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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Cyb3rHawk on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Cyb3rHawk on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Cyb3rHawk on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Detection through defined (MY) process]]></title>
            <link>https://cyb3rhawk.medium.com/detection-through-defined-my-process-24d24fe66ff6?source=rss-1b083d6470db------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[detection]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[detection-engineering]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[detection-process]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Cyb3rHawk]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 28 Oct 2021 22:50:56 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-10-28T22:50:56.781Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/386/0*lgNjPOqsJiaMnHIl.png" /></figure><p>A common question among SIEM content/detection creators is “What is the process that needs to be followed to create a detection?” There are different methods/methodologies/frameworks that are published by some of the great content creators. Here I will not be re-iterating on those but rather will document the process I follow to create rules. Here are the steps I take. Keep in mind that these steps need not be sequential.</p><ol><li>What kind of malware (just mentioning it as a broad category where it can be executable, script, WMI event, or anything else) OR kill Chain Stage OR MITRE Tactic are we dealing with?<br> Or contrary question if we are dealing with threat hunting or detection? What type of malware we are trying to detect?</li><li>Is this a novel technique? A variation of an existing technique? Just a simple rename?</li><li>What behavior/s does malware execute? What are the TTPs we observed? Are there any TTPs that are not present in MITRE (or any other framework)? Are we seeing any overlapping behaviors from the previous detections we have? If so, how it differs from the other malware?</li><li>What kind of logs we have to detect this malware? Are we already collecting those logs? If so, what percentage of the logs we collect is directly correlated to detect this malware ( this is important to know because of many reasons like I’m in fear of losing a detection, are we putting a load on our SIEM by collecting more than what we need ( Sysmon as a good example like every ID 3. Though it has its benefits like gaining access to the process making the network connection, it is still generating too much data. Filtering is necessary))<br>If the logs are not present, what can we do? How can we collect those logs efficiently and effectively without hoarding data?</li><li>What techniques can be used to detect this malware? Is it plain detection (like a signature or an event ID)? Is it behavioral? Is it an amalgam of two?</li><li>What is the F+ rate if we were to write this detection? More importantly, what is the acceptable rate of F+?</li><li>Did we detect the malware using our proposed detections? If not, what is the rate of true negative?</li></ol><p>In the above steps can be used for creating detections only. But detection creation is not the end, rather it is the start or a waypoint in Alert, Triage, Detection, IR lifecycle. In the next blog, we will see how we can apply this to create a detection.</p><p>See you next time and happy detecting/hunting</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://infosechaos.blogspot.com/2021/05/detection-through-defined-process.html"><em>https://infosechaos.blogspot.com</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=24d24fe66ff6" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Analyst’s Problems as a Service (APaaS)]]></title>
            <link>https://cyb3rhawk.medium.com/analysts-problems-as-a-service-apaas-24c577b409f2?source=rss-1b083d6470db------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[apaas]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cyber-security-analyst]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cyber]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[analyst]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Cyb3rHawk]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 28 Oct 2021 22:45:39 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-10-28T22:45:39.617Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>There are many blogs and industry experts who have discussed issues of a SIEM, how it can fail, and what it is lacking. I’m worked and am working in a SOC, so I understand most of the issues. One thing I see very rarely are discussions on how it will affect an analyst to perform their job. SOC is an analyst’s den and its success and failure depend on them and the management.</p><p>I have created a three-part series to discuss some of the issues an analyst face if the SIEM architecture is not planned and designed properly. For the sake of length and readability, I have divided this blog into three parts: Sections: “The usual” and “Architectural” will be discussed in the <a href="https://infosechaos.blogspot.com/2020/12/analysts-problems-as-service-apaas-part1.html">first </a>blog, “Augmentation” and “Alerts” will be discussed in the <a href="https://infosechaos.blogspot.com/2020/12/analysts-problems-as-service-apaas-part2.html">second </a>blog. After seeing some of the problems we as an analyst’s face at the above-mentioned levels, the third and <a href="https://infosechaos.blogspot.com/2020/12/analysts-problems-as-service-apaas-part3_8.html">final </a>blog, will discuss the things we as an analyst can/may do to help ourselves.</p><p>Though we will not go into technical details of every component, rather a mixture of both technical and non-technical reasons.</p><p>The usual:</p><p>In this blog, we will see how an analyst’s work is spiked by some of the industry problems like analyst’s burnout and less efficient/skilled staff.</p><p>Architectural:</p><p>There are many moving parts in a SIEM like data shippers, aggregators, queuing technologies, storage systems, and alert engines at a minimum. We will discuss the components and how it will thwart an analyst’s workflow if they are not designed properly.</p><p>Logs:</p><p>SIEM is full of logs. The main purpose of SIEM is to gather all the logs and view them from a single pane of glass. Several questions arise when it comes to logs like what are the important ones to collect, how to collect them, where to find them, and such. Though we will not go into details saying “here is how you and where to collect them”, we will see why these questions are important to ask and how an analyst’s work can become cumbersome if they are not being properly addressed.</p><p>Alerts:</p><p>An analyst spends a significant amount of time in this area of the SIEM. As the list of the products which generate logs and alerts increase, the demand for context around them also increase. If the SIEM is not designed to contextualize alerts and only gather them from these point products, an analyst will face several issues in their triage process.</p><p>What an analyst can/may do:</p><p>This is is the final part of the blog series where we will discuss the things analysts can do within their power or at least suggest things to the people who control the component. The whole concept of this blog is <strong><em>“Don’t make an analyst work for the SIEM instead let the SIEM work for an analyst “</em></strong><em> </em>(sorry Justin Henderson, I stole your quote).</p><p>I hope you enjoy this three-part series. I have done a <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VnSIkicTpbY&amp;feature=youtu.be">webinar </a>about this one too, if you are interested. Feedback and your thoughts are much appreciated and encouraged.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=24c577b409f2" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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