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    <channel>
        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Ryo on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Ryo on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@crypto_ryo?source=rss-d106e8b2cf0b------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Ryo on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@crypto_ryo?source=rss-d106e8b2cf0b------2</link>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Senior NASA engineer calls out Howard Chu (hyc_symas, Monero developer) on being a fraud]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@crypto_ryo/senior-nasa-engineer-calls-out-howard-chu-hyc-symas-monero-developer-on-being-a-fraud-db0b46688041?source=rss-d106e8b2cf0b------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[nasa]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency-news]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[monero]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[space]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ryo]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 03 Dec 2019 11:30:28 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-12-03T11:32:17.212Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Senior NASA engineer calls out Howard Chu (hyc_symas, Monero developer) for being a fraud</h3><p>I just read a <a href="https://oracletimes.com/monero-developer-caught-out-faking-cv-impersonating-his-brothers-career/">news story</a> so bizarre that I had to go through with it with an analytical eye</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/627/1*MqeoispzrzRnSInwsedSEA.png" /><figcaption>Summary of Howard’s claims <a href="https://www.facebook.com/notes/howard-chu/my-space-shuttle-story-for-catherine/109922698035/">[1]</a>. Take good note of timing — 20 minutes into the flight. Dates will become important</figcaption></figure><p>Ed Caro, senior engineer at NASA in charge of the system Howard claims so gallantly saved mid-flight, makes following claims:</p><ol><li>His story doesn’t add up on a technical level. There were multiple backups in place that would have prevented both vehicle failure and data loss.</li><li>His dates don’t add up. Howard claims to have worked in JPL from 1991 till 1993. The mission launched on 9th of April 1994</li><li>Actually, nobody he knows remembers Howard working on the project. One person remembers Howard’s older brother, Eugene. <strong>Source</strong>: <a href="https://oracletimes.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/1-768x1445.png">[ 2]</a></li></ol><p>Now, here is where the story, as published by a <a href="https://oracletimes.com/monero-developer-caught-out-faking-cv-impersonating-his-brothers-career/">minor cryptocurrency</a> news site, takes a really bizarre turn. Apparently someone calling himself Eugene wrote to them, twice.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/739/1*TUG4A1lJgaEi-0Bf19vJNg.png" /></figure><p>And a second reply:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/584/1*I-jnPojgqOOEqWUvJM7Kww.png" /></figure><p>For the record, I don’t think it was either Eugene or Howard writing those emails. A lot of holders of Monero cryptocurrency will perceive this story as a threat to their money — so it was most likely just a random community member.</p><p>If you worked at JPL on SIR-C project, and do — or do not remember Howard Chu, please email fireice.xmr@gmail.com and I will include your email in the story.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=db0b46688041" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Quick analysis of the BCH “50% attack” drama]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@crypto_ryo/quick-analysis-of-the-bch-50-attack-drama-98ba22a73339?source=rss-d106e8b2cf0b------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[bitcoincash]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bitcoin-mining]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bitcoin]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ryo]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 27 Oct 2019 09:58:21 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-10-27T10:04:33.040Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/815/1*dZZSvMXkMVcPMpqVC3xjTw.png" /><figcaption>Thumbnail</figcaption></figure><p>Today I woke up to 3 separate people asking me “WTF is going on with Bitcoin Cash” — mostly from LTC controlled Telegram channels. Let’s have a quick critical look to see if anything is amiss, shall we?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*LwOtAvOhTHVCau5mYnPnlA.png" /><figcaption>Difficulty, block time and height export — <a href="https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1iSHEYER92q1T_8n1aGy1SDfbz3CbJYcfuPqDvNpYQHk/edit?usp=sharing">https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1iSHEYER92q1T_8n1aGy1SDfbz3CbJYcfuPqDvNpYQHk/</a></figcaption></figure><p>As you can see from the graph, the 3-hour gap was most likely caused by a large (around 10% of the total hashrate) miner leaving the network.</p><p>In the period after that we had 149 blocks in 22 hours, which works out to 6.7 per hour with a target of 6. This is pretty normal, a change in the difficulty of this magnitude is bound to cause oscillations of over and under adjustments.</p><p>As I’m writing this, the hashrate is rising again by about 10%, this can easily be explained by people switching on their miners in response to those events.</p><h4>TLDR; What does it mean?</h4><p>There is nothing in the current data that even remotely resembles a 50% attack. The hashrate rose barely by 10%. In the same way that people are looking into their morning toast and seeing the face of Jesus ( <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pareidolia">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pareidolia</a> ), others are trying to divine an attack from those semi-random numbers.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=98ba22a73339" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Sneak peek at what’s happening in Ryo development trenches]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@crypto_ryo/sneak-peek-at-whats-happening-in-ryo-development-trenches-a3650af093e?source=rss-d106e8b2cf0b------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a3650af093e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[monero]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ryo]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[privacy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ryo]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 09 May 2019 19:41:36 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-05-09T19:41:36.463Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><strong>Let’s go atomic</strong></h3><p>According to Monero talking heads atomic swaps are impossible until you buy Tari. This is of course just a marketing strategy that we have seen thousands of times — gimp the current product to release a new one.</p><p>We are working on support atomic swaps with BTC via P2SH addresses. The mechanism of atomic swaps is extremely simple and described well <a href="https://hackernoon.com/atomic-swaps-simply-explained-how-to-swap-cryptocurrencies-without-a-middleman-6cd29680c32e">here</a> . All we need to implement in Ryo is a conditional timelock that allows earlier spending if you know the shared secret of the swap.</p><h3>Quasar web-wallet and 64-bit “ChooChoo” Elliptic Curve Crypto library</h3><p>You might recall me <a href="https://github.com/fireice-uk/cryptonote-speedup-demo">writing it </a>over a year ago. It has proven itself nicely doing the scanning for our <a href="https://www.ryowebwallet.com/">webwallet</a>. The next step will be to integrate it into the CLI and GUI wallets to speed up scanning there too.</p><h3>Implementing cutting edge crypto</h3><p>Last month, a new and much safer way of encrypting data (AES-GCM-SIV) has been standardised. There aren’t any multi-platform C++ implementations, so we will write one ourselves. We are planning to release it separately under BSD licence, so other projects can benefit from this advancement too.</p><p>This will improve the security of saved wallets, as well as enabling fast encryption of network traffic.</p><h3>Putting fun back into P2P</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*8tQkdhDihvvCwjIRms2rgA.png" /><figcaption>New P2P network with native IPv6 support and more efficient block broadcast</figcaption></figure><p>The current release will overhaul a large percentage of legacy BytecoinV1 codebase. This part of the code consists of about 30% of the total lines of code. Overall it has been neglected by Monero with only a single feature (fluffy blocks) implemented in five years — and a ton of busywork in patching the code rot.</p><p>There are multiple problems with the current setup. Fluffy blocks simply trade bandwidth for latency (we will implement a system that saves both bandwitdth and latency), critical features like IPV6 have to be shoehorned in, and the whole thing is much too rickety to implement what we want to do — anonymous tx broadcast without any external networks, as broadcasting transactions over Tor or I2P has its own set of <a href="https://arxiv.org/abs/1410.6079">security problems</a>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*5l1_eB2rjvK1v0bFkc8U7w.png" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a3650af093e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[On-chain tracking of Monero and other Cryptonotes]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@crypto_ryo/on-chain-tracking-of-monero-and-other-cryptonotes-e0afc6752527?source=rss-d106e8b2cf0b------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e0afc6752527</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency-news]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[monero]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[privacy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency-investment]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ryo]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 06 Apr 2019 19:45:12 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-05-14T08:12:44.689Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Final nail in the coffin of Monero privacy</h4><p><em>*Update to the story* I got banned by Monero community rep (Justin Ehrenhofer) from a “neutral” subreddit by giving this link to people trying to sell Monero — apparently that’s “diruptive” </em><a href="https://www.removeddit.com/r/CryptoCurrency/comments/gfs82r/lets_see_how_long_it_takes_for_me_to_be_banned/"><em>[source]</em></a></p><h3>Introduction</h3><p>In the previous articles we discussed how to turn churning into incriminating evidence using external metadata <a href="https://medium.com/@crypto_ryo/tracing-cryptonote-ring-signatures-using-external-metadata-8e4866810006">[ 1 ]</a> and how lack of churning will let your funds be tracked through simple output tagging (Knacc attack)<a href="https://medium.com/@crypto_ryo/how-buying-pot-with-monero-will-get-you-busted-knacc-attack-on-cryptonote-coins-b157cd97e82f">[ 2 ]</a>. In this article we will discuss how to track churning — and do active tracking attacks on-chain without help of any metadata. In fact you can do it on Monero blockchain right now, without anyone being any wiser.</p><h3>Simple output merging attack</h3><p>This attack builds upon the “Heuristic II” attack (section 5.2) from <em>A Traceability Analysis of Monero’s Blockchain by Amrit Kumar, Clément Fischer, Shruti Tople, and Prateek Saxena. IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive, 2017</em>. <a href="https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/338.pdf">[ link ]</a></p><p>In this attack the authors introduce a very simple and intuitive concept. If a transaction spends both outputs of another transaction then it is overwhelmingly likely that those are the real outputs. An observant reader here will notice that additionally it identifies those outputs as belonging to a single entity — even if the actual private keys were different.</p><p>Both those observations will become important as we move on to show how to both track churning and deanonymise further transactions using this method.</p><h3>Normal transaction flow</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*cG372ZTJAyUKNvvG_KuGjw.png" /><figcaption>Only real inputs are shown to simplify the diagram.</figcaption></figure><p>This diagram shows normal transaction flow. Here Alice has four outputs 1A-1D. She spends 1C and 1D in T1 on something. She receives 2A as change in her wallet. T2 spends that change and 1B, generating another change output 3A, and so on.</p><h3>Tracking churning</h3><p>Last week I explained how Knacc attack enables tracking users. Standard Monero advice is to “churn” (send money to yourself). I warned users very strongly not to do it. Author of the attack disagreed, possibly unaware of this possibility <a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/Monero/comments/b4k8h4/how_buying_pot_with_monero_will_get_you_busted/ej7erxh/?context=1">[ 1 ]</a>. Let’s see how such churn looks in context.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*crGCQQUQLhvFNUiGUFmvvg.png" /><figcaption>Here Alice does one churning transaction.</figcaption></figure><p>Here Alice had three outputs in her wallet (1A, 1B and 1C). She used 1B and 1C to send some money to herself in T1, then paid some people in T2 and T3.</p><p>You can immediately see that unlike in normal transaction flow, 3A, 2A and 2B form a ring. When we see that in possible inputs in ring signature group we can discard all other options as it is very likely that those are the real outputs.</p><p>What’s the chance of this happening by accident? Negligible — I already covered the calculation in <a href="https://medium.com/@crypto_ryo/how-buying-pot-with-monero-will-get-you-busted-knacc-attack-on-cryptonote-coins-b157cd97e82f">Knacc attack</a> article. For ring size of 3 (three generations on a graph) the probability is exactly the same, even larger ring sizes are likely traceable with high degree of certainty using nothing more than a simple blockchain scan.</p><h3>Active tracking attack</h3><p>Did you notice how we deanonymised T2? We know that T2 was created by Alice, we know that 3A is change, and the other output didn’t form another ring therefore Alice either hasn’t spent it yet or sent it to someone else.</p><p>How about if instead of waiting for Alice to churn, we send her a transaction like T1. Her wallet will be smart enough to select those outputs for different transactions, but they will still form a detectable ring like above.</p><p>In fact T1 does not have to be a single transaction at all in this scenario. All we need is multiple payments into Alice’s wallet to start creating rings and deanonymising her spending. Let’s go back to the normal flow diagram and assume that Bob sent outputs 1A and 1D. Since there is a ring between then, Bob now knows T1, T2 and T3 were all generated by Alice.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/850/1*lH60S9laogVzkI060hWEcA.png" /><figcaption>Active output trace attack</figcaption></figure><h3>Thanks section</h3><p>I would like to thank Dash and ZCash community for helping me spread awareness of privacy issues after I have been banned from @monero Telegram channel <a href="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1200/1*ElKw-NTSjW6VcnMWhUGCWQ.png">[ 3 ]</a>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Y-rS-b-PuKE1mQjUBqNPIQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Pretty thumbnail picture rendered by RyoRu</figcaption></figure><p>At the <a href="https://np.reddit.com/r/CryptoCurrency/comments/bl1fjj/lea_regularly_unmixes_btc/eml2yzr/?context=3">request</a> of a Monero moderator I’m adding a link to a community discussion on the topic <a href="https://np.reddit.com/r/Monero/comments/ba8lez/onchain_tracking_of_monero_and_other_cryptonotes/">here</a>. Please keep in mind that it is populated with <a href="http://archive.is/N7vGa">people</a> whose financial incentive is to deny existence of any problems, whereas we are acting contrary to that incentive as the problems apply to Ryo too.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e0afc6752527" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[How buying pot with Monero will get you busted — Knacc attack on Cryptonote coins]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@crypto_ryo/how-buying-pot-with-monero-will-get-you-busted-knacc-attack-on-cryptonote-coins-b157cd97e82f?source=rss-d106e8b2cf0b------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b157cd97e82f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[monero]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[privacy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ryo]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 23 Mar 2019 15:05:53 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-12-22T17:00:22.499Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Exchange-buyer-seller-exchange attack on Monero</h3><h3>Or How buying pot with Monero will get you busted.</h3><p><em>*Update to the story* I got banned by a Monero developer (Justin Ehrenhofer) for publishing this. <br>He himself was founded </em><strong><em>Moonstone Research</em></strong><em> and </em><a href="https://moonstoneresearch.com/2024/07/17/Tracelon-Uses-Crescent-Discovery.html"><em>started selling Monero tracking tools</em></a><em>. </em><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/posts/naxolabs_naxo-is-thrilled-to-announce-publicly-that-activity-7315025593463439361-Zn75"><em>He has been acquired by </em><strong><em>NAXO</em></strong><em> now</em></a></p><h3>Introduction</h3><p>This attack, was found by Knacc somewhere in early 2017. The original write-up that his article is based on can be found <a href="https://github.com/monero-project/monero/issues/1673#issuecomment-312968452">here</a>. TLDR readers should be aware that solutions suggested there are deeply flawed. This article discusses the current state of my own knowledge on this attack.</p><p>Another source of information on this attack is the official “Breaking Monero” series <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iABIcsDJKyM">[ 1 ]</a>. It is fairly long and waffly, as tends to happen when an inexperienced person does a live podcast without a good script.</p><h3>Hiding in a crowd of one, or perils of a small anonymity set</h3><p>Essence of a Knacc attack is extremely simple. In our simplified example let’s say that exchange E tags an output that buyer B withdraws on some kind of database. B then uses that output to pay seller S. S then deposits the money back with E.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*guNmoawh9rq2M-67txShpQ.png" /><figcaption>Tagged output for ring size of 3 (3² = 9 possibilities)</figcaption></figure><p>In case of Monero and our simplified example when E receives money from S there are 16^2 = 256 possible outputs, one of which happens to be our tagged output. The next question we need to ask ourselves, is what is the possibility that our tag was selected as a decoy by accident.</p><p>To answer this we need to estimate the amount of outputs considered by the wallet as decoys. Since it will be heavily biased towards recent outputs (to mimic user behaviour) let’s say that we consider 10 million out of roughly 145 million outputs created since 2014.</p><p>This gives us 1 in 10 million chance of accidental selection for each of 256 candidates. After setting up a quick binomial distribution for P(x=0), we can calculate that the probability that this output found itself there by pure accident is 1–0.99997 = <strong>0.003%</strong>. May the odds be in your favour.</p><h3>My umbrella will stop the spy satellite from seeing me! And other fanciful notions</h3><p><strong>I know my seller uses a different exchange!</strong></p><p>E does not have to be a person. All you need is a state database of “our exchange gave output Y to person X”.</p><p><strong>But what if a surveillance state tags every output! Then you will have multiple tags in your set!</strong></p><p>Firstly, congratulations on trying to fix something by breaking it further. Secondly, a DNA test has about 1 in 10 million probability of a false positive. This means that for every murder suspect there are about 10 to 20 people in the country that will also test positive. But you are not testing every person in the country, you are testing a guy that was picked up while running away from the murder scene (statistics can be complicated like that).</p><h3>How can I actually protect myself?</h3><p>The hard answer here is that there are no easy answers. Properly anonymous coin needs gigantic (1000+) ring sizes.</p><p>Suggestion to send the coins to yourself is deeply flawed — DO NOT — do this. As I <a href="https://medium.com/@crypto_ryo/tracing-cryptonote-ring-signatures-using-external-metadata-8e4866810006">demonstrated</a> in the previous episode, it turns suspicion into hard evidence.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b157cd97e82f" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Exchange Denial of Service in Monero]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@crypto_ryo/exchange-denial-of-service-in-monero-2b6f63454ac0?source=rss-d106e8b2cf0b------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2b6f63454ac0</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[monero]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ryo]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ryo]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 12 Mar 2019 18:27:32 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-07-06T20:24:34.554Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Introduction</h3><p>While discussing the previous Monero vulnerability, I confused the issues (they are both related to the fact that the encrypted amount and commitment are separate entities in RingCTs) and accidentally disclosed this one<a href="https://medium.com/@crypto_ryo/fake-deposit-amount-exchange-vulnerability-in-monero-dc230f7f02d8"> [ 1 ]</a>. Monero team has had over a week now to examine the source code and surprisingly they have not asked us for any details about the bug.</p><h3>Description of the issue</h3><p>Wallet does not perform sufficient error handling when an invalid encrypted amount is met. While the RCT library correctly throws an exception; it is caught and the returned amount is set to zero.</p><p>While there is nothing inherently wrong with this behaviour, wallet will attempt to use zero-sized sums in constructing transactions. This will cause the verification of such transaction to fail.</p><p>Overall impact of the bug is such that a publicly known wallet address, such as an exchange, can be put out of action through sending many small transactions with invalid encrypted amounts.</p><p>This outage is not terminal, and a rescan with a fixed wallet will enable the valid outputs to be used.</p><p>Recommended fix that we implemented in Ryo is to ignore zero amounts altogether.</p><h3>Why did you not report it to Monero?</h3><p>Because of their long standing and continuing history of toxic behaviour towards security researchers <a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/Monero/comments/5q60b3/security_issue_in_cryptonoteuniversalpool/dd24sbz/">[ 1 ]</a> <a href="https://twitter.com/fireice_uk/status/977167686097690624">[ 2 ]</a> <a href="https://github.com/monero-project/monero/issues/4104">[ 3 ]</a> <a href="https://hackerone.com/reports/291489">[ 4 ]</a> <a href="https://medium.com/@crypto_ryo/fake-deposit-amount-exchange-vulnerability-in-monero-dc230f7f02d8">[ 5 ]</a>.</p><p>At the request of a Monero moderator I’m adding a <a href="https://np.reddit.com/r/CryptoCurrency/comments/bl1fjj/lea_regularly_unmixes_btc/eml2yzr/?context=3">link</a> to a community discussion on the topic <a href="https://np.reddit.com/r/Monero/comments/b0b9b2/exchange_denial_of_service_in_monero/">here</a>. Please keep in mind that some posts are NSFW due to abuse being hurled around.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*_RYdD5bktPqhO8gI2zDpbg.jpeg" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2b6f63454ac0" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Fake deposit amount exchange vulnerability in Monero]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@crypto_ryo/fake-deposit-amount-exchange-vulnerability-in-monero-dc230f7f02d8?source=rss-d106e8b2cf0b------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/dc230f7f02d8</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[privacy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ryo]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[monero]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ryo]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 03 Mar 2019 15:17:19 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-07-06T20:25:21.242Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Foreword to Ryo community</h3><p>This bug has been fixed in Ryo 7 months ago. Patch is available <a href="https://github.com/ryo-currency/ryo-currency/blame/f698e11c88be33aaf89c316ac68baa0cb80a9c91/src/cryptonote_core/blockchain.cpp#L1194">here</a>, however in case of Monero it might cause a hard fork on exploitation. Another fix is possible by ignoring non-null RingCT coinbase transactions in the wallet.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*v-w0a17_lbZK4YjxbJJQBA.jpeg" /></figure><h3>How does the exploit work?</h3><p>RingCT has extremely insecure design where the amount displayed to the user (from now called masked amount) is different from the amount checked by the network (from now called commitment).</p><p>When a coinbase transaction is minted it will include a plaintext amount and a null rct signature. Network will construct commitment from this plaintext amount.</p><p>However if the coinbase transaction includes non-null rct signature, it will be able to communicate a masked amount too. This essentially means that the attacker can make it appear as if he deposited any sum of his choosing to an exchange.</p><h3>Why did you not report it Monero?</h3><p>Because of their long history of toxic behaviour towards security researchers <a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/Monero/comments/5q60b3/security_issue_in_cryptonoteuniversalpool/dd24sbz/">[ 1 ]</a> <a href="https://twitter.com/fireice_uk/status/977167686097690624">[ 2 ]</a> <a href="https://hackerone.com/reports/291489">[ 3 ]</a> <a href="https://github.com/monero-project/monero/issues/4104">[ 4 ]</a> I hope that Monero community uses this opportunity to reconsider their behaviour.</p><h3>Accidental leak open disclosure</h3><p>While discussing this exploit on Ryo public channel I confused the issues and accidentally leaked a different issue. Monero might want to get that one patched too. <a href="https://imgur.com/a/an0cyCX">[ 1 ]</a></p><h3>Monero Devlopers’ Response</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*NfHKNj-O73Y8ue7JjN4aTA.png" /></figure><p>At the <a href="https://np.reddit.com/r/CryptoCurrency/comments/bl1fjj/lea_regularly_unmixes_btc/eml2yzr/?context=3">request</a> of a Monero moderator I’m adding a link to a community discussion on the topic <a href="https://np.reddit.com/r/Monero/comments/awv5er/fake_deposit_amount_exchange_vulnerability_in/">here</a>. Please keep in mind that some posts are NSFW due to abuse being hurled around.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*_RYdD5bktPqhO8gI2zDpbg.jpeg" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=dc230f7f02d8" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Hiding your IP while using Ryo or other Cryptonotes + IP reveal exploit in Monero/OpenAlian]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@crypto_ryo/hiding-your-ip-while-using-ryo-or-other-cryptonotes-ip-reveal-exploit-in-monero-openalian-add97a464d48?source=rss-d106e8b2cf0b------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/add97a464d48</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[privacy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[monero]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ryo]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ryo]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 25 Feb 2019 14:33:25 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-05-05T21:19:19.689Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Hiding your IP while using Ryo or other Cryptonotes + IP reveal exploit in Monero/OpenAlias</h3><h3>Meta-issues</h3><p>In what has become a familiar pattern for anyone following our news feed, Monero community got red-faced angry at a mere proposition of me writing this guide, and are likely to do so now. You should be aware that if you provide intelligent criticism of Monero in any way (you don’t even need to be a Ryo supporter, <a href="https://www.reddit.com/u/hapticpilot">/u/hapticpilot</a> springs to mind) you will be accused by a sock-puppet of being my sock-puppet. The most glorious case was the now-deleted sock-puppet stipulating that actually I run the whole 5 man team of Ryo myself <a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/Monero/comments/a2zr9o/poll_which_cryptonote_tracking_method_should_i_do/eb3awk4/?context=1">[ 1 ]</a>. I won’t lie to you — being the boogeyman of reason is very satisfying.</p><h3>Problems</h3><p>As you might have heard, Ryo (and every other crypto-currency) is a p2p network. An essential feature of such a network is a list of potential peers to connect to. This obviously presents privacy problems:</p><p>1 — Every other Ryo daemon will be aware of your IP address.</p><p>2 — Your IP address will be tied to the transaction id (but not wallet address)</p><ul><li>2A — Everyone on the network will potentially be able to do point 2.</li><li>2B — Your ISP will be potentially able to do point 2.</li></ul><p>3 — In Monero, your IP address will be tied to your exchange account number (the long 64-character hex id), unless it uses integrated addresses. We fixed that in Ryo already by encrypting it, it will be live on the mainnet with the next fork.</p><ul><li>3A — Everyone on the network will potentially be able to do point 3.</li><li>3B — Your ISP will be potentially able to do point 3.</li></ul><p>4 — Your ISP will be aware that you are using Ryo</p><h3>Beware of a dangerous white elephant in Monero (openalias)</h3><p>You might have never heard of this feature as, thankfully, it is only used by some core team members, however Monero supports DNSSEC resolution of addresses. In practice this means if you mistype the address by putting a “.” character anywhere, you will broadcast your intent to send to that address to the whole Internet <a href="https://imgur.com/a/CoF3uaB">[ 2 ]</a> since it will try to resolve the mist-typed address and query the root DNS servers. Obviously if you use that feature, that will happen too, but I don’t think anyone does that.</p><p>This can additionally be escalated into IP reveal exploit. My donation wallet is:</p><p>4581HhZkQHgZrZjKeCfCJxZff9E3xCgHGF25zABZz7oR71TnbbgiS7sK9jveE6Dx6uMs2LwszDuvQJgRZQotdpHt1fTdDhk</p><p>If I register a domain as:</p><p>4581HhZkQHgZrZjKeCfCJxZff9E3xCgHGF25zABZz7oR71TnbbgiS7sK9jveE6Dx6uMs2LwszDuvQJgRZQotdpHt1fTdD.hk</p><p>User’s DNS server (for majority of home users that will be the router) will query my DNS server for wallet information. Gocha.</p><p>For the above reasons we ripped out this “feature” in Ryo long ago.</p><h3>Solutions</h3><p>As with everything in security, the major question is — how much convenience are you prepared to sacrifice to achieve the security level that you want? I will list solutions from the least to most private:</p><h3>Use “remote daemon only” option in our GUI</h3><ul><li>Addresses issues: 1, 2A, 3A</li></ul><p>Pros:</p><ul><li>Very simple</li></ul><p>Cons:</p><ul><li>You need to trust the remote node not to pass on 2A and 3A information</li><li>Remote nodes are almost always overloaded</li></ul><p>That one is really simple. Just select the option, but be prepared for some slow running-code.</p><h3>Use VPN + “local daemon only”</h3><ul><li>Addresses issues: 1, 2A, 2B, 3A, 3B</li></ul><p>Pros:</p><ul><li>Most private GUI method</li></ul><p>Cons:</p><ul><li>You shifted the trust from your ISP (that’s usually required by law to spy on you), to a VPN provider (that might spy on you)</li><li>Daemon uses a lot of bandwidth so it might be expensive</li></ul><p>We are still in the department of easy solutions, and this one is pretty good as long as you trust your VPN provider. Simply follow your VPN’s setup guide and make sure your VPN has no DNS leaks.</p><h3>Use <a href="https://www.whonix.org/">Whonix</a> for a totally private — “I never used Ryo guv’nor” setup</h3><ul><li>Addressed issues 1, 2A, 2B, 3A, 3B, 4</li></ul><p>Pros:</p><ul><li>Unless the VM container is found unencrypted, it is impossible to prove you even used Ryo in the first place.</li><li>Free</li></ul><p>Cons:</p><ul><li>You will need to learn how to use Linux command line</li><li>Tor is not very fast</li></ul><p>This one is much more difficult, but also much more private.</p><p>1) Download Whonix CLI VM images — <a href="https://www.whonix.org/wiki/VirtualBox/CLI">https://www.whonix.org/wiki/VirtualBox/CLI</a></p><p>2) Follow the setup guide for VirtualBox for your OS</p><p>3) (optional) Click File/Preferences in VirtualBox and change the default location to an encrypted volume — it needs to be large enough to easily fit the blockchain</p><p>4) Double click the images to import them.</p><p>5) Run Gateway VM, log in as root, run through the Tor setup</p><p>6) Once you get to the CLI, run</p><blockquote><em>apt update &amp;&amp; apt upgrade</em></blockquote><p>7) Right click Workstation VM, Settings/System, increase the memory to 8192 MB</p><p>8) Run Workstation VM, log in as root</p><p>9) Run</p><blockquote><em>apt update &amp;&amp; apt upgrade</em></blockquote><p>10) Run</p><blockquote><em>apt install build-essential cmake pkg-config libboost-all-dev libssl-dev libzmq3-dev libsodium-dev libunbound-dev git screen</em></blockquote><p>11) Log out Workstation root</p><p>12) Log in Workstation user</p><p>13) Run</p><blockquote><em>git clone </em><a href="https://github.com/ryo-currency/ryo-currency.git"><em>https://github.com/ryo-currency/ryo-currency.git</em></a></blockquote><p>13) Run</p><blockquote><em>cd ryo-currency &amp;&amp; make -j4</em></blockquote><p>14) When the binaries are compiled, run</p><blockquote><em>mv build/release/bin/* .. &amp;&amp; cd ..</em></blockquote><p>15) You now have Ryo binaries in your user’s home directory</p><p>16) To run ryod use</p><blockquote><em>screen -dmS ryo ./ryod — p2p-bind-ip 127.0.0.1 — no-igd –hide-my-port</em></blockquote><p>17) First time it will take 4–6 hours to download the blockchain, to watch ryod use “screen -r” to exit press “ctrl+a then d”</p><p>18) When ryod is synced — create wallet or restore from seed using “./ryo-wallet-cli” with the right options</p><h3>Closing statement</h3><p>Due to the p2p nature of crypto-currencies, removing all traces that you are using the network takes some effort. One of our main goals at Ryo is to improve security for average users by giving them both knowledge and tools to navigate any issues.</p><p>At the <a href="https://np.reddit.com/r/CryptoCurrency/comments/bl1fjj/lea_regularly_unmixes_btc/eml2yzr/?context=3">request</a> of a Monero moderator I’m adding a link to a community discussion on the topic <a href="https://np.reddit.com/r/Monero/comments/a4mq8j/hiding_your_ip_while_using_cryptonotes_and_when/">here</a>. Please keep in mind that it is populated with <a href="http://archive.is/N7vGa">people</a> whose financial incentive is to deny existence of any problems, whereas we are acting contrary to that incentive as the problems apply to Ryo too.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=add97a464d48" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Cryptonight-GPU — FPGA-proof PoW algorithm based on floating point instructions]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@crypto_ryo/cryptonight-gpu-fpga-proof-pow-algorithm-based-on-floating-point-instructions-92524debf8e8?source=rss-d106e8b2cf0b------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/92524debf8e8</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bitcoin]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[monero]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ryo]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 16 Feb 2019 17:00:42 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-05-05T21:23:18.701Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Cryptonight-GPU — FPGA-proof PoW algorithm based on floating point instructions</h3><h4>Graveyard of “ASIC/FPGA-proof” and a need for paradigm shift</h4><p>To anyone observing development of cryptonight mining algorithms, one thing will become immediately apparent — the claims ASIC resistance simply don’t stack up with historical reality. Current approach, something I call “Look, ma! No hands!”, where the algorithm designers ask “Maybe ASICs can’t do X?”, and then find out how wrong they were, simply does not work.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/930/1*10LYEUDWrMKaYdWbUU2fWw.png" /></figure><h4>Can FPGAs do floating point instructions?</h4><p>Of course they can. In fact in HPC this is a bit of a marketing number — similar to MPG for cars, therefore you will be easily able to find theoretical TFLOPS in their brochure.</p><p>So let’s do just that — <strong>“Intel boasts of an FPGA chip capable of 10 TFLOPS</strong>” … <a href="https://hexus.net/tech/news/cpu/117380-intel-boasts-fpga-chip-capable-10-tflops/">[ 1 ]</a> Hold on… Vega 64 does 12.5 TLOPS… <a href="https://www.techpowerup.com/gpu-specs/radeon-rx-vega-64.c2871">[ 2 ]</a></p><p>To get CN-GPU hashrate, take the TFLOPS and multiply them by 125. Simple is beautiful, no?</p><h4>WTF???? BUT FPGAs ARE SO FAST ON OTHER ALGOS????</h4><p>Systemic mistakes in algorithm design, namely trying to pull off a memory hard algorithm where an FPGA can be configured to access memory 100x faster than a CPU, led Monero algorithm designers to believe that FPGAs are some kind of metaphysical entities unbound by the laws of physics.</p><p>In reality, floating point performance boils down to the physical number of floating point cores on the chip. GPUs, by their very nature of being used to calculate… ummm…. graphics (remember those good old days when we bought GPUs to actually play Crisis?) are packed full of them. This is the primary reason why a $500 graphics card beats $10000 FGPA in TFLOPS.</p><p>Can you take a GPU core and strip out everything except FP cores? Sure. But then you have to ask yourself, how much can you strip out? 20% 50% 75%? Assuming the latter, who is going to buy an $6000 ASIC that only does 4x the hashrate of a $500 Vega 64?</p><h4>Monero FUD Hall of Fame</h4><p>In a pattern obvious to anyone who is involved in Ryo, when Monero community feels threatened by something we do, they tend to lash out. So I thought we will engage that “feedback” and pretend it is actual constructive feedback, after-all, why not =)?</p><p><strong>I can’t read the source code! Do a write-up!</strong></p><p><em>CN-GPU has no description and design rationale published — only source code, so I can’t compare now. What I understood so far is that CN-GPU is not Cryptonight at all — too many parts of the algorithm have changed. It’s also very power hungry on GPU and not suitable for CPUs which goes against what’s stated in the original Monero whitepaper. </em>[SChernykh] <a href="https://github.com/monero-project/monero/pull/5126#issuecomment-460380005">[ 3 ]</a></p><p>I’m always happy to help people that might have trouble reviewing the source code, so here we are =). Overall, it turned out that the power usage is on par with MoneroV8.</p><p><strong>Our culture is superior to yours!</strong></p><p><em>People interested in “project culture” and “development style” may compare this linked discussion on the Monero GitHub with the genesis of the CN-GPU PoW that for outsiders just pops into existence as finished code. </em>[rbrunner7] <a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/Monero/comments/ams8k5/xmrstak_280_release_cngpu_fpgaproof_pow_amd/efpxh22/?context=1">[ 4 ]</a></p><p>We are a small team of professionals and we like to move fast. We prefer to deliberate real issues, not magic bit patterns like MoneroV7.</p><p><strong>Let’s do a technical word salad and hope the reader is impressed!</strong></p><p><em>FPGA is fundamentally different to ASIC. FLOPs are not a protection against ASICs and the current pattern indicates a rise of ASICs.</em></p><p><em>Since I’m not aware of a critical review of “CN”-GPU, I’ll assume that a “feature” is hidden somewhere in the maths that allows an ASIC to skip certain values or just being able to afford to produce invalid hashes because the overall (good) hashrate increases by multiples. </em>[Leza89] <a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/Monero/comments/anms40/with_unknown_harshrate_now_more_than_51_what_is/efw2mbv/">[ 5 ]</a></p><p>First paragraph shows he hasn’t quite caught onto the paradigm shift here and assumes the protection is that ASICs “need hands” to do floating point, in the same way RandomX assumes they “need hands” to do instruction decoding.</p><p>Second paragraph is a good example of something so common we actually put it on <a href="https://twitter.com/fireice_uk/status/1093462724590424064">Monero Bullshit Bingo</a> square B3 I had “Monero community members” (square B1) trying to bamboozle others with completely fake research [ <a href="https://np.reddit.com/r/Monero/comments/a4mq8j/hiding_your_ip_while_using_cryptonotes_and_when/ebfvn5z/">6 </a>]. Another example is here <a href="https://np.reddit.com/r/Monero/comments/9v9335/is_this_real_how_do_i_protect_my_privacy/e9aatx9/?context=1">[ 7 ]</a>.Take it as you will — in my opinion it shows extreme disrespect towards their own community.</p><p><strong>Ryo is too small gambit</strong></p><p><em>[ … ]But it is ryo, of course you phish for monero supporters to get your devtaxed fork going.</em></p><p><em>And don’t forget ryo is safe from ASICS because no one actually cares to develop ASICS for their pow variant. Easy to throw mud at monero then. </em>[Flenst] <a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/CryptoCurrency/comments/aqr2ua/ryo_currency_successfully_forked_to_0400_new_pow/egivpg9/?context=1">[ 8 ]</a></p><p>Second paragraph is an interesting gambit from Flenst’s point of view. Sure, you might be excusing why Monero’s algos fail so much, but he is also suggesting that Ryo is under-priced for the work we are doing. Did he think this one through?</p><p>First paragraph perhaps shows what he is really anxious about. After-all poor Monero users must be protected from getting “wrong impressions”. I’m pretty sure that in his tin-foil-hat conspiracy world he imagines us as <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Impressment">press gangs impressing</a> poor Monero users into Ryo service =)</p><p><strong>“I’m not lashing out — you are lashing out! And you hate me!” strategy</strong></p><p><a href="https://twitter.com/fireice_uk/status/1096828570004082688">https://twitter.com/fireice_uk/status/1096828570004082688</a></p><p>As you can probably tell from the tone of this article, the whole Ryo team had pretty good fun collecting and discussing quotes in this article. Why wouldn’t we? The guys quoted made absolute fools of themselves. If you want to play <a href="https://twitter.com/fireice_uk/status/1093462724590424064">Monero Bulshit Bingo</a> with us — be sure to drop by out Telegram channel</p><p>At the <a href="https://np.reddit.com/r/CryptoCurrency/comments/bl1fjj/lea_regularly_unmixes_btc/eml2yzr/?context=3">request</a> of a Monero moderator I’m adding a link to a community discussion on the topic <a href="https://np.reddit.com/r/Monero/comments/araq7r/cryptonightgpu_fpgaproof_pow_algorithm_based_on/">here</a>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=92524debf8e8" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Tracing Cryptonote ring signatures using external metadata]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@crypto_ryo/tracing-cryptonote-ring-signatures-using-external-metadata-8e4866810006?source=rss-d106e8b2cf0b------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/8e4866810006</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[privacy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[monero]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bitcoin]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ryo]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 29 Dec 2018 17:06:52 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-05-14T08:11:45.338Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>*Update to the story* I got banned by Monero community rep (Justin Ehrenhofer) from a “neutral” subreddit by giving this link to people trying to sell Monero — apparently that’s “diruptive” </em><a href="https://www.removeddit.com/r/CryptoCurrency/comments/gfs82r/lets_see_how_long_it_takes_for_me_to_be_banned/"><em>[source]</em></a></p><p>Background reading — “<a href="https://ssd.eff.org/en/module/why-metadata-matters">Why metadata matters?</a>” by EFF.</p><h4>What is an attack?</h4><p>As we are heading into more technical topics of Cryptonote tracking, I will be using term “attack” for anything that can be used to deanonymise ring signatures. It is important to know that, similar to most practical attacks against cryptography, those attacks don’t tackle cryptography directly. Instead they rely on how transactions and people making the transactions interact. In fact this attack is a simple application of textbook forensic techniques to ring signatures.</p><p>As no single attack that I’m aware of is an “I win” button, it is important to understand their relative strengths and weaknesses.</p><h4>What are the general properties of metadata analysis?</h4><p>A single expression that I would use to describe is “churn killer”. Since the anonymity set provided by a ring signature is fairly small, a very naive and stupid advice would be “just send money to yourself a couple times”. Metadata attack turns churning into incriminating evidence in a scenario where you are trying to prove beyond reasonable doubt that a transaction occurred between Alice and Bob.</p><p>Another interesting property of metadata analysis is that larger ring sizes are more incriminating. It can be only countered with smarter output selection. For one such idea, see section 6.2 <a href="https://arxiv.org/pdf/1704.04299/">here</a>.</p><h4>How does it work in detail?</h4><p>Let’s say that Bob is running a shop. The state does not like what Bob is selling, so one beautiful morning Bob finds himself in his underwear in a police station. Bob decides to cooperate.</p><p>Alice doesn’t know Bob, and only transacted with him once. Alice thought she is smart. She knew that she would be in very hot water if she just sent money from an exchange to Bob due to Knacc attack, so she thought she will send the money a few times to herself to increase the anonymity set exponentially.</p><p>Unfortunately for Alice, Bob has given her delivery address as a part of his plea deal. This is not a court-grade evidence at this point. People make all sorts of stuff up if you give them an incentive (Google Rafid Ahmed Alwan al-Janabi). Next step the authorities take is to run Bob’s list against exchanges to see who has withdrawn money. This is still not evidence — Bob could be simply framing a person he doesn’t like. We need a proof that the money that Alice withdrew ended up with Bob.</p><p>Unfortunately for Alice, her ISP is obliged by law to log her activity. This makes it trivial to construct intervals when she was online.</p><p>Now we switch scenes to a courtroom. Alice is in the dock. Foxtrot, a computer forensics expert witness sits in the witness box.</p><p>F: As I explained in my report, presented to the Court as Evidence Exhibit A, Alice has used a protocol that allowed her to pick any number of fake inputs along with one real input to obscure her transaction.</p><p>QC: The number of possible fakes is in thousands. How can the Jury be sure that she is the one real actor and not 999 or more innocent bystanders?</p><p>F: As you can see in Appendix A to my report, Evidence Exhibit B, Alice picked two other innocent bystanders for each of her series of transactions. On level one, the most recent, there is only one output that was made while her ISP reported that she was online. On the next level there is also only one out of three — this means chance of both events occurring at the same time is much smaller. On the third level the chance that events “Alice is online” and “An output is generated” not correlated is very small. We very quickly arrive at a situation where it is a mathematical certainty that Alice sent money to Bob.</p><h4>Evidence Exhibit B</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*QxHGQXSYBg2WGTdYSiIXfg.png" /></figure><h4>What can be done to prevent it?</h4><p>First of all let’s get one thing out of the way. No amount of real-time traffic obfuscation will put you in the clear here. It does not address the root issue — that your activity and transaction happening are temporally correlated.</p><p>In Monero you are double-screwed. It has a non-constant fee that will leak information on when you signed the transaction, even if you delay its broadcast.</p><p>Smarter output selection (see the paper I <a href="https://arxiv.org/pdf/1704.04299/">linked</a> earlier) will help a lot. That favours very heavily outputs that are also temporally correlated to the real output.</p><p>Finally the real solution is to have protocol level way whereby the broadcast can be delayed while keeping the transaction anonymous.</p><p>We will be implementing both approaches in Ryo.</p><p>At the <a href="https://np.reddit.com/r/CryptoCurrency/comments/bl1fjj/lea_regularly_unmixes_btc/eml2yzr/?context=3">request</a> of a Monero moderator I’m adding a link to a community discussion on the topic <a href="https://np.reddit.com/r/Monero/comments/aamxya/tracing_cryptonote_ring_signatures_using_external/">here</a>. Please keep in mind that it is populated with <a href="http://archive.is/N7vGa">people</a> whose financial incentive is to deny existence of any problems, whereas we are acting contrary to that incentive as the problems apply to Ryo too.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8e4866810006" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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