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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Craig Fugate on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Craig Fugate on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@craig_40068?source=rss-255a06ff6e1c------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Craig Fugate on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@craig_40068?source=rss-255a06ff6e1c------2</link>
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        <lastBuildDate>Mon, 16 Nov 2026 21:22:33 GMT</lastBuildDate>
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            <title><![CDATA[RIDER TO SPEAKING AND ENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT: OPERATIONAL BEVERAGE PROTOCOLS]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@craig_40068/rider-to-speaking-and-engagement-agreement-operational-beverage-protocols-69fe1d28c6b2?source=rss-255a06ff6e1c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/69fe1d28c6b2</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Craig Fugate]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 09 Nov 2026 17:00:06 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-09T17:00:06.941Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>RIDER TO SPEAKING AND ENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT: OPERATIONAL BEVERAGE PROTOCOLS</strong></p><p>This Rider (the “Rider”) is attached to and made an integral part of the Speaking Agreement, Conference Contract, or Public Event Contract (the “Agreement”) by and between the Host Organization (“Host”) and William “Craig” Fugate (“Speaker”). In the event of any conflict between the Agreement and this Rider, this Rider shall govern.</p><p><strong>SECTION 1: PURPOSE AND OPERATIONAL RATIONALE</strong></p><p>The provisions herein are established solely to guarantee safe, stable, and predictable operating conditions for the Speaker during public appearances, keynote presentations, workshops, executive briefings, and emergency management conferences.</p><p><strong>SECTION 2: BEVERAGE STANDARDS</strong></p><p>2.1 Absolute Requirements</p><ol><li>All coffee served under this Agreement shall be delivered black and hot. No substitutions, alterations, or modifications shall be permitted under any circumstances.</li><li>Any coffee beverage whose name requires more syllables than “black coffee” to describe (including, but not limited to, the word “Frappuccino”), or which contains additives, flavorings, or ingredients that are not primarily coffee, is prohibited. The Americano authorized under Section 4.2 has been reviewed and granted a waiver.</li></ol><p>2.2 Quality Enforcement Metrics</p><ol><li>Baseline Standard: All coffee provided shall be recognizable as coffee by emergency responders, firefighters, truck drivers, or Waffle House employees. The preferred operational baseline is “strong enough to support hurricane season decisions.”</li><li>Visual Inspection: Coffee shall be deemed noncompliant if it is labeled “mild roast” or “easy drinking,” or if the Speaker can discern the bottom of the cup under normal ambient lighting. Corrective action shall be initiated immediately.</li><li>Secondary Operational Risks: Host is advised that weak coffee increases the probability of operational bluntness, unauthorized doctrine critiques, and unscheduled after-action reviews. This clause exists for the protection of all parties.</li></ol><p><strong>SECTION 3: LOGISTICAL SUPPLY AND TIMING</strong></p><p>Host shall ensure compliant coffee is continuously available to the Speaker:</p><ul><li>Phase I: Prior to Speaker arrival at the venue;</li><li>Phase II: For the entire duration of the scheduled event;</li><li>Phase III: Immediately following the event, to facilitate the unofficial debriefings where useful information is actually exchanged.</li></ul><p><strong>SECTION 4: APPROVED AND PROHIBITED SOURCING</strong></p><p>4.1 Approved Sources</p><ul><li>Waffle House establishments;</li><li>Active fire stations or Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs);</li><li>Traditional diners or church fellowship halls;</li><li>Gas stations that also sell bait, diesel additives, or hunting licenses;</li><li>Starbucks locations, restricted to dark roast or bold blends that taste “slightly hostile.”</li></ul><p>4.2 Starbucks Time-of-Day Contingency Protocol</p><p>If a Starbucks location is no longer brewing dark roast or bold blends because of afternoon or evening scheduling, an Americano is an acceptable substitute, provided that:</p><ul><li>It is prepared black and hot, per Section 2.1;</li><li>It contains exactly two (2) shots of espresso. A single-shot configuration shall not be deemed compliant under any circumstances.</li></ul><p>4.3 Prohibited Sources and Blends</p><ul><li>Starbucks Pike Place, Blonde roast, or any demonstrably weak blend;</li><li>Any beverage described as smooth, citrus-forward, floral, balanced, approachable, or “a coffee experience”;</li><li>Beverages featuring foam art or aesthetic garnishes.</li></ul><p><strong>SECTION 5: CUBAN COFFEE EXCLUSION PERIMETER</strong></p><ol><li>Absolute Prohibition: Cuban coffee and Cuban-style espresso products shall not be served, gifted, or introduced at any public event involving the Speaker. The Americano authorized in Section 4.2 has been evaluated and determined to be espresso of a non-escalating character.</li><li>Geofenced Exclusion Zone: Host shall guarantee that no Cuban coffee is present within a 100-yard radius of the Speaker.</li><li>Historical Precedent: This restriction originates from a documented operational incident at a Big City Emergency Managers Conference in Miami. The consumption of one Café Cubano resulted in a briefing tempo exceeding safe human processing limits, simultaneous policy redesign, constitutional lectures regarding state authority, and at least one federal employee attempting tactical retreat. Surviving witnesses continue to discuss the incident in hushed tones.</li></ol><p><strong>SECTION 6: DOSAGE THRESHOLDS AND INTERVENTION PROTOCOLS</strong></p><p>6.1 Dosage Thresholds</p><ul><li>Medium or Grande: Maximum approved operational dosage. Authorized before keynotes, executive briefings, media appearances, and legislative testimony.</li><li>Large, Extra Large, or Venti: Strictly contraindicated for public settings. Venti-level exposure may induce excessive operational velocity, increased truth density, and severe discomfort among congressional entities.</li></ul><p>6.2 Secondary Cup Intervention Protocol<br> If the Speaker attempts to acquire a second cup immediately before a press conference, executive session, or media interview, Host personnel are authorized to execute mitigation measures similar to workplace intervention protocols, including:</p><ul><li>Tactical distraction or stakeholder engagement;</li><li>Accelerated, early podium deployment;</li><li>Strategic substitution of the asset with unsweetened tea.</li></ul><p>Operational Warning: Direct verbal or physical confrontation is discouraged unless Host personnel possess verified prior intervention experience.</p><p><strong>SECTION 7: AUXILIARY BEVERAGES</strong></p><ul><li>Permitted: Unsweetened tea and water. Water is provisioned primarily as a visual aid to reassure audience members that human hydration remains theoretically achievable.</li><li>Prohibited: Sodas, flavored energy drinks, or any beverage requiring intellectual or culinary explanation.</li></ul><p><strong>SECTION 8: BREACH AND REMEDIES</strong></p><ol><li>Material Breach: Any violation of Section 2.1 or Sections 3 through 7 shall constitute an immediate and incurable material breach of this Rider. Noncompliance under Section 2.2 may be cured by immediate corrective action; failure to initiate such action shall constitute an incurable material breach.</li><li>Paid Engagements: Upon breach, the Host shall be immediately disqualified. The Speaker may vacate the premises and terminate all further obligations under the Agreement while retaining the full contractual honorarium.</li><li>Pro Bono Engagements: Where the Speaker appears without honorarium, breach shall result in immediate disqualification of the Host, immediate departure of the Speaker, and permanent placement of the Host, its representatives, employees, and affiliates on the Speaker’s Do Not Engage list.</li></ol><p>IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this Operational Beverage Rider as of the date written below.</p><p>For Host Organization: _______________________ Date: _______________</p><p>For the Speaker: ___________________________ Date: _______________</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=69fe1d28c6b2" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Emergency]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@craig_40068/emergency-54252acf36d5?source=rss-255a06ff6e1c------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[emergency]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[emergency-medical-service]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[rescue]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[paramedic]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ambulance]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Craig Fugate]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 05 Aug 2026 21:54:59 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-08-05T22:15:28.499Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*USUwahdsn2VMRCcFYhnYmw.jpeg" /></figure><p><em>“Rampart, this is Squad 51”</em></p><p>My generation of paramedics grew up on <em>Emergency!</em></p><p>Squad 51. Johnny Gage and Roy DeSoto. Rampart Emergency.</p><p>For many of us, that show wasn’t just entertainment. It was the reason we became paramedics.</p><p>The show neglected to mention a few things.</p><p>Johnny and Roy saved almost everyone. The survival rate from cardiac arrest in the real world was never what television suggested.</p><p>Rampart always answered on the first call. Your radio worked when it wanted to, which wasn’t always when you needed it to.</p><p>Squad 51 never seemed to run suicides. The squad never broke down. They never had another call just before the shift coming on after theirs. They rarely showed the paperwork, the equipment checks, the station chores, or the long stretches of waiting between calls. Understandably, it was TV, and who wants to watch the boring, routine parts.</p><p>They also never showed the calls that stay with you.</p><p>These are the calls Johnny and Roy never ran.</p><p>The stories begin in Gainesville, Florida, after Tom Petty had left town, when Cadillac ambulances had given way to modular rescue units, the Lifepak 5 was cutting-edge technology, treatment was guided by standing orders, and talking to a physician meant trying to raise the hospital over a med channel that didn’t always work.</p><p>Television inspired a generation to answer the call.</p><p>Real life taught us what the job actually was.</p><p>The names have been changed. The locations have been changed. The truth has not been changed because the truth was never in the names.</p><p>If you recognize yourself in these pages, you probably earned it.</p><h3>Running Down a Dream</h3><p>Dubs was loud.</p><p>That was the first thing you noticed and the last thing you forgot. Loud in the way that made conversation impossible and proximity necessary, which was the entire point of the place. A mixed crowd on a Saturday night, the newly separated and the newly twenty-one occupying the same room with different levels of experience and the same general agenda. Everyone running some version of the same calculation about what the night might produce.</p><p>The drugs and the alcohol were the lubricants. The music was the excuse.</p><p>Tom Petty had played Dub’s years before. Mudcrutch. By the time I was running rescue calls there in the mid-1980s, he had long since gone to California and made Damn the Torpedoes. The bar had moved on without him. But his ghost was still in the walls, the way Gainesville gets into everything it produces: stubborn, specific, and not particularly impressed by authority.</p><p>I was the medical infrastructure for whatever happened when the calculations at Dubs went wrong. They went wrong regularly. Predictably. With enough variety to keep it interesting.</p><p>The call on US 441 came in as a vehicle accident. The car had hit the palm tree in front of the bar at a speed that distributed it into three separate pieces across a four-lane highway. The engine went one direction. The rear end went the other. The passenger compartment found the palm tree and stopped there.</p><p>We cut him out of what remained. Broken toe. Blood alcohol approaching 0.3 percent. Nothing else.</p><p>The ER kept sending him for more tests because the math didn’t work. Engine on one side of 441. Rear end on the other. Passenger compartment around a palm tree. Broken toe. Those four facts do not belong in the same incident report.</p><p>The palm tree is still there. Palm trees are indifferent to what happens around them.</p><p>I was twenty-six when the call came from the women’s bathroom.</p><p>Bad breakup. Too much booze. Slashed wrists. Fighting to stay.</p><p>Our shift supervisor was closer. He took the call in the quick response truck and got there first. We heard him key up on the radio. On scene. Then nothing. No status report. That silence is its own kind of information when you’ve been doing this long enough to know what a status report is supposed to sound like.</p><p>We tried to raise him. Nothing back. We came in with the stretcher, the oxygen, the kit, the monitor, everything you bring when you might have to work a patient. The bouncers were already moving the crowd, parting a path to the bathroom door the way people do when they can tell something is wrong and don’t want to be near it.</p><p>We opened the door and found him on the floor with his hands on both her wrists, holding on. Blood everywhere. He was covered in it.</p><p>We got down with him. Trauma dressings first, then the rest. Blood everywhere. White uniform shirts, his and mine both. Her pressure was holding fine. She had fought hard enough for long enough that something in her just quit, went quiet, went still, and let us work. The fight leaving her wasn’t a medical event. It was something else, and it wasn’t ours to fix. That was for somebody else to deal with, later, if she was lucky enough to have someone.</p><p>We got the bleeding stopped. Bandaged. Line started. Oxygen on. Loaded for transport.</p><p>The band never stopped playing. The line of women waiting to use the bathroom never moved. The night kept going on the other side of that door the way it always does, indifferent, loud, full of people running their Saturday night calculations.</p><p>She made it. I drove back to the station in a white shirt that wasn’t white anymore, and the band was still playing when I left.</p><h3>Halloween</h3><p>Halloween in a college town is its own category of emergency services event. The costume creates problems that don’t exist on regular nights. You assess through the costume, past the costume, despite the costume, while the costume actively misleads you about what you were looking at.</p><p>B Shift responded in costume. They had also taped a skull mask to the flashing white light in the middle of the light bar so that the skull’s eye sockets strobed white into the Gainesville night. The skull was honest marketing. For some patients that night, looking up and seeing it was the most coherent part of their evening.</p><p>I was off duty. Going to a party as the Grim Reaper. A friend who did theater work had hooked me up with real stage makeup, not just white face paint. Actual clown white. Black lipstick on my lips and rimmed around my eyes. Blood red dripping from the corner of my mouth. Black cape, hood up. A sickle I’d built myself, a broom handle and a piece of plywood cut out and painted silver. I left the sickle in the truck.</p><p>Dispatch called. Volunteer fire station responding to a cardiac call. They needed a paramedic. No time to change. I went in costume.</p><p>Elderly woman. Short of breath. Chest pain. History of congestive heart failure.</p><p>She looked up at me. A pause that contained everything.</p><p><em>“Oh dear.”</em></p><p>I introduced myself. Told her that I was a paramedic. We agreed to proceed on that basis. She was from a generation that had lived through enough that the Grim Reaper showing up on Halloween was startling but manageable. Concerning but not disqualifying.</p><p>The ambulance crew arrived for transport. They stopped laughing eventually. She made it.</p><h3>The Grim Reaper</h3><p>Every department keeps score. Not officially. But in the oral tradition of the station, in the conversations at shift change, a record is kept. I set mine on the first day.</p><p>The first call was a cardiac arrest. The patient did not survive. You run the protocol. You work the call. You log it and move on.</p><p>The second call was different. Dispatch sent us to a fire in an RV. Three people were dead inside from carbon monoxide poisoning. No fire. That was four fatalities before evening.</p><p>Later, an experimental aircraft attempted to land in fog. It flew into the runway. Two fatalities. That was six. Before the shift ended there was one more cardiac arrest. The O sign. The patient did not survive. Seven fatalities. First day cleared. Small county. Set the record on my first shift as a full time attending Paramedic.</p><p>The calls between the fatalities were not routine. A patient run over by a ski boat with propeller lacerations from the shoulders to the thighs was not the remarkable call that period. It was the interval between remarkable calls. That is what three months as a Black Cloud does to your sense of baseline.</p><p>The jokes started in the second week. Questions about kickback arrangements with local funeral homes. By the end of three months, I held both the single-shift record and the probationary-period record.</p><p>The most dangerous dispatch code is unknown illness. My partner and I were responding to one down a single lane road with fencing on both sides. No room to turn around. One direction available.</p><p>As we approached the house there was a man on the porch with a shotgun. He was waving us forward. We were within range. You do not stop in a fatal funnel. So we continued. Hands visible. Radio keyed quietly.</p><p>He was not angry at us. A woman had been shot out on the highway and had made it to his porch. He had called for help and armed himself and was standing between her and whoever had done it. Nobody made a wrong decision. The geometry put everyone in the worst possible configuration for about ninety seconds until it resolved.</p><p>The confirmation came on a cardiac arrest call. The patient was in ventricular fibrillation. I gelled the paddles, confirmed V-fib, charged to 200 joules, cleared, and discharged. No response. Increased to 300 joules. Still V-fib. Recharged to 360 joules. Called clear. Pulled the triggers.</p><p>Instead of the patient’s body jerking as it should, a bright light formed between the paddles directly in front of my face and my supervisor, accompanied by a loud explosion. My driver stood over us and ran the calculation of which one of us he would attempt to resuscitate first.</p><p>The initial conclusion was operator error. Because after all it was me. Physio-Control examined the unit afterward. There was a ground fault. Three hundred and fifty joules discharged into the air between the paddles. Inches from my face. It had never happened before. It was not operator error. But the crew’s first instinct was not entirely wrong. Not about the cause. About the pattern. The machine chose my shift, my call, my hands on the triggers to fail in a way it had never failed before. That is not a coincidence. That is a Black Cloud with documentation.</p><h3>The Sorting Hat</h3><p>There were four hospitals. County. University teaching hospital. Private. VA. Every transport was a sorting hat decision. Not purely medical. Medical plus logistical plus political plus how the last three calls to that facility went.</p><p>The sorting hat decision that required no deliberation came in on a routine shift. Unresponsive patient. No identifying information. One data point. The sheets on the unit were from the university teaching hospital.</p><p><em>The sheets said Shands.</em></p><p>Shands it was. The charge nurse had opinions. Loud ones. That patient goes to county. Why did you bring them here.</p><p>The sheets said Shands. The patient was already in the bay. Possession is nine tenths of the law and the ambulance was already backing out. For the remainder of the shift we had three hospitals.</p><h3>The Highway of Doom</h3><p>Third service EMS is the redheaded stepchild of public safety funding. Every October 1st the budget year reset and EMS found out whether it survived another twelve months. Low bid everything. Ambulances that should not have been on the road. AC units that could cool a light breeze and had no position on Florida summers. Three ambulances in a single shift as the breakdown rate exceeded the maintenance yard’s capabilities.</p><p>We fought the system, the equipment, and our supervisors, who were fighting the same things from a different position in the same boat and couldn’t say so out loud.</p><p>The unstable cardiac was thirty-five minutes from the ER. Twelve minutes out the patient went into V-fib. You do not stop. You work the code in the back of a moving ambulance.</p><p>Two-fifty-five AC. Two front windows open at whatever speed the driver was doing. Ninety degrees. Ninety percent humidity. I charged the Lifepack 5 to 360 joules. My partner grabbed my belt to stabilize me, holding onto the IV rack. The IV rack connected to the ambulance frame. My partner connected to my belt. Me connected to the paddles. Gel on my hand. Dripping sweat. Salt water is an excellent conductor. I called clear and pulled the triggers.</p><p>I was on the bench. My right arm dangling. Wondering what had happened to the last several seconds of my life. My partner checked that I was breathing. Took over. The patient had converted to sinus tach. I had caught part of a 360-joule shock through my hand on a pothole highway in a non-air conditioned ambulance in a Florida summer while working a cardiac arrest. The patient got the better end of that transaction.</p><p>The ER was fascinated. They see this in interns on their first rotation in controlled environments. The blister on my finger was the entry wound. The numb arm was the nervous system still processing. We were short staffed. I went back out. Told to come back if anything felt funny. Other than the numb arm and the blister I felt fine. Squad 51 never covered this either.</p><h3>First Time But Not the Last</h3><p>The foundry was the kind of place that generated calls with mechanical creativity. The worker had fallen onto a threaded pipe. Both testicles accounted for, best I could tell from the blood. Torn open but missed the vitals. Compress dressing. Bleeding under control. O2. Large bore IV. The problem was the stretcher. Every time we moved him toward it his nervous system took him back to the floor into a ball.</p><p>The radios worked. That was a sign. The physician came back immediately. Two milligrams of morphine IV. Monitor the vitals. Repeat in 2 mg increments as needed, up to ten.</p><p>I watched his face. Two milligrams. Watch the face. Two more. The pain finding a lower frequency. The fetal position becoming negotiable. The stretcher becoming possible. The man who could not be moved became a man who could be moved. That is what the morphine was for. Not the lock box. Not the accounting. That moment on the foundry floor. First time but not the last.</p><h3>Not Much, Most of It on the Dash</h3><p>Some things you see you can never unsee. That is neurology. The images that arrive at a certain threshold of shock get filed somewhere else. They come back without invitation decades later with the same clarity they had on the day.</p><p>The call came in as a Gun Shot Wound. Quick response unit had gotten there first. CPR in progress. When I walked up to the truck I started reading the scene. There was a large gray bloody mass on the dashboard. That was my first clue.</p><p>The subject had used a shotgun. Other than the jaw, not much was left above it. The quick response paramedic was doing compressions because the protocol said to.</p><p>I called the ER. New doc. Didn’t know me. I told them what I saw. Told them I had stopped resuscitation. The new doc asked how much brain matter was left. This question was not covered in paramedic school. Squad 51 didn’t do suicides.</p><p>I told them: not much. Most of it appeared to be on the dashboard. The rest had gone through the roof of the pickup truck. The new doc did not authorize the stop.</p><p>The quick response paramedic pushed back. I declined. They said it was on me. I asked the crime scene technician for Polaroids. Drove to the ER. Showed the doc the pictures. Nothing was said. They signed the report. It was on me. I made the call.</p><p>Some things you see you can never unsee. The dashboard is still there, filed in the place where those things get filed, coming back without invitation with the same clarity it had that day. You carry it. You keep going. That’s the job Squad 51 didn’t show you.</p><h3>East of Main Street</h3><p>I worked the east side of the county for three years. Lower income. Large rural zone. Everything east of Main Street. Higher call volume, fewer resources, more complexity per call. The rural zone meant distance. The thirty-five minute cardiac on the highway of doom wasn’t the exception. It was Tuesday.</p><p>We rotated through the in-town ambulance and two outlying quick response trucks. Very low call volumes at the outlying stations. Except for me. The Black Cloud didn’t respect the rotation schedule.</p><p>Things they never teach you in paramedic school: the difference between a cutting and a stabbing. Cuttings are razors or knives drawn across the body. Rarely meant to kill. The cutting bleeds on the outside. The stabbing bleeds on the inside where you can’t find it until the pressure drops.</p><p>Dispatch saying it was a cutting also meant a fight. It meant the scene might still be ongoing. East of Main Street you were first in. Sometimes the crowd was with you. Sometimes against. Sometimes the person who did the cutting wanted them to bleed a little more.</p><p>We heard the crash before dispatch notified us. Two blocks from the outlying station. Convertible with the top down, T-boned by a pickup truck. Decerebrate posturing on one side. Decorticate on the other. Short scene time. Load and go. Heard later they were brain dead. The dye never made it past the jaw line. No perfusion.</p><p>Later we got called to a patient waiting on a transplant. The pagers had gone off across north Florida that night. It wasn’t a total loss.</p><p>The GSW call came in from a juke joint. The patient sitting at the bar with a beer. Blood dripping from his head. A .22. Six entry wounds. Six exit wounds. The rounds had traveled between the skull and the scalp without penetrating the brain. Six defined grooves along the skull on X-ray. The shooter had terrible aim. The patient had a hard head. The cause was a girlfriend who had been dating both of them without mentioning it.</p><p>The Tylenol call. A young man, a bad breakup, a bottle of acetaminophen and then a 911 call. He called because he wanted someone to come. The clinical problem was that Tylenol doesn’t know it’s a cry for help. Wait too long to start the antidote and the liver failure that follows is not fast and not merciful.</p><p>He didn’t want to drink the syrup of ipecac. I went into great detail about what dying from liver failure actually looked like over the course of a week. Great detail. Sparing nothing. He drank the ipecac with gusto. We almost made it to the ER. The stretcher required hosing off. He lived.</p><p>The most recurring call in EMS comes in at two in the morning as unknown illness. Chief complaint: back pain. Duration: ten years. What changed tonight: can’t stand it anymore. The charge nurse’s response when we rolled in was two words not printable in a family publication. The patient got seen. The back still hurt. But the ER at two in the morning was less dark and less solitary than the alternative. Chart notation: patient requested transport. We aim to serve.</p><p>This was also why I had a reputation as a smart ass. I think it was more about finding joy in the absurdities of running 24 hour shifts where calls to 911 were rarely because someone did something smart. The smart ass was the pressure valve. The thing that kept the weight from accumulating past what one person could carry.</p><p>When people asked how I handled a hostile congressional hearing my response was: you call that hostile? The congressman with the sharp questions and the prepared staff had never been the only thing standing between a patient and a crowd with a different outcome in mind. The threat assessment was built on real threats. A hostile witness table is uncomfortable. It is not a cutting scene east of Main Street with law enforcement eight minutes out and the crowd not moving. You knew the difference because you had stood in both places.</p><p>Never leave your very drunk friends to sleep it off. An early morning call to a lake house. The trash cans told the story before you got inside. Someone in the middle of the room. Already in rigor. If someone had stayed with him and kept him on his side he would have woken up to a very bad hangover. Instead he was dead. The intervention required nothing medical. Just someone paying attention. We left the scene to the sheriff’s office. Never leave your very drunk friends to sleep it off. That is the whole chapter in nine words.</p><h3>Skeeter’s and Sonnys</h3><h3>Skeeter’s</h3><p>Before Waffle House understood the assignment there was Skeeter’s.</p><p>Asher “Skeeter” Sullivan opened the original on Hawthorne Road in 1975. A kitchen mistake produced a biscuit of unreasonable size and instead of fixing the error Sullivan recognized what he had and built an institution around it. He eventually moved into a vacant department store on NW 13th Street, large space, windows on two sides, open kitchen, and stayed open 24 hours. The big biscuit was born from a screw-up. Most Gainesville institutions were.</p><p>EMS crews gravitated to Skeeter’s the way bugs go to a light at night. The window between the last drunk and the first woke up dead was a real thing.</p><p>The Asher Special. A mountain of hash browns (not home fries, hash browns, the distinction matters), three to four slices of American cheese melted into and across them, three scrambled eggs on top, and the big biscuit on its own plate because the biscuit could not share space with the rest of it. Two plates. One meal. Three in the morning.</p><p>You could get home fries. The hash browns were better. Most of us knew the difference. The Asher Special was not a meal. It was infrastructure.</p><p>Skeeter’s was not in our zone. This was acknowledged and set aside. Three units in the parking lot at three in the morning was not an uncommon configuration.</p><p>The supervisor drove up 13th Street and noticed three units in the parking lot where there was no call. He pulled in. Two of three crews ran the calculation on whether the Asher Special was worth the write up. He walked over. Told us to move over. Then told us to finish up and get back to our zones. He didn’t order. He saw nothing official. Delivered the message and left.</p><p>We ran calls to Skeeter’s too. Less frequent than Dubs but we knew where the bathrooms were. Other crews ran Skeeter’s bathroom calls while eating there. The response times were excellent. The fastest in department history for that address. Unit already on scene. Bathroom location known.</p><p>The documentation probably said arrived on scene prior to dispatch notification. Nobody asked why. Patient requested transport. We aim to serve.</p><h3>Sonnys</h3><p>Sonnys BBQ was different. Sonnys was in the zone. The original location. Still there today, still serving.</p><p>Right down Waldo Road from the station. No jurisdictional negotiation required. No finish up and get back to your zone conversation. Sonnys was legitimate. Sonnys understood the arrangement without anyone having to explain it.</p><p>Kind to EMS crews who may or may not get to eat the food ordered between calls. That was the whole relationship in one sentence. You ordered. You might eat it. You might not. The tones dropped and the food sat there and the staff understood this and held it for you or boxed it up or just knew that the next time you came in you’d try again. Nobody made it complicated.</p><p>The sweet tea was the reason.</p><p>Sugar. Caffeine. Ice cold. After a day running calls in broken AC at ninety degrees in swamp humidity it wasn’t a beverage. It was a treatment plan in a styrofoam cup. The body that had been losing the argument with the Florida summer for eight hours getting everything it needed in the time it took to walk from the unit to the table and sit down.</p><p>Three simultaneous interventions. One cup. The sweet tea was a mini resuscitation. We didn’t document it but it worked. Sonnys didn’t charge extra for the clinical intervention. It came with the meal.</p><p>The crews who were treated right came back. Brought other crews. Talked about it at shift change. Sonnys took care of the crews and the crews took care of Sonnys in the only currency they had. Loyalty. Presence. The recommendation that travels faster in a fire station than anything else.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=54252acf36d5" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[AM Radio]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@craig_40068/am-radio-19d0cfbc6655?source=rss-255a06ff6e1c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/19d0cfbc6655</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[radio]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[disaster]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[radio-broadcasters]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[emergency-communication]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[emergency-management]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Craig Fugate]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 20 Jul 2026 18:12:44 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-07-20T18:12:44.602Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="AM Radio What Still Works By Craig Fugate, Former FEMA Administrator (2009–2017)" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*7DXPu5kCWifRn8ZX5w_Fug.png" /></figure><h3>What Still Works</h3><p><strong>By Craig Fugate, Former FEMA Administrator (2009–2017)</strong></p><p>In a story I’ve been writing, a county in Iowa loses everything at 9:17 on a September morning. Not to a hurricane or a flood. A high-altitude nuclear detonation off the East Coast burns out the power grid across half the country in an instant. No warning that anyone in Liberty County could see coming. No phones. No internet. No way to ask a question and get an answer, and no way to know whether the rest of the country is still out there at all.</p><p>What the county has left is an AM station on the edge of town.</p><p>KHIG has been broadcasting to central Iowa since 1947, long enough that most people had stopped noticing it was there. What they didn’t know was that the federal government still had. A station that had quietly carried the national warning system through every name that system had held since the 1950s, CONELRAD, the Emergency Broadcast System, the Emergency Alert System, because one owner treated a broadcast license as a public trust and never let the equipment lapse.</p><p>When the modern world goes silent in that story, the oldest machine in the county is the one still standing. Not by accident. By design, and by decades of someone showing up to make sure the design still worked.</p><p>I wrote that scene as fiction. The system behind it is not.</p><p><strong>The real architecture</strong></p><p>The National Public Warning System still exists. It’s built around a network of FEMA-designated Primary Entry Point (PEP) stations, many of them high-power AM broadcasters engineered with hardened facilities and backup power to keep transmitting when the commercial grid and the digital infrastructure around it have failed. Many PEP facilities incorporate hardened infrastructure and resilience measures intended to keep operating under extreme conditions, including scenarios involving electromagnetic pulse effects. That architecture wasn’t built for a blue-sky afternoon. It was built for the worst day this country has, the day cellular networks are down, the power grid is down, and a president needs a message to reach the public anyway.</p><p>AM radio isn’t the Emergency Alert System by itself, but it remains one of the critical pathways that let the Emergency Alert System actually reach the public when other communications have failed. The weather alert people are used to hearing on a normal Tuesday runs on the same architecture built to carry a presidential message on the worst day imaginable.</p><p>That’s the part of the AM radio conversation that keeps getting skipped.</p><p>Most of the current debate over whether automakers should keep AM radios in new vehicles is framed around entertainment and consumer preference. Do people still listen to AM in their cars? Is it worth the manufacturing cost? I understand why that’s the conversation the industry wants to have. It’s the wrong one for the people whose job is to reach the public on the day everything else has failed.</p><p><strong>Streaming is not a backup plan</strong></p><p>Streaming isn’t broadcasting. It’s a chain of connected services that all have to work at the same time: cell towers, internet backbones, data centers, and grid power at both ends. Every one of those has to be working for the message to arrive. Broadcasting doesn’t ask that much of the world. A single transmitter can reach millions of people simultaneously without requiring any of that infrastructure to survive at the receiving end. That difference is not nostalgia. It’s engineering.</p><p>Wireless Emergency Alerts are an important tool, and they save lives every year. But they still depend on cellular infrastructure being up. AM broadcasting was designed for the day that infrastructure is no longer available.</p><p>Some automakers argue that electric powertrains generate interference that degrades AM reception, and that this is why the band is being dropped rather than defended. That’s a real problem, not an invented one. But it’s a filtering and shielding problem, the kind of switching noise hams have been suppressing in inverters and DC-DC converters for years, and some manufacturers have already solved it while others chose not to. What’s actually being weighed is not whether the interference can be engineered around. It’s who absorbs the cost of doing so. That’s a legitimate business conversation. It shouldn’t be dressed up as a technical inevitability, and it shouldn’t be the deciding factor when the capability at stake is the nation’s last-resort pathway for reaching the public.</p><p><strong>What actually happens after the storm</strong></p><p>I’ve watched this play out for real, more than once. After Hurricane Michael tore through the Florida Panhandle, the only signal still getting out was a radio station. After Hurricane Ian, it was broadcasters again, radio and public television both. That’s not a coincidence, and it’s not a one-time story. Time after time, after the storm, after the tornado, after the wildfire, broadcasters are what’s left standing. There’s no network congestion to fight through. No requirement for four bars of signal. No dependence on Wi-Fi. That’s the real advantage broadcasting has over the internet and cellular data: it doesn’t carry those limitations or dependencies. It’s free, and it’s there.</p><p><strong>This isn’t a niche audience</strong></p><p>It’s worth being clear that AM isn’t a relic nobody uses anymore. Nielsen puts monthly AM listenership at roughly 80 million people, spanning small rural markets and major metros alike: New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, Boston, Atlanta. It carries the local high school football game and the severe weather update in the same afternoon. It’s often the only reliable connection for communities where cellular and broadband coverage is thin or nonexistent, and it carries in-language and niche programming that serves Black, Asian, and Hispanic audiences in ways few other formats do. Congress has legislation pending that would keep AM radio standard equipment in new vehicles rather than shifting the cost onto drivers who’d otherwise need cellular data just to stream a signal that used to come free over the air. That’s the same redundancy argument from a different angle: this isn’t only about the worst day. It’s about who gets left without a reliable signal on an ordinary one, too.</p><p><strong>Redundancy isn’t waste</strong></p><p>We built layered communications for decades because no single technology survives every disaster. AM radio matters in that architecture not because it’s old, but because it’s one of the few systems specifically designed to keep working when nothing else does. During my years at FEMA, we never assumed the communications system we had at the beginning of a disaster would be the one we’d still have by the end of the day. Redundancy wasn’t a luxury. It was doctrine.</p><p>Before we remove a capability like that from the vehicles most Americans are sitting in when disaster strikes, the question worth asking isn’t what’s newest. It’s what’s left if everything else goes down.</p><p><strong>What the county learns</strong></p><p>In the story, the station doesn’t stop at warnings. Once the immediate crisis passes, the same frequency that carried the presidential alert starts carrying something else: the public health nurse explaining how far a latrine has to sit from a well, the extension agent walking through pressure-canning safety, the mechanic teaching someone how to keep a generator alive through another season. The internet used to be the place people went for exactly that kind of knowledge, on demand, hyper-local, endlessly available. When that layer disappears, the AM station becomes the thing that replaces it, not because anyone planned it that way, but because the signal was still there and the knowledge still had somewhere to go.</p><p>That’s fiction too. But it’s built on something I’ve watched happen in real disasters more times than I can count: systems don’t fail because the tools disappear. They fail when knowledge stops moving. The station that’s still standing on the worst day is the one that lets knowledge keep moving when everything else has stopped.</p><p>Technology will keep evolving. It should. But before we strip a resilient, purpose-built capability out of the vehicles millions of Americans depend on, we owe it to them to ask the only question that actually matters on the day the disaster shows up uninvited.</p><p>If everything else fails, what do we have left?</p><p>The disaster gets a vote.</p><p>— Craig Fugate</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=19d0cfbc6655" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Before You Blame the Boomers]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@craig_40068/before-you-blame-the-boomers-f94eafe69600?source=rss-255a06ff6e1c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f94eafe69600</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Craig Fugate]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 17 Jul 2026 15:29:08 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-07-17T15:29:08.122Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Yesterday, during a meeting with representatives from several organizations, someone made a comment that caught my attention.</p><p>They said many of today’s problems would disappear if the Baby Boomers would simply “go away.” According to them, Boomers occupy too many homes, control too much wealth, and are standing in the way of younger generations.</p><p>I doubt they intended it to be personal, but it made me think.</p><p>Generational stereotypes are easy. History is much more complicated.</p><p>It is fashionable today to portray Baby Boomers as a generation that inherited prosperity, accumulated wealth, and then pulled the ladder up behind them. There is some truth in the observation that older Americans today hold a disproportionate share of the nation’s wealth. People who have worked and saved for forty or fifty years naturally own more assets than those who are just beginning their careers.</p><p>But that is only part of the story.</p><p>The biggest misconception is that the Baby Boom generation was one economic class.</p><p>It wasn’t.</p><p>Like every generation, where you started in life mattered far more than when you were born.</p><p>If you grew up in an affluent family, had access to good schools, could afford college, and entered a profession with opportunities that others didn’t have, your path was very different. Those advantages often compounded over a lifetime.</p><p>But millions of Boomers — and those of us in Generation Jones — grew up in working-class families. We worked in factories, construction, transportation, agriculture, public safety, healthcare, retail, and the service trades. We served in the military. We built careers one step at a time, often without college degrees, inherited wealth, or any guarantee that the jobs we started with would still exist when we reached retirement.</p><p>The world we inherited was hardly free of uncertainty.</p><p>Older Boomers lived through the Cuban Missile Crisis, when the United States and the Soviet Union came frighteningly close to nuclear war. Years later, after Soviet archives became available, we learned just how close civilization had come to catastrophe.</p><p>Many of us practiced duck-and-cover drills in school. We grew up believing nuclear war was not just possible, but plausible.</p><p>Some of my earliest memories are not of understanding politics but of watching adults react to tragedy.</p><p>I remember standing in a Navy commissary on a base in Memphis when an announcement came over the loudspeaker that President Kennedy had been shot. I was just a child. I didn’t understand the politics, but I understood what I saw. Shopping carts stopped. Conversations stopped. Adults stood silently. Some cried.</p><p>A child may not understand the event, but a child understands fear.</p><p>We watched the country struggle through the Civil Rights Movement and tear itself apart over the Vietnam War. We watched Martin Luther King Jr. and Robert F. Kennedy assassinated. We witnessed Watergate and later the Church Committee expose illegal government surveillance and abuses of power. We watched a president resign in disgrace and another become president without ever having been elected to the office.</p><p>Then came the oil embargo, gasoline lines, inflation, blackouts, brownouts, and interest rates that climbed into the teens. Families watched the purchasing power of their paychecks disappear under double-digit inflation.</p><p>At the same time, America was changing. Manufacturing jobs disappeared. Plants closed. Entire communities built around factories, mills, and industrial production were disrupted. Workers who expected to spend a lifetime with one employer suddenly found themselves starting over.</p><p>That transition did not happen without casualties.</p><p>Many people lost careers, homes, savings, and the security they thought decades of hard work had earned.</p><p>Another myth is that every Boomer retired with a generous pension.</p><p>Some did.</p><p>Many did not.</p><p>During our working lives, traditional pensions began disappearing. Employers increasingly replaced defined-benefit pension plans with 401(k)s and other defined-contribution plans, shifting the responsibility — and the risk — from the company to the employee.</p><p>For many workers, that change came in the middle of their careers.</p><p>Others worked faithfully for decades believing they had earned a secure retirement, only to see pension plans frozen, reduced, or lost through bankruptcies, mergers, acquisitions, and corporate reorganizations. Companies decided retirement obligations had become too expensive and restructured, leaving workers with far less than they had expected.</p><p>The image of every Boomer retiring with a gold watch, a guaranteed pension, and a comfortable life simply isn’t true.</p><p>Some did.</p><p>Many never had a pension at all.</p><p>Others lost much of what they had earned through circumstances completely outside their control.</p><p>Today, many older Americans are living primarily on Social Security because they never accumulated substantial retirement savings or because those savings were consumed by layoffs, recessions, medical expenses, family obligations, or market losses.</p><p>For them, every increase in groceries, utilities, insurance, healthcare, or prescription drugs matters.</p><p>Retirement isn’t about travel or leisure.</p><p>It’s about making the monthly check last until the next one arrives.</p><p>None of this dismisses the very real challenges facing younger generations.</p><p>Housing affordability is a crisis. Student debt is real. Wages have struggled to keep pace with many essential costs. Climate change presents serious long-term risks. Technology is transforming careers faster than workers and institutions can adapt.</p><p>Those concerns deserve attention.</p><p>But blaming an entire generation rarely solves complex problems.</p><p>History is rarely that simple.</p><p>There were wealthy Boomers and poor Boomers.</p><p>There are wealthy Millennials and poor Millennials.</p><p>There are retirees living comfortably and retirees choosing between groceries and prescriptions.</p><p>Economic class, opportunity, education, health, geography, and a measure of luck have always mattered more than generational labels.</p><p>Every generation inherits problems it did not create.</p><p>Every generation leaves behind both progress and unfinished work.</p><p>Before writing off an entire generation as privileged or responsible for today’s challenges, remember that millions of people who happened to be born between 1946 and 1964 spent their lives working, serving, raising families, adapting to change, and simply trying to build a better future for those who came after them.</p><p>The year you were born mattered.</p><p>But the life you were born into mattered far more.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f94eafe69600" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[AI Is Already in Public Safety. The Question Is Whether We’re Using It Wisely.]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@craig_40068/ai-is-already-in-public-safety-the-question-is-whether-were-using-it-wisely-c07f7cea8899?source=rss-255a06ff6e1c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/c07f7cea8899</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[emergency-management]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[public-safety]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tabletop-exercise]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[writing-prompts]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ai]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Craig Fugate]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 12 Jun 2026 14:34:44 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-06-12T14:34:44.285Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="AI Is Already in Public Safety. The Question Is Whether We’re Using It Wisely." src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*DCR5BR1-WQn2EIJouNKhiA.png" /></figure><p>On June 9, Indian River State College hosted a one-day workshop on the practical use of Artificial Intelligence in public safety operations. Participants represented emergency management, law enforcement, fire rescue, EMS, and training organizations.</p><p>One thing became immediately clear:</p><p><strong>AI is already in public safety.</strong></p><p>Not someday. Not in a pilot program five years from now. Today.</p><h3>It Starts With the Prompt</h3><p>The workshop opened with a simple icebreaker. Participants entered their agency, title, how long they had been there, whether they were already using AI, and what they wanted out of the course. ChatGPT wrote their introduction. They read it back.</p><p>Then we built something real.</p><p>The second exercise was a daily situation report for their own agency — the kind a director might send to a college president or an EOC chief every morning. Participants entered the same five inputs: hazardous weather outlook, hurricane season outlook, tropical activity, critical infrastructure status, and the status of Waffle House.</p><p>That last one matters. If you know what the Waffle House Index means, you’re in the room. If you don’t, you just learned something about informal situational awareness that no textbook exercise would surface.</p><p>But something unexpected happened. Even though participants were entering the same prompts, they were getting different outputs. Because they had all entered different information in the icebreaker, the model was already carrying different context for each of them. Same query. Different conversation history. Different result.</p><p>That surprised people. They walked in thinking AI works like a search engine. It doesn’t. The model is stateful. What you put in earlier shapes what comes out later. Understanding that is foundational to using these tools correctly.</p><h3>When the Phone Rings</h3><p>The day before the workshop, an earthquake struck off the coast of Cuba. It was felt across much of South Florida, including Indian River County. Participants had felt it.</p><p>The scenario was simple: your sheriff calls. Your county commissioner calls. They felt it. They want to know: we didn’t think Florida got earthquakes. What’s our risk?</p><p>Participants entered the prompt. Within minutes, they had a substantive answer on Florida’s seismic vulnerability and historical earthquake activity — the kind of briefing that would normally take an hour to pull together from scratch.</p><p>Then: what’s your source for that? They ran the fact check prompt. The source came back as the U.S. Geological Survey — the official authoritative source on seismic activity.</p><p>That’s the pattern. Current event. Prompt. Useful output. Verify the source. It works the same whether the call comes in about an earthquake, a chemical release, or an agricultural outbreak nobody saw coming. What changes is how well the professional frames the question.</p><h3>Building a Tabletop in Real Time</h3><p>The third exercise was a tabletop. The scenario was current: a possible New World Screwworm detection in Okeechobee County’s dairy industry, reported by the Florida Department of Agriculture to USDA’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service.</p><p>From that prompt, ChatGPT generated a two-hour tabletop exercise.</p><p>Then we layered. Add the history of New World Screwworm outbreaks in Florida. Participants learned that screwworms devastated Florida’s livestock industry for decades until the sterile insect technique eradicated the pest from Florida by 1959 and from the entire United States by 1966. They also learned there was a more recent outbreak — September 2016 through January 2017 in the Florida Keys, centered on the endangered Key deer population at Big Pine Key. More than 130 Key deer were killed before APHIS released sterile males and eradicated the infestation. Florida was declared screwworm-free again on March 23, 2017. Most participants had no idea. Career public safety professionals were surprised by their own state’s history.</p><p>Next prompt: reformat the exercise to HSEEP standards. The emergency managers in the room recognized the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program format immediately. The model complied. HSEEP-formatted exercise documentation that would normally take days to produce came out in minutes.</p><p>Next prompt: Who’s in charge of this response? APHIS leads. The Florida Department of Agriculture supports. For emergency managers accustomed to ESF-structure thinking, having the model correctly identify federal lead agency authority in an agricultural incident was a useful data point.</p><p>At this point, the exercise was technically solid but operationally quiet for local responders. Screwworm eradication is largely a federal and state agricultural operation. So we added an inject.</p><h3>When Information Becomes the Incident</h3><p>The sterile fly release program works by irradiating male screwworm flies to make them sterile, then releasing them in the affected area. Irradiation. Radiation. It takes one social media post to close that gap.</p><p>The inject: a post claiming the released flies were radioactive and dangerous to children and pets, had been viewed over a million times.</p><p>The exercise shifted immediately. 911 overloaded. Elected officials demanding briefings. Public hotlines flooded. Media calls. And a correction message that was nearly impossible to deliver effectively — because “they were irradiated but not radioactive” is a technically accurate statement that sounds exactly like a cover story to anyone who already believes the original post.</p><p>The scenario worked because the history made the rumor plausible. Participants had just spent time learning that sterile fly releases are real, that they have been used in Florida before, and that the program involves radiation. The false narrative had just enough technical grounding to spread.</p><p>Once a false narrative is established and has a million views, technically accurate corrections don’t work. That’s not an AI lesson. That’s a public information lesson. AI built the scenario in minutes and played it out in real time.</p><h3>Fact Check Everything</h3><p>After updating the exercise with the misinformation inject, we added one more prompt: fact check all of the information in this exercise and list your sources.</p><p>The exercise didn’t run this out fully, but the habit matters. During a separate exercise, one participant updating a real agency plan found that some of the information the model returned was sourced from blogs and unofficial sources — not from FEMA, USDA, or state agency guidance. The only reason they caught it was because they knew to ask for sources.</p><p>The prompts that matter most may not be the ones that build the product. They may be the ones that check it.</p><p>Ask routinely:</p><p>• Fact check this.</p><p>• List your sources.</p><p>• Identify authoritative sources.</p><p>• Separate official sources from secondary sources.</p><h3>Building Your Own</h3><p>After the screwworm sequence, participants built their own tabletop exercises — their own hazards, their own jurisdictions, their own formats, their own injects. The instructor walked the room and coached on prompts.</p><p>What took minutes would have taken days or weeks to produce manually. For most of these agencies, it would have meant deferring the exercise entirely or hiring a contractor. The difference wasn’t the AI. It was the specificity of the prompts.</p><p>Several participants work as adjunct instructors and trainers. The training application got significant attention. Law enforcement, fire, and EMS certification training is governed by state standards. Students pass scenarios by memorizing what prior students describe. AI solves that problem: upload the state standards, prompt for scenario variability, and every student faces a different scenario built against the same learning objectives. The assessment measures actual competency, not information passed down from the previous class.</p><h3>Making It Jurisdictional</h3><p>Generic exercises test generic responses. To get exercises that test your actual plan, upload your actual plan.</p><p>Tools like ChatGPT’s Projects feature allow users to upload files — emergency operations plans, SOPs, resource inventories, agency-specific protocols — so the model works from those documents when generating output. An exercise built against your EOP will reference your EOC activation thresholds, your agency roles, and your mutual aid structure.</p><p>The boundary matters: public-facing documents, no personally identifiable information, nothing marked For Official Use Only. That’s not arbitrary caution. It’s the same information handling discipline public safety professionals already apply, in a new context.</p><h3>The Governance Gap Is Not Theoretical</h3><p>The range of AI policy in that room told the whole story.</p><p>One law enforcement agency was running a closed LLM environment specifically designed to handle evidentiary information, suspect data, and PII without exposing it to commercial platforms. They had thought it through and built a controlled system.</p><p>Other local governments had banned AI use in any official function. Yet in at least one fire department, many of the firefighters were already using AI chat tools on their personal laptops to do their jobs. The ban didn’t stop the use. It made the use invisible and undocumented.</p><p>One participant described software already deployed at a local sheriff’s office that converts body camera footage directly into a written report. The officer reviews, amends, and signs. That’s not a pilot. That’s in production.</p><p>A former prosecutor in the room put the legal exposure plainly: a defense attorney doesn’t have to prove the report is wrong. They only have to introduce doubt about what the officer’s own observation was and what was machine-generated language. Failure to document AI use doesn’t create a minor compliance issue. It creates an authenticity question that can be used to challenge evidence in jury trials and suppress cases.</p><p>Agencies that have employees already using AI without disclosure may have an existing liability problem they don’t know about yet.</p><p>Public safety leaders need answers to these questions before a problem occurs:</p><p>• What uses are permitted?</p><p>• What requires supervisory review?</p><p>• How should AI-generated content be documented and disclosed?</p><p>• What are the discovery implications for law enforcement documentation?</p><p>• How do we maintain transparency and accountability when AI contributes to an official record?</p><h3>The Human Advantage</h3><p>AI can build a two-hour tabletop in minutes. It can reformat it to HSEEP standards, identify lead agency authority, and generate a public information inject. What it cannot do is know your community.</p><p>It doesn’t know local politics. It doesn’t know which commissioner will call first when something goes wrong, or what that commissioner actually needs to hear. It doesn’t know that the bridge floods before the gauge reaches flood stage — the kind of thing that gets passed down from one emergency manager to the next because it’s never made it into a plan. It doesn’t know that the nursing home administrator never answers email but always answers a text.</p><p>That knowledge lives in the people who work in the community day after day. It comes from the calls taken at 2 a.m., the relationships built before the disaster, and the lessons learned the hard way from the last one. No prompt retrieves it because it’s not in any database.</p><p>The most common mistake people make with AI is assuming it replaces expertise. It doesn’t. The emergency manager still knows the community. The firefighter still understands fire behavior. The law enforcement officer still evaluates credibility. The public information officer still understands how rumors spread. AI accelerates many tasks, but experience remains the difference between a useful answer and a dangerous one.</p><h3>The Bottom Line</h3><p>By the end of the day, every participant understood what a prompt was and how to write one. That was the point.</p><p>AI doesn’t know your jurisdiction, your plan, your community, or your legal exposure. The professional does. The prompt is where that knowledge meets the tool. A specific, well-structured prompt from someone who knows their mission produces something useful. A vague prompt produces something generic. The quality of the output is a direct function of what the professional brings to it.</p><p>One participant put it simply: AI is a staff assistant. It can draft, summarize, research, format, and generate. It can do in minutes what used to take days. But it doesn’t replace experience, judgment, or accountability. The person who signs the report, approves the plan, or stands in front of the cameras is still responsible for every word.</p><p><strong>AI is the tool. The public safety professional is the creator.</strong></p><p>The agencies that gain the most value will not be those that blindly embrace AI or those that ban it outright. They will be the agencies that learn how to use it responsibly — with good prompts, verified sources, and clear documentation of what the machine produced and what the professional approved.</p><p><em>AI can help us anticipate what may happen next. But the disaster still gets a vote. Conditions change, information changes, and responders must constantly adapt.</em></p><p>This article was written by Craig Fugate. AI was used as an editor, not an author. It organized the notes, corrected the spelling, and occasionally suggested a better sentence. The opinions, observations, and lessons learned remain entirely human.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c07f7cea8899" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Raphael’s Report: Hamvention 2026]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@craig_40068/raphaels-report-hamvention-2026-db75c2ce9f22?source=rss-255a06ff6e1c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/db75c2ce9f22</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[amateur-radio]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[emergency-management]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[communication]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[emergency-communication]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ham-radio]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Craig Fugate]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 23 May 2026 16:56:28 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-05-23T19:17:03.918Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*dSu_iqCl8yEWoLXNW-Ub5Q.png" /></figure><p><em>Filed by XX1EM</em></p><p>This is XX1EM’s report from the world’s largest amateur radio gathering. Xenia, Ohio. May 2026. Thirty-five thousand operators. Five exhibit halls. Two thousand five hundred flea market spaces. Nearly sixty forums. Between fifteen and twenty food trucks.</p><p>Four callsigns that showed up at Hamvention 2026.</p><p>A1Ω, EX1L, XX1EM, XX1WX</p><p>One required an ITU working group and a retired frequency coordinator who took up gardening. One says exactly what it means to anyone paying attention. One was assigned by the FCC computer and never changed because the callsign was correct and that was sufficient.</p><p>And four operators who have been on the air longer than radio has existed.</p><p>XX1EM files after action reports. The lessons observed column is always longer than the lessons learned column. He arrived at Hamvention 2026 on day two, having spent day one reviewing the FEMA reform report. He missed the lightning protection and grounding session. He was not concerned. Lightning is one of the areas where XX1EM has some background.</p><p>What follows is his report.</p><p>It is longer than most. The lessons learned column is not empty. That alone made it worth filing in full.</p><h3>Hamvention 2026</h3><h3>The Four Operators</h3><p>Four callsigns. One fairground. Xenia, Ohio. May 2026.</p><p><strong>A1Ω</strong></p><p>Holds an Unlimited class license issued by an authority that predates the FCC, the ITU, and the concept of frequency coordination. He operates CW only, five watts, wire antenna, the minimum necessary to make contact. He goes where the flock is. He holds a lifetime membership in the ARRL — the original lifetime membership, from before the League eliminated the category — and current membership in every other national amateur radio organization on earth. The dues are paid. The newsletters are read. He attends most of the larger hamfests and occasionally the tailgate operations in church parking lots where eight operators spread equipment across open truck beds on a Saturday morning and call it a hamfest because it is. He usually brings coffee from Waffle House. The hobby rule applies to him as it applies to everyone. The omniscience stays outside the parking lot. Five watts is what remains. This is not a hardship. This is the point.</p><p><strong>EX1L</strong></p><p>Holds an Extra class license under a Kazakhstan prefix. EX1L is legitimate DX. Hunters want it in the log. He runs maximum power from a palace shack with full spherical antenna coverage and one additional lobe pointed at a coordinate that does not appear on any propagation map. He attends Hamvention without registering, without a badge through official channels, without appearing in any attendance database. He is simply there when the doors open. His operating posture has not changed since before the hobby existed. He does not jam individual frequencies. That is retail. He works wholesale, and when wholesale is unavailable he works the flea market one whisper at a time. He finds the hobby genuinely interesting and is professionally invested in ensuring that as much of it as possible never gets deployed when it actually matters.</p><p><strong>XX1WX</strong></p><p>Holds an Extra class license. WX suffix because he is Heaven’s Chief Meteorologist. SKYWARN was not invented. It was formalized. Uriel had been running the net considerably before the National Weather Service existed to receive the reports. He recognized that the forecast offices had radar and models and aircraft reconnaissance and did not have someone standing outside in a threatened community who could say exactly what the wind was doing right now at the surface. The trained spotter with a radio was the link between the model and the reality. He approached the Weather Bureau, which became the National Weather Service, with this concept at approximately the moment they were ready to hear it. The timing was not coincidental.</p><p>He teaches storm spotting at ham clubs. Has been doing this since before storm spotting was a formalized curriculum. The YouTube channel came later — the educational content that used to require a physical class in a church fellowship hall can now reach anyone with an internet connection. He is methodical on camera. Clear. Never sensational. The comment section contains a very high percentage of people who say this finally made me understand how supercells work. He moderates the comments himself. Personally. Has never lost his patience in the comment section. This is genuinely remarkable.</p><p><strong>XX1EM</strong></p><p>Holds a General class license. Heaven assigned the callsign when he got his ticket and he never changed it. The suffix announces what it is to anyone paying attention, which is not everyone. He goes to club meetings and sits with the new Technician who has not keyed up yet. He files after action reports. The lessons observed section is always longer than the lessons learned section. He has made peace with this.</p><p>These four have been on the air longer than radio has existed. They will be on the air after the current licensing structure is revised, reorganized, consolidated, and revised again. They show up to the same hamfests for different reasons and leave with different notes.</p><p>What follows is XX1EM’s.</p><h3>Arrival</h3><p>The Greene County Fairgrounds and Expo Center spread across multiple buildings — five exhibit halls running over five hundred indoor vendors, a dedicated forum building running four rooms simultaneously across all three days, and beyond the buildings the flea market, 2,500 spaces of outdoor commerce under Ohio sky. Thirty-five thousand operators from twenty countries. Six hundred volunteers running thirty-five committees. The theme for 2026 was Radio Adventure, which the hobby had been conducting since before anyone named it that.</p><p>XX1EM noted the food trucks. A1Ω had already found the pork tenderloin.</p><h3>The Hobby Rule</h3><p>Before finding A1Ω, XX1EM noted something that required no observation but was worth stating for the record.</p><p>The hobby rules apply to everyone.</p><p>A1Ω prefers POTA, CW at five watts with a wire antenna and whatever the band is doing that day. The omniscience stays outside the park. The foreknowledge of propagation conditions stays outside the park. The ability to simply know whether the contact will complete before the key goes down — outside the park.</p><p>What remains is five watts. A wire. The uncertainty.</p><p>This is the rule as A1Ω understands it. Which is to say, as the entity who may or may not have suggested it originally — this remains unconfirmed and will remain unconfirmed — it is the rule as its author understands it. The constraint is not a burden. It is the gift. Remove the uncertainty and the contact is not a contact. It is a demonstration. Demonstrations are for Michael.</p><p>Michael still cannot break ninety.</p><p>This has been true for longer than the game has existed in its current form. It was true when the game was played on courses that bore no resemblance to Augusta. It was true when the equipment was wood and gut and the rules were still being argued about in Scottish taverns. Michael has been playing golf with genuine effort and genuine frustration and no supernatural assistance for longer than most current nations have existed.</p><p>He has not quit. He quit nothing after the war in heaven and he is not starting now.</p><p>The handicap has not improved.</p><p>A1Ω has suggested, once, that Michael might find the hobby rule clarifying. That the uncertainty is not the enemy of the game. That it is the game.</p><p>Michael did not find this helpful. He went back to the course. He will be there tomorrow. The handicap will be what it is.</p><blockquote>XX1EM margin note: Hobby rule. Universal application confirmed. A1Ω: full compliance, genuine enjoyment of constraint, tailgate hamfests included. Michael: full compliance on the golf course, genuine suffering as a result, handicap unchanged, will not quit. XX1EM: full compliance, General class, seven year old Yaesu, wire antenna, exactly as intended. EX1L: compliance with the letter. Interpretation broad. The lost souls remain in a separate file. Filed under: the rule applies to everyone. This is what makes it a rule.</blockquote><h3>Why A1Ω Attends Hamvention</h3><p>He found A1Ω in the food area.</p><p>Not in any session room. Not at the ARRL booth. Not in the exhibit halls examining the latest transceiver releases with the careful attention of someone who already knows the outcome of every evaluation. The food area. Which in retrospect required no detective work. The food area at Hamvention is where operators go between sessions, between purchases, between the commercial floor and the swap tables. It is where conversations happen that do not happen anywhere else. Where the hobby is not performing itself but simply existing among people who love it.</p><p>A1Ω was wearing the 2026 ARRL America250 Field Day shirt from the booth. The League marking America’s 250th birthday, which for most operators was a souvenir and for A1Ω was something closer to a personal receipt. He had been present for all 250 years of the experiment. He holds a lifetime membership in the ARRL — the original lifetime membership, from before the League eliminated the category. The card predates the decision, predates several board compositions, predates the building on Newington Road, predates most of the arguments about whether the ARRL still represents the membership or merely administers it. The card is valid. The membership is current. It will remain current. The category no longer exists for new applicants and A1Ω is not a new applicant.</p><p>He is also a member of every other national amateur radio organization across the globe. RSGB. JARL. DARC. VERON. REF. RAC. Every federation, every league, every association that has ever organized itself around the shared act of getting on the air. The dues are current in all of them. He reads the newsletters when they arrive, in languages He has spoken since before the languages had names.</p><p>Jeans. Sandals. A pork tenderloin sandwich of the classic Midwest proportion — the breaded cutlet extending past the bun on every side in the tradition that defines the form. The name badge said <em>Al</em>. The callsign field said A1Ω.</p><p>The operators gathered around him had no idea who they were talking to. This was exactly right. This was always exactly right.</p><p>The debate was POTA versus Summits on the Air.</p><p>Someone made the case for elevation. The summit gives you the height. The radiation angle. The clear shot to the horizon that a valley site cannot replicate. These are real advantages. The argument was technically sound.</p><p>A1Ω listened. Let it finish. Then said: the park gives you the <em>reason</em>, the summit the view, why not both.</p><p>Nobody argued. He was right.</p><p>XX1EM arrived at the edge of the group without quite meaning to. A1Ω looked up. The exchange that followed required no words. XX1EM had been reviewing the FEMA reform report. A1Ω had been at Hamvention. The relative merits of these two activities were not discussed. A1Ω handed him half the sandwich.</p><p>XX1EM took it. They were caught up.</p><blockquote>XX1EM margin note: Arrived day two. A1Ω located in food area. Sandwich shared. Status: current. No further notation required for this portion of the day. Filed under: some check-ins do not require a full exchange.</blockquote><h3>Why A1Ω Goes Everywhere</h3><p>A1Ω goes where the flock is. Hamvention is where thirty-five thousand of them gather in one place for three days in May and argue about antennas and buy things they probably do not need and find the one piece of equipment they have been looking for since 2019 on a folding table in the third aisle and have conversations that do not happen anywhere else in the world.</p><p>He attends most of the larger hamfests. Hamvention. Orlando. Tokyo. Friedrichshafen. The ones that fill fairgrounds and convention halls and require advance tickets and hotel reservations months out.</p><p>And sometimes the smaller ones.</p><p>The regional hamfests that draw three hundred operators on a good day. The club hamfests in a school parking lot or a fairground building that smells like livestock the other eleven months of the year. The tailgate operations where eight or ten operators pull up in trucks and spread equipment across open tailgates in a church parking lot on a Saturday morning and call it a hamfest because it is.</p><p>He goes to those too.</p><p>The tailgate operation in a church parking lot on a Saturday morning in a county most operators have never heard of draws exactly the kind of operator A1Ω goes to find — the one who did not drive four hours to Xenia and did not buy an airplane ticket and is not on any national organization’s radar but shows up in that parking lot because the hobby matters to them and this is where the hobby is today.</p><p>That operator is the flock too.</p><p>The ARRL lifetime membership card does not specify which hamfests qualify. A1Ω has never needed it to. He usually brings coffee.</p><blockquote>XX1EM margin note: A1Ω. Memberships: all of them. Lifetime ARRL, original category, predates elimination, still valid. Attends: most major hamfests, some regional, occasional tailgate operations. The tailgate operations are not incidental. They are the point. The flock does not only assemble at Hamvention. Sometimes it assembles in a church parking lot with eight trucks and a card table. A1Ω knows which parking lots. Filed under: the shepherd does not wait for the flock to find a large enough venue. This is also not a new entry.</blockquote><h3>EX1L’s Hamvention</h3><p>EX1L attends Hamvention every year.</p><p>He does not announce this. He does not register in advance or purchase a badge through official channels or appear in any attendance database. He is simply there when the doors open. At the intersection near the main corridor where the sight lines are good and the wall is available for backing and the foot traffic from all five exhibit buildings passes within observation range.</p><p>He was conducting a mobility scooter census when XX1EM first spotted him.</p><p>This was not malicious. Or not entirely malicious. It was the observation posture of someone who has learned to read environments by watching how people move through them. The scooters were a legitimate navigation variable across five buildings of packed vendors and corridors that the collective energy of thirty-five thousand operators reduced to something approximating controlled flow on a good day and organized enthusiasm on all the others.</p><p>Most operators were fine. Careful. Considerate. Aware of the space they occupied and the people sharing it. But a subset had arrived at the conclusion — not examined, simply assumed — that possession of a vehicle resolved all questions of right of way. And the ones who traveled two abreast in corridors designed for one and a half, at a pace calibrated for personal convenience rather than shared navigation —</p><p>He made a small note.</p><p>Not because he had arranged anything. He had not needed to. He simply appreciated when humans self-selected.</p><p>XX1EM altered his route slightly upon spotting EX1L. Not avoidance exactly. Just no operational reason to walk into that particular monitoring radius before coffee. EX1L noticed anyway. He always noticed. He gave XX1EM a small nod and returned to his census.</p><p>They would have occasion to speak later.</p><blockquote>XX1EM margin note: EX1L present. Position: main corridor intersection. Activity: observation. Scooter census methodology appears sound. Two-abreast operators noted. Route adjusted. Filed under: situational awareness is not the same as avoidance. Sometimes it is. Moving on.</blockquote><h3>The Meshtastic Tables</h3><p>EX1L found the Meshtastic vendor tables on day one.</p><p>XX1EM found EX1L at the Meshtastic vendor tables on day two, which was not surprising. The technology was legitimate. LoRa mesh networking, low power, off-grid text communication, genuine utility in scenarios where infrastructure was absent and short-range local coordination was the actual need. XX1EM had read the technical documentation. The use cases were real. The capability was real.</p><p>EX1L was not disputing any of this.</p><p>He was simply helping interested parties skip past the use case conversation entirely.</p><p>The vendor was doing good work. Answering questions honestly. Describing the technology accurately. The operators asking questions were genuinely interested.</p><p>EX1L operated in the space between the question and the answer.</p><p><em>How many nodes would you need to cover a county?</em></p><p>The vendor drew breath to answer. EX1L was already there. <em>Depends on terrain. You would want to start with several. Maybe a dozen to be safe. Hard to know until you have them deployed.</em></p><p>Which was technically true.</p><p>The operator nodding along already had the expression of someone calculating how many would fit in the car.</p><p>XX1EM watched three separate conversations follow the same arc. The technology was real. The capability was real. The conversation about what problem was actually being solved, what integration with existing nets would look like, what the deployment plan was and who was responsible for executing it — those conversations did not happen.</p><p>What happened instead was the particular excitement of acquisition. The gear as the plan. The purchase as the preparation.</p><p>EX1L spread his hands when XX1EM looked at him. <em>I didn’t make them this way.</em> Technically accurate. He did not create the human tendency to acquire first and plan later. He simply understood which rooms to stand in and when to add one sentence to a conversation that was already going in a useful direction for his purposes.</p><p>XX1EM moved on. He had purchased one node himself. For his phone. The deployment plan was not yet determined. This was the correct posture. The node would go home. The node would get configured. The node would get tested. What it could actually do in his county, on his terrain, with his operators, would become clear through experimentation and not before.</p><p>The hams who had found the real applications for mesh were not the ones who bought six nodes with a county coverage plan already drawn. They were the ones who bought one, figured out what it actually did in the field, and built from there. The application that nobody anticipated was always the one that mattered. The oatmeal box radio was not built by someone who knew in advance what it would receive.</p><p>EX1L was aware of this distinction. He found it professionally inconvenient.</p><blockquote>XX1EM margin note: Meshtastic tables. EX1L present. Deployment plans among purchasers: limited. Nodes acquired: several. Personal acquisition: one node, phone attachment. Deployment plan: pending experimentation. This is the difference. The node has a job. The job will be discovered through use and not assumed in advance. Filed under: experiment first. Document what you find. The use case follows the operator. Cross-reference: every technology the hobby has absorbed and repurposed beyond its original design intent.</blockquote><h3>The Flea Market</h3><p>The flea market is where the hobby actually lives.</p><p>XX1EM worked the rows as an observer. Not entirely — he came away with a headset, some coax jumpers, and a Meshtastic node. But mostly an observer. The distinction matters and the sellers understood it within thirty seconds of conversation. They were mostly fine with it. The sellers at the flea market mostly wanted to talk. The transaction was frequently secondary to the conversation.</p><p>What was moving and what was not. What people were excited about and what had gone quiet. Who had been refining an antenna design for two seasons and had the SWR curves on their phone and wanted to show someone who would understand what they were looking at. Who was selling off a collection that did not belong to them anymore and knew more about every piece than most buyers would ever know — the institutional memory of a silent key walking out of the hobby one estate sale at a time, if someone was not paying attention and asking the right questions.</p><p>XX1EM was paying attention. He asked the right questions.</p><p>The coax jumpers require no explanation. Nobody who buys coax jumpers at a hamfest is buying them for any reason other than that they need coax jumpers. It is the most honest purchase at the flea market. No ambiguity. No undisclosed transaction. Just coax.</p><p>EX1L has never once tried to upsell coax jumpers. There is nothing to work with.</p><p>The flea market had its own geography of constraint that had nothing to do with HOA covenants.</p><p>The operators who had driven — who had a truck bed or a van or a trailer and the ability to load whatever the day produced — moved through the flea market with a different posture than the ones who had flown in. The drivers had optionality. The flyers had a weight limit and a carry-on and the particular discipline of someone who knew exactly how much room they had before the airline made the decision for them.</p><p>The tower sections stayed. Beautiful sections of Rohn 25, priced fairly, in good condition, going nowhere on an airplane. The seller knew this and had adjusted expectations accordingly. The buyer who wanted them was doing the mental arithmetic on freight shipping versus the price differential versus whether this was actually the project he was going to complete this time.</p><p>EX1L had a whisper for this situation too. <em>Freight’s not that bad. I can help you find a shipper.</em> The project that was never going to get done acquired a logistics plan. The tower sections went to a car that was already full. The freight never got arranged. The sections sat in a driveway until the next hamfest.</p><p>The smart vendors had read the room.</p><p>The commercial floor exhibitors who had been doing this long enough had anticipated the flyers entirely. Free shipping on new gear. Order here, ship to home, nothing to carry through the TSA checkpoint except the receipt and the anticipation. It was a clean solution to a real constraint and the flyers moved through those booths with the relieved purposefulness of people who had been given permission to spend money they were already planning to spend.</p><p>This was not EX1L’s operation. This was legitimate commerce solving a legitimate problem. The free shipping offer removed the friction without manufacturing desire. The desire was already present. The vendor had simply cleared the path.</p><p>EX1L found the free shipping booths mildly irritating. Clean transactions with no ambiguity left him nothing to work with. He preferred the flea market rows. The uncertainty. The weight limits that created decisions. The tower sections that someone was going to have to explain to someone else.</p><p>He went back to the third aisle.</p><blockquote>XX1EM margin note: Personal inventory. Hamvention 2026. Headset — consumable, mission-relevant, correct purchase. Coax jumpers — always correct. No new radios — noted with approval. One Meshtastic node, phone attachment — noted. Deployment plan pending. Tower sections: remained. Free shipping booths: legitimate, productive, EX1L-resistant. The flyer who built a go-kit around airline carry-on constraints has solved a portability problem most operators never confront. Filed under: the log does not lie. Neither does the go-bag inventory.</blockquote><h3>EX1L and the Flea Market</h3><p>EX1L worked the rows with a whisper. Not a pitch. Not maximum power. One sentence at the right moment.</p><p><em>Those don’t come up often.</em></p><p><em>Guy before you offered less and walked away.</em></p><p><em>Your wife doesn’t have to know what you paid.</em></p><p>The first two were commerce. The third one was something else. The wedge. Not driven today. Planted today, driven six to eighteen months from now in the middle of an argument about something entirely unrelated, when the Collins receiver that was not in the household accounting surfaces at exactly the wrong moment. EX1L thinks in timelines. He has been patient since before patience was a virtue anyone had named.</p><p>The broken equipment table was his most sophisticated operation. The operator standing at it was not buying a radio. They were purchasing a story about who they were. The kind of person who could fix this. Who had the bench. Who had the skills and the time and the motivation to finish the project that all the previous projects had been preparing them for.</p><p>EX1L did not challenge the story. He completed it. <em>That’s not a hard fix. Probably just the finals. Somebody did most of the work already. At that price you cannot go wrong even if it takes a while.</em></p><p>The radio went to the car. The car went home. The radio went to the bench. The bench already had projects on it.</p><p>XX1EM noted that the flea market carried no disclaimer about acquisition behavior.</p><p>Casinos are required by law to acknowledge the mechanism. The signage is small. The font is not chosen for readability. But the acknowledgment exists. The institution is required to say: this activity carries risk, here is a number if you need it.</p><p>The Hamvention flea market was folding tables and sunshine and the unregulated joy of amateur radio commerce with no warning label in any size font.</p><p>EX1L had always preferred unregulated environments.</p><p>His working relationship with divorce attorneys in forty-three states had, by any reasonable measure, a productive weekend.</p><blockquote>XX1EM margin note: Flea market. Observed EX1L at the broken equipment table, the vintage rig table, the new old stock connector table. Standard operating posture. One sentence at the correct moment. The flea market has no disclaimer. Casinos do. The casinos are not the more dangerous environment for most of the operators in that parking lot. Filed under: unregulated environments and the entities who prefer them.</blockquote><h3>The Antenna Conversations</h3><p>The corridor conversations between sessions had their own curriculum.</p><p>Antenna restrictions. The HOA that had opinions about anything visible from the street. The covenant that prohibited structures over a certain height. And somewhere in the middle of all of it, the negotiation between the hobby and the household.</p><p>This conversation had two chapters and A1Ω listened to both.</p><p>The first was the familiar one. The spouse who was not a ham and did not fully understand why the antenna mattered and had reasonable aesthetic objections that the operator could not quite counter without sounding like the hobby was more important than the marriage.</p><p>Which it was not. But the antenna still needed to go somewhere.</p><p>These negotiations had produced remarkable human ingenuity over the decades. The flagpole with the inverted-L that the HOA had approved without understanding what they were approving. The magnetic loop in the attic that the neighbors had never noticed. The random wire that ran along the fence line and looked, to anyone who was not paying attention, like a fence wire. The mobile setup in the driveway accepted on the grounds that he was outside and therefore not underfoot.</p><p>The antenna problem for these operators had not changed. It would not change. The covenant was the covenant. The spouse had not become a ham. The lot size was fixed. The solutions were creative because they had to be and the operators had found genuine satisfaction in the constraint.</p><p>A1Ω had observed this dynamic since before HOAs existed. The ingenuity the restriction produced was frequently more interesting than the unrestricted solution would have been. He did not say this. It would not have helped.</p><p>The second chapter was the one that made Him smile.</p><p>Someone mentioned his wife had her own callsign now and had become considerably more interested in the antenna question from a performance standpoint, which had changed the negotiation entirely.</p><p>Not resolved it. Changed it.</p><p>The household where only one operator wanted the antenna was a negotiation between a hobby and a spouse who did not fully understand it. The household where both operators held callsigns was a negotiation between two people who understood exactly what they wanted and had completely different opinions about how to get it.</p><p>Same HOA covenant. Same lot size. Same feedline run. Twice the expertise applied to the disagreement. The EZNEC models were now being disputed by someone who had also run EZNEC. The compromise antenna that neither party fully wanted was being rejected by two people who could articulate precisely why it was suboptimal.</p><p>The antenna problem had not been solved. It had found a worthier opponent.</p><p>A1Ω found this genuinely encouraging. The solution would eventually emerge. It always did. Usually a compromise neither party would have arrived at alone, performing better than either original proposal.</p><p>Both conversations were happening simultaneously at Hamvention. Both were legitimate. Both operators were still trying to get on the air within the constraints available to them. The antenna problem, in all its variations, remained unsolved and generative and entirely characteristic of the hobby.</p><p>XX1EM had a wire antenna strung between two trees on a property where nobody had opinions about it except him. He did not mention this.</p><blockquote>XX1EM margin note: Antenna restriction conversations. Two populations observed. First: non-licensed YL, covenant unchanged, creative solutions deployed, problem ongoing. Second: both operators licensed, antenna problem now contested at full technical capability, covenant also unchanged, problem ongoing at higher resolution. Combined observation: the antenna problem is permanent. The ingenuity it produces is also permanent. Filed under: constraints are not the enemy of the hobby. In several documented cases they appear to be the engine of it.</blockquote><h3>The YLs</h3><p>The corridor conversation about antennas had been framed, as it often is, around the negotiation between the operator and the household. XX1EM noted what the framing obscured.</p><p>The women in this hobby have always been here. Running nets. Designing antennas. Serving as Emergency Coordinators. Passing traffic when the county needed it. Showing up at Field Day before the sun came up and staying until everything went back in the trailer. Building go-kits that the men in the club came to examine and quietly copied.</p><p>The hobby’s public image had not always reflected this. The hobby itself was less narrow than the image.</p><p>On Friday afternoon, Room 4 had been running a forum: “Women Building Community Through Amateur Radio.” XX1EM had not attended. He had been reviewing the FEMA reform report. He noted this in the margin without comment. The forum had not needed him to observe it in order to happen.</p><p>Hazel Everetts, the assistant general chair who had helped run six hundred volunteers across thirty-five committees this weekend, would be the general chairperson next year. The first woman to hold that role in Hamvention’s seventy-four year history. She had not been waiting for the title to do the work. The work had been getting done. The title was the hobby catching up to what the log already showed.</p><p>The antenna negotiation stories were charming. The fuller picture was that in a significant number of households, both operators held callsigns, both operators had opinions about the antenna, and the negotiation was technical rather than diplomatic. In some of those households the YL’s antenna knowledge exceeded her husband’s and the negotiation reflected this clearly.</p><p>That was not a lesser version of the hobby. That was the hobby working correctly.</p><p>A1Ω had known this longer than Hamvention had existed. He listened to the antenna stories with the patience of someone who sees the fuller picture and waits for the telling to catch up to it.</p><blockquote>XX1EM margin note: YL population at Hamvention. Observed: operators, net controllers, Emergency Coordinators, forum presenters, committee chairs, the incoming general chairperson of the world’s largest amateur radio gathering. Also observed: framing of YL as primarily the person with opinions about the tower. These are not the same population and the framing should be updated. The log does not distinguish by gender. The log records who was on the air. Filed under: the image lags the reality. It usually does. The log is more current.</blockquote><h3>XX1WX</h3><p>XX1EM found XX1WX at the SKYWARN booth.</p><p>Not surprising. The SKYWARN booth drew the operators who took weather seriously as a public service function — the storm spotters, the NWS liaisons, the net controllers who ran the severe weather nets and passed ground truth reports from the field to the forecast office when the radar could not see what was happening at surface level. The National Weather Service personnel from the local office were there. The experienced spotters who had been calling in reports for decades were there. The newer spotters still learning to distinguish rotation from scud were there asking the right questions of the right people.</p><p>XX1WX was among them.</p><p>Not running the booth. Not presenting. Not announcing himself in any way that would have registered to anyone paying attention to the NWS handouts and the spotter training materials and the conversation about the upcoming severe weather season.</p><p>Just present. Listening. In the way that someone listens when they already know the answer but find the human approach to it genuinely interesting.</p><p>XX1WX had been watching weather since before weather had a name. Had watched the first storm system organize over a primordial ocean and taken notes. The NWS forecasters at the booth were very good at what they did. The spotters were careful and trained and took the responsibility seriously.</p><p>He found this moving. He always had.</p><p>The spotter who drives to the edge of a county road in a deteriorating situation to get eyes on a wall cloud and calls it in clearly and accurately so the warning can go out twelve minutes earlier than it would have otherwise — that spotter is doing something that no radar algorithm has fully replicated. Not because the technology is insufficient. Because the thing the spotter brings is not just observation. It is presence. The willingness to be in the weather in order to report the weather.</p><p>XX1WX understood presence. It was his primary operating mode.</p><p>XX1EM caught XX1WX’s eye across the booth. XX1WX gave him the same look he always gave. The one that said: I am not here officially. I am never here officially. But the spotters are doing good work and someone should be paying attention to that and today that someone is me.</p><p>XX1EM nodded. Moved on.</p><p>Some things did not require a full check-in.</p><blockquote>XX1EM margin note: XX1WX located at SKYWARN booth with NWS personnel and storm spotters from the local area. Not presenting. Listening. Among the people who do at ground level what XX1WX has been doing since before ground levels existed. The spotters are good. They take it seriously. They show up to the booth at Hamvention on a Saturday to talk about severe weather season the same way they show up to the county road on a Wednesday evening in April because the rotation is there and someone needs to see it. Filed under: some booths at Hamvention are more than booths.</blockquote><h3>The ARRL Area</h3><p>The ARRL did not have a booth at Hamvention.</p><p>The ARRL had an area.</p><p>The distinction mattered in the way that the distinction between a repeater and a linked repeater network matters — same basic function, substantially different scale and complexity. Multiple booth spaces assembled into a contiguous presence that covered the full range of what the League did and supported and advocated for and organized. Each section dedicated to a different program. Each staffed by people who knew the program from the inside because they had been living it between hamfests.</p><p>XX1EM worked through the area methodically. Not shopping. Observing. The ARRL Lab was offering free handheld radio testing for spurious emissions. A line had formed. XX1EM noted this with approval. Operators who wanted to know whether their equipment was performing within specifications before the activation rather than after the complaint was filed — those operators understood something about readiness that not everyone in the hobby had worked out yet.</p><p>The ARRL President and the Executive Director were both at the area.</p><p>Not scheduled appearances with a handler and a fifteen minute window. Not a ribbon cutting and a photograph and a departure. Present. Moving through the space. Stopping to talk. Asking questions as often as answering them. The kind of presence that communicates something that a press release cannot communicate — that the people running the organization had showed up to the place where the membership showed up and were prepared to be in the same room with whatever the membership brought.</p><p>The membership brought some things.</p><p>The ARRL had not had an uncomplicated few years. The governance questions. The membership debates. The decisions that some operators had agreed with and some had not and some had felt strongly enough about to let the leadership know in terms that were specific and not always gentle. Hamvention was where that conversation could happen in person.</p><p>The President and the Executive Director were there for all of it.</p><p>The welcoming was genuine. The willingness to hear the criticism was genuine. Not defensive. Not managed. Not redirected toward the positive developments and the exciting programs. Genuinely heard. Responded to directly. Sometimes agreed with. Sometimes not agreed with but acknowledged as legitimate and worth taking seriously.</p><p>The operators who had come to the ARRL area with criticisms left the conversation having been heard. Not necessarily having been agreed with. Not necessarily having been promised anything that was not going to happen. But heard. By the people who could actually do something about what they had heard.</p><blockquote>XX1EM margin note: ARRL area. President and Executive Director present. Not scheduled appearances. Present. Welcoming all operators. Hearing the criticisms. Staying in the conversations. The organization that shows up where the membership shows up and stays in the hard conversations is doing the thing the hard conversations exist to produce. Not resolution necessarily. Relationship. Filed under: leadership behavior under conditions that reveal character. Both present. Both in the conversations. Both still there at the end of the day. Filed also under: the good entries.</blockquote><h3>The ARES and Public Service Booth</h3><p>XX1EM made his way to the ARES and Public Service booth.</p><p>This was the one he had come to find.</p><p>The booth was staffed by people who understood the work from the inside. Not the organizational arguments. Not the credentialing debates. The work. The operators who showed up when the agency called and did what the agency needed and filed the after action report and came back the next time. The public service side — the marathons, the bike rides, the community events where amateur radio operators provided communication support for activities that had nothing to do with disasters but everything to do with the relationship between the hobby and the community it served.</p><p>XX1EM spent time there. Not asking questions he did not already know the answers to. Listening to the questions other operators were asking. What served agencies were looking for. What the gap was between what the operators thought they were offering and what the agencies actually needed.</p><p>The conversations at the ARES and Public Service booth were the ground-level version of what the forum session would address at the policy level. Same doctrine. Different register.</p><p>He was optimistic about the combined structure.</p><p>Not because combining emergency communications and public service under one umbrella solved the organizational challenges. It did not. But the public service events — the marathons, the bike rides, the community festivals — built the operators who showed up to activations already knowing whose emergency it was.</p><p>The operator who had worked six marathons and four bike rides had practiced setting up quickly in an unfamiliar location. Had practiced coordinating with non-ham personnel. Had practiced serving a mission that was not their own under time pressure with changing conditions. Had practiced all of this when the stakes were manageable.</p><p>Which was exactly the right time to practice it.</p><p>The combined structure was not a dilution. It was a pipeline. The public service events fed operators into the emergency communications program who had already learned the most important lesson before the first exercise. Not the radio skills. The judgment. The posture. The understanding of whose emergency it was.</p><p>That was harder to train. The marathons taught it without announcing that they were teaching it.</p><blockquote>XX1EM margin note: ARES and Public Service booth confirmed. Conversations observed: ground level version of the forum session doctrine. Same message. Different register. Combined structure assessment: optimism. Founded optimism. The kind that goes in the report. Filed under: optimism. Founded optimism. The public service events are the pipeline. The operator who has worked six marathons arrives at the first activation already knowing how to be in the room. Filed also under: the lessons learned column is having an unusually productive Hamvention.</blockquote><h3>The ARES Session</h3><p>The session XX1EM had come for on day two was officially titled “Reimagining RACES and ARES Programs, Bridging the Gap with Emergency Management.” Room 2. Saturday at 12:10 PM.</p><p>The title announced that the debate was still running.</p><p>What XX1EM had not anticipated was the second presenter.</p><p>The session had the expected voice — an experienced RACES Emergency Coordinator, deep in the organizational questions, fluent in the structure and its discontents, making the case that the bridge between amateur radio and emergency management needed reinforcement from both sides. Standard material. Well delivered.</p><p>The second presenter was a local emergency manager. Recently licensed — General class, had studied for it because the job had taken him somewhere he needed to understand the technology from the inside. He was not there to advocate for amateur radio. He was not a skeptic who had seen the light. He was a practitioner who had watched the videos circulating in the emergency management community and understood what they were doing to the conversation he needed to have with his peers.</p><p>The videos had been appearing for months across the platforms that emergency management professionals watched. The argument, stated plainly: ham radio was no longer necessary in emergency management. Starlink. FirstNet. Satellite messengers. Mesh networking. Technology had moved on. The hams had not moved with it.</p><p>The influencers were not entirely wrong. That was the uncomfortable part.</p><p>FirstNet is real. It works until the tower loses power at hour three and the generator has a maintenance history nobody audited. Starlink is real. It also requires a dish, a power source, a clear sky view, and the continued goodwill of a private company. The satellite messengers work. They are also one-to-one and dependent on commercial infrastructure that has never been stress-tested against a regional catastrophe that takes out every EOC in a multi-county area simultaneously.</p><p>But the emergency manager had seen something the videos had not accounted for.</p><p>He had been in the room when the new technology failed. Not catastrophically. Not in a way that made headlines. Just quietly, at the wrong moment, in the wrong county, with the wrong combination of circumstances that none of the technology’s advocates had modeled.</p><p>And in that room, at that moment, there had been a ham with a radio.</p><p>Not deployed by request. Just a ham who was also a county employee who had a radio on his desk because he was that kind of person, and who had kept a link alive for forty minutes while the new technology sorted itself out.</p><p>The emergency manager had studied for his ham license.</p><h3>The Three Structures</h3><p>His county used RACES. Not ARES. Not AUXCOM.</p><p>The room contained all three structures simultaneously and this was not unusual. It was the standard condition of amateur radio emergency communications in the United States, a country that had never fully resolved whether this capability was a federal function, a state function, a county function, or a hobby function that the other three borrowed when they needed it.</p><p>RACES operators were registered. Activated under civil defense authority. Defined chain of command. When the county emergency manager activated RACES he knew who was coming, what they were authorized to do, and who they answered to.</p><p>ARES operators were volunteers coordinated through the League structure. The relationship with the served agency was built through the Emergency Coordinator, who may or may not have a formal agreement with the county, who may or may not have had the conversation with the new emergency manager that the previous one had conducted three years ago before she retired.</p><p>AUXCOM was the DHS framework. The one that state emergency management had increasingly embraced because it spoke the language that the federal grant structure spoke and came with credentialing requirements that fit inside the NIMS architecture and could be documented in a way that satisfied the reporting requirements of the programs that funded the equipment.</p><p>Three frameworks. One spectrum. One disaster.</p><p>The emergency manager from the RACES county was not arguing that his structure was correct and the others were wrong. He was arguing that his county knew who was coming when he made the call and that was what mattered when need was there.</p><blockquote>XX1EM margin note: Three structures in one room. RACES: county registered, civil defense authority, defined activation chain. ARES: League structure, served agency relationship quality varies. AUXCOM: DHS framework, state embraced, credentialing documented, grant-compatible. All three valid. All three incomplete without the other two. The county that has all three talking to each other before the event is the county that keeps the link alive during it. Filed under: structure serves the mission when the structure knows what the mission is. The disaster does not care which framework the operator belongs to.</blockquote><h3>Serve the Agency</h3><p>The emergency manager had one more thing to say before he yielded the floor.</p><p>He said it quietly. Without drama.</p><p>Amateur radio operators serve the served agency. Not the other way around.</p><p>Serving the agency meant serving the agency’s mission. Not the operator’s preferred mode. Not the operator’s preferred frequency. The agency had a mission. The operator’s job was to support that mission by whatever means the mission required.</p><p>Which sometimes meant operating on frequencies that were not amateur frequencies. The served agency might need support on their licensed channels, on interoperability frequencies, on whatever the incident communications plan specified.</p><p>And sometimes — he paused here — sometimes what the agency needed had nothing to do with radio at all.</p><p>Sometimes the agency needed someone to make copies.</p><p>The room was quiet for a moment.</p><p>He let it be quiet.</p><p>The operator who arrived at the EOC and stood at the copier because that was what the EOC needed at that moment — that operator understood the mission. That operator would be called again.</p><p>The operator who refused the copier because they had not driven to the EOC to make copies — that operator had answered a question nobody had asked. About whose needs they were actually serving.</p><h3>The Thought That Did Not Get Said Out Loud</h3><p>XX1EM heard it anyway. He usually did.</p><p>Nobody said it out loud. But the thought moved through certain parts of the room the way thoughts do when they are shared without being spoken. A slight shift in posture. A jaw that did not quite unclench. A man in the third row who had been nodding along until the copier and was now looking at a point slightly above the presenter’s head.</p><p>XX1EM knew the thought because the thought was not entirely wrong.</p><p>The operator in the third row had, in many cases, forgotten more about radio communications than anyone currently employed in that EOC would ever learn. He had been doing this for thirty years. He had deployed in actual disasters. He had kept links alive when the infrastructure failed and gone home without a press release and showed up again the next time.</p><p>He was not wrong about what he knew.</p><p>He was wrong about what that knowledge entitled him to.</p><p>The EOC was not a radio club. The emergency manager was not the net control. The people in that EOC were managing the response. The resource requests. The shelter populations. The mutual aid agreements. The decision about whether to evacuate the sector that nobody had made yet because the information was still incomplete.</p><p>The operator’s job was to help them do that.</p><p>EX1L had a note in his file on the operator in the third row. Not a long note. Just the callsign and the observation.</p><p><em>Knows more than most. Knows it.</em></p><p>Two sentences. Everything EX1L needed.</p><blockquote>XX1EM margin note: The thought that did not get said out loud. Observed in approximately one third of the room. The thought is not entirely wrong. The conclusion the thought reaches is wrong. Knowing more about radio than the people in the EOC does not determine whose emergency it is. It has never determined whose emergency it is. EX1L has a file on the operators who cannot make peace with this. The file is not small. Filed under: expertise without humility is a capability the served agency cannot use.</blockquote><h3>It Is Always About the Relationships</h3><p>The emergency manager had one final thing. The thing that did not require elaboration because it was already complete.</p><p>It is always about the relationships. The trust. The showing up.</p><p>Not the equipment. Not the license class. Not the organizational structure or the credentialing framework or which of the three acronyms applied in this jurisdiction.</p><p>The relationships. The trust. The showing up.</p><p>The relationship was built before the disaster. In the months and years when nothing was happening. Built at the exercise that only twelve people attended and the after action review that only eight people stayed for and the coffee afterward that only three people had time for and the conversation in the parking lot that lasted forty-five minutes and produced nothing documentable but established something that no credential could replace.</p><p>The trust came not from the credential. The credential said the operator had passed an exam. The relationship said the operator could be handed a problem at the wrong moment under the wrong conditions with incomplete information and would handle it in a way that served the mission and not themselves.</p><p>Those were not the same statement. One of them fit in a database. The other one only existed in the memory of the people who had been in the room together before the room mattered.</p><p>And the showing up.</p><p>The showing up at the exercise nobody prioritized. The showing up at the EOC on a slow activation where nothing happened for six hours and the operator sat at their position and stayed current on the net and was ready and the readiness was never called upon and the operator went home without having used their radio and came back the next time anyway.</p><p>That operator was the reason the emergency manager had gone home from the forty minute activation and studied for his General class exam.</p><p>Because that operator had been in the room. Had been part of the team. Had shown up.</p><p>XX1EM had been writing about this since before emergency management was a profession. The thing underneath all of it had not changed.</p><p>It was always about the relationships. The trust. The showing up.</p><p>Everything else was a tool. Tools were useful. Tools mattered. But tools did not show up. Tools did not build trust. Tools did not remember that they had been in the room before the room mattered.</p><p>People did.</p><p>Hams did.</p><p>The ones who understood whose emergency it was.</p><blockquote>XX1EM margin note: Final point from the session. The relationships. The trust. The showing up. This is the doctrine. Not the equipment. Not the structure. Not the credential. Filed under: the doctrine has not changed. It has never changed. The tools change. The frequencies change. The modes change. The frameworks change. The relationships and the trust and the showing up have been the answer since before there was a question to answer. This is the whole report. Everything else is footnotes.</blockquote><h3>The Next Room</h3><p>The emergency manager gathered his notes at the end of the session.</p><p>XX1EM watched him do it with the particular attention he reserved for moments that were not endings but transitions. The forum room at Hamvention was not this man’s final destination. It was a waypoint.</p><p>The International Association of Emergency Managers conference. The room that did not contain amateur radio operators. The room that contained the people who wrote the plans and managed the EOCs and made the decisions about which capabilities got integrated into the response architecture and which ones got a polite acknowledgment and a footnote in the annex.</p><p>That room had been watching the same videos.</p><p>He was going to the IAEM conference with the same message he had delivered in Room 2 at Hamvention. Stripped of the organizational arguments. Just the operational truth.</p><p>When the internet is down and the cells are dead and the Starlink dish has lost its sky view and the FirstNet tower is on battery reserve and the message needs to get through — the ham with the radio and the wire antenna and the battery and the thirty years of practice in exactly these conditions is the one who gets it through.</p><p>Not because amateur radio is a legacy system that has survived past its relevance. Because it is a capability that does not depend on the infrastructure that disasters destroy.</p><p>That was not a hobby argument. That was an emergency management argument. It belonged in the language of the profession, delivered by someone who spoke that language natively, to the people who wrote the plans.</p><p>He was one of them. He was going to tell them what he knew.</p><p>The ham radio community had been making this case for years in rooms that already agreed with it. He was going to make it in the room that wrote the plans.</p><p>That was the difference.</p><p>XX1EM sat for a moment after the session cleared.</p><p>The after action report on this session was going to be short. The lessons observed column was not the long one this time.</p><p>Some things did not go in the margin. They went in the body of the text. And then you sat with them for a moment before moving on.</p><blockquote>XX1EM margin note: Post-session. The emergency manager’s next stop is the IAEM conference. The room that writes the plans. He is not carrying the ham radio community’s argument. He is carrying the profession’s argument back to the profession. Filed under: the right messenger. The right room. The message already existed. It needed someone who could walk into that room and be heard as one of them. Filed also under: the good entries. The very good entries. The hobby did not send him. The mission did.</blockquote><h3>The Capability Is Larger Than the Organization</h3><p>Not every ham wanted to do organized emergency communications.</p><p>This was not a failure of the hobby. It was not a recruitment problem to be solved. It was simply true. The hobby was large enough and varied enough to contain operators who had no interest in ARES rosters and credentialing pathways and activation protocols. Who had gotten their license for the contesting or the POTA activations or the kit building or the sheer technical pleasure of understanding how radio worked and making it work better.</p><p>Those operators were not lesser hams.</p><p>But the contester who had spent twenty years optimizing for rate under pressure had developed skills directly transferable to emergency communications. The POTA activator who had deployed from a different park every weekend for three seasons knew how to make a wire antenna work in whatever trees were available and power a radio from whatever battery they had carried in. The DXer who had learned to copy weak signals through noise and interference could hold a frequency under stress in a way that took most new ARES members years to develop.</p><p>The skills were there. Distributed across the hobby in operators who had developed them for entirely different reasons.</p><p>The smart Emergency Coordinators knew this.</p><p>They had planned for the hams who were not on the roster. Not as an afterthought. As a deliberate architectural decision. The standing team was the foundation. But the foundation was not the building.</p><p>The building included the contester who got a call from the EC on day two of a major activation and showed up with a station that outperformed anything on the standing roster and ran traffic for fourteen hours because that was what he did. The POTA activator who deployed to the sector that had lost all fixed infrastructure and set up in forty minutes because she had set up in worse conditions for less important reasons. The DXer who took the weak signal position that nobody else wanted because weak signals were where he lived.</p><p>Those operators were not on the ICS org chart going into the activation.</p><p>They were on the phone list. The one the smart EC kept separate from the official roster. The one that said: when the standing team needs depth, these are the operators who can provide it.</p><p>That list was not in any ARRL publication. It existed in the EC’s knowledge of their community and their willingness to think about the capability as larger than the organization.</p><p>The relationship still mattered. The EC who had spent a year going to the contesting club’s meeting once and the POTA group’s activation twice and introducing themselves as someone who might need help someday — that EC had built something that did not appear on any roster but was real and available.</p><p>The hobby produces the capability. The organization deploys it. These are not the same function.</p><blockquote>XX1EM margin note: The capability is larger than the organization. Always has been. The standing ARES roster is the foundation. The contester, the POTA activator, the DXer — those operators are the building. The smart EC knows who they are. Has the phone list. Has shown up to their events once or twice with no agenda except the introduction. Filed under: the capability is the community. The organization serves the community. Not the other way around. This is also the doctrine.</blockquote><h3>The Index Cards</h3><p>XX1EM spent twenty minutes at one table.</p><p>An older ham. Military bearing, though he did not announce it. Selling a careful selection of go-kit components. Not cleaning out a shack. Selecting from a shack. Each piece chosen because it was worth passing on to someone who would use it.</p><p>Every item had an index card.</p><p>Not a price tag. An index card. Handwritten. The piece, what it did, what it connected to, what the buyer would need to make it work. The relevant specifications. One known issue, if there was one, stated plainly. The approximate age. His assessment of the condition.</p><p>Nobody had asked him to write the cards. No rule required it. He simply believed that whoever bought the piece deserved to know what they were buying, and that the knowledge he had accumulated about each component was part of what he was selling, and that a buyer who understood the equipment was more likely to use it well than a buyer who had to figure it out from scratch.</p><p>That was the whole reasoning. Written on index cards. At a flea market table. In Xenia, Ohio.</p><p>XX1EM did not buy anything at that table. He stayed twenty minutes and asked several questions and listened to the answers and left knowing more about the state of go-kit component availability and the practical realities of battery chemistry aging than the previous quarter of technical reading had provided.</p><p>The hobby is its people. Not its equipment. The man with the index cards was the same figure who wound wire around an oatmeal box. Who built the Heathkit from the instructions and understood the circuit by the time he finished. Who showed up at Field Day before the sun came up and stayed until it all went back in the trailer.</p><p>He was also, XX1EM noted, exactly the kind of operator the ARES session had been describing. The knowledge written on the index cards was not just technical knowledge. It was the knowledge of someone who had thought carefully about what the next person would need. Who had considered the mission before the transaction.</p><p>That operator had been making copies without being asked for decades.</p><p>He just called them index cards.</p><blockquote>XX1EM margin note: Index card table. Twenty minutes. No purchase. Significant intelligence on go-kit component availability, battery chemistry degradation timelines, and connector compatibility across equipment generations. The index cards were the visible surface of something much deeper. The operator who writes down what he knows so the next person starts better has understood the mission. Not the radio mission. The larger one. Filed under: the most valuable conversations at any hamfest are not in the session rooms. They are at the tables where somebody wrote down what they know and waited for someone to ask.</blockquote><h3>Parking</h3><p>There was one advantage that the hobby rule did not address.</p><p>The hobby rule was specific. No heavenly powers during hobby time. What you could do as a mortal with mortal equipment and mortal skill — that was the hobby. The rest stayed outside.</p><p>The rest stayed outside <em>the hobby</em>.</p><p>Parking at Hamvention was not the hobby.</p><p>To be precise about the advantage: it was not the parking. The parking at the Greene County Fairgrounds was, by the standards of an event drawing thirty-five thousand operators to a mid-sized Ohio fairground, adequate. Once you were there. The lots were managed. The volunteers directing traffic within the grounds knew what they were doing.</p><p>The parking was fine.</p><p>The traffic getting to the parking was something else entirely.</p><p>US Route 35 on a Hamvention morning was its own activation. The operators who had planned their departure carefully and left forty-five minutes early were sitting in the backup with the operators who had not planned carefully and left fifteen minutes late and the result was the same for both of them because the variable was not their planning. The variable was thirty-five thousand operators and the road network of Greene County, Ohio.</p><p>A1Ω had not experienced this. Neither had XX1EM. Neither had XX1WX.</p><p>They had each been at the fairgrounds at whatever time the fairgrounds needed them to be at the fairgrounds. The mechanism of arrival had not involved US Route 35 in any direction or the intersection that backed up every year at the same point for the same reason.</p><p>They had simply been there.</p><p>Which was, all things considered, a significantly better way to arrive.</p><p>The hobby rule was clear. No powers during the hobby.</p><p>Getting to the hobby was a different matter.</p><p>The rule had been written by someone who understood the distinction completely and had chosen the boundary with care.</p><blockquote>XX1EM margin note: Arrival. Traffic on US Route 35: not experienced. Parking once on grounds: adequate, volunteers competent, layout functional. The advantage was not the parking space. The advantage was the absence of the forty minutes of traffic that preceded the parking space. The operators who hiked from Young’s Jersey Dairy arrived in good spirits. They always do. This is also in the report. Filed under: the rule governs the hobby. Arrival is logistics. Logistics were handled. The boundary was chosen carefully. It always is.</blockquote><h3>Filed</h3><p>XX1EM submitted the after action report on Hamvention 2026.</p><p>Not on the drive home. XX1EM did not drive. He was simply elsewhere when he was done being at Hamvention and the report was complete in the way that reports become complete before the writing happens — the observations settled, the margin notes in order, the lessons observed and lessons learned columns sorted.</p><p>He noted this without comment. Some advantages of the role were worth acknowledging quietly and not discussing further.</p><p>The report was filed before the last operator had reached their car in the parking lot.</p><p>A1Ω: present. Food area. POTA tent. Corridor conversations. ARRL 250 shirt. Lifetime member, original category. Pork tenderloin. Hobby rule: full compliance. Five watts. The uncertainty intact.</p><p>EX1L: present. Productive weekend by his metrics. The metrics were not XX1EM’s metrics. They were in a separate file. The file was current.</p><p>XX1WX: present. SKYWARN booth. Among the spotters. Listening. Not announced. Never announced. The spotters were doing good work. Someone was paying attention to that. The right someone.</p><p>XX1EM: present. Day two. FEMA reform report reviewed. Lightning session missed. Lightning not a concern. ARRL area visited. Leadership present and in the conversations. ARES forum session attended. Lessons learned column not empty. Emergency manager noted for the IAEM conference. Flea market observed. Index cards: twenty minutes. Meshtastic node: one, deployment plan pending experimentation. Headsets: acquired. Coax jumpers: acquired. New radios: none. Sandwich: half of one, shared.</p><p>The hobby is in reasonable condition at the ground level. The institutional debates continue and will continue. The capability is larger than the organization and the smart coordinators know it. The public service events are the pipeline. The index card operator is the whole doctrine in one table in the third aisle. The emergency manager is going to the IAEM conference with the message the profession needs to hear from someone the profession will recognize.</p><p>The YLs are on the air. The log already knew this.</p><p>A1Ω was in the food area. EX1L was in the flea market. XX1WX was at the SKYWARN booth. The hams are good people.</p><p>This was one of the good hamfests.</p><p>The report is filed.</p><p>XX1EM is back on frequency.</p><blockquote>XX1EM final margin note: Hamvention 2026. Observed. Reported. Filed. The hobby is harder to kill than it looks. The doctrine has not changed. The tools change. The people show up. The relationship is built before the disaster. The trust is earned through the showing up when nothing is happening. The capability is the community. The organization serves the community. The message needs to get through. When the internet is down and the cells are dead and the Starlink dish has lost its sky view and the FirstNet tower is on battery reserve — the ham with the radio and the wire antenna and the battery and the thirty years of practice in exactly these conditions is the one who gets it through. Because they were in the room before the room mattered. Because they showed up. Because it is always about the relationships. The trust. The showing up.</blockquote><blockquote>It has always been about the relationships. The trust. The showing up.</blockquote><blockquote>This is the whole report.</blockquote><p><strong>73 de XX1EM</strong></p><p><em>The Book of Raphael is an ongoing series on Medium.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=db75c2ce9f22" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The President’s Council to Assess the Federal Emergency Management Agency, May 7, 2026 — Final…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@craig_40068/the-presidents-council-to-assess-the-federal-emergency-management-agency-may-7-2026-final-06ff85e65a50?source=rss-255a06ff6e1c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/06ff85e65a50</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Craig Fugate]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 12 May 2026 17:04:15 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-05-12T17:04:15.863Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><em>The President’s Council to Assess the Federal Emergency Management Agency, May 7, 2026 — Final Draft</em></h3><h3>Before the Briefing</h3><p>God was looking at the earth.</p><p>Not at the report. Not at the council. Not at the ten recommendations or the seventy-five pages or the thirteen thousand public comments. He understood the 10 recommendations. The 10 Commandments followed a similar structure. The difference was that the Commandments were not recommendations, though some folk had always treated them that way.</p><p><em>I made storms, God said to no one in particular.</em></p><p>He had been saying it more often. From Andrew to Katrina to Maria. Since the moment the federal government looked at $27 billion in losses and sixteen insolvent insurance companies and a coastal development pattern that had been building toward exactly this outcome and said: we will pay for this.</p><p><em>I made the storm, He said again. I did not make the disaster.</em></p><p>The storm was a feature of the climate system He had designed. Pressure gradients. Sea surface temperatures. The Coriolis effect. The energy transfer between warm water and atmosphere. Elegant engineering. The storm moved heat from the tropics toward the poles. It had been doing this since before humans existed and would continue doing it long after. The storm was not the problem.</p><p>The problem was the decision — made incrementally, collectively, over decades, by developers and county commissioners and state legislators and federal program managers and insurance actuaries and mortgage underwriters and individual families looking for affordable coastal living — to build in the storm’s path in ways that required someone else to pay when the storm arrived.</p><p>And then to call it an act of God.</p><p><em>That phrase, God thought, has always bothered me.</em></p><p>An act of God. Legal terminology. Insurance terminology. The thing that happens that nobody could have predicted and nobody is responsible for. Force majeure. Beyond human control.</p><p>The storm was the same storm. The disaster was larger every time. This was not an act of God. This was a policy outcome.</p><p>God was thinking about all of this when Michael knocked.</p><h3>Outside the Door</h3><p>Michael found Raphael in the corridor with a report under his arm and the expression of someone who had been doing this long enough to know how it ends.</p><p>“The FEMA Review Council final report,” Raphael said. “May 7th. Ten recommendations. A year of work. Thirteen thousand public comments.”</p><p>Michael took it. Looked at the cover. The tornado wreckage. The torn flag. Turned to the table of contents with the efficiency of someone who reads executive summaries for a living and has done so across multiple civilizations.</p><p>“Locally executed,” Michael said. “State managed. Federally supported.” “That’s the doctrine.” “It was the doctrine in 1950.” Michael handed it back. “How many does this make.”</p><p>It was not really a question.</p><p>“On reforming federal disaster response specifically,” Raphael said, “or emergency management broadly.” “Either. Both.” “Enough,” Raphael said, “that we should know the answer by now.”</p><p>Michael was quiet for a moment.</p><p>“He’s been looking at Florida,” Michael said.</p><p>Raphael absorbed this. “Since Andrew?” “Since Andrew,” Michael said. “Today is worse than usual because the report landed and it doesn’t ask the question He’s been waiting thirty-four years for someone to ask in an official document.” “Which question.”</p><p>“Why,” Michael said simply. “Not how do we pay for it better. Why are we paying for it at all. Why did we build there that way. Why did we tell the market its price signal was wrong. Why did we call it an act of God and hand the bill to the federal taxpayer and then express surprise when Florida kept building.” He paused. “He made the storm. He’s tired of getting credit for the disaster.”</p><p>Raphael looked at the report. “The report doesn’t ask that,” he said.</p><p>“Neither does the House bill,” Michael said. “Neither has any report. That’s why He’s been looking at Florida for thirty-four years.” He stepped aside. “He’ll see you. He wants to hear the report. He also wants you to know He already knows what’s missing from it.”</p><p>“He always knows.” “Today it seems to matter more than usual,” Michael said quietly. “I think it’s the phrase. Act of God. It’s in the insurance policies. It’s in the legal language. It’s been in every disaster declaration since the beginning.” He paused. “He didn’t create the vulnerability. He created the storm. There’s a difference and nobody’s putting it in a report.”</p><p>Raphael looked at the door. “Why doesn’t He just tell them what to do,” Raphael said.</p><p>Michael looked at him.</p><p>“Render unto Caesar,” Michael said simply. “The storm is His. The disaster is theirs. The commission is theirs. The reform is theirs. He’ll observe what He sees. What they do with it is their jurisdiction.” He paused. “He made them capable of governing themselves. The governments they create from their own self-determination are part of the design. The fact that they keep calling their policy outcomes acts of God is what troubles Him. Not that they govern badly. That they won’t own it.”</p><p>Raphael went in.</p><h3>The Briefing</h3><p>God looked up from Florida.</p><p><em>The FEMA report.</em></p><p>“You’ve seen it.”</p><p><em>I’ve seen all of them. The pause contained the Hoover Commission, the post-Andrew task force, the Witt reforms, the Post-Katrina Reform Act, and several decades of GAO high-risk list designations. How many does this make.</em></p><p>“Michael asked the same thing.”</p><p><em>Michael always asks the right questions. It’s why I keep him. God gestured at the chair. Before you start. I want to say something about Andrew.</em></p><p>Raphael sat. He had not been expecting this. He set the report on the table and waited.</p><p><em>Hurricane Andrew was not an act of God. None of them were.</em></p><p>Raphael said nothing.</p><p><em>It was a storm. I made the storm. I made the pressure gradients and the sea surface temperatures and the Coriolis effect and the energy transfer that moves heat from the tropics toward the poles. That system has been operating since before humans existed. It will operate long after. The storm is not the problem. The storm has always been there. Every June. Reliable as sunrise. The Calusa knew. The Spanish learned. The early settlers learned. Everyone who paid attention to the climate system I designed knew or learned, often the hard way.</em></p><p><em>What changed was not the storm.</em></p><p><em>What changed was what humans built in the storm’s path. And then what happened when the storm arrived and the bill came due.</em></p><p>“The federal response,” Raphael said.</p><p><em>Twenty-seven billion dollars just for Hurricane Andrew. Sixteen insolvent insurance companies. A development pattern that had been building toward exactly that outcome for forty years. And the federal government looked at all of it and said: we will pay for this. I understand why. The people were suffering. The images were devastating. The political pressure was real. The impulse was genuinely compassionate. But compassion applied without wisdom changes behavior. And the behavior it changed was not where and how Florida built. It was whether Florida believed someone else would pay the next time.</em></p><p>“And Florida kept building,” Raphael said.</p><p><em>Of course it did. The beaches are still the beaches. The weather is still the weather. Everything that makes Florida worth living in was still there after Andrew. What was also there was the hurricane season. June through November. Every year. As it has always been. But the price signal that should have said this is too expensive to build here, too risky to insure here, too exposed to be sustainable without subsidy — that signal was muffled by the federal response. Not eliminated. Muffled. Just enough to keep the development going. Just enough to keep the exposure growing. Just enough to make the next storm hit a larger and more vulnerable built environment than the previous one.</em></p><p>“The storm was the same storm,” Raphael said quietly.</p><p><em>The disaster was larger every time. God looked at the report on the table. That is not an act of God. That is a policy outcome. And I am tired of being credited for it.</em></p><p>A long silence.</p><p><em>The report. Walk me through it. Not because I don’t know what’s in it. Because I want to hear what’s not in it said out loud by someone who read it carefully.</em></p><p><em>And I want to hear what the authority they already have — in the Stafford Act, in the CFR, in the regulations sitting in Title 44 right now — would allow them to do without waiting for the next commission. What Caesar has and hasn’t used is a different accounting than what Caesar wishes he had.</em></p><h3>The Setup</h3><p>“The doctrine first,” Raphael said. “Locally executed, state managed, federally supported. That’s the frame for all ten recommendations.”</p><p><em>Historically and politically consistent with the federal system. The Tenth Amendment. The tradition of states as primary responders. The federal government in a supporting role. That tradition predates the modern emergency management framework by a century and a half. The question is what supporting came to mean.</em></p><p>“It came to mean paying for the losses,” Raphael said. “That’s the whole report. Seventy-five pages about who writes the check and how fast the check clears.” He paused. “The leadership framing is easier to sell than the funding rebalancing framing. So they went with leadership.”</p><blockquote><em>In the margin, Lucifer wrote: I couldn’t have framed it better myself. The word leadership is doing the work that the word subsidy would do if anyone were being direct.</em></blockquote><p>“The engagement was genuine,” Raphael continued. “11,708 public comments through Federal Register Notice. 1,387 SLTT agencies surveyed. All fifty states and territories engaged directly. Listening sessions in thirteen cities. Four sessions with tribal nations. They went to Asheville a year after Helene. San Juan nine years after Maria.”</p><p><em>I know those places. The people who wrote this cared about it.</em></p><p>“That’s not the problem.”</p><p><em>No. The problem is what they were asked to solve. Walk me through it.</em></p><h3>Before the Ten Recommendations: The Question Neither Document Asks</h3><p>Raphael set down the council report and picked up his notes on the Fixing FEMA Act.</p><p>“There are two documents relevant to this briefing,” he said. “The council report delivered today — an executive branch advisory document. Ten recommendations. Directions and minimum actions required. No statutory language. No appropriations. No implementation mechanism of its own. Public comments open through June 8th.” He paused. “And H.R. 4669. The Fixing Emergency Management for Americans Act of 2025. Introduced by Chairman Sam Graves, Republican of Missouri, and Ranking Member Rick Larsen, Democrat of Washington. Bipartisan. Passed committee 57 to 3. Forty-six co-sponsors. Awaiting a floor vote. No Senate companion bill.”</p><p><em>Two vehicles. Same problem.</em></p><p>“With meaningful differences in how they solve it. And one critical thing they both share.” Raphael looked up. “Neither asks why the federal taxpayer is the primary recovery tool. Neither asks when that happened. Neither asks whether it should be true.” He paused. “Both assume it is true and design around it.”</p><p><em>When did it become true.</em></p><p>“Incrementally. No single moment where the nation openly acknowledged what had happened. Congress voted repeatedly — the Disaster Relief Act, the Stafford Act, supplemental appropriations after every major event. What never happened was a vote on the underlying question. Whether the federal government should be the primary recovery engine. Whether that was the right role. Whether the country understood what it was committing to.” Raphael opened his notes. “The first time Congress acted was 1803. A fire in Portsmouth, New Hampshire. The relief wasn’t for the people who lost their homes. It was a moratorium on the collection of debts that merchants owed to U.S. Customs. The federal government’s first disaster act protected commerce. Not people.”</p><p>He continued through the history: the New York City fire of 1835, Chicago in 1871, Galveston in 1900, San Francisco in 1906. Each time the scale was large enough, Congress acted. Each time the precedent grew slightly larger than the event that created it. The Mississippi flood of 1927 was the first time the federal government directly assisted in disaster response and recovery. The Disaster Relief Act of 1974 established presidential declarations. The Stafford Act in 1988 systematized and expanded them. Declarations became routine. More frequent. Lower threshold. Broader eligibility. The framers of that legislation would not have recognized what it became.</p><p>“Over two centuries of exceptional measures that stopped being exceptional, the federal government moved from bystander to backstop to primary. Nobody decided this. It accumulated.”</p><p><em>And insurance.</em></p><p>“Insurance was the primary recovery tool in 1950. Private carriers. State-regulated. Risk priced by actuaries. Development patterns constrained by coverage availability and premium cost.” Raphael paused. “The NFIP in 1968 was actually an attempt to keep insurance as the primary tool in flood zones where private carriers wouldn’t go. The intent was to use insurance markets to manage flood risk. The execution produced subsidized premiums that made floodplain development artificially cheap. More development followed the cheap insurance into the floodplain. More losses followed the development. More claims followed the losses. The debt followed the claims. Twenty billion dollars of debt and counting.”</p><p><em>The price signal.</em></p><p>“Suppressed. Not eliminated. The federal commitment and the subsidized insurance together created a situation where the true cost of building in high-risk areas was not visible to the people making the building decisions.” Raphael looked at his notes. “From a pure actuarial standpoint, the private insurance market is pricing risk more aggressively than it once did. Reinsurance cycles. Litigation environments — Florida in particular. Climate model uncertainty that makes long-tail exposure genuinely difficult to price. State regulatory structures that constrain what carriers can charge. All of it is real.” He paused. “What is also real is that the honest price is unaffordable in the most exposed places, because the risk in the most exposed places is genuinely very high. The unaffordable price produces dropped coverage. The dropped coverage produces gaps in recovery. The gaps go to FEMA.” He paused. “FEMA gets blamed for being slow. A commission is appointed. A report is produced.”</p><p><em>The report on the table.</em></p><p>“Which addresses how FEMA responds when insurance falls short. Not why insurance falls short so often. Not why the private market has increasingly retreated from the highest-risk exposures. Not why states and local governments have transferred risk to the federal taxpayer rather than working with the private sector to manage it through capital markets.” Raphael closed his notes. “FEMA was supposed to fill the gaps — to supplement insurance and other recovery mechanisms when they proved insufficient. Over time it became part of the recovery expectation. Insured. Underinsured. Disputed. Delayed. Deductibles too large to absorb. The gaps multiplied and the federal role expanded to fill them, and at some point the gap and the expectation became the same thing. The council report does not ask how that happened.”</p><p><em>The market question.</em></p><p>“By producing a federal backstop at relatively low levels — low enough that it doesn’t make survivors whole but high enough to suppress the urgency of maintaining private coverage — has the federal government created a moral hazard that prevents the markets from pricing risk in a way that changes behavior?” Raphael said it plainly. “Where and how we build. Rather than merely regulating how we pay for it after it fails.”</p><p>God looked at him.</p><p><em>That is the question.</em></p><p>“It is not in either document.”</p><p><em>It has not been in any document.</em></p><p>“No.”</p><p><em>Say why.</em></p><p>Raphael was quiet for a moment.</p><p>“Because the people who would have to answer it are the people who benefit from not answering it,” he said. “The developers who built the subdivisions. The county commissioners who permitted them. The state legislators who set the building codes. The mortgage industry that underwrote the loans because the NFIP made the properties insurable. The insurance industry that collected premiums until the exposure got too large and then exited, leaving the NFIP holding the policies.” He paused. “And the federal officials who kept expanding the commitment because the alternative — telling survivors that the federal government wouldn’t help — was politically impossible.” He looked up. “None of those people vote for the person who asks the question. All of them vote for the person who sends FEMA.”</p><p><em>And so we are here.</em></p><p>“And so we are here.”</p><blockquote><em>In the margin, Lucifer wrote: I want to be clear about something. I did not create the moral hazard. The moral hazard emerged from a series of genuinely compassionate decisions made by genuinely well-intentioned people over seventy-five years. I simply recognized what it was producing and made myself useful to the ecosystem that grew around it. There is a difference between authorship and stewardship and I want credit for the distinction.</em></blockquote><h3>The Three Audiences</h3><p>“Before the recommendations,” Raphael said, “you need to know there are three groups receiving this document simultaneously. They are not reading the same report.”</p><p><em>Go.</em></p><p>“The true believers. Some of them are on the council itself. They believe this is the document that finally gets it right. The diagnosis is correct. The engagement was genuine. They mean it completely.” Raphael paused. “They meant it the previous times too.”</p><p><em>The second group.</em></p><p>“The pragmatic middle. Larger. The serious state emergency management directors. The career federal staff. The practitioners who have been in the EOCs and know what the seven-phase PA process costs in human terms. The congressional staffers who have been working this issue for years. They are reading the report right now sorting it into three piles. Things that move. Things that need a bill. Things that needed a bill the last time someone recommended them.”</p><p><em>The third group.</em></p><p>“More complicated than they’re usually described.” Raphael set down his notes. “Some are pure obstruction. Protecting contracts. Protecting turf. Protecting the status quo because the status quo pays $300 an hour in Florida and $100 an hour was adequate in 2018.” He paused. “But a larger and more legitimate subset looks at this report and asks a reasonable question.”</p><p><em>Which is.</em></p><p>“Why are we starting over. The House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee released H.R. 4669 in July 2025 — while the council was still taking testimony. Bipartisan. Regular order. Practitioner input. It passed committee 57 to 3. Forty-six co-sponsors. It’s waiting on the House floor.” He paused. “The council report was delivered today. Eight months after the committee vote. The committee with actual jurisdiction over the Stafford Act did not feel it needed to wait for the executive branch to tell it what to do.”</p><p><em>Two vehicles.</em></p><p>“With a critical difference. The Fixing FEMA Act is legislation. Statutory language. Defined timelines. Specific authorities. The council report is an advisory document. It cannot appropriate money. It cannot amend the Stafford Act. It cannot change a regulation without a rulemaking that hasn’t started yet.” Raphael looked up. “The council report tells you where to go. The Fixing FEMA Act has drawn the map, gotten in the car, and passed committee. It is waiting for someone to schedule the floor vote.”</p><p><em>And neither one asks why we’re paying for it.</em></p><p>“Neither one,” Raphael agreed.</p><h3>The Ten Recommendations</h3><p><strong>Recommendation One: Equip States to Lead</strong></p><p><em>Which they already do.</em></p><p>“Since 1787. The Tenth Amendment did not get repealed between the last commission and this one.” Raphael paused. “The National Qualification System they want to modernize was established in 2012. The resource typing has existed since the early 2000s. Every after-action review since Katrina has included a version of this recommendation. The difference between this one and the previous ones is the specific acronym for the governing board.” He paused. “Policy. No legislation. Theoretically moves. Requires convening a governing board of federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial stakeholders to agree on national minimum standards.”</p><blockquote><em>In the margin, Lucifer wrote: the governing board meeting schedule alone is a procurement. Catering not included. The sandwiches are always the same.</em></blockquote><p>The deeper problem: whether equipping states to lead disaster response changes what they’re leading toward. A state that administers RAPID efficiently and rebuilds the same courthouse in the same flood zone with better paperwork has led disaster response effectively by every metric in this recommendation. The metric doesn’t measure the direction. Only the administration of it.</p><p><strong>Recommendation Two: Enhance Critical Federal Programs</strong></p><p><em>This is the federal role as the Stafford Act intended it.</em></p><p>“Preserve USAR. NDMS. IPAWS. Radiological Emergency Preparedness. The Disaster Relief Fund. The coordination role.” Raphael paused. “Both documents agree completely. This is the federal role nobody disputes — the things states genuinely cannot maintain individually. The disagreement is about everything else. Whether the federal role extends from coordination to primary funding of rebuilding. That question is not in either document.”</p><blockquote><em>In the margin, Lucifer wrote: Recommendation Two is the whole legitimate federal role described in two paragraphs. The other nine recommendations are about what grew around it over seventy-five years.</em></blockquote><p><strong>Recommendation Three: Realign Declaration Thresholds</strong></p><p>“Raise the per capita indicator from $1.94 to $2.99. The report’s analysis: 29 percent of declarations between 2012 and 2025 would not have met the new threshold. Sixteen fewer per year. $113 million less annually.”</p><p><em>Regulatory. Lives in Title 44. Hasn’t moved in decades.</em></p><p>“Real signal even with modest savings. The threshold hasn’t been updated for inflation since the 1990s — not because Congress blocked it but because no administrator moved it. The signal points in the right direction for the wrong reason. It is being raised because the current level is too low relative to historical inflation. Not because anyone asked whether the declaration threshold should be tied to private insurance penetration and state risk management capacity.”</p><blockquote><em>In the margin, Lucifer wrote: the first governor denied under the new threshold holds a press conference. I have it on the calendar. It is a recurring appointment. I bring my own lunch.</em></blockquote><p><strong>Recommendation Four: Replace HMGP With R3P</strong></p><p>“Eliminate the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program. Two-phase replacement. R3P. Rapid Mitigation Advance within thirty days. Strategic Mitigation Allocation within six months. States manage it. Requires legislation.”</p><p>The Fixing FEMA Act handles mitigation differently — keeps the existing program structure, allows states to pre-approve mitigation projects, moves pre-disaster mitigation to a formula-based grant. The council report replaces HMGP. The Fixing FEMA Act reforms it. The council report doesn’t have a legislative vehicle. The Fixing FEMA Act is waiting on the House floor. That asymmetry is not a small thing.</p><p>Neither approach answers the prior question: whether mitigation funding changes where people build or only how they build after they’ve already built there. Mitigation is retrofitting. Elevating houses. Hardening roofs. All valuable. None of it answers whether the house should have been built in that location by someone who assumed federal assistance would be available if the mitigation proved insufficient.</p><blockquote><em>In the margin, Lucifer wrote: R3P. I’m keeping this one. The acronym alone justified the year of meetings.</em></blockquote><p><strong>Recommendation Five: Streamline Individual Assistance</strong></p><p>“Fifteen categories to one direct payment. The FAIR Program. Homeowners up to fifteen percent of assessed value capped at $150,000. Renters three to six months at HUD Fair Market Rate. Seventy-five percent federal share. Requires legislation.”</p><p>The overhead is real. $3.6 billion in administrative costs against $8.6 billion directly to survivors over five years. Thirty percent overhead. Average repair and replacement award $4,636. A senior career official in San Juan testified: <em>“I have 500 contracted employees that would not be needed if FEMA’s grant process was not so complex.”</em> The math is in the document.</p><p>The Fixing FEMA Act fixes the existing program rather than replacing it. The most significant difference: permanent repair authority. Current law limits FEMA to basic habitability — safe, sanitary, functional. The Fixing FEMA Act expands that to permanent repairs. Fix the house. Don’t park a trailer in the yard for six months and call it housing.</p><p>The assessed value ceiling in FAIR reveals the gap the report doesn’t name. A manufactured home in coastal Louisiana assessed at $90,000 produces $13,500 for a destroyed structure. That gap is not a FEMA design failure. That gap is the distance between what private insurance would have paid and what the federal backstop provides.</p><p>There is an implementation problem neither document names. The moment FAIR becomes law, there are two populations of survivors — those whose disasters predated the effective date still moving through the old system, and those whose disasters followed moving through FAIR. Same state. Same agency administering both. Different outcomes based entirely on declaration date. The press will find two survivors in the same county with the same storm damage in different programs. And they will write the story they will write. That is not a transition problem. That is a policy design problem.</p><blockquote><em>In the margin, Lucifer wrote: A new program is the correct answer. You cannot fix what is fundamentally broken by patching it. FAIR starts clean. New regulations. New implementing guidance. New training. New IT systems. New forms. New appeals processes. New consultants to explain all of the above to the states who have to administer it while simultaneously winding down the old program which does not stop having open cases simply because Congress renamed it. The chaos is not a bug. I want to be precise about that. The chaos is the opportunity. I simply show up when it does. Fixing the existing program has a disappointing track record from my perspective. It tends to produce actual change. I have learned to argue against it on principle. The principle being mine.</em></blockquote><p><strong>Recommendation Six: Reform Public Assistance — RAPID</strong></p><p>“The centerpiece. Parametric direct funding. Money within thirty days. States manage procurement under state rules. Fifty to seventy-five percent based on performance metrics. Two audits. Eight year closeout.”</p><p>More than 300,000 open projects on more than 600 active disasters. 25,000 projects have exceeded their timelines. $54.8 billion in unliquidated obligations. Over five years — $180 billion in PA grants. $32 billion to administer it. The report calls the agency bloated. What those numbers describe is a system where the process of recovery has become an industry in itself.</p><p>The Fixing FEMA Act uses actual cost estimates as the funding basis. RAPID uses parametric triggers — wind speed, earthquake magnitude. One pays for what happened. One pays for what the model predicts happened. The IG question runs opposite directions: the council report reduces federal IG involvement to two state-conducted audits; the Fixing FEMA Act requires annual IG reviews and reporting to Congress. Both documents are active simultaneously. Neither acknowledges the incompatibility.</p><p>What RAPID doesn’t address: whether faster payment of uninsured public facility losses changes the incentive to insure public facilities. The Stafford Act at Section 311 has required recipients to obtain and maintain insurance as a condition of assistance since 1988. The compliance rate is not cited in either document.</p><p><em>Why informative.</em></p><p>“Because if the compliance rate were good they would have cited it.”</p><blockquote><em>In the margin, Lucifer wrote: the Coronavirus Relief Fund was the parametric model’s closest precedent. It produced $8.1 billion in questioned costs. The report cites this as a cautionary tale and as the model. In the same document. I appreciate the consistency.</em></blockquote><p><strong>Recommendation Seven: Reform the NFIP</strong></p><p>“Over $20 billion in debt. Congress canceled $16 billion in 2017. It rebuilt. Interest payments $700 million annually. Maps from the 1970s. Congressional mandates require the program to be simultaneously affordable, actuarially sound, and universally available.”</p><p><em>The three impossible things.</em></p><p>“Before breakfast. The NFIP is where the moral hazard is most visible and most documented. The subsidized premiums made floodplain development artificially cheap. The artificially cheap development increased the exposure. The increased exposure increased the losses. The losses exceeded the premiums. The program borrowed from Treasury. Congress canceled the debt. The premiums stayed subsidized. The development continued.” He looked up. “Risk Rating 2.0 is the first honest attempt to price the actual risk. The honest price is producing exactly the response you’d expect. Members of Congress from flood-prone districts are trying to roll it back.”</p><p><em>Because their constituents can’t afford the honest price.</em></p><p>“Because the honest price of living in a flood zone is higher than the market that developed around the subsidized price can sustain. The council report states this in pieces across several sections without naming it as the central issue. The roundtable recommendation is the policy equivalent of suggesting someone with a broken leg take up yoga.”</p><blockquote><em>In the margin, Lucifer wrote: I have attended several NFIP roundtables. The shrimp cocktail is consistently excellent. The debt is consistently $20 billion. These two facts have coexisted for decades without apparent tension.</em></blockquote><p><strong>Recommendation Eight: Reduce Administrative Costs</strong></p><p>“Almost twenty-five cents on every dollar in administrative expenses. Cap overhead. Simplify programs. Extend cooling off periods.” Florida recovery consultant rates from $100 per hour in 2018 to nearly $300 now. The Fixing FEMA Act’s accountability mechanisms — GAO review, IG oversight, transparency requirements — are institutionally more durable than the council report’s reliance on state-conducted audits. One strengthens existing oversight infrastructure. One reduces it and replaces it with state accountability.</p><blockquote><em>In the margin, Lucifer wrote: I did not invent the revolving door. It predates federal contracting by several administrations. I keep the hinges oiled. Preventive maintenance is simply good stewardship of existing infrastructure.</em></blockquote><p><strong>Recommendation Nine: Revitalize National Partnership Network</strong></p><p>“Whole Community approach. Relocate the BEOC. Regional BEOCs. Technology for shared situational awareness. Policy change. Moves if someone makes it move.”</p><p><em>This is genuinely good.</em></p><p>“Yes. The private sector owns most of the critical infrastructure. Formalizing that integration is overdue.” Raphael paused. “It has the least resistance and the thinnest implementation detail. In emergency management those two things travel together more often than they should.”</p><blockquote><em>In the margin, Lucifer wrote: least exciting. Most likely to help someone. I try not to dwell on it. It disturbs my equilibrium.</em></blockquote><p><strong>Recommendation Ten: Transform the Agency</strong></p><p>“Close the chapter on FEMA. New name. Lean workforce. Rebalance headquarters to field. Two to three year transformation timeline.”</p><p><em>The name.</em></p><p>“This is the third time someone has tried to rename FEMA.” Raphael paused. “When Congress created DHS in 2002, the original plan was to dismantle FEMA and reconstitute it as the Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate. President Bush overruled it. FEMA kept its name but lost more than most people remember. The real damage came under Secretary Chertoff, when preparedness was separated from response and recovery. That is the FEMA that faced Katrina.” He paused. “The Post-Katrina Act of 2006 put it back together. Restored authorities. Restored direct access to the President. Kept the name because the name was the one thing that had survived intact.” He looked up. “Twenty years later the council has rediscovered the question the name change never resolved. The Fixing FEMA Act — whose title literally contains the word FEMA — has answered it in the title.”</p><p>The structural incompatibility: the Fixing FEMA Act removes FEMA from DHS and restores it as a cabinet-level independent agency reporting directly to the President. The council report transforms FEMA within the existing executive structure without resolving the DHS relationship. Both documents active simultaneously. Neither acknowledges the incompatibility.</p><p>The staffing incompatibility: at the start of FY2022, approximately 11,400 disaster employees against a staffing goal of 17,670 — roughly 35 percent below goal. The two-to-three year transformation timeline means the shortage continues during the transformation. The FY2026 appropriations language directs FEMA to maintain staffing levels necessary to fulfill its missions. FEMA will receive both instructions simultaneously.</p><blockquote><em>In the margin, Lucifer wrote: the name change generates a branding contract. The branding on legacy IT systems requires IT modernization. Eight figures minimum. The announcement creates the contract. I recognized this early enough to be useful to certain parties. This is called market awareness.</em></blockquote><h3>What Neither Document Addresses</h3><p>“Two things that will quietly undermine everything else.”</p><p><em>Go.</em></p><p>“FEMA was supposed to fill the gaps — to supplement insurance and other recovery mechanisms when they proved insufficient. Both documents improve how that supplemental role works. Neither addresses why the gaps keep growing. Neither asks why states and local governments have transferred risk to the federal taxpayer rather than managing it through the private sector and capital markets.” Raphael paused. “The private insurance market is responding to risk signals it had previously underpriced or socialized. The honest price in the most exposed places is unaffordable because the risk is genuinely very high. The unaffordable price produces dropped coverage, delayed claims, disputed losses, deductibles that survivors cannot absorb. The shortfall goes to whatever the agency is called this year.”</p><p><em>The second.</em></p><p>“Neither document changes where or how we build. The performance metrics in the council report reward efficient administration of disaster funds. The Fixing FEMA Act rewards mitigation investment on existing structures. Neither measures whether a state’s overall risk exposure is growing.” He turned the page. “The same courthouse in the same flood zone gets rebuilt with a certified process and a compliant outcome. It may be insured now. The obtain and maintain requirement says it must be. The compliance rate on the existing requirement is not cited in either document.”</p><p><em>Why not.</em></p><p>“Because if the compliance rate were good someone would have cited it.”</p><h3>What Was Not Asked — And What the Authority Already Allows</h3><p>“Since they have been subsidizing risk for so long,” Raphael said, “and so many people now live in high-risk areas who could not afford insurance or market prices — what happens to them.”</p><p><em>That is the question the report should have started with.</em></p><p><em>God was quiet. He looked at Florida. He did not answer.</em></p><p>Raphael understood. That question belonged to Caesar. God would observe what was. What ought to be done was a human decision, made by human governments, accountable to the people who had created them.</p><p>“There are two problems inside what everyone calls the federal disaster funding problem,” Raphael said. “The commission has treated them as one. They are not.”</p><p><em>Go.</em></p><p>“The first is a behavior problem. Subsidized risk has enabled decisions by people and institutions with choices — developers, insurers, state governments, upper-income coastal homeowners — that transferred their tail risk to the federal taxpayer. The price signal works when the person receiving it had options.</p><p>“The second is an equity problem. Low-income communities, communities of color, renters, the unbanked — many of them were sorted into high-risk areas by forces that had nothing to do with federal disaster policy. Redlining. Exclusionary zoning in lower-risk areas. Affordable housing that was affordable precisely because it was where nobody else wanted to build. The market did not fail them. It never served them. They are not in the floodplain because the federal government made it too cheap. They are in the floodplain because that was what was available.</p><p>“Those are different problems. Every commission that has treated them as the same problem has ended up with a report that either preserves the subsidy for people who don’t need it or removes it from people who can’t survive without it. Usually both.”</p><blockquote><em>In the margin, Lucifer wrote: I want to be credited for this one. The conflation of the behavior problem and the equity problem is among my finest work. It means every reform either preserves the moral hazard in the name of protecting the vulnerable or harms the vulnerable in the name of ending the moral hazard. The argument cancels itself. The commission meets again. The shrimp cocktail remains excellent.</em></blockquote><p><em>God listened. He said nothing. The decision was Caesar’s.</em></p><p>“What the existing authority already allows — without new legislation — is worth naming,” Raphael said. “Because the Stafford Act and Title 44 of the CFR contain tools that have not been used.”</p><p><em>Go.</em></p><p>“Individual Assistance was built as a safety net. Not a recovery program. That distinction is in the original congressional intent and it has been blurred by administrative expansion. The current overhead — thirty cents of every dollar in administration — is not a statutory requirement. It is an administrative accumulation. The authority to simplify it, consolidate categories, and move money faster exists within the current regulatory structure. It has not been exercised.</p><p>“The prioritization of low-income uninsured homeowners within the existing IA program is an administrative choice. The Stafford Act at Section 408 grants the administrator broad discretion in how assistance is structured and targeted. The program has drifted upward in income eligibility over time. That drift was not legislated. It accumulated through regulatory interpretation. It can be reversed the same way.</p><p>“The NFIP’s own enabling legislation — the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 — never required subsidized coverage for new construction in mapped flood zones. That practice accumulated through administrative interpretation. The program already distinguishes between pre-FIRM and post-FIRM structures. The authority to extend that distinction to new construction on previously undeveloped lots exists. It has not been used.</p><p>“The existing policyholders are a different matter. The families already in flood zones, many of whom had no realistic alternative, made decisions under rules that existed. The subsidy they receive is not a reward for a bad decision. It is the consequence of a system they did not design. The Stafford Act and the NFIP both contain provisions that could protect existing policyholders while ending new subsidized exposure. The fifty percent substantial damage rule already exists. The existing framework, administered consistently, moves the stock toward resilience over time without forcing anyone out immediately.</p><p>“For public facilities, Section 311 of the Stafford Act has required recipients to obtain and maintain insurance as a condition of Public Assistance since 1988. That requirement exists. An administrator who chose to enforce it — consistently, transparently, with clear consequences for non-compliance — would be acting entirely within existing statutory authority.</p><p>“The small projects threshold lives in regulation. It has not been updated for inflation in decades. Raising it to ten million dollars would capture most of the disaster cost with a fraction of the current overhead, preserve eligibility review, preserve the insurance determination, and move money faster. That action could be taken before the next disaster season. It has not been.”</p><p><em>God looked at him. He did not comment on the remedies. Those belonged to Caesar.</em></p><p><em>The observation was His. The storm was His. The disaster was theirs. The reform was theirs. What troubled Him was not that the tools were missing. The tools had been there. They were in Title 44. They were in the Stafford Act. They were in the regulatory record going back thirty years.</em></p><p><em>What troubled Him was that Caesar kept building commissions instead of reading the law he already had.</em></p><blockquote><em>In the margin, Lucifer wrote: The administrative inaction is not my work. I take no credit for it. The authority to simplify IA has existed for years. The authority to enforce Section 311 has existed since 1988. The authority to update the small projects threshold has existed since the regulation was written. Nobody asked me to keep them unused. They simply were not used. This is called institutional inertia. It is, I will admit, more reliable than anything I could manufacture. I have learned not to interfere with it.</em></blockquote><h3>Tribal Governments: A Separate Obligation</h3><p>“One government category both documents handle poorly.” Raphael said it flatly.</p><p>“Tribes. They appear in the engagement section. Thirteen cities. Four sessions with tribal nations. And then they disappear from the policy design. The programs that come out of this process will be built around a model of state and local government that does not describe tribal governments accurately. Not because anyone decided to exclude them. Because the model was built without them and has never been redesigned with them in mind.</p><p>“The declaration access was hard won. Correct. Necessary. It solves the first problem — getting a declaration. It does not solve what happens after the declaration is made.” He looked at his notes. “The Navajo Nation is larger than some states. A village in rural Alaska may have one person who is simultaneously the tribal administrator, the emergency manager, the fire chief, and the public works director. Both are tribes. Both sovereign governments. Both subject to the same program requirements. The compliance burden that a state agency absorbs with a staff of forty lands on one person in the village. That is not a paperwork problem. That is a program design problem.</p><p>“IA assumes a housing market exists nearby. Temporary housing assistance that works in suburban Florida does not work when the nearest rental market is two hundred miles away. The NFIP penetration rate on tribal lands is among the lowest in the country. Not because of moral hazard. Because the program was never designed with tribal land tenure in mind. Trust land. Fee simple. Allotted land. All in the same community.</p><p>“The federal trust responsibility predates FEMA. It predates the Stafford Act. It predates the entire framework both documents are working within. It does not get discharged by adding tribal representatives to a governing board or conducting four listening sessions during the comment period.” He paused. “The self-determination of tribal peoples — their right to govern themselves, to build their own institutions, to make their own decisions about their own lands — is the same principle that underlies the Tenth Amendment arguments made on behalf of every state in both documents. It applies here with greater historical force, not less.”</p><p><em>God listened. He said nothing. This too was Caesar’s jurisdiction — the jurisdiction of a government built on the principle of self-determination, deciding whether that principle extended to the peoples whose self-determination it had most thoroughly suppressed.</em></p><blockquote><em>In the margin, Lucifer wrote: I have always found tribal sovereignty useful. Not because I oppose it — I don’t, on principle — but because the complexity it introduces into program design creates exactly the kind of extended uncertainty I find most productive. Each one is a comment period. Each comment period is a delay. Each delay is an opportunity. I did not create the complexity. I simply arrived before the implementing guidance did. I always do.</em></blockquote><h3>The Thing Neither Document Will Say</h3><p>“There is an operational reality both documents step around.”</p><p><em>Say it.</em></p><p>“When the disaster is bad enough — when enough of the housing stock is gone in a defined geography that the market cannot absorb the displaced population — the federal government is going to put mobile homes and travel trailers in.” He paused. “Every reform in both documents is correct and should happen. Permanent repair authority. Simplified IA. Streamlined programs. They will handle the majority of disasters better than the current system does.” Another pause. “They will not handle the next Katrina. They will not handle the next Maria. When you lose tens of thousands of housing units in a compressed geography you cannot insurance-market your way out of it. You cannot repair your way out of it because the homes are not there to repair. You put trailers in.”</p><p>“That is not a program failure. It is the irreducible federal role when the scale exceeds what any market or state program can absorb. The institutional embarrassment about the fact that we’re doing it makes us worse at doing it.” He paused. “The trailer becomes semi-permanent not because FEMA wants it that way but because the affordable housing that was destroyed has not been rebuilt. And the market was not going to rebuild it at prices the occupants could afford before the disaster either. The disaster made the deficit visible. It did not create it.</p><p>“The siting plan has to exist before the event. Where do the trailers go. What land is available. What utilities exist. What access roads can handle the logistics. Not a scramble in the aftermath while people are living in their cars. The authority to pre-plan direct housing deployment exists within current Stafford Act authority. It has not been systematically exercised.”</p><blockquote><em>In the margin, Lucifer wrote: the direct housing mission is the one area where I have consistently underperformed. The people who staff it — the ones who actually show up and set up the trailers and connect the utilities and make sure families have somewhere to sleep — are remarkably difficult to discourage. I have tried. They are stubborn in a way I find professionally inconvenient. Even I have to acknowledge when something works despite my best efforts.</em></blockquote><h3>Lean or Hollow: A Different Question</h3><p>“There is a difference between a lean organization and a hollow one.”</p><p><em>Go.</em></p><p>“The reform language is correct that FEMA carries administrative overhead that does not serve survivors. A smaller agency that does its core mission well is better than a larger one that does it slowly and expensively.” He paused. “But there is a category of federal capability that cannot be surged from zero. Urban search and rescue. The teams exist, are trained, are equipped, and are ready — or they are not there when the building collapses. You cannot hire and train a USAR team after the event. You cannot build the logistics network to move commodities to a million displaced people starting on day one if the contracts, the relationships, and the systems haven’t been maintained before the event.” Another pause. “And you cannot stand up a teleregistration system that handles a million calls in the first week if the system has been underfunded, the staff have been cut, and the surge contracts were allowed to lapse because there was no major disaster last year and someone decided that was savings.”</p><p>At the start of FY2022: approximately 11,400 disaster employees against a staffing goal of 17,670. Thirty-five percent below goal. The council report proposes a two-to-three year transformation review while the agency operates at that deficit. The next catastrophic event does not wait for the transformation timeline.</p><p>“The reform has to distinguish between two things it has been conflating. Administrative overhead that genuinely can be reduced — grant bureaucracy, duplicated headquarters functions, management layers that exist because they were never removed. And operational capability that cannot be cut without accepting that it will not be there when needed.” He looked up. “Every administrator who has faced a catastrophic event has learned this distinction. The ones who inherited a hollowed-out agency learned it faster and more painfully.”</p><p>“The next catastrophic event is already forming. Somewhere over warm water. Or in a drought-stressed forest. Or along a fault line that has not moved in a generation. It does not care about the transformation timeline.”</p><blockquote><em>In the margin, Lucifer wrote: the hollow organization is my preferred outcome of every reform process. Not a disbanded organization — a disbanded organization generates its own backlash and gets reconstituted. A hollow one is better. It exists on paper. It has the name. It has the authorities. It attends the meetings. It simply cannot do the things it is supposed to do when the moment arrives. The gap between the organization that exists on paper and the one that shows up after the earthquake is, in my experience, where the most durable damage occurs. Not to the buildings. To the belief that the system works. That belief, once lost, is very difficult to rebuild. I find that useful.</em></blockquote><h3>The Bottom Line</h3><p>Raphael set down all his notes.</p><p>“The bottom line,” he said, “is that both documents are about managing the consequence of a shift that happened without a vote and has never been officially acknowledged.”</p><p><em>Say it plainly.</em></p><p>“At some point between 1950 and now the federal government became the primary recovery tool for disaster losses in the United States. Not the backstop. The primary. There was no announcement. Congress voted on each piece separately. What was never voted on was the cumulative question. Whether this was the role the federal government intended to play. Whether the country understood what it had decided.” He paused. “The private insurance infrastructure that used to anchor individual and community recovery has increasingly retreated from the highest-risk exposures. The federal commitment expanded into the space. And the federal commitment, calibrated at levels too low to make survivors whole but high enough to suppress the urgency of maintaining private coverage, has created a moral hazard that prevents the market from pricing risk in a way that changes behavior.”</p><p><em>Where and how we build.</em></p><p>“Rather than merely regulating how we pay for it after it fails.” Raphael looked at the report. “Both documents address the payment mechanism. Neither addresses the building pattern. Neither asks whether the federal commitment at its current level is producing the exposure it’s designed to address.” He paused. “That question would require telling a county commissioner that the subdivision he approved is a federal liability. Telling a homeowner that the house they bought is in a place the market has increasingly priced beyond what most owners can afford to insure. Telling a state legislature that the courthouse they never insured is their problem now.”</p><p><em>They vote for the person who sends FEMA.</em></p><p>“Every time. Regardless of what the agency is called.”</p><blockquote><em>In the margin, Lucifer wrote nothing. This was the one place in the briefing where he had nothing to add. The situation required no assistance from him. It was, as he sometimes acknowledged in his more reflective moments, fully self-sustaining.</em></blockquote><h3>The Dedication</h3><p>Raphael picked up the last page.</p><p>“They dedicated it to the emergency management professionals. The tens of thousands who have dedicated their careers to preparation, response, recovery, and mitigation. Verbatim from the document.”</p><p><em>That part is true.</em></p><p>“Always been true. Will be true whatever the agency is called. Will be true while the committee markup is happening and the roundtable is meeting and the governing board is scheduling its first agenda.” He set the report down. “Those people don’t wait for the commission. They do the work. They have always done the work. They were doing it before either of these documents existed and they will be doing it after both documents are footnotes.”</p><p><em>Lucifer can’t touch that.</em></p><p>“He knows it. He doesn’t try. He works the margins. The contracts. The comment periods. The roundtables with excellent shrimp cocktail.” Raphael paused. “He’s very good at the margins. He’s been at it for a long time.”</p><p><em>But not the work.</em></p><p>“Never the work.”</p><p>God looked at Florida.</p><p>The beaches were still the beaches.</p><p>The weather was still the weather.</p><p>The hurricane season would begin again.</p><p>Reliable as sunrise.</p><p>As it had always been.</p><p>As it would always be.</p><p><em>The storm is mine, God said quietly. The catastrophe was optional. We made it routine by funding it. And now we have two documents about how to fund it better.</em></p><p>He looked at the report one more time.</p><p><em>Same time next commission.</em></p><p>“I’ll bring the report,” said Raphael.</p><p><em>You won’t need to.</em></p><p><em>I’ve read them all.</em></p><p>Outside the door Michael was already updating the schedule.</p><p>The next commission was not yet appointed.</p><p>But the next disaster was already forming.</p><p>Somewhere over warm water.</p><p>Patient as policy.</p><p>Patient as Lucifer.</p><p>Patient as the federal commitment that had been absorbing the consequence of human choices and would continue absorbing them until someone asked the question that neither document asked.</p><p>Why.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=06ff85e65a50" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[09:17]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@craig_40068/09-17-ec646b522b51?source=rss-255a06ff6e1c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ec646b522b51</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[public-safety]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[fiction]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[national-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[emergency-management]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[disaster-preparedness]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Craig Fugate]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 05 May 2026 19:31:31 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-05-05T23:04:25.194Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>By Craig Fugate</strong> <em>Former FEMA Administrator (2009–2017)</em></p><p><em>This scenario is based on my thirty-nine years of emergency management experience. While the operational insights and story are my own, I utilized AI for narrative flow, editing, and factchecking to ensure the most effective delivery of this professional assessment.</em></p><p>~60 min read · Emergency Management · Fiction</p><p>A scenario inside a county Emergency Operations Center when power, communications, 911 fails, and no help comes.</p><p>This is not about Washington. Not about the federal response.</p><p>This is what the first hours look like inside a County Emergency Operations Center when the screens go black and no one is coming to help.</p><p><em>Detection</em></p><p>The first indication came from space.</p><p>At 11:23 PM Eastern, a constellation of early-warning satellites registered an anomalous launch signature from a site the intelligence community had been monitoring for several months, a mobile transporter-erector in a remote province, repositioned twice in the past week. The signature was brief and partial. The trajectory did not match a standard ballistic profile; it appeared either highly lofted or consistent with a partial orbital insertion. The payload was unknown. North American Aerospace Defense Command’s core mission is early warning. When it comes to nuclear missile launches, that mission is about one thing: seeing it fast, confirming it, and getting the word out.</p><p>At NORAD, the word used in the initial assessment was concerning.</p><p>It moved up the chain in minutes.</p><p><em>H+2 Hours — Senior Leadership Briefing</em></p><p>The classified briefing in the Situation Room used careful language. There was no confirmation of a nuclear weapon, no impact projection, and no indication of an immediate strike. Defense systems were repositioned. Strategic assets were placed on elevated alert. Diplomatic channels, where they still existed, went quiet in ways that were themselves a kind of signal.</p><p>What made it different from previous elevated alerts was the combination of factors, the trajectory window, the timing, and one detail conveyed verbally to the principals: a human intelligence source had reported, with low-to-medium confidence, that a senior official in the adversary’s strategic command had been moved to a hardened facility three days prior.</p><p>Low-to-medium confidence. In a normal year, that would not have been enough to act on publicly.</p><p>This was not a normal year.</p><p>The intelligence picture was not sufficient to trigger automatic continuity protocols — it was sufficient to make everyone in the room aware that waiting for certainty might mean waiting too long.</p><p>Two decisions had to be made immediately, and they pulled against each other.</p><p>The E-4B was the most survivable option. An aircraft would have to be positioned from Offutt — a visible movement — and its departure from Andrews once on the ground would be picked up by cameras within minutes. What that image would do to a public already absorbing fragmented intelligence from social media at 0300 was its own calculation.</p><p>The President would remain at the White House. History had settled this question more than once, a president seen fleeing before the blow lands concedes something that cannot easily be reclaimed. The White House had its own hardened communications. The PEOC was functional. Evacuation remained an option if the threat picture changed.</p><p>The continuity of government, however, could not rest on one location and one person.</p><p>The Vice President would board the E-4B. Not as a precaution, as protocol. If the President was incapacitated or communications severed, command authority had to exist somewhere survivable and functional. The E-4B, hardened against EMP, capable of communicating with nuclear forces on every available frequency, able to refuel indefinitely in flight, was exactly that. The Vice President’s departure from Andrews would be quiet, timed, and if anyone noticed, described as a routine continuity exercise.</p><p>The National Security Advisor recommended the federal government go to COGCON 1. The President ordered it. This was no longer a secret.</p><p>Designated deputies from key Cabinet agencies would move to their alternate facilities. Not the secretaries themselves — their deputies, their emergency relocation group members, the people whose specific job was to keep the agencies functional regardless of what happened to the principals. The Department of Defense chain would flow to Site R. The civilian executive branch agencies would disperse to their designated alternate sites — not a single location, but a distributed network. NCR-based deputies to their respective relocation facilities, Mount Weather among the most significant. Regional offices and watch centers activating where they could. Whether those distributed nodes would remain functional under HEMP conditions was a question the architecture had never had to answer. FEMA would operate from both its Washington headquarters and its Mount Weather National Emergency Coordinating Center, with the communications bridge between them maintained through the FEMA Operations Center.</p><p>The facilities each served distinct purposes. Site R, the Raven Rock Mountain Complex in Pennsylvania, the underground Pentagon, was the Alternate National Military Command Center for the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs, designed to sustain military command and control in a national emergency. Mount Weather, the High Point Special Facility in Virginia managed by FEMA, was the civilian continuity site for senior executive branch leadership and Cabinet deputies, with communications links to the White House and a control station for the FEMA National Radio System connecting federal agencies to the states. The President, if evacuation became necessary, would go to Air Force One or board an E-4B, not a fixed ground facility. The lesson had been learned by the Eisenhower administration — once thermonuclear weapons entered the equation, no fixed, ground-based facility could be assumed to survive. The continuity architecture evolved accordingly.</p><p>Different facilities. Different missions. Different chains of authority — all part of a continuity architecture that had been built, maintained, and exercised for decades against exactly this kind of scenario.</p><p>Whether that architecture would hold under conditions it had never actually faced was something nobody in the Situation Room could answer with certainty.</p><p>If the event occurred, the communications architecture for reaching the public would depend on the National Public Warning System — FEMA-designated Primary Entry Point (PEP) high-power AM broadcast stations with backup power, built to operate independently of the commercial grid, capable of reaching more than ninety percent of the American population even after a catastrophic infrastructure failure. The components and built assemblies had been tested for EMP survivability at Department of Defense electromagnetic effects facilities, including work done at Patuxent River. The EAS had been tested nationwide as a communications system. What had never been tested was the full integrated chain — PEP stations receiving a Presidential National Emergency Message, broadcasting through the relay network of participating stations, that signal propagating across a country whose commercial grid and digital infrastructure had degraded or failed at scale. The design was sound. The components had been hardened. Whether the system held together at operational scale under actual conditions was a question that had never been answered, because it could only be answered once.</p><p>The decision to notify civil authorities, to brief the governors, their emergency management directors, and their teams was made before the Situation Room emptied. The window for preparation, however short, was better than no window at all.</p><p>At White House direction, FEMA would make the call. All fifty states. All six territories. All federally recognized tribal nations. And simultaneously, direct notification to each state emergency management director, not waiting for the governor’s office to pass it down the chain.</p><p><em>H+3 Hours — The Story and the Response, Simultaneously</em></p><p>The federal government had too many people watching too many things for the story to stay contained. It never did.</p><p>The first public indication was not a government statement. It was a photograph posted to a defense analysis forum at 2:17 AM, sourced to a commercial satellite pass, showing what appeared to be a mobile launch vehicle at a position inconsistent with any catalogued activity at that site. The post carried a single line of commentary from an account with eleven years of credible open-source postings: this is not a drill. Senior National Security Correspondents from across the major news outlets started calling about the post. Their sources were tight-lipped about what the intel said but confirmed that a launch had been detected. As seasoned reporters, they asked their sources questions to try to get more details, one source speculated it could be a nuclear weapon for a HEMP attack, but there is no confirmation. One source, speculation, but then a second more senior source confirmed the Situation Room was conducting a briefing for President with the FEMA Administrator present.</p><p>The story reached the major networks within the hour. By 0400, every cable channel was running variations of the same banner: CREDIBLE THREAT / SOURCES: US MONITORING POSSIBLE EMP DEVICE / WHAT IS AN EMP WEAPON?</p><p>The guests who went on camera at that hour were the ones available. Some were credible. Some had books to sell. A retired general told one network that a successful HEMP detonation would set the United States back to the nineteenth century — not entirely wrong, not entirely right, thirty seconds to explain something that took physicists years to model. A former national security advisor said to stay calm, that defense systems were robust. A professor of electrical engineering explained carefully that effects depended on a wide range of variables and that worst-case scenarios were not necessarily the most likely. He was interrupted three times. His segment ran four minutes.</p><p>The internet did not wait for segments.</p><p>While the networks ran their panels, FEMA was already on the video call. The emergency conference went out to all fifty states, six territories, and the federally recognized tribal nations at 0330 Eastern — convened at the same hours the story was breaking publicly, the two tracks running in parallel and accelerating each other. This was the call the President had ordered from the Situation Room two hours earlier: get to the governors, get to their emergency management teams, give them whatever window exists. The deputy administrator spoke plainly: credible threat, high-altitude EMP, intelligence picture incomplete, no confirmed timeline, no confirmed target area. The recommendation was activation. Review your plans. Verify your backup communications. Account for your generators and fuel. Be ready.</p><p>The deputy administrator used the phrase out of an abundance of caution three times.</p><p>Nobody on the call asked what caution was worth if the thing actually happened.</p><p>Then came the pizza.</p><p>It was a running joke with history. In the 1980s, a Domino’s franchise owner named Frank Meeks had noticed that his late-night delivery volume to the Pentagon, the CIA, and the State Department spiked in the hours before major operations. The night before Grenada. The night before Panama. The August evening in 1990 when the CIA ordered twenty-one pizzas and Iraq invaded Kuwait the next morning. The concept acquired a name the “Pentagon Pizza Index” and a life of its own. The Soviets had reportedly been doing something similar for decades, monitoring parking lots and late-night office lights as informal indicators of operational tempo.</p><p>By the modern era it had migrated to social media. An account called Pentagon Pizza Report tracked Google Maps foot traffic data at pizza establishments near the Pentagon, posting screenshots when busyness indicators spiked. It was part serious open-source intelligence experiment, part internet meme. A senior defense official had recently joked publicly about ordering random pizzas on quiet nights just to throw the trackers off.</p><p>Nobody was laughing at it tonight. The account had flagged elevated activity at two Pentagon-area locations at 1 am.</p><p>None of the nuances survived social media. By 0300 the pizza data had been absorbed into the story as confirmation. Not a data point. Evidence.</p><p><em>H+4 Hours — The State and the County</em></p><p>The state advisory hit county emergency management inboxes at 0512. About an hour after the FEMA call. But the formal warning had moved faster than the email, it had traveled through NAWAS.</p><p>The National Alert and Warning System was a dedicated 24-hour party-line telephone network operated by FEMA, connecting warning points across the country on hardwired circuits designed to function independently of local telephone systems. The federal backbone, FEMA operations centers, the ten FEMA regional offices, select National Weather Service facilities, and other federal operations centers, was maintained and staffed around the clock. The state warning points, the major terminals at each state EOC, were the primary nodes on the circuit and generally functional. Below that, the picture was less certain. Local warning points varied enormously in their operational status depending on what each state and county had invested in maintaining them.</p><p>The NAWAS operator transmitted two items. The first was the National Warning itself. The second was a notification to all state warning points: advise your governor’s office and state emergency manager that a federal conference call would convene in 30 minutes. All states, all territories, all tribal nations. Be on the call.</p><p>Where the circuit was maintained and monitored, the message got through fast. Where it wasn’t, the email had to carry the weight.</p><p>By 0530 the governor had declared a state of emergency and called up the National Guard on a readiness posture. The public statement was careful — precautionary measures, developing national security situation, no mention of nuclear, no acronym EMP. Residents should have emergency supplies on hand, keep vehicles fueled, monitor official channels.</p><p>The press asked what the threat was specifically.</p><p>The Governor’s Spokesperson said they were not in a position to discuss the threat.</p><p>By the time that statement aired, the networks had moved past it. The chyrons now read: SOURCES CONFIRM EMP THREAT / WHAT HAPPENS IF THE GRID GOES DOWN?</p><p>The public information environment had outrun the official response.</p><p>Gas stations had lines before 0700. The fuel distribution system had never been designed for everyone making the same reasonable decision at the same time. A station carries two days of normal throughput. When demand spikes simultaneously across a region the math breaks almost immediately, tanks drain faster than tanker routes can run, and there is no surge capacity in a just-in-time logistics chain because surge capacity costs money nobody budgeted for.</p><p>By early morning, stations in metro areas were out of regular. Images of bagged pumps and hand-lettered NO GAS signs moved faster than any official statement. People who hadn’t yet gone for fuel saw the images and got in their cars, draining what remained. The failure fed itself.</p><p>ATMs followed the same logic. Cash machines emptied within hours in high-traffic areas. People wanted paper money, something they could hold if the grid went down. This had happened before in countries under financial sanction, in banking crises, wherever people collectively lost confidence in the accessibility of their own money. The mechanism was well understood. The system had no answer for it on a national scale.</p><p>Grocery stores looked different depending on where you were. In the Southeast, where hurricane season had trained people, the bottled water aisles went first, families who had done this before, who knew what a week without tap water felt like. In the Northeast it was toilet paper, inexplicably and reliably, the physical expression of collective anxiety when people need to do something and don’t know what else to do. Everywhere it was batteries, canned goods, bread. People buying what they thought they might need or might not be able to get.</p><p>Coffee was still on the shelves in most places. Nobody ever explains that.</p><p>Many people still went to work. One of the lessons from COVID: not all work could be done remote and critical workers were expected to show up. The highways were not empty. The machinery of ordinary life continued, but the infrastructure beneath it was already under stress that wouldn’t show as failure until it was too late to address.</p><p>Schools had already made the decision to close and that threw more disruptions for families with no available childcare.</p><p>In the County, most gas stations were dry or nearly dry before 9 am. ATMs at both bank branches were out of cash. A local Facebook group was circulating a post claiming FEMA had pre-positioned body bags at the county fairgrounds. False. Shared four hundred times before anyone flagged it.</p><p>The physical infrastructure of daily life — fuel, cash, food supply — was already failing before a single weapon had been used. Not because anything broke. Because everyone made the same reasonable decision at the same time, and the systems were never built to absorb that.</p><p>It wasn’t panic buying. Not really. To the people standing in those aisles, this was the most rational thing they could do — maybe the only thing. Everything else was alarming and abstract and out of their hands. This was concrete. This was action. The alternative was to go home and wait and watch the news and feel the paralysis settle in. Most people don’t choose paralysis when there’s something left to do.</p><p><em>Full Activation — Mark Goes In</em></p><p><strong>ALL STATIONS, ALL STATIONS, THIS IS THE FEMA OPERATIONS CENTER.<br>THIS IS A NATIONAL WARNING.<br>TIME 0715 ZULU.<br>DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REPORTS POSSIBLE HIGH-ALTITUDE ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE EVENT UNDER EVALUATION.<br>NO CONFIRMED DETONATION OR IMPACT AREAS AT THIS TIME.<br>POTENTIAL EXISTS FOR WIDESPREAD DISRUPTION TO ELECTRICAL POWER, COMMUNICATIONS, AND TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS.<br>ALL STATE WARNING POINTS IMMEDIATELY REVIEW CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS PROCEDURES AND VERIFY CRITICAL COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITY.<br>ALL STATE WARNING POINTS ACKNOWLEDGE DURING ROLL CALL BY FEMA REGION.<br>REGION ONE, STAND BY.<br>MAINE, ACKNOWLEDGE.</strong></p><p>(pause)</p><p><strong>NEW HAMPSHIRE, ACKNOWLEDGE.</strong></p><p><strong>VERMONT, ACKNOWLEDGE.</strong></p><p><strong>MASSACHUSETTS, ACKNOWLEDGE.</strong></p><p><strong>RHODE ISLAND, ACKNOWLEDGE.</strong></p><p><strong>CONNECTICUT, ACKNOWLEDGE…</strong></p><p>The FEMA Operations Center continued the roll call though all 10 FEMA Regions.</p><p>The County Warning Point called Mark upon receiving the NAWAS notification. He was dressed and in his car ten minutes later.</p><p>He called his deputy from the road. “NAWAS just issued a National Warning”. I’m inbound. Get to the EOC. Full activation: all ESF leads, voluntary agencies, key partners. Briefing in one hour. Pass the word.”</p><p>His deputy didn’t ask questions. That was the right response.</p><p>It was the right call and he knew it. You didn’t get a NAWAS Alert like that and sit on it. The question wasn’t whether to activate — it was whether to have everyone in the room informed and ready, or to have them find out when something happened and scramble from a standing start.</p><p>NAWAS chimed again with a second message</p><p><strong>ALL STATIONS, ALL STATIONS, THIS IS THE FEMA OPERATIONS CENTER.<br>SUBJECT: PRIORITY: NATIONAL COORDINATION CALL — POTENTIAL HEMP EVENT<br>TIME SENT: 730 ZULU<br>BE ADVISED:<br>DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REPORTING POTENTIAL HIGH-ALTITUDE ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE EVENT UNDER EVALUATION.<br>NO CONFIRMED IMPACT AREAS AT THIS TIME. POTENTIAL EXISTS FOR WIDESPREAD DISRUPTION TO POWER AND COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE.<br>ACTION:<br>ALL RECIPIENTS JOIN VIDEO TELECONFERENCE.<br>START TIME: 0800 ZULU<br>SECURE LINK SENT TO AGENCY EMAIL ACCOUNTS. AUDIO DIAL-IN PROVIDED AS BACKUP.<br>REQUIRED PARTICIPANTS:<br>GOVERNORS<br>STATE AND TERRITORIAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT DIRECTORS<br>FEMA REGIONAL ADMINISTRATORS<br>FEDERAL INTERAGENCY PARTNERS<br>PREPARE TO REPORT:<br>OPERATIONAL STATUS OF STATE EOCS<br>PARTICIPANTS SHOULD ANTICIPATE DEGRADED COMMUNICATIONS AND MAINTAIN ALTERNATE CONTACT METHODS.</strong></p><p>They came to the County EOC within the hour. Leads for law enforcement, fire and EMS, public works, health, communications, mass care. The hospital liaison. The water plant superintendent. The sheriff’s major. A representative from the National Guard armory. The Red Cross chapter coordinator. The ARES Emergency Coordinator Carl Briggs.</p><p>Carl Briggs was sixty-seven, retired from the Army Intelligence and Security Command, the last decade of his career doing contract work he didn’t talk about much. Communications continuity programs. The kind of assignment that didn’t show up in press releases or retirement ceremony speeches.</p><p>He’d been licensed since 1974. Could still send and copy Morse at twenty words per minute, which most of the younger hams in the county didn’t know and wouldn’t have understood why it mattered.</p><p>He walked into the EOC two years ago, introduced himself, and said he’d like to help with the amateur radio program. Mark introduced him to the Amateur Radio Emergency Services (ARES) group. Within a year, Carl was appointed the ARES Emergency Coordinator for the County.</p><p>It took about eighteen months to figure out what he actually had.</p><p>Carl knew things. Not just frequencies and propagation — anyone could learn that. He knew which federal backup systems were real and which ones existed mostly on paper. He knew where the gaps were between what the plans assumed and what the infrastructure would actually do under stress. He knew because he’d spent a decades inside those programs watching the difference between how they were briefed and how they worked.</p><p>He didn’t volunteer that. You had to ask the right questions, and you had to ask more than once.</p><p>Mark had learned to ask.</p><p>Then Garrett, the county administrator, showed up without being asked.</p><p>That last part didn’t surprise Mark. Tom Garrett had been county administrator for six years, but before that he had been Sergeant Major Thomas Garrett of the state National Guard, thirty-two years, the last eight of them as the senior enlisted advisor to the state adjutant general. He had deployed to two hurricanes out of state, a major ice storm, and a flood that had taken out the county seat of a neighboring jurisdiction and required a six-week response. He understood what a declaration meant, what the Guard could and couldn’t do, and what happened to communities that didn’t have their civilian infrastructure ready when a disaster hit. He had watched it happen too many times from the uniformed side.</p><p>When the county commission offered him the administrator job after retirement, some people in the building had expected a ceremonial figure — a respected veteran who would rubber-stamp department heads and stay out of the way. What they got was a sergeant major who read every budget line, asked operational questions in every staff meeting, and showed up at EOC exercises without needing to be invited. He wasn’t an emergency manager. But he understood resource constraints, he understood unity of effort, and he understood that decisions made in the first hours of a crisis determined whether you were managing an emergency or chasing a disaster.</p><p>He took a seat in the back row of the briefing room and said nothing. That was exactly right. This was Mark’s briefing.</p><p>The briefing was short because the information was short.</p><p>Mark stood at the whiteboard. “Here’s what we know. There is a credible threat of a high-altitude EMP event. The intelligence picture is incomplete. We have no confirmed timeline and no confirmed target area. The governor has declared a State of Emergency, the Guard is on readiness posture, and the state EOC has recommended activation. So, we’re activated.”</p><p>He looked around the room.</p><p>“Here’s what I need from each of you now. Status of your systems. Generator fuel levels. Communications checks. Any gaps your continuity plans don’t cover. I want to know what you have and what you don’t. We’ll go around the room.”</p><p>They went around the room. It took forty minutes. Generator fuel was adequate at most facilities for 48 to 72 hours — the water plant had 60 hours at current load. The hospital was closer to three days; fire stations were mixed. Communications backup was in place, but some hadn’t been tested recently under full load. Voluntary agencies were ready to stand up on activation. The Red Cross coordinator noted shelter capacity was adequate for a localized event, not for county-wide displacement.</p><p>The School Board Representative said that they would recommend closing all schools until an all clear was issued by the Federal Government, the Community College representative concurred. Under the County’s Disaster plan, schools could be used as shelters and sites for feeding, as well as community briefings.</p><p>Nobody had a clean answer for: fuel resupply once the generators burned through what was on hand. Mark put Ray Collins’ name on the board and said he’d make contact later that morning.</p><p>He walked through the County’s Emergency Operation Plan. Not a specific HEMP plan, there wasn’t one. The all-hazards structure. Life safety first. Life sustaining second. Third, Stabilization and mass care. The same sequence regardless of cause.</p><p>“Our plan was not written for a HEMP event,” he said. But the framework holds for any large-scale simultaneous systems failure where outside help is not coming quickly. That is what we plan.”</p><p>He paused, then said the thing he had been thinking since he read the advisory.</p><p>“You’ve all seen the national coverage. The networks are using the word EMP. That’s the scenario we’re preparing for, and I’m not going to pretend otherwise in this room. If this event occurs, the same systems we use to notify you and coordinate with you may not function. Phones, cell, digital radio, the state portal, any or all of those could be gone simultaneously at the moment we need them most.”</p><p>He looked around the room slowly.</p><p>“So here is your standing order. If at any point you lose communications, lose power, or cannot reach this EOC by any means — do not wait for notification. Assume we are fully activated. Assume the event has occurred. Report into this location or to your designated alternate by whatever means you have available. We may not be able to call you. We may not be able to tell you it happened. Your trigger is the absence of communication itself.”</p><p>Nobody said anything for a moment.</p><p>“That’s not a scenario I’ve ever had to brief before,” Mark said. “It’s the right one for now.”</p><p>When it was done, he made the second call.</p><p>“Limited stand-down. Public safety leads stay, law enforcement liaison, fire, EMS. Communications stay. Everyone else: go home, check your systems, check your families, get some rest. I need you functional if this happens, not exhausted before it does. You will be notified immediately of any change. Your standing order applies, if communications go out, assume we are fully activated and report in. Questions?”</p><p>There were none.</p><p>The room thinned. The sheriff’s liaison stayed. The fire liaison stayed. Carl stayed without being asked, he had brought a cot and a thermos of coffee and showed no sign of leaving. Garrett stayed, taking a quiet position at the far end of the room. The core watch settled in.</p><p>Carl moved quietly to the radio corner and began verifying that every ham radio was disconnected from its antenna and grounded. The county had learned that lesson the hard way, a direct lightning strike on the tower had destroyed thousands of dollars of equipment despite the arrestors in line. Carl knew that lightning arrestors generally didn’t survive direct strokes. After the strike, he had written a one-page SOP: disconnect and ground all antennas when not in use. Mark had signed it. Nobody argued with it anymore.</p><p>Tonight the SOP had a second reason behind it. Carl had been following the threat reporting since the news broke. He understood what a credible HEMP threat meant for antenna-connected equipment. The lightning policy had taught him the right habit. Now he was applying it deliberately. Any radio still connected to an antenna at the moment of detonation was a radio he couldn’t count on.</p><p>Mark poured himself a cup of EOC coffee, black, hours old, the universal fuel of emergency management and pulled up a chair at the whiteboard. He was not going home. Not on this timeline. Not with a NAWAS Warning about a credible EMP threat.</p><p>He thought about fuel.</p><p>About Ray Collins — the manager of the local fuel tank farm — and whether he’d seen the news and understood what it meant.</p><p>About the nineteen names on the home ventilator registry.</p><p>And how long would their backup batteries last?</p><p><em>0800 — Full EOC Activation</em></p><p>Mark had been in the EOC for less than 6 hours.</p><p>He had worked through the night on the things he could work on — the generator priority list, the ventilator registry, the fuel consumption estimates. The NAWAS terminal had stayed busy with comms checks from the FEMA Operations Center and State EOCs, but not much more than the initial NAWAS Alert. Even got a short nap before returning his attention to next steps.</p><p>That itself was information. Mark had stopped counting on the state to push anything new to him, they were in the same position. He was building his picture from what he had.</p><p>By 0800 the room was full.</p><p>The ESF leads who had been released came back without being called. The county GIS tech came in on her day off. The hospital sent their EOC liaison without being asked. More of the County’s ARES Hams were reporting to Carl for assignments.</p><p>In this county, emergency management wasn’t a full-time machine. Mark served as the County’s Emergency Services and Emergency Management Director, overseeing the EMS, Volunteer Fire, Emergency Management, and Animal Control. Jenna Carver was the Emergency Management Coordinator, with agency representatives and volunteers providing most of the staffing during EOC activations.</p><p>Not in theory, in practice. People with day jobs who showed up when it mattered. Firefighters coming off shift. Retirees who knew the back roads better than any map. Ham radio operators, church groups, neighbors who had been through enough storms to understand what needed to be done.</p><p>There was a small staff, sure. But the system only worked because of the people who stepped in when everything else started to fail.</p><p>Compared to the staffing of large counties, they had a small team, but everyone knew their roles and how the system worked.</p><p>Mark noticed who was already working and who was waiting for someone to tell them what to do. He filed that away.</p><p>He had been in this work long enough to read a room that way. Fifteen years, three counties, two state positions. A business administration degree that had pointed him toward a county emergency management planning job he had expected to leave after eighteen months. He never left. The work caught him because the feedback loop was honest, you found out whether your plan worked, whether your relationships were real, whether the people you counted on showed up. Fast. He had taken every FEMA course available, earned his CEM credential, thought about a master’s degree in emergency management more than once. He knew the County’s EOP was not a plan for everything that could happen, but rather the document that tells you how the team is built and the processes used to respond to the things you know, and more importantly, the things you hadn’t faced before.</p><p>He had built a team: not a plan for every scenario, but an EOC that was a problem-solving engine. That team was going to be tested today against something it had never been designed for. He wasn’t sure if it would hold.</p><p>The State EOC portal was open on one screen and National News feeds were on the others with the ever-present Weather Channel. Someone made a fresh pot of coffee at 0800. Mark was on his fourth cup.</p><p>At 0917, the lights went out.</p><p><em>0917</em></p><p>Not a flicker.</p><p>A cut.</p><p>Every screen went black at once. GIS maps. Dashboards. Weather feeds. The state portal. Gone in a single, silent collapse. The air conditioner died mid-cycle. The room seemed to inhale and hold it.</p><p>For half a second, nobody moved.</p><p>Then the generator caught.</p><p>A low mechanical rumble rolled up through the floor. Emergency lights snapped on — thin, uneven strips of illumination. A few outlets came back. The coffee maker beeped like nothing had happened.</p><p>But other systems stayed dead.</p><p>Jenna stood at the console, hands still moving out of habit across controls that no longer responded. Mark watched her for just a moment, the muscle memory of looking for something that wasn’t there anymore. Then she caught herself, pulled her hands back, and looked at him.</p><p>That was enough.</p><p>Jenna Carver had come to the county with a degree in emergency management, one of the first hires Mark had made from a formal EM program rather than from the ranks of people who had drifted into the work from other fields the way he had. She was twenty-eight, methodical, and had a quality he valued more than any credential: she didn’t need to be told what to do twice, and she didn’t need to be managed when things went sideways.</p><p>She was also, Mark knew, not going to be here much longer. The state had reached out twice. Two other counties had expressed interest. Most recently, the county next door had posted their emergency management director position, and Mark had seen the application sitting on her desk. He hadn’t asked about it directly. He didn’t need to. He had told her months ago, in the way these things got said between people who respected each other: when the right opportunity came, he would write whatever letter she needed and mean every word of it. She had earned her own program. The field needed people like her running programs, not indefinitely serving as someone else’s deputy.</p><p>He knew she was ready. He knew she knew it too. Neither of them had said so out loud, which was fine. Today was not the day for that conversation anyway.</p><p>“Status.”</p><p>“Internet down. State link gone. EOC software offline.”</p><p>“Phones?”</p><p>“Dead.”</p><p>“Cell?”</p><p>She held it up. Nothing.</p><p>A beat.</p><p>“911 is down.”</p><p>That settled over the room — not panic, just weight. Because that meant the public had already lost their way in.</p><p>Mark nodded once.</p><p>“Assume wide-area power loss and comms disruption until proven otherwise.”</p><p>“Generator’s stable,” someone called. “Partial building power.”</p><p>“That buys time,” Mark said. “Not capability.”</p><p>He turned.</p><p>“Comms.”</p><p>Carl attached the antenna feedline to the first HF rig, the one he had verified was disconnected before the event and powered it up. He had been a ham operator for forty-six years and had never fully trusted digital systems. That was worth something right now.</p><p>His first attempt wasn’t on the amateur frequencies. He went to the DHS SHARES channels — the Shared Resources HF Radio Program, the federal HF interoperability network that operated on specific single-sideband frequencies when conventional systems failed. He tuned to 5063.5 kilohertz first, working through the known emergency channels in upper sideband mode. These were the frequencies authorized federal and state emergency management stations would be monitoring. If anyone in the federal system was transmitting, this was where they’d be.</p><p>He heard fragments. The EMP pulse had knocked out HF propagation across a large geographic area. He worked up to 14396.5 kilohertz, the National Coordination Net frequency, and held there for thirty seconds. Something that might have been a voice, might have been static.</p><p>He moved to the State Amateur Emergency Net on 3.950 MHz and keyed his callsign. He could hear voices, but the noise level made them unreadable. He switched to CW — the Morse key he had kept from his Army days — and called again. An immediate response came back from a station in the next county. Clear, steady, readable. Not the State EOC. Not anyone outside the region. But something.</p><p>He gave his report.</p><p>“SHARES is degraded. Long-range HF is unreliable, maybe gone for now. Voice on the state net is there but unreadable. CW is getting through at regional distances — barely but working. I’ve got contact with one neighboring county. That’s what we have.”</p><p>The county warning operator moved to the NAWAS circuit and attempted to raise the State Warning Point. No response.</p><p>After a few more attempts, other voices broke through.</p><p>The local National Weather Service office came up on the circuit, along with two neighboring counties. It wasn’t much, but it was something — a small, intact pocket of communications.</p><p>The Weather Service reported they were on emergency generator power. Many of their systems were still down, but they were bringing them back one at a time — rebooting, resetting, doing whatever it took. They could provide limited forecasting and could issue warnings as needed.</p><p>The two counties didn’t have much to add. Their situation mirrored what was already being seen locally, systems down, operating on whatever backup they had.</p><p>Still, it mattered.</p><p>This was the first confirmation they weren’t alone.</p><p>They agreed to stay on the circuit and conduct routine check-ins, not because they had new information, but to keep the line alive. In a situation like this, maintaining communication wasn’t just about passing information.</p><p>It was about proving the system, what was left of it, was still working. “NAWAS carrier is present. No traffic. SHARES degraded. Long-range is unreliable.”</p><p>“Local?”</p><p>“Simplex works.”</p><p>The second operator was already transmitting. “Fire Station Two, this is County EOC, do you copy?”</p><p>A pause. Then</p><p>“EOC, we copy. Power’s out. Running generator. Units are mobile.”</p><p>Mark glanced at Jenna. Confirmed.</p><p>“Repeaters are mixed,” Carl added. “Some up, some down. Direct comms are solid.”</p><p>That was enough to work with.</p><p>“Listen up.”</p><p>The room tightened, attention locking on Mark.</p><p>“We’re not waiting for perfect information. We build our own.”</p><p>He moved to the whiteboard. Old habit. He had been using whiteboards since before the digital displays existed, back when this was just how you ran an EOC.</p><p><strong>POWER / COMMS / MOBILITY / CRITICAL SERVICES</strong></p><p>Under COMMS, he wrote: 911: DOWN</p><p>“Initial assumptions,” he said. “Power, large-area outage. Comms degraded, no public access to emergency services. Mobility unknown, verify immediately. Critical services on backup where available.”</p><p>He turned.</p><p>“Without 911, incidents don’t come to us. We go find them.”</p><p>Jenna was already moving. “Teams of two, head out the major corridors. Twenty minutes out, twenty back. Write everything down. Everything.”</p><p>They went.</p><p>Before the last team reached the door, the radio started filling. Not the trunked system, that was out, but the backup channel. Simplex. Line-of-sight. Limited, but working.</p><p>“EOC, Sheriff’s Office. We’re deploying to intersections countywide. Traffic signals are out. Establishing intake points at all substations.”</p><p>“EOC Copies.”</p><p>“EOC, Hospital. We’re on generator, functional. Walk-ins increasing.”</p><p>“Copy, Hospital.”</p><p>“EOC, Water Plant. Pumps on backup power. Pressure holding for now. Duration depends on fuel.”</p><p>Mark wrote as they spoke.</p><p>They hadn’t waited to be called. They had activated because that was the plan, because they had exercised it, because they knew their roles without being told.</p><p>Those were years of relationships showing up exactly when they were supposed to.</p><p>Some were on county radios. Some were relayed through whoever could reach them. And where there was no radio, a ham would be sent with one.</p><p>He hadn’t built this plan for a HEMP event. He had built it for tornadoes and floods and whatever else this part of the country could produce. But a plan was never really for the specific event. It was for the habits and relationships that let you adapt when the event was something nobody anticipated.</p><p>The scenario was new. The people weren’t.</p><p>The county administrator walked up as the door swung closed behind the last departing team. Garrett had been in the EOC since before the event, taken a position at the far end of the room, and watched. He had not asked questions. He had not offered opinions. He had listened to the radio traffic and read the whiteboard and built his own picture the way he had been building operational pictures for three decades. Now he stepped forward.</p><p>“Mark. Where are we?”</p><p>“Wide-area outage. Comms degraded. 911 is down. Local radio is working. We’re building situational awareness manually. Partner agencies are self-activating.”</p><p>Garrett absorbed that. “What do you need?”</p><p>Mark didn’t hesitate. “Fuel. That’s the clock.”</p><p>“Walk me through it.”</p><p>“Hospital generator — maybe seventy-two hours at current load. Water plant, similar. Our backup here, less. Every fire station running a generator right now is burning through reserves we have no way to replace. Without fuel, everything else we’re doing stops mattering.”</p><p>“What are you asking for?”</p><p>“Authority to consolidate. Every bulk fuel depot, every tank farm, every supplier in the county — lock it down and prioritize emergency services.”</p><p>Garrett was quiet for a moment.</p><p>“Mark. I can give you everything the county owns. Every government reserve, every vehicle tank is yours to direct. But I cannot hand you authority to seize private property. Not without the board.”</p><p>“How long?”</p><p>“I’m calling them now. Two hours. Maybe three.”</p><p>Mark looked at him. “Phones are down.”</p><p>Garrett didn’t pause. “I know. I’ve got a deputy heading to Commissioner Harlan’s house right now — he lives four miles from here. I’ve got another going to Wheeler. Martinez is on the east side; we’ll send someone there too. If any POTS lines are still running, we’ll try those from here, but I’m not counting on it. Copper landlines might have some life left if the central office battery backup held, but I wouldn’t plan around it.” He looked at Mark. “We know where these people live. We will go get them. Same as everything else today.”</p><p>Two hours was a long time. It was also not very long at all.</p><p>“In the meantime,” Garrett said, “start your list. Every critical generator in this county, ranked by priority. When I walk into that meeting, I want to know exactly what we’re trying to protect and in what order.”</p><p>“And after the declaration?”</p><p>Garrett met his eyes. “Then we sit down with every fuel supplier we can reach, every elected official, every department head. We don’t take anything. We ask people to be part of the solution. That’s going to matter more than you think when this goes long.”</p><p>He said it the way a sergeant major said things, not as a suggestion, not as a hope, but as an operational fact drawn from thirty-two years of watching communities respond to disasters. The ones that made it through weren’t the ones with the most resources. They were the ones where people trusted each other enough to act together without being ordered to.</p><p>Mark held the look for a moment.</p><p>Then he turned to Jenna. “Update the list.”</p><p>Carl looked up from the HF rig.</p><p>“The AM station is still broadcasting. But they’re blind — operating off local observation only. No national feed, no state feed. They’re just talking into the dark.”</p><p>Mark thought about that. That station was reaching every car radio, every battery-powered transistor, every household that still had signal. The most powerful public communication tool in the county right now, and it was broadcasting uncertainty.</p><p>The EOC had the best picture in the county. Incomplete, but real. The gap between those two things was its own kind of crisis.</p><p>“Can you reach them direct?”</p><p>“I can set up a relay. Or, Carl paused, simpler to just send them a ham with a radio.</p><p>“Do it,” Mark said. “Get someone to them now. We’ll give them a briefing every thirty minutes.”</p><p>He looked at the whiteboard.</p><p>“First message: 911 is down. Go directly to fire stations, sheriff substations, hospitals. Don’t wait for help to find you.”</p><p>“Second message: this is going to last more than a day. Conserve water. Don’t run generators indoors. Check on your neighbors.”</p><p>“Third message: what the county is doing, what people should expect tomorrow.”</p><p>Jenna looked up. “You think that’s enough to hold people?”</p><p>“People don’t panic,” Mark said. “They make decisions based on whatever information they have. Right now, the information is rumor, as far as they can walk, as far as they can see. We give them something real to work with, they’ll do the right thing. Most of them already are.”</p><p>The AM signal sharpened.</p><p><strong>BEEEEEEP. BEEEEEEP. BEEEEEEP.</strong></p><p>Every head turned.</p><p>“EAS,” Carl said. He didn’t move.</p><p>What Carl knew, and most people in the room did not, was exactly why that signal was still there. Whether the system held together at operational scale under actual conditions was a question that could only be answered once. The signal in the EOC suggested the answer was yes. At least here. At least now.</p><p>Mark looked at Carl for a moment. Thirty years in the Army. A decade in continuity programs. Retired to a county EOC as a volunteer, handed a parking spot and a radio vest. Most people in this building had no idea who was actually sitting at the ARES station with all the ham radios.</p><p>He filed that away too. For later. When there was a later.</p><p>The digital burst followed — fast, sharp, unmistakable. Then a voice, steady and formal:</p><p><strong>“THIS IS THE EMERGENCY ALERT SYSTEM. THIS MESSAGE IS TRANSMITTED AT THE DIRECTION OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.”</strong></p><p>The room went completely still.</p><p><strong>THIS IS A MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.<br>WE ARE CURRENTLY RESPONDING TO A NATIONAL EMERGENCY AFFECTING LARGE PORTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES.<br>AT APPROXIMATELY 9:17 AM EASTERN TIME, THE UNITED STATES EXPERIENCED A HIGH-ALTITUDE ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE EVENT, LIKELY CAUSED BY A NUCLEAR DETONATION IN SPACE ABOVE THE EAST COAST OF AMERICA.</strong></p><p>Somebody exhaled. Mark didn’t look away from the radio.</p><p><strong>THIS EVENT HAS DISRUPTED ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS, COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS, TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS, AND OTHER CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE ACROSS MULTIPLE REGIONS.</strong></p><p><strong>AT THIS TIME, WE DO NOT HAVE INDICATIONS OF ADDITIONAL DETONATIONS. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, IN COORDINATION WITH STATE, LOCAL, TRIBAL, AND TERRITORIAL PARTNERS, IS ACTIVELY ASSESSING THE SITUATION. EMERGENCY RESPONSE OPERATIONS ARE UNDERWAY.</strong></p><p><strong>I AM ASKING ALL AMERICANS TO TAKE THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS IMMEDIATELY.</strong></p><p><strong>REMAIN WHERE YOU ARE IF IT IS SAFE TO DO SO. LIMIT TRAVEL — ROADS AND TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS MAY BE COMPROMISED. CONSERVE FUEL, WATER, AND ANY BACKUP POWER SOURCES. USE TELEPHONES ONLY FOR EMERGENCIES. COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS ARE DEGRADED. CHECK ON FAMILY MEMBERS AND NEIGHBORS, ESPECIALLY THOSE WHO MAY NEED ASSISTANCE.</strong></p><p><strong>IF YOU ARE IN A VEHICLE AND IT IS OPERATIONAL, USE IT ONLY IF ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY. SOME VEHICLES MAY NOT FUNCTION DUE TO THIS EVENT.</strong></p><p><strong>HOSPITALS, EMERGENCY SERVICES, AND FIRST RESPONDERS ARE OPERATING UNDER EMERGENCY CONDITIONS. YOU MAY EXPERIENCE EXTENDED OUTAGES OF POWER AND COMMUNICATIONS. THIS IS A NATIONAL-LEVEL INCIDENT, AND RESTORATION OF SERVICES WILL TAKE TIME.</strong></p><p><strong>THE UNITED STATES MILITARY AND FEDERAL AGENCIES ARE FULLY ENGAGED TO ENSURE NATIONAL SECURITY AND TO SUPPORT RESPONSE AND RECOVERY EFFORTS.</strong></p><p><strong>THERE IS NO INDICATION OF FALLOUT AT THIS TIME. THIS WAS NOT A GROUND-LEVEL NUCLEAR EXPLOSION.</strong></p><p>Mark heard someone behind him let out a breath they had been holding. The fallout question had been unspoken in the room since the lights went out. Now it was answered.</p><p><strong>WE WILL CONTINUE TO PROVIDE UPDATES THROUGH THE EMERGENCY ALERT SYSTEM AND ANY AVAILABLE BROADCAST STATIONS. STAY TUNED TO THIS STATION FOR OFFICIAL INFORMATION.</strong></p><p>The tone returned. Then the AM host came back on, the voice carefully controlled.</p><p>No one in the EOC spoke for a moment.</p><p>Mark looked at the board. Then at his team.</p><p>“Alright,” he said. “Now we know what they know.”</p><p>Jenna nodded slowly. “No additional detonations. No fallout. And no restoration timeline.”</p><p>“Which means they don’t have one,” Carl said from the HF rig. “Nothing long-range regional only.”</p><p>“So we work local,” Mark said. “Same as before. Nothing changes.”</p><p>He turned to the whiteboard and wrote:</p><p><strong>EAS CONFIRMED: HEMP EVENT / NUCLEAR DETONATION ABOVE NA / NO ADDITIONAL DETONATIONS / NO FALLOUT RISK / SCALE: NATIONAL / DURATION: UNKNOWN — PLAN LONG</strong></p><p>Scale unknown. Duration unknown. Those two facts told him almost everything he needed to know about how to run the next seventy-two hours. Scale unknown meant he could not count on mutual aid from neighboring counties — they were dealing with the same thing. Duration unknown but plan long meant every resource he had was finite and non-replenishable for the foreseeable future. No resupply. No cavalry. What was in the county right now was what he had to work with.</p><p>He had run disasters before where those facts were true locally. A bad tornado outbreak. The year the flooding took out three bridges and cut the county in half for eleven days. He had never run one where they were true nationally.</p><p>The difference was scale, not method. The method was the same.</p><p>He started with the first question. The one that always came first.</p><p>Who is dying right now that I don’t know about?</p><p><em>Life Safety — The First Hours</em></p><p>The reconnaissance teams came back in sequence starting at 0952.</p><p>Hospital: on generator, functional, walk-ins already heavy. Patients arriving by private vehicle and some on foot, oxygen-dependent individuals without power, home medical equipment failures, and patients whose ongoing home treatments could not be sustained.</p><p>The emergency department was managing but the volume was climbing.</p><p>Law enforcement: sheriff’s deputies deployed to all major intersections. They request the EOC get word out to remind everyone to treat signal outages as four way stops and have public works see if they can get signage up at key intersections. No significant civil disorder. Traffic backed up at the few gas stations with generators that still had fuel, but no confrontations reported. The jail was on generator, secure. One patrol vehicle fire — a newer model whose electronics had sparked on restart. Nobody hurt.</p><p>Fire: all stations reporting, all on generator. Responding to two traffic accidents due to signal outages, EMS running calls manually without dispatch, logging everything on paper. Two ambulances showing fault codes, crews troubleshooting. The units still running were the older ones. And the first carbon monoxide reports were already coming in by radio from fire units — people running generators in garages, in basements, in enclosed spaces because it was the obvious place to put them. Three incidents in the first two hours. Two families transported. One address had not answered the door when the unit arrived.</p><p>Mark looked at Carl. “Get a message to the radio station. Add it to the next broadcast. Generators outside only, away from windows and doors. Carbon monoxide kills without warning. If you feel dizzy or sick, get outside immediately.” And if the traffic signal is out, treat it as a four-way stop.</p><p>Carl was already writing it down.</p><p>The CO calls would keep coming. Mark knew that. People were doing what made sense to them — getting power, keeping the lights on, keeping the refrigerator running — without knowing that the exhaust accumulating in an enclosed space was odorless and would put a family on the floor before anyone understood what was happening. Public messaging was the only intervention available at scale. The fire units couldn’t be everywhere.</p><p>Water plant: Automated systems down. Manual backups working, pumps on backup power. Pressure stable for now. The superintendent had calculated his generator fuel at roughly sixty hours at current load. He had asked, carefully, whether anyone was bringing him more. Chlorine would be the next issue after a week if no resupply.</p><p>Mark read the water plant note twice.</p><p>Sixty hours. He did the math the way he always did, out of habit. The plant ran a 500-kilowatt generator — roughly 35 gallons an hour at full load, closer to 28 at the 75 to 80 percent load it was likely carrying. Call it 675 gallons a day. At that rate, the superintendent’s sixty-hour estimate was conservative but not wrong. Two and a half days. Maybe three if he shed non-critical loads.</p><p>That was the number everything else organized around.</p><p>Most people could survive a power outage for days if they had safe water and working sanitation. They could manage in the heat. They could eat what was in their pantry. They could find each other and help each other and make do in ways that would have seemed impossible before it happened. Take the water away — drop the pressure, lose the treatment, contaminate the supply — and every other problem got harder simultaneously. Sanitation failed. The hospital’s infection risk spiked. Elderly residents who were managing at home were suddenly not managing. The population that needed active intervention tripled overnight.</p><p>The water plant was not just one item on the list. It was the linchpin. Keep it running and he bought time across every other problem. Lose it and the calculus changed completely.</p><p>And water pressure was only half the sanitation equation. The wastewater system was the other half. Sewage lift stations across the county — the pump stations that moved wastewater uphill through the collection system to the treatment plant — ran on electricity. Some had backup generators. Many did not. Without power, the ones without generators would fill and overflow, backing sewage up into homes and on to streets. That was a public health crisis layered on top of everything else, the kind that didn’t announce itself dramatically but compounded quietly until it became impossible to ignore.</p><p>He added a line to the board: WASTEWATER — LIFT STATIONS — IDENTIFY GENERATOR GAPS.</p><p>Public works had the station list. Eighteen lift stations in the county. Four had their own backup generators. Fourteen did not. Getting a dedicated generator to each of those fourteen was not possible — there weren’t enough units and there wasn’t enough fuel to run them all continuously even if there were.</p><p>But continuous power wasn’t what the lift stations needed. They needed periodic pumping to keep the sewage moving.</p><p>Attach power, run the pump, move the sewage, move on. The cycle time depended on the flow rate at each station, but none of them needed a generator sitting there around the clock.</p><p>He had done this before. Not for an EMP event, but for a prolonged outage after a bad storm when the same problem had presented itself, more stations than generators, no help coming from outside the county, and a public works director who had looked at a flatbed truck and a single large generator and figured out the math.</p><p>You mounted the generator on the flatbed. You sized it for the largest station on the route. You built the route to hit each station before its wet well reached capacity. You ran the circuit on a schedule, and you kept the sewage moving without ever leaving a generator at any single site. One generator, one truck, one driver, fourteen stations covered.</p><p>He picked up the radio. “Public works, EOC. I need your largest portable generator on a flatbed and a driver who knows the lift station locations. We’re going to run a pump route. How long to get that moving?”</p><p>A pause. Then the public works supervisor’s voice: “Generator’s here. Flatbed’s here. Give me twenty minutes to get rigged and I can have a driver on the route within the hour.”</p><p>“Do it,” Mark said.</p><p>He added it to the fuel priority list. The flatbed circuit would burn maybe fifty gallons a day running the route. Not at the top. But on it. And the alternative — raw sewage backing up into neighborhoods while the county was already dealing with everything else — wasn’t acceptable.</p><p>He added a line to the board: WATER PLANT — 60 HRS FUEL — PRIORITY ONE.</p><p>Then he paused.</p><p>The water plant covered Newberry and the incorporated towns. It did not cover roughly sixty percent of the county that sat outside the municipal system on private wells. Those residents had whatever was left in their pressure tanks — twenty, maybe eighty gallons depending on the tank — and when that was gone, they had nothing unless they had a generator, hand pump, windmill, or a stock pond within reach. The EOC had no registry for any of that. No way to know which farms had hand pumps and which ones would be dry by tomorrow morning.</p><p>He wrote: RURAL WELLS — NO BACKUP VISIBILITY.</p><p>He turned to Jenna.</p><p>“Water distribution plan. Rural townships only — Newberry’s on the municipal system for now. Talk to the Guard liaison about water buffaloes from the armory, talk to fire about their water tanker. Loop in public health on certification and messaging, public works on fill points and routes. I want distribution locations people can reach — fire stations, the co-op lots — and I want it on the radio by this afternoon so people know where to go before their pressure tanks drain.”</p><p>Jenna wrote as he talked. She didn’t ask what a water buffalo was.</p><p>He added two lines to the board and moved on.</p><p><strong>RURAL WATER DISTRIBUTION — JENNA — GUARD / FIRE / PUBLIC HEALTH / PUBLIC WORKS.</strong></p><p><strong>DISTRIBUTION POINTS: TOWNSHIP FIRE STATIONS / CO-OP LOTS — ON RADIO BY 1400.</strong></p><p>That was not a problem he could solve today. It was a problem he needed to know existed.</p><p>Then he picked up the radio.</p><p>“Water plant, EOC. What do you need to run indefinitely?”</p><p>A pause. Then the superintendent’s voice, careful and precise: “Diesel. Steady supply. And someone to tell me how long this lasts so I can manage load.”</p><p>“Working on both,” Mark said. “Hold tight.”</p><p><em>Life Sustaining — The Clock</em></p><p>The first team’s vehicle report had been what he expected and more complicated than he hoped.</p><p>The picture wasn’t catastrophic failure across the board, it was unpredictable, which in some ways was harder to manage. Most vehicles had started. Some hadn’t. Some had started and then behaved strangely, warning lights, erratic gauges, systems cycling on and off. One of the newer patrol cars wouldn’t start at all. Two ambulances were showing fault codes and the crews were troubleshooting. One fire engine had started fine, ran for twenty minutes, and then stopped without warning. The county’s ancient backup communications van started on the first try and ran clean, and Mark had made a private note to send the budget committee a photograph of it when this was over.</p><p>The pattern, such as it was, older vehicles with simpler electronics were more reliable. Newer vehicles with complex engine management systems were unpredictable. Nobody could tell you in advance which specific unit would work, and which wouldn’t, because the variables, shielding, orientation, exposure — were too many. You found out by trying.</p><p>“Assume every vehicle is a question mark until you’ve run it,” Mark told the team leads. “Don’t plan around anything you haven’t confirmed today.”</p><p>At 1034 Ray Collins walked in with his own mug and forty thousand gallons of diesel and a simple request: tell me who gets it first so I can hold the line at my gate.</p><p>Mark had the list ready. He had been building it since Garrett left. Not just names and addresses — burn rates. Every critical generator in the county, estimated kilowattage, estimated fuel consumption per day.</p><p>Water plant: 500kW generator, approximately 675 gallons per day. Hospital: 750kW generator, approximately 900 gallons per day, the largest single consumer on the list, running surgical suites, HVAC, ICU equipment, and a load that would only grow as walk-ins increased. Six fire stations on smaller 150 to 200kW units, averaging maybe 12 gallons an hour each: roughly 300 gallons a day combined. Sheriff’s operations center and EOC together: another 150. The nursing homes: six of them, mix of 150 to 250kW units, somewhere around 600 gallons a day if all were running. And portable generators for the wastewater lift stations without backup power — public works had identified stations needing periodic service, rotating portable units through on a four-hour pumping schedule: roughly 100 gallons a day for that circuit alone.</p><p>Total estimated daily burn for critical county infrastructure: somewhere between 2,700 and 2,900 gallons. For seventy-two hours of coverage, he needed 8,500 gallons minimum, closer to 10,000 to have any margin.</p><p>Ray’s forty thousand gallons, if protected and prioritized, was roughly fourteen days at that rate. Enough to get somewhere. Not enough to wait indefinitely.</p><p>He handed Ray the list.</p><p>Ray read it without comment, set his mug down, and said he’d have the first delivery to the water plant to top off their tanks within the hour.</p><p>That was the whole community. Not a policy. A neighbor who showed up and asked what to do.</p><p>The communications piece was moving in parallel. Carl had the relay to the AM station established. The first public message went out at 1015–911 is down, go directly to fire stations and sheriff substations, don’t wait for help to find you. A carbon monoxide warning had already gone out before that, pushed the moment the first radio reports of CO incidents came in from fire units. The second message was scheduled for noon. Mark had written it himself: this is going to last more than a day. Conserve water. Check on your neighbors. We are working the problem.</p><p>That last sentence mattered. Not because it said anything specific. Because it said someone was there.</p><p>By midday the board had convened, declared, and given Garrett the legal authority he needed. The fuel rationing framework was moving from informal to official. The National Guard units recalled were beginning to report to staging areas, though without functioning digital communications their coordination was running on radio and runners and whatever they could figure out face to face.</p><p>The state EOC had not been heard from. That was not surprising. They were running the same playbook Mark was running, one level up, with the same degraded tools, and whatever they managed to transmit would take time to reach him. He had stopped waiting for it. He had a county to run.</p><p><em>The Electrical Grid</em></p><p>Sandra Okafor arrived at the EOC at 1712 with field dust on her boots and a yellow legal pad that had been through a full day’s work. She had a handheld radio clipped to her belt that she had clearly been using hard and a look that Mark recognized from the tail end of long activations, the particular flatness that settles in when someone has been solving problems since before breakfast and has not stopped.</p><p>She stopped just inside the door and looked at the room.</p><p>“Is there coffee,” she said.</p><p>Someone handed her a cup. She drank half of it standing by the door, not tasting it, and carried the rest to the whiteboard.</p><p>Mark knew Sandra Okafor the way emergency managers know the people they depend on, and then some. She had been in this room before, for the ice storm three winters ago and the tornado activation the spring before that. Her staff ran the utility desk during exercises. He had watched her brief incident commanders and fielded her calls at two in the morning when lines were down and he needed to know what was coming back up first and when. He had also sat across a board table from her for four years and watched her fight for every dollar of the resilience investment that was now the most important asset in the county. He knew she had come out of the Army Corps of Engineers, Prime Power, commissioned on her electrical engineering degree, and that she had been in Puerto Rico after Maria. He knew that when Sandra Okafor walked into an EOC at 1712 carrying a legal pad that had been through a full day’s work, she was not coming to ask for help. She was coming to deliver an answer she had spent the day working on.</p><p>She uncapped a marker and looked at the whiteboard for a moment.</p><p>“Okay,” she said, mostly to herself. Then she turned to the room.</p><p>“Here’s what we know and what we don’t. I’ll be quick.”</p><p>The co-op’s distribution infrastructure had survived with little to no damage. Her engineers had been in the field since the event and the picture was better than expected on that side. The EMP hardening work they had done on their critical substation equipment had held. Their SCADA systems were down but the hardware beneath them was largely intact.</p><p>What they did not know was the transmission grid above them.</p><p>“We buy our power,” she said. “We don’t generate it, except for one asset. The high-voltage transmission lines, the large step-down transformers at the regional level, we have no visibility on any of that. The state reliability council is not reachable. We don’t know if those systems survived. We don’t know when we’d have generation to distribute even if our distribution network is ready to carry it.”</p><p>She turned the page on the legal pad.</p><p>“The one asset we have is the solar farm on County Road 7. Twenty-two megawatts. Finished eighteen months ago under a federal resilience grant. Unlike a standard installation, this one was built to run on its own if it had to. We have twelve megawatt-hours of battery storage on site. The battery management system never lost power because it runs off the batteries directly. Our engineers read the charge level off the local display this morning.” She checked the legal pad. “Ninety percent.”</p><p>She paused.</p><p>“The grid-forming control systems in the inverters took damage. We’re still assessing how much. But enough that the battery and solar cannot establish their own island. They need an external reference signal to synchronize to before they can put power onto a circuit. Without that reference they are sitting on energy they cannot deliver.”</p><p>Mark waited.</p><p>“What we need is a generator large enough to energize the island. Not to carry the load. To form it. To give the inverters a stable voltage and frequency to lock onto.” She looked at the legal pad. “We have a 750 kilowatt unit we can move to the site. The generator starts up, energizes a section of our distribution circuit, establishes the reference. The battery inverters synchronize to it and come online behind it. From that point the battery is carrying the load and the generator is holding the reference signal and providing fault current capacity the inverters cannot match. It runs light. It is not working hard.”</p><p>“Walk me through what that actually does for us,” Mark said.</p><p>Sandra looked at him for a moment before she answered, and something shifted slightly in her expression. Not drama. Just the look of someone who has seen the alternative and is about to describe it to someone who has not.</p><p>“The hospital is on its own generator right now. Maybe forty percent of what it can normally do. Imaging is down, full HVAC is down, kitchen and laundry shed. The staff is managing around it.” She paused. “I can take the hospital off its generator entirely. Full clinical capacity, everything running, around the clock. Not just during the day. Continuously.”</p><p>The room was quiet for a moment.</p><p>“Their generator goes to standby. It stops burning fuel. It sits there as a backup in case we have a problem.”</p><p>Mark said nothing.</p><p>“During the day the solar farm carries the hospital and recharges the battery at the same time. One and a half megawatts against a twenty-two-megawatt farm is not a strain. At night the battery carries the hospital load, and our co-op generator supplements it for the last couple of hours before sunrise. That’s it. That’s the whole system.”</p><p>“What’s the battery math on that,” Mark said.</p><p>“Ninety percent of twelve megawatt-hours is about 10.8 usable. At 1.5 megawatts continuous that’s about seven hours on battery alone. September nights here are nine and a half hours. So, the generator picks up the last two to three hours before sunrise, running light.” She paused. “Battery recharges during the day. Cycle repeats.”</p><p>“What breaks it,” Mark said.</p><p>“Weather first. One bad day we can absorb. A string of cloudy days and we start having a harder conversation.” She flipped a page. “And the calendar. We have about twelve hours of useful sun right now. By late October that’s down to eight. By December it’s maybe seven, and the sun’s low enough that the panels aren’t working at full efficiency even when it’s clear.” She looked at the legal pad rather than at him. “The margin I have today is not the margin I’ll have in November. And a hospital running full capacity in an Iowa winter draws more power than the same hospital in September. I don’t have that number yet but it’s not 1.5 megawatts.”</p><p>She looked up.</p><p>“If this goes into winter, we need to be talking about that now. Not in November.”</p><p>Mark looked at the board. He wrote nothing yet.</p><p>“The generator on County Road 7,” Sandra said. “If that goes down the island goes with it. Battery and solar cannot re-establish without it.” She said it without emphasis, the way someone states a fact they have already made their peace with. “Dedicated fuel, security on site, qualified operator there at all times. That one doesn’t flex.”</p><p>“What about the water plant. The EOC.”</p><p>“Different situation. During solar hours I can put them on the island circuit and give their generators a rest. But not right at sunrise or sunset. The solar production is too variable at the edges to safely carry large loads during the transitions. One hour after sunrise, one hour before sunset. Right now, that’s about ten hours a day. By late October, about eight.” She looked at the map. “At night they go back on their own generators. Same as now. I’m not promising them continuous power. I’m promising their generators rest during the day and their fuel lasts longer. That’s still worth having.”</p><p>“When you bring the circuit up,” Mark said, “what about everyone else on it. Residential customers, businesses.”</p><p>“Every meter on that circuit that isn’t a designated critical facility gets pulled before we energize,” Sandra said. “Not managed. Pulled. I’m not running the hospital on continuous power with residential customers and their garage generators on the same circuit.” She checked the legal pad. “Our crews are already working on it. That’s part of why I need fuel. They’re driving the circuit right now.”</p><p>“How long does that take.”</p><p>“We’ll be ready by tomorrow morning. First light is when we attempt the solar inverters anyway. Everything comes together at the same time if the crew stay on schedule.”</p><p>“When the hospital lights up and everyone else on that circuit is dark, I’m going to hear about it,” Mark said.</p><p>Sandra looked up from the legal pad.</p><p>“Yes,” she said. “You are.”</p><p>“Dialysis clinic.”</p><p>“Dialysis patients can come to the hospital, if we’re running full capacity. That’s actually one of the things this buys you that you didn’t have this morning.” She paused. “Home oxygen and home medical equipment is the harder problem. My crews are going to pull meters on houses where people may have concentrators or other life-sustaining equipment running. We don’t have a good way to know which houses those are before we pull. That needs to be on your list today.”</p><p>Mark nodded and wrote something.</p><p>“It’s not a permanent situation,” Sandra said. “Day one I can’t take chances with the island. I need the circuit clean and I need to know exactly what’s on it. By day two, my crews are doing assessments. Day three I have a better picture of actual surviving load out there and I can start bringing selected meters back. Medical priority first, then facilities I can have a load discipline conversation with.” She looked at the map. “The nursing home is probably day two or three. The dialysis clinic depends on their generator situation. There are solar and battery installations on some of these circuits too. Health clinics, a few businesses, residential. Same inverter damage we saw at the farm most likely. Panels and batteries are intact. Whether we can do anything with them is a question for day two and three. But it’s on the list.”</p><p>“ESF 12,” Mark said. “Is anybody coming from the federal side.”</p><p>Sandra looked at him the way someone looks at a question they had already answered for themselves.</p><p>“Not in any timeframe that matters for what I’m describing,” she said. “We’re building the local answer.”</p><p>Mark nodded. He had known that since mid-morning. He had needed to hear someone else say it.</p><p>“How confident are you in the solar inverters,” he said. “You said the grid-forming controls took damage.”</p><p>Sandra looked at him with something close to approval.</p><p>“We believe the solar inverters sustained similar damage to the battery inverters and can synchronize to the generator reference the same way. Grid-following operation behind an established reference is simpler than grid-forming. We will not know for certain until we attempt it at first light tomorrow.” She made another note. “If the solar inverters are more damaged than we expect, the hospital still gets continuous power from the battery and generator. We just lose the daytime solar boost and the recharge cycle. The overnight math gets tighter and the fuel savings for the other facilities go away. That’s the downside case. It’s not the worst case.”</p><p>“What do you need from me.”</p><p>“Fuel for our crew vehicles and the 750-kilowatt generator at the farm. Security at the site, nobody near that equipment who doesn’t belong there.” She tapped the legal pad. “Direct communication to the hospital administrator before we close the circuit. When we bring the hospital onto the island their operators execute a controlled transfer and their generator goes to standby. That sequence must be coordinated. If someone restarts that generator while the hospital is already on our circuit, we have a problem that takes time to sort out.”</p><p>She finished the coffee.</p><p>“And the authority to shed load without asking first if I have to. I can’t be on the phone while the frequency is dropping.”</p><p>“You have all of it,” Mark said. “Get your crews moving.”</p><p>Sandra nodded and was already writing. She pulled the cap off the marker and added two lines to the whiteboard herself without asking, the way someone does when they have been in enough of these rooms to know that waiting for someone else to write it down is how things get lost.</p><p>Mark looked at what she had written and added his own lines below.</p><p><strong>SOLAR ISLAND / HOSPITAL FULL CAPACITY CONTINUOUS / OTHER CRITICAL FACILITIES DAYLIGHT RELIEF / SOLAR INVERTERS UNCERTAIN / WEATHER DEPENDENT.</strong></p><p><strong>SEASONAL WINDOW CLOSING.</strong></p><p><strong>PROTECT THE GENERATOR ON COUNTY ROAD 7.</strong></p><p>He looked at the fuel numbers on the adjacent board. The water plant was still on Ray Collins’ diesel. The EOC was still on Ray Collins’ diesel. Half the county’s critical infrastructure was still on Ray Collins’ diesel.</p><p>But the hospital was not. Starting tomorrow morning, the hospital was Sandra’s problem. And Sandra, it turned out, had done her homework.</p><p>She had wired generators into hospital feed heads in the dark after Sandy with the 249th. She had done it in Puerto Rico after Maria.</p><p>Mark turned to Dave Cutter at the fuel board.</p><p>“You heard all of that,” he said.</p><p>Dave had a pencil in his hand and was already looking at his numbers.</p><p>“Tell me which generators come off primary load first,” he said, “and I’ll tell you how long we have.”</p><p>The calendar, though. The calendar was nobody’s problem yet. In six weeks, it would be everyone’s.</p><p><em>Mass Care — The List</em></p><p>The special needs registry was a spreadsheet that lived on a server that no longer existed.</p><p>Mark had a printed copy. He had made that call two years ago after a generator test failure had taken the EOC offline for six hours during a winter ice storm watch, and he had stood in the dark thinking about every piece of information that was suddenly inaccessible. The next week he had printed the registry, laminated the critical pages, and put them in a binder on the shelf behind his desk. His deputy had teased him about it.</p><p>The binder was open on the table now.</p><p>Six nursing homes. Two assisted living facilities. One memory care unit. The county jail with 340 inmates and staff dependent on electronic systems for everything from door locks to medication dispensing. Four congregate care group homes. The dialysis clinic. A home ventilator registry with nineteen names and addresses, people who could not breathe without power.</p><p>Nineteen names.</p><p>He looked at that number for a moment.</p><p>Some of them had backup batteries. Some of those batteries were already running. He had no way to know which ones, because the phone system was down and the registry had last been updated four months ago and people moved, people changed equipment, people were added and not recorded and removed and not removed.</p><p>The list was a starting point. It was not a complete picture. The complete picture did not exist.</p><p>He assigned two sheriff’s deputies and one fire unit to begin working the ventilator list in address order. They would go door to door. They would find out who needed what and report back. It was slow and it was manual and it was the only way to do it.</p><p>The nursing homes were a different problem. They had generators. Most of them. But generators needed fuel, and fuel needed delivery, and he had just sent the first delivery to the water plant and the hospital. The nursing homes were on the list. They were not at the top of the list. He had made that call consciously and he would answer for it if he had to.</p><p>A fire unit doing welfare checks had raised the dialysis clinic on simplex radio at 1220. Generator fuel down to ninety minutes. Three patients were currently on machines.</p><p>Mark looked at the fuel list. Looked at the board. Looked at the map he had taped to the wall when the digital displays went dark, a paper county road map from the bottom drawer of the filing cabinet, the kind nobody used anymore.</p><p>He made the call. Dialysis clinic moved to second on the next delivery run. One of the nursing homes dropped a slot.</p><p>He did not feel good about that. He was not supposed to feel good about it. Triage was not about good options. It was about making the best available call with incomplete information and then moving to the next one.</p><p>Jenna put a note on the table without saying anything. A handwritten message relayed by radio from a fire unit two miles north: a congregate care group home for adults with developmental disabilities, eight residents, staff of three, generator out of fuel, no response to radio contact.</p><p>Eight residents. Staff of three. No contact.</p><p>He looked at the board. He looked at the fuel list. He looked at the map.</p><p>He picked up the radio.</p><p>The picture was still incomplete. It would stay that way. That was the nature of the first hours — you were always working ahead of your information, always making calls based on what you knew and accounting for what you didn’t, always aware that somewhere in the county, something was going wrong that hadn’t reached you yet.</p><p>That was the job. Not to have all the answers. To keep asking the right questions and to move toward the ones that mattered most.</p><p>Outside, the county was already solving problems he would never know about — neighbors with generators sharing power through extension cords strung across yards, a hardware store owner who had opened his doors and was handing out batteries on the honor system, the same church two miles away whose pastor had turned the fellowship hall into a feeding station without being asked and without calling anyone for permission.</p><p>And scattered across the county, a patchwork of light that nobody had planned for. Houses with solar panels and battery backup systems were in varying states. The panels themselves — passive arrays converting sunlight to DC current — were largely unaffected. The batteries were largely unaffected. What was less certain were the inverters and charge controllers and transfer switches that made those systems usable — the electronics that converted stored DC power to household AC and managed the handoff from grid to battery when grid power failed. Some of those had survived. Some had not. Some had failed in ways that could be worked around by someone who understood the system.</p><p>That was happening in pockets across the county. People who understood their systems were assessing them, working around failed components, sharing what they knew with neighbors. Some of it was sophisticated — ham operators rebuilding charge controller circuits from spare parts. Some of it was simple — someone who had read their system manual figuring out the manual override. None of it was organized. All of it was real.</p><p>The county was not uniformly dark. It was a patchwork of outcomes determined by what equipment people owned, how well they understood it, and whether they knew someone who could help them figure out what had failed and what could be fixed. Mark didn’t know the exact shape of that patchwork and couldn’t. But he understood its implication: the people who had working power were largely managing their own situation. His immediate problem was the people who didn’t and within that group, the ones with no margin and no workaround.</p><p>The plan nobody wrote down. The part that worked anyway.</p><p>Mark keyed the radio.</p><p>“Fire Three, EOC. I need you to divert to 4417 County Road 12. Congregate care facility. Eight residents. Unknown status. Report immediately on arrival.”</p><p>A pause.</p><p>“EOC, Fire Three. Copy. En route.”</p><p>He set the radio down.</p><p>There was no timeline.</p><p>Only the next decision.</p><h3>Author’s Note</h3><p>My name is Craig Fugate. I served as FEMA Administrator under President Obama from 2009 to 2017, and before that as Director of the Florida Division of Emergency Management and Director of Alachua County Emergency Management in Gainesville, Florida. I have been working in emergency management since 1987.</p><p>A Note on Inspiration</p><p>This story was inspired by Annie Jacobsen’s Nuclear War: A Scenario (2024), an account of what a nuclear attack would look like from the perspective of national leadership and military command. Her book made me think about the question she didn’t address: what does it look like at the bottom of the system? Not the Situation Room. Not STRATCOM. Not NORAD. But at a County Emergency Management program, like where I started my journey in this profession.</p><p>Early in my career, we were still actively planning for nuclear war. As a new county emergency manager, I was introduced to the current U.S. nuclear war preparedness doctrine. One of the products that guided us was Nuclear Attack Planning Base — 1990 (NAPB-90), published by Federal Emergency Management Agency to help states and local governments plan for nuclear war.</p><p>It covered population protection plans, relocation of people from high-risk areas to safer ones, critical infrastructure, likely target analysis, and fallout modeling.</p><p>We used early DOS-based computer programs to project fallout spread. And we had wheel calculators, physical slide-rule devices, to estimate blast overpressure and thermal effects based on yield and height of burst.</p><p>I used those tools.</p><p>They were not hypothetical.</p><p>The Cold War ended, the Soviet Union dissolved, and that planning largely faded from institutional memory. Emergency management moved toward all-hazards frameworks, natural disasters, terrorism after September 11, and the daily work of helping communities recover from floods and hurricanes and tornadoes. The nuclear threat became something we acknowledged in the background but rarely planned for in detail.</p><p>I’ve always been interested in nuclear electromagnetic pulse weapons. What made me want to write this story is that it occupies a unique space in the threat landscape. In most nuclear war scenarios, the choice is between escalation and what strategists call a bolt from the blue, a ground burst or air burst that produces immediate casualties, blast damage, and fallout. A HEMP detonation at high altitude produces none of those things directly. No crater. No immediate casualties from the detonation itself. No significant fallout risk. What it produces instead is the simultaneous failure of the electrical and electronic infrastructure across a vast geographic area, the invisible collapse of every system that modern life depends on, all at once.</p><p>That is a different kind of catastrophe. And it is one that the emergency management community has not fully reckoned with.</p><h3>What We Know: A Practitioner’s Assessment of HEMP</h3><p>The following is not a technical treatise. It is a summary of what the unclassified public record, primarily the EMP Commission’s reports of 2004, 2008, and the 2017 reassessment, all cleared for public release tells us about the likely effects of a high-altitude electromagnetic pulse event. I am writing this for emergency managers, not for physicists or defense analysts.</p><h3>What a HEMP Event Is</h3><p>A high-altitude electromagnetic pulse is produced by a nuclear detonation above the atmosphere, generally above 30 kilometers. The detonation produces an immediate burst of gamma radiation that interacts with the upper atmosphere to generate a powerful electromagnetic field across a vast geographic area. A single weapon detonated at sufficient altitude could expose most of the continental United States to EMP effects.</p><p>There is no blast at ground level. There is no immediate fallout risk. The weapon kills nothing directly. What it does is attack the electrical and electronic infrastructure that modern life depends on, simultaneously, across a geographic area that no prior disaster has ever matched.</p><p>The pulse has three components with different characteristics and different effects on infrastructure. The E1 component is the fast pulse, it peaks in nanoseconds and can damage or destroy semiconductor electronics, particularly those connected to external antennas or long conductors. The E2 component behaves similarly to lightning and is generally less concerning because most infrastructure has some protection against lightning. The E3 component is the slow pulse, it behaves similarly to a geomagnetic storm and poses the greatest threat to large extended systems, particularly high-voltage transmission lines and the transformers that connect them.</p><h3>What Science Fiction Gets Wrong</h3><p>The popular image of a HEMP event, every electronic device simultaneously destroyed, every vehicle stopped in its tracks, civilization instantly collapsed, is not supported by the unclassified test record. The EMP Commission’s own findings corrected this misconception explicitly. Smaller, self-contained systems that are not connected to long external conductors tend to survive E1 effects. Vehicles are a primary example. The Commission found that most vehicles tested were not disabled by simulated EMP, though some experienced disruption and a smaller number had permanent damage. Hand-held radios, portable equipment, and systems in metal enclosures are more resilient than the fiction suggests.</p><p>What is not resilient is the large, networked infrastructure: the power grid, the telecommunications backbone, and the industrial control systems that run water and fuel. These are the real targets.</p><p>Not because every component fails, but because these systems are interconnected. The loss of a few critical pieces — especially the giant high-voltage transformers that move power across regions — can cascade into widespread and prolonged outages, even if most of the equipment below them survives intact.</p><p>And those backbone transformers are not replaced quickly. Many now have lead times measured in three to five years, turning what starts as equipment damage into a long-term lifeline crisis.</p><h3>What We Genuinely Don’t Know</h3><p>The honest answer, drawn directly from the EMP Commission’s findings, is that precise predictions about the effects of a specific HEMP event on specific infrastructure remain out of reach. The most comprehensive unclassified HEMP risk assessment concluded that long-term catastrophic damage across multiple critical infrastructures is possible, but that precise predictions remain difficult due to limited real-world data. We have not tested HEMP events against modern civilian infrastructure at operational scale. We have simulation data, component-level testing, and the results of the 1962 atmospheric nuclear tests. We do not have the complete picture.</p><p>The satellite infrastructure itself is probably more resilient than science fiction suggests, but ground terminal survivability follows the same uneven pattern as everything else. This is an area where the EMP Commission reports have less granular public guidance than on the power grid question.</p><p>This uncertainty cuts in both directions. The worst-case scenarios may be overstated. The optimistic scenarios may also be understated. An emergency manager planning for this event cannot know in advance whether the county’s generators will start, whether vehicles will run, whether the water plant’s control systems survived. What they can know is the framework for triage and response regardless of the specific outcome.</p><h3>What This Means for Local Emergency Management</h3><p>The HEMP scenario does not require a new plan. It requires an honest assessment of whether your existing all-hazards plan can survive the simultaneous failure of the communications and logistics infrastructure it depends on.</p><p>Most plans assume the phone system will work well enough to activate partners. That the internet will be available for coordination. That mutual aid from neighboring jurisdictions is accessible. That state and federal resources arrive within a reasonable timeframe. A HEMP event systematically invalidates each of those assumptions — potentially for an extended period, potentially across a geographic area so large that mutual aid and federal response face the same degraded conditions your county does.</p><p>The framework — life safety, life sustaining, stabilization — remains valid. The tools for executing it are what the scenario challenges. The relationships built before the event, the analog backups maintained and exercised, the fuel reserves and printed registries and standing orders that don’t depend on digital systems — these are what determine whether a county manages the first seventy-two hours or is managed by them.</p><h3>A Note on COGCON</h3><p>The story references COGCON 1 — the Continuity of Government Readiness Condition framework used within the U.S. Executive Branch to describe readiness levels for continuity operations. The scale runs from COGCON 4 (normal, routine operations) to COGCON 1 (maximum readiness). COGCON 1 means continuity plans are no longer theoretical — they are being executed. Primary facilities are assumed to be degraded, at risk, or unusable. The priority is leadership survivability and command continuity.</p><p>At COGCON 1, typical actions include relocation of key leadership and continuity personnel, activation of alternate operating facilities and continuity sites, and transition to redundant, hardened communications systems. The facilities referenced in the story — Mount Weather and Raven Rock (Site R) — are illustrative examples of the kind of infrastructure this framework draws on, not an exhaustive list.</p><p>COGCON is sometimes confused with DEFCON. They are distinct systems. DEFCON governs military readiness and is managed by the Department of Defense. COGCON governs Executive Branch survivability and continuity — it is about whether the government can keep functioning, not about the military’s combat posture. During a major crisis they may move in parallel, but they serve different purposes and different chains of authority.</p><p>The existence of continuity programs and the general readiness level framework is unclassified and publicly acknowledged. The specific triggers, thresholds, personnel movements, and execution details are not. COGCON levels are not typically discussed publicly in real time — unlike DEFCON, the term does not appear in press releases or official public statements. What becomes visible is not the designation itself but the actions it triggers: deputies relocating, alternate facilities activating, observable changes in government posture that reporters and adversaries alike can read. That is what “this was no longer a secret” means in the story.</p><h3>Why I Wrote This Story</h3><p>This story is not science fiction. It is an attempt to think through, as honestly as I can, what the first hours of a HEMP event would actually look like from inside a small county Emergency Operations Center — not the scenario as imagined by novelists, but the scenario as experienced by a local emergency manager with a solid all-hazards plan, good relationships, and a problem that exceeds every assumption their plan was built on.</p><p>The tools Mark uses are real. The systems Carl monitors are real. The fuel math is real. The gaps are real.</p><p>My hope is that emergency managers who read this will recognize both what they already have — the framework, the relationships, the trained instinct to sequence decisions under pressure — and what the HEMP scenario specifically demands that most plans do not yet provide for.</p><p>I am not attempting to address what happens in the days and weeks following such an event. The recovery from a large-scale HEMP event would be unlike anything in our experience, and that story deserves its own treatment. What I am addressing is the first operational period, the initial hours when a local emergency manager is working from what they have, before state and federal resources have arrived, before the full picture is known, before anyone can say with confidence how long this will last. For what the following weeks and months might look like at the community level, Strieber and Kunetka’s <em>Warday</em> remains the most honest fictional treatment I know of.</p><p>Your emergency operations plan is your starting point. It gives you the framework to solve the problems you know — and the ones you haven’t faced yet. It defines your team and how they operate — for the expected, the unexpected, and the unthinkable.</p><p><em>Craig Fugate</em></p><p><em>FEMA Administrator, 2009–2017</em></p><p><em>Director, Florida Division of Emergency Management, 2001–2009</em></p><p><em>Director, Alachua County Emergency Management, 1987–1997</em></p><p>A Note on How This Was Written</p><p>This story was written with AI assistance — Claude for editing, grammar, and narrative flow; ChatGPT for factchecking. The experience, the operational knowledge, the interviews with former FEMA staff, and the story itself are mine. AI wasn’t my ghostwriter. It was my editor.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ec646b522b51" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[God and Emergency Managers]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@craig_40068/god-and-emergency-managers-964b819a0e1e?source=rss-255a06ff6e1c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/964b819a0e1e</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Craig Fugate]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 25 Apr 2026 22:32:09 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-05-20T20:53:31.908Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Report from Raphael</p><p>God was contemplating the universe.</p><p>Not managing it. Contemplating it.</p><p>Management implied surprise, and there were very few surprises left.</p><p>Michael approached carefully, the way one approaches omnipotence when it appears to be in a mood.</p><p>“Lord, Raphael needs to speak with You.”</p><p>“Raphael,” God said, without looking up.</p><p>Michael nodded.</p><p>“Yes. Him.”</p><p>God sighed, and somewhere a star dimmed slightly.</p><p>“What does he want now?”</p><p>Michael shifted.</p><p>“It’s the emergency managers, Lord. They’re lost.”</p><p>God closed one galaxy and turned His attention.</p><p>“They are always lost.”</p><p>Raphael entered carrying a stack of papers thick enough to qualify as scripture.</p><p>Raphael was God’s representative to the disaster after-action reviews. He often arrived disguised as a FEMA reservist or a consultant — one of those faceless people always sitting in meetings, taking notes, asking uncomfortable questions, and somehow appearing on every distribution list despite no one knowing exactly who they were or who they worked for.</p><p>He compiled recommendations, documented failures, and carried them back to Heaven, where they received approximately the same attention as the ones on Earth.</p><p>“Lord,” he said, “I have once again brought this matter before You.”</p><p>“I know,” God said. “You keep emailing about it.”</p><p>Raphael set the papers down.</p><p>“The emergency managers are asking questions again.”</p><p>“Dangerous.”</p><p>“They want to know who they are. They ask if they are a profession. They ask why no one understands what they do. They say they do not have an elevator speech.”</p><p>God frowned.</p><p>“I invented elevators specifically for that purpose.”</p><p>Raphael continued.</p><p>“They complain that sometimes they report to the fire chief. Sometimes to the sheriff. Sometimes directly to the governor or mayor. Others are buried so deep in the organizational chart they report through facilities maintenance and must share a copier with Parks and Recreation.”</p><p>God nodded slowly.</p><p>“I created emergency managers because humans kept building systems that collapse the moment someone yells ‘flood.’ I made them to stand in the gap between catastrophe and chaos. I did not intend for them to spend their days arguing over copier access.”</p><p>He looked directly at Raphael.</p><p>“Look, Ralph — “</p><p>“Raphael, Lord.”</p><p>“I know what I said.”</p><p>God looked at Raphael.</p><p>“I did a great deal of work through day seven. On day eight, I rested. Since then, I have spent much of eternity trying to balance free will with preventing humans from setting the entire project on fire and then arguing over whose department handles smoke.”</p><p>Raphael opened his mouth.</p><p>God raised a hand.</p><p>“Yes, Lord, but they keep emailing me. Next thing I know, I am in a Teams meeting trying to explain debris management to three county administrators, two consultants, someone from procurement, and a man whose only contribution is replying-all with ‘following.’”</p><p>God was silent for a long moment.</p><p>“Raphael, I did not create Microsoft Teams. That was Lucifer. Nor did I create most of the systems they use under the pretense of managing disaster.”</p><p>“I created floods. They created login credentials.”</p><p>“I created storms. They created dashboards.”</p><p>“I created earthquakes. They created SharePoint.”</p><p>Raphael adjusted his papers.</p><p>“They are also still saying ‘act of God,’ Lord.”</p><p>God stood.</p><p>Once.</p><p>And every mountain on Earth remembered Sinai.</p><p>“One more time, Ralph. There are natural hazards. There are human decisions. There are consequences. There is no such thing as an act of God. I made creation. I did not authorize poor zoning. The storms, the floods, the earthquakes, the fires — these are not disasters by themselves. It is where they build. It is how they build. It is what they choose to ignore. That is what creates disaster. Why are they blaming Me?”</p><p>He paused.</p><p>“And I even gave them building codes. It is right there in the manual.”</p><p>“The wise man builds his house upon the rock. The rains come. The floods rise. The winds blow. It stands.”</p><p>“The foolish man builds on sand. It collapses.”</p><p>“How much clearer was I supposed to be?”</p><p>Raphael nodded carefully. He looked down at his sandals, as though the answer might be written there.</p><p>It was not.</p><p>God sat.</p><p>“The Ralphs persist,” Michael said quietly.</p><p>“They do,” God replied.</p><p>Raphael straightened.</p><p>“Lord, You must help me deliver these emergency managers into something resembling the Promised Land. Or at least a new certification. They grow discouraged. They burn out. They leave for the private sector — some even become consultants.”</p><p>“Satan is complaining that the debris contractors are crowding out the lawyers.”</p><p>God paused.</p><p>“There are debris contractors in Hell?”</p><p>Michael nodded.</p><p>“Yes, Lord. They have submitted change orders.”</p><p>God closed His eyes.</p><p>“Of course they have.”</p><p>Raphael continued.</p><p>“And then the next flood arrives, and no one remembers where the sandbags are. Or the generator does not start. Or the fuel contract expired. Or the satellite phone contract lapsed. Or the person with the password retired three years ago and no one thought to ask where he wrote it down.”</p><p>God closed His eyes. Then He opened them.</p><p>“Ralph.”</p><p>“Raphael, Lord.”</p><p>“I gave them exercises. I gave them the gift of practice before consequence. A chance to fail without cost. A chance to find the broken thing before the broken thing finds them.”</p><p>He paused.</p><p>“And what do they do?”</p><p>Raphael waited.</p><p>“They exercise to success. They build exercises around what they can already do. They practice the day they are capable of, not the day I am capable of sending.”</p><p>God rose.</p><p>“Ralph, I made a distinction, and I made it clearly. There are emergencies — the daily currency of sirens, incident command, and people who know their jobs. And there are disasters — the thing that overwhelms all of that. The thing that breaks the system they practiced.”</p><p>He looked out across everything.</p><p>“They train for the emergency. They pray the disaster never comes. And when it does, they are surprised.”</p><p>A long silence.</p><p>“They are always surprised.”</p><p>Another silence.</p><p>“Ralph. Where in the Bible did I ever say hope is a strategy?”</p><p>Raphael opened his mouth.</p><p>“Do not look it up. I wrote it. I know what is in there.”</p><p>“And Ralph — My God — how many after-action reports have they written, and they still have not learned?”</p><p>Raphael cleared his throat.</p><p>“Lord, they now call them improvement plans.”</p><p>God turned to Michael.</p><p>It was not anger. It was the expression of someone reconsidering omniscience.</p><p>Michael gave the smallest possible shrug.</p><p>God turned back.</p><p>“If you can get the emergency managers to agree upon a single representative, I will meet with them Myself.”</p><p>Raphael blinked.</p><p>“Do You want one that represents nations? States? Local governments? Because they all have separate organizations, separate conferences, separate certifications, and they are usually competing for the same shrinking resources. Getting them to agree, even among themselves, is nearly impossible. Frankly, Lord, unifying them may qualify as a miracle, and that seems like Your department.”</p><p>God sighed.</p><p>“All I was trying to do was help humans manage catastrophe when the governments they built could not. That was the whole purpose of emergency management. Not managing grants. Not writing plans nobody reads. Not this thing they call ICS, where everyone wears a vest and somebody immediately believes they control the disaster. I thought I made Myself clear. No other gods before Me. And now they have charts where they make people gods.”</p><p>“Lord,” Raphael said carefully, “they call it Command, not God.”</p><p>God looked at him.</p><p>“That may be what they call it, Ralph. But the moment someone gets a vest and a whiteboard, they start accepting worship.”</p><p>Michael quietly pretended to review a cloud.</p><p>God looked over at him.</p><p>“And where is Gabriel in all of this? He is My enforcer. Why has he not been making them adhere to the rules? No other gods before Me. Fix the ICS. Stop writing plans nobody understands. Put the operators in charge and let the clerks run payroll. I did not part the Red Sea so someone could deny a generator request because no one checked the priority in Box 8 of the ICS 213 RR.”</p><p>Michael cleared his throat.</p><p>“Gabriel is in procurement, Lord.”</p><p>Raphael said nothing.</p><p>God stared into eternity.</p><p>“Procurement?”</p><p>Michael nodded.</p><p>“Yes, Lord. They said his approval authority was essential, but he is currently waiting on three signatures, a legal review, and a competitive bid process for trumpets.”</p><p>Silence filled Heaven.</p><p>Somewhere on Earth, a committee was contemplating a new Emergency Support Function.</p><p>God stared into eternity.</p><p>It had not improved.</p><p>He could see it all. The next storm. The next failure. The next hearing. The next reorganization. The next administrator who would be praised, then blamed, then forgotten.</p><p>He had seen it before. He would see it again.</p><p>“Michael.”</p><p>“Yes, Lord?”</p><p>“Get Me Lucifer.”</p><p>Michael hesitated.</p><p>“Directly, Lord?”</p><p>“Yes. At this point, I trust the fallen angel more than middle management.”</p><p>Michael left.</p><p>God sat alone with what He already knew.</p><p>The next flood was already forming.</p><p>And God wept.</p><p>From the</p><p>THE BOOK OF RAPHAEL</p><p>God’s Emergency Manager</p><p>Being the recently discovered collected writings, field observations, after action reports, and marginal annotations of the archangel Raphael, together with the competing annotations of the adversary, recovered from a climate-controlled storage unit in the Mojave Desert, beneath approximately forty years of federal documentation, in a box labeled MISC — DO NOT DISCARD.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=964b819a0e1e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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