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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Jose Luis Rodriguez on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Jose Luis Rodriguez on Medium]]></description>
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            <title><![CDATA[Mapping ATT&CK Data Sources to Security Events via OSSEM ⚔️]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/threat-hunters-forge/mapping-att-ck-data-sources-to-security-events-via-ossem-%EF%B8%8F-b606d99e738c?source=rss-b8f2906f3de3------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[data-engineering]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[infosec]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mitre-attack]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[attck]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jose Luis Rodriguez]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 28 Oct 2020 18:43:25 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-12-01T02:53:59.001Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*eJjsJOF74bHLSy6SbOjgMA.png" /></figure><p>The MITRE-ATT&amp;CK team just released the last entry of a two-part blog series where they proposed a new methodology to start defining and extending the concept of ATT&amp;CK data sources. They went from <a href="https://medium.com/mitre-attack/defining-attack-data-sources-part-i-4c39e581454f">identifying opportunities and enhancing the current state</a> of data sources, all the way to <a href="https://medium.com/mitre-attack/defining-attack-data-sources-part-ii-1fc98738ba5b">operationalizing a methodology</a> to improve the definition of current data sources and the identification of new ones within the framework. We highly recommend you to read those blog posts first 😉 .</p><p>One of the main changes in the ATT&amp;CK framework, from a data perspective, is the new structure applied to the data source objects concept. Data sources went from being simply additional metadata for each (sub)-technique to its own ATT&amp;CK object with its own attributes as shown below:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*XPcpJ5_cG2zmZ4oqPUigDQ.png" /><figcaption>Adapted from <a href="https://medium.com/mitre-attack/defining-attack-data-sources-part-i-4c39e581454f">ATT&amp;CK Data Source Object</a></figcaption></figure><p>From a contribution perspective, we believe that the InfoSec community can start not only by improving current data sources definitions and proposing new ones, but also to start mapping and sharing security telemetry related to relationships among data elements. According to the ATT&amp;CK team:</p><blockquote>The diagram below maps out how ATT&amp;CK could provide information from the data source to the relationships identified among the data elements that define the data source. It’d then be up to you to determine how best to map those data components and relationships to the specific data you collect</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/988/1*_zUzUTAT9HHnkEGze2xL6g.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://medium.com/mitre-attack/defining-attack-data-sources-part-i-4c39e581454f">Extending ATT&amp;CK Data Sources</a></figcaption></figure><p>In this blog post, we the <a href="https://twitter.com/OTR_Community">Open Threat Research (OTR)</a> community, will share our approach on mapping a few security events to relationships among data elements through <a href="https://github.com/OTRF">open source projects</a> such as Open Source Security Event Metadata (<a href="https://github.com/OTRF/OSSEM">OSSEM</a>), <a href="https://github.com/OTRF/mordor">Mordor</a>, and the <a href="https://github.com/OTRF/ThreatHunter-Playbook">Threat Hunter Playbook</a>. We will show an extended yaml file with security event logs mapped to specific data relationships, and how we have applied it when developing detection analytics for simulated adversary behaviors.</p><h3>What is OTR? 🧐</h3><p>At the beginning of the year, a community based effort, <strong>Open Threat Research (OTR)</strong>, was founded to empower the InfoSec community through open source projects and bring other passionate threat researchers together to collaborate and share. Overall, we hope everything that is contributed through the OTR community can help organizations to improve their security posture.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/498/1*yaKIZw6MMaXs31MbKVPxmw.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://github.com/OTRF">Open Threat Research (OTR)</a></figcaption></figure><p>One good example of the type of open source contributions developed under the OTR community is the OSSEM project. A project that has helped a lot to the revamping of data sources in the <a href="https://attack.mitre.org/">MITRE ATT&amp;CK framework</a>. We are very happy to see those contributions impacting a world-wide community leveraging ATT&amp;CK to validate their detection rules and improve their data collection strategy.</p><h3><strong>What is OSSEM?</strong></h3><p>The Open Source Security Events Metadata (OSSEM) is a community-led project that focuses primarily on the documentation and standardization of security event logs from diverse data sources and operating systems. Security events are documented in a <strong>data dictionary (DD)</strong> format and can be used as a reference while mapping data sources to data analytics used to validate the detection of adversarial techniques. In addition, the project provides a <strong>common data model (CDM)</strong> that can be used for data engineers during data normalization procedures to allow security analysts to query and analyze data across diverse data sources. Finally, the project also provides documentation about the structure and relationships identified in specific data sources to facilitate the development of data analytics and adversary behavior representation from a data perspective. This relationships are stored under the <strong>detection model (DM)</strong> section of the project.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*H-b0do2W7PBHZDinszSJIw.png" /><figcaption>Open Source Security Events Metadata (OSSEM) project general schema</figcaption></figure><h3>How Do We Start Mapping ATT&amp;CK Data Sources to Security Events? 🤔</h3><p>Within its <a href="https://github.com/mitre-attack/attack-datasources">GitHub repo</a>, the ATT&amp;CK team shared their initial <a href="https://github.com/mitre-attack/attack-datasources/blob/main/attack_data_sources.yaml">data sources objects</a> in yaml format. Based on this initial file, we can extend the data sources objects and map them to security telemetry such as Windows Security Auditing, Windows System, Sysmon and PowerShell.</p><p>The process is pretty straight-forward and involves the following steps:</p><ul><li>Understanding security event logs via data dictionaries</li><li>Identifying relationships in security events logs</li><li>Mapping security event logs to ATT&amp;CK data sources objects</li></ul><h4>Understanding security event logs via Data Dictionaries</h4><p>In order to understand and map a specific security event logs to a data source object, we needed to comprehend the structure and data provided by every event log. We believe that the best way to accomplish this is documenting security event logs through data dictionaries.</p><p>The <a href="https://github.com/OTRF/OSSEM/tree/master/data_dictionaries">Data Dictionaries (DD) sub-module of the OSSEM</a> project gives you information about telemetry that can be colledted from different platforms. If you want to consume OSSEM data dictionaries in a programmatically way, you can find the yaml files <a href="https://github.com/OTRF/OSSEM/tree/master/source/data_dictionaries">here</a>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*9nd5Y6T2L9oNVfHLEkNb3g.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://github.com/OTRF/OSSEM/blob/master/data_dictionaries/windows/etw-providers/Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing/events/event-4697.md">Microsoft Windows Security Auditing — Event 4697</a></figcaption></figure><h4>Identifying relationships in security events logs</h4><p>If you are trying to map security events to already defined relationships in the ATT&amp;CK data source objects, here is where you can try to validate if those relationships exist in your security events. For example, the new data source object “Service” has the following relationship:</p><ul><li><strong>user</strong> created a <strong>service</strong></li></ul><p>Looking at the previous image, data dictionary for event 4697 from Windows Security, we can validate that the “SubjectUserName” and “ServiceName” data fields give me context that represents this relationship. Therefore, we can say that the Windows Security event 4697 is a good candidate to be mapped against the following relationship “user created a service”. If the relationships identified in the security event logs you are working with does not exist in the framework, then it is a good opportunity to contribute to the <a href="https://github.com/mitre-attack/attack-datasources">ATT&amp;CK data source objects project</a>.</p><h4>Mapping security event logs to ATT&amp;CK data sources objects</h4><p>Once we have a better understanding of the data provided by security event logs and the relationships identified in them, we can start the mapping them to data sources objects. In the image below, we are showing an example of the initial mapping performed over the “Service” data source object.</p><p>Some of the data fields that we are adding to the original YAML file are the following:</p><ul><li>relationship name</li><li>relationship id</li><li>telemetry</li><li>event_provider</li><li>event_id</li></ul><p>You can find our initial mapping in yaml format within the <a href="https://github.com/OTRF/OSSEM-DM/blob/main/attack_event_mapping/_all_attack_ds_mappings.yml">Detection Model (DM) sub-module of the OSSEM</a> project.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/901/1*9KdzcHIsgUs-L1R3N58nXQ.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://github.com/OTRF/OSSEM-DM/blob/main/attack_event_mapping/service.yml">Service data source object — Security event logs mapping</a></figcaption></figure><p>Within the OSSEM-DM sub-module, you can also find a quick reference of all the current security event logs mapped to ATT&amp;CK data sources objects in this <a href="https://github.com/OTRF/OSSEM-DM/blob/main/docs/mitre_attack/security_events_mappings.md">markdown file</a>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*r-mMk-bDpzViydMoMxgTYQ.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://github.com/OTRF/OSSEM-DM/blob/main/docs/mitre_attack/security_events_mappings.md">Mapping of data sources to security event logs</a></figcaption></figure><h3>How Can We Consume the Security Event Logs Mapping from OSSEM? 🧐</h3><p>We have prepared a Jupyter Notebook for you to explore the security telemetry mapped to new ATT&amp;CK data sources objects. In this notebook, we are also sharing with you a couple of ideas on what you can do with the information provided by the OSSEM project. You can find the notebook <a href="https://ossemproject.com/notebooks/dm/attack_ds_event_mappings_nb.html">here</a><em>.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/977/1*ogeMz5e-1WetC5olGXuKew.png" /><figcaption>OSSEM — Security Event Logs Mapping</figcaption></figure><h4>Visualizing relationships among data elements using a Network Graph</h4><p>Without modifying the original ATT&amp;CK data sources yaml file, we can start analyzing its information from a visualization perspective. Here is where the concepts such as source_data_element, relationship, and target_data_element become really important.</p><p>According to the first part of the ATT&amp;CK data sources blog series, adversary behavior might be represented using data elements and relationships. Therefore, it makes sense to represent the interaction among data elements using a network visualization. In the image below, we show a basic example using the <a href="https://bokeh.org/">Bokeh</a> Python library. We can see that the <strong>user</strong> and <strong>process</strong> data elements are the ones that concentrate most of the interactions.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/719/1*e-mqRmUEd3J56nFubS9XbQ.png" /><figcaption>Relationships among data elements</figcaption></figure><h4>Mapping (sub)techniques to potential security event logs</h4><p>Another interesting use case when analyzing the initial mapping from OSSEM is actually to complete the mapping process all the way to (sub)techniques.</p><p>Within the jupyter notebook that we have prepared for you, we are using the <a href="https://github.com/OTRF/ATTACK-Python-Client">attackcti</a> Python library to collect and parse the content of the ATT&amp;CK framework. In addition, we are updating our dataframe with the <a href="https://github.com/mitre-attack/attack-datasources/blob/main/new_data_sources_names.yaml">new data sources names</a> proposed by the ATT&amp;CK team. Finally, we were able to start mapping security event logs to (sub)techniques. The example that we present at the end of the notebook is the mapping process for the <strong>SMB/Windows Admin Shares</strong> <strong>(T1021.002)</strong> sub-technique. This mapping example only considers the current recommended data sources by the ATT&amp;CK framework.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/974/1*PuoZhcK3ND24O2r2Mw0MXQ.png" /><figcaption>Mapping of security event logs/relationships/components to SMB/Windows Admin Shares</figcaption></figure><h3>How Can We Operationalize the Security Event Logs Mapping? 🤔</h3><p>The idea of revamping the data sources piece of ATT&amp;CK was to get the framework closer to the community and support the representation of adversary behavior, development of detection analytics and improve our security posture from a data perspective. The security event logs mapping output from the OSSEM project is a very helpful resource that we can use to support all these activities. A practical way to show you its application, is the development of detection analytics for Mordor datasets through the Threat Hunter Playbook.</p><p>Let’s continue using the <strong>SMB/Windows Admin Shares (T1021.002)</strong> sub-technique that adversaries may use to accomplish lateral movement. The Mordor project contains a <a href="https://mordordatasets.com/notebooks/small/windows/08_lateral_movement/SDWIN-200806015757.html">small dataset</a> that we can use to study this specific behavior, so we were able to put together a <a href="https://threathunterplaybook.com/notebooks/windows/08_lateral_movement/WIN-201012004336.html">playbook</a> where we share our experience developing detection analytics.</p><p>The offensive tradecraft behind the sub-technique simulation is that adversaries might be using the Server Message Block (SMB) protocol to copy files over the network to either execute code remotely or exfiltrate data.</p><p>Some of the actions that the adversary developed in our environment are accessing the file share, accessing the file, and copying or creating a file. Using data elements and relationships provided by the ATT&amp;CK team and the data sources mapping from the OSSEM project, we can represent this behavior with the following schema:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*eJjsJOF74bHLSy6SbOjgMA.png" /><figcaption>Potential data representation of adversary behavior for SMB/Windows Admin Shares (T1021.002) sub-technique</figcaption></figure><p>Using this adversary behavior data model, we can start defining detection analytics after analyzing the Mordor dataset.We might not use all the relationships from this data model, however all of them are a very good reference when trying to get more context of the adversary behavior. Within the playbook, you will find at least 5 detection analytics related to the <strong>SMB/Windows Admin Shares (T1021.002) sub-technique</strong>. In the following image, a couple of these basic detection analytics are shown:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*eOccCuOeWgr7X8MkZtYSJg.png" /><figcaption>Detection analytics II for SMB/Windows Admin Shares (T1021.002) — Threat Hunter Playbook</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*-Fu1kTDDjkur-bIGtdRE5g.png" /><figcaption>Detection analytics V for SMB/Windows Admin Shares (T1021.002) — Threat Hunter Playbook</figcaption></figure><p>After performing this mapping exercise, we were able to identify a potential contribution opportunity to the MITRE-ATT&amp;CK framework from a data sources perspective. The current data sources recommended are Authentication log and Process. However, when defining our detection analytics, we required more security context around creation and manipulation of a file. Therefore, we are proposing to consider also the <strong>File</strong> data source object as part of the recommended data sources for this sub-technique.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*9xiyPnqNq1x0ISjmWyvxBA.png" /><figcaption>Contribution opportunity — File data source object as recommended data source</figcaption></figure><h3>Wait… Is the Threat Hunter Playbook applying the Security Event Logs Mapping from OSSEM? 😱</h3><p>The answer is <strong>YES!! 🍻 😉 </strong>Since the beginnings of the project, we considered data sources as a main component of the project. However, we decided not to show it as part of the playbooks because we were looking for a methodology that allows us to start mapping security events in a more effective way. After the release of ATT&amp;CK data sources objects, we have updated all the playbooks within the project with data sources metadata. This metadata will help you to get a better understanding of the logic behind the detection analytic. You can find and review all the available playbooks <a href="https://threathunterplaybook.com/introduction.html">here</a>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*QT_gTQGyCQXDQaGu1v2Mug.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://threathunterplaybook.com/notebooks/windows/08_lateral_movement/WIN-201012004336.html">SMB Create Remote File example — Threat Hunter Playbook</a></figcaption></figure><h3>How can you contribute? 💜</h3><h4>a) Fork the <a href="https://github.com/OTRF/OSSEM-DM">Detection Model (DM)</a> sub-module of the OSSEM project</h4><p>You can use this <a href="https://docs.github.com/en/free-pro-team@latest/github/getting-started-with-github/fork-a-repo">GitHub document</a> as a reference to understand the forking a GitHub repo process. You will find tabs with content for Mac, Windows and Linux platforms.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Tbve1hnofiKmwLyu0gO9fw.png" /><figcaption>GitHub Doc — Fork a repository</figcaption></figure><h4>b) Access the <a href="https://github.com/OTRF/OSSEM-DM/tree/main/attack_event_mapping">attack_event_mapping</a> section</h4><p>Our preferred application to handle the documentation of the project is Visual Studio Code, but you can use the one that works better for you. You will need to access the attack_event_mapping section where we have made available a yaml file per data source object. As it was described before, these yaml files are just extensions of the original ones provided by the ATT&amp;CK team. For example, in the image below you can see the Logon Session data source object.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*v7m2A9WRz0CLFrEpLSJk9w.png" /><figcaption>logon_session data source object example</figcaption></figure><h4>c) Share With The Community</h4><p><strong>Adding security events to current relationships (Option #1)</strong></p><p>You can start by adding security events to already existing event providers like Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing, or you can also add a new event provider to the relationships defined by the MITRE ATT&amp;CK team.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/514/1*4ffcDJyIOsOXdCLN9uHBMA.png" /><figcaption>Example — Adding security event to <strong>User created Logon Session</strong> relationship</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Adding a new relationship/component (Option #2)</strong></p><p>Also, based on the methodology described by the AT&amp;CK team, you could define new relationships and data components when learning about security events. This type of contribution would be really awesome because you are not only contributing to the security events mapping community effort, but also helping the community to document and propose new content for the MITRE-ATT&amp;CK framework. I am one of the ATT&amp;CK members that developed the methodology, so I can provide feedback before it is contributed to the framework itself via the <a href="https://github.com/mitre-attack/attack-datasources">attack-datasources</a> GitHub repo</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/572/1*oi5_t--O2q1FlBRMEJ5asQ.png" /><figcaption>Example — Adding a <strong>new relationship/data component</strong></figcaption></figure><h4>d) Submit a Pull Request (PR) to the <a href="https://github.com/OTRF/OSSEM-DM">Detection Model (DM)</a> sub-module of the OSSEM project</h4><p>You can use this <a href="https://docs.github.com/en/free-pro-team@latest/github/collaborating-with-issues-and-pull-requests/creating-a-pull-request">GitHub document</a> as a reference to understand the creating a pull request process.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*xiZUASKYqhAEt8QhU7LC7Q.png" /><figcaption>GitHub Doc — Fork a repository</figcaption></figure><p>That’s it for this post! I hope you found it useful for the understanding and application of the new methodology proposed by the MITRE-ATT&amp;CK team. We will continue sharing practical applications of this methodology when conducting detection research through OSSEM, Mordor, and the Threat Hunter playbook. Please feel free to review the projects <a href="https://github.com/OTRF">here</a> and submit a pull request. There are a lot and diverse telemetry sources that need to be mapped to (sub)techniques, and we can not do this without your help 😉 🍻 🌎 💜.</p><h3>References</h3><ul><li><a href="https://github.com/OTRF/OSSEM-DM/tree/main/attack_event_mapping">https://github.com/OTRF/OSSEM-DM/tree/main/attack_event_mapping</a></li><li><a href="https://github.com/OTRF/OSSEM-DM/blob/main/docs/ossem_data_sources_mapping.ipynb">https://github.com/OTRF/OSSEM-DM/blob/main/docs/ossem_data_sources_mapping.ipynb</a></li><li><a href="https://threathunterplaybook.com/notebooks/windows/windows.html">https://threathunterplaybook.com/notebooks/windows/windows.html</a></li><li><a href="https://mordordatasets.com/notebooks/small/windows/windows.html">https://mordordatasets.com/notebooks/small/windows/windows.html</a></li><li><a href="https://docs.github.com/en/free-pro-team@latest/github/getting-started-with-github/fork-a-repo">https://docs.github.com/en/free-pro-team@latest/github/getting-started-with-github/fork-a-repo</a></li><li><a href="https://docs.github.com/en/free-pro-team@latest/github/collaborating-with-issues-and-pull-requests/creating-a-pull-request">https://docs.github.com/en/free-pro-team@latest/github/collaborating-with-issues-and-pull-requests/creating-a-pull-request</a></li><li><a href="https://medium.com/mitre-attack/defining-attack-data-sources-part-i-4c39e581454f">https://medium.com/mitre-attack/defining-attack-data-sources-part-i-4c39e581454f</a></li><li><a href="https://medium.com/mitre-attack/defining-attack-data-sources-part-ii-1fc98738ba5b">https://medium.com/mitre-attack/defining-attack-data-sources-part-ii-1fc98738ba5b</a></li><li><a href="https://github.com/mitre-attack/attack-datasources">https://github.com/mitre-attack/attack-datasources</a></li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b606d99e738c" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/threat-hunters-forge/mapping-att-ck-data-sources-to-security-events-via-ossem-%EF%B8%8F-b606d99e738c">Mapping ATT&amp;CK Data Sources to Security Events via OSSEM 🛡⚔️</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/threat-hunters-forge">Open Threat Research</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Defining ATT&CK Data Sources, Part II: Operationalizing the Methodology]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/mitre-attack/defining-attack-data-sources-part-ii-1fc98738ba5b?source=rss-b8f2906f3de3------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/1fc98738ba5b</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[datasource]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[infosec]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mitre]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[attck]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jose Luis Rodriguez]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 20 Oct 2020 15:29:47 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-10-20T15:29:47.684Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*cfXGChCVmIvYdletwStMAQ.png" /></figure><p>In <a href="https://medium.com/mitre-attack/defining-attack-data-sources-part-i-4c39e581454f">Part I</a> of this two-part blog series, we reviewed the current state of the data sources and an initial approach to enhancing them through data modeling. We also defined what an ATT&amp;CK data source object represents and extended it to introduce the concept of data components.</p><p>In Part II, we’ll explore a methodology to help define new ATT&amp;CK data source objects, how to implement the methodology with current data sources, and share an initial set of data source objects at <a href="https://github.com/mitre-attack/attack-datasources">https://github.com/mitre-attack/attack-datasources</a>.</p><h3>Formalizing the Methodology</h3><p>In Part I we proposed defining data sources as objects within the ATT&amp;CK framework and developing a standardized approach to name and define data sources through data modeling concepts. Our methodology to accomplish this objective is captured in five key steps — Identify Sources of Data, Identify Data Elements, Identify Relationships Among Data Elements, Define Data Components, and Assemble the ATT&amp;CK Data Source Object.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*UZSwThDiCiAsUTSiXGHjtg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Figure 1: Proposed Methodology to Define Data Sources Object</figcaption></figure><h4>Step 1: Identify Sources of Data</h4><p>Identifying the security events to inform the specific ATT&amp;CK data sources being assessed kickstarts the process. The security events can be uncovered by reviewing the metadata in the event logs that reference the specific data source (i.e., process name, process path, application, image). We recommend complementing this step with documentation or data dictionaries that identify relevant event logs to provide the key context around the data source. It’s important at this phase in the process to document where the data can be collected (collection layer and platform).</p><h4>Step 2: Identify Data Elements</h4><p>Extracting data elements found in the available data enables identification of the data elements that could provide the name and the definition of the data source.</p><h4>Step 3: Identify Relationships Among Data Elements</h4><p>During the identification of data elements, we can also start documenting the available relationships that will be grouped to enable us to define potential data components.</p><h4>Step 4: Define Data Components</h4><p>The output of grouping the relationships is a list of all potential data components that could provide additional context to the data source.</p><h4>Step 5: Assemble the ATT&amp;CK Data Source Object</h4><p>Connecting all of the information from previous steps enables us to structure them as properties of the data source object. The table below provides an approach for organizing the combined information into a data source object.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*cfXGChCVmIvYdletwStMAQ.png" /><figcaption>Table 1: ATT&amp;CK Data Source Object</figcaption></figure><h3>Operationalizing the Methodology</h3><p>To illustrate how the methodology can be applied to ATT&amp;CK data sources, we feature use cases in the following sections that reflect and operationalize the process.</p><p>Starting with the ATT&amp;CK data source that is mapped to the most sub-techniques in the framework, Process Monitoring, we will create our first ATT&amp;CK data source object. Next we will create another ATT&amp;CK data source object around Windows Event Logs, a data source that is key for detecting a significant number of techniques</p><p>Windows is leveraged for the use cases, but the approach can and should be applied to other platforms.</p><h4>Improving Process Monitoring</h4><p><strong>1) Identifying Sources of Data: </strong>In a Windows environment, we can collect information pertaining to “Processes” from built-in event providers such as Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing and open third-party tools, including Sysmon.</p><p>This step also takes into account the overall security events where a process can be represented as the main data element around an adversary action. This could include actions such as a process connecting to an IP address, modifying a registry, or creating a file. The following image displays security events from the Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing provider and the associated context about a process performing an action on an endpoint:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*OLUcWK2ejslEcYAqD85OvQ.jpeg" /><figcaption><em>Figure 2: Windows Security Events Featuring a Process Data Element</em></figcaption></figure><p>These security events also provide information about other data elements such as “User”, “Port” or “Ip”. This means that security events can be mapped to other data elements depending on the data source and the adversary (sub-)technique.</p><p>The source identification process should leverage available documentation about organization-internal security events. We recommend using documentation about your data or examining data source information in open source projects such as <a href="https://github.com/rabobank-cdc/DeTTECT">DeTT&amp;CT</a>, the <a href="https://github.com/OTRF/OSSEM">Open Source Security Events Metadata (OSSEM)</a>, or <a href="https://github.com/olafhartong/ATTACKdatamap">ATTACK Datamap</a>.</p><p>An additional element that we can extract from this step is the data collection location. A simple approach for identifying this information includes documenting the collection layer and platform for the data source:</p><ul><li><strong><em>Collection Layer:</em></strong><em> Host</em></li><li><strong><em>Platform:</em></strong><em> Windows</em></li></ul><p>The most effective data collection strategy will be customized to your unique environment. From a collection layer standpoint, this varies depending on how you <strong>collect</strong> data in your environment, but Process information is generally collected directly from the endpoint. From a platform perspective, this approach can be replicated on other platforms (e.g., Linux, macOS, Android) with the corresponding data collection locations captured.</p><p><strong>2) Identifying Data Elements:</strong> Once we identify and understand more about sources of data that can be mapped to an ATT&amp;CK data source, we can start identifying data elements within the data fields that could help us eventually represent adversary behavior from a data perspective. The image below displays how we can extend the concept of an event log and capture the data elements featured within it.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*uRsHxbsYty0UtF1wW5ZmFg.jpeg" /><figcaption><em>Figure 3: Process Data Source — Data Elements</em></figcaption></figure><p>We will also use the data elements identified within the data fields to create and improve the naming of data sources and inform the data source definition. Data source designations are represented by the core data element(s). In the case of Process Monitoring, it makes sense for the data source name to contain “Process” but not “Monitoring,” as monitoring is an activity around the data source that is performed by the organization. Our naming and definition adjustments for “Process” are featured below:</p><ul><li><strong><em>Name:</em></strong><em> Process</em></li><li><strong><em>Definition:</em></strong><em> Information about instances of computer programs that are being executed by at least one thread.</em></li></ul><p>We can leverage this approach across ATT&amp;CK to strategically remove extraneous wording in data sources.</p><p><strong>3) Identifying Relationships Among Data Elements: </strong>Once we have a better understanding of the data elements and a more relevant definition for the data source itself, we can start extending the data elements information and identifying relationships that exist among them. These relationships can be defined based on the activity described by the collected telemetry. The following image features relationships identified in the security events that are related to the “Process” data source.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*A8JEOhL18WcAXyWWO7qRsA.jpeg" /><figcaption><em>Figure 4: Process Data Source — Relationships</em></figcaption></figure><p><strong>4) Defining Data Components: </strong>All of the combined information aspects in the previous steps contribute to the concept of data components in the framework.</p><p>Based on the relationships identified among data elements, we can start grouping and developing corresponding designations to inform a high-level overview of the relationships. As highlighted in the image below, some data components can be mapped to one event (Process Creation -&gt; Security 4688) while other components such as “Process Network Connection” involve more than one security event from the same provider.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*rnF656KERnh215oKz1xotw.jpeg" /><figcaption><em>Figure 5: Process Data Source — Data Components</em></figcaption></figure><p>“Process” now serves as an umbrella over the linked information facets relevant to the ATT&amp;CK data source.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*XC07eOybOF2Szn8r4i622w.jpeg" /><figcaption><em>Figure 6: Process Data Source</em></figcaption></figure><p><strong>5) Assembling the ATT&amp;CK Data Source Object: </strong>Aggregating all of the core outputs from the previous steps and linking them together represents the new “Process” ATT&amp;CK data source object. The table below provides a basic example of it for “Process”:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*EiN_Thal7TZQGNJQU_jhMQ.png" /><figcaption><em>Table 2: Process Data Source Object</em></figcaption></figure><h4>Improving Windows Event Logs</h4><p><strong>1) Identifying Sources of Data: </strong>Following the established methodology, our first step is to identify the security events we can collect pertaining to “Windows Event Logs”, but it’s immediately apparent that this data source is too broad. The image below displays a few of the Windows event providers that exist under the “Windows Event logs” umbrella.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*MeeufV_wS7kb6fbKTQ42gg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Figure 7: Multiple Event Logs in Windows Event Logs</figcaption></figure><p>The next image reveals additional Windows event logs that could also be considered sources of data.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*DXGPbELSUwHCYXb0nuOebg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Figure 8: Windows Event Viewer — Event Providers</figcaption></figure><p>With so many events, how do we define what needs to be collected from a Windows endpoint when an ATT&amp;CK technique recommends “Windows Event Logs” as a data source?</p><p><strong>2–3–4) Identifying Data Elements, Relationships and Data Components:</strong> We suggest that the current ATT&amp;CK data source Windows Event Logs can be broken down, compared with other data sources for potential overlaps, and replaced. To accomplish this, we can duplicate the process we previously used with <strong>Process Monitoring</strong> to demonstrate that Windows Event Logs covers several data elements, relationships, data components and even other existing ATT&amp;CK data sources.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*u5YTrMm-x5QOM8vK1jgDiQ.jpeg" /><figcaption><em>Figure 9: Windows Event Logs Broken Down</em></figcaption></figure><p><strong>5) Assembling the ATT&amp;CK Data Source Object:</strong> Assembling the outputs from the process, we can leverage the information from Windows security event logs to create and define a few data source objects.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*kRmXe5GtYPOK68qChGjiqw.png" /><figcaption>Table 3: File Data Source Object</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Iv_M_V5pYUkrLw9TRPsAsw.png" /><figcaption>Table 4: PowerShell Log Data Source Object</figcaption></figure><p>In addition, we can identify potential new ATT&amp;CK data sources. The <strong>User Account</strong> case was the result of identifying several data elements and relationships around the telemetry generated when adversaries create a user, enable a user, modify properties of a user account, and even disable user accounts. The table below is an example of what the new ATT&amp;CK data source object would look like.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*dLqd-d0fCQG4i3ZjeYDA1w.png" /><figcaption>Table 5: User Account Data Source Object (NEW)</figcaption></figure><p>This new data source could be mapped to ATT&amp;CK techniques such as <strong>Account Manipulation (T1098)</strong>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*_wWKsYMS1Zn3BpFajkUA0w.png" /><figcaption><em>Figure 10: User Account Data Source for Account Manipulation Technique</em></figcaption></figure><h3>Applying the Methodology to (Sub-)Techniques</h3><p>Now that we’ve operationalized the methodology to enrich ATT&amp;CK data through defined data source objects, how does this apply to techniques and sub-techniques? With the additional context around each data source, we can leverage the results with more context and detail when defining a data collection strategy for techniques and sub-techniques.</p><h4>Sub-Technique Use Case: T1543.003 Windows Service</h4><p><strong>T1543 Create and Modify System Process</strong> (used to accomplish <strong>Persistence</strong> and <strong>Privilege Escalation</strong>tactics) includes the following sub-techniques: Launch Agent, System Service, Windows Service, and Launch Daemon.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*QzvnLRkTcaUMJRisF5LZBA.png" /><figcaption>Figure 11: Create or Modify System Process Technique</figcaption></figure><p>We’ll focus on <strong>T1543.003 Windows Service</strong> to highlight how the additional context provided by the data source objects make it easier to identify potential security events to be collected.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*UShAiZ3Lq1J0o7EYRvKB2Q.png" /><figcaption><em>Figure 12: Windows Service Sub-Technique</em></figcaption></figure><p>Based on the information provided by the sub-technique, we can start leveraging some of the ATT&amp;CK data objects that can be defined with the methodology. With the additional information from <strong>Process</strong>, <strong>Windows Registry</strong> and <strong>Service</strong> data source objects, we can drill down and use properties such as <strong>data components </strong>for more specificity from a data perspective.</p><p>In the image below, concepts such as data components not only narrow the identification of security events, but also create a bridge between high- and low-level concepts to inform data collection strategies.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*5_3b3YlMy-jRGT4vyyILig.jpeg" /><figcaption><em>Figure 13: Mapping Event Logs to Sub-Techniques Through Data Components Example</em></figcaption></figure><p>Implementing these concepts from an organizational perspective requires identifying what security events are mapped to specific data components. The image above leverages free telemetry examples to illustrate the concepts behind the methodology.</p><p>This T1543.003 use case demonstrates how the methodology aligns seamlessly with ATT&amp;CK’s classification as a mid-level framework that breaks down high-level concepts and contextualizes lower-level concepts.</p><h3>Where can we find initial Data Sources objects?</h3><p>The initial data source objects that we developed can be found at <a href="https://github.com/mitre-attack/attack-datasources">https://github.com/mitre-attack/attack-datasources</a> in <strong>Yaml</strong> format for easy consumption. Most of the data components and relationships were defined from a Windows Host perspective and there are many opportunities for contributions from collection layer (i.e. Network, Cloud) and platform (i.e. Mac, Linux) perspectives for applying this methodology.</p><p>Outlined below is an example of the Yaml file structure for the Service data source object:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*d-xQbqivi1L4BYxe13_S-Q.jpeg" /><figcaption><em>Figure 14: Service Data Source Object — Yaml File</em></figcaption></figure><h3>Going Forward</h3><p>In this two-part series, we introduced, formalized and operationalized the methodology to revamp ATT&amp;CK data sources. We encourage you to test this methodology in your environment and provide feedback about what works and what needs improvement as we consider adopting it for MITRE ATT&amp;CK.</p><p>As highlighted both in this post and in <a href="https://medium.com/mitre-attack/defining-attack-data-sources-part-i-4c39e581454f">Part I</a>, mapping data sources to data elements and identifying their relationships is still a work in progress and we look forward to continuing to develop this concept with community input.</p><p>©2020 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 20–02605–3</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1fc98738ba5b" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/mitre-attack/defining-attack-data-sources-part-ii-1fc98738ba5b">Defining ATT&amp;CK Data Sources, Part II: Operationalizing the Methodology</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/mitre-attack">MITRE ATT&amp;CK®</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Defining ATT&CK Data Sources, Part I: Enhancing the Current State]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/mitre-attack/defining-attack-data-sources-part-i-4c39e581454f?source=rss-b8f2906f3de3------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/4c39e581454f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[mitre]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[attck]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[datasource]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[infosec]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jose Luis Rodriguez]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 10 Sep 2020 19:19:09 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-09-11T06:57:33.210Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*RxoZUkh3iqEjKP9iVNxZ6w.jpeg" /><figcaption><em>Figure 1: Example of Mapping of Process Data Source to Event Logs</em></figcaption></figure><p>Discussion around ATT&amp;CK often involves tactics, techniques, procedures, detections, and mitigations, but a significant element is often overlooked: data sources. Data sources for every technique provide valuable context and opportunities to improve your security posture and impact your detection strategy.</p><p>This two-part blog series will outline a new methodology to extend ATT&amp;CK’s current data sources. In this post, we explore the current state of data sources and an initial approach to enhance them through data modeling. We’ll define what an ATT&amp;CK data source object represents and how we can extend it to introduce the concept of data components. In our next post we’ll introduce a methodology to help define new ATT&amp;CK data source objects.</p><p>The table below outlines our proposed data source object schema:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Cc1dSbK0GXARyEzMozjmbg.png" /><figcaption><em>Table 1: ATT&amp;CK Data Source Object</em></figcaption></figure><h3>Where to Find Data Sources Today</h3><p>Data sources are featured as part of the <strong>(sub)technique</strong> object properties:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*JQKR1_OugK6iVPXe8Dwabw.png" /><figcaption><em>Figure 2: LSASS Memory Sub-Technique (https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001/)</em></figcaption></figure><p>While the current structure only contains the names of the data sources, to understand and effectively apply these data sources, it is necessary to align them with detection technologies, logs, and sensors.</p><h3>Improving the Current Data Sources in ATT&amp;CK</h3><p>The <a href="https://attack.mitre.org/docs/ATTACK_Design_and_Philosophy_March_2020.pdf"><em>MITRE ATT&amp;CK: Design and Philosophy </em></a>white-paper defines data sources as “information collected by a sensor or logging system that may be used to collect information relevant to identifying the action being performed, sequence of actions, or the results of those actions by an adversary”.</p><p>ATT&amp;CK’s data sources provide a way to create a relationship between adversary activity and the telemetry collected in a network environment. This makes data sources one of the most vital aspects when developing detection rules for adversary actions mapped to the framework.</p><p>Need some visualizations and audio track to help decipher the relationships between data sources and the number of techniques covered by them? My brother and I recently presented at ATT&amp;CKcon on how you can explore more about <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eM0c_Gil-38&amp;feature=youtu.be&amp;list=PLkTApXQou_8KXWrk0G83QQbNLvspAo-Qk">data sources metadata</a> and <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QCDBjFJ_C3g&amp;list=PLkTApXQou_8JrhtrFDfAskvMqk97Yu2S2&amp;index=21&amp;t=0s">how to use sources to drive successful hunt programs</a>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*GxdYUPUpQxwR2X2p4-_j9g.png" /><figcaption>Figure 3:ATT&amp;CK Data Sources, Jose Luis Rodriguez &amp; Roberto Rodriguez</figcaption></figure><p>We categorized a number of ways to improve the current approach to data sources. Many of these are based on community feedback, and we’re interested in your reactions and comments to our proposed upgrades.</p><h4>1. Develop Data Source Definitions</h4><p>Community feedback emphasizes that having definitions for each data source will enhance efficiency while also contributing to data collection strategy development. This will enable ATT&amp;CK users to quickly translate data sources to specific sensors and logs in their environment.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/920/1*5nwMMIjyDSKJVlpIILireA.jpeg" /><figcaption><em>Figure 4: Data Sources to Event Logs</em></figcaption></figure><h4>2. Standardize the Name Syntax</h4><p>Standardizing the naming convention for data sources is another factor that came up during feedback conversations. As we outline in the image below, data sources can be interpreted differently. For example, some data sources are very specific, e.g., Windows Registry, while others, such as Malware Reverse Engineering, have a wider scope. We propose a consistent naming syntax structure that addresses explicitly defined elements of interest from the data being collected such as files, processes, DLLs, etc.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*wwFhzDS5G9btFP8AlS-d6g.jpeg" /><figcaption>Figure 5: Name Syntax Structure Examples</figcaption></figure><h4>3. Address Redundancy and Overlapping</h4><p>Another unintended consequence of not having a standard naming structure for data sources is redundancy, which can also lead to overlaps.</p><p><strong>Example A: Loaded DLLs and DLL monitoring</strong></p><p>The recommended data sources related to DLLs imply two different detection mechanisms; however, both techniques leverage DLLs being loaded to proxy execution of malicious code. Do we collect “Loaded DLLs” or focus on “DLL Monitoring”? Do we do both? Can they just be one data source?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*eY_GBZcET09ezwuK7WmTeQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Figure 6: AppInit DLLs Sub-Technique (https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/010/)</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*-IWPFjvlY-pjCjugUV2zLw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Figure 7: Netsh Helper DLL Sub-Technique (https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/007/)</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Example B: Collecting process telemetry</strong></p><p>All of the information provided by Process Command-line Parameters, Process use of Network, and Process Monitoring refer to a common element of interest, a <strong>process</strong>. Do we consider that “Process Command-Line Parameters” could be inside of “Process Monitoring”? Can “Process Use of Network” also cover “Process Monitoring” or could it be an independent data source?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/848/1*B58in2pmgmYhmEMEqhzbHg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Figure 8: Redundancy and overlapping among data sources</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Example C: Breaking down or aggregating Windows Event Logs</strong></p><p>Finally, data sources such as “Windows Event Logs” have a very broad scope and cover several other data sources. The image below shows some of the data sources that can be grouped under event logs collected from Windows endpoints:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*mksOP5d5hQlfYwOO0oYq9w.jpeg" /><figcaption>Figure 9: Windows Event Logs Viewer</figcaption></figure><p>ATT&amp;CK recommends collecting events from data sources such as PowerShell Logs, Windows Event Reporting, WMI objects, and Windows Registry. However, these could be already covered by “Windows Event Logs” as previously shown. Do we group every Windows data source under “Windows Event Logs” or keep them all as independent data sources?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/972/1*lQP2l4pmQzOjNs6q2doiEw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Figure 10: Windows Event Logs Coverage Overlap</figcaption></figure><h4>4. Ensure Platform Consistency</h4><p>There are also data sources that, from a technique’s perspective, are linked to platforms where they can’t feasibly be collected. For example, the image below highlights data sources related to the Windows platform such as PowerShell logs and Windows Registry given for techniques that can be also used on other platforms such as macOS and Linux.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*LKtUubfEv0fyxDqbNnYeFQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Figure 11: Windows Data Sources</figcaption></figure><p>This issue has been addressed to a degree by the <a href="https://medium.com/mitre-attack/attack-with-sub-techniques-is-now-just-attack-8fc20997d8de">release of ATT&amp;CK’s sub-techniques</a>. For instance, in the image below you can see a description of the <strong>OS Credential Dumping (T1003)</strong> technique, the platforms where it can be performed, and the recommended data sources.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*XQIcPG31MQRXuNcdCsAgDA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Figure 12: OS Credential Dumping Technique (https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/)</figcaption></figure><p>While the field presentation could still lead us to relate PowerShell logs data source to non-Windows platform, once we start digging deeper into sub-technique details, the association between PowerShell logs and non-Windows platforms disappears.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*n6ikZzoxPeMfjpxHDoIRzQ.jpeg" /><figcaption><em>Figure 13: LSASS Memory Sub-Technique (https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001/)</em></figcaption></figure><p>Defining the concept of platforms at a data source level would increase the effectiveness of collection. This could be accomplished by upgrading data sources from a simple property or field value to the status of an object in ATT&amp;CK, similar to a (sub)technique.</p><h3>A Proposed Methodology to Update ATT&amp;CK’s Data Sources</h3><p>Based on feedback from the ATT&amp;CK community, it made sense to start providing definitions for each ATT&amp;CK data source. However, we realized right away that without a structure and a methodology to describe data sources, definitions would be a challenge. Even though it was simple to describe data sources such as “Process Monitoring”, “File Monitoring”, “Windows Registry” and even “DLL Monitoring”, data source descriptions for “Disk Forensics”, “Detonation Chamber” or “Third Party Application Logs” are more complex.</p><p>We ultimately recognized that we needed to apply data concepts that could help us provide more context to each data source in an organized and standardized way. This would allow us to also identify potential relationships among data sources and improve the mapping of adversary actions to data that we collect.</p><p>Our methodology for upgrading ATT&amp;CK’s data sources is captured in the following six ideas:</p><h4>1. Leverage Data Modeling</h4><p>A data model is a collection of concepts for organizing data elements and standardizing how they relate to one another. If we apply this basic concept to security data sources, we can start identifying core data elements that could be used to describe a data source in a more structured way. Furthermore, this will help us to identify relationships among data sources and enhance the process of capturing TTPs from adversary actions.</p><p>Here is an initial proposed data model for ATT&amp;CK data sources:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*2DIhXGX2JuSrXkhmPpHm1w.png" /><figcaption><em>Table 2: Data Modeling Concepts</em></figcaption></figure><p>Based on this notional model, we can begin to identify relationships between data sources and how they apply to logs and sensors. For example, the image below represents several data elements and relationships identified while working with <strong>Sysmon</strong> event logs:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1004/1*BsXvb5gO-Vdm35QuE1O50A.jpeg" /><figcaption><em>Figure 14: Relationships examples for process data object — </em><a href="https://github.com/hunters-forge/OSSEM/tree/master/data_dictionaries/windows/sysmon"><em>https://github.com/hunters-forge/OSSEM/tree/master/data_dictionaries/windows/sysmon</em></a></figcaption></figure><h4>2. Define Data Sources Through Data Elements</h4><p>Data modeling enables us to validate data source names and provide a definition for each one in a standardized way. This is accomplished by leveraging the main data elements present in the data we collect.</p><p>We can use the data element to name the data source related to the adversary behavior that we want to collect data about. For example, if an adversary modifies a Windows Registry value, we’ll collect telemetry from the Windows Registry. How the adversary modifies the registry, such as the process or user that performed the action, is additional context we can leverage to help us define the data source.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*c7epV_N0OVA-DE4IWSo8PA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Figure 15: Registry Key as main data element</figcaption></figure><p>We can also group related data elements to provide a general idea of what needs to be collected. For example, we can group the data elements that provide metadata about network traffic and name it Netflow.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*2k_PzJWEXslpAwjJUhk1vw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Figure 16: Main data elements for Netflow data source</figcaption></figure><h4>3. Incorporate Data Modeling and Adversary Modeling</h4><p>Leveraging data modeling concepts would also enhance ATT&amp;CK’s current approach to mapping a data source to a technique or sub-technique. Breaking down data sources and standardizing the way data elements relate to each other would allow us to start providing more context around adversary behaviors from a data perspective. ATT&amp;CK users could take those concepts and identify what specific events they need to collect to ensure coverage over a specific adversary action.</p><p>For example, in the image below, we can add more information to the <strong>Windows Registry</strong> data source by providing some of the <strong>data elements</strong> that relate to each other to provide more context around the adversary action. We can go from <strong>Windows Registry</strong> to ( Process — created — Registry Key).</p><p>This is just one relationship that we can map to the Windows Registry data source. However, this additional information will facilitate a better understanding of the specific data we need to collect.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*_oSktGrFkAi-xwTrcEbhvQ.jpeg" /><figcaption><em>Figure 17: ATT&amp;CKcon 2019 Presentation — Ready to ATT&amp;CK? Bring Your Own Data (BYOD) and Validate Your Data Analytics!</em></figcaption></figure><h4>4. Integrate Data Sources into ATT&amp;CK as Objects</h4><p>The key components in ATT&amp;CK — tactics, techniques, and groups — are defined as objects. The image below demonstrates how the technique object is represented within the framework.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*cqYIMZM5wxhWnopdeUWQ7Q.jpeg" /><figcaption>Figure 18: ATT&amp;CK Object Model with Data Source Object</figcaption></figure><p>While data sources have always been a property/field object of a technique, it’s time to convert them into objects, with their own corresponding properties.</p><h4>5. Expand the ATT&amp;CK Data Source Object</h4><p>Once data sources are integrated as objects in the ATT&amp;CK framework, and we establish a structured way to define data sources, we can start identifying additional information or metadata in the form of properties<strong>.</strong></p><p>The table below outlines some initial properties we propose starting off with:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*tkGbWXbDGfe31JV93tXp-A.png" /><figcaption><em>Table 3: Data Modeling Concepts</em></figcaption></figure><p>These initial properties will advance ATT&amp;CK data sources to the next level and open the door to additional information that will facilitate more efficient data collection strategies.</p><h4>6. Extend Data Sources with Data Components</h4><p>Our final proposal is to define data components. The relationships we previously discussed between the data elements related to the data sources (e.g., Process, IP, File, Registry) can be grouped together and provide an additional sub-layer of context to data sources. This concept was developed as part of the <a href="https://github.com/OTRF/OSSEM">Open Source Security Event Metadata (OSSEM)</a> project and presented at ATT&amp;CKcon 2018 and 2019. We refer to this concept as <strong>Data Components</strong>.</p><p><strong>Data Components in action</strong></p><p>In the image below, we extended the concept of Process and defined a few data components including <strong>Process Creation</strong> and <strong>Process Network Connection</strong> to provide additional context. The outlined method is meant to provide a visualization of how to collect from a Process perspective. These data components were created based on relationships among data elements identified in the available data source telemetry.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*m0pYJlcV2Ap5c7CbAYiqkg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Figure 19: Data Components &amp; Relationships Among Data Sources</figcaption></figure><p>The diagram below maps out how ATT&amp;CK could provide information from the data source to the relationships identified among the data elements that define the data source. It’d then be up to you to determine how best to map those data components and relationships to the specific data you collect.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*8T1qZBntj3IDduun3HBpdA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Figure 20: Extending ATT&amp;CK Data Sources</figcaption></figure><h3>What’s Next</h3><p>In the second post of this two-part series, we’ll explore a methodology to help define new ATT&amp;CK data source objects and how to implement the methodology with current data sources. We will also release the output of our initial analysis, where we applied these data modeling concepts to draft a sample of the new proposed data source objects. In the interim, we appreciate those who contributed to the discussions around data sources and we look forward to your additional feedback.</p><p>©2020 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 20–00841–11.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4c39e581454f" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/mitre-attack/defining-attack-data-sources-part-i-4c39e581454f">Defining ATT&amp;CK Data Sources, Part I: Enhancing the Current State</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/mitre-attack">MITRE ATT&amp;CK®</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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