederkehrende Berufung auf griechische und römische Beispiele, wie diese in der Revolutionszeit bei den Franzosen so häufig vorgekommen ist.”</p><p><a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i#footnote-anchor-14">14</a></p><p>VPG, p.14: “Es ist die Geschichte, deren Darstellung, nicht in Beziehung auf die Zeit, sondern rücksichtlich des Geistes über die Gegenwart hinaus ist.”</p><p><a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i#footnote-anchor-15">15</a></p><p>VPG, p.14:“Man verlangt überhaupt die Übersicht der ganzen Geschichte eines Volkes oder eines Landes oder der Welt, kurz das, was wir <em>allgemeine Geschichte </em>schreiben nennen.”</p><p><a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i#footnote-anchor-16">16</a></p><p>VPG, p.14: “Hierbei ist die Verarbeitung des historischen Stoffes die Hauptsache, an den der Arbeiter mit <em>seinem </em>Geiste kommt, der verschieden ist von dem Geiste des Inhalts.”</p><p><a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i#footnote-anchor-17">17</a></p><p>VPG, pp.14–15: “Bei uns Deutschen ist die Reflexion und Gescheitheit dabei sehr mannigfach, jeder Geschichtschreiber hat hier seine eigne Art und Weise besonders sich in den Kopf gesetzt. Die Engländer und Franzosen wissen im allgemeinen, wie man Geschichte schreiben müsse, sie stehen mehr auf der Stufe allgemeiner und nationeller Bildung;”</p><p><a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i#footnote-anchor-18">18</a></p><p>VPG, p.15: “und der Geist, der aus dem Schriftsteller spricht, ist ein andrer als der Geist dieser Zeiten. So läßt Livius die alten Könige Roms, die Konsuln und Heerführer Reden halten, wie sie nur einem gewandten Advokaten der 4 Livianischen Zeit zukommen, und welche wieder aufs stärkste mit echten aus dem Altertum erhaltenen Sagen, z. B. der Fabel des Menenius Agrippa, kontrastieren.”</p><p><a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i#footnote-anchor-19">19</a></p><p>VPG, p.16: “Wenn Livius von den Kriegen mit den Volskern erzählt, so sagt er bisweilen kurz genug: Dieses Jahr ist mit den Volskern Krieg geführt worden.”</p><p><a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i#footnote-anchor-20">20</a></p><p>VPG, p.17: “Ob nun solche Reflexionen wirklich interessant und belebend seien, das kommt auf den eignen Geist des Schriftstellers an.”</p><p><a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i#footnote-anchor-21">21</a></p><p>VPG, p.17: “Es ist hier auch besonders der moralischen Reflexionen Erwähnung zu tun und der durch die Geschichte zu gewinnenden moralischen Belehrung, auf welche hin dieselbe oft bearbeitet wurde.”</p><p><a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i#footnote-anchor-22">22</a></p><p>VPG, p.17: “Wenn auch zu sagen ist, daß Beispiele des Guten das Gemüt erheben und beim moralischen Unterricht der Kinder, um ihnen das Vortreffliche eindringlich zu machen…”</p><p><a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i#footnote-anchor-23">23</a></p><p>VPG, p.17: “Was die Erfahrung aber und die Geschichte lehren, ist dieses, daß Völker und Regierungen niemals etwas aus der Geschichte gelernt und nach Lehren, die aus derselben zu ziehen gewesen wären, gehandelt haben.”</p><p><a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i#footnote-anchor-24">24</a></p><p>VPG, p.17: “Jede Zeit hat so eigentümliche Umstände, ist ein so individueller Zustand, daß in ihm aus ihm selbst entschieden werden muß und allein entschieden werden kann. Im Gedränge der Weltbegebenheiten hilft nicht ein allgemeiner Grundsatz, nicht das Erinnern an ähnliche Verhältnisse, denn so etwas, wie eine fahle Erinnerung, hat keine Kraft gegen die Lebendigkeit und Freiheit der Gegenwart.”</p><p><a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i#footnote-anchor-25">25</a></p><p>VPG, p.18: “Es ist nicht die Geschichte selbst, welche hier vorgetragen wird, sondern eine Geschichte der Geschichte und eine Beurteilung der geschichtlichen Erzählungen und Untersuchung ihrer Wahrheit und Glaubwürdigkeit.”</p><p><a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i#footnote-anchor-26">26</a></p><p>VPG, p.18: “Die Franzosen haben hierin viel Gründliches und Besonnenes geliefert.”</p><p><a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i#footnote-anchor-27">27</a></p><p>VPG, pp.18–9: “Diese höhere Kritik hat dann die Berechtigung abgeben sollen, allen möglichen unhistorischen Ausgeburten einer eitlen Einbildungskraft Eingang zu verschaffen. Dies ist die andre Weise, Gegenwart in der Geschichte zu gewinnen, indem man subjektive Einfälle an die Stelle geschichtlicher Daten setzt, — Einfälle, die für um so vortrefflicher gelten, je kühner sie sind, das ist, auf je dürftigeren Umständchen sie beruhen und je mehr sie dem Entschiedensten in der Geschichte widersprechen. –</p><p><a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i#footnote-anchor-28">28</a></p><p>VPG, p.19: “In unserer Zeit ist diese Weise der <em>Begriffsgeschichte </em>mehr ausgebildet und hervorgehoben worden.”</p><p><a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i#footnote-anchor-29">29</a></p><p>VPG, p.19: “Sie ist zwar abstrahierend, bildet aber, weil sie allgemeine Gesichtspunkte (z. B. die Geschichte der Kunst, des Rechts, der Religion) nimmt, einen Übergang zur philosophischen Weltgeschichte.”</p><p><a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i#footnote-anchor-30">30</a></p><p>VPG, p.19: “Wenn nun die reflektierende Geschichte dazu gekommen ist, allgemeine Gesichtspunkte zu verfolgen, so ist zu bemerken, daß, wenn solche Gesichtspunkte wahrhafter Natur sind, sie nicht bloß der äußere Faden, eine äußere Ordnung, sondern die innere leitende Seele der Begebenheiten und Taten selbst sind.”</p><p><a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i#footnote-anchor-31">31</a></p><p>VPG, p.20: “Da die Geschichte nun aber bloß aufzufassen hat, was ist und gewesen ist, die Begebenheiten und Taten, und um so wahrer bleibt, je mehr sie sich an das Gegebene hält, so scheint mit diesem Treiben das Geschäft der Philosophie in Widerspruch zu stehen, und dieser Widerspruch und…”</p><p><a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i#footnote-anchor-32">32</a></p><p>VPG, p.20: “Der einzige Gedanke, den die Philosophie mitbringt, ist aber der einfache Gedanke der <em>Vernunft</em>, daß die Vernunft die Welt beherrsche, daß es also auch in der Weltgeschichte vernünftig zugegangen sei.<em>”</em></p><p><a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i#footnote-anchor-33">33</a></p><p>VPG, p.20: “Diese Überzeugung und Einsicht ist eine <em>Voraussetzung </em>in Ansehung der Geschichte als solcher überhaupt; in der Philosophie selbst ist dies keine Voraussetzung. Durch die spekulative Erkenntnis in ihr wird es erwiesen…”</p><p><a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i#footnote-anchor-34">34</a></p><p>VPG, p.21: “Die <em>Substanz </em>ist sie, nämlich das, wodurch und worin alle Wirklichkeit ihr Sein und Bestehen hat”</p><p><a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i#footnote-anchor-35">35</a></p><p>VPG, p.21: “die <em>unendliche Macht</em>, indem die Vernunft nicht so ohnmächtig ist, es nur bis zum Ideal, bis zum Sollen zu bringen und nur außerhalb der Wirklichkeit, wer weiß wo, als etwas Besonderes in den Köpfen einiger Menschen vorhanden zu sein;”</p><p><a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i#footnote-anchor-36">36</a></p><p>VPG, p. 21: “der <em>unendliche Inhalt</em>, alle Wesenheit und Wahrheit, und ihr selbst ihr Stoff, den sie ihrer <em>Tätigkeit </em>zu verarbeiten gibt,”</p><p><a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i#footnote-anchor-37">37</a></p><p>VPG, p.23: “Die Bewegung des Sonnensystems erfolgt nach unveränderlichen Gesetzen: diese Gesetze sind die Vernunft desselben,”</p><p><a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i#footnote-anchor-38">38</a></p><p>VPG, p.21: “sie zehrt aus sich und ist sich selbst das Material, das sie verarbeitet;”</p><p><a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i#footnote-anchor-39">39</a></p><p>VPG, p.21: “so ist sie selbst dessen Betätigung und Hervorbringung aus dem Inneren in die Erscheinung, nicht nur des natürlichen Universums, sondern auch des geistigen, — in der Weltgeschichte.”</p><p><a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i#footnote-anchor-40">40</a></p><p>VPG, p.22: “Es hat sich also erst aus der Betrachtung der Weltgeschichte selbst zu ergeben, daß es vernünftig in ihr zugegangen sei, daß sie der vernünftige, notwendige Gang des Weltgeistes gewesen, des Geistes, dessen Natur zwar immer eine und dieselbe ist, der aber in dem Weltdasein diese seine eine Natur expliziert.”</p><p><a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i#footnote-anchor-41">41</a></p><p>VPG, p.24 (Hegel quotes from <em>Phaidon</em>, Steph., 97, 98): “»Ich freute mich desselben,« läßt Plato ihn sagen, »und hoffte einen Lehrer gefunden zu haben, der mir die Natur nach der Vernunft auslegen, in dem Besonderen seinen besonderen Zweck, in dem Ganzen den allgemeinen Zweck aufzeigen würde, ich hätte diese Hoffnung um vieles nicht aufgegeben. Aber wie sehr wurde ich getäuscht, als ich nun die Schriften des Anaxagoras selbst eifrig vornahm und fand, daß er nur äußerliche Ursachen, als Luft, Äther, Wasser und dergleichen, statt der Vernunft aufführt.«”</p><p><a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i#footnote-anchor-42">42</a></p><p>VPG, p. 24: “Man sieht, das Ungenügende, welches Sokrates an dem Prinzip des Anaxagoras fand, betrifft nicht das Prinzip selbst, sondern den Mangel an Anwendung desselben auf die konkrete Natur, daß diese nicht aus jenem Prinzip verstanden, begriffen ist, daß überhaupt jenes Prinzip abstrakt gehalten blieb, daß die Natur nicht als eine Entwicklung desselben, nicht als eine aus der Vernunft hervorgebrachte Organisation gefaßt ist.”</p><p><a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i#footnote-anchor-43">43</a></p><p>VPG, p.22: “Dies muß, wie gesagt, das Ergebnis der Geschichte sein. Die Geschichte aber haben wir zu nehmen, wie sie ist: wir haben historisch, empirisch zu verfahren; unter anderm müssen wir uns nicht durch die Historiker vom Fach verführen lassen, denn diese, namentlich Deutsche, welche eine große Autorität besitzen, machen das, was sie den Philosophen vorwerfen, nämlich apriorische Erdichtungen in der Geschichte.”</p><p><a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i#footnote-anchor-44">44</a></p><p>VPG, p.23: “Als die erste Bedingung könnten wir somit aussprechen, daß wir das Historische getreu auffassen;”</p><p><a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i#footnote-anchor-45">45</a></p><p>VPG, p.23: “Auch der gewöhnliche und mittelmäßige Geschichtsschreiber, der etwa meint und vorgibt, er verhalte sich nur aufnehmend, nur dem Gegebenen sich hingebend, ist nicht passiv mit seinem Denken und bringt seine Kategorien mit und sieht durch sie das Vorhandene;”</p><p><a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i#footnote-anchor-46">46</a></p><p>VPG, p. 23: “wer die Welt vernünftig ansieht, <em>den </em>sieht sie auch vernünftig an, beides ist in Wechselbestimmung.”</p><p><a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/hegel-and-the-mirror-i#footnote-anchor-47">47</a></p><p>VPG, p.26: “Wir haben vielmehr Ernst damit zu machen, die Wege der Vorsehung, die Mittel und Erscheinungen in der Geschichte zu erkennen, und wir haben diese auf jenes allgemeine Prinzip zu beziehen.”</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=66985d3516cb" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Metaphysics of the Subject, III]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@collwyn/metaphysics-of-the-subject-iii-046deae2f812?source=rss-bec57615ac86------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/046deae2f812</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[metaphysics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[emmanuel-levinas]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ethics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[narcissism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Collwyn Redslob]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 09 Feb 2026 15:32:38 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-02-09T15:32:38.407Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The ethics of Other Responsibility.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*3qZsDXXbgwxpWWW4.jpeg" /></figure><p>Disclaimer: this article was originally posted on Substack (<a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/metaphysics-of-the-subject-iii">https://collwyn.substack.com/p/metaphysics-of-the-subject-iii</a>). This is part III of a 4-part series on the Metaphysics of the Subject, grounding the absolute moral value of Man, through phenomenological, analytical and ethical angles.</p><p>In part I, I have proposed to ground the metaphysical absolute moral value of man by appealing to moral realism, Man’s unicity and his inexhaustible phenomenality, all crowned by self-consciousness capable of meaning-making and in turn constitutive of full personhood over time.</p><p>Part II further explored the infinite existential dimensions of existence underpinning Man’s absolute value. Particularly, we hinted at the infinite as constitutive of life understood generally, the presence of an infinite infra-phenomenality laying the groundwork for its precious distillation into self-consciousness before showing that this phenomenal (no pun intended) potential resulted in an ethics of self-fulfilment of one’s given capacities, echoing the old Greek concept of ἀρετή, or virtue, understood as the achievement of one’s potential in this life.</p><p>The fact that humans are the repository of such a rich, multi-layered and inexhaustible potential led us to posit an ethics of responsibility towards oneself directed at preserving the preciousness of such a vast potential.</p><p><strong>Synopsis.</strong></p><p>In Part III of these series, it is time I tackled intersubjective ethics, i.e. an ethics towards the Other. But an immediate problem arises: if we are constructing a metaphysics of the Subject, understood as individually, what is the logical justification of inter-subjective ethics within my framework? Is it not contradictory, equivalent to diluting the subject into an intersubjective whole that would constitute a semantic drift from the individual to the collective, whose metaphysical constitution might fundamentally differ?</p><p><strong>I. Foundations: The justification of intersubjective ethics within the metaphysics of the subject.</strong></p><p>Firstly, a very simple, introductory observation: the Other is another Me. Not the same as me, but, like me, participating in the same infinite self-reflective potential which we explored and fleshed out in parts I and II. The Other withholds the same inexhaustible potential, despite her / his fundamental unicity.</p><p>Given my capacity to influence, affect, or even <em>harm </em>the Other, I am directly partaking in the Other’s rich existential potential. And in turn, this capacity of affecting the Other (or my own vulnerability to the Other in return) directly affects the Other’s potential, constitutive of his personhood. Therefore it appears that any metaphysical (and, derivatively, moral) justification of the Self is indifferentiable from an intersubjective ethics, by way of my responsibility towards the Other.</p><p>The infant will progressively grow to go beyond the initial mirroring stage and progressively develop his consciousness of being a discrete individual .</p><p>As a result, the constitution of personhood is entirely dependent on the Other right from the start. There is no metaphysics of the Subject (understood as self-conscious) without an interaction with the Other, which enables this very constitution. <em>As such, intersubjective ethics are not simply a moral consequence of our existence as subjects, but a </em><strong><em>logical or necessary pre-condition</em></strong><em> of its very existence. </em>In other words, intersubjective ethics are inherently part of our constitution, and cannot be excluded from a metaphysics of the Subject.</p><p><strong>Interlude.</strong></p><p>However, Levinas’ approach to the problem is particularly original and deserves to be understood fully: his philosophical premises are very specific and in some respects somewhat differ from our approach in parts I and II while complementing it. As such, an engaged dialogue with his thought is necessary, but to do so, a rigorous exposition of his philosophical framework is necessary.</p><p><strong>II. A. Preamble: a Levinasian metaphysics without God.</strong> <strong>B. The critique of the Self and relentless appropriation: the perils of <em>totality</em>C. Totality as appropriation: a long, fraught intellectual genealogy.</strong> <strong>.</strong> <strong>Totality and Infinite: Levinas’ metaphysics of the Other as breach of the autonomous self.</strong> <strong>D. The ethical implications of totality: history and concepts as radically reductive.</strong></p><p>A quick linguistic note: in the original French, Levinas uses the “Meme” (English <em>same)</em>, which I translate into Self, but which in French would more often be rendered as “ <em>Moi</em>”. The Levinasian idea is that the <em>Moi</em> implies the <em>Meme</em> (same), i.e. that the original <em>Moi</em> always strives to appropriate and subsume the world around it into the <em>Meme</em>, i.e. to dilute the alterity into sameness by an integration of the outside inside the Self for the purposes of his structurally self-ish psyche.</p><p><strong>Interlude.</strong></p><p>But Levinas’ genealogy and logic go deeper. Even among the pre-Socratics, who strived to abstract thought from themselves by way of discovering the secrets of ontology (i.e. the search for a neutral, archeological source of Being ontologically prior to human existence), Levinas argues that even this ontology can ultimately be captured by my own psyche, and therefore made my own: “ <em>egology</em> “, again. Similarly, Heidegger’s later efforts to ascend back to what is Being (Heideggerian ontology ) also participates of this movement: the search for something that is pre-human, but ultimately becomes captured by the human psyche, because Being as a concept is still inseparable from the comprehension of being (i.e., by my consciousness) . Still a totality, i.e., an enclosed perimeter.</p><p><em>For him, the notion of infinite as transcendence is the key to the possibility of breaking the circle (or sphere, as it were) of egology, by way of the Other.</em></p><p>Levinas remains attentive to all alternatives to such a way of thinking in the western tradition and considers major alternative attempts to transcend “egological” thought. Taking Durkheim as example (see bibliography below), who tried to conceive of the religious as the eminently social, non-egological core of primitive societies at least, Levinas admits that Durkheim’s sociological interpretation is an attempt at the constitution of a religious <em>transcendence</em>, that would finally breach the closed circle of egology. But Levinas notes that Durkheim’s intuition of the religious ends up being captured by a <em>collective representation</em>, which he views as another expression of objectifying intentionality. As collective representation, religion loses its transcendence and can be reduced to an intellectual object, absorbable by the ego. The religious remains captured by a totalizing logic whereby what appears as potentially transcendent is reintegrated in the totalizing sphere.</p><p><strong>III. Levinas and the Other as infinite.</strong> <strong>A. Infinite as transcendence and our metaphysical Desire for it.</strong></p><p>Levinas draws the fuller implications of this intellectual and existential logic of appropriation: abstractions are fundamentally de-humanizing. Talking about the idea of the State, whereby ontology is interpreted as a philosophy of power by excellence, he contends that by reifying the notion of State, the conceptual frame of thought of appropriation-totality results in an <em>impersonal universality</em>, which Levinas views as an umpteenth avatar of inhumanity, negating the very truth that should reconcile people .</p><p>Levinas rejects Totality ethically and existentially. But Levinas offers an alternative, constructive framework that transcends this egological, totalizing totality, which encloses the Self in a recursive world.</p><p><strong>B. The other as radical Otherness and infinite opening.</strong></p><p>The Other is the infinite Other that offers the possible breach to one’s egology. Let’s see how Levinas develops this frame, which will be of utmost importance for our wider metaphysical reflection, as it touches on the already outlined notions of absolute and infinity exposed in parts I and II.</p><p><strong>C. Language as archetypal modality of intersubjectivity.</strong></p><p>Likewise, the infinite is the only concept that cannot be <em>revealed </em>by Man’s reasoning capabilities: the infinite <em>reveals itself</em>, but cannot be unveiled. This is a particularly significant point in Levinas’s approach: from Plato to Heidegger, many a prominent philosophers have considered the aspect of truth-seeking as <em>aletheic </em>(from Greek <em>ἀλήθεια</em> = truth, etymologically, un-conceal, or uncovering what is hidden but already there) . Levinas’ issue with this approach is that it still comes back to the point of revealing something for myself, i.e. an <em>egological</em> move. He sees <em>ἀλήθεια </em>as substantively project, therefore appropriative, while infinite is <em>καθ’ αὑτό</em>, i.e. by itself, essentially unseizable.</p><p>For Levinas, this interpretation of infinite and our metaphysical desire for it, once established, provides the background for infinite Otherness, i.e. not as the pure abstraction of the idea of infinite, but a personalized infinite that presents itself in a radical and novel way. Let us examine this now.</p><p>The face of the Other and his presence is a constant <em>surging forth</em> or sudden appearing of another person’s presence, whose intentionality is entirely hers and where Levinas finds the essence of human <em>expression</em>. The face precedes the Husserlian <em>Sinngebung </em>(meaning giving), reflecting <em>the precedence of being (participle) over Being (concept)</em>. The Other’s expression etymologically beams outwards, i.e. towards us, but because this expression is unpredictable, it cannot be appropriated within my totality, it surges before any possible capture, now and onwards. It opens an unpredictable breach, at any moment.</p><p><strong>IV.A. Implications, I: Architectural ethics as foundation.</strong> <strong>Philosophical implications.</strong> <strong>B.</strong></p><ol><li><strong>The inversion of being:</strong> as exposed above, Levinas’s framework inverts the traditional order of philosophical priority. L’ <em>Etant</em> precedes l’ <em>Etre</em>, i.e. existential being trumps Being writ concept, inverting the traditional ontology governing philosophical and pre-philosophical thought from the pre-Socratics (see above). <strong>Expressive being comes before ontological Being</strong>.</li><li><strong>Metaphysics prior to ontology, language transcends totality:</strong> by the same token, based on their truth-constituting features, the metaphysics of infinity, via Otherness mediated by language, also trump ontology and totality. This is because totality is always define by a subject willing to appropriate what is not his, in itself the “negative” side of his existence. But the negative, being the side that I still do not own, is always the negativity of my subjectivity, i.e. comprised within Totality: “Negativity is incapable of transcendence.”</li><li><strong>The Other as <em>constitutive of phenomenology</em></strong>. For Levinas, the Other is indispensable to the constitution of <em>meaning</em>. There is no making sense of the world around us without the Other and the medium of language. Consequently, absent the presence of the Other, the world of <em>phenomena</em> is degraded into a world of simple <em>appearances</em>, that is a world devoid of constitutive meaning (see part II, Appendix, on the <em>synthetic intentionality</em> of consciousness). As such, the Other is constitutive of the phenomenon and signification precedes appearance.</li><li><strong>Being as feeling subject is destructive of every systematization</strong>: be it history or philosophical system, including Hegel’s historical dialectics, all individuals, because they feel in their own way, compare everything without ever be comparable themselves, annihilate all systems. Hegel posits his dialectics on the felt subject, not the feeling and the felt, but echoing the earlier views of Heraclites and Protagoras whereby the expressiveness and feeling ability of the human is necessary to breach the Parmenidian ontology of man into a subject-in-becoming, non-reducible to an objective flow of elements: a non-determinism of sorts.</li></ol><p><strong>Implications, II: a plural epistemic upheaval.</strong> <strong>V. A dialogue with Levinas: alignment, complement, divergences.</strong></p><p>The accumulative, totalizing logic of language comprised as the accumulation and appropriation of a growing corpus of thoughts is turned upside down: it is in the language between two persons that <em>truth</em> is constituted . Language as <em>moment</em> of truth, not as crystallized objectivation. Levinas notes that this dimension did not escape Plato, who made the difference between objective reality (as could be found in written works) and a dialogue which is not an unfolding of internal truth (in other words, a <em>monologue</em>), but the constitution of truth in an essentially agonistic, <em>confrontational</em> dialogue. Levinas to conclude: “ <em>Parler suppose une possibilite de rompre et de commencer</em> “ (speaking presupposes the possibility of a break and of a beginning, my translation).</p><p><strong>A. Alignments</strong></p><p>To be clear, Levinas does not reify language, but sees it as the original necessity and medium for the constitution of truth. What appears as particularly interesting is that the infinite potential of the Other expresses itself in a no less infinite mode of meaning-making, namely language.</p><p>Let me now turn to the implications of Levinas’s structural understanding of the Other as infinite.</p><p>Levinas’s interpretation of language as the revelation of the Other’s uncertainty and the constitution of truth by dialogue implies an intersubjective ethics <em>per se</em>. But at this stage ethics should not be understood as morals (put simply, right or wrong), but as <em>architectural</em>. This directly derives from Levinas’ unpredictability of intersubjective dialogue. Because I do not control the other’s discourse, and because this emerging discourse is not captured by an appropriating ontology, I as an interlocutor am logically constrained to welcome the other, to make place for his discourse. This fundamental but also <em>necessary</em> welcoming of the other (welcoming understood as necessity of hearing, not necessarily of tacit agreement) implies an <em>ethics</em>, because in its turn it implies a necessary acknowledgment of the Other’s discourse’s <em>value</em>, in itself an ethical move by excellence, because it <em>admits</em> of the worth of the Other as He is.</p><p>Now that Levinas’ ethics have been described including their key implications, it is necessary to see whether, how and to what extent Levinas’ approach is coherent with ours.</p><p>Based on what I have established in parts I and II, I need to test Levinas’ cohesiveness with my own metaphysics, examining where we converge, complement and diverge.</p><p><strong>B. Complementarity and extensions.</strong></p><p><strong>The necessity of intersubjective ethics:</strong> The first point of convergence is architectural. As we explained in Part I, there is no constitution of the Self without an Other, who acts as indispensable safeguard to my future development as a person, or a fully constituted Self. No person grows up alone nor can fully develop in a social void. From a psychological standpoint, one could wittily say: “In the beginning was the (M)Other.” A metaphysics of the Subject requires the Other, directly implying intersubjective ethics as necessary condition to it.</p><p><strong>The Other as infinite springing forth:</strong> the unseizability and resulting unpredictability of the Other results in infinite intersubjective potential. While Levinas stresses the transcendent nature of this infinite (i.e. my incapacity to appropriate it within my totality, which I agree with), the intersubjective exchange is also infinite in its potential: through the mediation of language in particular (but Levinas’s notion of the face of the Other encompasses even more), new forms of truths can emerge at every moment, adding to our multiple infinite dimensions of existence (see parts I and II), which we may call the dimension of the <em>intersubjective infinite</em>, or relational infinite, echoing our part II remark on the infinite nature of the very texture of life.</p><p><strong>C. Ambiguities and recontextualizations.</strong></p><p><strong>Metaphysical desire: </strong>what Levinas adds specifically as well is Man’s ability to strive for something that is irremediably larger than his own totality, the idea of the transcendent infinite. This dimension includes a metaphysical opening of human beings to something that can never be grasped. In a way, this further strengthen our initial part I thesis about the specificity of the human condition vis-a-vis other living beings. Self-consciousness, including a capacity for metaphysical desire towards something that exceeds it.</p><p><strong>Truth as appropriation in the philosophical tradition:</strong></p><ol><li>Levinas sees Socratic dialectics as essentially inwards-focused, i.e. knowledge is intentionally turned towards the Self, or an expansion of one’s totality, hinting at a fundamentally appropriative approach to truth. He also argues that Plato’s <em>aletheia</em> ultimately remains a process of revealing something <em>to oneself</em> and therefore is an essentially egotistic <em>project</em> (the revealing results in a discovery, which I ultimately appropriate).</li><li>Plato’s epistemic humility: while the tradition of western thought might be perceived as very appropriative in the Levinasian sense, Plato’s original philosophy may be more open-ended than appears: in two of his major dialogues, <em>The Republic</em> and <em>The Gorgias</em>, Socrates fails at establishing a consensus and Plato famously ends up with an aporia, which he consciously proposes to resolve by way of a <em>myth</em>. This in itself warrants a somewhat less absolutist reading of Plato’s truth-seeking: there is no systematic closure either.</li><li>Lastly, Socratic dialectics are eminently intersubjective <em>in form</em>: truth appears as dialogical, therefore <em>by necessity</em> not exclusively self-generated. While truth emerges in the dialogue, the very constitution and continuation or progression of this dialogue however relies on the pre-condition of an appropriation of the dialogue by both subjectivities.</li></ol><p><strong>D. Divergences and extensions.</strong></p><p>To conclude, Levinas’s intersubjective ethics are necessary, align with the infinite dimension of our existence, albeit in a qualitatively partly different manner (multi-dimensionality of infinites, but also its transcendent, non-totalized facet) and a metaphysical valence of Desire towards which cannot be grasped, be it the idea of infinite conceptually, or the Other as radically transcendent.</p><p>Let me now turn to the points of complementarity.</p><p><strong>Nature and outcome of intersubjective potential: </strong>Levinas’s intersubjective ethics principally focus on the conditions of transcendental appearance, i.e. the <em>expression</em> of the Other. This is the foundation of everything, including our phenomenological apprehension. There is a focus on instantaneity: the Other as radical Otherness, because one cannot know for certain what is in the offing, at every second of this interaction. Here I would like to also focus on the consequences of this intersubjective <em>emergence</em>. Once “accomplished”, the initial transcendent emergence will inevitably be captured within my totality. That is, the Other’s future potential remains unharmed and never to be grasped, but the past discussion or exchange are ultimately integrated by my own psyche by way of memory, integration, understanding or even opposition. This subsequent reaction-integration echoes the constitution of personhood which we alluded to at the end of part I”: if the Other is fully transcendent, my cumulative interactions with him end up being integrated (within my totality, if we use Levinas terms), therefore there is a form of <em>metabolization</em> of transcendence, i.e. the transcendent moment, once given, is in turn crystallized.</p><p><strong>The liminal case of pathological narcissism as confirmatory of Levinas’ framework: </strong>Levinas’ etiology is mostly philosophical and metaphysical, and psychological aspects are relatively secondary, if we make abstraction of the broad notion of psychism which acts as the very possibility of both totality but also the existential being (more on that below). Clinical psychology described pathological narcissism — among other factors — as the inability of an individual to make a clear distinction between himself and another person. He is not able to “understand” or maybe more accept the reality of the agency of the other, i.e. its ability, and, intersubjectively speaking, its necessary potential of being radically unpredictable. This means that while he is cognitively aware of his actions and their impact, he is not empathetically aware. Philosophically understood within Levinasian ethics, the narcissistic personality completely fails to acknowledge the transcendent nature of the other, because he mechanically objectifies the Other by appropriating Him. To be clear, the narcissist does not really appropriate the Other (who remains intrinsically independent and capable of agency) but thinks as if he owns the Other as an object, a psychodynamic alteration which clinicians characterize as introjection: basically, the narcissist absorbs the Other within his totality, failing to grasp the radical Otherness of the other person. Levinasian ethics therefore tend to confirm that structural narcissism is indeed an intersubjective pathology, but philosophically understood as an inability to attune to the transcendent Otherness of the Other.</p><ul><li><strong>Levinas’s dialogical truth-emergence:</strong> metaphysical Desire and excess of being pre-conditioned by the Other. (most common)</li><li><strong>Solipsistic inventor’s breach</strong> that redefines or expands the ontological, epistemic field. (rarity)</li></ul><p><strong>The Other’s primacy vs. the primordial sphere. </strong>Levinas poses ethics and intersubjectivity as fundamentally primary. But Levinas’ text shows one notable inflection: Levinas once characterizes one’s totality as a primordial sphere (“ <em>sphere primordiale</em>”). This term seems problematic as it implies the possible primacy (primordial) of the Self and not of the Other. In our view, this is because the Other’s primacy appears to be more <em>dialectical</em> than it seems: while Levinas focuses on intersubjective exchange and the moment of transcendent truth emergence as original point, the primordial sphere remains <em>a necessary condition</em>, not only of the reception of what is exchanged, but of the exchange itself. In other words, there is no ethics or truth emerging without the Other, but also without a Self in the first instance. Dialogical truth-making is original in a sense, <em>but presupposes two constituted egotistic spheres in the first instance, thereforethe moment of the origin must be re-contextualized as dialectical more than absolute</em>.</p><p><strong>VI. Towards an ethics of Responsibility to the Other.</strong> <strong>A. Exposition of the problem.</strong></p><p><strong>Language as absolute truth-opener. </strong>Levinas sees language as the medium of truth-emergence, defining the intersubjective rapport, and resulting, by way of its infinite semantic and intentional potential, as pre-condition to truth-emergence. But if language can be seen as constitutive of truth, its very existence is still conditional on the <em>acquisition</em> of language, i.e its <em>internalization within a totality</em>. Language makes truth emerge in dialogue, but it should be seen as a <em>moment</em>, not as the absolute original point of truth constitution.</p><p><strong>The possibility of truth-emergence as self-opening, immanent-transcendent totality.</strong> Levinas’ primary focus on language and intersubjectivity seems too monopolistic to me. If we take the example of truth-discovery in a scientific or philosophical remit, it appears some of the greatest inventions are the result of individual discovery more than intersubjective exchange. Many world-famous inventors (Descartes, Newton, Leibniz, Kant, Poincare, Einstein, Edison etc.) made their discoveries <em>alone, i.e. </em>by way of their own reasoning and intuition, hinting at other modes of truth emergence. Of course, Levinas would have been aware of this and might have replied such discoveries relied on these individuals’ previously acquired <em>collective knowledge</em> and not only their own. And at a more fundamental level Levinas is right that absent the Other, even the world of phenomena would degrade into a world of appearances devoid of meaning, therefore our synthesizing consciousness relies on our original exposition to the Other, practical (caregivers, family etc.) or abstract (books etc.). However, inventors’ discoveries show the possibility of one person’s not only expanding one’s totality by learning (still within the Levinasian remit of appropriation of the world) but also of <em>breaching</em> it by a discovery that <em>exceeds</em> totality by way of immanent-transcendent epistemic emergence. In turn, this discovery is <em>both </em>personal and collective. It emerges from a single individual’s consciousness but also <em>exceeds</em>, or <em>transcends</em>, the universal knowledge there previously was. So the transcendental discovery is acquired by way of a thinking totality, not dialogically, hinting at the (ever so rare) possibility of a totality <em>exceeding</em> itself, not by way of appropriative knowledge acquisition (which is an expansion of totality but not a breach) but by a breach that exceeds both one’s totality and collective knowledge by the same token.</p><p><strong>Mysticism. </strong>If we are to consider the liminal case of mystic tradition — as hypothesis, not established fact — the dynamics of Totality and metaphysical Desire are changed: by reaching union with God, the mystic’s Totality accedes to the Infinite (God) but not by way of appropriation: here, Totality becomes permeated or fused with the transcendent, bridging the gap of metaphysical Desire.</p><p><strong>B. The necessary institutional mediation of moral realism.</strong></p><p>Therefore three geometries of truth-emergence appear:</p><p>Let me now turn to the final part, wrapping up our findings above and how they interplay with our wider metaphysics of the subject.</p><p>We saw that:</p><p><strong>C. <em>Checks and balances</em> as dynamic of institutionalization.</strong></p><p>Parts I and II exposed why we have a duty to ourselves, while part III has established the metaphysical premises or framework for why this is also the case to the Other.</p><p>Is there a way to solve or manage this conflictual dimension in the best possible way?</p><p><strong>In other words, the human condition requires order-making (Totality) to enable meaning-making (fulfilment of potential).</strong> <strong>Conclusion to part III.</strong></p><p>Our objective has been to found human absolute moral value.</p><ul><li>Even with solid ethical grounding, violence is not eliminated.</li><li>The infinite potential of Man (individually and collectively) can be (and has been) used for evil deeds.</li></ul><p>We argued that for this to be absolute, the foundations had to be metaphysical and independent of cultural context, history, traditions or beliefs. This metaphysical foundations can be summed up as unicity and multi-dimensional potential: biological, phenomenological, affective, potential, self-reflective and inherently intersubjective. All these dimensions are comprised within the limits of moral realism, i.e. a morality founded on absolute values that are incommensurable or non-relativistic.</p><p>This institutional mediation doesn’t negate Levinas’s ethics of welcoming-it creates conditions where the welcoming of the Other remains possible. Without third-party arbitration, Totality’s appropriative logic would prevail through violence. Law preserves the space where the Other’s transcendence can appear.</p><p>This is where our briefly outlined considerations about the legal order resurface. Looking at the broadest spectrum of social organization and their forms of government (Republic, empire, village community, etc.), an institutional framework that regulates intersubjective relationships is indispensable.</p><p>Given our existential <em>Geworfenheit</em> — our existences <em>always</em> unfold in a given society at a given time, which we do not choose from birth — the only way to conceive of life-preserving order implies an institutional mediation as (however imperfect) <em>enabler</em> of collective life. What is the mechanism used by any regime to realize this? At the most abstract level by a system of <em>checks and balances</em>.</p><p>Back to the American conception of checks and balances understood as iterative, a progressive evolution of this totality into a slightly different one is probably preferable than more radical transitions and upheavals, which can often imply violence and uncertainty. Of course, radical changes might be necessary and morally preferred when dealing with particularly toxic regimes, but as a general rule, a progressive transition informed and realized by consensus is preferable to a radical — and uncertain — rupture.</p><p>Again, the Greeks observed this fact within the framework of their sometimes turbulent City-states, and called these moments of uncertainty, when the existing order is on the verge of collapse, stasis, which was reviled and feared because of its potential for tragic violence and social splintering. Here, the infinite potential appears in a darker shade, and it is the necessity of human society to narrow the range of uncertainty (and, therefore, potential) because in such situations, infinite potential turns more often than not unpredictable and violent, which in turn risks annihilating the potential of many human beings.</p><p>We have proposed a metaphysical foundation for the absolute moral value of Man, but questions remain:</p><p>Therefore, the pervasiveness of evil — and its infinite potential- beg to address the following question: if evil is in potential everywhere, why stick to a metaphysical moral grounding of man, even if absolute? Is there a way to weigh good and evil and justify the preservation of our potential? Is such a question even solvable, particularly on a grand scale? Admitting the evil objection can be soundly addressed, what does it tell us about uncertainty, and can we associate ethics with it?</p><p>Part IV will address these questions, developing what I call an <strong>ethics of uncertainty</strong>-a philosophical response to our constitutive fallibility and the pervasiveness of evil in all its dimensions that acknowledges the <em>pluri-dialectical</em> texture of human existence: infinite potential, transcendent intersubjectivity, conscious agency and radical unpredictability.</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/metaphysics-of-the-subject-iii"><em>https://collwyn.substack.com</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=046deae2f812" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Prospects of Space Exploration, I.]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@collwyn/the-prospects-of-space-exploration-i-507887360d87?source=rss-bec57615ac86------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/507887360d87</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[elon-musk]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[space-exploration]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[starship]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[astronomy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[exoplanets]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Collwyn Redslob]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 06 Jan 2026 20:20:53 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-01-06T20:20:53.668Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>A sober assessment: physical, financial and logistical challenges</h3><p>This article was originally written on my Substack platform Sublimating the Quant. (Some pictures on the original article might have been removed in the present text due to technical reasons)</p><p>The link to the original article is here: <a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/the-prospects-of-space-exploration">https://collwyn.substack.com/p/the-prospects-of-space-exploration</a></p><p><a href="https://substack.com/@collwyn">Sublimating the Quant</a></p><p>Oct 15, 2025</p><p><strong>Introduction</strong></p><p>In the first part of this article dedicated to space exploration, I will focus on the recent history of space exploration and assess its prospects for the next few decades. This part surveys the main milestones and current prospects of space exploration. <strong>It is therefore mostly descriptive and introductory, while the second part will explore wider philosophical aspects implied by a successful spatial endeavor.</strong></p><p>Space exploration has fascinated generations of aficionados and the recent advent of private corporations and disruptors like Elon Musk’s Space X have triggered renewed space exploration optimism. However, the barriers to human space exploration remain immense, even for the most gifted engineers and wealthiest entrepreneurs. We must carefully assess both the scale of what is required and its ultimate purpose: while successful exploration could pave the way for breathtaking innovations and long term social and existential changes, the road is long and uncertain and technical success alone will not necessarily guarantee the viability of this enterprise.</p><p><strong>Part II of this article will explore the wider implications of a successful space exploration program for humanity, including political, philosophical and psychological aspects among others.</strong></p><p><strong>I. A brief history</strong></p><p><strong>a) 1940–60s: Beginnings and Cold War emulation</strong></p><p>I will not harp here on the history of exploration whose main steps are well-known by the public (see bibliography below). Suffice to say that post world war II, the American space agency (NASA) was constituted and made use of former German engineers, including Wernher von Braun, who had worked on wartime rocket programs and who is often credited to be the man behind the first man on the Moon.</p><p>As the Cold War intensified between the USA and the USSR in the 1950–60s, colossal budgets were dedicated to space exploration, with the USSR taking the first man in orbit (Yuri Gagarin) while the USA would be able to set foot on the Moon in 1969, an unprecedented, groundbreaking achievement and a milestone in the history of mankind.</p><p><em>Man on the moon.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*xu06oY8pIpj4phSP.jpeg" /></figure><p><strong>b) 1970s: The end of the space race</strong></p><p>The USA returned several times to the Moon but given the lack of competition (the USSR was not able to send their cosmonauts there), the prohibitive costs of the missions and their virtually nil economic return, the Moon program was closed in 1972 after six completed missions. NASA then focused instead on the new shuttle program (active 1981–2011, 135 flights), which focused on flexibility and reusability by using a shuttle that was able to go to orbit and land back to earth and be re-used after. The 1980s also saw an increased focus on orbital operations with the launch and repair missions of the Hubble telescope, which proved a remarkable scientific success in terms of astronomy.</p><p><strong>c) 1980–90s: a muddled trajectory of successes and failures</strong></p><p>The 1980s were however marred by the tragic explosion of the Challenger shuttle in 1986, which traumatized the public and led to significant questions regarding the viability and health and safety of inhabited rockets. Likewise, the USSR then Russia failed at succeeding with their own <em>Buran</em> shuttle program due to lack of funds and economic disorganization post 1991.</p><p><em>The Shuttle</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*8FmdujKicezpMVfg.png" /></figure><p>In the 1990s and 2000s, a time of international space cooperation ensued with the constitution of the International Space Station (the ISS), the largest man-made object ever put on orbit, and which was assembled with dozens of successive flights. Key partners included the US, the Russian Federation, Europe via the European Space Agency (ESA) and Canada among others.</p><p><em>The ISS</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*DGjpZtB5cl46Ikhc.jpeg" /></figure><p>During this time, other significant uninhabited missions were successfully completed, such as the sending of the first rovers on Mars (<em>Pathfinder </em>mission, 1996, Soviet and American spacecrafts had already landed on Mars, but were static) signaling significant advances in robotics. Astronomy continued to progress but inhabited space exploration continued to stagnate in orbit.</p><p><strong>d) 2000–20s: Back to the Moon, European stagnation, private sector and Chinese indents</strong></p><p>Then President George Bush junior decided to reignite the NASA manned space program (“<em>Moon, Mars and Beyond</em>”), with the ambition to bring back the US astronauts to the “stars” by the 2020s. As frequent with high-budget space programs, the Constellation program was cancelled by the Obama administration but re-started as Project Artemis by the Trump administration and followed up by the Biden one, aiming at bringing man back to the Moon by the mid-2020s. Despite some delays, the program is shaping up, the flying crew is now selected, a fly-by expected by 2026 and a return to the Moon by mid-2027 if all goes well. An unmanned flight was performed successfully in 2022 with an Artemis I rocket and the <em>Orion</em> capsule which flew by the Moon.</p><p><em>Artemis I</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/960/0*mN0wxF5FPn1GWLof.jpeg" /></figure><p>During this time, Russia has receded due to an ageing infrastructure and challenges with their new Angara rocket and the cosmodrome of Vostochny (replacing Baikonour in Kazakhstan, partly out of sovereignty and independence considerations). In Europe, the ESA made successful launches with Ariane 5 but still no human program envisaged. China was the only non-US power to progress, being able to constitute a small space station in orbit (<em>Tiangong</em>) and able to send humans there by their own means. China is aiming at going to the Moon in the mid-2030s and, as such, might be conducive of further space emulation worldwide.</p><p>The 2010s saw the emergence of private US actors, including Blue Origin (Jeff Bezos’s space venture), Bigelow Aerospace (inflatable structures, now defunct) and Elon Musk’s Space X, so far and by far the most successful private enterprise in human space exploration. Space X has consistently progressed in terms of launcher capacity with its latest <em>Starship</em> rivaling the best ever rockets in terms of propulsion power / <em>payload capacity</em> and reusability alike. However, even in this most spectacular case, rocket failures and delayed timetables remain present.</p><p><em>Starship’s payload capacity versus comparables</em></p><p>With this historical trajectory in mind, let’s now turn to the key pillars of what space exploration is.</p><p><strong>II. The three pillars of space exploration:</strong> <strong>astronomy, uncrewed spaceflight and manned spaceflight.</strong></p><p>When looking at space exploration, it is important to distinguish between three elements:</p><p>1) <strong>Astronomy</strong>,</p><p>Astronomy deals with the discovery of our cosmic environment, potentially encompassing the whole universe. Its primary goal is scientific in essence and aims at better understanding the universe and its laws and includes a number of sub-disciplines such as the formation and growth pattern of the universe (cosmology), the discovery of extraterrestrial species (astrobiology), the discovery of planets outside of the solar system (exoplanets), the discovery of the content of matter in the universe, the natures of cosmic bodies such as black holes, pulsars, galaxies or galaxy clusters etc. Main recent successes and breakthroughs include:</p><ul><li>The discovery of the first planets outside of the solar system (<em>exoplanets</em>) by Swiss astronomers <strong>Mayor / Queloz</strong> in 1995. This was a Copernican revolution of some sort: for the first time, it was clear there were planets in other solar systems. Thanks to the improvement in telescopes and refinements in observation techniques, now up to 4,000 such exoplanets have been discovered, indicating that their numbers might easily be in the billions in our galaxy, some of which might well be habitable and possibly harbor intelligent life in rare cases.</li><li><em>Exoplanet sample by name and size</em></li><li><strong>Hubble telescope</strong>: he provided us with a fresh new view of the universe and cosmic cliches on an unprecedented scale delving into our universal past by billions of years. He made countless other discoveries and stunning pictures of various celestial bodies in our cosmic vicinity and beyond.</li></ul><p><em>Pillars of gas within the Carina Nebula (Hubble shot)</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*uOR4npvV-vNXPdQk.jpeg" /></figure><ul><li>The <strong>James Webb telescope</strong>: launched a few years ago by an ESA Ariane 5 and commissioned by NASA, this is the largest telescope in space ever and the most ambitious of all. The telescope sits more than one million kilometers away from earth at a <em>Lagrangian</em> <em>point</em> (i.e. where the gravity forces of celestial bodies perfectly cancel each other, enabling location stability). Webb, albeit fairly recent, has already made stunning pictures and discoveries that will provide data for astronomers (and AI) to chew on for decades. Main findings include the finding of very early galaxies (only 300–400 million years after the Big Bang) and early supermassive black holes and started to find out the detailed spectra of some exoplanets, i.e. for the first time being able to detect the presence of molecules like water, carbon dioxide etc. on such planets.</li></ul><p><em>James Webb’s deep field shot (galaxy cluster SMACS 0723)</em></p><p>2) <strong>Uncrewed exploration</strong></p><p>This type of space exploration uses robots (mostly rovers nowadays) and uncrewed spacecrafts to go to places still inaccessible to manned ships and do not require bulky life-support systems. These spacecrafts can be single spacecrafts or a combination of spacecrafts (such as Cassini-Huygens, with one spacecraft to orbit the planet / satellite, one to land on the surface) as well as rovers who land on a planet and can drive for miles and perform basic geological experiments (drilling, analyzing etc.) as well as take pictures sent back to earth. Uncrewed exploration has been most successful in the last 40 years, with notable achievements including:</p><ul><li><strong>Pioneer and Voyager (NASA)</strong> spacecrafts who flew by the farthest planets of the solar system and have now left it. Voyager 1 is the farthest man-made object from earth, now at c. 24 billion kilometers from the sun, outside the heliosphere and now firmly in interstellar space. The spacecraft still sends back some information on its limited power supply.</li><li><em>Voyager spacecraft</em></li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*nvSN-IL6bl-IzkWe.jpeg" /></figure><ul><li><strong>New Horizons (NASA)</strong>: launched 2006 and flew by Pluto in 2015, sending back the highest resolution pictures of Pluto, a trans-Neptunian object more than 5bn kilometers from us and now aiming at farther Kuiper Belt objects for future exploration.</li><li><em>Pluto (New Horizons spacecraft flyby shot)</em></li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*FQqTFjZaRhbYuZGR.jpeg" /></figure><ul><li><strong>Cassini-Huygens (ESA):</strong> spacecraft sent to a moon of Saturn and that performed a close analysis of Saturn, Titan and landed a craft on there to better know the chemical components of the satellite’s atmosphere.</li><li><em>Cassini-Huygens (ESA)</em></li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*Z_JSum4a9s2wZbzU.jpeg" /></figure><ul><li><strong>Mars rovers (NASA):</strong> in the last 20 years, NASA has sent many rovers on Mars (<em>Pathfinder</em> etc) enabling us to catch a much better glimpse of Martian surface and its appearance while deepening our understanding of Mars geology.</li><li><em>Curiosity rover on Mars</em></li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*fTJZap-ork1LjK4g.jpeg" /></figure><p>3) <strong>Manned exploration (the main topic of this article):</strong></p><p>This is where things look somewhat frustrating. More than 50 years after the last humans set foot on the Moon, we have not yet been able to come back, despite decades of political promises. While the ISS is a clear success and an international one at that, humankind’ s capability to project itself even only to the Moon seems highly challenging with no progress in 60 years. As mentioned above, the last few years have seen — finally — an acceleration in the conception and testing of much more robust manned spacecrafts by both the NASA (Space Launch System) and Space X (Starship) and we can only hope that they will pave the way for proper Moon and Mars progress in the coming years (more on it below).</p><p>Let’s now zoom in on manned space exploration by considering the very significant challenges facing it and assess the possibility of reasonable success in the medium term.</p><p><strong>III. Manned space exploration: a Herculean task.</strong></p><p>While astronomy and uncrewed space exploration already present tremendous engineering challenges (rocket, propulsion, in-space communication, ageing of instruments, navigation, reliability of separate instruments etc.) with frequent failures (rockets delayed or failures / explosions, rovers or crafts crashing rather than landing etc.), manned exploration ups the stakes by an order of magnitude: not only the engineering needs to work out, but life-support systems also need to work. Water recycling, food, oxygen, mental health of astronauts, cosmic rays, health impact on bone and muscle loss are of the essence. Simple testimonies from weathered astronauts will probably tame any space enthusiasts with regards to the adaptability of human biology to low- or no-gravity environments for a prolonged duration.</p><p>Sending humans to the Moon and further to Mars on a permanent basis seems extremely challenging. I am outlining a few of these challenges above, but they are far from exhaustive (for further details, please refer to bibliography below):</p><p><strong>- Transit time to Mars and celestial dynamics</strong>: while a trip to the Moon is a matter of days (the distance being 400,000km, a measly amount in cosmic terms), a realistic timetable for Mars is about 6 months (56,000,000km <em>at the closest</em>). Bear in mind that both the Earth and Mars revolve around the sun however at different paces and therefore the distance between both planets evolves considerably so that the rocket needs to travel during an optimal orbital window (when both planets are at the closest put simply) so a round trip is likely to last between 24 to 36 months (6–9 to go 12–18 to wait for the next window and 6–9 return trip with current technologies). Which leads us to the next challenge:</p><p>- <strong>Prolonged low or no gravity:</strong> if no artificial gravity systems on the spacecraft, astronauts would spend 6–9 months in zero gravity environment, requiring intense physical regime to offset the negative effects and be in sufficient shape to land on Mars in good enough shape to perform their duties there. Even on Mars, the gravity is lower than Earth’s (0.38g) so the effect will continue to impact on astronauts even if less drastically than in orbit. Another 6–9 months of no gravity regime will ensue on the return trip, posing the question of astronaut’s health after such an ordeal in terms of bone and muscle loss among many other symptoms.</p><p><strong>- Solar rays:</strong> the sun sometimes emits more light via solar bursts akin to a volcano. While our atmosphere shelters us from it, a spacecraft would not, drastically increasing the probability of various cancers for astronauts exposed to such bursts while in interplanetary space. Protections such as adding water shields around the astronauts as partial ray blockers are possible but would require costly and complex engineering tweaks and probably add to the weight of the spacecraft, which is itself very costly: sending an additional pound of payload in orbit and beyond costs up to USD 4,000 to start with. As a result, even a modest increase in payload (say a few hundred pounds) has a high financial cost and is also a logistical challenge: even the most powerful rockets have relatively low payloads compared to the rocket mass itself, a key constraint in all types of space exploration.</p><p><strong>- Criticality of life-support systems: </strong>on a 30-month ideal Mars return trip, the astronauts could perish if the oxygen supply fails just for a few minutes (in space or on Mars, where the atmosphere is not breathable for humans). This shows how much by a thread this manned space missions hang. Even assuming there are no problems there, any issue in water recycling systems would probably lead to the loss of the crew within days if un-remediated. Less critical but still highly risky events such as food contamination, sudden loss of crew out of a disease etc. could further jeopardize a mission.</p><p>Even a less risky trip to the Moon with a mission to establish a base there, many challenges such as low gravity, absence of atmosphere and limited local resources, dependence on critical life systems remain very high.</p><p><strong>As such, manned space missions should be viewed in the light of their <em>extreme difficulty and risk</em>, which partly explains why progress seems painstakingly slow. Despite major progress in the last fifty years in engineering, computing, materials and even AI now, it remains extremely challenging to send just a handful of humans on a nearby satellite, because as every astronaut knows too well, just leaving the Earth orbit requires tremendous chemical propulsion power and will remain intrinsically risky for the foreseeable future, notwithstanding all the subsequent challenges alluded to above.</strong></p><p>As such, why spend so many resources on manned space programs? The next section will address the potential benefits.</p><p><strong>IV. Manned space exploration: what for?</strong></p><p>When looking at the basic costs and risks of even small scale missions to the nearby celestial bodies (namely the Moon and Mars), a question is immediately asked: why incur all the costs and risks for such a low result? Indeed, if we were to take a pure economic return perspective on it, the billions expended on such missions given no economic return (assuming astronauts do not finds piles of polished diamonds on site and even this would imply high transportation costs) seem hard to justify. While wealthy entrepreneurs like Elon Musk are free to do so, national space agencies are funded by the taxpayer and need to justify the cost.</p><p>In addition, even if we were to focus on the scientific returns of such missions, another question arises: can’t astronomy or uncrewed missions (still expensive but much cheaper) or even humanoid robots replace humans for realistic purposes (no life-support systems needed etc.)?</p><p>At this stage, I would contend that some elements still play in favor of the continuation of manned missions, despite their higher complexity. Despite impressive recent advances in robotics, humans retain a few advantages in a Martian mission:</p><ol><li>Human <strong>capacity to react quickly and innovate:</strong> in an emergency, highly gifted astronauts would be able to make decisions on the spot with their crew, and also prove creative where needed. Human <em>intuition</em> may also play a role in the ability of a crewed mission to focus its research on the most interesting spots etc. A robot depending on instructions sent from Earth would need to wait c. 40 minutes to receive an order (given the distance between earth and mars and the time needed for radio waves to reach the point), which significantly expands communication time and could prove fatal in an emergency. Even allowing for more advanced, dexterous robots, humans are likely to retain an edge for some time.</li><li><strong>Human dexterity:</strong> while robotics advance quickly, even the most sophisticated models still look clumsy when compared to a human. In robotics, having a robot hold on to something that it does not look at (a common cognitive operation for any healthy human) is tremendously challenging to achieve. Humans are remarkably dexterous and agile compared to the best robots.</li><li><strong>The meaning of exploration and psychological resonance</strong>: while robotic missions are seen enthusiastically perceived by the public, the impact of a manned mission such as setting foot on Mars would likely be much more significant. There are several reasons for this in my view:</li><li><strong>Collective emotional resonance</strong>: Humans could <em>identify</em> with other fellow humans (even highly selected and gifted astronauts) as they never will with a rover or any robot. This means the <em>emotional</em> impact is a lot higher on the wider public and as such one might expect a much greater degree of <em>public support</em>, a key ingredient to sustain large budgets and long-winded space programs.</li><li><strong>Symbolic political value:</strong> in addition, if we envisage a multi-nation mission (not exclusively the USA) involving European, Asian, Middle Eastern or African astronauts, the level of <em>collective identification</em> would likely reach new heights, with everyone feeling they have a <em>stake</em> in humanity’s future beyond Earth. This would drastically change the perspective from “this is another Western scientific foray” versus a new dawn for mankind writ large.</li><li><strong>Inspiration for world peace:</strong> while the second part of this article will come back to the potential phenomenological and philosophical implications of successful space exploration, this would also likely act as a formidable call for world peace and unifying forces to advance mankind beyond what might increasingly be seen as petty local rivalries. We do not want to be naive here and note that the discovery of the Moon was performed on the back of the Cold War, but there still might be more than cold politics at play in such a scenario.</li><li><strong>Springboard for industrial scale developments:</strong> as a result of the points above, the collective inspiration might drive a lot of <em>vocations</em> among talented youths to become space engineers or astronauts and make space colonization an increasingly realistic prospect as the scale of missions and colonization progresses. While the demands remain huge, a cohesion of world forces towards such projects would likely accelerate space and technological cooperation between great powers and possibly lead to a more rapid pace of Martian implantation. While Musk himself has recently published a new plan for a scale-able and ultimately sustainable settling of Mars (involving <em>hundreds</em> of spaceships), it is likely a combined international effort that could accelerate things drastically.</li><li><strong>A cosmic overture. </strong>The Russian physicist Tsiolkowski once said that the Earth is our cradle and one cannot forever stay in the cradle. It is an extremely important point. If it was proven that humans can go to Mars and progressively settle there and create a new society, it is fair to say that humankind would enter into a new phase of its history, and on a grand scale at that, becoming a <em>multi-planetary civilization</em>. Philosophically speaking, it would mean that there is literally the potential for a new mankind, namely a Martian one. Such an achievement would be conducive of hope, but also of wider epistemic revolutions (see part II).</li></ol><p><strong>Provisional conclusion: a reasonable hope</strong></p><p>We have laid the groundwork for the realistic prospects of space exploration (limited here to the most realistic next steps, namely a human settlement on Mars). While the obstacles remain very high, and large scale success remains far (say at least a few thousands permanent inhabitants on Mars), the recent momentum currently being achieved in terms of powerful rocket conception and development as well as more advanced plans for settlements (Space X and NASA-led for now) does allow for realistic hopes of tangible progress in the next few decades.</p><p>In addition to these, the rapid progress of AI could help mission-making, navigation, emergency resolution etc. more efficiently over time. Likewise, more advanced propulsion systems could help reduce transit times to Mars from 6 to 9 months to 30 to 60 days based on plasma-based propulsions, which NASA, Rosatom and private companies like Ad Astra are working on. Plasma propulsion compounds the initial speed of the chemical engines with a slow but much longer acceleration (chemical rockets use their combustible very quickly) enabling much faster speeds. While the most advanced prototypes enable particle ejection speeds of up to 100km/s, engineers remain faced with extreme challenges such as the amount of power required for these to be efficient on a manned Mars trip as well as the thermal management of the fast exhausted particles.</p><p>Taking the above into account and leaning on the side of reasonable optimism, space exploration prospects by way of an early, growing human settlement of Mars by the end of this century can be envisaged.</p><p><em>An evolved Martian settlement (AI rendition)</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/640/0*3ZUyYyKI48PwFEQi.jpeg" /></figure><p>Based on the above premises, the second part will explore what implications such a development could have for mankind from various standpoints, while assessing possible scenarios. In particular, what a long term implantation would mean in terms of political representations, the ascent of a Martian phenomenology , the political and legal relationships between a growing Mars and the Earth and other implications.</p><p>© 2025 Collwyn Redslob. All rights reserved.</p><p>Do not reproduce without permission. For citations, please credit Collwyn Redslob and link to this Substack.</p><p><strong>Suggested bibliography</strong></p><ol><li><strong>On Space exploration history</strong></li></ol><p>Launius, Roger D. <em>The Smithsonian History of Space Exploration: From the Ancient World to the Extraterrestrial Future</em>. Washington, DC: Smithsonian Books, 2018.</p><ol><li><strong>Uncrewed space missions</strong></li></ol><p>Russell, Christopher T., ed. <em>The Cassini-Huygens Mission: Orbiter Remote Sensing Investigations</em>. Dordrecht: Springer Science+Business Media, 2005</p><p>Stern, Alan, and David Grinspoon. <em>Chasing New Horizons: Inside the Epic First Mission to Pluto</em>. New York: Picador, 2018.</p><p>Mishkin, Andrew. <em>Sojourner: An Insider’s View of the Mars Pathfinder Mission</em>. New York: Penguin Books, 2003.</p><ol><li><strong>Existing and future space propulsion systems</strong></li></ol><p>Czysz, Paul A., and Claudio Bruno. <em>Future Spacecraft Propulsion Systems and Integration: Enabling Technologies for Space Exploration</em>. 3rd ed. Berlin: Springer, 2022.</p><p>Long, K. F. <em>Deep Space Propulsion: A Roadmap to Interstellar Flight</em>. New York: Springer, 2012.</p><ol><li><strong>Recent research articles for further thematic explorations</strong></li></ol><p>“Overview of Environmental Control and Life Support Systems in Human Space Missions”<br><em>Acceleron Aerospace Journal</em>, July 2025</p><p>“The Impact of Space Radiation on Brains of Future Martian Explorers”<br><em>Geophysical Research Letters</em>, 2023</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=507887360d87" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Age of AI, V: Riding the Abyss?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@collwyn/the-age-of-ai-v-riding-the-abyss-9ded9572ee4e?source=rss-bec57615ac86------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/9ded9572ee4e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[education]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ai]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[dialectics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Collwyn Redslob]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 31 Dec 2025 11:55:39 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-12-31T11:55:39.273Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>From Atticism to AI-tticism: the constructive uses of AI</h3><p>The link to the original Substack article is here: <a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/the-age-of-ai-v-riding-the-abyss">https://collwyn.substack.com/p/the-age-of-ai-v-riding-the-abyss</a></p><p><a href="https://substack.com/@collwyn">Sublimating the Quant</a></p><p>Dec 11, 2025</p><p><strong>Background</strong></p><p>This is the fifth and last part of our AI series. As a brief reminder:</p><ul><li>Part I exposed the main elements of the current situation, namely a rapid progression of AI and its integration in our daily lives and the risks associated with it.</li><li>Part II provided a more detailed description of AI integration in the form of a <em>geometry of infiltration</em>, characterized by speed, depth and breadth of AI applications.</li><li>Part III contextualized the advent of AI within a historical genealogy of the technician system as envisaged by Ellul.</li><li>Part IV investigated the deeper ontological implications of AI acting as an <em>Ersatz </em>of human reasoning and the risk of a gradual semantic disempowerment, echoing Heidegger’s concerns of mankind’s en-framing into it (<em>Gestell</em>). We proposed a model of <em>schizo-recursion</em> whereby AI could end up becoming reified to the point that mankind ends up dispossessed of its agency as a result of an outsourcing of its independent thinking.</li></ul><p><strong>Synopsis.</strong></p><p>In part V, we will propose a constructive alternative to a worst case scenario (<em>schizo-recursion</em>) based on a set of proposals already partly outlined at the end of Part I. We will first further flesh out the recursive nature of AI by having a look at the current functioning of LLMs. We will then define what we believe are the necessary conditions for a constructive use of these LLMs, then provide a more specific case study as a brief example showing in what way this tool can be used to advance human thinking rather than outsourcing it. We will then wrap up by contextualizing this potential constructive uses and stressing the need to keep human intentionality at the core.</p><p><strong>I. Large Language Models (LLMs): a formidable but recursive tool.</strong></p><p>At the end of part IV we exposed why we believe LLMs are ultimately recursive, given their dependence on human input and their inability to generate original synthesis of their own: I would like here to explain in more detail why, by touching on how they function.</p><p><strong>A. Why do AI “hallucinate”?</strong></p><p>Recently, there has been widespread talk of AI “hallucinating”, i.e. providing answers that are completely off from the original request. The reason for these errors will help us understand why we call LLMs recursive.</p><p>The main reasons why AI may make such mistakes is due to the following reasons:</p><p>(1) the prompt by the user was unclear or too broad;</p><p>(2) the LLM has not been enough trained on a specific topic or the training data contains conflicting or missing information.</p><p>The fundamental reason for these lies in the functioning of the LLM: it is probabilistic. Based on the prompt, the LLM will access an immense database and produce words (in more technical parlance <em>tokens</em>) that are the most likely to be logical based on the prompt. The key thing is that the model at each step of its generation (I prefer it to the word <em>reasoning</em> which is still a human monopoly) may not “reality-check” all steps. If the question is forced and the model “doesn’t know”, it will still provide a probabilistic answer but that might be completely “invented”, and therefore highly error-prone in such cases.</p><p>LLMs (and that is their strength) are based on a vast amount of knowledge but they tend to compress this data to provide the answer: this compression (statistically driven) may lead to more subtle semantic loss as well, by approximation. By using probabilistic inference at its core functioning, the risk of error is very low but not negligible. LLMs as we said above will always try to give an answer as they are not programmed to say “I don’t know”. The issue is that if someone completely invents a quote by a famous author or thinker that does not exist, it will still try to “reconcile” to provide an answer, however unfounded it might be.</p><p>The direct consequence from the above is that the more LLMs lacks data about a topic, the more likely they are to generate an error, as there are not enough statistical iterations that reduce the risk of hallucinations, due to model guesses based on too shallow an existing database (think about a prompt of rare, even obscure epigraphic evidence in a technical area of archaeology). But even with a lot of data available the risk of hallucination is still not reduced to zero due to the reasons outlined above (misleading prompt, model programmed to generate at least <em>something</em> etc.).</p><p><strong>B. The recursive nature of LLMs, with nuance.</strong></p><p>In part IV, I hinted at the recursive nature of AI, caveating that this was not a basic recursion but something more sophisticated. Let us flesh it out in more detail:</p><p>Technically speaking, LLMs are not recursive in algorithmic terms, but more precisely <em>autoregressive</em>. In plain words, this means:</p><ul><li><strong>Locally self-referential:</strong><br>AIs generate each token (word) based on all previously generated tokens; this means that their own result (even if erroneous) immediately becomes new input, which in turn yields a new output, and so forth. In other words, the model continuously conditions on itself with <em>no sanity-checking</em>. This self-referential unfolding may lead to the propagation of a small mistake into a full hallucination: the model begins from a minor deviation, which is then amplified because the deviation itself becomes context. A small hallucination can thus become the scaffolding for a larger semantic drift. (<em>Important note: this mechanism applies equally to “right” answers, which represent the overwhelming majority. Even when the answer is correct, the AI remains self-referential: it feeds on human input and on its own unfolding, whether true or not.</em>)</li><li><strong>Not globally recursive:</strong><br>However, if the AI is <em>not prompted</em> to reflect on or revise its own generated output, it will not iterate upon it; it will not loop back or re-evaluate the previous step. If the user is dissatisfied with an answer, the model will not <em>automatically</em> reconsider the wrong result. <strong>Human agency and judgment therefore directly affect the quality of AI output:</strong> on the one hand, there is less risk <em>if</em> human judgment is robust enough (see next paragraph on my proposed conditions for a constructive use of LLMs); on the other, this shows that AI does not self-check its information (lack of consciousness, awareness, or any internal critical loop).</li></ul><p>Conversely, if the user accepts the wrong output, the model may reinforce it by being asked to build upon it. For instance (simplified example — errors of that kind would be caught by most models): if I state that the Eiffel Tower is in Shanghai, the model may continue by inferring that it was built by Chinese architects. This is logically coherent but factually wrong because the AI does not verify its claims.</p><p><strong>To conclude: the model is locally self-referential (building on whatever is already in context), but globally autoregressive, meaning it does not self-correct its own output but simply marches forward. In this sense, autoregression constitutes a second path toward error: not because it recursively amplifies an initial deviation, but because it proceeds blindly, extending whatever context — right or wrong — happens to be present.</strong></p><p><strong>In my view, this is symbolically or at a more abstract level still structurally recursive: AI does not know, and therefore generates data of its own making, potentially making errors — in itself not strictly recursive because it is <em>open-ended</em> — but philosophically recursive in spirit because it cannot generate self-checked data that provides a <em>true</em> innovation in knowledge and therefore expand the existing knowledge on a <em>certified</em> basis.</strong></p><p><strong>C. The random innovation wildcard and the <em>meaning</em> of true (human) innovation.</strong></p><p>As a final remark to this section and for the sake of completeness: an AI model <em>could</em> generate something new based on a probabilistic iteration of tokens. However the probability of such an innovation being epistemically sound is statistically low. Most of the time, when pushed to its limits, the model would generate a statistically-driven (and therefore somewhat random) output. The only condition at which a LLM could invent something that is epistemically founded is that it would be humanly sanity-checked. This is because LLMs are not <em>self-aware</em> and do not <em>know</em>.</p><p>Even in a “successful” case of LLM-driven breakthrough, the invention would still be driven by a circularity constraint because the output is <em>determined</em> entirely:</p><p>(1) earlier states condition later states,</p><p>(2) the system is constrained by its own previous output,</p><p>(3) stochasticity (probabilistic inference, however random, see above) sits on top of a <em>deterministic</em> backbone, that is a statistical model from which the LLM <em>cannot deviate, however rich the statistical generation can be </em>(it is still methodologically and absolutely limited).</p><p>This is the true difference with a human “eureka” moment: the inventor, the philosopher, the practician invent out of their own experience and independent thinking, i.e. independent of any probabilistic model. While AI outputs are determined (or deduced) by a program that functions statistically, true human genius can spring forth by a finding that is not pre-determined in a statistical way, allowing genuine epistemic breaks.</p><p><strong>Interestingly, this leads to the following: a discovery (or invention) in the traditional sense is a truth found by an inventor who literally un-covers it.</strong> Note the etymology of discovery: dis-covery, or un-covering something that pre-exists, akin in substance and linguistic form to French <em>dé-couvrir</em>, German <em>ent-decken</em> and Greek <em>apo-kaluptein</em>, i.e etymologically remove a cover). In contrast, AI generates outputs out of inputs, trying to “force its way” into something new, while an authentic (human) discovery is the capturing of something that is true but that has been dis- (or un-) covered: AI tries to build a new truth (literally and algorithmically speaking) whereas humans <em>find</em> it.</p><p>This echoes a long tradition, which we have alluded to in part IV and other texts on this platform:</p><ul><li><strong>Classically Greek</strong> (ἀλήθεια as <em>a-letheia</em>, “un-hiddenness”) and <strong>Heideggerian</strong> (truth is not correctness, but <em>Entbergung</em> — “de-concealing”): see <a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/the-age-of-ai-iv-schizo-recursion">The Age of AI, IV: Schizo-recursion.</a></li><li>Within a philosophical-theological remit, ἀνάμνησις, i.e. the recollection of knowledge by a mechanism of unveiling (<a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/puzzling-the-cogito-ii-the-anamnetic">Puzzling the Cogito, II: the Anamnetic Route Where Descartes and Plato converge in God</a>) is structurally akin to discovery (or re-discovery, recalling to be entirely rigorous).</li></ul><p>As such, AI does not discover but builds in an additive, generative, i.e. in a <em>constructive</em> way, while human discovery is “aletheic”, i.e. human insight removes a veil, rather than “adding layers”. AI recombines existing data, whereas human disclose a portion of truth, as a result AI is epistemically secondary: it cannot generate ἀλήθεια but only techno-effects.</p><p>Now that we have established the ultimate limits of existing LLMs, it is time we assessed whether a constructive use of these tools can be envisaged, in which rather than users <em>outsourcing</em> their reasoning, they can use it as a tool to further refine their reasoning. In order for this to be possible though, we need to establish the (human) conditions under which such a constructive use is made possible.</p><p><strong>II. The key requirements for a constructive of AI: personal education and acquisition of <em>judgment</em>.</strong></p><p><strong>A. Context</strong></p><p>In Part II of our AI series, we mentioned the risk of humans becoming increasingly dependent on AI for an increasing number of tasks and existential meaning, while pointing out the simultaneous progressive cognitive erosion observed in the population. Part III and IV deepened the diagnosis by highlighting the risk of techno-en-framing of mankind, rendering humans increasingly dependent of a technician system that, pushed to its consequences, would lead to what we have called <em>schizo-recursion</em>.</p><p><strong>B. Constructive use of AI: a narrow path?</strong></p><p>LLMs do not know, are not self-reflective, but are still increasingly used by humans to answer a lot of questions. LLMs statements are not conscious and therefore can only be sanity-checked by more traditional human knowledge and reasoning. This knowledge and reasoning are acquired by humans in their infancy, then childhood and adolescence by learning, usually in schools and high schools for most of us, albeit complemented by family transmission of knowledge, early social interactions or even self-teaching.</p><p>Therefore it appears that the best defense mechanism of humans against the risk of excessive AI dependency resides in their own intellectual conformation, which we view as the acquisition of a sufficient amount of knowledge and reasoning skills in order to be able to sanity check the answers provided by LLMs.</p><p>This condition relies on a qualitative instruction from a young age on. Children developing basic skills starting with spelling, grammar, syntax and basic arithmetic form the unconditional foundation thereof, or the minimal toolkit to allow a development of their reasoning capabilities later.</p><p>Once these foundations are established, further capabilities are developed via the reading of classical and simpler literary texts (literature or religious / foundational texts) which can develop empathy and emotional understanding (something LLMs are also devoid of), the accumulation of elementary knowledge of the world (geography, history etc.) and the wrestling with complex problem-solving tasks (mathematics etc.).</p><p>The combination of these acquisitions will help develop what LLMs eminently lack: first, an <em>awareness</em> of this knowledge, <em>psychologically internalized</em> by the person, secondly, a sufficient amount of context (think intersubjective context in literature, world or environmental awareness for history and geography), which will provide a basis for detecting any potential LLM errors (factual or hallucinatory), thirdly, a logical ability to further refine reasoning skills and see logical links. In a last step, and probably the most critical one, this knowledge blended with intersubjective, social experience will lead to the elaboration of a <em>critical filter</em>, based on a rich accumulated semantic context, or what we call <em>judgment</em>.</p><p>Where things get interesting is in the <em>progressive</em> nature of the above. It is clear that the more a person is educated and has internalized a diverse pool of knowledge, the stronger her critical filter will be: a young child may not yet know where America is on the map, and therefore could easily be misled by a faulty AI (or as we said, this person could possibly mislead AI herself, creating an erroneous self-referential loop, see above). At a more advanced level, an educated person will be able to spot most basic mistakes where they occur, but also to refine their own judgment as to the <em>qualitative</em> nature of a more complex answer.</p><p>Say a user is looking for a budget holiday in a cheap destination. The LLM will likely provide a list with some details for each. Ultimately though, the person should use their own judgment with regards to their preference for weather, local culture and cuisine, crowdedness, flight time or else. But this judgment obviously already requires some <em>personal</em> experience already, both knowledge-wise and experience-wise (maybe a history of past holidays, some experience traveling abroad, feedback from friends familiar with the destination).</p><p>In short, humans will need to maintain their education level and personal experience before using AI, lest their minds become excessively molded by it, and prevent the natural and integrated emergence of a minimum amount of knowledge, and — ultimately — judgment. While this will sound self-evident to the reader, one should think of new generations who will grow up with it as an instantaneous and powerful tool to outsource their own efforts (and therefore, progression) from start, potentially jeopardizing their ability to patiently internalize self-acquired knowledge</p><p>As such, education and schooling systems remain essential for the acquisition of these. We saw in part II (<a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/the-age-of-ai-ii-architecture-of">The Age of AI, II: “Architecture of Aggression”. Part II: A Cartography of the Abyss)</a> that a relative and concerning erosion has happened in many western countries for decades (largely preceding AI and smartphones themselves), posing the risk of new generations being less-equipped against too comfortable a LLM dependency.</p><p>In East Asia, where traditional and education values remain paramount, intensive research is being made to balance the need for technological integration but keeping human at the core. In a very recent article (October 2025, cf bibliography below), Weihe Xie posits that “<em>human-centered value orientation” </em>should remain the core principle<em> </em>by <em>“offering essential support for achieving Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in education and advancing human civilization”. </em>The message is clear: humans remain at the center of the process, and AI must be integrated <em>within</em> the educational path rather than outsource students’ thinking.</p><p>If individual education is the first line of defense, what does empirical research tell us about the risks of bypassing it?</p><p><strong>C. The state of research on AI usage and the risk of LLM overreliance.</strong></p><p>In a recent contribution by Elshall / Badir (bibliography below), applied to more advanced science and engineering graduate and post-graduate studies, the authors put the <strong>FACT</strong> (Fundamental, Applied, Conceptual, critical Thinking) frame at the core, where we find the critical importance of acquire independent thinking as a pre-condition to AI use (emphases are mine):</p><p><em>“the FACT assessment includes: (1) Fundamental skills assessment (F) through assignments </em><strong><em>without AI assistance</em></strong><em> to build a strong coding foundation, (2) applied project assessment (A) through AI-assisted assignments and term projects to engage students in authentic tasks, (3) </em><strong><em>conceptual-understanding assessment</em></strong><em> © through a </em><strong><em>traditional paper-based exam</em></strong><em> to independently evaluate comprehension, and (4) </em><strong><em>critical-thinking assessment</em></strong><em> (T)”</em>.</p><p>Even within advanced scientific studies, the ability to test student’s knowledge without AI assistance by way of <em>traditional</em> paper-based exams and the assessment of critical thinking (synonymous to our judgment notion above) remain core. <strong>There is no using AI without being able to understand the concepts and context themselves independently.</strong></p><p>Interestingly, many students which took part in the experiment found that there was a risk of <em>overreliance</em> on AI. The authors mention other research (Camarilo et al., Wilson and Nishimoto, Lee et al. cf bibliography), in particular that “<em>For example, in data science education, student dependence on AI tools has the potential to </em><strong><em>diminish the development of basic coding and problem-solving skills</em></strong><em> necessary for their professional growth” </em>and that <em>“research has shown that increased confidence in AI-generated output often leads to </em><strong><em>reduced engagement in critical thinking</em></strong><em>, as users tend to rely on AI responses rather than independently evaluating information”.</em></p><p>Most recent research in the field confirms the risks of overreliance on AI leading to a lack of independent critical thinking and a reduced engagement, echoing our Part II concern whereby while cognitive abilities seem to be eroding in some parts of the world at least, the use of AI may increase this trend by overreliance. Significant increases in plagiarism and academic honor violation are also stressed (see part I, <a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/the-age-of-ai-mankinds-downfall-or">The Age of AI: Mankind’s Downfall or Springboard? Part I: Regulating the Uncontainable?</a>).</p><p>This article also highlights the speed of progression of AI (see part II) whereby LLMs become increasingly competent at even advanced tasks, highlighting that “<em>verifying independent capabilities is needed” </em>(Gehrlich, Lubbe et al., see bibliography). They highlight that a simple proficient use of AI could mask students (and future professors or researchers) foundational weaknesses: think of a great looking house with no foundations or just the facade.</p><p>Other researchers (Jain and Samuel, 2025, cf bibliography) forged the powerful metaphor of the risk of “<em>ventriquolizing</em>” (eerily echoing our notion of human hollowing out in part IV) with learners merely replicating AI result without <em>internalization</em>. Think of a basic and pre-AI example: if you let your friend do your dissertation for you, you may get a good mark, but you will have learned nowt.</p><p>Going even further, Elshall and Badir also highlight that the need for foundational skills are supported by foundational cognitive load theory (Sweller, 1988). “<em>Poor instructional design or insufficient prerequisite knowledge can introduce extraneous cognitive load, which diverts cognitive resources away from intrinsic cognitive load and germane cognitive load</em>”. Learners cognitive load and resources might be diverted by the use of AI and lead to less concentration capabilities and deep engagement, a pattern already particularly visible with smartphones these days and the growing inability to focus for instance on reading material for a sustained period of time.</p><p><strong>D. Human-centered education as paramount in the Age of AI.</strong></p><p>The field of research on the impact of AI on education is booming and it is not within the remit of our article to mention all (further sources provided below) but the message from various research institutes is overwhelmingly clear: <strong>if AI progresses too quickly and is not matched by traditional learning (including basic skills, paper-based exams, oral defense and critical thinking development) from the ground up, mankind’s semantic erosion, cognitive disempowerment, AI overreliance and ultimately a hollowing out of thought might ensue.</strong></p><p><strong>Traditional education (writing, reading, counting, integration of a basic corpus of knowledge etc.) remain fundamental if any use of AI can prove beneficial at all: a fine but still possible line to tread.</strong></p><p>Assuming today’s education systems enable counter-measures that enable a smoother integration of AI within the curriculum while preserving essential human judgment, I would like to discuss an anecdotal example of how AI, rather than cutting corners to our thinking, could actually be used to <em>expand</em> human mind in a positive and constructive manner.</p><p><strong>III. LLMs as virtual dialectical partners.</strong></p><p><strong>A. Conversation with AI: from Atticism to AI-tticism?</strong></p><p>Assuming that individuals have acquired sufficient knowledge and independent thinking, I would argue that AI can be used in a much more positive, and even radically creative way, while offering the benefits inherent to it: incredible speed and a massive amount of available data.</p><p>Take the following example, which I extract from a virtual conversation I had with DeepAI:</p><p>User: What is philosophy?</p><p><em>LLM: Philosophy is the study of fundamental questions about existence, knowledge, values, reason, and reality.</em></p><p><em>User: What is reason?</em></p><p><em>LLM: Reason is the ability to think logically, make sense of information, and draw conclusions based on evidence and rational thought.</em></p><p><em>User: What do you mean by make sense of information?</em></p><p><em>LLM: Making sense of information means understanding it clearly and organizing it in a way that makes it meaningful and understandable.</em></p><p><em>User: How does clarity and structured thought make it meaningful?</em></p><p><em>LLM: Clarity and structured thought make information meaningful by organizing ideas clearly, reducing confusion, and helping you see connections, which makes it easier to understand and use.</em></p><p><em>User: But is not meaningful more meaningful than you say? Not only clarity and rigor, but also meaningful in a more profound sense?</em></p><p><em>LLM: You’re right. Beyond clarity and structure, being truly meaningful also involves relevance, significance, and personal or broader importance — connecting information to values, goals, or deeper understanding, making it resonate on a more profound level.</em></p><p><em>User: So meaningful knowledge implies human resonance, what do you mean by this?</em></p><p><em>LLM: By human resonance, I mean that meaningful knowledge connects deeply with human values, emotions, or experiences, creating a sense of relevance and personal significance.</em></p><p><em>User: In a way, philosophy is therefore not only focused on seeking clear knowledge, but also a knowledge that resonates with our deeper emotions and values? So what is the true aim of philosophy then? Shot answer.</em></p><p><em>LLM: Yes, the true aim of philosophy is to seek understanding that illuminates truth while also enriching our connection to deeper human values and meaning.</em></p><p><em>User: Would you say the same applies to mathematics?</em></p><p><em>LLM: Yes, similarly, mathematics seeks to uncover truths and patterns that resonate with our logical understanding and sense of beauty or harmony, connecting abstract concepts to our appreciation of order and structure.</em></p><p><em>User: So there is a connection between knowledge, reasoning and our existential longing?</em></p><p><em>LLM: Absolutely. Knowledge and reasoning fulfill our desire to understand the world, while our existential longing drives us to find meaning and connection — philosophy and mathematics both serve as avenues to bridge that inner yearning with understanding.</em></p><p><em>User: Where does our yearning for understanding come from? Is this a natural drive? Some people are intellectually curious but some other less? Contradiction? Short answer.</em></p><p><em>LLM: Our yearning for understanding is a natural, innate drive rooted in human curiosity and the desire to make sense of our existence. While some people are more intellectually curious, this variation reflects individual differences, not a contradiction — everyone has the capacity for curiosity, but its expression varies.</em></p><p><em>User: So this means there is an ordering of human beings in terms of curiosity? Do we know why some humans are more curious than ohters?</em></p><p><em>LLM: There appears to be variability in curiosity among individuals, which suggests some form of ordering. Factors influencing this include genetics, environment, education, and personal experiences. While we understand some influences, the precise reasons why some humans are more curious than others remain complex and not fully understood.</em></p><p><em>User: If it includes genetics, have we found a gene of curiosity?</em></p><p><em>LLM: Currently, no specific gene has been identified as directly responsible for curiosity. Curiosity is a complex trait likely influenced by multiple genes interacting with environmental factors, rather than a single “curiosity gene.” Research is ongoing to better understand the genetic and neurobiological underpinnings of curiosity.</em></p><p><em>User: So ultimately philosophical understanding is partly genetics-dependent?</em></p><p><em>LLM: That’s a thoughtful point. While genetics can influence cognitive traits, personality, and perhaps tendencies toward curiosity, philosophical understanding is also shaped by environment, education, culture, personal experiences, and individual reflection. Therefore, philosophical insight is a complex interplay of biological predispositions and experiential factors, rather than being determined solely by genetics.</em></p><p>I stop here. The key takeaways of this brief virtual dialogue, vaguely Socratic in nature, are as follows:</p><ul><li><strong>Basic premise:</strong> LLMs do not know and have no awareness, but they can make sense.</li><li><strong>Virtual dialectics:</strong> The user can expand their own knowledge by deepening the questioning. This is akin to a (virtual) Socratic dialogue of sorts: I questioned the answers provided by LLM for it to provide a deeper answer.</li><li><strong>Fractal / divergent potential</strong>: by widening the scope of the conversation, we briefly touch on philosophy, mathematics, genetics and knowledge as meaning, while trying to better define what meaning is and how it is constituted, <em>helping expand the user’s knowledge and depth of understanding</em>.</li><li><strong>Input dependence:</strong> the LLMs remain dependent on my inputs. Other questions would have led to completely different answers.</li><li><strong>Input quality:</strong> the quality of the answer depends on the quality of the user’s question. If the user does not understand he can ask further clarification thereof, but this supposes he is fully aware he has not necessarily understood well (semantic gap risk). Self-awareness is paramount and does require some traditional training in thinking by oneself to test one’s limits first.</li><li><strong>Tone:</strong> I kept the tone factual. A say playful conversation tone may have led the LLM to adopt a less dry type of wording.</li><li><strong>Limits:</strong> for the sake of brevity, I did not push the conversation to a very long and deeper one. One might of course find LLMs answers still partly incomplete or partly contradictory.</li><li><strong>Future potential</strong>: as LLMs refine, they may be more “competent” and able to gain in clarity, depth and (unconscious) reasoning capabilities.</li><li><strong>Speed:</strong> answers are provided by LLMs in seconds. This is an advantage when needing to understand complex matters in more depth without a human interlocutor or lacking time.</li></ul><p>Other examples of productive conversations could include general knowledge, such as “tell me more about India” or “what is botanical science” etc., then starting from Wikipedia-type answers, go into deeper questions and connections in a rhizomatic way. But again, this AI potential can be tapped only if prompted soundly, and more importantly with intent (echoing our short dialogue above on curiosity). In more advanced cases, advanced students in theoretical physics or speculative theologians may submit their essay to a LLM asking guidance about structure, clarity, or even the legitimacy, strengths and weaknesses of their argument.</p><p><strong>B. AI usage as constructive.</strong></p><p>All of the above belongs to what I call a constructive use of AI. Constructive because it is done with (human) <em>intent</em> as a starting point, can teach the user new facts, authors, ideas etc. (expanding the user’s knowledge in return). But what is as clear is that the quality of the LLM output will depend on the quality of the human input. It is not only about the quality of the prompt, but at a more profound level the inner wrestling of the user with his own thoughts to seek what it is that he is trying to understand.</p><p>My contention (see all series already published) is this can be achieved only based on a long and traditional training of the mind, which is the <em>sine qua non</em> condition for a productive use (bar very simple data requests such as “where is China?” but these do not represent a true reasoning replacement risk per se, more a dictionary replacement at worst).</p><p><strong>IV. A few caveats and reminders.</strong></p><p>From the above we can say that AI can become complementary as long as the human cognitive process remains human-centered (intention) and not outsourced (hollowing out).</p><p><strong>A. Real dialectical engagement remains essential.</strong></p><p>Part III provided a basic example of what I have called virtual dialectics. But what is the difference with real dialectics, such as a political or philosophical debate between two (or more) individuals?</p><p>In essence, a LLM will be prompted and filter its huge data base to produce an answer that is focused on the user’s request. In real life, if we replace the LLM by a flesh-and-bone philosopher for instance, the interlocutor may also tap their internal knowledge, but it will do it with intent and also gauge his partner’s intentions, too.</p><p>Rather than being cornered by his interlocutor into a narrower semantic field in a stochastic way, the interlocutor may decide to think laterally, object more strongly to the other’s thesis or even use one’s personal life experience (anecdote or else), which will orientate the debate much more richly (and sometimes possibly dishonestly, too).</p><p>Likewise, we have explained above LLMs are not conscious and do not know. They generate tokens probabilistically. Humans have the capacity to judge the proposed argument and challenge it, again with both a self-conscious critical filter intentionality.</p><p><strong>B. Statistical combination and generation vs human agency and intentionality.</strong></p><p>A human user may be provided with a virtually infinite amount of information by a LLM. The LLM will also go further than a simple data base based on its (probabilistically inferred) combinatorial capacities: exposing the links between biology and biomechanics, the differences between Hegel and Kant, or the different views existing about a political matter.</p><p>However, the user will not only select his own topic of interest but also <em>choose</em> which arguments seem most <em>meaningful</em> to him. Humans can cut through the data out of their own volition to build their own thinking. One could think of LLMs as a 2-dimensional interface (the virtual map of knowledge) while humans intentionally confront this frame (one might muse orthogonally) providing the third dimension of (literally speaking) <em>intention </em>(first) then <em>reflection</em> in return. But the richness of this three-dimensional construct will depend on the capacity for engagement with the data provided, itself dependent on solid cognitive foundations, including critical judgment (and common sense). In other words, the more one knows and understands, the more you can use LLMs “productively”.</p><p><strong>C. A word on the Ellulian critique.</strong></p><p>What would Ellul say of AI? It is always fraught to guess what past thinkers would think of today’s developments, but we can stay true to one core argument made by him (and Heidegger as well): <strong>there is no good or bad use of technology because technology engulfs us in its own nets, creating an environment we become fully dependent on.</strong></p><p>I agree with the general logic and concern but would add some nuance: if we compare individuals, we note that some, even nowadays, may not have a TV or, in rare cases, even a smartphone. Even among those who use them, type and duration of use vary considerably (and the same will go for LLMs). As such, there seems to be at least a <em>gradation of engulfment</em> in intensity (how much reliant we are on technology) but also in qualitative terms (one might use a smartphone for long conversations or playing <em>Sudoku</em>, while others could spend hours scrolling Tik Tok). In a way, AI is not here fundamentally different from other <em>media</em>. Pierre Bourdieu, in Distinction, noted that some will read page-turners while others Shakespeare, but in both cases they use the same technology (here, a paper book).</p><p>If human beings benefit from a strong education including basic skills, general knowledge and ultimately a sound degree of critical judgment (all these to be understood on a continuum), I can only conclude that their immunity to technological overreliance will be intrinsically stronger: today, there are children who still read paper books and other who spend time on social media. I believe this will result, years down the line, in very different cognitive outcomes, including one’s ability to focus, concentrate over a long period of time and else.</p><p><strong>It nonetheless appears that, when facing the technician system and particularly its latest AI, smartphone and social media offspring, the cultivation of traditional learning in paramount.</strong></p><p>An advanced researcher in physics can safely use AI as a tool once he has integrated the understanding of his technical field from the ground up. Yes, at a systemic level, AI will still mold society on a global basis, but it may not take the form of a final <em>schizo-recursion</em> if human fundamentals are safely preserved.</p><p><strong>Interlude</strong>.</p><p>We have now gone full circle. From the risks of AI to its structural infiltration, then its genealogical-historical context and its ultimate ontological consequences should the worst case materialize, to the narrow constructivist path, it is now time to conclude our series, being aware that this is not the end, but a starting point to further reflection in the field.</p><p><strong>Conclusion: education, intentionality and human-centeredness.</strong></p><p>Human flourishing is inseparable from the ability to think and judge independently, lack of which they will be more easily misled and controlled. This requires a robust educational foundation as we said above.</p><p>The source of knowledge and creativity continues to reside in human-centered intentionality, but, as Heidegger’s notion of <em>Gestell</em> indicates, the proliferation of increasingly less-reflective and more passive use of LLMs could blind humankind to another dimension, that of self-critical and informed enough thinking, leading to <em>schizo-recursion</em> for a great majority of the population.</p><p>The primacy of human agency, constitution and dignity is paramount, and can only be supported by a human-centered view of education and human development, along the lines of the vertical axiology we mentioned in part I as well as the primacy of human decision over LLM determinism in the longer run.</p><p>I will leave the final word to Kant and his faithful, timeless injunction:</p><p>“<em>Sapere Aude.</em>” (think for yourself)</p><p>… while offering a modest “update” for the XXIst century:</p><p><em>Use AI as a tool, not as an oracle.</em></p><p>© 2025 Collwyn Redslob. All rights reserved.</p><p>Do not reproduce without permission. For citations, please credit Collwyn Redslob and link to this Substack.</p><p><em>A final note to the reader: the scope of these articles is limited by their format. I welcome further insights, and particularly important ones in my view, regarding:</em></p><p><em>(1) the inequality of the schooling and education systems, across and within countries. AI could certainly act as a negative social differentiator between individuals not able to afford a sound education and becoming dependent on LLMs and at higher risk of existential hollowing out, while well-educated users will use it to further expand their already substantial intellectual confirmation, with the risk of LLMs acting as accelerating social differentiators in a negative sense.</em></p><p><em>(2) The risks of AI ideological orientation and manipulation: indeed, various LLMs can and are already censored in many ways. While some of these limits are completely legitimate and within traditional legal boundaries (harmful requests etc.), some are infinitely subtler and could result in selective censorship, which, combined with the risk of overreliance on AI, could considerably alter the democratic and independent thinking fabric (or what is left of it) of our societies, while reinforcing the recursive nature of AI.</em></p><p><strong>Suggested Bibliography (recent research oriented)</strong></p><ul><li>Bratsberg, Bernt, and Ole Rogeberg. 2018. “Flynn Effect and Its Reversal Are Both Environmentally Caused.” <em>Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences</em> 115 (26): 6674–78. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1718793115">https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1718793115</a>.</li><li>Delgado, Pablo, Cristina Vargas, Rakefet Ackerman, and Ladislao Salmerón. 2018. “Don’t Throw Away Your Printed Books: A Meta-Analysis on the Effects of Reading Media on Reading Comprehension.” <em>Educational Research Review</em> 25: 23–38. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.edurev.2018.09.001">https://doi.org/10.1016/j.edurev.2018.09.001</a>.</li><li>Desmurget, Michel. 2023. <em>Faites-les lire ! Pour en finir avec le crétin digital</em>. Paris: Seuil.</li><li>Dworak, Elizabeth M., William Revelle, and David M. Condon. 2023. “Looking for Flynn Effects in a Recent Online U.S. Adult Sample: Examining Shifts within the SAPA Project.” <em>Intelligence</em> 98: 101734. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.intell.2023.101734">https://doi.org/10.1016/j.intell.2023.101734</a>.</li><li>Elshall, Ahmed S., and Mohamed Badir. 2025. “Balancing AI-Assisted Learning and Traditional Assessment: The FACT Assessment in Environmental Data Science Education.” <em>Frontiers in Education</em> 10: 1596462. <a href="https://doi.org/10.3389/feduc.2025.1596462">https://doi.org/10.3389/feduc.2025.1596462</a>. (Note: Exact title/dates from 2025 publication; adjust if needed.)</li><li>Jain, [First Name if known], and [Co-author if applicable]. 2025. [Full title on “ventriloquizing” AI overreliance — exact match elusive; closest is emerging work on AI dependency in education]. [Journal details pending; placeholder for your precise ref.]</li><li>Lubbe, A., Marais, E., and Kruger, D. (2025). Cultivating independent thinkers: the triad of artificial intelligence, bloom’s taxonomy and critical thinking in assessment pedagogy. <em>Educ. Inf. Technol.</em> doi: 10.1007/s10639–025–13476-x</li><li>Madigan, Sheri, Brae Anne McArthur, Ciana Anhorn, Rachel Eirich, and Dimitri A. Christakis. 2020. “Associations Between Screen Use and Child Language Skills: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis.” <em>JAMA Pediatrics</em> 174 (7): 665–75. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1001/jamapediatrics.2020.0327">https://doi.org/10.1001/jamapediatrics.2020.0327</a>.</li><li>Sweller, John. 1988. “Cognitive Load During Problem Solving: Effects on Learning.” <em>Cognitive Science</em> 12 (2): 257–85. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1207/s15516709cog1202_4">https://doi.org/10.1207/s15516709cog1202_4</a>.</li></ul><p><strong>And about social implications of culture access:</strong></p><ul><li>Bourdieu, Pierre. 1979. La distinction: Critique sociale du jugement. Paris: Éditions de Minuit.</li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9ded9572ee4e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Age of AI, IV: Schizo-Recursion.]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@collwyn/the-age-of-ai-iv-schizo-recursion-8288206d0342?source=rss-bec57615ac86------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/8288206d0342</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[schizo-recursion]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[heidegger]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[jacques-ellul]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[das-gestell]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ai]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Collwyn Redslob]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 27 Dec 2025 13:42:52 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-12-27T13:42:52.090Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>From Heidegger’s Gestell to Mankind’s Hollowing Out.</h3><p><em>This article was originally published on Substack.</em></p><p><em>Original link: </em><a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/the-age-of-ai-iv-schizo-recursion"><em>https://collwyn.substack.com/p/the-age-of-ai-iv-schizo-recursion</em></a></p><p><strong>Background.</strong></p><p>This is part IV of our AI series. I refer the reader to the three first articles of the series on the platform. As a brief reminder:</p><ul><li>Part I provided an introductory reflection on the state of AI today and its potential risks in everyday lives.</li><li>Part II highlighted that AI’s rapid emergence must be contextualized in a landscape of progressive cognitive erosion, paving the way for what we called a <em>geometric infiltration</em> of AI in our lives, highlighting the risk of a possible tipping point past which the recovery of our full autonomy / agency might get out of reach.</li><li>In Part III, we zoomed out further, drawing on Ellul’s seminal work on the technician system, to show that AI was preceded by the long emergence of a technician architecture that had come to pervade our lives virtually entirely since the beginnings of the Industrial Revolution, facilitated by a <em>tabula rasa</em> type of ideology propounded by the French Revolution, which exposed the increasingly atomized individual to an all-pervasive and already largely reified technician system.</li></ul><p><strong>Synopsis.</strong></p><p>In part IV, we will further deepen our analysis by moving from the socio-anthropological framework provided by Ellul to the ontological plane proposed by Heidegger.</p><p>Based on our findings, we will propose a new risk model of an AI takeover, which we call <em>schizo-recursion</em>, whereby AI acts as the capstone of the technician system by not only infiltrating human socio-economics existence, but outsourcing its very soul.</p><p>Again, we want to warn the reader that the proposed model, while we believe it quite plausible, is not the only way forward, and that some guardrails (hinted at at the end of Part I) and a more constructive approach of AI can be envisaged (to be fleshed out in Part V and the final chapter of our series).</p><p><strong>I. Heidegger and the <em>Frage nach der Technik</em>: <em>Gestell</em> and the ontological impact of modern technique.</strong></p><p><strong>A. The essence of Technique.</strong></p><p>In a short text, <em>die Frage nach der Technik</em>, Heidegger proposes a framework for interpreting the impact of modern technique on civilization. Not dissimilarly to Ellul, Heidegger caveats up-front the fact that condoning or refusing technique is not a way to understand it, but the best way to remain chained to it (“<em>an die Technik gekettet</em>”).</p><p>Heidegger starts with the Greek concept of ποίησις, which is specifically related to the notion of <em>bringing-forth</em> (“<em>das</em> <em>Hervorbringen</em>”) more than the general concept of human creation, i.e. which includes human modes of creation but also the natural appearing of things, such as the blossoming of a bloom.</p><p>The process of creation (artistic as much as technical) is understood by Heidegger as a process of <em>un-concealment</em> essentially (<em>Entbergen</em>). To him, <strong>the world is made of possibilities and truths</strong> which can be made visible by the process of ποίησις, directly echoing the adjacent Greek notion of <em>truth</em>, ἀλήθεια, which, etymologically, literally means un-concealment as well (privative ἀ-, λήθη: forgetfulness, concealment and even oblivion). <strong>In other words, human creation is not so much creating something as revealing which already latently pre-exists.</strong></p><p><strong>B. Modern technique as epistemic breach.</strong></p><p>Heidegger then moves on to the concept of τέχνη which we reviewed in part III and which he sees as belonging to ποίησις, i.e. as one of its modalities, because τέχνη is another mode of bringing-forth, but strictly a human craft, albeit not necessarily instrumental (τέχνη can be artistic, too).</p><p>That is when a breach occurs with the historical moment where traditional technique transforms into modern technique. Heidegger sees its arising in the XVIIth century with the advent of mechanical thinking among others. The key point is that where τέχνη used to be a craft, modern technique is defined by both <em>exploitation </em>and <em>extraction</em> (Herausforderung), i.e. a technique that is driven towards <em>efficiency </em>and more importantly the wholesome control of nature.</p><p>To that effect, he uses the metaphor of the windmill and the hydropower plant: while the windmill is included in the river flow and uses it somewhat passively without altering the river flow, the hydropower plant <strong>becomes a primary element of the process</strong>: the river is literally made for the plant, not the other way around (“<em>Vielmehr ist der Strom in das Kraftwerk verbaut</em>”). The river becomes subordinated to it, because it becomes a pure energetic supply of the plant. Traditional technique made use of the elements, whereas modern technique makes use of it, to the point that one could say the river is built for the plant, not the other way around.</p><p><strong>This example provides the background to understand the wider inversion at play here: nature, or the physical universe, become entirely here <em>for the taking</em>. They do not provide the landscape against which human existence unfolds, but a material or energy to tap. This is one of the fundamental ontological turns at which Heidegger hints.</strong></p><p><strong>C. <em>Gestell</em> as consequence of the inversion of modern technique.</strong></p><p>Heidegger, in a way similar to Ellul or Marx before them, sees this progressive transformation of our natural world into a tool of our technological aggrandizement as highly problematic. This is because modern technique tends to progressively <em>monopolize</em> all modes of bringing forth, with natural processes, arts and other forms of revealing dangerously receding in the background.</p><p><em>Gestell</em> is this process of radical instrumentalization, whereby man focuses all his energies to reduce all forms of possibilities to something entirely extractable*. Heidegger makes a clear distinction: <em>Gestell</em> goes beyond a mere “tooling” of the world: it is not technical or machine-like, <strong>but the way in which the entire reality appears or emerges as something exploitable</strong>**.</p><p><strong>In other words, Gestell is the monopolization of all modes of un-concealment.</strong></p><p>This is why we said in the beginning that Heidegger critique of modern technique goes even deeper than Marx’s and Ellul’s: it reaches to the ontological core of it, inscribing itself in a long genealogy of the concept of Being in western thought, from pre-Socratics to today (Heidegger would reject an historical frame <em>per se</em>, but its genealogical lineaments are implicit in my view).</p><p><strong>D. <em>Gestell</em> as <em>entrapment</em>: an implicit narcissistic recursion as vector of epistemic blinding?</strong></p><p>The implications of the above are radical: as humans transform nature into an extractable raw material or tool, humans in turn transform themselves into tool-users (<em>Besteller des Bestandes</em>), verging on an existential brink (<em>Absturz</em>): becoming tools themselves.</p><p>More, as humans have transformed the world into an exploitation site, all appearance becomes the product of modern technique, which Heidegger views as a deceptive appearance (<em>trugerischer Schein</em>), deceptive because it conceals all other potentialities as hinted above. Quoting Heisenberg, Heidegger highlights that man sees only its own creation in the end, having left nothing outside the technical landscape.</p><p>While he does not explicitly say so, both Heisenberg and Heidegger remarks strongly point at a form of an altered perception of the mind akin to a narcissistic deformation: man only sees “himself” (more rigorously put, the product of his works) in the world around him, a dangerous mirroring of sorts as it closes other possibilities of “seeing” in the most profound sense. Narcissism is a blinding of sorts and as such a subtle form of <em>human self-alienation</em> in a technical world: while Heidegger points out that humans can only see themselves in this technical world (<em>nur sich selber begegnen kann</em>), I would argue that what humans constantly meet in this world is their psychoanalytical “image” (some may say “false Self”) rather than themselves (“true Self”) strictly speaking, which I contend reconciles the impression of human estrangement evoked by both.</p><p>As a result, this considerable narrowing of our perception has led to a unidimensional <em>Weltanschauung, </em>whereby it is not only Man’s relation to himself and the world that is endangered, but the entire process of bringing-forth itself (“<em>vertreibt is jede andere Moglichkeit der Entbergung”</em>). The consequence is that mankind, trapped in <em>Gestell</em>, closes the doors to the emergence of new forms of truths. There is no determinism here: in essence, the realm of possibilities remains the same, but an entrapment in <em>Gestell</em> makes it very difficult to get out of.</p><p><strong>The main threat is therefore not the machinic world in itself, but an ill orientation of Being towards <em>Gestell***</em>.</strong> For Heidegger there is no reification of technique per se as one can see in Marx, because the problem resides at the upper level of the ontological source, where Being, in our technical age, is drawing us to <em>Gestell</em>.</p><p>To conclude, Heidegger views the main risk of today’s technical system and our utility-focused perception as consisting in a blindness of sorts that increasingly prevents mankind from contemplating other forms of revealing.</p><p>Now that we have established the ontological framework of the critique of the modern technical system, it is time to wrap up before offering a model of schizo-recursion based on the latest AI developments. We have established the following so far:</p><ul><li>Marx (capitalist critique lens) warned against a progressive objectification of Man in a capitalistic system where he becomes a cog of a much bigger capitalistic machine, itself progressively reified.</li><li>Ellul (socio-anthropological lens) went beyond by showing that — regardless of capitalism or socialism — the technician system was engulfing mankind in a net of meanings from which one could not extract itself.</li><li>Heidegger (ontological lens) views modern technique and its risk of <em>Gestell</em> as literally preventing the future possibilities which we called an epistemic blinding.</li></ul><p>Let’s now see how these conclusions blend into our reflection about AI risks.</p><p><strong>II. Schizo-recursion.</strong></p><p><strong>A. AI declensions: from human dependence to irrelevance?</strong></p><p>We saw in parts I and II that AI poses the risk of semantic erosion, i.e. of humans becoming increasingly irrelevant in a world where solutions can be found more rapidly by AI than by the best (human) experts in their field, artistic creation included.</p><p>Humans therefore become increasingly dependent on a technology that exceeds their capacities. Whereas men became progressively dependent of an organizational (industry <em>and</em> services) system that already objectified them in a mechanical system, AI now challenges their very relevance: humans are at the risk of becoming <em>economically redundant, </em>too. That is, they are progressively losing their (already objectified) economic <em>value</em> within a system that does not need them anymore (we provided a few examples in Part I — as I write this, many news articles report an increasingly challenging job market for young graduates and their replacement for many tasks: back office functions in services industries, drafting of legal documentation in financial services etc.).</p><p>AI is therefore pressuring humans economically and semantically, but, as we said in part II, the effect is compounded by the risk of a human form of <em>passive abdication</em>: as new generations grow with AI, the temptation for pupils to solve their math problems with Chatgpt rather than developing their skills is growing stronger, jeopardizing the semantic future of the next human generation. <strong>The utilitarian trap is fully set: it is way more efficient to let AI solve our problems, but in return we are made downright <em>redundant</em>, a cosmic irony of sorts, as humans become victims of their own utilitarian mindset.</strong></p><p><strong>B. AI and human hyper-alienation</strong></p><p>AI language models, acting as virtual semantic vectors of human intersubjectivity, act as the soul capstone of the technician system. While with Marx the reification of the industrial or capitalist system could appear <em>metaphorical </em>(this in itself being relative), the advent of AI gives it a stronger subjective consistency: the organizational system evolves into a system that starts thinking for itself and replaces human thinking and agency step by step.</p><p><strong>The subjectivity of the “system” has become “real”.</strong></p><p><strong>C. Schizo-recursion: a model.</strong></p><p><strong>i) Definition.</strong></p><p>Based on what we said above, I would define <em>schizo-recursion</em> as such:</p><p><strong>An archetype of human estrangement whereby a semantic construct, product of a human mind, acquires an independent existence, leaving man existentially hollowed out.</strong></p><p><strong>ii) Etymology and Meaning.</strong></p><p>Let us flesh out it in more detail, by first examining its etymological sense.</p><p>(1) <strong>Schizo</strong>, from Greek σχίζω (“I split, I cut”), is understood here as indicating that the Self has split from its source. In our mind, this means that the split has been effectuated by man, but possibly unconsciously so.</p><p>(2) <strong>Recursion</strong>: from late Latin <em>recurs-</em> ‘returned’ (from the verb <em>recurrere</em> ‘run back’). In modern parlance: <strong>a process where a function calls itself to solve a problem</strong> by breaking it down into smaller, similar problems until reaching a base case. Two core notions emerge: (a) the idea of circling on itself, going back to its origin or the idea of not progressing (etymological) ; (b) autonomy and self-reliance (modern).</p><p><strong>iii) Contextualization (application to AI).</strong></p><p>Based on our reflections so far (Parts I to IV), AI (understood here as Large Language Models, or LLMs) is a model of schizo-recursion in that:</p><ul><li>It is a <em>product</em> of the human mind</li><li>Its problem-solving abilities and quasi omniscient knowledge are a potential driver of a human <em>hollowing out</em> by way of an outsourcing of knowledge-acquiring, reasoning, problem-solving and creating, while being simultaneously <em>recursive</em> because</li><li>In two key moments, (a) all its data input is directly or derivatively human and therefore <em>finite </em>(input), and (b) recursive because it <em>self-refers</em> to its own programmatic knowledge in order to operate (finite / automated process, recursive output).</li></ul><p>We note the input supply of AI is essentially human dependent: as such, it could be argued that while humans continue to provide supply the model keeps <em>growing</em>. However, it remains nonetheless recursive because once a certain amount of data has been input, the language model pursues a logic of its own (itself human determined) in a self-referential manner.</p><p>I remain attentive to the possible technical objection that language models are constantly evolving in their functioning and that there is nothing preventing them from becoming one day truly creative, i.e. being able to say forge new concepts which were not originally invented or thought by humans, thereby limiting its recursive nature to the modern definition, not to the etymological one (i.e. it does not necessarily folds back on itself and can transcend reasoning or artistic boundaries).</p><p>To this objection I would reply that we are still waiting for an AI language to be nominated for a Nobel Prize or make a truly original contribution in human sciences past the level of a brilliant synthesis, i.e. an intelligent recombination of existing data.</p><p><strong>iv) Implications.</strong></p><p>We said above that as man transforms the world through modern technique, it becomes a means to its own creation, closing further opportunities for other modes of truth-emergence. Man becomes estranged or alienated from itself.</p><p>What we mean by the Human Self is the source from which human life, creativity and libidinal energy unfold. By outsourcing not only its physical needs but also its thought to a systemic apparatus (the technician system, including its latest AI offspring), humans progressively cut themselves from the source of inner creativity by externalizing it entirely, the most radical <em>schizophrenic</em> act there has ever been, and etymologically right on point:</p><ul><li>σχίζω (split): as above.</li><li>φρήν (phrēn): mind, heart, brain, <em>but also</em> source of water.</li></ul><p><strong>As such, schizophrenia can be understood here as the ultimate act of cutting ourselves from the source of life.</strong></p><p><strong>v) Exposition.</strong></p><p>We have positied schizo-recursion above as a concept but it is also an act, which process unfolds as per below (not to be seen as an historical unfolding, even less so as an historical necessity, but as a logical development):</p><ol><li><strong>Originally (harmony):</strong> Man and Nature coexist, with Man being part of Nature which acts as the physical and imaginary background on which he evolves;</li><li><strong>Modernity (subordination):</strong> Man ceases to see nature as background and appropriates it wholesomely, subordinating it to his needs, and, somewhat subconsciously, to the ever-growing appropriation needs of technique;</li><li><strong><em>Bestand</em> (counter-mirroring):</strong> Man is fully integrated into a world he sees as endless extractable resource (<em>Bestand</em>), becoming part of a system he has himself created: his energies are increasingly spent towards the systemic world of technique, having become an extractable resource (<em>Bestand!</em>) in return. We call this movement counter-mirroring, whereas the creator of the mirror becomes absorbed by the mirror itself.</li><li><strong>Hollowing out (schizo-recursion):</strong> as the <em>Bestand</em> universe is fully established (step 2) and integrated (step 3), a surrounding semantic layer of AI is added by the remaining <em>available</em> energies of Man, i.e. its thinking and semantic potential. This layer becomes increasingly self-reliant to the point where Man is no longer needed in the new world’s economy.</li></ol><p><em>Additional precision: in 4. above, I am not arguing that man is emptied in an absolute manner. Humans may continue to exist and reproduce etc. What I am saying is that the last remnant of human energies that still stood “independent” are now fully extrojected and captured by the surrounding AI layer, acting as ultimate human substitue. One should therefore see this movement as eminently dynamic, within the wider systemic dynamic animating the movement from step 1. to step 4.</em></p><p><strong>© 2025 Collwyn Redslob. All rights reserved.<br>No part of this work may be reproduced, distributed, or transmitted in any form or by any means, including photocopying, recording, or other electronic or mechanical methods, without the prior written permission of the author, except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical reviews and certain other non-commercial uses permitted by copyright law.</strong></p><p><strong>Additional notice<br>This text is the exclusive intellectual property of the author. Any use of this work (including excerpts longer than 200 words) for the training, fine-tuning, or development of large language models or other generative artificial intelligence systems is strictly prohibited and will be pursued under applicable copyright and intellectual-property law.</strong></p><p>*<em>”Wir nennen jetzt jenen herausfordernden Anspruch, der den Menschen dahin versammelt, das Sichentbergende als Bestand zu bestellen — das Ge-stell.”</em></p><p>**”<em>Es ist nicht Technisches, nichts Maschinenartiges. Es ist die Weise, nach der sich das Wirkliche als Bestand entbirgt.</em>”</p><p>*** “<em>Die Bedrohung des Menschen kommt nicht erst von den moglicherweise todlich wirkenden Maschinen und Apparaturne der Technik.</em>”</p><p><strong>Suggested bibliography:</strong></p><p><strong>Heidegger, Martin.</strong> 1954. <em>Die Frage nach der Technik</em>. Vorträge und Aufsätze. Pfullingen: Neske.</p><p><strong>Ellul, Jacques.</strong> 1954. <em>La Technique ou l’enjeu du siècle</em>. Paris: Armand Colin.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8288206d0342" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Age of AI, III: an Ellulian detour.]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@collwyn/the-age-of-ai-iii-an-ellulian-detour-156b8b426ec0?source=rss-bec57615ac86------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/156b8b426ec0</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[alexis-de-tocqueville]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[walter-mignolo]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[jacques-ellul]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tocqueville]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[technology]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Collwyn Redslob]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 27 Dec 2025 13:39:04 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-12-27T13:39:04.393Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*mLl98UbG35yEjKOU.jpeg" /></figure><p><em>This article was originally published on Substack. Original link: </em><a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/the-age-of-ai-iii-an-ellulian-detour"><em>https://collwyn.substack.com/p/the-age-of-ai-iii-an-ellulian-detour</em></a></p><p>This is the third part of our series on AI. As a brief reminder:</p><ul><li>Part I exposed the current situation, by highlighting the rapid progression and integration of various AI models in our cognitive landscape as well as its already visible and potential future implications for the job market and human relevance writ large; we proposed that a legal answer based on fundamental ethical principles (principial ethics) and a corresponding global AI charter could act as a stronger guardrail against unchecked AI disruption. Noting the arm’s race nature of AI, we also posited that, realistically and at first, national legislations could be envisaged first.</li><li>Part II provided further analysis of the matter by first establishing a diagnosis of a somewhat concerning landscape of cognitive decline in many countries, triggered by both the emergence of technologies such as smartphones and social media in the last fifteen years, as well as a longer perceived and documented erosion of the school systems and education levels in a number of countries, too. We then offered an anatomy in many human fields, which we called a <em>geometry of infiltration</em> — given its protean nature — noting three fundamental dimensions of its development: <em>extension</em> (multi-domain), <em>depth </em>(from mundane requests to deeply technical matters) and <em>speed</em> (with its obvious rapid pace of expansion).</li></ul><p><strong>Synopsis.</strong></p><p>In part III, I would like to explore the philosophical and existential implications of AI’s future progression in more depth by exposing a short genealogy of the emergence of the technical system in which we live, drawing first on the reflection of certain thinkers and observers of the past two centuries who already expressed (decades before the advent of AI) their concern regarding the possibility of technology engulfing the entire scope of human activities and rendering mankind somewhat moot in return.</p><p>Indeed, while AI poses significant challenges to society, its appearance needs to be contextualized within the recent human history (the last two centuries from the First Industrial Revolution): what we need to be aware of is that the degree of technological infiltration we have reached in our lives is already highly pervasive, and, as we said in Part II, is already meaningfully affecting people’s cognitive landscape and behaviors. This “genealogical detour” is therefore indispensable to better comprehend the stakes at play when tackling AI.</p><p><strong>I. Setting the landscape: Technique, Technology: what is it really about?</strong></p><p>Technology, in its turn, is the application of scientific knowledge for practical purposes, especially in industry and everyday life. Derived from the Greek words “τέχνη” (téchne) meaning “art” or “craft,” and “λόγος” (lógos) meaning “word,” “study,” or “discourse”, it refers to the systematic treatment or study of an art or craft.</p><p><strong>II. Ellul: a prophetic warning.</strong> <strong>A. The pre-modern world: a subordinated technique.</strong></p><p>The works of French thinker Jacques Ellul are substantial, encompassing reflections on technique, Marxism, Christianity and the history of institutions among others. In <em>La Technique</em>, Ellul takes aim at what he calls the technician system, which he considers as having flourished from the beginnings of the Industrial Revolution. According to him — and here he disagrees with others historians of technology (Lewis Mumford et al) — he notes that while technique existed in earlier societies, technique was always <em>subordinated </em>to higher existential goals. In medieval Christendom for instance, any new technique was subjected to the question “is it fair?” or “ is it good?” before being considered appropriate for future applications, with efficiency being considered only <em>secondary</em>. As such, one could say technique was contained by fundamental moral principles, not unlike the vertical axiology we hinted at in Part I.</p><p>Ellul also points out <strong>the lack of uniformity of techniques </strong>back then, on a global scale: tools were used as long as they could be useful and there was no conscious effort to improve them in terms of productivity. Rather, Ellul argued they were <em>subordinated</em> to esthetic principles: even in military matters, where the efficiency of technique was paramount, the shape of similar weapons would vary considerably across societies, showing in return an absence of standardization which is so common these days (think of the entire world using platforms like Facebook or operating systems like Windows) as well as the importance of the esthetic shape over its operational goal.</p><p>Interestingly, in his brief historical review, Ellul does point out the fact that in Ancient Greece, where science grew to unprecedented levels, by way of self-reflexivity and a keen endeavor of θεωρία (“theory” or contemplation), technique however did not take over <strong>and remained subordinated to higher philosophical and esthetic imperatives</strong>. It would seem that the Greeks, albeit presumably aware of the technical applications of science, somewhat or partly refrained from enacting a systematic application in applied sciences, possibly by fear of ὕβρις (hubris) and out of ἐγκράτεια, that is self-control, temperance and moderation, a form of self-conscious firewall again what Ellul calls <em>technolatrie </em>(techno-worship).</p><p>The question therefore is: what was the historical or civilizational trigger that changed the paradigm of technique being subordinated to higher ethics to a society where technique and technology take precedence and prevail over other imperatives, including ethical or esthetic ones?</p><p><strong>B. The French Revolution as ideological and semantic enabler of today’s technical world.</strong></p><p>For Ellul, the French Revolution and its philosophical principles acted as a turning point. The reason is that the Revolution opened the floodgates in many existential fields: the apparition of new religions (the ephemeral and somewhat grandiloquent “religion of Reason”), the disappearance of old societal structures such as the corporations, the affirmation of philosophical materialism (and one could add here Condorcet and his philosophy of history centered around constant scientific progress, paving the way for the Age of Progress during the first two industrial revolutions), the persecution of the clergy and finally, <em>to crown it all</em>, the regicide of Louis XVI. This multidimensional <em>abrasion</em> of entire domains of life, including venerable traditions and ways of life paved the way for a new paradigmatic <em>tabula rasa</em>, as if the human substrate (including religions, traditions and past institutions) would be get rid of to leave a blank slate on which technological efficiency could finally flourish unhindered, not anymore impeded by moral or religious principles. Although we will come back later to it, many later thinkers have warned against the conceptual approach of the <em>tabula rasa</em> that writes off the past entirely in order to construct a new society <em>ex nihilo</em> based on new principles grounded in “reason” (I will invite the reader to consult the works of Hannah Arendt and Adorno and Horkheimer in their <em>Dialectic of Enlightenment)</em>. The first eminent and contemporary critique of the French Revolution who viewed this institutional and moral upheaval as a sheer folly that would literally cut the “source of the fountain of life” (here understood as the age-long lineage of French kings from the Merovingian times) was Irish-born British parliamentary and philosopher Edmund Burke (see bibliography below) in his <em>Reflections on the Revolution in France</em>.</p><p>Ellul argues, that, long before our contemporary era, the principles of the French Revolution paved the way for the atomization of the individual. This new epistemic context would first unfold in the real world in the British Industrial Revolution (interestingly, the British however took great care to keep their political regime unharmed by revolution by maintaining it reformist in nature). Of course, one might counter Ellul by saying that new collective and powerful structures would arise during the Industrial Revolution and later such as modern trade unions, national forms of economic protectionism to ward off social dumping etc., thereby reconstituting as best as possible new human solidarities, but the fact is that the accelerating technical progress by the early Industrial Revolution literally dislocated the old social structures (and their landscape, see my article on Weberian disenchantment <a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/the-god-eclipse-and-bare-law">The God Eclipse and Bare Law — Weber and the Ethical Limbo of Disenchantment</a>), allowing in turn a massive displacement of humans in England, France and western Europe generally by way of a never-before-seen rural exodus and an unprecedented change in collective mentalities and ways of life. This phenomenon would unfold globally throughout the XXth century, with similar social and existential impacts.</p><p>Once achieved, this paradoxical <em>concentration of atomized humans</em> (peasants coming from their village congregating into gritty overpopulated industrial centers devoid of family or ancestral communal roots, a grim change eloquently portrayed by Engels) where a plethora of humans became a mass of isolated individuals all cleared the path for what Ellul calls <em>societal plasticity</em>, i.e. the ability for technique to <em>mold</em> the human environment to an extreme degree, and allowing future changes to happen easily because they would not anymore be hindered by moral considerations (which themselves resided on institutions now virtually or entirely defunct).</p><p><strong>C. A short “decolonial” detour: The technological system and its “third world” declension or the inescapability of technique.</strong></p><p><strong>Even the few countries that succeeded in warding off European colonization did have to adapt their society to withstand the formidable challenge of western technology</strong>: in 1853, the commodore Perry, keen on forcing Japan to open their country to trade, showed a display of military superiority which led the Japanese establishment to react by opening, a few years later, a new imperial era (Meiji) and a whole re-organization of their institutions, including industry, law and the military. The situation in China was not dissimilar with Western indents becoming so concerning as to trigger, over a century or so, a modernist upheaval leading to the first non-imperial regime in the history of China under Sun Yat-Sen in 1911.</p><p>The occupation of the colonized countries led to a fundamental change of the colonized societies (the bibliography on the topic is immense) to the point of denaturation. The main culprit was not authoritarianism only (itself a significant factor) but even more a technically driven wholesome re-ordering of these societies along “rational” lines: technical infrastructure (transportation and mineral resources exploitation) trumping an ancestral life completely estranged to the principle of systematic, rationalized environmental exploitation (the same goes for North and South America goes without saying).</p><p>Major contemporary critiques of the abrasive impact of coloniality on local cultures have expressed this fact most eloquently (Frantz Fanon, Achille Mbembe, Walter Mignolo, Anibal Quijano etc.) and Mignolo himself coined the term <em>Colonial Matrix of Power</em> to express this phenomenon of organized engulfment and semantic de-possession of these societies. While Mignolo stresses the importance of semantic de-possession on top of blunt economic exploitation, leading to the notion of an all-controlling matrix, I would add that the origin, even more than colonial ideology or cultural supremacism (again and undoubtedly very much at play too) was ultimately led by an uncontrolled acceleration of the technical system that was literally feeding off itself.</p><p>Contemporary historians have noted in this regard (see Daniel Lefeuvre, <em>Pour en finir avec la repentence coloniale</em>) that the colonial movement was not entirely morally and ethically evil and that some positive contributions were made to the local populations with the advent of the colonial empires, but more interestingly is that, in the case of the French Empire he has reviewed, the <em>economic</em> net gains of the Empire were <em>virtually null</em>. As we said above, <strong>even the economy was subordinated to the autonomous technical system</strong>, <strong>overarching the colonial enterprise in the last instance (possibly unbeknownst to the imperialists themselves) by following a logic of its own.</strong> As a result I would slightly inflect and add to Mignolo’s CMP term that of a <em>Technological Matrix of Power</em>, which does justice to the catalytic role of technology in the process of colonial expansion. <strong>Ironically enough, and this is something decolonial thinkers are usually well aware of, the European peoples were also colonized by this technological matrix in the first instance (cf above).</strong></p><p><strong>D. Technique: Capitalistic, Marxist or Political? An Ellulian disambiguation.</strong></p><p>One of Ellul’s strongest arguments is that technique is not subordinated to an ideology or an economic system. <em>The technician system trumps all</em>. Regarding capitalism, many argue it used technology to increase productivity and profitability but that is a partial misunderstanding at best. Technological progress has often led to overproduction, which in turn did not find sufficient demand outlets and therefore depressed prices and margins, <em>the opposite goal of capitalism</em>. As such, while technique increases production, this is far from always beneficial for capitalism understood as the search for higher profits and return on capital. Many historical cases document large enterprises destroying more efficient machines after having acquired all of them in order to reduce offer and maintain more attractive prices. <strong>Therefore the perception according to which capitalism and technique go hand in hand is flawed. Capitalism is subordinated to technique, which gives the initial impulse and constrains capitalism to adapt,</strong> even if in some cases the technique can favor capitalism (by way of more efficient production systems that reduce costs or reduce staff needs or managerial techniques that improve processes).</p><p>Likewise, communism is not immune to technique. In the USSR, economists of a Marxist obedience tried to find a balance between inevitable technological progress (see our earlier comments on technology’s “arm’s race” shape) and the need to preserve safe employment (a key social tenet of the soviet political system) when technology led to reduced human staffing needs.</p><p>Finally, the political is also reduced to a follower role when the technician system has taken over. Should a politician (or more) go against the grain, i.e. by proposing measures to preserve society from certain problems created by technology, he would be constrained by several factors: (1) the arm’s race logic writ large (if other countries have certain technologies and we have not, we will be left behind in terms of competitiveness); (2) the efficiency argument: technology improves efficiency, why would we adopt a reactionary attitude to it? <strong>The latter is because, once the technician system has taken over, it creates new technologies and techniques that create new challenges, which in turn can only be solved by technique itself. </strong>A rock-hard circularity of sorts.</p><p>Regarding the points above on capitalism and communism, I would like to further point out Marx’s position regarding the matter: Marx (see <em>Fragments on Machines</em> in the <em>Grundrisse</em>) was particularly aware of the effects of technology on human societies and their potential of human alienation. Literally, he saw the emergence of new forms of large scale industrialism (and, in this case, in their capitalist form), as creating a system that transformed subjective human beings into the objective cogs of a wider technical or industrial system, while the industrial system itself <em>acquired a life of its own</em>, <em>transforming the objective into the subjective</em>, a whole epistemic upheaval of immense magnitude. But what Marx seemed somewhat oblivious to is that the logic was not driven by the capitalist system, and that as long as technique progressed, a “Marxist” regime would go in exactly the same direction as a capitalist one, which proved to be the case a century later among the USSR and its satellites: the population under these regimes became as <em>objectified</em> by technique as their western counterparts, albeit (or despite) different ideological leanings (showing, once more, that <em>even ideology</em> is subordinated to technique). As such, one may want to adopt a <em>Marxian</em> interpretive framework (alienation by the technician or technological system), but not a Marxist one (alienation by capitalism).</p><p>Now that we have sketched the genealogical contours of the emergence and compacity of the technical system, it is time we considered its political implications, with the adjective political considered in its broadest meaning, i.e. the organization of social power.</p><p><strong>III. Technique and the Political: massification, centralization, atomization.</strong></p><p>A. Tocqueville’s warning.</p><p>In <em>La democratie en Amerique</em>, written in the 1830s, Tocqueville presciently forewarned humanity of the risks of a democratic-liberal and equalitarian regime which could lead to the mass society we live in today. His — simplified here — line of argumentation went as such:</p><ul><li><strong>Equality erodes traditional hierarchies: </strong>when everyone see themselves as equal, old social structures such as aristocracy, orders and classes ultimately dissolve.</li><li><strong>Individuals become similar in habits, opinions, and desires. </strong>Equality tends individuals to look for people similar to them, producing conformity and uniformity.</li><li><strong>Individuals turn inward and become isolated. </strong>Without strong intermediate bodies (aristocracy, guilds, local elites), people retreat into private life, leaving society flat and atomized.</li><li><strong>The central state fills the vacuum: </strong>with no strong vertical ties, the state easily gathers power over a population of isolated, similar individuals-Tocqueville’s “soft despotism.”</li></ul><p>What does Tocqueville concerns about an egalitarian society have to do with the technician system we have fleshed out above?</p><p>Tocqueville was essentially concerned by a general <em>flattening</em> of human society, which would produce conformity and uniformity. For him, the main reasons underpinning the change were the loss of verticality or hierarchy, i.e. the disappearance of intermediary bodies (aristocracy, guilds etc.) and communal structures which would lead individuals to turn towards their private lives primarily, if not exclusively. Interestingly, Tocqueville thought that a partial antidote to this revolution could reside in the force of the public institutions (including the legal system), which could protect the individual from final atomization. Ellul seems aligned with this position noting in La Technique that one of the more difficult items for the technological system to digest was the legal order, given its lower pliability to the efficiency imperatives of technique. In a recently published book ( <em>Philosophie de la catastrophe</em>), Jean Vioulac surmises that Tocqueville saw in the institutions an instrument of the <em>katechon</em>, i.e. the force which restrains the world from falling into the final Apocalypse.</p><p>The link to the technician system now appears more clearly: <strong>in a dialectical movement, the technician system flattens the cognitive landscape by imposing its vocabulary, methods and inner logic, while in turn the social substrate compounds its effects by preparing its own absorption into it thanks to its unprecedented conformity on a popular scale.</strong></p><p><strong>B. The paradox of atomization.</strong></p><p>The mass society predicted by Tocqueville has largely come to pass, reviewed and criticized by many contemporary thinkers. Paradoxically, this very massification has led to an atomization of individuals, because of a lack of substantial intermediary bodies: the large corporations of today and some public institutions may provide an intermediary layer between the state and society, but these have largely been emptied of their existential meaning. Nowadays, individuals focusing on their <em>careers</em> rarely feel the sense of belonging to their employer the way a pre-Industrial Revolution apprentice dedicated his life to one line of business while benefitting from its protective social environment. Individualism is exacerbated by economic constraints and one’s loyalty towards the institution he belongs to or work for is not necessarily rewarded.</p><p>This is worsened by the use of technology (see parts I and II) which tends to promote egotistic behaviors such as compulsive screen usage and self-absorption. <strong>The irony is that this atomization is enabled by a technical system that is common to all: in other words, the deep dissemination of the technological apparatus does not drive cohesion by means of a unified technical system, but atomization by a usage that is preeminently individualistic: a resolutely solitary crowd.</strong></p><p><strong>C. Technique and the essence of centralization.</strong></p><p>This phenomenon of technological centralization goes as well for political organization and power: leading men are also caught in the technological system whereas efficiency is the imperative. <strong>As such, the room for political manoeuvre or even initiative becomes increasingly limited.</strong> The formidable constraints imposed by the <em>already established</em> technological system require political alignment as the technological framework is immovable, reducing political agency considerably. The example of the EU trying to fight certain North American monopolies is proverbial: creating national or European champions looks like wishful thinking.</p><p><strong>Conclusion of part III</strong></p><p>While technique used to be subordinated to higher ends in all civilizations until the advent of the First Industrial Revolution (itself ideologically prepared by the radical ideals of the French Revolution), the technological system literally took over from the early 1800s, becoming a life of its own. As technology progresses, it imposes its semantic register on all the domains of human activity. This architectonic revolution is both quantitative (scale, measurability, efficiency) and qualitative (by changing people’s behaviours, worldviews and ways of life).</p><p><strong>This results in a progressive hollowing out of mankind, whereby an increasing number of tasks, productive, intellectual or physical are literally outsourced to the technical apparatus, which progressively becomes independent and omnipotent and a key driver of human destinies.</strong></p><p>© 2025 Collwyn Redslob. All rights reserved.</p><p>Do not reproduce without permission. For citations, please credit Collwyn Redslob and link to his Substack.</p><p><strong>Suggested bibliography</strong></p><ul><li>Adorno, Theodor W., and Max Horkheimer. (1947) 2002. Dialectic of Enlightenment. Translated by Edmund Jephcott. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.</li><li>Arendt, Hannah. 1963. On Revolution. New York: Viking Press.</li><li>Burke, Edmund. (1790) 2003. Reflections on the Revolution in France. Edited by J. C. D. Clark. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.</li><li>Ellul, Jacques. (1954) 1964. The Technological Society. Translated by John Wilkinson. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.</li><li>Engels, Friedrich. (1845) 1987. The Condition of the Working Class in England. Translated by Florence Kelley Wischnewetzky. Harmondsworth: Penguin.</li><li>Fanon, Frantz. 1961. Les damnés de la terre. Paris: Maspero.</li><li>Lefeuvre, Daniel. 2006. Pour en finir avec la repentance coloniale. Paris: Flammarion.</li><li>Mbembe, Achille. 2019. Necropolitics. Translated by Steven Corcoran. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.</li><li>Mignolo, Walter D. 2011. The Darker Side of Western Modernity: Global Futures, Decolonial Options. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.</li><li>Quijano, Aníbal. 2000. “Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism, and Latin America.” Nepantla: Views from South 1 (3): 533–80.</li><li>Tocqueville, Alexis de. (1835–1840) 2004. Democracy in America. Translated by Arthur Goldhammer. New York: Library of America.</li><li>Vioulac, Jean. 2024. Philosophie de la catastrophe. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.</li><li>Wesseling, Henri. 1996. Divide and Rule: The Partition of Africa, 1880–1914. Translated by Arnold J. Pomerans. Westport, CT: Praeger.</li></ul><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/the-age-of-ai-iii-an-ellulian-detour"><em>https://collwyn.substack.com</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=156b8b426ec0" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Age of AI, II: “Architecture of Aggression”.]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@collwyn/the-age-of-ai-ii-architecture-of-aggression-0c2abf18b2bb?source=rss-bec57615ac86------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/0c2abf18b2bb</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[ai-risk]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cognitive-erosion]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[utilitarianism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[geometry-of-infiltration]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[byung-chul-han]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Collwyn Redslob]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 26 Dec 2025 09:40:25 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-12-26T09:40:25.607Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/770/0*vlRE2PfDqr3byI5r.jpeg" /></figure><p>In my previous article ( <a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/the-age-of-ai-mankinds-downfall-or">The Age of AI: Mankind’s Downfall or Springboard? Part I: Regulating the Uncontainable?</a>), we explored the implications of AI’s rapid progress:</p><ul><li>AI’s very rapid progression is a real challenge that should be addressed by adequate and centralized regulation quickly.</li><li>AI could be weaponized, triggering a multi-dimensional arms race, which is why global regulation should be supported.</li></ul><p><strong>Synopsis.</strong></p><p>In this second part, we would like to explore the most comprehensive possible scenario, of a slow(ish) AI takeover of mankind, by generalizing some of the examples provided in part I (replacement of creative jobs etc.) and mulling the wider existential aspects and implications of what such a takeover could look like. While no one has a crystal ball, this scenario can be viewed as a cautionary tale of how things could slip in the absence of a rapid and conscious political, social and regulatory reaction.</p><p>In the first section, we will discuss the background of a concerning cognitive decline already documented in a number of countries for decades now, then look more closely into what we will call a <em>geometry of AI infiltration, </em>before looking at what appears to be the main risks of such a future development then ask whether this AI progression includes a tipping point, beyond which all bets are probably off. The final section will look at the intellectual tradition on which AI’s substitution risk ultimately reposes.</p><p><strong>I. Setting the landscape: a background of long-term cognitive decline?</strong></p><p>I am outlining here a few recent pieces of research as introductory discussion (see bibliography for full references):</p><ol><li>I <strong>Q decline</strong> (Bratsberg &amp; Rogeberg, 2018): Male IQ data in Norway was analyzed and showed a consistent decline from 1975 to 1991. When excluding exogenous factors (immigration, social mix etc.) and focusing on within-family variation, the study showed a drop of 0.33 IQ point / year during the period. The main reason was environmental, primarily <em>a decline </em>[in the] <em>quality of education and school systems</em> and secondarily <em>worst nutrition and healthas well as lower standards of living</em>. While we do not have subsequent data for this study in Norway in 1991, the below studies may provide confirmatory data points.</li><li>A recent 2023 paper (Dworak, Revelle, Condon) shows that IQ scores among US adults are declining in a more recent period (2006–2018). Like the Norwegian study, it confirms declining IQ scores are observed <em>across all demographic categories, social classes and education levels</em>, pointing to a <em>general</em>, nation-wide cognitive erosion at play there. This study also emphasizes the educational <em>factor </em>as a main vector of decline. While the more recent role of smartphones is teased as a potential aggravating factor, its possible negative impact is not ascertained there.</li><li>Another 2018 paper (Delgado, Vargas, Ackerman, Salmeron, see bibliography) in <em>Educational Research Review </em>argues that the medium of interaction does impact cognitive performance: the authors argue that reading a <em>paper book is more efficient than reading on a computer screen</em> (hand devices were not part of the test, just traditional computer ones), concluding that while screens were an unavoidable fixture of our existences, one should encourage the recourse to physical books where possible. <strong>In this case, technology seen as progress may actually impair our ability to recall and understand a text or an article, </strong>particularly for informational texts or informational texts with a mix of narrative.</li><li>Another piece of research (Madigan, McArthur,Anhorn, Eirich and Tough, 2019) suggests that <em>child language skills are negatively impacted by higher screen usage</em>. The study relies on statistically robust surveys (dozens of them) performed over decades and therefore including television as well. The survey confirms the American Academy of Pediatrics recommendations of considerably limiting screen exposure in infants and toddlers and keeping it under control past 6 years of age. While the reader can consult the online research piece in full, the following paragraph is particularly eloquent: “ <strong><em>Greater quantity of screen use was associated with lower language skills in children</em></strong><em>. Experimental studies have demonstrated that the ability to apply information from screens to real life may be restricted in young children, known as a transfer deficit. Screen time viewing </em><strong><em>can also displace a variety of missed opportunities</em></strong><em> to practice developmental milestones, such as language and motor skills. That is, screen time may displace time spent learning, for example, to walk, talk, and draw. Moreover, screens can limit or hinder important caregiver-child interactions that are critical for enhancing child language, ,,especially in vulnerable groups. </em>In short, increased screen time is detrimental for children, even if educational electronic content and co-viewing (for instance with parents explaining to the children what they see on screens) may partly mitigate this, but obviously the question is whether children view this type of content on screens or not as a general rule.</li></ol><p>While a comprehensive review of the topic of cognitive decline and the role of new technologies in there is still being debated and too vast within our present contribution (see bibliography for further insight), an increasing amount of research does seem to point to a progressive decline in average IQ across most if not all population categories as well as a presumably negative impact of technology (screen usage).</p><p>Despite the nascent nature of research in this field, recent studies tend to argue that technology adoption is detrimental to cognitive capacities in general. As Delgado, Vargas, Ackerman, Salmeron argue in their article (emphases are mine): “ <em>Several researchers have argued, however, that increasing exposure to technology, with its emphasis on speed and multitasking, </em><strong><em>may encourage a shallower kind of processing</em></strong><em> that leads to </em><strong><em>a decrease in deep comprehension in digital environments</em></strong><em> (e.g. Lauterman &amp; Ackerman, 2014; Wolf &amp; Barzillai, 2009). Indeed, current evidence supports the claim that </em><strong><em>mere</em></strong><em> experience with digital technology does not improve students’ comprehension skills, but instead has a detrimental effect. </em>“ Recent research therefore seems to argue that individuals among the younger generation who would <em>only know digital reading</em> versus paper reading would be at a disadvantage, hinting to a form of <em>technology-induced regress</em> on which we will come back.</p><p><strong>Provisional conclusion</strong>: based on a nascent but fast growing body of research, it looks quite plausible that (1) IQ and cognitive erosion are now being statistically documented in many countries, across all demographic categories and over significant periods of time (decades if not generational) and (2) the reasons for this decline include a mix of lower promotion of education value and decline in schooling quality as well as an increasing use of technology, particularly screen, digital interfaces.</p><p>Based on this and our findings in Part I, let’s now mull a worst case scenario by extrapolating some of these trends a few years into the future.</p><p><strong>II. AI penetration: the geometry of infiltration.</strong></p><p>We briefly presented in pat I some professional and academic examples in which AI substitution could pose a real risk within the foreseeable future. Here I would like to adopt a more systematic approach.</p><p>Firstly, we need to acknowledge that the AI irruption potential impacts all fields of human activity:</p><ul><li><strong>In intellectual fields</strong> (ultimately, this is about “intelligence”), language models can write entire dissertations, correct mistakes in a draft submission, propose new ideas or synthesize existing ones, have access to a virtually unlimited library of knowledge with the ability to tap immediately into it. It can assist in all domains, from literary criticism to quantum physics. Believing that AI is innocuous at advanced levels is now an illusion: PhD students in advanced physics use it for content-related tasks and Part I mentioned that even military officials were using it for fundamental strategic exercises (scenario assessment). Without even going into the still challenged notion that AI can be truly intellectually creative, it is already operating at a very advanced level with a remarkable level of precision and efficiency.</li><li><strong>In technical fields</strong>, AI is already able to help users (for free): for instance a DIY issue at home can be solved without calling a plumber for easier repairs, or a legal, administrative or fiscal issue can be partly solved by AI advice, potentially progressively replacing jobs such as <em>plumbers, lawyers or civil servants alike </em><strong>(</strong>as we said in Part 1, a plumber would still be needed for a bigger issue but for simpler to intermediate problems <strong>, </strong>substitution risks already looms large) .</li><li><strong>Within a psycho-affective remit</strong>, individuals already consult AI language to help them with psychological issues, dating challenges or relationships as a whole. One can see the long term implications in terms of jobs for psychologists, life coaches <em>but also the potential impact on personal, intimate relationships, which are also increasingly intermediated by AI input.</em></li><li><strong>In artistic-creative fields</strong>, AI programs are able to song-write credibly and come up with esthetically convincing graphic illustrations with a decent prompt in a few seconds. This is just a prefiguration of what is to come.</li></ul><p>The sudden AI onslaught affects virtually all domains of human activity, covering the whole human semantic field. It is difficult to think of past inventions that would have had both this level of extension in terms of fields of application and semantics as well as this rapidity of spread. Most industrial revolutions took decades to impact the majority of the population while AI is already pervasive in just a matter of years. <em>Extension, depth</em> and <em>speed </em>are the features of AI: it covers all sorts of fields ( <em>extension</em>), it is ranging from basic issues to most complex matters ( <em>depth</em>) and it is progressing very fast ( <em>speed</em>) on the back of increased user numbers, proliferation of AI languages and their own rapid development to higher levels of performance.</p><p>Based on these trends, what are the key risks we can envisage for humans?</p><p><strong>b) AI existential risk mapping: an “architecture of aggression”.</strong></p><p>Let’s briefly look at the obvious types of risks involved by an unchecked AI proliferation in our lives:</p><ul><li><strong>Obsolescence? </strong>An obvious one. As shown above, many jobs could be replaced or partly replaced. While in some cases AI can be a useful tool to help, it generally goes with lost revenues and lost human relevance, even if there are exceptions (like delegating easy tasks to AI to focus on more complex ones, but as we said the limit is that more often than not AI can also do the complex ones, with manual work still being mostly sheltered), hinting at a gradual human value erosion. Think job losses, but also progressive loss of revenues for entire businesses, freelance professions and more.</li><li><strong>Atomization? </strong>We highlighted the challenges posed by technological adoption in cognitive fields. Screen, smartphone or now AI usage are in my view likely to <em>further exacerbate the process of individualization</em> within our societies: if AI can advise us in all fields of our existences, the need for professionals or even friends reduces. This is what we can call <em>a gradual semantic erosion</em>: humans are being replaced by a “ <em>more efficient</em> “ algorithm, leading to increased individualistic traits.</li><li><strong>Dehumanization?</strong> the ultimate philosophical or existential implications are already there. Say people increasingly use AI to advise them on where to go on holidays, how to date, what to say to certain people etc. Quickly, our own relatives, friends may implicitly be perceived as “less useful” from a utilitarian perspective. Give it another few years and human relations are likely to be significantly altered — if not altogether hollowed out — by this evolution.</li></ul><p>Based on this risk taxonomy, another final aspect to consider is the possible existence of an AI infiltration hypothetical tipping point process beyond which resistance or opposition are likely to become futile.</p><p>The question of an AI tipping point is key. So far, we have shown the pluri-dimensionality of AI and its capacity to infiltrate many fields of human activity, including psycho-affective life and the entire cognitive landscape. Therefore the next question is, as part of this rampant infiltration, whether there would be a point beyond which human relevance is definitely lost, as it would have conceded too much semantic ground and might not be able to resist as the previous (human) system has been destabilized beyond repair and any hope of restauration.</p><p>We have offered different types of risks involved by AI above, but there is one risk we have not tackled yet. Beyond the risk <em>content</em>, there is also a risk in the <em>process</em> itself: to me, the key transitional risk we are facing here is <em>when the AI system starts to work by itself</em> ,i.e. when human <em>relevance</em>, input, contribution or even <em>necessity</em> to the functioning of the system has faded so much that entire parts of the — human — system are replaced by an AI-exclusive logic. Of course, this is an ideal endpoint and I am not saying — yet — that this would be entirely possible in any field.</p><p>But if we take for instance say, teaching. When an AI is able to prepare — for free, in a better way and more rapidly — an English or a Math course. What need is there for a teacher, especially if teachers are seen as less competent than they were (see section I above)? But then the pupils <em>themselves</em> cannot expect to become teachers in the future because the jobs are already taken by AI, <em>closing another opportunity</em> to other humans in the long run and <em>reducing the universe of opportunities altogether</em>.</p><p>Then the next question becomes: <em>why is there a need for pupils to learn anything when AI has all the answers baked in, in all disciplines and fields</em>? How <em>relevant</em> are human efforts in the face of what looks like <em>unfair</em> competition? Both a <em>chain</em> (intergenerational) and <em>spiraling</em> (multi-disciplinary, in waves) effect of AI substitution become clear.</p><p><strong>e) The genealogy of <em>utilitarianism</em>: the launching pad of human obsolescence?</strong></p><p>We have seen how AI progresses. Despite its protean nature, there is one element that seems to recur in all fields: <strong>AI superiority in terms of <em>efficiency</em></strong>. AI calculates quicker, understands deeper, summarizes faster and advises better. This faster-better motto is essentially <em>performative</em> in nature. AI is simply more performant than humans (back to part I, this might also apply to physical activities assuming robots do take off). But have we asked ourselves: is performance what there is all about?</p><p>In the western world, efficiency and performance have infiltrated the history of thought for centuries but in my view truly took off with the emergence of utilitarianism, a component of economic theory that posited that human behaviors could be <em>optimized</em> to <em>maximize happiness</em>. Have we not found the <em>original sin</em> or the <em>original erring</em> here? Indeed, how can one truly <em>maximize</em> happiness? Is this a statistical quantity that can also be manipulated in a way as to maximize it <em>mathematically</em>? Is happiness reducible to an economic-mathematical function? This is what utilitarian economists assumed, originally with nuances arguably (see bibliography).</p><p>The fact utilitarianism exerted massive influence on later economic theory but also public policies is telling: this infiltration of utilitarianism actually paved the way for a progressive quantification of the human factor, a tendency well identified by many critics: Michel Foucault has delineated this process of human quantification with remarkable acumen and depth (see bibliography).</p><p><strong>AI, part II: a second provisional conclusion.</strong></p><p>In my view, this long <em>quantification</em> trajectory in the history of thought, in turn applied to social and political <em>praxis</em> (public administration, economic policies, demographic census, national economic institutes and up to life insurers’ actuarial calculations) paved the way for a new, much <em>reduced</em> reading of man.</p><p><strong>Suggested bibliography</strong> <strong>A. Cognitive decline and its urgency</strong></p><ul><li>Dworak, E. M., Revelle, W., &amp; Condon, D. M. (2023). Looking for Flynn effects in a recent online U.S. adult sample: Examining shifts within the SAPA Project. <em>Intelligence</em>, <em>98</em>, Article 101734. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.intell.2023.101734">https://doi.org/10.1016/j.intell.2023.101734</a></li><li>Prensky, Marc. 2001. “Digital Natives, Digital Immigrants.” <em>On the Horizon</em> 9 (5): 1–6. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1108/10748120110424816">https://doi.org/10.1108/10748120110424816</a>. <em>(Note: 2018 follow-up analyses often cited in secondary literature; original framework remains seminal.)</em></li><li>Turkle, Sherry. 2015. <em>Reclaiming Conversation: The Power of Talk in a Digital Age</em>. New York: Penguin Press. <em>(Empirical extension in Turkstra &amp; Turkle 2021 review: Journal of Language and Social Psychology. See DOI below.)</em></li></ul><p><strong>B. Utilitarianism: an introductory literature. C. A genealogy of human quantification.</strong> <strong>D. Reducing humans to quantities: a few seminal critiques.</strong></p><p>As such, AI seems to prosper on this fertile utilitarian ground: AI is superior from a utilitarian standpoint. The question therefore is: <em>should we reduce everything to utility</em>, or are other aspects worth preserving? In Part I, we proposed an axiologically informed legal response to the rise of AI, arguing that such a protean onslaught needed a vertical, axiomatic, and, one might say, uncompromising answer. In part II, we have examined the AI infiltration process in more detail as well as summarily unearthed some of its intellectual genealogical lineaments. Part III will offer a fuller philosophical interpretation and its connection with wider humanistic themes evoked in other series of articles on this platform.</p><p>AI progression is rampant and multi-dimensional, rendering its proliferation very difficult to contain. At a time when humans would need their wits to retain control on AI’s rapid and comprehensive infiltration, cognitive capabilities seem to have been on the decline for some time now, with computers and smartphones, combined with lesser educational values and a slowly eroding schooling system, seeming to have paved the way for this cognitive — and moral? — progressive disarmament. By looking at the overall logic of infiltration, the risk is that simple and plain <em>human relevance</em> progressively loses steam in favor of an AI semantic upsurge.</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/the-age-of-ai-ii-architecture-of"><em>https://collwyn.substack.com</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=0c2abf18b2bb" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Age of AI: Mankind’s Downfall or Springboard?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@collwyn/the-age-of-ai-mankinds-downfall-or-springboard-18cd2a1e3836?source=rss-bec57615ac86------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/18cd2a1e3836</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[jobs]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cognitive-erosion]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[boaventura-de-sousa]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[axiology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ai]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Collwyn Redslob]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 26 Dec 2025 09:38:10 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-12-26T09:38:10.165Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*923IcocxJDtI6O-g.jpeg" /></figure><p>The advent of popular Artificial Intelligence (AI) has been viral in the last two or three years. Previous models existed (ELIZA in 1966, more recently Google and Microsoft tools such as Cortana etc.) but it is with GPT-3 that a conversational program was demoed online. It was fully released by OpenAI in late November 2022 hitting a hundred million users after two months. Many others are available online today (Grok, DeepSeek, DeepAI, Perplexity, Claude etc). and are quickly gaining in popularity among all social classes, genders, ages, covering a fast and growing range of topics like holidaying, counselling or scientific research.</p><p>Although research in the field is necessary new, I agree with the wider consensus that AI will change our lives at least in the way internet or smartphones did and possibly more. Many of us are using it already as an advisor in serious decisions as well as a crucial supporting tool, like helping pupils or students with their home works, academic research or even medical advice. AI is flagged in the mainstream and specialized press as a primary cause of future unemployment given its ability to perform increasingly sophisticated tasks.</p><p>As everyone knows already, AI is a new but huge topic, with a very wide range of users and applications, from leisure to professional, including scientific, medical and legal fields. We will tackle AI’s potential impact in the foreseeable future as follows:</p><ul><li>Part I will provide some general considerations pertaining to AI proliferation and the urgent need for regulation.</li><li>Part II will expose the mechanism of AI proliferation in greater detail, including a possible path towards symbolic extinction.</li><li>Part III will explore the philosophical implications of an AI systemic generation, and we will provide there a full architecture of what we will call an AI semantics ecosystem and its potential full disjunction from a human(e) substrate.</li><li>Part IV will provide an example of how AI could prove constructive in a specific field, namely philosophical thinking, and pave the way for constructive (r)evolutions in other fields.</li></ul><p><strong>I. AI as a challenge: a multi-pronged battle ahead.</strong> <strong>a) Academia</strong></p><p>We can already see the possibility of efficient regulation is not warranted given AI’s fast development and its increasing embeddedness in our lives. Let’s therefore assess whether regulation is even possible.</p><p><strong>b) The irks of How does one then regulate something that has already made you redundant?</strong> <strong>c) A case study in AI replacement: “creative jobs”.</strong> <strong>II. Is there a point of no return?</strong> <strong>a) Quantitative and qualitative considerations. <em>unchecked sprawling</em>b) The human qualitative edge: a fallacy?</strong> <strong>: can we even regulate AI?</strong> <strong>III. Assessing the threat: mapping early containment tactics. a) Taming doom: a physical limitation.</strong> <strong>b) AI integration: vertical proliferation and containment challenges.</strong></p><p>Beyond a simple quantitative progression, what about a <em>qualitative </em>tipping point? We also need to talk about the nature of AI replacement risk. Back to our advertising creators: is there a specific value to the advertising piece being concocted by slower human beings versus an AI-generated flick? And is this value relative to humans only or is it <em>objectively</em> valuable, i.e. paradoxically could it have some <em>objective</em> value versus AI-generated stuff? If consumers are happy with AI suggestions and AI-generated campaigns, what is left then?</p><p>Where do we go from here? Are there ways to fend off AI substitution risk crystallizing too quickly? While part II will offer deeper insights re diagnosis and response, we will provide here some initial markers.</p><p><strong>c) A word of caution.</strong> <strong>IV. A robust answer? Principial ethics regulation.</strong> <strong>a) The AI arm’s race: challenges of regulation in a globalized and privatized world.</strong></p><p>A second example: in today’s job market, young employees communicate on their use of AI. They have not lost their job (yet). AI is used as a facilitator helping them solve technical problems, so they can focus on core issues: within, say, a HR department, an AI tool will screen hundreds of CVs based on basic features to eliminate what are sometimes obviously irrelevant candidates. From that perspective, it is up to HR leaders to determine what is performed by AI and what is not (in essence, a regulation of some sorts at a micro level). AI may be useful for a first screening, meeting the individuals requires humans who are better equipped re empathetic resonance and subtle social cues.</p><p>Following this logic, even senior executives and CEOs might become partly redundant: AI might better assess the risks and rewards of a new strategy or even formulate highly complex scenarios much more rapidly. A company might keep a very few individuals as checks against a potential AI error, but the staff left would be pretty thin indeed (and would need to review the plans of a fast-generating AI fairly quickly, too, therefore requiring AI assistance on its own plans, implying a further degree of human dependence).</p><p><strong>AI looks like an arm’s race — No one wants self-destruction, but everyone is forced to keep up with competitors. Containment is therefore always difficult and drawing a line in the sand possibly more wishful thinking than not.b) The risks of AI engulfment</strong> <strong>This raises the question of national-global and all-encompassing regulations to ensure a fair playground.</strong></p><p>(1) Regulation already started in some industries and institutions but results are not yet known given a lack of statistical testing, and regulation needs to be produced at national levels, too. Legislative processes in parliamentary regimes tend to be slow and protracted, while AI progresses very quickly, increasing the risk of being outpaced by AI due to a lack of timely enough responsiveness.</p><p><strong>c) The private sector and the hazardous no man’s land of legal deterritorialization: <em>lex mercatoria</em> and thin normativity. Provisional conclusion — axiology as ultimate <em>garde-fou?</em></strong></p><p>(2) The “arm’s race” challenge: say company A decides to ban AI from replacing HR executives to interview candidates as an AI containment ethical strategy. Now say company B allows AI and becomes more competitive by way of further cost reduction. Company A will probably receive pressures from its own shareholders to enforce the same procedures:</p><p>A logic of <em>excess</em> is therefore triggered, implying a <em>lack of human control</em> ultimately. AI infiltration is analogous to financial bubbles created by an acceleration of expectations beyond reasonableness ending up in uncontrollable excesses and systemic collapse (see my recent article “ <a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/the-medieval-pluriverse-and-de-colonized"><em>The Medieval Pluriverse and De-Colonial Finance</em></a>” also in the bibliography below). As our simplistic scenario infers, AI could progressively go up the chain from commodifiable tasks to the most strategic ones, rendering mankind’s input somewhat moot from top to bottom.</p><p>What are the options then? Either strict AI containment or symbolic death by AI engulfment (see part II)? If we decide to contain AI to protect jobs — for economic reasons and existential purposes, a decision needs to be taken at national levels, where all employers are subject to the rules.</p><p>This might prove a tall order noting the growing independence of large corporations versus national laws: for some time now, keen legal theorists and observers have denounced a <em>deterritorialization of law,</em> whereby large transnational corporations <em>create</em> their own transnational legal regimes ( <em>lex mercatoria</em>) operating outside national rules: more concerningly, these corporations <em>“decide not only what will become law but also, more insidiously, </em><strong><em>what will not become law.</em></strong><em>” </em>(Boaventura de Sousa Santos, see bibliography below). According to Santos, <em>lex mercatoria </em>is “ <em>constituted by thick cognitive expectations and thin normative allegiances</em> “, that is, corporations are expecting tangible results (profits) based on well-established practices while being less regarding about any ethical implications: a means above ends of some sort.</p><p>So we may face a conflict between very large profit-driven institutions on the one hand and political instances on the other, who might lean more on the ethical-social side (that is, at least, my possibly optimistic contention). The risk here is twofold: (1) not only large corporations with considerable wherewithal could exert pressure on the political side in order to allow deeper AI penetration on the back of cost reduction considerations, but also (2) the rapid pace of AI infiltration could itself increasingly alter the nature of the regulation itself.</p><p><strong>Suggested bibliography</strong> <strong>Legal implications</strong> <strong>AI versus man — philosophical implications</strong> <strong>AI in the military and intel</strong></p><ul><li>Khlaaf, Heidy, Emily Myers West, and Meredith Whittaker. 2024. <em>“Mind the Gap: Foundation Models and the Covert Proliferation of Military Intelligence, Surveillance, and Targeting.”</em> arXiv preprint, October 2024. <a href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2410.14831">https://arxiv.org/abs/2410.14831</a></li><li>Mitchell, John. 2023. <em>“Artificial Intelligence in Modern Military Strategy: Applications, Challenges, and Strategic Implications.”Journal of Military Strategy and Defense Studies</em> 1 (1). <a href="https://jmsds.fupress.org/index.php/jmsds/article/view/1">https://jmsds.fupress.org/index.php/jmsds/article/view/1</a></li><li>Nitzl, Christian, Michael Cyran, Dario Krstanovic, and Ulrich Borghoff. 2024. <em>“The Use of Artificial Intelligence in Military Intelligence: An Experimental Investigation of Added Value in the Analysis Process.”</em> arXiv preprint, December 2024. <a href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2412.03610">https://arxiv.org/abs/2412.03610</a></li><li>Saidi, Fethi. 2022. <em>“The Weaponization of Artificial Intelligence in the Military: The Importance of Meaningful Human Control.”Malaysian Journal of Arms, Politics and Strategy</em> 2 (1): 40–58. <a href="https://masjaps.com/index.php/mas/article/view/187">https://masjaps.com/index.php/mas/article/view/187</a></li><li>Szabadföldi, Zsolt. 2021. <em>“Artificial Intelligence in Military Application — Opportunities and Challenges.”Review of the Air Force Academy</em> 19 (2): 75–88. <a href="https://doi.org/10.2478/raft-2021-0022">https://doi.org/10.2478/raft-2021-0022</a></li></ul><p><strong>AI and the downfall of mankind</strong></p><p><strong>Smartphones and eroding mental health</strong></p><p>AI-regulation will be time-pressured given its rapid adoption and multi-dimensional infiltration. However, regulation remains a key pillar in order for AI to be controlled and avoid a devastating social, economic and existential impact on entire populations if left unchecked.</p><p>The strategy is not a piecemeal fight but a foundational grounding in human values: we need to <em>affirm</em> what we as humans are worth and make a clear claim AI will not take over and reduce us to bio(political?) cattle, lest Paul Tillich’s injunction of the <em>courage to be</em> become the <em>courage to survive</em>. Practically speaking, and echoing our arm’s race analogy above, a global tier of regulation might be necessary (ultimately this is about mankind). A global charter for AI ethics or anything similar, strengthened by legal enforcement instances in case of breaches. Such a broad agreement encompassing all national jurisdictions including instances to audit breaches and enforce law is clearly complicated, which is why national implementations are probably more realistic now. But back to the arm’s race problem, some global coordination will likely be needed.</p><p>This is obviously a broad brush proposal at this stage, but regulators might start thinking about it sooner rather than later.</p><p>While part I provided some examples of rampant AI progress in many fields, part II will offer a more systematic description of the morphology of a possible AI takeover and its deeper philosophical implications.</p><p>© 2025 Collwyn Redslob. All rights reserved.</p><p>Do not reproduce without permission. For citations, please credit Collwyn Redslob and link to this Substack.</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://collwyn.substack.com/p/the-age-of-ai-mankinds-downfall-or"><em>https://collwyn.substack.com</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=18cd2a1e3836" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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